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TITLE: INDONESIA HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES, 1994
AUTHOR: U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DATE: FEBRUARY 1995
INDONESIA
The Indonesian political system, despite a surface adherence to
democratic forms, remains strongly authoritarian. President
Soeharto, now in his sixth 5-year term, a small group of
advisers, and the military dominate the political life of this
heavily populated developing country, whose people come from
hundreds of different cultural, linguistic, and ethnic
backgrounds. The Government requires allegiance to a state
ideology known as "Pancasila," which includes belief in a
supreme god, a just and civilized humanity, national unity,
democracy, and social justice. It has used Pancasila as a
justification for restricting the development of opposition
elements.
Under a doctrine of "dual function," the military is given
special civic rights and responsibilities, including unelected
military seats in Parliament (DPR) and local legislatures, in
addition to its defense and security roles. The 450,000-member
armed forces, including 175,000 police, consider the
maintenance of internal security as their primary mission, and
they have traditionally acted swiftly to suppress perceived
threats to security, whether from criminal acts, separatist
movements, or allegedly subversive activities, with a vigor
that has often led to human rights abuses. A few military
leaders sometimes raised questions about the validity of this
"security approach." There continued to be numerous, credible
reports of human rights abuses by the military and police,
although they exhibited some restraint in controlling crowds
and demonstrations.
In contrast to its restrictive political system, Indonesia has
an increasingly open and deregulated economy. Though still a
poor country, Indonesia's economy continued to expand in 1994,
especially in manufacturing, with gross domestic product
expected to increase by 6.7 percent. With inflation remaining
under control, the continued economic growth has produced
steady gains in living standards for much of Indonesian
society. The number of people living below the poverty line
has fallen from 70 million in 1970 to 27 million in 1990.
Income inequality has been slightly reduced over the past
quarter century. Widespread unemployment persists, however, as
do corruption and influence peddling.
The Government continued to commit serious human rights abuses
and in some areas, notably freedom of expression, it became
markedly more repressive, departing from a long-term trend
towards greater openness. The most serious abuses included the
continuing inability of the people to change their government
and harsh repression of East Timorese dissidents. Reports of
extrajudicial killings declined. Security forces continued to
torture those in custody: some sources reported that the use
of torture declined, but definitive statistics are not
available. Extrajudicial arrests and detentions continued, as
did the use of excessive violence in dealing with suspected
criminals or perceived troublemakers.
The Government imposed severe limitations on freedoms of
speech, press, and assembly, and suppressed efforts to develop
a free trade union movement. The armed forces continued to be
responsible for the most serious human rights abuses. Some
military leaders showed a willingness to admit misconduct
publicly and take action against offenders. The Government in
a few cases brought abusers to justice, but their punishment
rarely matched the severity of the abuse. The judiciary
continued to be largely subservient to the executive branch and
the military. Widespread corruption in the legal system
remained a serious problem.
The Government withdrew the licenses of three leading
publications. It prepared but has not issued a draft
presidential decree that would restrict further the activities
of nongovernmental organizations (NGO's), and it increasingly
cracked down on antigovernmental critics, labor activists, and
alleged criminals during the year, including in an anticrime
campaign dubbed "Operation Cleanup" by the Government. These
constraints, however, did not completely dampen dissenting
voices in the media, and the many human rights NGO's continued
to be active. The government-appointed National Human Rights
Commission established in 1993 showed some independence and a
willingness to criticize government policies and actions.
On East Timor, no progress was made in accounting for the
missing persons following the 1991 Dili incident, and troop
levels remained unjustifiably high. Somewhat greater access
was permitted to foreign journalists and others, including a
July visit by the United Nations Special Rapporteur on Summary,
Arbitrary and Extra-judicial Executions, although some NGO
representatives and foreign journalists continued to encounter
difficulties or were denied access to East Timor.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killings
Historically, politically motivated extrajudicial killings
generally have occurred most frequently in areas where
separatist movements were active, such as East Timor, Aceh, and
Irian Jaya. Although security forces continue to employ harsh
measures against separatist movements in these three areas,
there were no confirmed reports of politically motivated
extrajudicial killings in 1994.
However, there were reports of security forces killing armed
insurgents including six Aceh Merdeka supporters in clashes in
Aceh. At least four members of the security forces were also
reported killed in these clashes. Reliable civilian sources
reported that in East Timor security forces killed several
Timorese civilians. The number of such reports was lower than
in previous years, however. There were no reports of such
killings in Irian Jaya.
Troop strength in East Timor declined in 1994. Reliable
estimates indicated that about 6,000 army troops from outside
the province reinforced the normal garrison of about 3,000.
There are also about 3,000 police in East Timor. Commanders
there have stated that they intend to review the level of
troops in the province for possible further reductions on a
twice yearly basis. The Government offered a general amnesty
to members of the Timorese resistance who surrender their arms,
and it was reported to have released some who were apprehended
rather than trying them.
The police often employ excessive force in apprehending
suspects or coping with alleged criminals. In Jakarta police
in April mounted an anticrime program dubbed "Operation
Cleanup," in which they employed deadly force against
suspects. In response to protests that the methods used are
unjustifiably harsh and amount to execution without trial,
police have generally claimed that the suspects were fleeing,
resisting arrest, or threatening the police. Although accurate
statistics were unavailable, the number of fatal shootings by
police seemed to be increasing, with some 150 incidents
reported in West Java (including Jakarta) by mid-July. Human
rights groups were particularly concerned that this cleanup
campaign was intensified in the weeks leading up to the
Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum (APEC) meeting in
November. In North Sumatra, 80 shootings by police, including
4 deaths, were reported by mid-December.
In the past the authorities almost never took action against
police for using excessive force. However, there is some
indication that the situation is improving, although action
taken by the authorities is still not commensurate with the
gravity of police abuses. For example, a military court in
Medan sentenced a policeman accused of killing a suspect in
1993, who was allegedly trying to escape, to 3 months in prison
in 1994. In March a military court sentenced four policemen in
Palembang to prison terms of 2 to 3 months for shooting, but
not killing, a suspect at close range. The five police
officers detained in 1993 in North Sumatra in connection with
the death of Syamsul Bahri were not tried, apparently because
the family did not pursue the case. At least one of the 10
police cadets accused of beating a man to death in Kupang in
April was sentenced to 2 years in prison. At year's end the
military claimed to be still investigating the September 1993
killings by security forces of four demonstrators who were
peacefully protesting construction of a dam in Madura; some two
dozen police and military personnel are involved. Residents
from the area met with representatives of the National Human
Rights Commission in May and December to request legal action
against civilians and military personnel accused of involvement
in the shootings.
b. Disappearance
There were no politically motivated abductions. Security
forces in areas of conflict often hold suspects for long
periods without formal charges, but these cases usually end
with official acknowledgement of detention (see Section l.d.).
Reliable sources report that all those alleged to have
disappeared during the mid-July disturbances at the University
of East Timor have been located.
Government efforts to account for the missing and dead from the
November 12, 1991 military shooting of civilians in Dili, East
Timor, remained inadequate. No additional cases of those still
listed as missing in a report the military gave to Human Rights
Watch/Asia were resolved during the year. Government spokesmen
implied that their failure to locate those missing was
primarily due to those persons wishing to evade detection.
Many knowledgeable observers, however, continued to believe
that most of the missing are dead and that some members of the
armed forces know where their bodies are located.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
The Criminal Code makes it a crime punishable by up to 4 years
in prison for any official to use violence or force to elicit a
confession, and it establishes pretrial procedures to give
suspects or their families the right to challenge the legality
of an arrest or detention. In practice, security forces
continued to employ torture and other forms of mistreatment,
particularly in regions of security concerns such as Aceh and
East Timor, although some sources reported that the use of
torture declined. Legal protections are both inadequate and
widely ignored. According to the January, 1994 report of the
Special Rapporteur on Torture to the United Nations Human
Rights Commission, the most commonly used methods are: beating
on the head, shins, and torso with fists, lengths of wood, iron
bars, bottles, rocks, and electric cables; kicking with heavy
boots; burning with lighted cigarettes; electric shocks;
slashing with razor blades and knives; death threats, faked
executions and deliberate wounding with firearms; pouring water
through the nose; prolonged immersion in fetid water; hanging
upside down by the feet; placing heavy objects on knees and
other joints; isolation; sleep and food deprivation and genital
mutilation, sexual molestation, and rape. Civilian sources in
East Timor report that security agencies still employ torture
before releasing suspects to police custody, particularly
electric shocks, though its incidence has decreased.
Police often resort to physical abuses even in minor incidents,
and prison conditions are harsh, with violence among prisoners
and mistreatment and extortion of inmates by guards reportedly
common. The incidence of mistreatment by prison officials
drops sharply once a prisoner has been transferred from police
or military custody into the civilian prison system, and prison
conditions generally have improved in recent years. Officials
have publicly condemned police brutality and harsh prison
conditions and occasionally instigate disciplinary action,
including transfer, dismissal, and trials leading to prison.
In August a civilian employed at a Medan jail was tried on
charges of causing the death of an inmate who died from
injuries sustained in a beating. He was sentenced to 6 months
in jail. Such actions, however, are an exception to the rule
of general impunity.
Political prisoners are usually mixed with the general prison
population, although in the Cipinang prison in Jakarta
high-profile political prisoners are segregated. In 1994 the
Government allowed the International Committee of the Red Cross
(ICRC) to visit prisoners in Cipinang in Jakarta and also
granted access to prisons elsewhere in Java, Sumatra, Aceh, and
other provinces as well as EasT Timor. The Government also has
allowed the ICRC to organize family visits to political
prisoners. In January the authorities suspended visitation
rights for jailed East Timorese Fretilin leader Xanana Gusmao
for 1 month following release of a letter he sent to the
International Commission of Jurists which Indonesian
authorities deemed objectionable.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
The Criminal Procedures Code contains provisions against
arbitrary arrest and detention which are routinely violated.
The Code specifies the right of prisoners to notify their
families, and that warrants must be produced during an arrest
except under specified conditions, such as when a suspect is
caught in the act of committing a crime. It also authorizes
investigators to issue warrants to assist in their
investigations or if sufficient evidence exists that a crime
has been committed. Despite these requirements, authorities
sometimes make arrests without warrants. Some persons
suspected of involvement in the Medan riots in April were
arrested before formal warrants were issued.
The law presumes defendants innocent and permits bail. They or
their families may also challenge the legality of their arrest
and detention in a pretrial hearing and may sue for
compensation if wrongfully detained. However, it is virtually
impossible for detainees to invoke this procedure, let alone
receive compensation, after being released without charge. In
both military and civilian courts, appeals based on legality of
arrest and detention are rarely, if ever, accepted. The Code
also contains specific limits on periods of pretrial detention
and specifies when the courts must get involved to approve
extensions, usually after 60 days.
In areas where active guerrilla movements exist, such as East
Timor and Aceh, people are routinely detained without warrants,
charges, or court proceedings. Bail is rarely granted,
especially in political cases. The authorities frequently
prevent access to defense counsel and make it difficult or
impossible for detainees to get legal assistance from voluntary
legal defense organizations. The authorities routinely approve
extensions of periods of detention. In addition, suspects
charged under the 1963 Antisubversion Law are subject to
special procedures outside the Criminal Procedures Code which
allow, for example, the Attorney General the authority to hold
a suspect up to 1 year before trial. He may renew this 1-year
period without limit. Special laws on corruption, economic
crimes, and narcotics are similarly exempt from the Code's
protections.
The Agency for Coordination of Assistance for the Consolidation
of National Security (BAKORSTANAS) operates outside the Code
and has wide discretion to detain and interrogate persons
thought to threaten national security. It is impossible to
state the exact number of arbitrary arrests or detentions
without trial but in March 59 people being held in connection
with the 1989-91 Aceh insurgency were released without charges
or trials, bringing the total number released since 1990 to
around 965 persons. Many had been held incommunicado without
knowing the charges against them; some, including at least five
of those released in 1994, had been held for over 2 years. The
authorities require many of those released to report back at
regular intervals. Three other Acehnese convicted previously
of subversion were released in 1994 after serving two-thirds of
their sentences. The decline in armed separatist activity led
to fewer detentions, and fewer than 100 Acehnese were believed
to be in detention without trial at year's end. An additional
five persons were sentenced for subversion in Aceh in 1994, and
the trials of five others on charges of subversion and
narcotics smuggling were scheduled to begin in mid-December.
In East Timor military authorities continued the practice of
detaining people without charges for short periods and then
requiring them to report daily or weekly to police after their
release. Three East Timorese students detained by police in
August for bringing forbidden books and foreign items into the
province were released, but two of them are required to report
to the authorities. Six East Timorese who received lengthy
sentences in connection with the November 1991 shootings in
Dili were transferred to the maximum security prison in
Semarang without prior notice to their families or humanitarian
organizations, and their whereabouts were unknown for several
days. Jose Antonio Neves, an acknowledged member of the
clandestine proindependence movement, and in detention since
May, was charged with sedition in September. His defense
attorney asked for dismissal of the charges, citing procedural
flaws in Neves' arrest. They also allege that police denied
him access to legal representation for the first 2 months of
his detention. Around 100 people were arrested during
demonstrations and outbreaks of violence in Dili around the
time of the November APEC meetings. Some remained in custody
at year's end.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
The Constitution stipulates the independence of the judiciary,
but in practice the judiciary is subordinated to the executive
and the military, and in many cases procedural protections,
including those against coerced confessions, are inadequate to
ensure a fair trial. A quadripartite judiciary of general,
religious, military, and administrative courts exists below the
Supreme Court. The right of appeal from district court to high
court to Supreme Court exists in all four systems of justice.
The Supreme Court does not consider factual aspects of a case,
only the lower courts' application of law. A three-judge panel
conducts trials at the district court level, poses questions,
hears evidence, decides guilt or innocence, and assesses
punishment. Initial judgments are rarely reversed in the
appeals process, although sentences are sometimes increased or
reduced (both the defense and the prosecution may appeal). In
1994 for example, the 4-year sentence of a student tried in
Jakarta for insulting the President in leaflets he distributed
near the Parliament in November 1993 was increased to 5 years
upon appeal of the prosecutor. The relatively light (6 months)
sentences of 21 other students who were also convicted of
insulting the President during demonstrations at Parliament in
December 1993 were increased to between 8 and 14 months
following appeal by the prosecutor. In August the Supreme
Court ordered the release of those among the 21 students whose
sentences had been raised to 8 months when they were still
being held a week following completion of their sentences.
Defendants have the right to confront witnesses and to produce
witnesses in their defense. An exception is allowed in cases
in which distance or expense is deemed excessive for
transporting witnesses to court. In such cases, sworn
affidavits may be introduced. However, the Criminal Procedures
Code does not provide for witnesses' immunity or for compulsory
process of defense witnesses. As a result, witnesses are
sometimes too afraid of retribution to testify against the
authorities.
In cases tried under the 1963 Antisubversion Law, trials in
absentia are permitted and public access generally requires
advance approval by the military. The courts commonly allow
forced confessions and limit the presentation of defense
evidence. For example, the court trying the suspects in the
Marsinah murder admitted their confessions into evidence and
convicted them of the murder, even though the defendants
claimed that their confessions had been obtained by coercion
and torture. The court allowed defense attorneys for the
student mentioned above whose sentence was raised to 5 years on
appeal, to call only one out of 17 witnesses they wished to
present. Mochtar Pakpahan was not allowed to call expert legal
witnesses in his defense (see Section 6). Defendants do not
have the right to remain silent and can be compelled to testify
in their own trials.
The Criminal Procedures Code gives defendants the right to an
attorney from the moment of their arrest through the
investigation and trial. The law requires that a lawyer must
be appointed in capital cases and those involving a prison
sentence of 15 years or more. In cases involving potential
sentences of 5 years or more, a lawyer must be appointed if the
defendant desires an attorney and is indigent. In theory
destitute defendants may obtain private legal help, such as
that provided by the Legal Aid Institute. In practice,
however, defendants are often persuaded not to hire an
attorney, or access to an attorney of their choice is impeded.
The authorities reportedly pressured several defendants tried
in Medan on charges stemming from labor unrest in April, which
turned into anti-Chinese riots, to decline attorneys, while
some attorneys involved in the cases were subjected to official
harassment of various kinds. Five East Timorese sentenced to
20 months imprisonment for publicly expressing anti-Indonesian
sentiments during a banner-waving incident in the presence of
foreign journalists were not represented by counsel.
Authorities claim they declined the right to counsel, while
nongovernmental sources indicated access to counsel was
impeded, and that the defense lawyers were not notified in
advance of their appearance in court that sentencing was to
begin.
The Supreme Court theoretically stands coequal with the
executive and legislative branches, but it does not have the
right of judicial review over laws passed by Parliament. The
Supreme Court has not yet exercised its power (held since 1985)
to review ministerial decrees and regulations. In 1993 Chief
Justice Purwoto Gandasubrata laid out judicial procedures for
limited judicial review, and some cases of this kind were
initiated in 1994. Judges are civil servants employed by the
executive branch, which controls their assignments, pay, and
promotion. They are subject to considerable pressure from
military and other governmental authorities. Such control
often determines the outcome of a case. Corruption permeates
the legal system. In civil and criminal cases, the payment of
bribes can influence prosecution, conviction, and sentencing.
To address this problem, the Government announced that the
salaries of judges would be doubled as of January 1, 1995.
The Supreme Court bowed to government pressure in a
longstanding land dispute between the central Java government
and 34 farmers who had been forced to sell their land for the
construction of the Kedungombo dam, a development project
funded by the World Bank. The villagers sued for increased
compensation. The Supreme Court initially overturned decisions
of both the Semarang district court and the central Java high
court in favor of the Government, awarding the plaintiffs even
greater compensation than they had sought, including
"nonmaterial losses." However, the Supreme Court later
reversed its own ruling after the Government refused to accept
it and asked the Court to review it again.
In an unusual move in November, the East Java High Court
overturned the conviction of the reputed mastermind of the
Marsinah murder for insufficient evidence. The Government has
appealed the decision to the Supreme Court despite provisions
of the Criminal Code which disallow an appeal in such
circumstances.
For the fourth consecutive year, there was a decline in the
number of persons prosecuted under the 1963 Antisubversion Law,
which carries a maximum penalty of death. The authorities
tried at least five persons in 1994 under the Law for
subversion in Aceh and sentenced them to from 19 to 20 years'
imprisonment. The Antisubversion Law makes it a crime to
engage in acts that could distort, undermine, or deviate from
the state ideology or broad outlines of state policy, or which
could disseminate feelings of hostility or arouse hostility,
disturbances, or anxiety among the population. The excessively
vague language makes it possible to prosecute people merely for
peaceful expression of views contrary to those of the
Government.
The Government does not make available statistics on the number
of people currently serving subversion sentences or sentences
classified as felonies under the so-called Hate-Sowing or
Sedition laws. Informed sources estimate the number of people
serving sentences for subversion in 1994, including members of
the banned Communist Party of Indonesia (PKI), Muslim
militants, and those convicted of subversion in Irian Jaya,
Aceh, and East Timor, at around 300. Scores, and possibly
hundreds, more were believed to be serving sentences under the
Hate-Sowing or Sedition laws. Some of these persons advocated
or employed violence, but many are political prisoners who were
convicted for attempting to exercise such universally
recognized human rights as freedom of speech or association or
who were convicted in manifestly unfair trials. Six prisoners
convicted of subversion remained under death sentence. Five of
these were associated with the Indonesian Communist party, are
78 or more years old, and have been imprisoned for 29 years.
In June two students convicted of subversion in 1993 for
possessing banned literature and participating in illegal
discussion groups were granted conditional release after
serving two-thirds of their sentences. Three alleged members
of Aceh Merdeka convicted of subversion were released after
serving lengthy sentences.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
Judicial warrants for searches are required except for cases
involving suspected subversion, economic crimes, and
corruption. However, security agencies regularly make forced
or surreptitious entries. They also intimidate by surveillance
of persons and residences and selective monitoring of local and
international telephone calls without legal restraint.
Government security officials monitor the movements and
activities of former members of the PKI and its front
organizations, especially persons the Government believes were
involved in the abortive 1965 Communist-backed coup. The
Government stated in late 1990 that this latter group then
totaled 1,410,333 people. These persons and their relatives
sometimes are subject to surveillance, required check-ins,
periodic indoctrination, and restrictions on travel outside
their city of residence. Their legally required identification
cards carry the initials "E.T." which stand for "Ex-Tapol," or
former political prisoner, which readily identifies them to
prospective employers or government officials.
The Government's transmigration program which moved large
numbers of people from overpopulated islands to more isolated
and backward ones has been criticized by nongovernmental human
rights monitors. They say that it not only violates the rights
of indigenous people but also those of the transmigrants,
claiming that they are frequently duped into leaving their home
villages without any means of return (see Section 5.).
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
The trend toward greater openness and freedom of expression in
the press, which began in 1993 and continued through the first
half of 1994, suffered a serious setback on June 21 when the
Government revoked the publishing permits of three of
Indonesia's best known weekly publications: Tempo, Detik, and
Editor. Tempo was the nation's most influential newsmagazine,
founded in 1971 and widely respected for the breadth and depth
of its coverage. Detik was a hard-hitting tabloid specializing
in political affairs and social issues. Editor was a respected
voice on public affairs. The official reasons given for
revocation of the licenses were that Tempo had endangered
national security through its reporting, and that the other two
had committed administrative violations. It is widely
believed, however, that reporting of alleged differences in the
Cabinet over a controversial military procurement issue was the
proximate cause of the Government's action.
Although the Constitution and the 1982 Press Law provide for
freedom of the press, the issuance of publishing licenses under
a 1984 ministerial decree is one method the Government uses to
control the press. Three other publications had their licenses
revoked in the last decade, although two later reappeared with
new names and changes in top management. In December Minister
of Information Harmoko stated that the Government would issue
no new press licenses during 1995 for publications on current
affairs, and he said there was no chance that the majority
group of journalists from the former Tempo magazine would be
issued a press permit to found a successor publication; rather,
the Minister noted that a press permit had already been issued
to a smaller group of former Tempo employees. Other means of
control include regulation of the amount of advertising
permitted and of the number of pages allowed in newspapers.
The practice of telephoning editors to caution against
publishing certain stories--the so-called telephone
culture--continued, and its incidence seemed to increase
following the action against the three publications in June.
Self-censorship continued to be another publicly acknowledged
brake on free expression whose effectiveness increased after
June.
Military and civilian authorities continued in some cases to
issue instructions, more or less subtle, to local journalists
on what they could print. For example, after extensive
coverage of the April strikes and riots, press coverage of
labor issues dropped markedly in Medan following directives
from authorities to cut back on controversial issues. In
Jakarta, papers were warned against covering topics ranging
from the prolonged summer drought to the ban of the three
publications. Medan police tried to curb foreign coverage of
the April disturbances by insisting on special permits from the
ministry of information, and at least two foreign reporters
were forced to leave the city. The staff of East Timor's only
newspaper were subject to various forms of intimidation by
unknown sources, and a newspaper-owned vehicle was burned and
heavily damaged following the newspaper's coverage of a
mid-July demonstration which was at variance with the official
account.
The Government's actions against press freedom in 1994 limited
the increasingly vocal and independent press that has emerged
in recent years. Although protest demonstrations dwindled
following the harsh government reaction against some
demonstrators, active opposition to the new government press
measures continued in other channels. A number of unsanctioned
journals continued to provide critical coverage of
controversial issues, but they were circulated in small numbers
largely in major cities. In August, 55 journalists founded the
Alliance of Independent Journalists, rivaling the
government-sponsored Indonesian Journalists Association (PWI),
to work for freedom of expression and oppose any form of
censorship and interference in press freedom. In September the
former chief editor of Tempo brought a lawsuit in Jakarta
administrative court against the Minister of Information over
the revocation of Tempo's license, the first ever such
lawsuit. At year's end, this suit was still not decided. In
October most of the editorial staff of Detik joined the staff
of the existing publication Symphony and revamped it to
resemble Detik. However, publication was suspended after only
a few days when the PWI withdrew its legally required approval,
thus jeopardizing Symphony's own publication license.
While public dialog is still freer than it was a few years ago,
the Government continues to impose restrictions on free
speech. For example, on August 29 security forces prohibited
noted human rights activist Adnan Buyung Nasution from
addressing a seminar on development in Indonesian society in
Surabaya. The Government also prevented several other public
figures, including members of the National Human Rights
Commission, from participating in public seminars on one or
more occasions. Authorities often capriciously applied these
strictures without clear justification for the prohibition. In
East Timor authorities denied permission for NGO's and the
local university to hold an open seminar on development and the
local environment. In February authorities in East Java banned
the performance in Surabaya of a play by well-known author Emha
Ainun Nadjib, which was critical of government land policies in
development cases. Subsequently the authorities allowed
performance of the play, which had been previously performed in
Jogjakarta. Two U.S. movies were banned following protest by
Islamic religious leaders. However, a play about the
controversial murder of labor activist Marsinah was staged in
Jakarta in September.
The electronic media remained more cautious in their coverage
of the Government than the printed media. The Government
operates the nationwide television network, which has 12
regional stations. Private television companies continued to
expand, with a fifth station scheduled to begin operation in
November. All are required to broadcast government-produced
news, but many also produce public affairs style programming
that borders on news.
Approximately 600 private radio broadcasting companies exist in
addition to the Government's national radio network. The
government radio station produces "National News," which is by
law the only radio news broadcast in Indonesia, and it is
relayed throughout the country by the private stations and 49
regional affiliates of the government station. By law, the
private radio stations may produce only "light" news, such as
human interest stories, and may not discuss politics. In
practice, many broadcast interviews and foreign news as well.
Foreign television and radio broadcasts are readily accessible
to those who can afford the technology, and satellite dishes
have proliferated throughout the country. The Government makes
no efforts to restrict access to this programming.
The Government closely regulates access to Indonesia,
particularly to certain areas of the country, by visiting and
resident foreign correspondents, and occasionally reminds the
latter of its prerogative to deny requests for visa
extensions. The Government requires a permit for the
importation of foreign publications and video tapes, which must
be reviewed by government censors. Importers sometimes avoid
foreign materials critical of the Government or dealing with
topics considered sensitive, such as human rights. Foreign
publications are normally available, although several issues
were delayed or embargoed in 1994 when they carried stories on
matters considered sensitive, such as East Timor.
Special permission is necessary for foreign journalists to
travel to East Timor, and the Government organized a number of
group trips to the province during the year. Approval for
individual trips by journalists to the province, and for travel
outside Dili, remains difficult. During the November APEC
meetings, the Government approved travel to the province by
several dozen foreign journalists, the largest number to visit
the province in many years. Some six journalists and
freelancers who had not obtained permits were denied access to
the province or instructed by authorities to leave East Timor.
While the law provides for academic freedom, constraints exist
on the activities of scholars. Political activity and
discussions at universities, while no longer formally banned,
remained tightly controlled. Scholars sometimes refrain from
producing or including in lectures and class discussions
materials that they believe might provoke government
displeasure. An Indonesian academic who has conducted studies
on East Timor and whose conclusions are at variance with those
of the Government was strongly criticized by government figures
and his house stoned by unknown youths. Publishers sometimes
refuse to accept manuscripts dealing with controversial
issues. On occasion the Government bans publications and books
outright. In January it banned a book dealing with President
Soeharto's rise to power, and in August, the Attorney General
banned a book published by the leader of the messianic Islamic
sect Darul Arqam, the third book of this group to be banned in
Indonesia. On the other hand, "The Fugitive," a book by the
prominent Indonesian novelist and former political prisoner
Pramoedya Anata Toer, which together with other works by
Pramoedya had been banned for many years, was published in
August.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
Although the Constitution provides for freedom of assembly and
association, the Government places significant controls on the
exercise of this right. All organizations must have government
permission to hold regional and national meetings. Public
marches and demonstrations also require permits, which are
frequently not granted. During the year, government and
military authorities returned to a more restrictive policy on
authorizing public protest demonstrations, after loosening such
restrictions for a while during the latter half of 1993. Many
jurisdictions often require prior approval for smaller
gatherings as well. While obtaining such approval is usually
routine, the authorities occasionally withhold permission or
break up peaceful gatherings for which no permit has been
obtained. In 1994 authorities broke up a meeting between an
attorney and his clients in a labor compensation case, and a
public seminar on land issues which was sponsored by a
well-known NGO.
The courts sometimes hand out stiff penalties to persons
convicted in cases involving free expression, as in the two
cases of student demonstrators (mentioned in Section l.e.
above), whose sentences were increased on appeal, while at
other times they are more lenient. On June 27, security forces
violently broke up two peaceful marches on the Ministry of
Information by persons protesting the withdrawal of publication
licenses from the three publications mentioned above.
Approximately 30 persons were detained by the authorities and
several demonstrators were injured. The Jakarta central
district court sentenced all but one of the persons arrested on
the day after their arrest for demonstrating without a permit,
and they were released after paying a nominal fine equivalent
to $1. The remaining person, a parolee, was returned to prison
to finish his sentence. On July 7, police entered the compound
of the Legal Aid Society, a prominent Indonesian human rights
NGO, and arrested 41 hunger strikers who were protesting the
media banning. These demonstrators, too, were sentenced to pay
token fines and released after 2 days. Other demonstrations on
this issue during this period were allowed to take place
without incident, such as a July 5 demonstration of journalists
in Jakarta.
A group of several hundred people, who had assembled at the
University of East Timor wishing to march to the provincial
assembly to air their views about an incident of alleged
religious disrespect the previous day, were dispersed by riot
police who refused to let the march proceed without a permit.
Around a dozen individuals were lightly injured in this
incident, and a number were briefly detained. The authorities
showed greater restraint than in past incidents involving
crowds, using police rather than the army and avoiding the use
of firearms.
The 1985 Social Organizations Law (ORMAS) requires the
adherence of all organizations, including recognized religions
and associations, to the official ideology of Pancasila. This
provision, which limits political activity, is widely
understood as designed to inhibit activities of groups seeking
to make Indonesia an Islamic state. The law empowers the
Government to disband any organization it believes to be acting
against Pancasila and requires prior government approval for
any organization's acceptance of funds from foreign donors,
thereby hindering the work of many local humanitarian
organizations. Nevertheless, a significant number of
organizations, including the independent labor organization
Serikat Buruh Sejahtera Indonesia (SBSI), continue to be active
without official recognition under this law (see Section 6).
In the past few years, NGO's have proliferated in such fields
as human rights, the environment, development, and consumer
protection. In late 1994, the Government prepared a draft
presidential decree that would bring the more than 700 NGO's
under controls similar to the ORMAS Law. The draft decree made
available by the Government for comment indicated that NGO's
would have to receive government approval for the use of any
foreign assistance they accept, and such assistance must be
deemed consistent with national development policy and not
detrimental to national interests. NGO's would also be
prohibited from engaging in political activity and would
receive government guidance on fulfilling their declared
functions. Many NGO's, fearing that the proposed new decree is
an effort by the Government to control their organizations or
curb some of their activities, reacted strongly to the draft
which, at year's end, the Government had not yet put into
effect.
c. Freedom of Religion
The Constitution provides for religious freedom and belief in
one Supreme God. The Government recognizes Islam,
Christianity, Buddhism, and Hinduism, and permits practice of
the mystical, traditional beliefs of "Aliran Kepercayaan."
Although the population is overwhelmingly Muslim, the practice
and teachings of the other recognized religions are generally
respected, and the Government actively promotes mutual
tolerance and harmony among them. Some restrictions on certain
types of religious activity exist (see below).
Because the first tenet of Pancasila is belief in a supreme
being, atheism is forbidden. The legal requirement to adhere
to Pancasila extends to all religious and secular
organizations. The Government strongly opposes Muslim groups
which advocate establishing an Islamic state or acknowledging
only Islamic law. There are government procedures for banning
religious sects in Indonesia. Among those prohibited are
Jehovah's Witnesses and Baha'i. In 1994 the Government banned
the messianic Islamic sect Darul Arqam in a number of
provinces, prohibited three of its books, and in August forbade
its leader, Abuya Sheikh Imam Ashaari Muhammad, from entering
Indonesia.
Violence between rival factions in the Huria Kristen Batak
Protestan (HKBP), Indonesia's largest Protestant church,
continued in north Sumatra throughout 1994, with at least six
fatalities. In early 1993, citing a threat to civil order, the
Northern Sumatra regional military commander intervened in an
internal leadership dispute which broke out within the HKBP the
previous year, appointing a new bishop and helping the new
bishop's supporters take over church property. Civilian and
military authorities have called the dispute an internal church
matter that should be resolved by the HKBP members themselves.
To date, however, only supporters of the former bishop have
been prosecuted for acts of violence despite evidence that
members of the opposing faction engaged in violent acts as
well.
There were widespread reports from religious minorities
indicating that the extent of religious tolerance weakened
somewhat during the year and that they felt less free to carry
out their religious activities unimpeded. High-level
officials, including the President, however, spoke out several
times to emphasize the importance of religious tolerance. Two
army privates accused of provocative behavior during a Catholic
mass in East Timor in June were court-martialed. In October
both were expelled from the army, and received prison sentences
of 2, and 2 and 1/2 years respectively. The law allows
conversion between faiths, and such conversions occur.
Marriages between persons of different religions are allowed.
The Government views proselytizing by the recognized religions
in areas heavily dominated by one recognized religion or
another as potentially disruptive and discourages it. Foreign
missionary activities are relatively unimpeded, although in
East Timor and occasionally elsewhere missionaries have
experienced difficulties and delays in renewing residence
permits, and visas allowing the entrance of new foreign clergy
are difficult to obtain. Laws and decrees from the 1970's
limit the number of years foreign missionaries can spend in
Indonesia, with some extensions granted in remote areas like
Irian Jaya. Foreign missionary work is subject to the funding
stipulations of the ORMAS Law (see Section 2.b.). Indonesians
practicing the recognized religions maintain active links with
coreligionists inside and outside Indonesia and travel abroad
for religious gatherings.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
In 1993 the Government drastically reduced the number of people
barred either from entering or departing Indonesia from a
publicly announced figure of 8,897 "blacklisted" people in
January to a few hundred by August. According to government
authorities, no one is now prohibited for political reasons
from leaving the country. However, the Government restricts
movement by Indonesian and foreign citizens to and within parts
of Indonesia. In addition, it requires permits to seek work in
a new location in certain areas, primarily to control further
population movement to crowded cities, and special permits are
required to visit certain parts of Irian Jaya. The military
carried out security checks affecting transportation and travel
to and within East Timor sporadically in 1994, and it
occasional imposed curfews in connection with military
operations. The authorities require former political
detainees, including those associated with the abortive 1965
coup, to give notice of their movements and to have official
permission (see Section l.f.) to change their place of
residence.
In past years the Government admitted large numbers of asylum
seekers from Indochina. Only a relatively small number now
remain and the Government plans to work with Vietnam under a
tripartite Memorandum of Understanding signed in 1993 with the
United Nations High commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) to
peacefully repatriate the remaining asylees to Vietnam.
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government
Citizens do not have the ability to change their government
through democratic means. The 1,000-member People's
Consultative Assembly (MPR), which is constitutionally the
highest authority of the State and meets every 5 years to elect
the President and Vice President and set the broad outlines of
state policy, is controlled by the Government through the
appointment of half its membership. The remaining half come
from the National Parliament (DPR), 80 percent of whose members
are elected. In 1993 the MPR elected Soeharto to his sixth
uncontested 5-year term as President. Legally, the President
is constitutionally subordinate to the Parliament, but actually
he and a small group of active duty and retired military
officers and civilian officials exercise governmental
authority.
Under a doctrine known as "dual function," the military assumes
a significant sociopolitical as well as a security role.
Members of the military are allotted an unelected 20 percent of
the seats in national, provincial, and district parliaments,
and occupy numerous key positions in the administration. The
other 80 percent of national and local parliamentary seats are
filled through elections held every 5 years. All adult
citizens are eligible to vote, except active duty members of
the armed forces, convicted criminals serving prison sentences,
and some 36,000 former PKI members. Voters choose by secret
ballot between the three government-approved political
organizations, which field candidate lists in each electoral
district. Those lists must be screened by BAKORSTANAS (see
Section l.d.), which determines whether candidates were
involved in the abortive 1965 Communist coup or pose other
broadly defined security risks. Critics charge these
screenings are unconstitutional, since there is no way to
appeal the results, and note that they can be used to eliminate
critics of the Government from Parliament.
Strict rules establish the length of political campaigns,
access to electronic media, schedules for public appearances,
and the political symbols that can be used. The Government
permits only three political organizations to exist and contest
elections. The largest and most important of these is GOLKAR,
a government-sponsored organization of diverse functional
groups which won 68 percent of the seats in the 1992
elections. The President strongly influences the selection of
the leaders of GOLKAR. The other two small political
organizations, the Unity Development Party (PPP) and the
Democratic Party of Indonesia (PDI), split the remaining vote.
The law requires all three political organizations to embrace
Pancasila, and none of the organizations is considered an
opposition party. Government authorities closely scrutinize
and often guide their activities. Members of the DPR and the
provincial assemblies may be recalled from office by party
leaders.
GOLKAR maintains close institutional links with the armed
forces and KORPRI, the association to which all civil servants
automatically belong. Civil servants may join any of the
political parties with official permission, but most are
members of GOLKAR. Former members of the PKI and some other
banned parties may not run for office or be active
politically. The DPR considers bills presented to it by
government departments and agencies but does not draft laws on
its own, although it has the constitutional right to do so.
The DPR makes technical and occasionally substantive
alterations to bills it reviews. In practice, it remains
clearly subordinate to the executive branch, but recently it
has become much more active in scrutinizing government policy
through hearings at which members of the Cabinet, military
commanders, and other high officials are asked to testify. For
example, parliamentary examination brought to light a major
scandal in government banks and forced the Government to
address it seriously. The DPR has also become increasingly a
focal point of appeals and petitions from students, workers,
displaced farmers, and others protesting alleged human rights
abuses and airing other grievances.
While there are no de jure restrictions on women in politics,
only 55 out of 500 members of the national Parliament are
women; 2 women are cabinet members.
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
of Human Rights
While various domestic organizations and persons interested in
human rights operate energetically, some human rights monitors
face government harassment such as frequent visits by police or
agents from military intelligence, interrogations at police
stations, or cancellations of private meetings (see Section
2.b.). Following the April labor unrest in Medan, local
security authorities increased surveillance and harassment of
NGO's in north Sumatra that were active in labor affairs.
Moreover, the Government prepared in 1994 a draft decree which,
if issued and fully implemented, would give it broad powers to
control the activities of NGO's concerned with human rights and
seriously impede their ability to function.
The Government considers outside investigations of alleged
human rights violations to be interference in its internal
affairs and emphasizes its belief that linking foreign
assistance to human rights observance is unacceptable. In 1994
it pressured several neighboring countries to prohibit or
restrict NGO-sponsored human rights seminars on the situation
in East Timor.
The ICRC continued to operate in East Timor, Irian Jaya, and
Aceh, and to visit prisoners convicted of participation in the
abortive, Communist-backed coup in 1965, convicted Muslim
extremists, and East Timorese prisoners. However, as of year's
end, the Government had not approved the ICRC's request to open
an office in Aceh, though official cooperation on access by its
delegates from Jakarta showed substantial improvement in 1994.
ICRC access also greatly improved in other areas, including
East Timor where it has an office. The ICRC no longer
maintains an office in Irian Jaya but visits that province from
Jakarta several times a year. However, in 1994 the visiting
representative of Human Rights Watch/Asia, a key U. S. human
rights NGO, was denied permission to visit Medan and East
Timor. The Government authorized the visit of the U.N. Special
Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary and Arbitrary Executions
and allowed him to see those persons he had requested. The
Rapporteur publicly questioned, however, whether all those who
might have wanted to speak with him had been afforded full
access.
In January the National Human Rights Commission, most of whose
members were named the month before, began operations. Despite
continuing skepticism about the Commission's independence, in
part because its members are appointed by the President,
commission members during the course of the year actively
looked into many of the numerous complaints and petitions
presented to it and in some cases showed themselves willing to
question government actions. For example, the Commission
strongly condemned the Government's revocation of the
publication licenses of three publications (Section 2.a.) as an
infringement of free speech, and it has criticized the way in
which the suspects in the Marsinah murder case were prosecuted,
as well as questioning whether all the guilty had been brought
to justice. Lacking enforcement powers, the Commission
attempts to work within the system, sending teams where
necessary to inquire into possible human rights problems and
employing persuasion, publicity, and moral authority to
highlight abuses and encourage corrective action. A team
visited East Timor in September and December. Operations in
1994 were hampered somewhat by startup logistical and
procedural problems.
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Disability, Language, or Social Status
Women
By law, women are equal to and have the same rights,
obligations, and opportunities as men. However, in practice
women face some legal discrimination. For example, in divorce
cases women often bear a heavier evidentiary burden than men,
especially in the Islamic-based family court system. Although
some women enjoy a high degree of economic and social freedom
and occupy important midlevel positions in both the public and
private sectors, the majority of women do not experience such
social and economic freedoms, and are often disproportionately
represented at the lower end of the position scale. For
example, although women constitute one-quarter of the civil
service, they occupy only a small fraction of the service's top
posts. Income disparity between men and women diminishes
significantly with greater educational attainment.
Women are often not given the extra benefits and salary that
men receive that is their due when they are the head of
household, and in some cases do not receive employment benefits
for their husband and children, such as medical insurance.
Despite laws guaranteeing women a 3-month maternity leave, the
Government has conceded that pregnant women are often dismissed
or are replaced while on leave. Some companies require that
women sign statements that they will not become pregnant.
Women workers also have complained of being sexually victimized
by foremen and factory owners.
Women workers in manufacturing generally receive lower wages
than men and also are more likely to be hired on a daily only
basis. As a result, they are less likely to receive benefits
legally mandated for permanent workers.
Women disproportionately experience illiteracy, poor health,
and inadequate nutrition. However, women's educational
indicators have improved in the last decade. For example, the
number of girls graduating from high school tripled from 1980
to 1990. Several voluntary, private groups work actively to
advance women's legal, economic, social, and political rights
and claim some success in gaining official cognizance of
women's concerns.
Rape is a punishable offense in Indonesia. Men have been
arrested and sentenced for rape and attempted rape. The
National Police reported 1,341 rape cases for 1991, 1,356 cases
for 1992, and 1,341 cases for 1993. However, women's rights
activists believe rape is grossly underreported owing to the
social stigma attached to the victim. Some legal experts state
that if a woman does not go immediately to the hospital for a
physical exam which produces semen or other physical evidence
of rape, she will not be able to bring charges. Some women
fail to report rape to police out of fear of being molested
again by the police themselves."
In general, the problem of violence against women remains
poorly documented. However, the Government has acknowledged
the problem of domestic violence in society, which some say has
been aggravated by recent social changes brought about by rapid
urbanization. Longstanding traditional beliefs that the
husband may "teach" or "control" the wife through several
means, including violence, also contribute to the problem.
Although women's groups are trying to change the law, rape by a
husband of a wife is not a crime in Indonesia. While police
could bring assault charges against a husband for beating his
wife, due to social attitudes they are unlikely to do so. The
Government provides some counseling, and several private
organizations exist to assist women. Many of these
organizations focus mainly on reuniting the family rather than
on providing protection to the women involved. There are no
battered women's shelters. Many women rely on extended family
systems for assistance in cases of domestic violence.
Children
The Government is committed to children's rights and welfare,
but is hampered by a lack of resources in translating this
commitment into practice. A 1979 law on children's welfare
defines the responsibility of the State and parents to nurture
and protect children. However, implementing regulations have
never been developed, and the law's provisions have yet to go
into effect. The Government has made particular efforts to
improve primary education, maternity services, and family
planning.
The United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) estimates that more
than 1 million children drop out of primary school every year
due mainly to the cost of supplies, uniforms and other
expenses, in addition to the professed need for the children to
supplement family income. Thousands of street children living
in Jakarta and other cities sell newspapers, shine shoes, help
to park or watch cars, and otherwise earn money. Many
thousands more work in factories and fields (see also Section
6.d.). NGO's criticize government efforts to help these
children as inadequate.
Child prostitution and other sexual abuses occur, especially
cases of incest between stepfathers and stepdaughters, but data
on their incidence is lacking. Some child care experts believe
it to be low. While there are laws designed to protect
children from indecent activities, prostitution, and incest,
the Government has made no special enforcement efforts in these
areas.
Female genital mutilation (FGM) occurs in some parts of
Indonesia; precise statistics are not available. In Java, it
usually takes place within the first year after birth and is
performed either at a hospital or by a local traditional
practitioner or "dukun," especially in rural areas. Usually a
small section of the tip of the clitoris is cut or a small
incision is made in the tip of the clitoris with the purpose of
drawing a few drops of blood. Total removal of the clitoris is
not the objective of the practice, although it does occur if
ineptly performed.
Indigenous People
The Government states publicly that it recognizes the existence
of several indigenous population groups, and that they have a
right to participate fully in political and social life.
Critics maintain that the Government's approach is basically
paternalistic and designed more to integrate them more closely
into Indonesian society than to protect their traditional way
of life.
The Government's transmigration program, which moved large
numbers of people from overpopulated islands to more isolated
and backward ones, has been significantly reduced in recent
years. The program is criticized by human rights monitors who
say that it not only sometimes violates the rights of
indigenous people but also those of some of the transmigrants
who claim that they are duped into leaving their home villages
without any means of return.
Human rights monitors have expressed concern about the
practices of some logging companies which recruit indigenous
people for work. According to Human Rights Watch, this
activity in Irian Jaya has separated these people from their
traditional economies. Workers reportedly are paid using
company-issued credit cards that can be used only at company
stores where prices are fixed. Workers go into debt and remain
indentured to the company.
Where indigenous people clash with development projects, the
developers almost always win. For example, in Kalimantan
members of a Dayak tribe were forced from their land by a
timber concession in August. In retaliation, they attacked
company facilities and several were subsequently arrested.
Most civil servants in local governments in Irian Jaya and
other isolated areas continue to come primarily from Java
rather than the indigenous population.
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities
Indonesians exhibit considerable racial and ethnic tolerance,
with the important exception of official and informal
discrimination against ethnic Chinese, who comprise about 3
percent of the population. Since 1959 noncitizen ethnic
Chinese have been denied the right to run businesses in rural
Indonesia. Regulations prohibit the operation of all Chinese
schools for ethnic Chinese, formation of exclusively Chinese
cultural groups or trade associations, and public display of
Chinese characters. In August the ban on use of Chinese
characters was eased slightly to allow firms working in the
tourist industry to produce Chinese-language brochures,
programs, and similar material for Chinese-speaking tourists.
However, Chinese-language publications, with the exception of
one government-owned daily newspaper, may neither be imported
nor produced domestically. Private instruction in Chinese is
generally prohibited but takes place to a limited extent, and
since August has been allowed in training employees in the
tourism industry in functional Mandarin. State universities
have no formal quotas that limit the number of ethnic Chinese.
The law forbids the celebration of the Chinese New Year in
temples or public places, but its enforcement was limited in
1994, and Chinese New Year decorations were displayed in public
shopping areas in major cities.
East Timorese and various human rights groups charge that the
East Timorese are underrepresented in the civil service in East
Timor. It is difficult to confirm or deny the charges as there
appears to be no registry of the birth place of civil servants,
who can be transferred anywhere. East Timorese have expressed
concern that the transmigration program could lead to fewer
employment opportunities and might eventually destroy East
Timor's cultural identity.
People with Disabilities
No national law specifically addresses the problems or status
of the disabled, nor do they receive special programs or
attention. However, during 1994 the Ministry of Social Welfare
began drafting regulations on treatment of the handicapped
partly based on the Americans with Disabilities Act, and
President Soeharto gave his approval to submission of these new
regulations to the Parliament. Virtually no public buildings
or public means of transport are designed specifically for
access by the disabled. They face considerable discrimination
in employment.
The Constitution includes the right of every citizen to obtain
an education. In 1989 the Government issued regulations
covering education for the mentally and physically disabled.
However, the regulations do not grant a right to public
education for handicapped children. While there are some
public schools for the handicapped, the Government supports the
concept that education should be provided by the community in
the form of NGO-run private schools that may receive some
public funds.
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
Private sector workers including those in export processing
zones are free to form worker organizations without prior
authorization. Until 1994 only a recognized union could
bargain on behalf of employees or represent workers in the
Department of Manpower's labor courts. A new regulation
promulgated in January provides that workers in a single
company with more than 25 employees can join together and
negotiate legally binding agreements with their employer
outside the framework of the All Indonesian Workers Union
(SPSI), the only legally recognized union (see below). The
Government encourages these plant-level workers associations to
join the SPSI. While 192 of these plant-level associations
were formed by the end of the year, only one had concluded a
collective bargaining agreement with management. Current
numerical requirements for union recognition, though lowered in
1993, still constitute a significant barrier to recognition and
the right to engage in collective bargaining. In addition, the
Ministry of Manpower enforces a regulation that requires a
union be set up "by and for workers" to deny recognition to
groups which include people it considers nonworkers, such as
lawyers or human rights activists, who are involved as labor
organizers.
There is, de facto, a single union system, and it is the
Government's stated policy to seek to improve effectiveness of
the recognized SPSI unions rather than to further the process
for the formation of alternative organizations. The SPSI began
in 1993 a transformation from a unitary (centralized) to a
federative (decentralized) structure. Its 13 industrial
sectors are now registered as independent unions. The only
unions recognized by the Department of Manpower are those which
previously constituted the SPSI's industrial sectors.
Two other labor groups, Setia Kawan (Solidarity), also known as
Serikat Buruh Merdeka (SBM, Free Trade Union), and Serikat
Buruh Sejahtera Indonesia (SBSI, Indonesian Workers Welfare
Union), have been organized but are not registered. Setia
Kawan, founded 3 years ago, is now essentially moribund. The
SBSI, created in 1992, claims it has formed the necessary
number of factory-level units to meet the legal requirements
for registration as a labor union, but its most recent request
in November for registration as a trade union was denied. The
Minister of Manpower has stated that any unions which are
formed should affiliate with the SPSI federation and that the
Government will not recognize any unions outside the
federation. There have reportedly been tentative overtures to
bring the SBSI into the SPSI. The SBSI, however, has refused
to accept these offers.
The SBSI also has attempted unsuccessfully three times to
register with the Department of Home Affairs as a social
organization under the ORMAS Law, a prerequisite to recognition
as a labor union. The Home Affairs Department had not replied
at year's end to SBSI's most recent request of November 17.
The Government considers the SBSI illegal. Although the
Government has not disbanded it, it has continually harassed
it, especially after large-scale labor demonstrations, which
the SBSI helped to organize in Medan in April, degenerated into
anti-Chinese rioting. The Government arrested a number of the
Medan SBSI leadership in the spring, and it arrested the
National Chairman of the SBSI, Muchtar Pakpahan, in August.
They were charged with inciting violence in connection with the
riots. The Director General of the International Labor
Organization (ILO) sent a strongly worded letter to the
Minister of Manpower expressing "serious concern" over the
arrest of Pakpahan. The Medan leadership received sentences of
between 3 and 15 months in prison. In November Pakpahan was
sentenced to a 3-year prison term, a sentence that was extended
to 4 years in January 1995 when his appeal was rejected. It is
widely believed that the Government's actions against the SBSI
leadership are intended to discredit or destroy the
organization.
Also in November, the ILO's Committee on Freedom of
Association, in its conclusions on the complaint made by the
SBSI against the Government, criticized the Government's policy
of recognizing only the SPSI and commented that "beyond the
specific events raised in the present case, the Committee feels
bound to note that the allegations reveal, from a more general
perspective, a situation of a trade union monopoly in practice,
and of heavy involvement of the police and armed forces in
labor matters," and called on the Government to refrain from
showing favoritism toward, or discrimination against, any
particular unions.
Because of past Ministry of Manpower regulations, many SPSI
factory units are led by persons who have little credibility
with their units' members because they were selected by
employers. A new regulation states that employees must only
notify their employer that they wish to form a union and that
they may proceed if they do not receive a response from their
employer within 2 weeks. Despite this new provision, strikes
continue to occur because employers attempt to prevent the
formation of union branches. These strikes are invariably
successful, and the formation of an SPSI unit follows shortly
thereafter. However, workers who are active in the formation
of the union are frequently dismissed and have no practical
protection by either law or government practice.
Civil servants are not permitted to join unions and must belong
to KORPRI, a nonunion association whose Central Development
Council is chaired by the Minister of Home Affairs. State
enterprise employees, defined to include those working in
enterprises in which the State has a 5-percent holding or
greater, usually are required to join KORPRI, but a small
number of state enterprises have SPSI units. Teachers must
belong to the Teachers' Association (PGRI). While technically
classed as a union, the PGRI continues to function more as a
welfare organization and does not appear to have engaged in
trade union activities such as collective bargaining.
Unions may draw up their own constitutions and rules and elect
their representatives. However, the Government has a great
deal of influence over the SPSI and its federated unions. The
head of the SPSI is a senior member of GOLKAR, and he and two
other senior SPSI officials are members of Parliament
representing GOLKAR. With one exception, all members of the
executive council are members of GOLKAR. These persons have
been given positions in the new federated industrial sector
unions. The Minister of Manpower is a member of the SPSI's
Consultative Council. Numerous regional SPSI officials also
are GOLKAR members, sometimes serving in regional
legislatures. According to credible reports, the Government
interferes in the selection of SPSI officers, especially by
placing retired military officers in midlevel SPSI positions.
The Government has stated that it will cease the practice of
placing military officers in union positions and eventually
will remove officials with significant GOLKAR connections.
Under the Criminal Code, police approval is needed for all
meetings of five people or more of all organizations outside
offices or normal work sites. This provision also applies to
union meetings. Permission is routinely given to the SPSI but
not to rival organizations such as SBSI, which was prevented
from holding several meetings over the last few years,
including its first congress in 1993. The Government may
dissolve a union if it believes the union is acting against
Pancasila, although it has never actually done so, and there
are no laws or regulations specifying procedures for union
dissolution.
The SPSI maintains international contacts but is not affiliated
with any international trade union organizations except the
association of Southeast Asian nations (ASEAN) Trade Union
Council.
On April 20 the International Confederation of Free Trade
Unions lodged a formal complaint against Indonesia with the
International Labor Organization (ILO), supplementing a
previous complaint filed in 1987, accusing the Government of
denying workers' right to set up unions of their own choosing,
harassing independent workers' organizations, and of taking
other actions contrary to ILO standards on freedom of
association and the right to collective bargaining.
While Pancasila principles call for labor-management
differences to be settled by consensus, all organized workers
except civil servants have the legal right to strike. While
state enterprise employees and teachers rarely exercise this
right, private sector strikes are frequent. Before a strike
can occur in the private sector, the law requires intensive
mediation by the Department of Manpower and prior notice of the
intent to strike. However, no approval is required. In
practice, dispute settlement procedures are not followed, and
formal notice of the intent to strike is rarely given because
Department of Manpower procedures are slow. These procedures
have little credibility with workers, who ignore them. Sudden
strikes, therefore, tend to result from longstanding grievances
or recognition that legally mandated benefits or rights are not
being received. While strike leaders are not arrested for
illegal strikes, they often lose their jobs and have no legal
recourse for reinstatement. The number of strikes increased
significantly during 1994 compared to the previous year, with
the most dramatic increases occurring in the first quarter of
the year.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
Collective bargaining is provided for by law, and the
Department of Manpower promotes it within the context of the
national ideology, Pancasila. Until recently only recognized
trade unions, that is, the SPSI and its components, could
legally engage in collective bargaining. As noted, new
government regulations also permit unaffiliated plant-level
workers associations to conclude legally binding agreements
with employers, though only one had done so by year's end.
Agreements concluded by any other groups are not considered
legally binding and are not registered by the Department of
Manpower.
The majority of the collective bargaining agreements between
the SPSI units and employers are negotiated bilaterally. Once
notified that 25 employees have joined a registered SPSI or
independent plant level union, an employer is obligated to
bargain with it. In companies without unions, the Government
discourages workers from utilizing outside assistance, e.g.,
during consultations with employers over company regulations.
Instead, the Department of Manpower prefers that workers seek
its assistance and believes that its role is to protect
workers. There are credible reports that for some Indonesian
companies, consultations are perfunctory at best and usually
with management-selected workers; there are also credible
reports to the contrary from U.S. companies. Over half of the
factory-level SPSI units have collective bargaining
agreements. The degree to which these agreements are freely
negotiated between unions and management without government
interference varies. By regulation, negotiations must be
concluded within 30 days or be submitted to the Department of
Manpower for mediation and conciliation or arbitration. Most
negotiations are concluded within the 30-day period.
Agreements are for 2 years and can be extended for 1 year.
According to NGO's involved in labor issues, the provisions of
these agreements rarely go beyond the legal minimum standards
established by the Government, and the agreements are often
merely presented to worker representatives for signing rather
than being negotiated.
Although government regulations prohibit employers from
discriminating or harassing employees because of union
membership, there are credible reports from union officials, of
employer retribution against union organizers, including
firing, which is not effectively prevented or remedied in
practice. Some employers reportedly have warned their
employees against contact with union organizers from the
unrecognized SBSI organization. In addition to Marsinah (see
Section 1.e.), several other labor union activists have died
under mysterious circumstances during the past 2 years. Some
human rights and labor NGO's believe that the authorities have
not adequately investigated these deaths.
Charges of antiunion discrimination are adjudicated by
administrative tribunals. However, many union members believe
the tribunals generally side with employers. Because of this
perceived partiality, many workers reject or avoid the
procedure and present their grievances directly to Parliament
and other agencies. Administrative decisions in favor of
dismissed workers tend to be monetary awards; workers are
rarely reinstated. The provisions of the law make it difficult
to fire workers, but the law is often ignored in practice.
The armed forces, which include the police, continues to
involve itself in labor issues, despite new regulations
promulgated in January to prohibit military interference when
there is no threat to security. There is some evidence that
the incidence of such military involvement decreased in 1994,
and some observers credit government security forces with
restraint in restoring order in the Medan riots of April.
However, these perceptions are not shared by all observers.
Workers charge that members of the security forces attempt to
intimidate union organizers and strike leaders and have been
present in significant numbers during some strikes, even when
there has been no destruction of property or other violence.
Members of military intelligence attended and monitored trade
union education seminars run by the Asian-American Free Labor
Institute (AAFLI), even though these programs were approved by
the Department of Manpower. In 1993 the military command in
Surabaya also halted an AAFLI-SPSI program on legal aid for
industrial disputes approved by the Department of Manpower. At
year's end the program had not been allowed to resume despite
government assurances. Military officials occasionally have
been reported present during negotiations between workers and
management. Their presence has been described as intimidating
by plant-level union officials. A military officer was among
those convicted in connection with the Marsinah murder case.
Labor law applies equally in export processing zones.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
The law forbids forced labor, and the Government generally
enforces it. NGO reports have alleged that some cases of
forced labor in the form of debt bondage by logging companies
exist in Irian Jaya. The Government says that it is unable to
verify these allegations because they are insufficiently
specific. No complaints or information on forced labor in
Irian Jaya had come to the attention of the National Human
Rights Commission as of late September. (See also Section 5,
Indigenous People.)
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
Child labor exists in both industrial areas and rural areas.
There are an estimated 2.7 million working children between the
ages of 10 and 14, according to a 1994 report of the U.N. Human
Rights Commission. Indonesia was one of the first countries to
be selected for participation in the ILO's International
Program on the Elimination of Child Labor (IPEC), and signed a
memorandum of understanding with the ILO to guide their
collaboration under this program on May 29, 1992.
Recommendations for a plan of action were developed at a
national conference in Bogor in July 1993. During 1994, 120
government labor inspectors received ILO-sponsored training on
child labor matters under the IPEC program.
The Government acknowledges that there is a class of children
who must work for socioeconomic reasons, and in 1987 the
Minister of Manpower issued regulation per-ol/men/1987,
"Protection of Children Forced to Work," to regulate this
situation. This regulation legalizes the employment of
children under the age of 14 who must work to contribute to the
income of their families. It requires parental consent,
prohibits dangerous or difficult work, limits work to 4 hours
daily, and requires employers to report the number of children
working under its provisions. It does not set a minimum age
for children in this category, effectively superseding the
colonial-era government ordinance of December 17, 1925, on
"Measures Limiting Child Labour and Nightwork of Women," which
is still the current law governing child labor and sets a
minimum age of 12 for employment. The 1987 regulation is not
enforced. No employers have been taken to court for violating
its restrictions on the nature of employment for children, and
no reports are collected from establishments employing
children.
Act No. 1 of 1951 was intended to bring into force certain
labor measures, including provisions on child labor which would
replace those of the 1925 legislation. However, implementing
regulations for the child labor provisions have never been
issued. Thus the child labor provisions in the 1951 Act have
no validity. In September 1993, the Government announced it
would review its child labor regulations with the intention of
tightening enforcement of restrictions on child labor. At
year's end, the review had not been completed.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
In the absence of a national minimum wage, area wage councils
working under the supervision of the national wage council
establish minimum wages for regions and basic needs figures for
each province--a monetary amount considered sufficient to
enable a single worker to meet the basic needs of nutrition,
clothing, and shelter. While Indonesia has succeeded in
dramatically lowering the level of poverty throughout the
country, the minimum wage rates have lagged behind the basic
needs figures. Minimum wage rates were raised throughout the
country in three stages by province on January 1, April 1, and
August 1. While in most cases the new rates still did not
equal the basic needs figure, the Government announced in
August that new increases would take place simultaneously
throughout the country on April 1, 1995. The Department of
Manpower projects that at that time minimum wage rates on the
average will equal 106 percent of the basic needs figure, up
from 97 percent as of August 1, 1994. Payment of the minimum
wage is another question. There are no reliable statistics.
The Government's estimate in September, that 96 percent of all
companies were paying at least the regional minimum wage is
certainly exaggerated; independent observers' estimates range
between 30 and 60 percent. Government enforcement is weak, and
sanctions are light against employers who fail to pay the
minimum wage. Nevertheless, as a result of government
pressures, the wave of strikes in the first quarter, and the
Medan riots, some improvement in the situation seems to have
taken place. Labor law and ministerial regulations provide
workers with a variety of other benefits, such as social
security, and workers in more modern facilities often receive
health benefits and free meals.
The law establishes 7-hour workdays and 40-hour workweeks, with
one 30-minute rest period for each 4 hours of work. The law
also requires 1 day of rest out of every week. The daily
overtime rate is 1 1/2 times the normal hourly rate for the
first hour, and twice the hourly rate for additional overtime.
Regulations allow employers to deviate from the normal work
hours upon request to the Minister of Manpower and with the
agreement of the employee. Observance of laws regulating
benefits and labor standards varies from sector to sector and
by region. Employer violations of legal requirements are
fairly common and often result in strikes and employee
protests. The Ministry of Manpower continues publicly to urge
employers to comply with the law. However, in general,
government enforcement and supervision of labor standards are
weak.
Both law and regulations provide for minimum standards of
industrial health and safety. In the largely Western-operated
oil sector, safety and health programs function reasonably
well. However, in the country's 100,000 larger registered
companies in the nonoil sector, the quality of occupational
health and safety programs varies greatly. The enforcement of
health and safety standards is severely hampered by the limited
number of qualified Department of Manpower inspectors as well
as by the low level of employee appreciation for sound health
and safety practices. Allegations of corruption on the part of
inspectors are common. Workers are obligated to report
hazardous working conditions. Employers are forbidden by law
from retaliating against those who do, but the law is not
effectively enforced.
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