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TITLE: VIETNAM HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES, 1994
AUTHOR: U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DATE: FEBRUARY 1995
VIETNAM
The Socialist Republic of Vietnam (SRV) is a one-party state
controlled by the Vietnamese Communist Party (VCP). The VCP's
constitutionally mandated leading role and the occupancy of
nearly all senior Government positions by Party officials
ensures the primacy of Politburo guidelines. The National
Assembly, chosen in elections in which all candidates are
approved by the Party, remains largely subservient to the VCP.
However, an effort is underway to reduce Party intrusion into
Government operations and Government officials have more
latitude in implementing policy. The Government continued to
restrict individual liberties on national security and other
grounds.
The military is responsible for external defense and has no
direct role in maintaining internal security. The Ministry of
Interior is responsible for internal security, employing a
large border defense force and the police to monitor persons
suspected of involvement in unauthorized political or religious
activities. The Government continued to monitor the general
populace through informants, household registration, and
party-appointed block wardens, but apparently reduced somewhat
the extent of such monitoring to concentrate on those suspected
of engaging, or likely to engage, in political or religious
activities opposed by the Government.
The Government continued the market-oriented economic reforms
begun in 1986 to try to modernize and develop the predominantly
agricultural economy. The reforms have had the greatest impact
in urban areas, where private businesses are increasing, and in
fertile agricultural regions where farmers have incentives to
grow and market their produce. Although Vietnam remains very
poor, particularly in marginal rural areas, the reforms have
helped raise most people's standard of living. Also, private
sector growth has made it more difficult for the Party and the
Government to dominate people's lives, particularly in urban
areas, to the extent they did in the past.
Nonetheless, the Government was responsible for continued human
rights violations in 1994. Vietnamese citizens did not have
the right to change their government or to assemble, associate,
or speak freely. The Government continued to prohibit
establishment of an independent press and independent
organizations. It also maintained its longstanding policy of
not tolerating dissent. Despite some progress in developing a
legal infrastructure, Vietnam does not yet enjoy the rule of
law. The judicial system is not independent, and the judicial
process lacks transparency. However, citizens enjoyed greater
freedom to travel and change their residence, to engage in
economic activity, and to initiate labor strikes. Within
narrow boundaries, the Government tolerated and even welcomed
serious press and public debate and criticism --including
occasional public protest--primarily with regard to corruption
and mismanagement.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
There were no reports of political killings. Little
information is available on the number of deaths in police
custody or on official investigations into such incidents, but
some extrajudicial killings do occur. In at least 2 instances,
killings were acknowledged and legal action was taken against
the perpetrators. The Vietnamese press reported in September
that the Institute of People's Investigation in Quang Ninh
province had decided to take legal action against police
officials in Ha Long City for reportedly beating a suspected
thief to death. In October, following a public outcry, a Hanoi
court tried and convicted policeman for robbing and shooting to
death an innocent passerby.
b. Disappearance
There were no documented incidents of political abductions by
Government security organizations or by antigovernment forces.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
The law prohibits physical abuse and torture. However, there
were credible reports of inhuman treatment in the penal system,
although the lack of access to jails and prisons makes any
conclusive judgments impossible. There were no credible
reports of torture of detainees. Authorities reportedly did
use threats and other psychological coercion to elicit
confessions.
Prison conditions are severe but do not generally threaten the
lives of prisoners. There were credible reports of the use of
forced labor. Prisoners doing hard labor complained that the
diet and health care available at the prisons was insufficient
to sustain their health, especially when they were detained in
remote, disease-ridden areas.
Credible reports indicate that well-known dissident Dr. Doan
Viet Hoat, who is in poor health, was shackled, placed in
solitary confinement, and denied visits from his wife after
refusing to carry out hard labor in a remote prison camp near
the Laotian border. In July prison officials eventually
allowed Dr. Hoat's wife to visit, but she reported she was
given only 15 minutes to see him and said that prison
authorities harassed her. According to unconfirmed reports,
four Buddhist monks imprisoned in Ba Sao reeducation camp near
Hanoi conducted a hunger strike to protest prison conditions.
In both cases, SRV authorities denied the reports but refused
to allow international observers to visit the prisoners.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
Little information is available on the extent to which families
and attorneys have access to criminal and political prisoners.
Anecdotal evidence indicates that they generally are able to
visit. Diplomats had limited access to imprisoned nationals.
The Government continued to arrest and imprison people
arbitrarily. Although the 1989 Criminal Procedure Code
provides for various rights for detainees, including time
limits on pretrial detention and the right to have a lawyer
present during negotiation, in practice authorities often
ignore these legal safeguards.
Law enforcement personnel appear able to arrest and incarcerate
people without presenting arrest warrants. In cases where a
warrant is presented, the procurator rather than an independent
judiciary approves issuance of warrants. Once arrested, people
are often held for indefinite periods without formal charges
and without access to a lawyer. There is no functioning bail
system, and detainees do not have the right to judicial
determination of the legality of their detention. The extent
to which authorities hold detainees incommunicado is unknown.
Two Vietnamese-Americans, Nguyen Tan Tri and Tran Quang Liem,
were arrested in November 1993 for trying to organize a
democracy conference in Ho Chi Minh City. At year's end, they
had not been charged but were still being detained.
Those arrested for peaceful expression of their views are
likely to be charged under any one of several provisions in the
Criminal Code outlawing acts against the State. For example,
authorities arrested Pham Van Quang in December 1992 for waving
the former Republic of Vietnam flag during the Ho Chi Minh City
international marathon. In February 1994, Quang was tried and
convicted of "rebellion" and was sentenced to 15 years
imprisonment. According to press reports, Buddhist monk Vo
Hanh Duc, arrested following disturbances involving Buddhists
in Ba Ria-Vung Tau province in July 1993, was sentenced to 3
years in prison in January for "activities against the law" and
"handing out documents hostile to the Socialist Government of
Vietnam."
There are no reliable figures on the number of political
detainees being held since the Government often does not
publicize arrests and frequently conducts secret trials and
sentencing.
The Government does not use exile as a means of political
control.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
The court system consists of local people's courts, military
tribunals, and the Supreme People's Court, an appellate court.
In addition, local mass organizations are empowered to deal
with minor breaches of law or disputes, and the National
Assembly in late 1993 approved the establishment of economic
courts to hear commercial disputes.
While the Constitution provides for the independence of judges
and jurors, in practice the VCP closely controls the courts at
all levels, selecting judges primarily for political
reliability. Credible reports indicate that Party officials,
including top leaders, instruct courts how to rule on
politically important cases. The procurator determines, based
on a police investigation, whether to prosecute or to release
the accused. The procurator serves as both prosecutor and
supervisor of the trial proceedings. A two-person judging
council, made up of a judge and a people's juror (lay judge),
determines guilt or innocence and also passes sentence on the
convicted. The President appoints judges. The relevant
people's council appoints people's jurors, who are to be people
of high moral standards but who are not required to have legal
training.
Trials are open to the public, although the procurator has the
right to close trials in sensitive cases. Defendants have the
right to be present during their trial, and the defendant or
his lawyer has the right to cross-examine witnesses. Little
information is available on the extent to which defendants and
their lawyers have time to prepare for trials and obtain access
to government evidence. Although Vietnam has made some
progress in establishing a legal system, many judges and other
court officials lack adequate legal training, and the lack of
openness in the judicial process, coupled with judicial
subservience to the executive branch, continue to block the
emergence of a fair and effective judicial system.
There is no reliable information on the total number of
political prisoners in Vietnam. Anti-SRV exile groups have
claimed there are as many as 1,000 political prisoners in the
country; other reliable sources put the figure closer to 200.
The secrecy surrounding the Vietnamese judicial and prison
systems makes it difficult for outside observers to make an
accurate estimate.
Several persons are known to be in prison for peaceful
expression of their views. For example, Doan Thanh Liem is
currently serving a 12-year labor camp sentence for spreading
anti-Socialist propaganda. Truong Hung Thai, arrested with
Liem, is serving an 8-year sentence. Doan Van Hoat is serving
a 15-year sentence for "counterrevolutionary" activity. Human
rights activist Nguyen Dan Que, sentenced to 20 years
imprisonment in 1991, remains in prison despite his poor health.
In 1994 the Government released a number of well-known
political prisoners, including the well-known dissident Quach
Vinh Nien. Nien, who was allowed to join his family abroad,
had been in prison since 1978 serving a life sentence for
"antigovernment activity and disloyalty."
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
The Government continued to operate a nationwide system of
surveillance and control through household registration and
party-appointed block wardens who use informants to keep track
of individual activities. However, many foreign observers
believe this monitoring was done with less scope and efficiency
than in the past, with authorities concentrating on those
suspected of involvement in unauthorized political or religious
activities. Anecdotal evidence suggests Government monitoring
is stricter in the south, especially in Ho Chi Minh City.
Particularly in urban areas, most Vietnamese citizens were free
to contact, talk, and work with foreigners, although many
remained nervous about extensive social contacts.
The Government continued to selectively censor mail, confiscate
packages, and monitor telephone and facsimile transmissions.
In the past, the Party pressed people to belong to one or more
mass organizations, which exist for villages, city districts,
schools, work (trade unions), youth, and women. However, with
the growth of the private sector, these organizations play a
less important role than in the past.
While membership in the VCP remains an aid to advancement in
the Government or in state companies, and vital to promotion to
senior levels of the Government, the Party faced increased
difficulty attracting members. In response, the Government
increased its recruitment efforts and was marginally successful
in attracting new members from the private sector.
The Government continued to implement a family-planning policy
that urges all families to have no more than two children. It
sometimes penalized people who have more than two children by
denying promotions or permission to change jobs.
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
The Constitution provides for freedom of speech and press, but
in practice the Government severaly limits such freedoms. The
Party and the Government tolerated public discussion and even
criticism somewhat more than in the past, though still within
narrow and poorly defined limits. For example, Vietnamese
citizens could and did complain openly about bureaucratic
lethargy, administrative procedures, corruption, and even
economic policy.
However, the Government continued to clamp down on free speech
that questioned the role of the Party, criticized individual
SRV leaders, promoted multiparty democracy, or discussed
sensitive matters such as human rights. For example, credible
nongovernmental organizations (NGO's) reported that in March,
the authorities arrested Nguyen Ho, a southern Party figure,
for writing and circulating an article calling for greater
democracy and respect for human rights in Vietnam. In poor
health, he was released in June and at year's end remained at
home under surveillance.
The Government did not use systematic prior censorship to
control the media, but Party guidance was pervasive, and
national security legislation remained sufficiently broad to
ensure effective self-censorship in the domestic media. The
Government continued to control the domestic print media, but
new newspapers were approved for publication and investigative
reporting of corruption and mismanagement increased. In
addition, there was some debate on economic policy with
political overtones. Restrictions against new publications by
dissident writers remained in force.
The Party and the Government continued to control the broadcast
media and did not normally permit the broadcast of opposing
views. The Government made no effort to limit access to
international radio or television, which many Vietnamese listen
to regularly. Vietnamese television and radio frequently
carried interviews with and speeches by foreigners, including
diplomats and businessmen, and foreign publications continued
to be widely available. Although the Government announced its
intention to control satellite dishes more strictly, they
appear to be proliferating. Foreign journalists must be
approved by the Foreign Ministry's press center. The center
monitors their activities and decides on a case-by-case basis
whether to send a press center representative to accompany
journalists covering specific events.
The trend toward increased information flow appeared to extend
into the university system. Foreign scholars working
temporarily at Vietnamese universities said they were able to
discuss freely a wide range of issues, including human rights,
in the classroom. Vietnamese academic publications, however,
usually reflect the views of the Party and the Government.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
The Government restricts the right of assembly in law and
practice. People wishing to gather in a group are required to
apply for a permit, which local authorities can deny
arbitrarily. However, people routinely gathered in an informal
groups. The Government does not usually interfere as long as
the gatherings are not organized. Normally, the Government
does not permit demonstrations or meetings for political
purposes, but has been more tolerant than in the past of
occasional popular demonstrations about specific grievances
against local officials. With few exceptions, the Government
prohibits the establishment of private, independent
organizations, insisting that individuals work within
established, party-controlled organizations. Vietnamese
citizens cannot establish independent political parties,
religious organizations, labor unions, business or veterans'
organizations.
c. Freedom of Religion
Although the Constitution provides for freedom of worship, the
Government continued to restrict religious organizations
significantly. The Party forbids its officials to adhere to a
religion, although it appears to have relaxed enforcement of
this rule. The Government continued to ease restrictions on
the practice of religion in 1994.
The Party and the Government continued policies designed to
control religious hierarchies and organized religious
activities, in part because the Government perceives that
religion may threaten the Party's monopoly of influence. All
religious groups report continued difficulties in obtaining
teaching materials, expanding religious training facilities,
and publishing materials.
The Government requires all Buddhist monks to work under the
Government-controlled Buddhist organization's umbrella. The
Government has actively suppressed recent efforts by the
Unified Buddhist Church of Vietnam (UBCV) to operate outside of
Government control. The Government has arrested Buddhists who
have pushed for an independent organization, and it has harshly
criticized the UBCV in a series of speeches and publications,
calling it a tool of reactionary exiles.
The tension between the Government and the UBCV, which had
escalated in 1993 with public demonstrations and the arrest of
Buddhist monks and followers in Hue and Ba Ria-Vung Tau
province, continued in 1994. The UBCV's leader, the Venerable
Thich Huyen Quang, called on his followers to step up their
fight against the Government's domination of religion. Despite
SRV claims to the contrary, credible reports indicated that
Quang remained under house arrest in Quang Ngai province for
most of the year. In late December, Buddhist organizations
abroad reported that the Venerable Thich Huyen Quang and the
Venerable Thich Quang Do had been arrested for their
activities. Four monks imprisoned in 1993 after disturbances
in Hue reportedly began a hunger strike at the Ba Sao
reeducation camp. There was also an unconfirmed report that in
July the Venerable Thich Hunh Duc began a hunger strike in
Phuoclo prison in Ba Ria to protest his prison sentence and the
postponement of his appeal. Subsequently, his appeal was
rescheduled and his sentence reaffirmed.
In a marked improvement from the 1980's, people appear free to
attend worship services, and attendance at religious services
continued to increase. Catholic churches in Hanoi and Ho Chi
Minh City, as well as Buddhist temples and Hoa Hao and Cao Dai
edifices in the south, appear active. Also, in July the
Government issued Directive 1379 which called for the
authorities to allow the restoration of places of religious
worship, allow the printing of religious books in accordance
with the law, and create favorable conditions for religious
denominations to train their missionaries at religious training
centers approved by the Government. It is unclear what impact
this Directive will have on religious freedom.
The Government has sought to control the Catholic Church
hierarchy in Vietnam, in part by requiring all clergy to belong
to the government-controlled Catholic Patriotic Association.
It has also insisted on its right to approve Vatican
appointments, and as a result key church positions remained
unfilled for long periods. The Vatican has acceded to the
Government's demand that it approve Vatican appointments. As a
result, increasing numbers of vacant clerical positions were
filled, including bishops and archbishops.
In mid-1994 the Vatican and the SRV reached agreement on the
appointments of Bishop Tung of Bac Ninh to be Archbishop of
Hanoi and Nguyen Nhu The as Apostolic Administrator for the
Archdiocese of Hue. The Vactican's reassignment of Bishop
Nguyen Van Thuan opens the way to appoint a successor to the
ailing Bishop of Ho Chi Minh City. The Government has slightly
eased some restrictions on Catholic Church activities while
maintaining control of its hierarchy and restricting training
of new clergy. In March the Government declared that bishops
and priests could travel freely in their dioceses and that
priests released from reeducation camps could carry out
religious duties if local authorities agreed. Five training
seminaries are now open, with 120-150 students. All students
must be approved by the Government, both upon entering the
seminary and prior to ordination as priests.
The Christian Missionary Alliance of Vietnam, the only
government-approved Protestant organization in the country,
enjoyed slightly greater freedom. Church attendance grew
despite continued Government restrictions on proselytizing
activities. NGO's reported the arrest of several Hmong
protestants for proselytizing in northern Vietnamese villages.
The Government has allowed the Alliance to open a Bible college
in Danang and to reestablish ties with foreign religious groups.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
Most citizens enjoyed greater freedom to travel within the
country. In general, the Government no longer requires permits
to travel across provincial lines and in practice enforces few
restrictions on internal travel. However, there were credible
reports of members of ethnic minorities being required to
obtain permission from local authorities to travel outside of
certain highland areas. Officially, citizens must obtain
permission to change their residence, but many people have done
so without approval. Foreigners are free to travel throughout
the country. Foreigners are generally free to travel througout
the country, although the Government must approve travel by
foreigners to border areas, some areas in the central
highlands, and some islands. Local authorities have sometimes
been willing to allow foreigners to travel to the border
without permission.
The Government still requires citizens traveling abroad to
obtain exit visas but is more willing to grant those visas than
in the past. For example, the well-known dissident writer,
Dinh Thu Huong, was allowed for the first time to travel to
conferences in Europe in the fall. However, not everyone is
allowed to travel abroad. For example, members of Vietnam's
small Muslim community have not been allowed to leave the
country to make the hajj.
The Government continued to permit emigration for some
categories of Vietnamese. The U.S. Orderly Departure Program
continued to resettle beneficiaries, including Amerasians,
former reeducation camp detainees, and family unification
cases, at the rate of about 4,000 persons per month. Other
nations operate smaller resettlement programs for Vietnamese
nationals. There are some concerns that members of minority
ethnic groups, particularly highland peoples such as the
Montagnards, may not have ready access to these programs.
The Government generally permits Vietnamese who emigrate to
return to visit but it considers them citizens and therefore
subject to Vietnamese law even if they have adopted another
country's citizenship. Because it regards overseas Vietnamese
both as a valuable potential source of foreign exchange and
expertise and as a potential security threat, the Government
generally encourages them to visit Vietnam, whether they
emigrated legally or illegally, but at the same time it
monitors them carefully.
In 1989 Vietnam signed a memorandum of understanding with the
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) to
increase acceptance of voluntary repatriates, provided there
was financial assistance. The agreement included a commitment
by Vietnam to waive prosecution and punitive measures for
illegal departure from Vietnam of persons who return under the
UNHCR voluntary repatriation program. Vietnam also agreed to
permit the UNHCR to monitor the returnees through direct
visits. This agreement has resulted in a substantial flow of
repatriates from several countries to Vietnam. More than
65,000 Vietnamese have returned voluntarily. The UNHCR, which
extensively monitors those who have repatriated voluntarily,
reported that they do not face retribution or official
discrimination.
Although the source of refugees itself in the past, Vietnam has
also been the country of first asylum for Cambodian refugees,
mainly ethnic Chinese, but also ethnic Vietnamese. The
Government has worked closely with the UNHCR in repatriating
those desiring to return to Cambodia. There were no reports of
forced repatriation.
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government
Citizens are not free to change their government. All
authority and political power is vested in the VCP; political
opposition and other political parties are not tolerated. The
Central Committee is the supreme decisionmaking body in the
nation, and the Politburo is the locus of policymaking. The
Secretariat of the Central Committee oversees day-to-day
implementation of leadership directives. Debate and criticism
are limited to certain aspects of individual, state, or Party
performance determined by the VCP itself. No public challenge
to the legitimacy of the one-party state, or even debate on
this subject, is permitted.
Citizens elect the members of the National Assembly, ostensibly
the chief legislative body, although the VCP approves all
candidates. The National Assembly engaged in increasingly
vigorous debate on economic and social issues, but it remained
largely subservient to the VCP. Legislators rewrote laws,
questioned ministries, and occasionally rejected draft
legislation. However, Party officials occupy most senior
Government positions and continued to have final say on key
issues.
The law provides the opportunity for equal participation in
politics by women and minority groups, but in practice they are
underrepresented. Most of the senior leaders, including all 17
members of the Politburo, are male. The President of the
National Assembly, who is also a Politburo member, is a member
of an ethnic minority.
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
of Human Rights
The Government does not permit private human rights
organizations to form or operate and generally prohibits
private citizens from contacting international human rights
organizations. It has permitted international visitors to
monitor implementation of its repatriation commitments under
the Comprehensive Plan of Action agreed on at the 1989 Geneva
Conference, and it has carried on a limited dialog with human
rights organizations. In October a delegation from the UNHRC
was permitted to visit prisons; a report is expected in early
1995.
The Government has shown increased willingness to discuss human
rights issues bilaterally with other governments if such
discussions take place under the rubric of "exchanges of ideas"
rather than "investigations." However, in July it canceled the
visit of an Australian human rights delegation when an ethnic
Vietnamese member of that delegation said publicly that the
group would be "investigating" the human rights situation in
Vietnam.
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Disability, Language, or Social Status
People released from reeducation camps have reported varying
levels of discrimination in the areas of housing and
education. They generally are not eligible to regain their
citizenship rights until 1 year after their release. They and
their families are not allowed employment with the Government,
though this was less a factor in 1994 than in the past because
of the growth of the private sector.
Women
While there is no legal discrimination, women face deeply
engrained social discrimination. Despite extensive provisions
in the Constitution, legislation, and regulations that mandate
equal treatment, few women can compete with men for higher
status positions. The Government has not enforced the
constitutional provision that women and men must receive equal
pay for equal work. Despite the large body of legislation and
regulations devoted to the protection of women's rights in
marriage, the workplace, and the new labor law calling for the
preferential treatment of women, these legal pronouncements are
distant from the reality for many, if not most, women.
Although the law addresses the issue of domestic violence,
there is credible evidence that these laws are not enforced. A
1993 report by a Vietnamese researcher stated that domestic
violence has grown in recent years. Some international NGO
workers as well as many Vietnamese women have commented that
domestic violence against women is common. Most divorces are
due to domestic violence. Many women remain in abusive
marriages rather than confront the stigma of divorce. These
problems tend to be more prevalent in rural than in urban
areas.
Children
Reputable international organizations, including the United
Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), commended the Government's
interest in children's issues and its promotion of child
welfare. The Government has continued a nationwide
immunization campaign, and the government-controlled press
regularly stresses the importance of health and education for
all children. Despite some success, UNICEF estimates there are
still 3 million children living in "especially difficult
circumstances." There is no information on the extent of child
abuse.
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities
Although the Government says it is opposed to discrimination
against ethnic minorities, there continued to be credible
reports that some local officials restricted ethnic minority
access to education, employment, and travel, both internal and
foreign. The Government continued to implement policies
designed to narrow the gap in the standard of living between
ethnic groups living in the highlands and lowland ethnic
Vietnamese by providing preferential treatment to domestic and
foreign companies investing in highland areas. There is no
information available on whether repression of some highland
minorities for suspected ties with resistance groups, reported
in the past, continued in 1994.
People with Disabilities
The Government provides little official protection or support
for the disabled, and there are no laws mandating access for
the disabled. However, the 1994 Labor Law calls on the State
to protect the right and encourage the employment of the
disabled and includes provisions for preferential treatment for
firms that recruit disabled persons for training or
apprenticeship and a special levy on firms that do not employ
disabled workers. It is not yet clear whether the Government
has begun to enforce these provisions. The Government has
permitted international groups to assist those who have been
disabled by war or by subsequent accidents involving unexploded
ordinance.
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
Workers are not free to form or join unions of their own
choosing unless they have obtained approval from the local
trade union federation office. The party-controlled Vietnam
General Confederation of Labor (VGCI) is the umbrella
organization under which all local trade unions must operate.
The Labor Law requires provincial trade union organizations to
establish unions at all new enterprises as well as at existing
enterprises that currently operate without trade unions.
Management of union-affiliated companies is required to accept
and cooperate with those unions. However, most joint ventures
and small, private companies, especially at the retail level,
do not have unions.
The June 1994 Labor Law provides for the right to strike under
certain circumstances. It calls for management and labor to
resolve labor disputes through the enterprise's own labor
conciliation council. If that fails, the matter goes to the
provincial labor arbitration council. If the council's
decision is unsatisfactory, unions have the right to appeal to
the provincial people's court or to strike. However, the law
prohibits strikes at enterprises that serve the public and at
those that are important to the national economy or to national
security and defense, as defined by the Government. It also
grants the Prime Minister the right to suspend a strike
considered detrimental to the national economy or to public
safety.
A number of strikes occurred in 1994, primarily against
foreign-owned companies but also involving state-owned and
private firms as well. The Government tolerated the strikes,
even though some occurred before the new Labor Law made them
legal. The new Labor Law prohibits retribution against
strikers, and there have been no credible reports of such
retribution.
Unions are not legally free to, and do not in practice, join,
affiliate with, or participate in international labor bodies.
However, in 1992, Vietnam rejoined the International Labor
Organization, from which it had withdrawn in 1985.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
Workers have the right to organize unions in their enterprises,
but they must be approved by the local union leadership. They
also can bargain collectively through the party-approved unions
at their enterprises. In the past, the Government generally
set wages, since most people worked for state companies. With
the growth of the private sector and the increased autonomy of
state firms, a growing percentage of companies are setting
wages through collective bargaining with the relevant unions,
and market forces play a much more important role in
determining wages. Antiunion discrimination on the part of
employers against employees seeking to organize is forbidden in
the labor code.
The Government has approved formation of a number of export
processing zones and new industrial zones, which are governed
by the same labor laws as apply to the rest of the country.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
The new Labor Law prohibits all forms of forced labor, and
there have been no reports of such practices, except in some
detention facilities.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
The Labor Law sets the minimum age for employment at 15.
Children as young as 13 can register at trade training centers,
which are a form of vocational training. Vietnam also has
compulsory education laws. These laws are not effectively
enforced, especially in rural areas where children are needed
to farm. However, the Vietnamese culture's strong emphasis on
education leads most people to send their children to school,
rather than to work.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
The Labor Law requires the Government to set a minimum wage,
which changes with inflation and other economic changes. The
Government does not publicize minimum wage rates. The minimum
wage, including for those working for joint ventures, is by
itself insufficient to provide a worker and his family with a
decent standard of living. However, many workers receive
subsidized housing, bonuses, and also supplement their incomes
by engaging in entrepreneurial activities. The Government
enforces the minimum wage at foreign and major Vietnamese
firms. It has little control over other wages.
The Labor Law sets working hours at a maximum of 8 per day and
48 per week, with a mandatory 24-hour break each week. Any
additional hours require overtime pay, and the law limits
compulsory overtime. It is not clear how well the Government
enforces these provisions.
The Labor Law calls on the Government to promulgate rules and
regulations to ensure worker safety. The Ministry of Labor, in
coordination with local people's committees and labor unions,
is charged with enforcing the regulations. In practice,
enforcement is inadequate because of the Ministry's
insufficient resources. Anecdotal evidence indicates that
workers, through labor unions, have been more effective in
forcing changes in working conditions than has the Government.
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[end of document]
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