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TITLE: CHINA HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES, 1994
AUTHOR: U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DATE: FEBRUARY 1995
CHINA
The People's Republic of China (PRC) is an authoritarian state
in which the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) monopolizes
decisionmaking authority. Almost all top civilian, police, and
military positions at the national and regional levels are held
by party members. A 22-member Politburo and retired senior
leaders hold ultimate power, but economic decentralization has
increased the authority of regional officials. Socialism
continues to provide the ideological underpinning, but Marxist
ideology has given way to pragmatism in recent years. The
party's authority rests primarily on the success of economic
reform, its ability to maintain stability, and control of the
security apparatus.
The security apparatus comprises the Ministries of State
Security and Public Security, the People's Armed Police, the
People's Liberation Army, and the state judicial,
procuratorial, and penal systems. The Constitution protects
fundamental human rights, but they are frequently ignored in
practice, and challenges to the CCP's political authority are
often dealt with harshly and arbitrarily. Legal safeguards for
those detained or imprisoned are inadequate and inconsistently
implemented. The Government attaches higher priority to
maintaining public order and suppressing political opposition
than to enforcing legal norms. As a result, security forces
are responsible for numerous human rights abuses, including
arbitrary detention, forced confessions, and torture.
More than a decade of rapid economic growth has raised living
standards and enabled growing numbers of Chinese to assume
greater control over their own lives. The scope for private
economic activity has expanded rapidly, and the degree of
government and party control over the economy has continued to
decline. Although many details remain to be worked out, and
the pace of privatization has been uneven, many elements of the
old planned economy have already been dismantled. Income
disparities between coastal regions and the interior are
significant and growing, but overall there has been a sharp
drop in the number of Chinese living in absolute poverty.
Greater disposable income, looser ideological controls, and
freer access to outside sources of information have led to more
diversity in cultural life and media reporting. Government
control of information media now depends to an increasing
extent on self-censorship to regulate political and social
content, but the authorities also consistently penalize those
who exceed the permissible.
In 1994 there continued to be widespread and well-documented
human rights abuses in China, in violation of internationally
accepted norms, stemming both from the authorities' intolerance
of dissent and the inadequacy of legal safeguards for freedom
of speech, association, and religion. Abuses include arbitrary
and lengthy incommunicado detention, torture, and mistreatment
of prisoners. Despite a reduction during the year in the
number of political detainees from the immediate post-Tiananmen
period, hundreds, perhaps thousands, of other prisoners of
conscience remain imprisoned or detained. The Government still
has not provided a comprehensive, credible public accounting of
all those missing or detained in connection with the
suppression of the 1989 demonstrations. Chinese leaders moved
swiftly to cut off organized expressions of protest or
criticism and detained government critics, including those
advocating greater worker rights. Citizens have no ability
peacefully to change their government leaders or the form of
government. Criminal defendants are denied basic legal
safeguards such as due process or adequate defense. The regime
continued severe restrictions on the freedoms of speech, press,
assembly and association, and tightened controls on the
exercise of these rights during 1994. Serious human rights
abuses persisted in Tibet and other areas populated by ethnic
minorities.
The human rights situation in 1994 was, however, marked by the
same diversity that characterizes other aspects of Chinese
life. In several instances, the Government acted to bring its
behavior into conformity with internationally accepted human
rights norms. These actions included releasing several
prominent political and religious prisoners, granting passports
to some critics of the regime and their relatives, and adopting
a law, which became effective in January 1995, that allows
citizens to recover damages from the Government for
infringement of their rights. The Government continued to
acknowledge the need to implement the rule of law and build the
necessary legal and other institutions, but it has not yet
significantly mitigated continuing repression of political
dissent. In 1994 China also continued a human rights dialog
with some foreign critics, and reaffirmed its adherence to the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Chinese officials
provided limited information about the status of several
hundred specific cases of international concern.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
It is impossible to determine the number of extrajudicial
killings by government officials in 1994 or the adequacy of the
government response, since the Government restricts access to
such information. There were individual accounts of such
killings, including some carried in the Chinese press.
Credible reports from international human rights organizations
indicate a Tibetan nun died on June 4 in a prison hospital,
reportedly as a result of a beating by guards. In May Tibetan
officials reported that a former public security official in
Tibet was sentenced to 9 years for causing the death of a
suspect while torturing him to obtain a confession. In Fujian,
a public security official was also prosecuted for torturing a
prisoner to death, but no details on his sentence were
provided. In December the Chinese press reported that a city
police chief in Shanxi province was sentenced to 5 years for
malpractice after ordering the detention and beating of two
Chinese for allegedly complaining about the police chief's
son. One detainee died from his injuries. Two other police
officials were sentenced to death and life imprisonment,
respectively, for extorting a confession in the same case.
Legislators in Guangdong province also reported two cases of
death by torture, but there were no details on the disposition
of the cases.
b. Disappearance
There were no reported cases in 1994 in which individuals who
disappeared were suspected to have been killed by officials.
The Government still has not provided a comprehensive, credible
public accounting of all those missing or detained in
connection with the suppression of the 1989 Tiananmen
demonstrations.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
Police and other elements of the security apparatus continue to
employ torture and degrading treatment in dealing with detained
and imprisoned persons. Both official Chinese sources and
international human rights groups reported many instances of
torture. Persons detained pending trial were particularly at
risk as a result of government failure to correct obvious
systemic weaknesses in the design and operation of the legal
system. These weaknesses include a reliance on confessions as
a basis for convictions and the lack of access to prisoners by
legal counsel and family members until after formal charges are
brought, a step which often takes months. Former detainees
have credibly reported that officials used cattle prods,
electrodes, prolonged periods of solitary confinement and
incommunicado detention, beatings, shackles, and other forms of
abuse against detained men and women. There are credible
reports that some women detainees in Tibet have been tortured,
but female prisoners do not appear to have been targeted for
rape.
In March the Supreme People's Procuratorate reported it had
investigated 378 cases where torture was used to extract
confessions in 1993, but it provided no information on
convictions or punishments. The number of actual incidents of
torture and ill-treatment by government officials is almost
certainly far greater than this number. In one case, a
policeman was given a 1-year suspended sentence for beating Yan
Zhengxue, an artist who was also a municipal people's congress
deputy from Jiaojiang in Zhejiang province. In May legislators
in Guangdong province identified 838 cases of police corruption
and brutality, but Chinese press accounts reported that only 50
of the cases had been "corrected." According to Chinese
officials, the Procuratorate has a total of 748 officials in
China's jails, "reform through labor," and "reeducation through
labor" facilities. Their responsibility is to supervise prison
management and enforce laws on treatment of prisoners.
Procuratorial offices or officers are assigned to approximately
94 percent of prisons and labor camps. Another 7,000 officials
are responsible for supervising China's detention centers.
In January Justice Minister Xiao Yang announced plans to
modernize 80 percent of China's prisons and reform through
labor facilities by the year 2000. Conditions in Chinese penal
institutions are generally harsh and frequently degrading, and
nutritional and health conditions are sometimes grim. Adequate
medical care for prisoners continues to be a problem, despite
official assurances that prisoners have the right to prompt
medical treatment if they become ill. In 1994 political
prisoners who reportedly had difficulties in obtaining timely
and adequate medical care included Bao Tong, Ren Wanding, and
Qin Yongmin. Wang Juntao was allowed to go to the United
States for medical treatment in April, and Chen Ziming was
released on medical parole in May, although he remains at home
under heavy surveillance.
Conditions of imprisonment for political prisoners vary
widely. According to credible reports, some detained
dissidents continue to be incarcerated in psychiatric
institutions and treated with drugs. Dissidents such as Wang
Wanxing, Wang Miaogen (who had chopped off four of his fingers
in a protest in 1993 over alleged persecution), and Xing
Jiandong are reportedly being held in mental hospitals in
Beijing and Shanghai. However, the lack of independent outside
access to such persons made it impossible to verify their
diagnoses or medical treatment or the conditions under which
they are being held.
Political prisoners are also often incarcerated with common
criminals. Chinese press reports claimed that Zheng Musheng, a
Christian, was beaten to death by fellow inmates, who were then
arrested. His widow filed suit against local public security
officials after Zheng died in custody in early 1994.
Unspecified "action" was taken against prison supervisory
personnel. There were credible reports that dissident Qin
Yongmin was severely beaten twice by fellow inmates in a
reeducation through labor facility in June. According to these
reports, he failed to receive adequate medical care after the
beatings.
China does not permit independent monitoring of prison
conditions. The Procuratorate, charged with law enforcement in
the corrections system, reported 39,342 law violations in
prisons, 17,823 of which were corrected. China held two rounds
of talks with the International Committee of the Red Cross in
January and April to discuss access to prisoners, but no
agreement was reached. In February five American journalists
were permitted to visit a Liaoning labor camp where political
prisoner Liu Gang is held. The journalists saw Liu through a
window but were not allowed to interview him. Reports persist
that Liu suffers ill health as a result of beatings and other
mistreatment, although Chinese officials have denied these
allegations. In February a member of the China Human Rights
Society, an organization established primarily to study and
defend China's human rights record, was allowed to meet Liu and
review his medical records in an attempt to refute reports that
he had been mistreated.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
Because the Government tightly controls information, it is
impossible to estimate accurately the total number of people
subjected to new or continued arbitrary arrest or detention.
According to one Chinese media report from 1992, authorities
have carried out close to 1 million detentions annually in
recent years under a form of detention known as "shelter for
investigation." They released some people without charge after
several days or weeks. In some cases, they charged dissidents
with "disturbing public order" or "causing social turmoil" and
sentenced them to 1 to 3 years of detention without independent
judicial review (see Section 1.e.).
Under China's Criminal Procedure Law, officials may hold
detainees for up to 10 days before a formal arrest warrant must
be approved by the Procuratorate; they must notify the
detainee's family or work unit within 24 hours. Exceptions to
these provisions include the sweeping provision that
notification may be withheld if it would "hinder the
investigation" of a case. On May 12, the Government issued
revised public order regulations setting out penalties for
social groups that fail to register with the proper authorities
or for persons on parole or deprived of political rights who
"violate regulations," as well as for several other offenses.
With some exceptions, violators can be detained for up to 15
days and fined about $23 (RMB200). In 1994 authorities
detained dissidents before high-level visits of foreign
leaders, but it is not clear whether the new public order
regulations were the basis for these detentions. Most of those
detained were released shortly after the visits ended. Others
were held for longer periods or detained formally.
In practice, authorities often disregard or circumvent limits
on detention by using regulations on "taking in for shelter and
investigation," "supervised residence," and other methods not
requiring procuratorial approval. Dissident Wei Jingsheng has
been held incommunicado in supervised residence since April 1.
Credible reports indicate that police detained several other
political activists, including Dai Xuezhong, Xiao Biguang, Zhou
Qianbing, and Zhu Fuming, for months without filing charges
against them. Wang Dan and others were also detained briefly
without charge several times during 1994.
Local officials and business leaders frequently conspire to use
detentions as a means of exerting pressure in commercial
disputes; cases in some areas have reportedly increased 50
percent over 1993. Authorities held Hong Kong businessman
Chong Kwee-Sung for 30 months in Henan while his case was being
"investigated," then released him in February without charges
being filed. Australian businessman James Peng was kidnaped by
public security officials in Macao and brought to China, where
he was held for several months before being tried in November.
Chinese officials said his detention was legal because it was
approved by the National People's Congress Standing Committee,
which has apparently not been the case in other commercial
dispute cases.
In March Procurator General Zhang Siying reported on the
problem of prisoners kept in prison past their release dates,
noting that 34,432 of 73,416 such cases had been corrected.
The legality of detentions can be challenged under the
Administrative Procedure Law, but since detainees do not have
access to lawyers, they have been unable to use this law to
obtain prompt judicial determination of the legality of their
detentions. The new State Compensation Law, passed in May,
clarified the right of citizens to recover damages for illegal
detentions. Even before the law took effect on January 1,
1995, the Chinese press reported a decision by a Beijing lower
court awarding damages to a law professor who was illegally
detained and beaten by public security officials in May. In
June a Fujian court awarded damages in a case of illegal
"taking in for shelter and investigation." There is no
judicially supervised system of bail, but at the discretion of
public security officials, some detainees are released pending
further investigation.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
According to the Constitution, the court system is equal in
authority to the State Council and the Central Military
Commission, the two most important government institutions.
All three organs are nominally under the supervision of the
National People's Congress (NPC). The Supreme People's Court
stands at the apex of the court system, followed in descending
order by the higher, intermediate, and basic people's courts.
Judges are appointed by the people's congresses at the
corresponding level. There are special courts for handling
military, maritime, and railway transport cases.
Officials insist that China's judiciary is independent but
acknowledge that it is subject to the Communist Party's policy
guidance. In practice, party and government leaders use a
variety of means to influence court verdicts and sentences.
Corruption and conflicts of interest also affect judicial
decisionmaking. In March Supreme Court officials acknowledged
problems with local protectionism and failure to conduct fair
trials, particularly in economic disputes. The Chinese press
publicized a 1993 economic case in which the court told the
parties the decision was already written before the parties had
finished producing their evidence.
In practice, officials often ignore due process rights granted
by the Constitution. Both before and after trial, prisoners
are subjected to severe psychological pressure to confess their
"errors." Defendants who fail to "show the right attitude" by
confessing their crimes are typically sentenced more harshly.
Persons appearing before a court are not presumed innocent;
despite official denials, trials are essentially sentencing
hearings. Confessions without corroborating evidence are
insufficient for a conviction under Chinese law, but coerced
confessions are not automatically excluded as evidence.
Accused persons are given virtually no opportunity to prepare
an adequate defense while their cases are being investigated, a
time when the question of guilt or innocence is essentially
decided. The law provides that defense lawyers may be retained
7 days before trial. However, in some cases, even this brief
period is shortened under regulations issued in 1983 to
accelerate the adjudication of certain serious criminal cases.
Under Chinese law, there is no requirement that the court
appoint a defense attorney for the defendant unless the
defendant is hearing impaired or a minor, although the court
may appoint defense counsel if it feels an attorney is
necessary. When attorneys do appear, they have little time to
prepare a defense and rarely contest guilt; their function is
generally confined to requesting clemency. The conviction rate
is over 90 percent. The court's permission is required before
the accused or his representative can interrogate witnesses,
produce new witnesses, or review evidence.
In some regions, experimentation with the trial system is
underway. Shanghai court officials announced plans in August
in some criminal and civil cases to expand an experiment with a
more adversarial system, which gives attorneys more
responsibility for presenting evidence and arguing the facts
during trials.
Chinese officials state that China has insufficient numbers of
lawyers to meet the country's growing needs. Knowledgeable
observers report that defense attorneys appear in only a small
number of criminal trials. As a key element in its legal
reform plans, China plans to increase the number of lawyers to
150,000 by the year 2000. As of July, there were 70,515
lawyers working in 5,885 law firms. In many cities, private
law firms are being organized outside the framework of
established government legal offices. These firms are
self-regulating and do not have their personnel or budgets
determined directly by the State. At the end of 1993, there
were 502 such firms. However, many defense lawyers, like other
Chinese, still depend on an official work unit for employment,
housing, and other benefits. They are therefore often
reluctant to be viewed as overzealous in defending individuals
accused of political offenses. In some sensitive cases,
relatives of defendants have reportedly found it difficult to
hire defense lawyers.
The Criminal Procedure Law requires that all trials be held in
public, except those involving state secrets, juveniles, or
"personal secrets." Details of cases involving
"counterrevolutionary" charges, however, have frequently been
kept secret, even from defendants' relatives, under this
provision. The 1988 Law on State Secrets affords a ready basis
for denying a public trial. Hong Kong reporter Xi Yang's trial
in March on the charge of stealing state secrets was not open
to the public (see Section 2.a.). In November journalist Gao
Yu was sentenced to 6 years in prison for "leaking state
secrets," allegedly published in the Hong Kong press. Gao's
lawyer and her relatives said they had not been notified of the
final trial or sentencing hearing (the case had been returned
twice for insufficient evidence). There is an appeals process,
but initial decisions are rarely overturned, and appeals
generally do not provide meaningful protection against
arbitrary or erroneous verdicts. Under the Criminal Procedure
Law, persons "exempted from prosecution" by procurators may
still be deemed to have a criminal record, despite the lack of
a judicial determination of guilt. Such provisions can be
applied in "counterrevolutionary crimes" as well as in ordinary
criminal offenses.
Lack of due process is particularly egregious when defendants
receive the death sentence. Chinese officials refuse to
provide comprehensive statistics on death sentences or
executions, but hundreds of executions are officially reported
annually. The actual numbers may be much higher. All death
sentences are nominally reviewed by a higher court. Reviews
are usually completed within a few days after sentencing and
consistently result in a perfunctory confirmation of sentence.
No executions for political offenses are known to have occurred
in 1994.
During 1994 new reports revived previous allegations that
organs from executed Chinese prisoners are removed and
transplanted to patients without the consent of the prisoner or
his or her family. These reports have not been verified.
In January 1995, a Ministry of Justice official said there were
a total of 1,285,000 prisoners in prisons or reform through
labor camps at the end of 1994. Prisoners can be sentenced to
these facilities only by the courts. However, government
authorities can assign persons accused of "minor" public order
offenses to "reeducation through labor" camps in an
extrajudicial process. Terms of detention run from a normal
minimum of 1 year to a maximum of 3 years. The labor
reeducation committee which determines the term of detention
may extend an inmate's sentence for an additional year.
According to Chinese officials, 153,000 detainees were in
reeducation through labor facilities at the end of 1993, up 16
percent over 1992 figures. Other estimates of the number of
inmates are considerably higher. Officials said 75,900 were
released from reeducation through labor facilities in 1993.
Under a State Council regulation issued in early 1991, those
sentenced to reeducation through labor may ask the committee to
reconsider its decision.
Since 1990 reeducation through labor sentences may also be
judicially challenged under the Administrative Procedure Law.
While some persons have obtained a reduction in or withdrawal
of their sentence after reconsideration or appeal, in practice
these procedures are not widely used, and short appeal times,
lack of access to lawyers, and other problems weaken their
effectiveness in preventing or reversing arbitrary decisions.
Government officials deny that China has any political
prisoners, asserting that persons are detained not for the
political or religious views they hold, but because they have
taken some action which violates the Criminal Law. Political
dissidents, however, are often detained or charged for having
committed "crimes of counterrevolution" under Articles 90
through 104 of the Criminal Law. Counterrevolutionary offenses
range from treason and espionage to spreading
counterrevolutionary propaganda. The authorities also used
these articles to punish persons who organized demonstrations,
disrupted traffic, disclosed official information to
foreigners, or formed associations outside state control. In
December, 9 of 16 defendants tried in Beijing in July were
sentenced to prison terms ranging from 3 to 20 years for
leading or participating in "counterrevolutionary groups" or
conducting "counterrevolutionary propaganda and incitement."
One defendant was sentenced to two years of "supervision," one
was excused before trial for medical reasons, and charges
against five others were dropped. All 16 defendants had been
held in pretrial detention for more than 2 years. In other
cases, the system of reeducation through labor is used to deal
with political offenders. Qin Yongmin was sentenced to 2
years' reeducation through labor in January for "creating
turmoil," apparently for his role as founder of the "Peace
Charter" group in 1993. Labor activist Zhang Lin and lawyer
Zhou Guoqiang were reportedly sentenced to 3-year terms of
reeducation through labor in September, as were activists Bao
Ge, Yang Zhou, Li Guotao, and Yang Qingheng in October. Liu
Huanwen was sentenced to 2 years' reeducation through labor in
August. Shanghai Human Rights Association member Dai Xuezhong
was sentenced to 3 years for alleged tax evasion in December.
Wei Jingsheng's secretary, Tong Yi, began serving a 2 1/2 year
sentence of reeducation through labor in late December for
allegedly forging an official stamp. Dissidents such as Fu
Shenqi and Zhang Xianliang are also still being held in
reeducation through labor facilities and are reportedly in poor
health.
In January an official from the Chinese Ministry of Justice
said there were 2,678 people serving sentences for
counterrevolutionary crimes at the end of 1994. Chinese
officials told an American human rights monitor in June that as
of the end of March there were 2,935 people serving sentences
for counterrevolutionary crimes, down from 3,172 in December
1993. These figures include people convicted of espionage or
other internationally recognized criminal offenses but do not
include political prisoners detained but not charged; political
or religious activists held in reeducation through labor camps;
and persons detained or convicted for criminal offenses due
solely to their nonviolent political or religious activities.
The Government released on parole during 1994 several Chinese
prisoners who were detained for political or religious reasons,
including prominent activists Wang Juntao, Chen Ziming, Ding
Junze, Yulo Dawa Tsering, and others. Nevertheless, many
others, including Wei Jingsheng, Ren Wanding, Bao Tong, and Liu
Gang, remained imprisoned or under other forms of detention in
1994. Some of those released in 1994 or earlier, such as Chen
Ziming and Wang Dan, remain under close police surveillance and
suffer from occasional police harassment, making it difficult
for them to live a normal life. Wang Dan, for example, was
threatened physically in December by undercover police
officers, some of whom continued surveillance outside his
home. Fearing physical harm, Wang disappeared from public view
for 4 weeks before returning home.
Many political prisoners are subject to "deprivation of
political rights" even after their period of parole has
expired. This status further limits their rights of free
speech and association. With a criminal record, their status
in society, ability to be employed, freedom to travel, and
numerous other aspects of their lives are often severely
restricted, although economic reform and social change have
ameliorated these problems somewhat. The families of political
prisoners are also adversely affected; sometimes family members
encounter difficulty in obtaining or keeping employment and
housing. For example, Zhang Fengying, wife of imprisoned
activist Ren Wanding, and her teenage daughter were evicted
from their apartment, owned by Ren's work unit, in 1992 and
remained in poor housing during 1994.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
Changes in the economic structure, including the growing
diversity of employment opportunities and the increasing market
orientation of many work units, are undermining the ability of
the authorities to monitor and regulate personal and family
life as closely as in the past, particularly in rural areas.
In urban areas, however, most people still depend on their
government-linked work unit for housing, permission to have a
child, approval to apply for a passport, and other aspects of
ordinary life. The work unit, along with the neighborhood
committee, is charged with monitoring activities and attitudes.
Although the law requires search warrants before security
forces can search premises, this provision is often ignored.
In addition, both the Public Security Bureau and procuracy
apparently can issue search warrants on their own authority.
The 1982 Constitution states that "freedom and privacy of
correspondence of citizens ... are protected by law," but in
practice, authorities record some telephone conversations and
some mail is opened and censored. Government security organs
monitor and sometimes restrict contact between foreigners and
Chinese citizens, particularly dissidents. Rules issued in
July implementing the State Security Law define "activities of
individuals outside the country (including non-Chinese citizens
resident in China) who disregard dissuasion and meet with
personnel in the country who have endangered state security or
who are seriously suspected of endangering state security" as a
violation of the State Security Law.
The Government has continued its effort to control citizens'
access to outside sources of information, selectively jamming
Chinese language broadcasts of the Voice of America (VOA) and
British Broadcasting Corporation. The effectiveness of the
jamming varies considerably by region, with audible signals of
VOA and other broadcasters reaching most parts of China.
China's population has roughly doubled in the past 40 years to
1.18 billion people. In the 1970's and 1980's, China adopted a
comprehensive and highly intrusive one-child family planning
policy. This policy most heavily affects Han Chinese in urban
areas. Urban couples seldom obtain permission to have a second
child. However, exceptions are allowed for the 70 percent of
Han who live in rural areas, and ethnic minorities are subject
to less stringent population controls. Enforcement of the
family planning policy is inconsistent, varying widely from
place to place and year to year.
The population control policy relies on education, propaganda,
and economic incentives, as well as more coercive measures,
including psychological pressure and economic penalties.
Rewards for couples who adhere to the policy include monthly
stipends and preferential medical and educational benefits.
Disciplinary measures against those who violate the policy
include fines, withholding of social services, demotion, and
other administrative punishments, such as loss of employment.
Unpaid fines have sometimes resulted in confiscation or
destruction of personal property. Because penalties for excess
births can be levied against local officials and the mothers'
work units, many individuals are affected, providing multiple
sources of pressure.
Physical compulsion to submit to abortion or sterilization is
not authorized, but Chinese officials acknowledge privately
that there are instances of forced abortions and
sterilizations. Officials maintain that, when discovered,
responsible officials are disciplined and undergo retraining.
They admit, however, that stronger punishment is rare.
Individuals can also sue officials who have exceeded their
authority in implementing family planning policy, but
government officials have not provided data on the number of
successful suits on these grounds.
Regulations forbid sex-selective abortion, but because of the
traditional preference for male children, particularly in rural
areas, some families have used ultrasound to identify and abort
female fetuses. Use of ultrasound for this purpose was
specifically prohibited by the Maternal and Child Health Law
passed in October, which prescribes penalties for medical
practitioners who violate this provision. The Chinese press
has reported that the ratio of male to female births is 114 to
100, based on a nationwide average, while the statistical norm
is 106 male births to 100 female. The ratio excludes many
female births, especially the second or third in a family,
which are unreported to permit the parents to keep trying to
conceive a boy, but may also reflect the abuse of sonography.
Female infanticide may also be a factor in some areas of China.
At least five provincial governments have implemented
regulations seeking to prevent people with severe mental
handicaps from having children. In October China passed a
national Maternal and Child Care Law calling for premarital and
prenatal examinations to determine whether couples have acute
infectious diseases, certain mental illnesses (not including
mental retardation), or are at risk for passing on debilitating
genetic diseases. The law goes into effect on June 1, 1995,
and implementing regulations defining which diseases or
conditions will be covered have not yet been completed. The
law will be implemented by the Ministry of Health, not the
State Family Planning Commission, and while it includes
provisions for abortion or sterilization in some cases based on
medical advice, it provides for obtaining a second opinion and
mandates that patients or their guardians give written consent
to such procedures. (See also Section 5 on People with
Disabilities.)
There were no reported cases of prosecution of parents for
teaching their children religion in the privacy of their home.
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
Although the Constitution states that freedom of speech and
freedom of the press are fundamental rights enjoyed by all
Chinese citizens, the Government interprets the Communist
Party's "leading role" as circumscribing these rights. It does
not permit citizens to publish or broadcast criticism of senior
leaders or opinions that contradict basic Communist Party
doctrine, which provides for a Socialist state under the
party's leadership. The Government and party maintained strict
control over published expression of dissenting views in 1994.
Public security authorities briefly detained several foreign
journalists in March, April, and May after they had interviewed
or attempted to interview noted dissidents or their relatives.
Under China's State Security Law, "official secrets" are
broadly defined, and interpretation is left to the Ministries
of State Security and Public Security. Hong Kong reporter Xi
Yang was convicted of "spying and stealing state secrets" after
a closed trial in March. He was sentenced to 12 years'
imprisonment and 2 years' deprivation of political rights for
allegedly obtaining "financial and economic secrets," including
information on China's interest rates and plans to sell gold.
Tian Ye, the bank official who allegedly supplied Xi with the
information, was sentenced to 15 years' imprisonment and 3
years' deprivation of political rights. After a closed trial,
former journalist Gao Yu was sentenced to 6 years' imprisonment
in November for "leaking state secrets abroad." (See Section
1.e.)
The party and the Government continue to control print and
broadcast media and compel them to propagate the currently
acceptable ideological line. In June press guidelines called
on reporters to protect state secrets, avoid corruption, and
not publicize "sensitive subjects." Despite these admonitions,
the lively tabloid sector continued to expand in 1994, while
circulation of major propaganda-oriented dailies continued to
decline. Radio talk shows remained popular, and, while
generally avoiding politically sensitive subjects, they
provided opportunities to air grievances about public issues.
A small but rapidly growing segment of the population has
access to satellite television broadcasts. Satellite
television dishes are widely available for sale, and a
licensing scheme begun in October 1993, which controls purchase
and possession of the equipment, has been implemented at best
unevenly.
The Government's ability to control the production and
dissemination of publications continued to diminish in 1994.
Fierce competition and dwindling government subsidies have
increased opportunities for private publishers and
booksellers. Some credible estimates hold that, at the end of
1993, as much as one-third of all books were being published
through these unsanctioned channels. In April officials
announced the number of licensed publications would be frozen
at current levels. Shenzhen authorities confiscated a thousand
copies of "Tendency Quarterly" and briefly detained its founder
in January. In May 45 newspapers and periodicals were banned
for illegally reselling their publishing licenses. Seven film
directors were banned in March for entering their works in an
overseas film festival without going through official channels.
The Government has continued to impose heavy ideological
controls on colleges, universities, and research institutes.
As a result, many intellectuals and scholars, fearing that
books or papers on political topics would be deemed too
sensitive to be published, feel compelled to exercise
self-censorship. In areas such as economic policy or legal
reform, there was greater official tolerance for comment and
criticism.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
While the Constitution provides for freedom of peaceful
assembly and association, the Government severely restricted
these rights in practice. The Constitution provides, for
example, that such activities may not infringe "upon the
interests of the State"; protests against the political system
or its leaders are prohibited. Although some small-scale
demonstrations on nonpolitical grievances are tolerated in
practice, demonstrations involving expression of dissident
political views are denied permits and suppressed if held.
Police detained Zhou Guoqiang and Yuan Hongbing in March,
reportedly in part due to their presentation of a petition on
human rights and worker rights to the NPC during its annual
plenary session. Press reports from a Chinese-controlled
service also accused Zhou of planning to sell "political"
T-shirts while the NPC was in session.
The Communist Party organizes and controls most professional
and other mass associations. Regulations promulgated in 1990
require all organizations to be officially registered and
approved. Ostensibly aimed at secret societies and criminal
gangs, the regulations also deter the formation of unauthorized
political or labor organizations. Authorities in Shanghai
refused to allow several individuals to register a proposed
"human rights association," and some members of the group were
subsequently detained (see Section 4). In March Liu Nianchun
was denied permission to register the Association for
Protection of Labor Rights; Liu himself was detained in May but
released in October. No charges were filed against him.
c. Freedom of Religion
The Government subjects religious freedom to restrictions of
varying severity, although the number of believers continues to
grow. While the Constitution affirms toleration of religious
beliefs, government regulations restrict religious practice to
government-controlled religious organizations and registered
places of worship. The Government supervises the publication
of religious material for distribution. There are persistent
complaints that the number of Bibles and other religious
materials allowed to be printed falls far short of demand.
Religious affairs bureaus, which are staffed by officials who
rarely are religious believers, provide "guidance and
supervision" over implementation of government regulations on
religion. In a Catholic seminary in Chengdu, all the
seminarians walked out in April to protest party interference
in the operation of the school. Communist Party officials
state that party membership and religious belief are
incompatible. This places a serious limitation on religious
believers, since party membership is required for almost all
high positions in government and state-owned businesses.
There are no specific bans on particular religious groups, but
the treatment of religious believers and organizations varies
widely. Unregistered or "house" church leaders and members are
harassed in some regions but tolerated in others.
Nonmainstream sects are often singled out. Credible reports
indicate members of an evangelical sect known as "Shouters"
continued to be harassed, detained, fined, and imprisoned in
Henan after the group was deemed "counterrevolutionary" in 1984.
After forcefully suppressing all religious observances during
the 1966-76 Cultural Revolution, the Government began in the
late 1970's to restore or replace damaged or confiscated
churches, temples, mosques, and monasteries. The official
religious organizations administer more than a dozen Catholic
and Protestant seminaries, nine institutes to train Imams and
Islamic scholars, and institutes to train Buddhist monks.
Students who attend these institutes must demonstrate
"political reliability," and all graduates must pass an
examination on their theological and political knowledge to
qualify for the clergy. The Government permitted some Catholic
seminarians, Muslim clerics, and Buddhist clergy to go abroad
for additional religious studies in 1994.
The authorities permit officially sanctioned religious
organizations to maintain international contacts as long as
these do not entail foreign control. In January China
promulgated regulations on religious practices by foreigners
and on places of religious activities. The regulations
codified many existing rules, including a ban on proselytizing
by foreigners, but allow foreign nationals to preach to
foreigners, bring in religious materials for their own use, and
preach to Chinese in churches, mosques, and temples at the
invitation of registered religious organizations. In practice,
some discreet proselytizing and distribution of religious texts
by foreigners outside official channels is tolerated.
Buddhists are by far the largest body of religious believers in
China. The Government estimates that there are 100 million
Chinese Buddhists, most of whom are from the dominant Han
ethnic group. (A discussion of government restrictions on
Tibetan Buddhism can be found in the addendum to this report.)
According to government figures, there are 17 million Muslims
in China. In some areas with large Muslim populations,
officials continue to restrict the building of mosques and the
religious education of youths under 18. Following the 1990
unrest in Xinjiang, the authorities issued regulations further
restricting religious activities and teaching. Ningxia
authorities issued regulations in July forbidding religious
bodies from interfering in administrative affairs, including
education, marriage, and family planning.
China permits Muslim citizens to make the hajj to Mecca, and
the number of those making the hajj has significantly increased
in recent years. About 3,000 officially sponsored Chinese made
the hajj in 1993; many more traveled at their own expense.
The number of Christians continues to grow rapidly. Only those
Christian churches affiliated with either the Catholic
Patriotic Association or the (Protestant) Three Self Patriotic
Movement, which the Government established in the 1950's to
eliminate perceived foreign domination of Christian groups, may
operate openly.
Active unofficial religious movements pose an alternative to
the state-regulated churches, although in some areas there is
tacit cooperation between official and unofficial churches.
The unofficial, Vatican-affiliated, Catholic Church claims a
membership far larger than the 4 million registered with the
official Catholic Church, though actual figures are unknown.
In addition to the 6 million persons who are officially counted
as following Protestantism, a large number of Protestants
worship privately in "house churches" that are independent of
government control.
There continued to be credible reports in 1994 of efforts by
authorities in some areas to rein in activities of the
unapproved Catholic and Protestant movements, including raiding
and closing a number of unregistered churches. Two Protestant
house churches in Shenzhen were reportedly closed and their
leaders briefly detained. Several Hong Kong-based Christian
missionaries were detained for a few days in Henan in February
for violating regulations on religious activities by
foreigners; several Chinese Christians also detained in
connection with the incident were released later. In November,
in another town in Henan, a preacher from Taiwan and 152 local
Christians were reportedly detained on charges of unauthorized
proselytizing by foreigners (under the January religious
regulations, Chinese from Hong Kong and Taiwan are covered by
the rules governing foreigners). Ten are still in custody; the
rest reportedly were released after paying fines of
approximately $118 (1,000 RMB). The Guangzhou house church of
Pastor Samuel Lamb (Lin Xiangao) continued to operate openly
but was subject to limited harassment by the authorities.
Elsewhere, authorities tolerate the existence of unofficial
Catholic and Protestant churches as long as they remain small
and discreet.
A number of religious activists remained imprisoned in 1994.
There was some evidence that authorities have increasingly used
short-term detentions, rather than long prison terms when
dealing with unauthorized religious activities. Pan Yiyuan,
leader of a house church in Fujian, was detained in March and
released in December. Wei Jingyi was redetained in January in
Hebei less than a year after finishing a 3-year sentence to
reeducation through labor. Two church members from Anhui were
reportedly sentenced to 2 years' reeducation through labor in
September, reportedly for contacting "anti-China overseas
organizations." Father Gu Zheng was reportedly detained in
Xinjiang in October for teaching in an unregistered Catholic
seminary. Father Vincent Qin Guoliang was sentenced to 3
years' reeducation through labor in November in Qinghai
province. Bishop Su Zhiming was detained briefly in January
after meeting with a visiting U.S. Congressman. Authorities in
Jiangxi reportedly redetained Bishop Zeng Jingmu in September
after holding him for a few days in August. Father Liao
Haiqing, also detained in September, was released in November.
Several other religious activists were released in 1994,
although the whereabouts of some reported to have been released
could not be confirmed, and others remained under some
restrictions. Pei Ronggui and Jia Zhiguo were released in late
January or early February; Zhang Ruiyu, Chen Zhuman, Cui Tai,
Yan Peizhi, Xu Zhihe and Zhang Li were released in May. In
April a visiting American religious figure was told that Han
Dingxiang, Fan Zhongliang, Liu Guangdong, and others had been
released. In November the U.N. Special Rapporteur on Religious
Intolerance made a 10-day visit to China, including Tibet, at
the invitation of the Chinese Government.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
The effectiveness of the Government's identification card
system used to control and restrict individual residence
location within the country continued to erode in 1994. The
"floating population" migrating to China's urban areas from the
countryside is estimated at anywhere from 50 to 100 million.
In January the Government announced the household registration
system would be revamped to adapt to the new situation.
However, because this itinerant population lacks official
status, access to housing, schooling, and the full range of
employment opportunities can be restricted.
Some former inmates have been denied permission, under the
"staying at prison employment" system, to return to their
homes, a provision applicable to those incarcerated in both the
"reform through labor" and the "reeducation through labor"
systems. For those assigned to camps far from their
residences, this constitutes a form of internal exile. The
number of prisoners subject to this restriction is unknown.
Others have reportedly been forced to accept jobs in state
enterprises where they can be more closely supervised after
their release from prison or detention.
The Government routinely permits legal emigration and most
foreign travel. There was progress during 1994 in several
cases in which the Government had denied passports for
political reasons. Legal scholar Yu Haocheng finally obtained
a passport and exit permit in May, as did several relatives of
dissidents currently residing abroad. Although regulations
promulgated in 1990 require college graduates to repay the cost
of their free postsecondary education by working for 5 years
before going abroad, students wishing to go abroad still manage
to obtain passports. The Government continues to use political
attitudes as a major criterion in selecting people for
government-sponsored study abroad.
The Government continued its efforts to attract persons who
have studied overseas back to China. Official media have said
that before returning home, Chinese citizens who have joined
foreign organizations hostile to China should quit them and
refrain from activities which violate Chinese law. The
authorities continued to refuse to allow labor activist Han
Dongfang to return to China after revoking his passport in 1993
on the grounds that he engaged in activities hostile to China
while overseas. In November authorities stopped poet Bei Dao
at Beijing Airport and reportedly interrogated him overnight
about his position as director of Human Rights in China, a
U.S.-based organization. He was then refused entry into
China. Some former student leaders who were active in the 1989
Tiananmen demonstrations reportedly continue to have difficulty
getting permission to return to China.
The Government accepts the repatriation of citizens who have
entered other countries or territories illegally. In 1994, in
addition to the routine return of Chinese illegal immigrants
found in Hong Kong, the Government permitted the return of
several large groups of illegal immigrants from other countries.
Citizens illegally smuggled to other countries are often
detained for a short time to determine identity and any past
criminal record or involvement in smuggling activities. As a
deterrent and to recover local costs incurred during the
repatriation, the authorities in some areas levy a fine of
$1,000 or more on returnees.
Currently there is no law authorizing the authorities to grant
refugee status, and they generally repatriate persons of other
nationalities seeking to be recognized as refugees. The
Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Public Security, and Civil
Affairs, in collaboration with the U.N. High Commissioner for
Refugees, are writing legislation that would allow China to
honor its obligation as a party since 1982 to the Geneva
Convention in regard to refugees.
Although the Government denies having tightened its policy on
accepting Vietnamese refugees, in recent years very few such
refugees have actually been resettled in China. China has not
signed the Comprehensive Plan of Action negotiated at the
Geneva International Conference on Indochinese Refugees in
1989, but it generally has abided by its principles.
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government
Citizens lack the means to change their government legally and
cannot freely choose or change the laws and officials that
govern them. Citizens vote directly only for county-level
people's congress delegates. People's congress delegates at
the provincial level are selected by county-level people's
congresses, and in turn provincial-level people's congresses
select delegates to the National People's Congress. According
to the 1982 Constitution, the National People's Congress (NPC)
is the highest organ of state power. It elects the President
and Vice President, decides on the choice of the Premier, and
elects the Chairman of the Central Military Commission. In
some elections (but not for the central Government positions
chosen by the NPC), voters are offered more candidates than
positions, allowing a modest degree of choice among officially
approved candidates. There were credible reports that the
candidates most favored by authorities were defeated in some
local elections, particularly at the village level.
There are no restrictions placed on the participation of women
or minority groups in the political process, and women make up
14 percent of Communist Party membership. However, the
election and agenda of people's congresses at all levels remain
under tight control by the Communist Party, the paramount
source of political authority in China. The Constitution was
amended in 1993 to ratify the existence of small "democratic"
parties, but these play only a minor consultative role at most,
and all pledge allegiance to the Communist Party. Thus, the
Communist Party retains an explicit monopoly on political
decisionmaking.
The requirement that associations register and be approved
makes it difficult for independent interest groups to form and
affect the system. Several persons who petitioned the NPC
calling for greater attention to human rights and workers'
rights, including Zhou Guoqiang, Yuan Hongbing, and others,
were detained by authorities in March and April. Zhou Guoqiang
was sentenced in September to 3 years' reeducation through
labor (see Section 1.e.).
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
of Human Rights
There are no independent Chinese organizations that publicly
monitor or comment on human rights conditions in China. The
Government has made it clear it will not tolerate the existence
of such groups. In April Shanghai officials denied a request
for permission to register by the Chinese Human Rights
Association, a group founded by Yang Zhou and other
dissidents. The decision was justified on the grounds that the
group was not affiliated with an official organization. The
authorities subsequently detained most of the members of the
group, but it is not clear whether their detentions resulted
solely from their involvement in the group. Wang Dan, a 1989
student activist, was repeatedly detained for brief periods in
1994 after announcing his intention to investigate China's
human rights situation. (See also Section 1.d.)
The Government has promoted limited academic study and
discussion of concepts of human rights since 1991. Research
institutes in Shanghai and Beijing, including the Chinese
Academy of Social Sciences, have organized symposia on human
rights issues, established human rights research centers, and
visited other countries to study human rights practices in
those nations. In 1993 the Government formed the China Society
for Human Rights Studies as a "nongovernmental organization";
its efforts have focused largely on improving China's image
abroad and responding to criticism of China's human rights
record. In June the Society issued comments on the 1993 U.S.
State Department Human Rights Report which stridently defended
Chinese practices and glossed over fundamental human rights
abuses that the Government continues to perpetrate.
The Government reiterated in April that China agrees to abide
by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other
international human rights documents. Despite this public
statement, Chinese officials accept only in theory the
universality of human rights. They argue instead that a
nation's political, economic, and social system and its unique
historical, religious, and cultural background determine its
concept of human rights. To advocate this nonuniversal view,
and to deflect attempts to discuss its human rights record,
China was active in 1994 in international forums, including the
annual U.N. Human Rights Commission meeting.
The Government remains reluctant to accept criticism of its
human rights practices by other nations or international
organizations and often criticized reports by international
human rights monitoring groups in 1994. Nevertheless,
officials no longer dismiss all discussion of human rights as
interference in the country's internal affairs. Chinese
authorities continued their limited dialog with foreign
governments on human rights issues in talks with a number of
visiting delegations from other countries, and also during
visits abroad by Chinese leaders. At the request of the U.S.
Government in 1993, the Chinese Government provided limited
information about the status of several hundred persons
believed to be imprisoned for their political or religious
beliefs. As noted in Section 2.c., in November the U.N.
Special Rapporteur on Religious Intolerance visited China for
10 days at the invitation of the Chinese Government. His visit
included a trip to Lhasa, capital of the Tibet Autonomous
Region.
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Disability, Language, or Social Status
Laws exist that seek to protect women, children, the disabled,
and minorities. In practice, social discrimination based on
ethnicity, gender, and disability has persisted and the concept
of a largely homogeneous Chinese people pervades the general
thinking of the Han majority.
Women
The 1982 Constitution states that "women enjoy equal rights
with men in all spheres of life," including ownership of
property, inheritance rights, and access to education. In 1992
the NPC enacted legislation on the protection of the rights and
interests of women which was designed to assist in curbing
sex-related discrimination. Women continued, however, to
report discrimination, sexual harassment, unfair dismissal,
demotion, and wage cuts. Women are sometimes the unintended
victims of economic reforms designed to streamline enterprises
and give workers greater job mobility. A survey of the
All-China Federation of Trade Unions found that women made up
60 percent of those forced to leave their jobs due to
enterprise cutbacks or reorganizations in 1993. Many employers
prefer to hire men to avoid the expense of maternity leave and
child-care, and some even lowered the retirement age for female
workers to 40 years of age. Although Chinese law promises
equal pay for equal work, a 1990 survey found that women's
salaries averaged 77 percent of men's. Most women employed in
industry work in lower-skilled and lower-paid jobs.
In June the Government issued a white paper on the situation of
Chinese women, spurred by plans to host the Fourth World
Conference on Women in Beijing in 1995. According to the white
paper, women hold relatively few positions of significant
influence within the party or government structure (there are
no women in the 22-member Politburo), although 21 percent of
national People's Congress delegates and 13 percent of members
of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference are
women. While the gap in the education levels of men and women
is narrowing, men continue to constitute the majority of the
educated, particularly the highly educated. For example, the
white paper reported that in 1992, women made up 33.7 percent
of college students, and 24.8 percent of postgraduates. From
1982 to 1993, 4.9 percent of doctoral degrees were awarded to
women.
The Government continued in 1994 to condemn strongly and take
steps to prevent and punish the abduction and sale of women for
marriage or prostitution, violence against women, and female
infanticide. It has severely punished and in some cases
executed a number of people accused of such crimes. In a case
reported in the Chinese press in December, a gang of 48 people
in Anhui province received sentences ranging from 19 years to
death for abducting, raping, and selling 102 women. The case
was the most serious which has become known to date. The
abduction of women remains a serious problem, especially in
those areas where local officials have resisted efforts of
central authorities to stop it. According to figures announced
by the Ministry of Public Security in January, there were
15,000 cases of abduction and trafficking in women and children
in 1993.
One report from Inner Mongolia blamed part of the problem of
abduction and selling of women on a serious imbalance in sex
ratios in one county, where there were 115 men for every 100
women. The question of male/female birth ratios and
traditional preferences for boys is discussed in Section 1.f.
Although Chinese authorities have enacted laws and conducted
educational campaigns to eradicate the traditional preference
for sons, in many areas this preference remains strong,
especially in rural China. A number of provinces have sought
to reduce the perceived higher value of boys in providing old-
age support for their parents by establishing or improving
pensions and retirement homes.
Nationwide statistics on the extent of physical violence
against women are not available, but a survey of 2,100 families
by the Beijing Society for Research on Marriage and the Family
published in March, showed that one-fifth of all wives had been
abused by their spouses. One government study indicated 2
percent of urban households and 5 percent of rural ones had
serious problems of domestic violence.
Children
China does not condone violence against children, and physical
abuse can be grounds for criminal prosecution. In 1992 China's
Law on the Protection of Juveniles was enacted. It forbids
infanticide, as well as mistreatment or abandonment of
children. The law also prohibits discrimination against
handicapped minors, emphasizes the importance of safety and
morality, and codifies a variety of judicial protections for
juvenile offenders. The Chinese press continues to report
instances of child abuse, for example a December case in which
a mother beat her daughter to death despite several prior
warnings to stop abusing the child. In one case publicized in
the Chinese press, a hospital successfully sued a father for
abandoning his infant twin daughters soon after their birth.
He was given a 1-year suspended sentence. Female and
especially handicapped children represent a disproportionate
percentage of those abandoned. Kidnaping and buying and
selling of children continued to be a problem in some rural
areas. China's extensive health care delivery system has led
to a sharp decline in infant mortality rates and improved child
health. According to Chinese media, China's infant mortality
rate declined to 31 per 1,000 live births in 1994.
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities
The 55 designated ethnic minorities constitute just over 8
percent of China's total population. Most minority groups
reside in areas they have traditionally inhabited, many of
which are in mountainous or remote parts of China. China's
minorities benefit from a policy of preferential treatment in
marriage policy, family planning, university admission, and
employment. While the standard of living for most minorities
has improved in recent years, incomes in these areas are often
well below the national average. The Government has programs
to provide low interest loans, subsidies, and special
development funds for minority areas. While these government
development policies have helped raise minority living
standards, they have also disrupted traditional living
patterns.
The central Government has tried to adopt policies responsive
to minority sensitivities, but in doing so has encountered the
dilemma of how to respect minority cultures without damaging
minority educational and economic opportunities. In many areas
with a significant population of minorities, there are
two-track school systems using standard Chinese and minority
languages. Students can choose which system to attend. One
acknowledged side effect of this policy to protect and maintain
minority cultures has been reinforcement of a segregated
society. Under this separate education system, those
graduating from minority schools are at a disadvantage when
competing for jobs in government and business, which require
good spoken Chinese. These graduates must take Chinese
language instruction before attending universities and colleges.
The Communist Party has an avowed policy of boosting minority
representation in the Government and the party. Many
minorities occupy local leadership positions, and a few have
positions at the national level. However, in most areas,
ethnic minorities are effectively shut out of most positions of
real political and decisionmaking power. Some minorities
resent Han officials holding key positions in minority
autonomous regions. Ethnic minorities in Tibet, Xinjiang, and
elsewhere have at times demonstrated against Han Chinese
authority. Central authorities have made it clear that they
will not tolerate opposition to Communist Party rule in
minority regions.
People with Disabilities
In 1990 China adopted legislation protecting the rights of
China's 54.64 million disabled. However, as with many other
aspects of Chinese society, reality for China's handicapped
lags far behind the legal provisions. Misdiagnosis, inadequate
medical care, pariah status, and abandonment remain the norm
for China's disabled population.
Statistics on education reveal the inequity of resources
afforded the handicapped in China: only 6 percent of disabled
school children receive primary education. The illiteracy
rate among the disabled is 60 percent, and school attendance
averages only 20 percent for blind, deaf, or mentally retarded
children.
In May the China Welfare Fund for the Handicapped, headed by
Deng Pufang, son of retired senior leader Deng Xiaoping,
announced plans to raise the employment rate and the education
enrollment rate of the disabled to 80 percent by the year 2000,
increase vocational training, and promote research on
disabilities in China. All state enterprises are required to
hire a certain number of disabled workers, but Chinese
authorities estimate that 40 percent of disabled people are
jobless.
In May China adopted standards for making roads and buildings
accessible for the handicapped. The 1990 Law on the
Handicapped, however, calls for "gradual" implementation of the
standards. A low level of compliance with the regulations to
date has resulted in limited access to most buildings for
China's physically handicapped.
The new Maternal and Child Health Care Law passed in October
postpones the marriage of persons with certain specified
contagious diseases or certain acute mental illnesses such as
schizophrenia. If doctors find that a couple is at risk of
transmitting disabling congenital defects to their children,
the couple may marry only if they agree to use birth control or
undergo sterilization. The law mandates premarital and
prenatal examination for genetic or contagious diseases, and it
specifies that medically advised abortion or sterilization
require the signed consent of the patients or their guardians.
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
China's 1982 Constitution provides for "freedom of
association," but this right is heavily diluted by references
to the interest of the State and the leadership of the Chinese
Communist Party. The country's sole officially recognized
workers' organization, the All-China Federation of Trade Unions
(ACFTU) is controlled by the Communist Party. Independent
trade unions are illegal. Though ACFTU officials recognize
that workers' interests may not always coincide with those of
the Communist Party, the trade union law passed by the NPC in
March 1992 stated that the ACFTU is a party organ, and its
primary purpose is to mobilize workers for national
development. The 1993 revised Trade Union Law required that
the establishment of unions at any level be submitted to a
higher level trade union organization for approval. The ACFTU,
the highest level organization, has not approved the
establishment of independent unions. Attempts to form or
register independent unions have been severely repressed (see
Section 1.e. and 2.b.). There are no provisions allowing for
individual workers or unofficial worker organizations to
affiliate with international bodies. The vast majority of
workers have no contact with any union other than the ACFTU.
Credible reports indicate that the Government has attempted to
stamp out clandestine union activity. In March a petition
calling, among other things, for workers to have "freedom from
exploitation," the right to strike, and the right to organize
nonofficial trade unions was circulated in Beijing. Chinese
authorities later detained Zhou Guoqiang, (an associate of Han
Dongfang, see Section 2.d.) Yuan Hongbing, and Wang Jiaqi after
they presented the petition; Zhou was sentenced in September
to 3 years' reeducation through labor, although the charges
against him were reportedly not linked to the petition.
Accurate figures are not available on the number of Worker
Autonomous Federation detainees still being held after the 1989
Tiananmen Square demonstrations.
The ACFTU's primary attention remains focused on its
traditional constituency, state sector workers. The Trade
Union Law mandates that workers may decide whether to join the
union in their enterprise. By official estimate, 10 percent of
workers in collectively and state-owned enterprises have chosen
for their own reasons not to join. There have been no reports
of repercussions for workers who have not joined ACFTU unions.
Diversification of enterprise types over the last decade of
reform has vastly increased the number of workers outside the
traditional sphere of the ACFTU. Over half of China's
nonagricultural work force is now largely unorganized and
outside the state industrial structure, in collectives,
township and village enterprises, private and individual
enterprises, and foreign-invested enterprises. In township and
village enterprises, one of the fastest growing sectors of the
economy, only 0.1 percent of workers are organized in ACFTU
affiliates.
Workers in companies with foreign investors are guaranteed the
right to form unions, which must affiliate with the ACFTU.
According to ACFTU statistics, 60 percent of workers in
foreign-invested companies had joined unions by December 1994.
Unofficial Embassy surveys suggest a more accurate estimate of
unionization of employees in foreign-invested enterprises might
be closer to 40 percent. According to press reports, 14
coastal provinces issued regulations requiring all
foreign-invested enterprises to establish unions by the end of
1994. Enforcement of these regulations appears to have been
haphazard. Guangdong province, recipient of much of China's
foreign investment, reported 40-percent unionization of
foreign-invested enterprises in December 1994.
The right to strike, which had been included in China's 1975
and 1978 constitutions, was not retained in the 1982
Constitution. In general, the Union Law assigns unions the
role of mediators or go-betweens with management in cases of
work stoppages or slowdowns. Nonetheless, work stoppages
occurred in several locations in China during 1994. One of the
largest well-documented cases occurred when 1,300 workers in a
foreign-invested enterprise in Shekou in Guangdong province
struck over working conditions. Beginning in 1993, the
Ministry of Labor no longer officially denied the existence of
strikes in China. In 1994 Ministry of Labor officials provided
detailed statistics on the number and type of labor disputes.
The statistics, based on National Mediation Center and Labor
Bureau records, reveal a 50-percent increase in disputes in
1993. Ministry of Labor arbitration bureaus across China
recorded 12,358 disputes involving 34,794 workers. Of these,
all but 1,173 were initiated by workers. According to the
Ministry of Labor, roughly two-thirds of the disputes were
settled through mediation or arbitration, 334 were taken to
court, and 244 resulted in strikes.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
The long-awaited National Labor Law, passed by the NPC's
Standing Committee on July 5, permits workers in all types of
enterprises in China to bargain collectively. The law, which
will take effect January 1, 1995, supersedes a 1988 law that
allowed collective bargaining only by workers in private
enterprises. Some high-profile experiments in collective
bargaining have been carried out at state enterprises, notably
the Shanghai Number Five Iron and Steel Plant. In the past,
the ACFTU has limited its role to consulting with management
over wages and regulations affecting working conditions and
serving as a conduit for communicating workers' complaints to
management or municipal labor bureaus. The ACFTU has shown
concern about protecting workers' living standards in areas
such as unemployment insurance and argued in 1993 that the
traditional definition of workers should be expanded to include
peasants laboring in China's township and village enterprises.
Before wage reform, workers' wages were set according to a
uniform national scale, based on seniority and skills. Since
wage reform, a total wage bill for each collective and
state-owned enterprise is set by the Ministry of Labor
according to four criteria: 1) as a percentage of profits, 2)
as a contract amount with the local labor bureau, 3) for money
losing enterprises, according to a state-set amount, or 4) as
an enterprise-set amount subject to Labor Ministry review.
Individual enterprises determine how to divide the total among
workers, a decision usually made by the enterprise manager in
consultation with the enterprise party chief and the ACFTU
representative. Worker congresses (see below) have mandated
authority to review plans for wage reform, though these bodies
serve primarily as rubberstamp organizations. Wages are
generally equal for the same type of work within enterprises.
Incentives are provided for increased productivity. Under the
new Labor Law, wages may be set according to conditions set out
in collective contracts negotiated between ACFTU representatives
and management. In practice, only the small number of workers
with high technical skills can negotiate effectively on salary
and fringe benefit issues.
The old permanent employment system is increasingly giving way
to a more flexible contract-based system. Most workers in
state-owned enterprises hired in the last 3 years have signed
individual contracts--a practice mandated by the new Labor
Law--and a number of large enterprises have converted all
workers to such contracts. Approximately 40 percent of state
sector workers now work under contract, but the proportion of
contract workers varies widely according to regional economic
development. In Shanghai, 1.5 million workers, or 97.5 percent
of all workers in state sector firms, have signed labor
contracts. Contract arrangements are more common in township
and village enterprises and many types of joint ventures. In
collective enterprises below the provincial level, contract
workers are a distinct minority. China's new Labor Law
provides for workers and employers at all types of enterprises
to sign both collective and individual contracts. The former
will be worked out between ACFTU or worker representatives and
management and will specify such matters as working conditions,
wage distribution, and hours of work. Individual contracts
will then be drawn up in line with the terms of the collective
contract.
Worker congresses, held periodically in most Chinese
enterprises, theoretically have the authority to remove
incompetent managers and approve major decisions affecting the
enterprise, notably wage and bonus distribution systems.
However, worker congresses generally take place only once a
year and serve essentially to approve agreements worked out
among factory managers, party secretaries, and ACFTU
representatives. In smaller enterprises it is not unusual to
find these three posts held by the same person.
A dispute settlement procedure has been in effect since 1987.
The procedure provides for mediation, two levels of arbitration
committees, and a final appeal to the courts. Of the 12,358
cases brought for arbitration in 1993, 64 percent were resolved
at the first or second level. Less than 3 percent reached the
courts. Approximately 40 percent of the cases closed in 1993
were resolved in favor of the worker(s), 20 percent in favor of
management; the rest resulted in a compromise. According to
Labor Ministry officials, most arbitration cases are filed by
contract workers or their employers, indicating, they assert,
that the new contract system provides a clearer set of ground
rules which both sides can attempt to enforce.
The 1982 Trade Union Law prohibits antiunion discrimination and
specifies that union representatives may not be transferred or
terminated by enterprise management during their term of
office. Unionized foreign businesses generally report
pragmatic relations with ACFTU representatives. At its
National Congress in October 1993, the ACFTU set the goal of
establishing unions in 50 percent of all foreign-funded
enterprises by the end of 1994.
Laws governing working conditions in China's special economic
zones (SEZ's) are not significantly different from those in the
rest of the country. However, wages in the SEZ's, and in
southeastern China generally, are significantly higher than in
other parts of the country.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
In addition to prisons and reform through labor facilities,
which contain inmates sentenced through judicial procedures
(see Section 1.c.), China also maintains a network of
"reeducation through labor" camps, where inmates are sentenced
through nonjudicial procedures (see Section l.e.). Inmates of
reeducation through labor facilities are generally required to
work. Reports from international human rights organizations
and the foreign press indicate that at least some persons in
pretrial detention are also required to work. Justice
officials have stated that in reeducation through labor
facilities there is a much heavier emphasis on education than
on labor. Most reports conclude that work conditions in the
penal system's light manufacturing factories are similar to
those in ordinary factories, but conditions on farms and in
mines can be harsh. As is the case in most Chinese workplaces,
safety is not a high priority. There are no available figures
for casualties in prison industry.
Some penal facilities contract with regular industries for
prisoners to perform light manufacturing and assembly work. In
1991 the Government published a reiteration of its regulations
barring the export of prison-made goods. On August 7, 1992,
the U.S. and Chinese Governments signed a memorandum of
understanding (MOU) prohibiting trade in prison labor
products. A statement of cooperation detailing specific
working procedures for implementation of the MOU was agreed to
and signed on March 14, 1994.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
China's National Labor Law, effective January 1, 1995, forbids
employers to hire workers under 16 years of age and specifies
administrative review, fines, and revocation of business
licenses of those businesses that hire minors. In the interim,
regulations promulgated in 1987 prohibiting the employment of
school-age minors who have not completed the compulsory 9 years
of education continued in force. Enterprise inspection and
effective enforcement of labor regulations is expanding.
Officials insist that increased diligence in monitoring
temporary workers has successfully precluded widespread
employment of minors. Labor officials also report that
employers were disciplined in 1994 for infringement of child
labor regulations, but such reports cannot be verified. In
poorer isolated areas, child labor in agriculture is
widespread. Most independent observers agree with Chinese
officials that, given its vast surplus of adult labor, urban
child labor is a relatively minor problem in formal sectors of
the economy. Rising dropout rates at secondary schools in some
southern provinces and anecdotal reports suggest that children
may increasingly be entering unregulated sectors of China's
economy. No specific Chinese industry is identifiable as a
significant violator of child labor regulations.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
The new Labor Law codifies many of the general principles of
China's labor reform, setting out provisions on employment,
labor contracts, working hours, wages, skill development and
training, social insurance, dispute resolution, legal
responsibility, supervision, and inspection. In anticipation
of the Law's minimum wage requirements, many local governments
already enforce regulations on minimum wages. Generally the
wage levels have been set higher than the local poverty relief
ceiling but lower than the current wage level of the average
worker. Minimum wage figures do not include free or heavily
subsidized benefits which employers commonly provide in kind,
such as housing, medical care, and education. Unemployment
insurance schemes now cover a majority of urban workers
(primarily state sector workers). Benefits from these funds
are provided to laid off workers according to "local
conditions," but unemployment subsidies generally equal 120 to
150 percent of the local hardship relief standard.
Regularization of unemployment insurance coverage and
administration in 1994 has served to decrease the incidence of
nonpayment of severance allowances. Workers are eligible to
receive unemployment relief funds for varying lengths of time,
up to 24 months, according to length of service.
In February the State Council reduced the national standard
workweek from 48 hours to 44 hours, excluding overtime, with a
mandatory 24-hour rest period. A system of alternating weeks
of 6- and 5-day workweeks began in March, with a 6-month grace
period for implementation. The same regulations specified that
cumulative monthly overtime could not exceed 48 hours. The
Chinese press regularly reported cases of workers forced to
work regular 12-and 14-hour days of forced overtime at
foreign-invested enterprises, particularly in southeast China
and the SEZ's.
Occupational health and safety are constant themes of posters
and campaigns. Every work unit must designate a health and
safety officer, and the International Labor Organization has
established a training program for these officials. The U.S.
Department of Labor's Mine Safety and Health Administration is
participating actively in this program. Moreover, while the
right to strike is not provided for in the 1982 Constitution,
the Trade Union Law explicitly recognizes the right of unions
to "suggest that staff and workers withdraw from sites of
danger" and to participate in accident investigations. Labor
officials reported that such withdrawals did occur in some
instances during 1994. Nonetheless, pressures for increased
output, lack of financial resources to maintain equipment, lack
of concern by management, and a traditionally poor
understanding of safety issues by workers have contributed to a
continuing high rate of accidents. Statistics provided by the
ACFTU indicate that 11,600 workers were killed in industrial
accidents from January to August of 1993, up 13 percent over
the same period of 1992. One credible report indicates there
are over 10,000 miners killed in accidents yearly. Fatal
factory explosions, fires, and collapsing dormitories have been
covered by both the domestic and foreign press. Officials
blame 60 percent of accidents on violation of safety
regulations, particularly in the rapidly expanding rural,
private, and foreign-invested enterprise sectors. In
Guangdong, where 1,300 fires killed 329 people and injured 889
in 1993, the authorities announced in February new fines for
enterprises that neglect safety precautions. Negligent units
will be fined 1 to 5 percent of the total losses they incur in
any fire, $3,450 (RMB 30,000) for every worker killed, and $345
to $575 (RMB 3,000 to 5,000) for each worker injured. Many
factories using harmful products, such as asbestos, fail not
only to protect their workers against the ill effects of such
products, but also fail to inform them about the potential
hazards.
----------------
TIBET
(This section of the report on China has been prepared pursuant
to Section 536 (b) of Public Law 103-236. The United States
recognizes the Tibet Autonomous Region (hereinafter referred to
as "Tibet") to be part of the People's Republic of China.
Preservation and development of Tibet's unique religious,
cultural, and linguistic heritage and protection of its
people's fundamental human rights continue to be of concern.)
Respect for the Integrity of the Person
Because the Chinese Government strictly controls access to and
information about Tibet, it is difficult to state precisely the
scope of human rights abuse there. It is known, however, that
during 1994 Chinese government authorities continued to commit
widespread human rights abuses in Tibet, including instances of
torture, arbitrary arrest, and detention without public trial,
long detention of Tibetan nationalists for peacefully
expressing their political views, and rigid controls on freedom
of speech and the press, particularly for Tibetans. There are
credible reports that authorities in some instances tortured
and killed detainees in Tibet. Reports from international
human rights organizations indicate that a Tibetan nun died on
June 4 in a prison hospital, reportedly as a result of a
beating by guards. In May Tibetan officials reported that a
former public security official in Tibet was sentenced to 9
years in prison for causing the death of a suspect while
torturing him to obtain a confession. The United Nations
Working Group on Arbitrary Detentions has concluded that China
is arbitrarily detaining 32 Tibetans and has called for their
release.
The authorities permit most traditional religious practices
except those seen as a vehicle for political dissent, which
they ruthlessly suppress. They continue to detain and
prosecute monks and nuns who have expressed dissenting
political views in public. Legal safeguards for Tibetans
detained or imprisoned are inadequate in design and
implementation, and lack of independent outside access to
prisoners or prisons makes it difficult to assess the extent
and severity of abuses and the number of Tibetan prisoners.
According to human rights organizations, small-scale protests
were reported to have occurred in Lhasa, the capital, and
elsewhere during 1994, resulting in swift detention for
participants. According to credible reports, in January, 11
nuns were sentenced to terms of 2 to 7 years' imprisonment for
taking part in a proindependence demonstration in 1993.
Another group of 14 nuns reportedly had their prison sentences
increased by up to 9 years for singing proindependence songs.
In May a demonstration by Tibetan shopkeepers protesting tax
increases took on political overtones, and several dozen
Tibetan monks and nuns were detained, apparently for raising
independence slogans. Police responded without using excessive
force, reflecting better riot control training; no lives were
lost. Tibetan political prisoners such as Ngawang Pulchung and
Jempel Tsering remained imprisoned in 1994, although Yulo Dawa
Tsering and three other Tibetans were released in November.
Freedom of Religion
In Tibet, where Buddhism and Tibetan nationalism are closely
intertwined, relations between Buddhists and secular
authorities continued to be tense in 1994. The Government does
not tolerate religious manifestations that advocate Tibetan
independence, and it has prohibited a large traditional
festival which has in the past been used to encourage
separatist sentiment. The Government condemns the Dalai Lama's
political activities and his leadership of a "government in
exile," but it recognizes him as a major religious figure.
Government religious authorities in 1994 forbade party and
government officials from displaying the Dalai Lama's
photograph, including in their homes, and removed his
photographs from sale at bazaar shops. His photos remain in
prominent positions in most temples in Tibet. The autonomous
region government in Tibet also ordered Tibetan officials who
have children studying in India to bring them back to Tibet
immediately.
In 1994 the Chinese Government continued to take steps to
ameliorate damage caused in the 1960's and 1970's to Tibet's
historic religious buildings and other aspects of its cultural
and religious heritage. The Government has expended
substantial sums to reconstruct the most important sacred sites
of Tibetan Buddhism. A 5-year project to restore the Potala
Palace (the most important Tibetan Buddhist center) in Lhasa
was concluded in August 1994 at a cost of $6.4 million. The
Government also provided funding in 1994 for the restoration of
two other major religious sites in Lhasa, the Jokhang and
Ganden monasteries. Ganden had been completely destroyed
during the Cultural Revolution. Public contributions also
helped to rebuild these and many smaller monasteries. Although
the Government denied it, the practice of religion in Tibet
continued to be hampered by the limits the Government imposes
on the number of resident monks in several of Tibet's main
temples. There are 34,000 Buddhist monks and nuns in Tibet,
according to official figures, a small number compared to
traditional norms. Tibetan Buddhists claim that they are
restricted in the numbers and training of religious
practitioners, even though limits on resident monks are not
strictly observed in practice. Monks at some Tibetan
monasteries known for their opposition to Han Chinese
domination may still face travel restrictions.
Economic Development and Protection of Cultural Heritage
Like China's 54 other minority ethnic groups, Tibetans receive
preferential treatment in marriage policy, family planning,
university admission, and employment. Chinese government
development policies have helped raise the living standards of
Tibetans, but also have disrupted traditional living patterns.
The Government has sought to preserve the Tibetan language, but
in doing so has encountered the dilemma of how to preserve the
language without limiting educational opportunities. In Tibet
primary schools at the village level teach in Tibetan. Many
pupils end their formal education after graduating from these
schools, which usually only have two or three grades. Those
who go on to regional primary schools and beyond, particularly
after junior high school, receive much of their education in
Chinese, although some areas provide instruction in Tibetan
through junior high school. Efforts to expand Tibetan language
instruction are hampered by lack of materials and competent
teachers at higher levels.
In July 1994, the Chinese Communist Party and the State Council
conducted a large-scale work conference on Tibet. The third of
its kind since 1980, this work conference was attended by
delegations from the CCP and central government organizations,
as well as provincial representatives and delegates from
certain urban areas. The conference focused on setting
economic development goals, pledging to increase economic
activity in Tibet by 10 percent a year. The plan included a
total of $270 million in investment projects, continuing the
government policy of providing substantial budget subsidies to
develop Tibet's backward economy. China's leaders also made
clear that Tibet would continue to receive central government
financial assistance and would retain "special flexibility" in
implementing reform policies mandated elsewhere in China. In a
speech covered extensively in the Chinese press, President
Jiang Zemin reiterated Beijing's willingness to "welcome back"
the Dalai Lama to Tibet, so long as "he abandons advocacy of
Tibetan independence and ceases activities to split the
motherland." Although the work conference approved plans to
boost economic development in Tibet, it produced no change in
the Chinese Government's policy toward Tibet.
The Dalai Lama continued in 1994 to express concern that
development projects and other central government policies
encourage a massive influx of Han Chinese into Tibet, which has
the effect of overwhelming Tibet's traditional culture and
diluting Tibetan demographic dominance in Tibet. Freer
movement of people throughout China in recent years, and the
prospect of economic opportunity in Tibet, has led to a
substantial increase in the non-Tibetan population (including
China's Muslim Hui minority as well as Han Chinese) in Lhasa
and other urban areas. Most of these migrants profess to be
temporary residents, but small businesses run by ethnic Han and
Hui peoples (mostly restaurants and retail shops) are becoming
more numerous in or near some Tibetan towns and cities.
Roughly one-third of the population of Lhasa is Han Chinese.
Chinese officials assert that 95 percent of Tibet's officially
registered population is Tibetan, with Han and other ethnic
groups making up the remainder. Increased economic development
will likely mean the transfer to, or temporary duty in, Tibet
of a greater number of non-Tibetan technical personnel, and may
also increase the number of immigrants from China's large
floating population seeking to take advantage of new economic
opportunities.
Economic development, fueled by central government subsidies,
is changing traditional Tibetan ways of life. While the
Chinese Government has made efforts in recent years to restore
the physical structures and other aspects of Tibetan Buddhism
and Tibetan culture damaged or destroyed during the Cultural
Revolution, repressive social and political controls continue
to limit the individual freedoms of Tibetans.
(###)
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