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The People's Republic of China (PRC) is an authoritarian state 
in which the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) monopolizes 
decisionmaking authority.  Almost all top civilian, police, and 
military positions at the national and regional levels are held 
by party members.  A 22-member Politburo and retired senior 
leaders hold ultimate power, but economic decentralization has 
increased the authority of regional officials.  Socialism 
continues to provide the ideological underpinning, but Marxist 
ideology has given way to pragmatism in recent years.  The 
party's authority rests primarily on the success of economic 
reform, its ability to maintain stability, and control of the 
security apparatus.

The security apparatus comprises the Ministries of State 
Security and Public Security, the People's Armed Police, the 
People's Liberation Army, and the state judicial, 
procuratorial, and penal systems.  The Constitution protects 
fundamental human rights, but they are frequently ignored in 
practice, and challenges to the CCP's political authority are 
often dealt with harshly and arbitrarily.  Legal safeguards for 
those detained or imprisoned are inadequate and inconsistently 
implemented.  The Government attaches higher priority to 
maintaining public order and suppressing political opposition 
than to enforcing legal norms.  As a result, security forces 
are responsible for numerous human rights abuses, including 
arbitrary detention, forced confessions, and torture.

More than a decade of rapid economic growth has raised living 
standards and enabled growing numbers of Chinese to assume 
greater control over their own lives.  The scope for private 
economic activity has expanded rapidly, and the degree of 
government and party control over the economy has continued to 
decline.  Although many details remain to be worked out, and 
the pace of privatization has been uneven, many elements of the 
old planned economy have already been dismantled.  Income 
disparities between coastal regions and the interior are 
significant and growing, but overall there has been a sharp 
drop in the number of Chinese living in absolute poverty.  
Greater disposable income, looser ideological controls, and 
freer access to outside sources of information have led to more 
diversity in cultural life and media reporting.  Government 
control of information media now depends to an increasing 
extent on self-censorship to regulate political and social 
content, but the authorities also consistently penalize those 
who exceed the permissible.

In 1994 there continued to be widespread and well-documented 
human rights abuses in China, in violation of internationally 
accepted norms, stemming both from the authorities' intolerance 
of dissent and the inadequacy of legal safeguards for freedom 
of speech, association, and religion.  Abuses include arbitrary 
and lengthy incommunicado detention, torture, and mistreatment 
of prisoners.  Despite a reduction during the year in the 
number of political detainees from the immediate post-Tiananmen 
period, hundreds, perhaps thousands, of other prisoners of 
conscience remain imprisoned or detained.  The Government still 
has not provided a comprehensive, credible public accounting of 
all those missing or detained in connection with the 
suppression of the 1989 demonstrations.  Chinese leaders moved 
swiftly to cut off organized expressions of protest or 
criticism and detained government critics, including those 
advocating greater worker rights.  Citizens have no ability 
peacefully to change their government leaders or the form of 
government.  Criminal defendants are denied basic legal 
safeguards such as due process or adequate defense.  The regime 
continued severe restrictions on the freedoms of speech, press, 
assembly and association, and tightened controls on the 
exercise of these rights during 1994.  Serious human rights 
abuses persisted in Tibet and other areas populated by ethnic 

The human rights situation in 1994 was, however, marked by the 
same diversity that characterizes other aspects of Chinese 
life.  In several instances, the Government acted to bring its 
behavior into conformity with internationally accepted human 
rights norms.  These actions included releasing several 
prominent political and religious prisoners, granting passports 
to some critics of the regime and their relatives, and adopting 
a law, which became effective in January 1995, that allows 
citizens to recover damages from the Government for 
infringement of their rights.  The Government continued to 
acknowledge the need to implement the rule of law and build the 
necessary legal and other institutions, but it has not yet 
significantly mitigated continuing repression of political 
dissent.  In 1994 China also continued a human rights dialog 
with some foreign critics, and reaffirmed its adherence to the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights.  Chinese officials 
provided limited information about the status of several 
hundred specific cases of international concern.


Section 1  Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including 
           Freedom from:

     a.  Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing

It is impossible to determine the number of extrajudicial 
killings by government officials in 1994 or the adequacy of the 
government response, since the Government restricts access to 
such information.  There were individual accounts of such 
killings, including some carried in the Chinese press.    
Credible reports from international human rights organizations 
indicate a Tibetan nun died on June 4 in a prison hospital, 
reportedly as a result of a beating by guards.  In May Tibetan 
officials reported that a former public security official in 
Tibet was sentenced to 9 years for causing the death of a 
suspect while torturing him to obtain a confession.  In Fujian, 
a public security official was also prosecuted for torturing a 
prisoner to death, but no details on his sentence were 
provided.  In December the Chinese press reported that a city 
police chief in Shanxi province was sentenced to 5 years for 
malpractice after ordering the detention and beating of two 
Chinese for allegedly complaining about the police chief's 
son.  One detainee died from his injuries.  Two other police 
officials were sentenced to death and life imprisonment, 
respectively, for extorting a confession in the same case.  
Legislators in Guangdong province also reported two cases of 
death by torture, but there were no details on the disposition 
of the cases.

     b.  Disappearance

There were no reported cases in 1994 in which individuals who 
disappeared were suspected to have been killed by officials.  
The Government still has not provided a comprehensive, credible 
public accounting of all those missing or detained in 
connection with the suppression of the 1989 Tiananmen 

     c.  Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading 
         Treatment or Punishment

Police and other elements of the security apparatus continue to 
employ torture and degrading treatment in dealing with detained 
and imprisoned persons.  Both official Chinese sources and 
international human rights groups reported many instances of 
torture.  Persons detained pending trial were particularly at 
risk as a result of government failure to correct obvious 
systemic weaknesses in the design and operation of the legal 
system.  These weaknesses include a reliance on confessions as 
a basis for convictions and the lack of access to prisoners by 
legal counsel and family members until after formal charges are 
brought, a step which often takes months.  Former detainees 
have credibly reported that officials used cattle prods, 
electrodes, prolonged periods of solitary confinement and 
incommunicado detention, beatings, shackles, and other forms of 
abuse against detained men and women.  There are credible 
reports that some women detainees in Tibet have been tortured, 
but female prisoners do not appear to have been targeted for 

In March the Supreme People's Procuratorate reported it had 
investigated 378 cases where torture was used to extract 
confessions in 1993, but it provided no information on 
convictions or punishments.  The number of actual incidents of 
torture and ill-treatment by government officials is almost 
certainly far greater than this number.  In one case, a 
policeman was given a 1-year suspended sentence for beating Yan 
Zhengxue, an artist who was also a municipal people's congress 
deputy from Jiaojiang in Zhejiang province.  In May legislators 
in Guangdong province identified 838 cases of police corruption 
and brutality, but Chinese press accounts reported that only 50 
of the cases had been "corrected."  According to Chinese 
officials, the Procuratorate has a total of 748 officials in 
China's jails, "reform through labor," and "reeducation through 
labor" facilities.  Their responsibility is to supervise prison 
management and enforce laws on treatment of prisoners.  
Procuratorial offices or officers are assigned to approximately 
94 percent of prisons and labor camps.  Another 7,000 officials 
are responsible for supervising China's detention centers.

In January Justice Minister Xiao Yang announced plans to 
modernize 80 percent of China's prisons and reform through 
labor facilities by the year 2000.  Conditions in Chinese penal 
institutions are generally harsh and frequently degrading, and 
nutritional and health conditions are sometimes grim.  Adequate 
medical care for prisoners continues to be a problem, despite 
official assurances that prisoners have the right to prompt 
medical treatment if they become ill.  In 1994 political 
prisoners who reportedly had difficulties in obtaining timely 
and adequate medical care included Bao Tong, Ren Wanding, and 
Qin Yongmin.  Wang Juntao was allowed to go to the United 
States for medical treatment in April, and Chen Ziming was 
released on medical parole in May, although he remains at home 
under heavy surveillance.

Conditions of imprisonment for political prisoners vary 
widely.  According to credible reports, some detained 
dissidents continue to be incarcerated in psychiatric 
institutions and treated with drugs.  Dissidents such as Wang 
Wanxing, Wang Miaogen (who had chopped off four of his fingers 
in a protest in 1993 over alleged persecution), and Xing 
Jiandong are reportedly being held in mental hospitals in 
Beijing and Shanghai.  However, the lack of independent outside 
access to such persons made it impossible to verify their 
diagnoses or medical treatment or the conditions under which 
they are being held.

Political prisoners are also often incarcerated with common 
criminals.  Chinese press reports claimed that Zheng Musheng, a 
Christian, was beaten to death by fellow inmates, who were then 
arrested.  His widow filed suit against local public security 
officials after Zheng died in custody in early 1994.  
Unspecified "action" was taken against prison supervisory 
personnel.  There were credible reports that dissident Qin 
Yongmin was severely beaten twice by fellow inmates in a 
reeducation through labor facility in June.  According to these 
reports, he failed to receive adequate medical care after the 

China does not permit independent monitoring of prison 
conditions.  The Procuratorate, charged with law enforcement in 
the corrections system, reported 39,342 law violations in 
prisons, 17,823 of which were corrected.  China held two rounds 
of talks with the International Committee of the Red Cross in 
January and April to discuss access to prisoners, but no 
agreement was reached.  In February five American journalists 
were permitted to visit a Liaoning labor camp where political 
prisoner Liu Gang is held.  The journalists saw Liu through a 
window but were not allowed to interview him.  Reports persist 
that Liu suffers ill health as a result of beatings and other 
mistreatment, although Chinese officials have denied these 
allegations.  In February a member of the China Human Rights 
Society, an organization established primarily to study and 
defend China's human rights record, was allowed to meet Liu and 
review his medical records in an attempt to refute reports that 
he had been mistreated.

     d.  Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile

Because the Government tightly controls information, it is 
impossible to estimate accurately the total number of people 
subjected to new or continued arbitrary arrest or detention.  
According to one Chinese media report from 1992, authorities 
have carried out close to 1 million detentions annually in 
recent years under a form of detention known as "shelter for 
investigation."  They released some people without charge after 
several days or weeks.  In some cases, they charged dissidents 
with "disturbing public order" or "causing social turmoil" and 
sentenced them to 1 to 3 years of detention without independent 
judicial review (see Section 1.e.).

Under China's Criminal Procedure Law, officials may hold 
detainees for up to 10 days before a formal arrest warrant must 
be approved by the Procuratorate; they must notify the 
detainee's family or work unit within 24 hours.  Exceptions to 
these provisions include the sweeping provision that 
notification may be withheld if it would "hinder the 
investigation" of a case.  On May 12, the Government issued 
revised public order regulations setting out penalties for 
social groups that fail to register with the proper authorities 
or for persons on parole or deprived of political rights who 
"violate regulations," as well as for several other offenses.  
With some exceptions, violators can be detained for up to 15 
days and fined about $23 (RMB200).  In 1994 authorities 
detained dissidents before high-level visits of foreign 
leaders, but it is not clear whether the new public order 
regulations were the basis for these detentions.  Most of those 
detained were released shortly after the visits ended.  Others 
were held for longer periods or detained formally.

In practice, authorities often disregard or circumvent limits 
on detention by using regulations on "taking in for shelter and 
investigation," "supervised residence," and other methods not 
requiring procuratorial approval.  Dissident Wei Jingsheng has 
been held incommunicado in supervised residence since April 1.  
Credible reports indicate that police detained several other 
political activists, including Dai Xuezhong, Xiao Biguang, Zhou 
Qianbing, and Zhu Fuming, for months without filing charges 
against them.  Wang Dan and others were also detained briefly 
without charge several times during 1994.

Local officials and business leaders frequently conspire to use 
detentions as a means of exerting pressure in commercial 
disputes; cases in some areas have reportedly increased 50 
percent over 1993.  Authorities held Hong Kong businessman 
Chong Kwee-Sung for 30 months in Henan while his case was being 
"investigated," then released him in February without charges 
being filed.  Australian businessman James Peng was kidnaped by 
public security officials in Macao and brought to China, where 
he was held for several months before being tried in November.  
Chinese officials said his detention was legal because it was 
approved by the National People's Congress Standing Committee, 
which has apparently not been the case in other commercial 
dispute cases.

In March Procurator General Zhang Siying reported on the 
problem of prisoners kept in prison past their release dates, 
noting that 34,432 of 73,416 such cases had been corrected.  
The legality of detentions can be challenged under the 
Administrative Procedure Law, but since detainees do not have 
access to lawyers, they have been unable to use this law to 
obtain prompt judicial determination of the legality of their 
detentions.  The new State Compensation Law, passed in May, 
clarified the right of citizens to recover damages for illegal 
detentions.  Even before the law took effect on January 1, 
1995, the Chinese press reported a decision by a Beijing lower 
court awarding damages to a law professor who was illegally 
detained and beaten by public security officials in May.  In 
June a Fujian court awarded damages in a case of illegal 
"taking in for shelter and investigation."  There is no 
judicially supervised system of bail, but at the discretion of 
public security officials, some detainees are released pending 
further investigation.

     e.  Denial of Fair Public Trial

According to the Constitution, the court system is equal in 
authority to the State Council and the Central Military 
Commission, the two most important government institutions.  
All three organs are nominally under the supervision of the 
National People's Congress (NPC).  The Supreme People's Court 
stands at the apex of the court system, followed in descending 
order by the higher, intermediate, and basic people's courts.  
Judges are appointed by the people's congresses at the 
corresponding level.  There are special courts for handling 
military, maritime, and railway transport cases.

Officials insist that China's judiciary is independent but 
acknowledge that it is subject to the Communist Party's policy 
guidance.  In practice, party and government leaders use a 
variety of means to influence court verdicts and sentences.  
Corruption and conflicts of interest also affect judicial 
decisionmaking.  In March Supreme Court officials acknowledged 
problems with local protectionism and failure to conduct fair 
trials, particularly in economic disputes.  The Chinese press 
publicized a 1993 economic case in which the court told the 
parties the decision was already written before the parties had 
finished producing their evidence.

In practice, officials often ignore due process rights granted 
by the Constitution.  Both before and after trial, prisoners 
are subjected to severe psychological pressure to confess their 
"errors."  Defendants who fail to "show the right attitude" by 
confessing their crimes are typically sentenced more harshly.  
Persons appearing before a court are not presumed innocent; 
despite official denials, trials are essentially sentencing 
hearings.  Confessions without corroborating evidence are 
insufficient for a conviction under Chinese law, but coerced 
confessions are not automatically excluded as evidence.

Accused persons are given virtually no opportunity to prepare 
an adequate defense while their cases are being investigated, a 
time when the question of guilt or innocence is essentially 
decided.  The law provides that defense lawyers may be retained 
7 days before trial.  However, in some cases, even this brief 
period is shortened under regulations issued in 1983 to 
accelerate the adjudication of certain serious criminal cases.  
Under Chinese law, there is no requirement that the court 
appoint a defense attorney for the defendant unless the 
defendant is hearing impaired or a minor, although the court 
may appoint defense counsel if it feels an attorney is 
necessary.  When attorneys do appear, they have little time to 
prepare a defense and rarely contest guilt; their function is 
generally confined to requesting clemency.  The conviction rate 
is over 90 percent.  The court's permission is required before 
the accused or his representative can interrogate witnesses, 
produce new witnesses, or review evidence.

In some regions, experimentation with the trial system is 
underway.  Shanghai court officials announced plans in August 
in some criminal and civil cases to expand an experiment with a 
more adversarial system, which gives attorneys more 
responsibility for presenting evidence and arguing the facts 
during trials.

Chinese officials state that China has insufficient numbers of 
lawyers to meet the country's growing needs.  Knowledgeable 
observers report that defense attorneys appear in only a small 
number of criminal trials.  As a key element in its legal 
reform plans, China plans to increase the number of lawyers to 
150,000 by the year 2000.  As of July, there were 70,515 
lawyers working in 5,885 law firms.  In many cities, private 
law firms are being organized outside the framework of 
established government legal offices.  These firms are 
self-regulating and do not have their personnel or budgets 
determined directly by the State.  At the end of 1993, there 
were 502 such firms.  However, many defense lawyers, like other 
Chinese, still depend on an official work unit for employment, 
housing, and other benefits.  They are therefore often 
reluctant to be viewed as overzealous in defending individuals 
accused of political offenses.  In some sensitive cases, 
relatives of defendants have reportedly found it difficult to 
hire defense lawyers.

The Criminal Procedure Law requires that all trials be held in 
public, except those involving state secrets, juveniles, or 
"personal secrets."  Details of cases involving 
"counterrevolutionary" charges, however, have frequently been 
kept secret, even from defendants' relatives, under this 
provision.  The 1988 Law on State Secrets affords a ready basis 
for denying a public trial.  Hong Kong reporter Xi Yang's trial 
in March on the charge of stealing state secrets was not open 
to the public (see Section 2.a.).  In November journalist Gao 
Yu was sentenced to 6 years in prison for "leaking state 
secrets," allegedly published in the Hong Kong press.  Gao's 
lawyer and her relatives said they had not been notified of the 
final trial or sentencing hearing (the case had been returned 
twice for insufficient evidence).  There is an appeals process, 
but initial decisions are rarely overturned, and appeals 
generally do not provide meaningful protection against 
arbitrary or erroneous verdicts.  Under the Criminal Procedure 
Law, persons "exempted from prosecution" by procurators may 
still be deemed to have a criminal record, despite the lack of 
a judicial determination of guilt.  Such provisions can be 
applied in "counterrevolutionary crimes" as well as in ordinary 
criminal offenses.

Lack of due process is particularly egregious when defendants 
receive the death sentence.  Chinese officials refuse to 
provide comprehensive statistics on death sentences or 
executions, but hundreds of executions are officially reported 
annually.  The actual numbers may be much higher.  All death 
sentences are nominally reviewed by a higher court.  Reviews 
are usually completed within a few days after sentencing and 
consistently result in a perfunctory confirmation of sentence.  
No executions for political offenses are known to have occurred 
in 1994.

During 1994 new reports revived previous allegations that 
organs from executed Chinese prisoners are removed and 
transplanted to patients without the consent of the prisoner or 
his or her family.  These reports have not been verified.

In January 1995, a Ministry of Justice official said there were 
a total of 1,285,000 prisoners in prisons or reform through 
labor camps at the end of 1994.  Prisoners can be sentenced to 
these facilities only by the courts.  However, government 
authorities can assign persons accused of "minor" public order 
offenses to "reeducation through labor" camps in an 
extrajudicial process.  Terms of detention run from a normal 
minimum of 1 year to a maximum of 3 years.  The labor 
reeducation committee which determines the term of detention 
may extend an inmate's sentence for an additional year.  
According to Chinese officials, 153,000 detainees were in 
reeducation through labor facilities at the end of 1993, up 16 
percent over 1992 figures.  Other estimates of the number of 
inmates are considerably higher.  Officials said 75,900 were 
released from reeducation through labor facilities in 1993.  
Under a State Council regulation issued in early 1991, those 
sentenced to reeducation through labor may ask the committee to 
reconsider its decision.

Since 1990 reeducation through labor sentences may also be 
judicially challenged under the Administrative Procedure Law.  
While some persons have obtained a reduction in or withdrawal 
of their sentence after reconsideration or appeal, in practice 
these procedures are not widely used, and short appeal times, 
lack of access to lawyers, and other problems weaken their 
effectiveness in preventing or reversing arbitrary decisions.

Government officials deny that China has any political 
prisoners, asserting that persons are detained not for the 
political or religious views they hold, but because they have 
taken some action which violates the Criminal Law.  Political 
dissidents, however, are often detained or charged for having 
committed "crimes of counterrevolution" under Articles 90 
through 104 of the Criminal Law.  Counterrevolutionary offenses 
range from treason and espionage to spreading 
counterrevolutionary propaganda.  The authorities also used 
these articles to punish persons who organized demonstrations, 
disrupted traffic, disclosed official information to 
foreigners, or formed associations outside state control.  In 
December, 9 of 16 defendants tried in Beijing in July were 
sentenced to prison terms ranging from 3 to 20 years for 
leading or participating in "counterrevolutionary groups" or 
conducting "counterrevolutionary propaganda and incitement."  
One defendant was sentenced to two years of "supervision," one 
was excused before trial for medical reasons, and charges 
against five others were dropped.  All 16 defendants had been 
held in pretrial detention for more than 2 years.   In other 
cases, the system of reeducation through labor is used to deal 
with political offenders.  Qin Yongmin was sentenced to 2 
years' reeducation through labor in January for "creating 
turmoil," apparently for his role as founder of the "Peace 
Charter" group in 1993.  Labor activist Zhang Lin and lawyer 
Zhou Guoqiang were reportedly sentenced to 3-year terms of 
reeducation through labor in September, as were activists Bao 
Ge, Yang Zhou, Li Guotao, and Yang Qingheng in October.  Liu 
Huanwen was sentenced to 2 years' reeducation through labor in 
August.  Shanghai Human Rights Association member Dai Xuezhong 
was sentenced to 3 years for alleged tax evasion in December.  
Wei Jingsheng's secretary, Tong Yi, began serving a 2 1/2 year 
sentence of reeducation through labor in late December for 
allegedly forging an official stamp.  Dissidents such as Fu 
Shenqi and Zhang Xianliang are also still being held in 
reeducation through labor facilities and are reportedly in poor 

In January an official from the Chinese Ministry of Justice 
said there were 2,678 people serving sentences for 
counterrevolutionary crimes at the end of 1994.  Chinese 
officials told an American human rights monitor in June that as 
of the end of March there were 2,935 people serving sentences 
for counterrevolutionary crimes, down from 3,172 in December 
1993.  These figures include people convicted of espionage or 
other internationally recognized criminal offenses but do not 
include political prisoners detained but not charged; political 
or religious activists held in reeducation through labor camps; 
and persons detained or convicted for criminal offenses due 
solely to their nonviolent political or religious activities.

The Government released on parole during 1994 several Chinese 
prisoners who were detained for political or religious reasons, 
including prominent activists Wang Juntao, Chen Ziming, Ding 
Junze, Yulo Dawa Tsering, and others.  Nevertheless, many 
others, including Wei Jingsheng, Ren Wanding, Bao Tong, and Liu 
Gang, remained imprisoned or under other forms of detention in 
1994.  Some of those released in 1994 or earlier, such as Chen 
Ziming and Wang Dan, remain under close police surveillance and 
suffer from occasional police harassment, making it difficult 
for them to live a normal life.  Wang Dan, for example, was 
threatened physically in December by undercover police 
officers, some of whom continued surveillance outside his 
home.  Fearing physical harm, Wang disappeared from public view 
for 4 weeks before returning home.

Many political prisoners are subject to "deprivation of 
political rights" even after their period of parole has 
expired.  This status further limits their rights of free 
speech and association.  With a criminal record, their status 
in society, ability to be employed, freedom to travel, and 
numerous other aspects of their lives are often severely 
restricted, although economic reform and social change have 
ameliorated these problems somewhat.  The families of political 
prisoners are also adversely affected; sometimes family members 
encounter difficulty in obtaining or keeping employment and 
housing.  For example, Zhang Fengying, wife of imprisoned 
activist Ren Wanding, and her teenage daughter were evicted 
from their apartment, owned by Ren's work unit, in 1992 and 
remained in poor housing during 1994.

     f.  Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or 

Changes in the economic structure, including the growing 
diversity of employment opportunities and the increasing market 
orientation of many work units, are undermining the ability of 
the authorities to monitor and regulate personal and family 
life as closely as in the past, particularly in rural areas.  
In urban areas, however, most people still depend on their 
government-linked work unit for housing, permission to have a 
child, approval to apply for a passport, and other aspects of 
ordinary life.  The work unit, along with the neighborhood 
committee, is charged with monitoring activities and attitudes.

Although the law requires search warrants before security 
forces can search premises, this provision is often ignored.  
In addition, both the Public Security Bureau and procuracy 
apparently can issue search warrants on their own authority.  
The 1982 Constitution states that "freedom and privacy of 
correspondence of citizens ... are protected by law," but in 
practice, authorities record some telephone conversations and 
some mail is opened and censored.  Government security organs 
monitor and sometimes restrict contact between foreigners and 
Chinese citizens, particularly dissidents.  Rules issued in 
July implementing the State Security Law define "activities of 
individuals outside the country (including non-Chinese citizens 
resident in China) who disregard dissuasion and meet with 
personnel in the country who have endangered state security or 
who are seriously suspected of endangering state security" as a 
violation of the State Security Law.

The Government has continued its effort to control citizens' 
access to outside sources of information, selectively jamming 
Chinese language broadcasts of the Voice of America (VOA) and 
British Broadcasting Corporation.  The effectiveness of the 
jamming varies considerably by region, with audible signals of 
VOA and other broadcasters reaching most parts of China.

China's population has roughly doubled in the past 40 years to 
1.18 billion people.  In the 1970's and 1980's, China adopted a 
comprehensive and highly intrusive one-child family planning 
policy.  This policy most heavily affects Han Chinese in urban 
areas.  Urban couples seldom obtain permission to have a second 
child.  However, exceptions are allowed for the 70 percent of 
Han who live in rural areas, and ethnic minorities are subject 
to less stringent population controls.  Enforcement of the 
family planning policy is inconsistent, varying widely from 
place to place and year to year.

The population control policy relies on education, propaganda, 
and economic incentives, as well as more coercive measures, 
including psychological pressure and economic penalties.  
Rewards for couples who adhere to the policy include monthly 
stipends and preferential medical and educational benefits.  
Disciplinary measures against those who violate the policy 
include fines, withholding of social services, demotion, and 
other administrative punishments, such as loss of employment.  
Unpaid fines have sometimes resulted in confiscation or 
destruction of personal property.  Because penalties for excess 
births can be levied against local officials and the mothers' 
work units, many individuals are affected, providing multiple 
sources of pressure.

Physical compulsion to submit to abortion or sterilization is 
not authorized, but Chinese officials acknowledge privately 
that there are instances of forced abortions and 
sterilizations.  Officials maintain that, when discovered, 
responsible officials are disciplined and undergo retraining.  
They admit, however, that stronger punishment is rare.  
Individuals can also sue officials who have exceeded their 
authority in implementing family planning policy, but 
government officials have not provided data on the number of 
successful suits on these grounds.

Regulations forbid sex-selective abortion, but because of the 
traditional preference for male children, particularly in rural 
areas, some families have used ultrasound to identify and abort 
female fetuses.  Use of ultrasound for this purpose was 
specifically prohibited by the Maternal and Child Health Law 
passed in October, which prescribes penalties for medical 
practitioners who violate this provision.  The Chinese press 
has reported that the ratio of male to female births is 114 to 
100, based on a nationwide average, while the statistical norm 
is 106 male births to 100 female.  The ratio excludes many 
female births, especially the second or third in a family, 
which are unreported to permit the parents to keep trying to 
conceive a boy, but may also reflect the abuse of sonography.  
Female infanticide may also be a factor in some areas of China.

At least five provincial governments have implemented 
regulations seeking to prevent people with severe mental 
handicaps from having children.  In October China passed a 
national Maternal and Child Care Law calling for premarital and 
prenatal examinations to determine whether couples have acute 
infectious diseases, certain mental illnesses (not including 
mental retardation), or are at risk for passing on debilitating 
genetic diseases.  The law goes into effect on June 1, 1995, 
and implementing regulations defining which diseases or 
conditions will be covered have not yet been completed.  The 
law will be implemented by the Ministry of Health, not the 
State Family Planning Commission, and while it includes 
provisions for abortion or sterilization in some cases based on 
medical advice, it provides for obtaining a second opinion and 
mandates that patients or their guardians give written consent 
to such procedures.  (See also Section 5 on People with 

There were no reported cases of prosecution of parents for 
teaching their children religion in the privacy of their home.

Section 2  Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:

     a.  Freedom of Speech and Press

Although the Constitution states that freedom of speech and 
freedom of the press are fundamental rights enjoyed by all 
Chinese citizens, the Government interprets the Communist 
Party's "leading role" as circumscribing these rights.  It does 
not permit citizens to publish or broadcast criticism of senior 
leaders or opinions that contradict basic Communist Party 
doctrine, which provides for a Socialist state under the 
party's leadership.  The Government and party maintained strict 
control over published expression of dissenting views in 1994.  
Public security authorities briefly detained several foreign 
journalists in March, April, and May after they had interviewed 
or attempted to interview noted dissidents or their relatives.  
Under China's State Security Law, "official secrets" are 
broadly defined, and interpretation is left to the Ministries 
of State Security and Public Security.  Hong Kong reporter Xi 
Yang was convicted of "spying and stealing state secrets" after 
a closed trial in March.  He was sentenced to 12 years' 
imprisonment and 2 years' deprivation of political rights for 
allegedly obtaining "financial and economic secrets," including 
information on China's interest rates and plans to sell gold.  
Tian Ye, the bank official who allegedly supplied Xi with the 
information, was sentenced to 15 years' imprisonment and 3 
years' deprivation of political rights.  After a closed trial, 
former journalist Gao Yu was sentenced to 6 years' imprisonment 
in November for "leaking state secrets abroad."  (See Section 

The party and the Government continue to control print and 
broadcast media and compel them to propagate the currently 
acceptable ideological line.  In June press guidelines called 
on reporters to protect state secrets, avoid corruption, and 
not publicize "sensitive subjects."  Despite these admonitions, 
the lively tabloid sector continued to expand in 1994, while 
circulation of major propaganda-oriented dailies continued to 
decline.  Radio talk shows remained popular, and, while 
generally avoiding politically sensitive subjects, they 
provided opportunities to air grievances about public issues.  
A small but rapidly growing segment of the population has 
access to satellite television broadcasts.  Satellite 
television dishes are widely available for sale, and a 
licensing scheme begun in October 1993, which controls purchase 
and possession of the equipment, has been implemented at best 

The Government's ability to control the production and 
dissemination of publications continued to diminish in 1994.  
Fierce competition and dwindling government subsidies have 
increased opportunities for private publishers and 
booksellers.  Some credible estimates hold that, at the end of 
1993, as much as one-third of all books were being published 
through these unsanctioned channels.  In April officials 
announced the number of licensed publications would be frozen 
at current levels.  Shenzhen authorities confiscated a thousand 
copies of "Tendency Quarterly" and briefly detained its founder 
in January.  In May 45 newspapers and periodicals were banned 
for illegally reselling their publishing licenses.  Seven film 
directors were banned in March for entering their works in an 
overseas film festival without going through official channels.

The Government has continued to impose heavy ideological 
controls on colleges, universities, and research institutes.  
As a result, many intellectuals and scholars, fearing that 
books or papers on political topics would be deemed too 
sensitive to be published, feel compelled to exercise 
self-censorship.  In areas such as economic policy or legal 
reform, there was greater official tolerance for comment and 

     b.  Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association

While the Constitution provides for freedom of peaceful 
assembly and association, the Government severely restricted 
these rights in practice.  The Constitution provides, for 
example, that such activities may not infringe "upon the 
interests of the State";  protests against the political system 
or its leaders are prohibited.  Although some small-scale 
demonstrations on nonpolitical grievances are tolerated in 
practice, demonstrations involving expression of dissident 
political views are denied permits and suppressed if held.  
Police detained Zhou Guoqiang and Yuan Hongbing in March, 
reportedly in part due to their presentation of a petition on 
human rights and worker rights to the NPC during its annual 
plenary session.  Press reports from a Chinese-controlled 
service also accused Zhou of planning to sell "political" 
T-shirts while the NPC was in session.

The Communist Party organizes and controls most professional 
and other mass associations.  Regulations promulgated in 1990 
require all organizations to be officially registered and 
approved.  Ostensibly aimed at secret societies and criminal 
gangs, the regulations also deter the formation of unauthorized 
political or labor organizations.  Authorities in Shanghai 
refused to allow several individuals to register a proposed 
"human rights association," and some members of the group were 
subsequently detained (see Section 4).  In March Liu Nianchun 
was denied permission to register the Association for 
Protection of Labor Rights; Liu himself was detained in May but 
released in October.  No charges were filed against him.

     c.  Freedom of Religion

The Government subjects religious freedom to restrictions of 
varying severity, although the number of believers continues to 
grow.  While the Constitution affirms toleration of religious 
beliefs, government regulations restrict religious practice to 
government-controlled religious organizations and registered 
places of worship.  The Government supervises the publication 
of religious material for distribution.  There are persistent 
complaints that the number of Bibles and other religious 
materials allowed to be printed falls far short of demand.  
Religious affairs bureaus, which are staffed by officials who 
rarely are religious believers, provide "guidance and 
supervision" over implementation of government regulations on 
religion.  In a Catholic seminary in Chengdu, all the 
seminarians walked out in April to protest party interference 
in the operation of the school.  Communist Party officials 
state that party membership and religious belief are 
incompatible.  This places a serious limitation on religious 
believers, since party membership is required for almost all 
high positions in government and state-owned businesses.

There are no specific bans on particular religious groups, but 
the treatment of religious believers and organizations varies 
widely.  Unregistered or "house" church leaders and members are 
harassed in some regions but tolerated in others.  
Nonmainstream sects are often singled out.  Credible reports 
indicate members of an evangelical sect known as "Shouters" 
continued to be harassed, detained, fined, and imprisoned in 
Henan after the group was deemed "counterrevolutionary" in 1984.

After forcefully suppressing all religious observances during 
the 1966-76 Cultural Revolution, the Government began in the 
late 1970's to restore or replace damaged or confiscated 
churches, temples, mosques, and monasteries.  The official 
religious organizations administer more than a dozen Catholic 
and Protestant seminaries, nine institutes to train Imams and 
Islamic scholars, and institutes to train Buddhist monks.  
Students who attend these institutes must demonstrate 
"political reliability," and all graduates must pass an 
examination on their theological and political knowledge to 
qualify for the clergy.  The Government permitted some Catholic 
seminarians, Muslim clerics, and Buddhist clergy to go abroad 
for additional religious studies in 1994.

The authorities permit officially sanctioned religious 
organizations to maintain international contacts as long as 
these do not entail foreign control.  In January China 
promulgated regulations on religious practices by foreigners 
and on places of religious activities.  The regulations 
codified many existing rules, including a ban on proselytizing 
by foreigners, but allow foreign nationals to preach to 
foreigners, bring in religious materials for their own use, and 
preach to Chinese in churches, mosques, and temples at the 
invitation of registered religious organizations.  In practice, 
some discreet proselytizing and distribution of religious texts 
by foreigners outside official channels is tolerated.

Buddhists are by far the largest body of religious believers in 
China.  The Government estimates that there are 100 million 
Chinese Buddhists, most of whom are from the dominant Han 
ethnic group.  (A discussion of government restrictions on 
Tibetan Buddhism can be found in the addendum to this report.)

According to government figures, there are 17 million Muslims 
in China.  In some areas with large Muslim populations, 
officials continue to restrict the building of mosques and the 
religious education of youths under 18.  Following the 1990 
unrest in Xinjiang, the authorities issued regulations further 
restricting religious activities and teaching.  Ningxia 
authorities issued regulations in July forbidding religious 
bodies from interfering in administrative affairs, including 
education, marriage, and family planning.

China permits Muslim citizens to make the hajj to Mecca, and 
the number of those making the hajj has significantly increased 
in recent years.  About 3,000 officially sponsored Chinese made 
the hajj in 1993; many more traveled at their own expense.

The number of Christians continues to grow rapidly.  Only those 
Christian churches affiliated with either the Catholic 
Patriotic Association or the (Protestant) Three Self Patriotic 
Movement, which the Government established in the 1950's to 
eliminate perceived foreign domination of Christian groups, may 
operate openly.

Active unofficial religious movements pose an alternative to 
the state-regulated churches, although in some areas there is 
tacit cooperation between official and unofficial churches.  
The unofficial, Vatican-affiliated, Catholic Church claims a 
membership far larger than the 4 million registered with the 
official Catholic Church, though actual figures are unknown.  
In addition to the 6 million persons who are officially counted 
as following Protestantism, a large number of Protestants 
worship privately in "house churches" that are independent of 
government control.

There continued to be credible reports in 1994 of efforts by 
authorities in some areas to rein in activities of the 
unapproved Catholic and Protestant movements, including raiding 
and closing a number of unregistered churches.  Two Protestant 
house churches in Shenzhen were reportedly closed and their 
leaders briefly detained.  Several Hong Kong-based Christian 
missionaries were detained for a few days in Henan in February 
for violating regulations on religious activities by 
foreigners; several Chinese Christians also detained in 
connection with the incident were released later.  In November, 
in another town in Henan, a preacher from Taiwan and 152 local 
Christians were reportedly detained on charges of unauthorized 
proselytizing by foreigners (under the January religious 
regulations, Chinese from Hong Kong and Taiwan are covered by 
the rules governing foreigners).  Ten are still in custody; the 
rest reportedly were released after paying fines of 
approximately $118 (1,000 RMB).  The Guangzhou house church of 
Pastor Samuel Lamb (Lin Xiangao) continued to operate openly 
but was subject to limited harassment by the authorities.  
Elsewhere, authorities tolerate the existence of unofficial 
Catholic and Protestant churches as long as they remain small 
and discreet.

A number of religious activists remained imprisoned in 1994.  
There was some evidence that authorities have increasingly used 
short-term detentions, rather than long prison terms when 
dealing with unauthorized religious activities.  Pan Yiyuan, 
leader of a house church in Fujian, was detained in March and 
released in December.  Wei Jingyi was redetained in January in 
Hebei less than a year after finishing a 3-year sentence to 
reeducation through labor.  Two church members from Anhui were 
reportedly sentenced to 2 years' reeducation through labor in 
September, reportedly for contacting "anti-China overseas 
organizations."  Father Gu Zheng was reportedly detained in 
Xinjiang in October for teaching in an unregistered Catholic 
seminary.  Father Vincent Qin Guoliang was sentenced to 3 
years' reeducation through labor in November in Qinghai 
province.  Bishop Su Zhiming was detained briefly in January 
after meeting with a visiting U.S. Congressman.  Authorities in 
Jiangxi reportedly redetained Bishop Zeng Jingmu in September 
after holding him for a few days in August.  Father Liao 
Haiqing, also detained in September, was released in November.  
Several other religious activists were released in 1994, 
although the whereabouts of some reported to have been released 
could not be confirmed, and others remained under some 
restrictions.  Pei Ronggui and Jia Zhiguo were released in late 
January or early February; Zhang Ruiyu, Chen Zhuman, Cui Tai, 
Yan Peizhi, Xu Zhihe and Zhang Li were released in May.  In 
April a visiting American religious figure was told that Han 
Dingxiang, Fan Zhongliang, Liu Guangdong, and others had been 
released.  In November the U.N. Special Rapporteur on Religious 
Intolerance made a 10-day visit to China, including Tibet, at 
the invitation of the Chinese Government.

     d.  Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign 
         Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation

The effectiveness of the Government's identification card 
system used to control and restrict individual residence 
location within the country continued to erode in 1994.  The 
"floating population" migrating to China's urban areas from the 
countryside is estimated at anywhere from 50 to 100 million.  
In January the Government announced the household registration 
system would be revamped to adapt to the new situation.  
However, because this itinerant population lacks official 
status, access to housing, schooling, and the full range of 
employment opportunities can be restricted.

Some former inmates have been denied permission, under the 
"staying at prison employment" system, to return to their 
homes, a provision applicable to those incarcerated in both the 
"reform through labor" and the "reeducation through labor" 
systems.  For those assigned to camps far from their 
residences, this constitutes a form of internal exile.  The 
number of prisoners subject to this restriction is unknown.  
Others have reportedly been forced to accept jobs in state 
enterprises where they can be more closely supervised after 
their release from prison or detention.

The Government routinely permits legal emigration and most 
foreign travel.  There was progress during 1994 in several 
cases in which the Government had denied passports for 
political reasons.  Legal scholar Yu Haocheng finally obtained 
a passport and exit permit in May, as did several relatives of 
dissidents currently residing abroad.  Although regulations 
promulgated in 1990 require college graduates to repay the cost 
of their free postsecondary education by working for 5 years 
before going abroad, students wishing to go abroad still manage 
to obtain passports.  The Government continues to use political 
attitudes as a major criterion in selecting people for 
government-sponsored study abroad.

The Government continued its efforts to attract persons who 
have studied overseas back to China.  Official media have said 
that before returning home, Chinese citizens who have joined 
foreign organizations hostile to China should quit them and 
refrain from activities which violate Chinese law.  The 
authorities continued to refuse to allow labor activist Han 
Dongfang to return to China after revoking his passport in 1993 
on the grounds that he engaged in activities hostile to China 
while overseas.  In November authorities stopped poet Bei Dao 
at Beijing Airport and reportedly interrogated him overnight 
about his position as director of Human Rights in China, a 
U.S.-based organization.  He was then refused entry into 
China.  Some former student leaders who were active in the 1989 
Tiananmen demonstrations reportedly continue to have difficulty 
getting permission to return to China.

The Government accepts the repatriation of citizens who have 
entered other countries or territories illegally.  In 1994, in 
addition to the routine return of Chinese illegal immigrants 
found in Hong Kong, the Government permitted the return of 
several large groups of illegal immigrants from other countries.
Citizens illegally smuggled to other countries are often 
detained for a short time to determine identity and any past 
criminal record or involvement in smuggling activities.  As a 
deterrent and to recover local costs incurred during the 
repatriation, the authorities in some areas levy a fine of 
$1,000 or more on returnees.

Currently there is no law authorizing the authorities to grant 
refugee status, and they generally repatriate persons of other 
nationalities seeking to be recognized as refugees.  The 
Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Public Security, and Civil 
Affairs, in collaboration with the U.N. High Commissioner for 
Refugees, are writing legislation that would allow China to 
honor its obligation as a party since 1982 to the Geneva 
Convention in regard to refugees.

Although the Government denies having tightened its policy on 
accepting Vietnamese refugees, in recent years very few such 
refugees have actually been resettled in China.  China has not 
signed the Comprehensive Plan of Action negotiated at the 
Geneva International Conference on Indochinese Refugees in 
1989, but it generally has abided by its principles.

Section 3  Respect for Political Rights:  The Right of Citizens 
           to Change Their Government

Citizens lack the means to change their government legally and 
cannot freely choose or change the laws and officials that 
govern them.  Citizens vote directly only for county-level 
people's congress delegates.  People's congress delegates at 
the provincial level are selected by county-level people's 
congresses, and in turn provincial-level people's congresses 
select delegates to the National People's Congress.  According 
to the 1982 Constitution, the National People's Congress (NPC) 
is the highest organ of state power.  It elects the President 
and Vice President, decides on the choice of the Premier, and 
elects the Chairman of the Central Military Commission.  In 
some elections (but not for the central Government positions 
chosen by the NPC), voters are offered more candidates than 
positions, allowing a modest degree of choice among officially 
approved candidates.  There were credible reports that the 
candidates most favored by authorities were defeated in some 
local elections, particularly at the village level.

There are no restrictions placed on the participation of women 
or minority groups in the political process, and women make up 
14 percent of Communist Party membership.  However, the 
election and agenda of people's congresses at all levels remain 
under tight control by the Communist Party, the paramount 
source of political authority in China.  The Constitution was 
amended in 1993 to ratify the existence of small "democratic" 
parties, but these play only a minor consultative role at most, 
and all pledge allegiance to the Communist Party.  Thus, the 
Communist Party retains an explicit monopoly on political 

The requirement that associations register and be approved 
makes it difficult for independent interest groups to form and 
affect the system.  Several persons who petitioned the NPC 
calling for greater attention to human rights and workers' 
rights, including Zhou Guoqiang, Yuan Hongbing, and others, 
were detained by authorities in March and April.  Zhou Guoqiang 
was sentenced in September to 3 years' reeducation through 
labor (see Section 1.e.).

Section 4  Governmental Attitude Regarding International and 
           Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations 
           of Human Rights

There are no independent Chinese organizations that publicly 
monitor or comment on human rights conditions in China.  The 
Government has made it clear it will not tolerate the existence 
of such groups.  In April Shanghai officials denied a request 
for permission to register by the Chinese Human Rights 
Association, a group founded by Yang Zhou and other 
dissidents.  The decision was justified on the grounds that the 
group was not affiliated with an official organization.  The 
authorities subsequently detained most of the members of the 
group, but it is not clear whether their detentions resulted 
solely from their involvement in the group.  Wang Dan, a 1989 
student activist, was repeatedly detained for brief periods in 
1994 after announcing his intention to investigate China's 
human rights situation.  (See also Section 1.d.)

The Government has promoted limited academic study and 
discussion of concepts of human rights since 1991.  Research 
institutes in Shanghai and Beijing, including the Chinese 
Academy of Social Sciences, have organized symposia on human 
rights issues, established human rights research centers, and 
visited other countries to study human rights practices in 
those nations.  In 1993 the Government formed the China Society 
for Human Rights Studies as a "nongovernmental organization"; 
its efforts have focused largely on improving China's image 
abroad and responding to criticism of China's human rights 
record.  In June the Society issued comments on the 1993 U.S. 
State Department Human Rights Report which stridently defended 
Chinese practices and glossed over fundamental human rights 
abuses that the Government continues to perpetrate.

The Government reiterated in April that China agrees to abide 
by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other 
international human rights documents.  Despite this public 
statement, Chinese officials accept only in theory the 
universality of human rights.  They argue instead that a 
nation's political, economic, and social system and its unique  
historical, religious, and cultural background determine its 
concept of human rights.  To advocate this nonuniversal view, 
and to deflect attempts to discuss its human rights record, 
China was active in 1994 in international forums, including the 
annual U.N. Human Rights Commission meeting.

The Government remains reluctant to accept criticism of its 
human rights practices by other nations or international 
organizations and often criticized reports by international 
human rights monitoring groups in 1994.  Nevertheless, 
officials no longer dismiss all discussion of human rights as 
interference in the country's internal affairs.  Chinese 
authorities continued their limited dialog with foreign 
governments on human rights issues in talks with a number of 
visiting delegations from other countries, and also during 
visits abroad by Chinese leaders.  At the request of the U.S. 
Government in 1993, the Chinese Government provided limited 
information about the status of several hundred persons 
believed to be imprisoned for their political or religious 
beliefs.  As noted in Section 2.c., in November the U.N. 
Special Rapporteur on Religious Intolerance visited China for 
10 days at the invitation of the Chinese Government.  His visit 
included a trip to Lhasa, capital of the Tibet Autonomous 

Section 5  Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, 
           Disability, Language, or Social Status

Laws exist that seek to protect women, children, the disabled, 
and minorities.  In practice, social discrimination based on 
ethnicity, gender, and disability has persisted and the concept 
of a largely homogeneous Chinese people pervades the general 
thinking of the Han majority.


The 1982 Constitution states that "women enjoy equal rights 
with men in all spheres of life," including ownership of 
property, inheritance rights, and access to education.  In 1992 
the NPC enacted legislation on the protection of the rights and 
interests of women which was designed to assist in curbing 
sex-related discrimination.  Women continued, however, to 
report discrimination, sexual harassment, unfair dismissal, 
demotion, and wage cuts.  Women are sometimes the unintended 
victims of economic reforms designed to streamline enterprises 
and give workers greater job mobility.  A survey of the 
All-China Federation of Trade Unions found that women made up 
60 percent of those forced to leave their jobs due to 
enterprise cutbacks or reorganizations in 1993.  Many employers 
prefer to hire men to avoid the expense of maternity leave and 
child-care, and some even lowered the retirement age for female 
workers to 40 years of age.  Although Chinese law promises 
equal pay for equal work, a 1990 survey found that women's 
salaries averaged 77 percent of men's.  Most women employed in 
industry work in lower-skilled and lower-paid jobs.

In June the Government issued a white paper on the situation of 
Chinese women, spurred by plans to host the Fourth World 
Conference on Women in Beijing in 1995.  According to the white 
paper, women hold relatively few positions of significant 
influence within the party or government structure (there are 
no women in the 22-member Politburo), although 21 percent of 
national People's Congress delegates and 13 percent of members 
of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference are 
women.  While the gap in the education levels of men and women 
is narrowing, men continue to constitute the majority of the 
educated, particularly the highly educated.  For example, the 
white paper reported that in 1992, women made up 33.7 percent 
of college students, and 24.8 percent of postgraduates.  From 
1982 to 1993, 4.9 percent of doctoral degrees were awarded to 

The Government continued in 1994 to condemn strongly and take 
steps to prevent and punish the abduction and sale of women for 
marriage or prostitution, violence against women, and female 
infanticide.  It has severely punished and in some cases 
executed a number of people accused of such crimes.  In a case 
reported in the Chinese press in December, a gang of 48 people 
in Anhui province received sentences ranging from 19 years to 
death for abducting, raping, and selling 102 women.  The case 
was the most serious which has become known to date.  The 
abduction of women remains a serious problem, especially in 
those areas where local officials have resisted efforts of 
central authorities to stop it.  According to figures announced 
by the Ministry of Public Security in January, there were 
15,000 cases of abduction and trafficking in women and children 
in 1993.

One report from Inner Mongolia blamed part of the problem of 
abduction and selling of women on a serious imbalance in sex 
ratios in one county, where there were 115 men for every 100 
women.  The question of male/female birth ratios and 
traditional preferences for boys is discussed in Section 1.f.  
Although Chinese authorities have enacted laws and conducted 
educational campaigns to eradicate the traditional preference 
for sons, in many areas this preference remains strong, 
especially in rural China.  A number of provinces have sought 
to reduce the perceived higher value of boys in providing old- 
age support for their parents by establishing or improving 
pensions and retirement homes.

Nationwide statistics on the extent of physical violence 
against women are not available, but a survey of 2,100 families 
by the Beijing Society for Research on Marriage and the Family 
published in March, showed that one-fifth of all wives had been 
abused by their spouses.  One government study indicated 2 
percent of urban households and 5 percent of rural ones had 
serious problems of domestic violence.


China does not condone violence against children, and physical 
abuse can be grounds for criminal prosecution.  In 1992 China's 
Law on the Protection of Juveniles was enacted.  It forbids 
infanticide, as well as mistreatment or abandonment of 
children.  The law also prohibits discrimination against 
handicapped minors, emphasizes the importance of safety and 
morality, and codifies a variety of judicial protections for 
juvenile offenders.  The Chinese press continues to report 
instances of child abuse, for example a December case in which 
a mother beat her daughter to death despite several prior 
warnings to stop abusing the child.  In one case publicized in 
the Chinese press, a hospital successfully sued a father for 
abandoning his infant twin daughters soon after their birth.  
He was given a 1-year suspended sentence.  Female and 
especially handicapped children represent a disproportionate 
percentage of those abandoned.  Kidnaping and buying and 
selling of children continued to be a problem in some rural 
areas.  China's extensive health care delivery system has led 
to a sharp decline in infant mortality rates and improved child 
health.  According to Chinese media, China's infant mortality 
rate declined to 31 per 1,000 live births in 1994.

     National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities

The 55 designated ethnic minorities constitute just over 8 
percent of China's total population.  Most minority groups 
reside in areas they have traditionally inhabited, many of 
which are in mountainous or remote parts of China.  China's 
minorities benefit from a policy of preferential treatment in 
marriage policy, family planning, university admission, and 
employment.  While the standard of living for most minorities 
has improved in recent years, incomes in these areas are often 
well below the national average.  The Government has programs 
to provide low interest loans, subsidies, and special 
development funds for minority areas.  While these government 
development policies have helped raise minority living 
standards, they have also disrupted traditional living 

The central Government has tried to adopt policies responsive 
to minority sensitivities, but in doing so has encountered the 
dilemma of how to respect minority cultures without damaging 
minority educational and economic opportunities.  In many areas 
with a significant population of minorities, there are 
two-track school systems using standard Chinese and minority 
languages.  Students can choose which system to attend.  One 
acknowledged side effect of this policy to protect and maintain 
minority cultures has been reinforcement of a segregated 
society.  Under this separate education system, those 
graduating from minority schools are at a disadvantage when 
competing for jobs in government and business, which require 
good spoken Chinese.  These graduates must take Chinese 
language instruction before attending universities and colleges.

The Communist Party has an avowed policy of boosting minority 
representation in the Government and the party.  Many 
minorities occupy local leadership positions, and a few have 
positions at the national level.  However, in most areas, 
ethnic minorities are effectively shut out of most positions of 
real political and decisionmaking power.  Some minorities 
resent Han officials holding key positions in minority 
autonomous regions.  Ethnic minorities in Tibet, Xinjiang, and 
elsewhere have at times demonstrated against Han Chinese 
authority.  Central authorities have made it clear that they 
will not tolerate opposition to Communist Party rule in 
minority regions.

     People with Disabilities

In 1990 China adopted legislation protecting the rights of 
China's 54.64 million disabled.  However, as with many other 
aspects of Chinese society, reality for China's handicapped 
lags far behind the legal provisions.  Misdiagnosis, inadequate 
medical care, pariah status, and abandonment remain the norm 
for China's disabled population.

Statistics on education reveal the inequity of resources 
afforded the handicapped in China:  only 6 percent of disabled 
school children receive primary education.   The illiteracy 
rate among the disabled is 60 percent, and school attendance 
averages only 20 percent for blind, deaf, or mentally retarded 

In May the China Welfare Fund for the Handicapped, headed by 
Deng Pufang, son of retired senior leader Deng Xiaoping, 
announced plans to raise the employment rate and the education 
enrollment rate of the disabled to 80 percent by the year 2000, 
increase vocational training, and promote research on 
disabilities in China.  All state enterprises are required to 
hire a certain number of disabled workers, but Chinese 
authorities estimate that 40 percent of disabled people are 

In May China adopted standards for making roads and buildings 
accessible for the handicapped.  The 1990 Law on the 
Handicapped, however, calls for "gradual" implementation of the 
standards.  A low level of compliance with the regulations to 
date has resulted in limited access to most buildings for 
China's physically handicapped.

The new Maternal and Child Health Care Law passed in October 
postpones the marriage of persons with certain specified 
contagious diseases or certain acute mental illnesses such as 
schizophrenia.  If doctors find that a couple is at risk of 
transmitting disabling congenital defects to their children, 
the couple may marry only if they agree to use birth control or 
undergo sterilization.  The law mandates premarital and 
prenatal examination for genetic or contagious diseases, and it 
specifies that medically advised abortion or sterilization 
require the signed consent of the patients or their guardians.

Section 6  Worker Rights

     a.  The Right of Association

China's 1982 Constitution provides for "freedom of 
association," but this right is heavily diluted by references 
to the interest of the State and the leadership of the Chinese 
Communist Party.  The country's sole officially recognized 
workers' organization, the All-China Federation of Trade Unions 
(ACFTU) is controlled by the Communist Party.  Independent 
trade unions are illegal.  Though ACFTU officials recognize 
that workers' interests may not always coincide with those of 
the Communist Party, the trade union law passed by the NPC in 
March 1992 stated that the ACFTU is a party organ, and its 
primary purpose is to mobilize workers for national 
development.  The 1993 revised Trade Union Law required that 
the establishment of unions at any level be submitted to a 
higher level trade union organization for approval.  The ACFTU, 
the highest level organization, has not approved the 
establishment of independent unions.  Attempts to form or 
register independent unions have been severely repressed (see 
Section 1.e. and 2.b.).  There are no provisions allowing for 
individual workers or unofficial worker organizations to 
affiliate with international bodies.  The vast majority of 
workers have no contact with any union other than the ACFTU.

Credible reports indicate that the Government has attempted to 
stamp out clandestine union activity.  In March a petition 
calling, among other things, for workers to have "freedom from 
exploitation," the right to strike, and the right to organize 
nonofficial trade unions was circulated in Beijing.  Chinese 
authorities later detained Zhou Guoqiang, (an associate of Han 
Dongfang, see Section 2.d.) Yuan Hongbing, and Wang Jiaqi after 
they presented the petition;  Zhou was sentenced in September 
to 3 years' reeducation through labor, although the charges 
against him were reportedly not linked to the petition.  
Accurate figures are not available on the number of Worker 
Autonomous Federation detainees still being held after the 1989 
Tiananmen Square demonstrations.

The ACFTU's primary attention remains focused on its 
traditional constituency, state sector workers.  The Trade 
Union Law mandates that workers may decide whether to join the 
union in their enterprise.  By official estimate, 10 percent of 
workers in collectively and state-owned enterprises have chosen 
for their own reasons not to join.  There have been no reports 
of repercussions for workers who have not joined ACFTU unions.  
Diversification of enterprise types over the last decade of 
reform has vastly increased the number of workers outside the 
traditional sphere of the ACFTU.  Over half of China's 
nonagricultural work force is now largely unorganized and 
outside the state industrial structure, in collectives, 
township and village enterprises, private and individual 
enterprises, and foreign-invested enterprises.  In township and 
village enterprises, one of the fastest growing sectors of the 
economy, only 0.1 percent of workers are organized in ACFTU 

Workers in companies with foreign investors are guaranteed the 
right to form unions, which must affiliate with the ACFTU.  
According to ACFTU statistics, 60 percent of workers in 
foreign-invested companies had joined unions by December 1994.  
Unofficial Embassy surveys suggest a more accurate estimate of 
unionization of employees in foreign-invested enterprises might 
be closer to 40 percent.  According to press reports, 14 
coastal provinces issued regulations requiring all 
foreign-invested enterprises to establish unions by the end of 
1994.  Enforcement of these regulations appears to have been 
haphazard.  Guangdong province, recipient of much of China's 
foreign investment, reported 40-percent unionization of 
foreign-invested enterprises in December 1994.

The right to strike, which had been included in China's 1975 
and 1978 constitutions, was not retained in the 1982 
Constitution.  In general, the Union Law assigns unions the 
role of mediators or go-betweens with management in cases of 
work stoppages or slowdowns.  Nonetheless, work stoppages 
occurred in several locations in China during 1994.  One of the 
largest well-documented cases occurred when 1,300 workers in a 
foreign-invested enterprise in Shekou in Guangdong province 
struck over working conditions.  Beginning in 1993, the 
Ministry of Labor no longer officially denied the existence of 
strikes in China.  In 1994 Ministry of Labor officials provided 
detailed statistics on the number and type of labor disputes.  
The statistics, based on National Mediation Center and Labor 
Bureau records, reveal a 50-percent increase in disputes in 
1993.  Ministry of Labor arbitration bureaus across China 
recorded 12,358 disputes involving 34,794 workers.  Of these, 
all but 1,173 were initiated by workers.  According to the 
Ministry of Labor, roughly two-thirds of the disputes were 
settled through mediation or arbitration, 334 were taken to 
court, and 244 resulted in strikes.

     b.  The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively

The long-awaited National Labor Law, passed by the NPC's 
Standing Committee on July 5, permits workers in all types of 
enterprises in China to bargain collectively.  The law, which 
will take effect January 1, 1995, supersedes a 1988 law that 
allowed collective bargaining only by workers in private 
enterprises.  Some high-profile experiments in collective 
bargaining have been carried out at state enterprises, notably 
the Shanghai Number Five Iron and Steel Plant.  In the past, 
the ACFTU has limited its role to consulting with management 
over wages and regulations affecting working conditions and 
serving as a conduit for communicating workers' complaints to 
management or municipal labor bureaus.  The ACFTU has shown 
concern about protecting workers' living standards in areas 
such as unemployment insurance and argued in 1993 that the 
traditional definition of workers should be expanded to include 
peasants laboring in China's township and village enterprises.

Before wage reform, workers' wages were set according to a 
uniform national scale, based on seniority and skills.  Since 
wage reform, a total wage bill for each collective and 
state-owned enterprise is set by the Ministry of Labor 
according to four criteria:  1) as a percentage of profits, 2) 
as a contract amount with the local labor bureau, 3) for money 
losing enterprises, according to a state-set amount, or 4) as 
an enterprise-set amount subject to Labor Ministry review.  
Individual enterprises determine how to divide the total among 
workers, a decision usually made by the enterprise manager in 
consultation with the enterprise party chief and the ACFTU 
representative.  Worker congresses (see below) have mandated 
authority to review plans for wage reform, though these bodies 
serve primarily as rubberstamp organizations.  Wages are 
generally equal for the same type of work within enterprises.  
Incentives are provided for increased productivity.  Under the 
new Labor Law, wages may be set according to conditions set out 
in collective contracts negotiated between ACFTU representatives
and management.  In practice, only the small number of workers 
with high technical skills can negotiate effectively on salary 
and fringe benefit issues.

The old permanent employment system is increasingly giving way 
to a more flexible contract-based system.  Most workers in 
state-owned enterprises hired in the last 3 years have signed 
individual contracts--a practice mandated by the new Labor 
Law--and a number of large enterprises have converted all 
workers to such contracts.  Approximately 40 percent of state 
sector workers now work under contract, but the proportion of 
contract workers varies widely according to regional economic 
development.  In Shanghai, 1.5 million workers, or 97.5 percent 
of all workers in state sector firms, have signed labor 
contracts.  Contract arrangements are more common in township 
and village enterprises and many types of joint ventures.  In 
collective enterprises below the provincial level, contract 
workers are a distinct minority.  China's new Labor Law 
provides for workers and employers at all types of enterprises 
to sign both collective and individual contracts.  The former 
will be worked out between ACFTU or worker representatives and 
management and will specify such matters as working conditions, 
wage distribution, and hours of work.  Individual contracts 
will then be drawn up in line with the terms of the collective 

Worker congresses, held periodically in most Chinese 
enterprises, theoretically have the authority to remove 
incompetent managers and approve major decisions affecting the 
enterprise, notably wage and bonus distribution systems.  
However, worker congresses generally take place only once a 
year and serve essentially to approve agreements worked out 
among factory managers, party secretaries, and ACFTU 
representatives.  In smaller enterprises it is not unusual to 
find these three posts held by the same person.

A dispute settlement procedure has been in effect since 1987.  
The procedure provides for mediation, two levels of arbitration 
committees, and a final appeal to the courts.  Of the 12,358 
cases brought for arbitration in 1993, 64 percent were resolved 
at the first or second level.  Less than 3 percent reached the 
courts.  Approximately 40 percent of the cases closed in 1993 
were resolved in favor of the worker(s), 20 percent in favor of 
management; the rest resulted in a compromise.  According to 
Labor Ministry officials, most arbitration cases are filed by 
contract workers or their employers, indicating, they assert, 
that the new contract system provides a clearer set of ground 
rules which both sides can attempt to enforce.

The 1982 Trade Union Law prohibits antiunion discrimination and 
specifies that union representatives may not be transferred or 
terminated by enterprise management during their term of 
office.  Unionized foreign businesses generally report 
pragmatic relations with ACFTU representatives.  At its 
National Congress in October 1993, the ACFTU set the goal of 
establishing unions in 50 percent of all foreign-funded 
enterprises by the end of 1994.

Laws governing working conditions in China's special economic 
zones (SEZ's) are not significantly different from those in the 
rest of the country.  However, wages in the SEZ's, and in 
southeastern China generally, are significantly higher than in 
other parts of the country.

     c.  Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor

In addition to prisons and reform through labor facilities, 
which contain inmates sentenced through judicial procedures 
(see Section 1.c.), China also maintains a network of 
"reeducation through labor" camps, where inmates are sentenced 
through nonjudicial procedures (see Section l.e.).  Inmates of 
reeducation through labor facilities are generally required to 
work.  Reports from international human rights organizations 
and the foreign press indicate that at least some persons in 
pretrial detention are also required to work.  Justice 
officials have stated that in reeducation through labor 
facilities there is a much heavier emphasis on education than 
on labor.  Most reports conclude that work conditions in the 
penal system's light manufacturing factories are similar to 
those in ordinary factories, but conditions on farms and in 
mines can be harsh.  As is the case in most Chinese workplaces, 
safety is not a high priority.  There are no available figures 
for casualties in prison industry.

Some penal facilities contract with regular industries for 
prisoners to perform light manufacturing and assembly work.  In 
1991 the Government published a reiteration of its regulations 
barring the export of prison-made goods.  On August 7, 1992, 
the U.S. and Chinese Governments signed a memorandum of 
understanding (MOU) prohibiting trade in prison labor 
products.  A statement of cooperation detailing specific 
working procedures for implementation of the MOU was agreed to 
and signed on March 14, 1994.

     d.  Minimum Age for Employment of Children

China's National Labor Law, effective January 1, 1995, forbids 
employers to hire workers under 16 years of age and specifies 
administrative review, fines, and revocation of business 
licenses of those businesses that hire minors.  In the interim, 
regulations promulgated in 1987 prohibiting the employment of 
school-age minors who have not completed the compulsory 9 years 
of education continued in force.  Enterprise inspection and 
effective enforcement of labor regulations is expanding.  
Officials insist that increased diligence in monitoring 
temporary workers has successfully precluded widespread 
employment of minors.  Labor officials also report that 
employers were disciplined in 1994 for infringement of child 
labor regulations, but such reports cannot be verified.  In 
poorer isolated areas, child labor in agriculture is 
widespread.  Most independent observers agree with Chinese 
officials that, given its vast surplus of adult labor, urban 
child labor is a relatively minor problem in formal sectors of 
the economy.  Rising dropout rates at secondary schools in some 
southern provinces and anecdotal reports suggest that children 
may increasingly be entering unregulated sectors of China's 
economy.  No specific Chinese industry is identifiable as a 
significant violator of child labor regulations.

     e.  Acceptable Conditions of Work

The new Labor Law codifies many of the general principles of 
China's labor reform, setting out provisions on employment, 
labor contracts, working hours, wages, skill development and 
training, social insurance, dispute resolution, legal 
responsibility, supervision, and inspection.  In anticipation 
of the Law's minimum wage requirements, many local governments 
already enforce regulations on minimum wages.  Generally the 
wage levels have been set higher than the local poverty relief 
ceiling but lower than the current wage level of the average 
worker.  Minimum wage figures do not include free or heavily 
subsidized benefits which employers commonly provide in kind, 
such as housing, medical care, and education.  Unemployment 
insurance schemes now cover a majority of urban workers 
(primarily state sector workers).  Benefits from these funds 
are provided to laid off workers according to "local 
conditions," but unemployment subsidies generally equal 120 to 
150 percent of the local hardship relief standard.  
Regularization of unemployment insurance coverage and  
administration in 1994 has served to decrease the incidence of 
nonpayment of severance allowances.  Workers are eligible to 
receive unemployment relief funds for varying lengths of time, 
up to 24 months, according to length of service.

In February the State Council reduced the national standard 
workweek from 48 hours to 44 hours, excluding overtime, with a 
mandatory 24-hour rest period.  A system of alternating weeks 
of 6- and 5-day workweeks began in March, with a 6-month grace 
period for implementation.  The same regulations specified that 
cumulative monthly overtime could not exceed 48 hours.  The 
Chinese press regularly reported cases of workers forced to 
work regular 12-and 14-hour days of forced overtime at 
foreign-invested enterprises, particularly in southeast China 
and the SEZ's.

Occupational health and safety are constant themes of posters 
and campaigns.  Every work unit must designate a health and 
safety officer, and the International Labor Organization has 
established a training program for these officials.  The U.S. 
Department of Labor's Mine Safety and Health Administration is 
participating actively in this program.  Moreover, while the 
right to strike is not provided for in the 1982 Constitution, 
the Trade Union Law explicitly recognizes the right of unions 
to "suggest that staff and workers withdraw from sites of 
danger" and to participate in accident investigations.  Labor 
officials reported that such withdrawals did occur in some 
instances during 1994.  Nonetheless, pressures for increased 
output, lack of financial resources to maintain equipment, lack 
of concern by management, and a traditionally poor 
understanding of safety issues by workers have contributed to a 
continuing high rate of accidents.  Statistics provided by the 
ACFTU indicate that 11,600 workers were killed in industrial 
accidents from January to August of 1993, up 13 percent over 
the same period of 1992.  One credible report indicates there 
are over 10,000 miners killed in accidents yearly.  Fatal 
factory explosions, fires, and collapsing dormitories have been 
covered by both the domestic and foreign press.  Officials 
blame 60 percent of accidents on violation of safety 
regulations, particularly in the rapidly expanding rural, 
private, and foreign-invested enterprise sectors.  In 
Guangdong, where 1,300 fires killed 329 people and injured 889 
in 1993, the authorities announced in February new fines for 
enterprises that neglect safety precautions.  Negligent units 
will be fined 1 to 5 percent of the total losses they incur in 
any fire, $3,450 (RMB 30,000) for every worker killed, and $345 
to $575 (RMB 3,000 to 5,000) for each worker injured.  Many 
factories using harmful products, such as asbestos, fail not 
only to protect their workers against the ill effects of such 
products, but also fail to inform them about the potential 



(This section of the report on China has been prepared pursuant 
to Section 536 (b) of Public Law 103-236.  The United States 
recognizes the Tibet Autonomous Region (hereinafter referred to 
as "Tibet") to be part of the People's Republic of China.  
Preservation and development of Tibet's unique religious, 
cultural, and linguistic heritage and protection of its 
people's fundamental human rights continue to be of concern.)

     Respect for the Integrity of the Person

Because the Chinese Government strictly controls access to and 
information about Tibet, it is difficult to state precisely the 
scope of human rights abuse there.  It is known, however, that 
during 1994 Chinese government authorities continued to commit 
widespread human rights abuses in Tibet, including instances of 
torture, arbitrary arrest, and detention without public trial, 
long detention of Tibetan nationalists for peacefully 
expressing their political views, and rigid controls on freedom 
of speech and the press, particularly for Tibetans.  There are 
credible reports that authorities in some instances tortured 
and killed detainees in Tibet.  Reports from international 
human rights organizations indicate that a Tibetan nun died on 
June 4 in a prison hospital, reportedly as a result of a 
beating by guards.  In May Tibetan officials reported that a 
former public security official in Tibet was sentenced to 9 
years in prison for causing the death of a suspect while 
torturing him to obtain a confession.  The United Nations 
Working Group on Arbitrary Detentions has concluded that China 
is arbitrarily detaining 32 Tibetans and has called for their 

The authorities permit most traditional religious practices 
except those seen as a vehicle for political dissent, which 
they ruthlessly suppress.  They continue to detain and 
prosecute monks and nuns who have expressed dissenting 
political views in public.  Legal safeguards for Tibetans 
detained or imprisoned are inadequate in design and 
implementation, and lack of independent outside access to 
prisoners or prisons makes it difficult to assess the extent 
and severity of abuses and the number of Tibetan prisoners.

According to human rights organizations, small-scale protests 
were reported to have occurred in Lhasa, the capital, and 
elsewhere during 1994, resulting in swift detention for 
participants.  According to credible reports, in January, 11 
nuns were sentenced to terms of 2 to 7 years' imprisonment for 
taking part in a proindependence demonstration in 1993.  
Another group of 14 nuns reportedly had their prison sentences 
increased by up to 9 years for singing proindependence songs.  
In May a demonstration by Tibetan shopkeepers protesting tax 
increases took on political overtones, and several dozen 
Tibetan monks and nuns were detained, apparently for raising 
independence slogans.  Police responded without using excessive 
force, reflecting better riot control training; no lives were 
lost.  Tibetan political prisoners such as Ngawang Pulchung and 
Jempel Tsering remained imprisoned in 1994, although Yulo Dawa 
Tsering and three other Tibetans were released in November.

     Freedom of Religion

In Tibet, where Buddhism and Tibetan nationalism are closely 
intertwined, relations between Buddhists and secular 
authorities continued to be tense in 1994.  The Government does 
not tolerate religious manifestations that advocate Tibetan 
independence, and it has prohibited a large traditional 
festival which has in the past been used to encourage 
separatist sentiment.  The Government condemns the Dalai Lama's 
political activities and his leadership of a "government in 
exile," but it recognizes him as a major religious figure.  
Government religious authorities in 1994 forbade party and 
government officials from displaying the Dalai Lama's 
photograph, including in their homes, and removed his 
photographs from sale at bazaar shops.  His photos remain in 
prominent positions in most temples in Tibet.  The autonomous 
region government in Tibet also ordered Tibetan officials who 
have children studying in India to bring them back to Tibet 

In 1994 the Chinese Government continued to take steps to 
ameliorate damage caused in the 1960's and 1970's to Tibet's 
historic religious buildings and other aspects of its cultural 
and religious heritage.  The Government has expended 
substantial sums to reconstruct the most important sacred sites 
of Tibetan Buddhism.  A 5-year project to restore the Potala 
Palace (the most important Tibetan Buddhist center) in Lhasa 
was concluded in August 1994 at a cost of $6.4 million.  The 
Government also provided funding in 1994 for the restoration of 
two other major religious sites in Lhasa, the Jokhang and 
Ganden monasteries.  Ganden had been completely destroyed 
during the Cultural Revolution.  Public contributions also 
helped to rebuild these and many smaller monasteries.  Although 
the Government denied it, the practice of religion in Tibet 
continued to be hampered by the limits the Government imposes 
on the number of resident monks in several of Tibet's main 
temples.  There are 34,000 Buddhist monks and nuns in Tibet, 
according to official figures, a small number compared to 
traditional norms.  Tibetan Buddhists claim that they are 
restricted in the numbers and training of religious 
practitioners, even though limits on resident monks are not 
strictly observed in practice.  Monks at some Tibetan 
monasteries known for their opposition to Han Chinese 
domination may still face travel restrictions.

     Economic Development and Protection of Cultural Heritage

Like China's 54 other minority ethnic groups, Tibetans receive 
preferential treatment in marriage policy, family planning, 
university admission, and employment.  Chinese government 
development policies have helped raise the living standards of 
Tibetans, but also have disrupted traditional living patterns.  
The Government has sought to preserve the Tibetan language, but 
in doing so has encountered the dilemma of how to preserve the 
language without limiting educational opportunities.  In Tibet 
primary schools at the village level teach in Tibetan.  Many 
pupils end their formal education after graduating from these 
schools, which usually only have two or three grades.  Those 
who go on to regional primary schools and beyond, particularly 
after junior high school, receive much of their education in 
Chinese, although some areas provide instruction in Tibetan 
through junior high school.  Efforts to expand Tibetan language 
instruction are hampered by lack of materials and competent 
teachers at higher levels.

In July 1994, the Chinese Communist Party and the State Council 
conducted a large-scale work conference on Tibet.  The third of 
its kind since 1980, this work conference was attended by 
delegations from the CCP and central government organizations, 
as well as provincial representatives and delegates from 
certain urban areas.  The conference focused on setting 
economic development goals, pledging to increase economic 
activity in Tibet by 10 percent a year.  The plan included a 
total of $270 million in investment projects, continuing the 
government policy of providing substantial budget subsidies to 
develop Tibet's backward economy.  China's leaders also made 
clear that Tibet would continue to receive central government 
financial assistance and would retain "special flexibility" in 
implementing reform policies mandated elsewhere in China.  In a 
speech covered extensively in the Chinese press, President 
Jiang Zemin reiterated Beijing's willingness to "welcome back" 
the Dalai Lama to Tibet, so long as "he abandons advocacy of 
Tibetan independence and ceases activities to split the 
motherland."  Although the work conference approved plans to 
boost economic development in Tibet, it produced no change in 
the Chinese Government's policy toward Tibet.

The Dalai Lama continued in 1994 to express concern that 
development projects and other central government policies 
encourage a massive influx of Han Chinese into Tibet, which has 
the effect of overwhelming Tibet's traditional culture and 
diluting Tibetan demographic dominance in Tibet.  Freer 
movement of people throughout China in recent years, and the 
prospect of economic opportunity in Tibet, has led to a 
substantial increase in the non-Tibetan population (including 
China's Muslim Hui minority as well as Han Chinese) in Lhasa 
and other urban areas.  Most of these migrants profess to be 
temporary residents, but small businesses run by ethnic Han and 
Hui peoples (mostly restaurants and retail shops) are becoming 
more numerous in or near some Tibetan towns and cities.  
Roughly one-third of the population of Lhasa is Han Chinese.  
Chinese officials assert that 95 percent of Tibet's officially 
registered population is Tibetan, with Han and other ethnic 
groups making up the remainder.  Increased economic development 
will likely mean the transfer to, or temporary duty in, Tibet 
of a greater number of non-Tibetan technical personnel, and may 
also increase the number of immigrants from China's large 
floating population seeking to take advantage of new economic 

Economic development, fueled by central government subsidies, 
is changing traditional Tibetan ways of life.  While the 
Chinese Government has made efforts in recent years to restore 
the physical structures and other aspects of Tibetan Buddhism 
and Tibetan culture damaged or destroyed during the Cultural 
Revolution, repressive social and political controls continue 
to limit the individual freedoms of Tibetans.


[end of document]


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