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TITLE: BURMA HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES, 1994
AUTHOR: U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DATE: FEBRUARY 1995
BURMA
Burma continued to be ruled by a highly authoritarian military
regime widely condemned for its serious human rights abuses.
The Military Government, the State Law and Order Restoration
Council (SLORC), headed by the armed forces commander and
composed of top military officers, seized power in September
1988 after harshly suppressing massive prodemocracy
demonstrations. Retired dictator General Ne Win, whose
idiosyncratic policies had isolated Burma and driven the
country into deep economic decline, is believed by many to
continue to wield considerable influence.
The SLORC permitted a relatively free election in 1990, but it
failed to honor the results--which were an overwhelming
rejection of military rule--or to cede power to the victorious
prodemocracy forces. Instead, the SLORC attacked the coalition
of winning parties and their leaders through intimidation,
detention, and house arrest. Since April 1992, the SLORC has
taken some modest steps to lessen its harsh rule. Universities
were reopened, many political prisoners were released, and
steps were taken to reform the economy. But in January 1993
the SLORC established the "National Convention," a body
ostensibly tasked with working out a new Constitution.
Overwhelmingly made up of delegates handpicked by the military,
the SLORC has carefully stage-managed the Convention's
proceedings and ignored even limited opposition views. Despite
having no mandate from the people, the SLORC seems determined
to draft a Constitution that will guarantee a dominant role for
the military in the country's future political structure.
The Government reinforces its rule via a pervasive security
apparatus led by military intelligence, the Directorate of
Defense Services Intelligence (DDSI). Control is buttressed by
selective restrictions on contact with foreigners, surveillance
of government employees and private citizens, harassment of
political activists, intimidation, arrest, detention, and
physical abuse. The Government justifies its security measures
as necessary to maintain order and national unity, although
many longstanding insurgent groups have reached accommodations
with the SLORC in recent years and the others pose little
threat to major population centers.
Burma is primarily an agricultural country, although it also
has substantial mineral, fishing, and timber resources. Since
1988, the Government has slowly opened up the economy to permit
expansion of the private sector, and to attract foreign
investment. Some economic improvement has ensued, but major
obstacles to economic reform persist. These include
restrictions on private commerce; constantly changing rules and
regulations; overcentralized decisionmaking; a bloated
bureaucracy; a greatly overvalued currency; poor
infrastructure; and grossly disproportionate military spending.
Despite an appearance of greater normalcy fostered by increased
economic activity, in fact the Government's unacceptable record
on human rights changed little in 1994. Out of sight of most
visitors, Burmese citizens continued to live subject at any
time and without appeal to the arbitrary and sometimes brutal
dictates of the military. There continued to be credible
reports, particularly from ethnic minority-dominated areas,
that soldiers committed serious human rights abuses, including
extrajudicial killings and rape. The use of porters by the
army--with all the attendant maltreatment, illness, and even
death for those compelled to serve--remained a standard
practice and probably even increased. The Burmese military
forced hundreds of thousands, if not millions, of ordinary
Burmese (including women and children) to "contribute" their
labor, often under harsh working conditions, to construction
projects throughout the country. The forced resettlement of
civilians also continued.
Four hundred or more political prisoners remained in detention,
including approximately 40 parliamentarians elected in 1990.
Although she has yet to be charged with any crime, Nobel
Laureate Aung San Suu Kyi began her sixth year of house arrest
in July. In extending her arrest, the SLORC circumvented its
own amended statute limiting house arrest to 5 years and
ignored repeated U.N. General Assembly and U.N. Human Rights
Commission resolutions calling for her release and that of all
other prisoners of conscience.
The SLORC continued to restrict severely basic rights to free
speech, association, and assembly. In July and August the
authorities arrested five persons for trying to smuggle out
information on conditions in Burma to the outside world.
Through use of pressure and outright threats, the Government
gathered 4 million Burmese at political rallies in January to
endorse its political agenda. The authorities continued to
control discussion at the national convention.
More than 100,000 Rohingyas (Burmese Muslims from Arakan State)
remained in refugee camps in Bangladesh, pending repatriation
under an ongoing program overseen by the U.N. High Commissioner
for Refugees (UNHCR). A few thousand students and dissidents
continued in exile in Thailand, while at year's end roughly
70,000 Burmese were residing in ethnic minority camps near the
border in Thailand.
Several positive developments occurred, including the February
decision to allow a nonfamily member to visit Aung San Suu
Kyi. Also, after years of refusing to acknowledge her status
as the leader of Burma's prodemocracy forces, in September
SLORC Chairman Than Shwe and DDSI Chief Khin Nyunt met with
Aung San Suu Kyi for the first time since she was placed under
house arrest.
An unknown number of political prisoners was released,
including prominent political satirist Zargana, although the
number of public announcements of such releases declined
compared to 1993. By midyear, the Government agreed to study a
draft Memorandum of Understanding to govern visits by the
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) to Burmese
prisons. The Government permitted the UNHCR to open an office
in Rangoon and to work in the Rohingya refugee processing
area. A limited number of international nongovernmental
organizations (NGO's) were allowed to set up operations or
expand existing ones.
Despite these positive moves, there was by year's end no clear
sign that the SLORC was yet ready to take the kind of decisive
action needed to break with its past, reach a political
settlement with the country's democratic forces, and restore
the basic human and political rights once enjoyed by the people
of Burma.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
There was no evidence of an explicit or systematic government
policy encouraging summary killings. However, there continued
to be credible reports of instances of brutality and killings
of civilians by the military, particularly in
minority-dominated areas and among those impressed as porters.
The Government did not take any action against military
personnel responsible for extrajudicial killings or other
abuses. The Government did not carry out the death sentences
imposed after a summary trial of four civilians charged with
killing a student in Rangoon in January.
b. Disappearance
As in previous years, private citizens and political activists
continued to "disappear" temporarily for several hours to
several days. DDSI officials usually picked up individuals for
questioning without the knowledge of their family members, and
in most cases released them soon afterward. However, many
people continued to be conscripted by the military for
porterage or other duties without the knowledge of their family
members. The whereabouts of those conscripted, as well as of
prisoners transferred for labor or porterage duties, remained
difficult to trace (see Sections 1.g. and 6.c.).
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
Again in 1994, political detainees were held incommunicado for
long periods. These detainees were routinely subjected to
harsh interrogation techniques designed to intimidate and
disorient. The most common forms of maltreatment were sleep
and food deprivation coupled with round-the-clock questioning.
There were also reliable indications that authorities sometimes
physically abused prisoners and pretrial detainees. In recent
years, there have been credible reports of beatings and of
prisoners being forced to squat or assume unnatural positions
for lengthy periods. In the past, there have also been reports
of practices such as electrical shocks to the genitals,
suffocation, and cigarette burns, but there were no known
instances of these techniques being employed in 1994.
The regimen at Insein prison near Rangoon remained unacceptably
harsh, including permanent solitary confinement for 250 of the
approximately 4,000 inmates, little or no exercise, no reading
or writing materials for all but a tiny minority of prisoners,
poor nutrition, and inadequate medical care. A few prominent
political prisoners, such as former National League for
Democracy (NLD) Chairmen Tin Oo and Kyi Maung, continued to be
provided limited reading material and bungalow accommodations.
Most prisoners were permitted to receive medicine as well as
supplemental food brought by their families during the
15-minute visits permitted every 2 weeks. Conditions were
reliably reported to be much worse at some upcountry locations,
particularly Thayet and Thayawaddy prisons, to which scores of
Insein's political prisoners were transferred in June.
In February U.S. Congressman Bill Richardson was able to meet
with Nobel Laureate Aung San Suu Kyi and four other political
prisoners, writer Ma Thida, former NLD central committee member
Win Tin, former Aung San Suu Kyi administrative aide Win Htein,
and former student leader Min Ko Naing. The health of Min Ko
Naing, whom the Congressman had met the previous year at Insein
prison, appeared to have improved somewhat but he continued to
show signs of mental and physical suffering from his 5 years of
solitary confinement.
The Government continued to bar the ICRC from visiting
detainees or convicted prisoners of any kind, but its
discussions with the Government concerning such access
intensified.
Beyond its harsh treatment of prison inmates there continued to
be credible reports that security forces subjected ordinary
citizens to harassment and physical abuse. The military
routinely seized villages to confiscate property and food, and
used abusive recruitment methods to procure porters. Those
forced into porterage or other duties faced extremely difficult
conditions and maltreatment that sometimes resulted in death
(see Section 1.g.).
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
The SLORC routinely practiced arbitrary arrest and
incommunicado detention. Prior to being charged, detainees do
not have access to legal counsel or their families. There is
no provision in Burmese law for judicial determination of the
legality of detention, and political detainees have no
opportunity to obtain release on bail.
Because of the high level of intimidation discouraging overt
political activity, detentions for public antigovernment
activities were less frequent in 1994 than in the early
1990's. Nonetheless, in the course of the year scores of
political activists were detained for low-level political
protests, such as handing out opposition flyers or attempting
to organize demonstrations. Such detentions often coincided
with various political anniversaries. For example, in July a
group of high school students was detained in Rangoon for
participating in protest activities to mark the anniversary of
Ne Win's destruction of the Rangoon University Student Union
building. Most of these cases ended with eventual release of
the detainees.
However, in July Khin Zaw Win, a former local contract employee
of the U.N. Children's Fund (UNICEF), was detained at Rangoon
airport, questioned secretly, and charged in late August with
trying to smuggle antigovernment materials and confidential
government information out of the country. As a result of Khin
Zaw Win's arrest, four others, including the writer San San Nwe
and her daughter Myat Mo Mo Tun, together with two NLD winners
in the 1990 election, Khin Maung Swe and Sein Hla Oo, were also
picked up and accused of abetting the effort to get information
on Burma to the outside world, including to the U.N. Human
Rights Commission's Special Rapporteur on Burma, Professor Yozo
Yokota. All five were found guilty in October and received
sentences ranging from 7 to 15 years for "spreading false
information injurious to the State" and other minor offenses.
In January the military informed former NLD General Secretary
and Nobel Peace Laureate Aung San Suu Kyi that her house arrest
had been extended for another year. This was done despite the
fact that in 1994 she reached the 5-year legal limit of
detention without charge or trial. In February the authorities
announced, apparently for the first time, that the initial year
of the former NLD leader's house arrest had been pursuant to a
decision of the previously unknown "Central Body" and that the
5-year clock began to run only after that time.
Streetside guard posts were removed from in front of Aung San
Suu Kyi's house in January, but the conditions of her detention
did not change. She continued to receive visits from her
immediate family. In mid-February the authorities also
permitted U.S. Congressman Bill Richardson, along with an
official from the United Nations and a New York Times reporter,
to meet with the former NLD leader, the first such visit by
outsiders other than family members since her house arrest
began. In August a Buddhist monk resident in the United
Kingdom was likewise permitted to see Aung San Suu Kyi prior to
the SLORC's meeting with her in September.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
Throughout 1994 the Government continued to rule by decree and
was not bound by any constitutional provisions guaranteeing
fair public trials or any other rights. Although remnants of
the British-era legal system were formally in place, the court
system and its operation remained seriously flawed. Many
observers believe there has been an improvement in judicial
procedures, at least in the handling of nonpolitical cases.
But ongoing unprofessional behavior by some court officials,
pervasive bribe taking, the misuse of overly broad laws, and
the manipulation of the courts for political ends continued to
deprive the country of the right to a fair trial and the rule
of law. The judiciary is not independent of the executive.
Some basic due process rights, including the right to a public
trial and to be represented by a defense attorney, were
generally respected. However, the Supreme Court appoints
judges with the approval of the SLORC (which also names
justices to the Supreme Court).
Defense attorneys are permitted to call and cross-examine
witnesses, but their primary purpose is to bargain with the
judge to obtain the shortest possible sentence for their
clients. Most court proceedings are open to the public.
However, in political cases, almost all trials are held in
courtrooms on prison compounds and are not open to the public.
In these instances, defense counsel appears to serve no purpose
other than to provide moral support, since reliable reports
indicate verdicts are dictated by higher authorities. In an
effort to head off student unrest, in January the authorities
apprehended, charged, tried, and sentenced to death four
persons accused of involvement in the murder of a student from
the Rangoon Institute of Economics--all within the space of 2
days. The sentences, however, appear not to have been carried
out.
The Government continued to release political prisoners in 1994
although the exact numbers could not be verified.
Approximately 400 political prisoners remained in jail at
year's end, including at least 40 parliamentarians elected in
1990. Both prominent political satirist Zargana and M.P.-elect
Nai Tun Thein were freed during the year.
Political prisoners were held not only in Rangoon's Insein
prison but also in some of the country's more than 20 upcountry
prisons. For example, the monk who led the 1990 movement to
withhold spiritual services from the military, Ye Wa Da,
reportedly remained in Mandalay prison, while two other
prominent monks, Da Ma Wa Ya and Wi Thu Ta, were believed to
still be in custody in Myitkyina. Among the many well-known
prisoners of conscience who continued to be held either at
Insein or elsewhere were former NLD leaders Tin Oo and Kyi
Maung, former National Convention delegate Dr. Aung Khin Sint,
the writer Ma Thi Da, and lawyer U Nay Min, who was reportedly
transferred in the course of the year from Insein to the
infamous Thayet prison.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
The military rules unchecked by any outside authority and the
State continued to interfere extensively and arbitrarily into
the lives of private citizens. Through its extensive
intelligence network, the Government closely monitored the
travel, whereabouts, and activities of many citizens,
particularly those known to be politically active. Security
personnel selectively screened private correspondence and
telephone calls and conducted warrantless searches of private
premises. Government employees were required to obtain advance
permission before meeting with foreigners.
The SLORC continued to move people out of cities to peripheral
new town settlements throughout the country, albeit on a
smaller scale than in past years. While facilities in some of
these areas have improved over time, residents targeted for
displacement continued to be given no option but to move,
usually on short notice. The military also continued to
forcibly relocate villages in rural areas, especially those
with large ethnic minority populations.
Also, those able to remain in established cities and towns were
subject to arbitrary seizure of their property. Many residents
of Mandalay were compelled early in the year to cede large
parcels of prime downtown real estate to the authorities for
road-widening projects decided upon without any public
consultation or endorsement. Widespread reports indicate the
Mandalay city government threatened to charge demolition costs
to those in affected areas who wavered in tearing down their
own homes. Beyond these seizures for public purposes there
were consistent reports of pressure being applied to force
individuals to cede parts of their property to government or
military officials, in some cases for these officials' personal
use. Automobiles and other movable property also remained
vulnerable to arbitrary seizure. In rural areas, military
personnel confiscated livestock and food supplies during
periodic sweeps to procure porters.
g. Use of Excessive Force and Violations of Humanitarian
Law in Internal Conflicts
For more than 4 decades the Burmese Army has battled diverse
ethnic insurgencies. These ethnic minority insurgent groups
have sought to gain greater autonomy from the dominant ethnic
Burman majority. For most of the year the SLORC continued to
pursue efforts to engage insurgent groups in cease-fire talks
and refrained from launching major military offensives.
However, in late December, fighting between the Burmese Army
and the Karen National Union (KNU) and the All Burma Students'
Democratic Front (ABSDF) broke out when Burmese forces sought
to take advantage of an internal dispute among the Karen. In
general, combat and attendant human rights abuses remained at a
persistent but low level in areas controlled by those ethnic
insurgent groups.
In November the Government allowed the ICRC to conduct a course
in Rangoon on humanitarian law during armed conflict.
In conjunction with the military's campaign against drug
trafficker Khun Sa and his Shan United Army, as many as several
thousand civilians were press-ganged into working as porters in
jungle areas in or near combat zones. According to reliable
reports, Burmese military sweeps for porters reached such urban
areas as Rangoon, Mandalay, and Moulmein. Military authorities
commonly demanded as much as $230 (10 times the minimum monthly
wage) to avoid service. It was also credibly reported that
some members of the military used sham threats of impressment
to extort money. There were numerous credible reports that
soldiers abused porters; when wounded, ill, or unable to work,
they were sometimes left unattended in harsh conditions to
die. There were also continuing reports of rape, particularly
of ethnic minority women by soldiers.
Antigovernment insurgent groups were also responsible for
violence, causing both civilian and military deaths. There
were also credible reports that members of these groups
committed serious human rights violations. The
narcotics-trafficking Shan United Army is reported to have
brutalized villagers and impressed porters in the course of
fighting against the Burmese army and to have extorted
protection fees from local merchants. In early May, insurgents
from the Rohingya Solidarity Organization (RSO) detonated a
series of bombs in towns and villages near the western border
of Arakan State resulting in several deaths and injuries.
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
Severe restrictions on freedom of speech and the press
persisted throughout 1994. The security services continued to
clamp down on those who expressed opposition political views or
attempted to provide outsiders with information at variance
with the government-approved image of the country (see Section
1.d.). Many more have refrained from speaking out for fear of
arrest and interrogation by police or military intelligence.
The Government-monopoly television, radio, and newspaper media
remained propaganda instruments. With the exception of
coverage of some limited aspects of the national convention,
these official media did not report opposing views. Editors
remained answerable to military authorities. While the
English-language daily New Light of Myanmar continued to
include many international wire service reports on foreign
news, domestic news hewed strictly to and reinforced government
policy.
Practically all forms of media were officially controlled and
censored. This strict control in turn encouraged
self-censorship on the part of writers and publishers. Private
citizens were generally unable to subscribe directly to foreign
publications. Some international newsmagazines and a sizable
number of new private publications on nonpolitical issues were
available to the public at large, but censors occasionally
banned issues or deleted articles deemed unwelcome by the
Government.
Foreign journalists, including television crews, were granted
increased access to the country, but their movements and
contacts were closely monitored. Despite government hostility
to them, foreign radio broadcasts such as those of the British
Broadcasting Corporation, Voice of America, and Democratic
Voice of Norway remained prime sources of uncensored
information. The Government also allowed the U.S. Information
Service to conduct a wide range of programs. Foreign
television remained in limbo. After its imposed September 1993
registration deadline for satellite dishes, the Government
failed to approve additional licenses or clarify who in the
future would be allowed to have foreign television. Late in
the year, the Government cracked down on video rental shops in
Rangoon, forcing the withdrawal from circulation of most
foreign language videos.
University teachers and professors remained subject to the same
restrictions on freedom of speech, political activities, and
publications as other government employees. These included
warnings against criticism of the Government; instructions not
to discuss politics while at work; and strictures against
joining or supporting political parties, engaging in political
activity, or meeting foreign officials. Teachers continued to
be held responsible for maintaining discipline among their
students and preventing them from engaging in any unauthorized
political activity.
The universities, closed for several years after the 1988
disturbances, were open for most of 1994. However, the
university midyear break was extended until August 18,
presumably to lessen the chance of unwanted student activities
in conjunction with various sensitive political anniversaries
falling in July and early August.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
The Government does not respect these rights. In January the
Government organized a series of 26 stage-managed mass rallies
throughout the country which were attended by approximately
4 million people. The meetings of this government-initiated
group, the Union Solidarity and Development Association (USDA),
were orchestrated by government authorities as a mass
demonstration of support for the SLORC's political objectives.
With few exceptions, attendance was coerced, with explicit
threats of penalties to those who contemplated staying away.
Multiple reports indicate that at one rally in Pyay, a few
people were trampled to death when attendees ran from rally
monitors attempting to seize those in the crowd who had called
out dissenting views.
For others, the Government prohibition on unauthorized outdoor
assemblies of more than five people remained in effect, albeit
unevenly enforced. Political demonstrations were strictly
banned, but even religious groups sometimes encountered
problems holding outdoor gatherings. Legal political parties
were required to request permission from the authorities even
to hold internal meetings of their own membership.
The right of association existed only for organizations,
including trade associations and professional bodies, permitted
by law and duly registered with the Government. Only a handful
continued to exist, and even those were subject to direct
government intervention or took special care to act in line
with government policy. This included such benign groups as
the Myanmar Red Cross and the Myanmar Medical Association.
Only 10 political parties, out of an original 75 in 1992,
remained legal at the end of 1994, but even the few which
remained legal were virtually immobilized.
c. Freedom of Religion
Adherents of all religions duly registered with the authorities
generally enjoyed freedom to worship as they chose, although
Buddhists continued to enjoy a privileged position. In recent
years, the Government has made special efforts to link itself
with Buddhism as a means of asserting its own popular
legitimacy. For example, during the year the military
contributed an elaborate prayer hall, which was dedicated at
the foot of the revered Shwedagon pagoda in Rangoon. This
campaign has led to increased government support for Buddhism
in keeping with the Government's strong nationalistic views.
The Government monitors the activities of members of all
religions in part because they have in the past become
politically active. Security services demanded that religious
groups seek prior authorization to conduct services out of
doors. These regulations were also in effect in and around
Buddhist monasteries and pagodas. The SLORC has been largely
successful in halting political activism among the Buddhist
clergy, and by year's end, many, though not all, monks arrested
earlier had been released and most quietly resumed their
religious duties.
Religious publications, like secular ones, remained subject to
control and censorship. Christian Bibles translated into
indigenous languages could not be imported.
Religious groups were able to establish links with
coreligionists in other countries, although these activities
were reportedly monitored by the Government. Foreign religious
representatives were usually only allowed visas for short
stays, but in some cases were permitted to preach to Burmese
congregations. Permanent foreign missionary establishments
have not been permitted since the 1960's, but a few foreign
Catholic nuns, and at least one priest resident in Burma since
independence, continued to reside upcountry.
It has proven extremely difficult for Christian and Muslim
groups to obtain permission to build new churches and mosques.
For example, although there are more than 5,000 mosques in
Burma, the newest reportedly dates to 1975. There were
isolated incidents in which the Government destroyed places of
worship as a result of infrastructure projects. Also, the
Government continued to remove cemeteries from urban areas,
even though many non-Buddhist religions consider these to be
sacred ground. In March four trustees of a Muslim cemetery in
Mandalay were taken into custody in the course of protests by
Muslims over destruction of an historic graveyard and religious
buildings.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
Although citizens have the legal right to live anywhere in the
country, both urban and rural residents were subject to
arbitrary relocation (see Section 1.f.). Except for
limitations in areas of insurgent activity, citizens could
travel freely within the country but must notify local
authorities of their whereabouts. Those residents unable to
meet the restrictive provisions of the citizenship law, (e.g.
Chinese, Arakanese Muslims, etc.) had to obtain prior
permission to travel.
Though travel strictures continued to ease, the Government
maintained tight controls over travel abroad. The Government
board that reviewed passport applications denied passports in
some cases apparently on political grounds. Emigrants were
required to reimburse the Government for "educational expenses"
before receiving exit permits and were severely limited in what
they could take with them. Burmese citizens who left legally
were generally allowed to return to visit relatives, and those
wishing to extend their stays usually had little difficulty
obtaining permission to do so. Some who had lived abroad
illegally and acquired foreign citizenship found it easier to
return. In most instances it was impossible for Christian
groups to obtain permission for their would-be clergy to travel
abroad to pursue religious studies.
The Government continued to ease restrictions on foreign
travelers. However, select categories such as human rights
advocates and political figures continued to be denied entry
visas unless traveling under the aegis of a sponsor acceptable
to the Government. Although large areas of the country
remained off-limits to foreigners for sercurity reasons, the
authorities did open up a number of new domestic destinations.
Except during clashes with the Shan United Army, foreigners
continued to be able to travel from northern Thailand into
Tachilek and Kentung in easternmost Shan state.
The pace of the repatriation of Muslims from Bangladesh
accelerated. By year's end more than 130,000 of those who fled
the country had returned. The UNHCR indicated cooperation with
the authorities had been good and that it had not detected any
signs of renewed action against the Rohingyas.
The Government does not allow refugees or displaced persons to
resettle or seek safe haven.
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government
Despite the overwhelming desire the Burmese people demonstrated
in the 1990 elections for a return to democracy, they continued
to be denied the right to change their government. Since 1988
active duty military officers have occupied an increasing
number of important positions throughout the bureaucracy,
particularly at the policymaking level. Despite the
appointment of several civilians to the Cabinet in 1992, the
process of placing military or recently retired military
officers in most key senior level positions once held by
technocrats in the economic ministries has accelerated.
Following the NLD's victory in the 1990 elections, the SLORC
set aside the election results and disqualified, detained,
arrested, or drove into exile many successful candidates. By
the end of the year, 198 of the 485 deputies elected had either
been disqualified, resigned under pressure, gone into exile,
been detained, or died. Approximately 40 successful candidates
from the election remain in prison.
Rather than accept the will of the citizenry, the SLORC
convened a National Convention in January 1993 to draw up
principles for a new Constitution. The SLORC handpicked
delegates, and proceedings have been carefully stage-managed;
even limited opposition views have been ignored. Despite
having no mandate from the people, the SLORC tasked the
Convention with drafting a new constitution that will guarantee
a dominant role for the military in the country's future
political structure. Although the SLORC leadership met with
detained prodemocracy leader Aung San Suu Kyi on two occasions,
at year's end it remained unclear whether the Military
Government is prepared to begin a genuine dialog with its
opponents to achieve a peaceful political settlement.
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
of Human Rights
The Government does not allow internal human rights
organizations to exist, and it remained generally hostile to
outside scrutiny of its human rights record (see Section 1.d.
and 2.d.). However, in July Burmese Foreign Minister Ohn Gyaw
agreed in principle to hold consultations with the U.N.
Secretary General regarding the human rights situation.
Subsequently, Foreign Minister Ohn Gyaw met with U.N.
Undersecretary for Political Affairs Marrack Goulding during
the U.N. General Assembly and in Rangoon in November with
Rafeeudin Ahmed, Deputy Head of the United Nations Development
Program. At year's end both sides had agreed to continue their
discussions.
In keeping with his mandate, in November the Government allowed
U.N. Special Rapporteur Yozo Yokota to travel to Burma.
However, in its written response to the Rapporteur's interim
report, the Government denied allegations of extrajudicial
killings, torture, and rape, and indicated that instances of
arbitrary arrest and detention and forced labor were undertaken
in "accordance with the law."
NGO representatives previously denied visas were able to travel
to remote areas of the country and several others began
negotiations with the Government to establish humanitarian
programs. In May ICRC representatives met with top government
officials, and the SLORC agreed to accept a draft memorandum of
understanding regarding prison visits.
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Disability, Language, or Social Status
Women
In general, women in Burma have traditionally enjoyed a high
status, exercising most of the same basic rights as men and
taking an active role in business. Consistent with traditional
culture, they keep their own names after marriage and often
control family finances. However, women remained
underrepresented in most traditional male occupations, and a
few professions continued to be entirely barred to women.
Women did not consistently receive equal pay for equal work.
There are no women's rights organizations in Burma or any
government agencies specifically devoted to safeguarding
women's interests.
There were reliable reports that many women and children in
border areas, where the Government's control is limited, were
forced or lured into working as prostitutes in Thailand. It is
unknown how many young women have been duped into working as
prostitutes, but a common practice is to lure young women to
Thailand with promises of employment as a waitress or domestic
(See Thailand Report.). Also, the Burmese military continued
to impress women for military porterage duties, and there was a
steady pattern of reports of rape of ethnic minority women by
Burmese soldiers.
Children
Despite the establishment of various child welfare programs,
the Government allocated few resources for programs relevant to
children, and cut the share of the national budget for
education to 16 percent, with a mere 0.4 percent allocated to
social welfare services (versus almost 38 percent for the
military).
Many families allowed their young daughters to travel to
Thailand to work as prostitutes. The rising incidence of Human
Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV) infection has increased demand for
younger prostitutes.
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities
Burma's myriad ethnic minorities have long resented the
dominance of the country's Burman majority. The minorities
have been underrepresented in the Government and largely
excluded from the military leadership. Over the last few years
and continuing in 1994, the SLORC, in the name of national
solidarity, has sought to pacify these ethnic groups by means
of negotiated cease-fires, grants of limited autonomy, and
promises of development assistance. The Government included a
large number of ethnic minority representatives in the National
Convention and permitted extended debate on the issue of
minority autonomy. However, the ethnic minority populations
complain that their concerns have not been addressed adequately
by the Government.
Government investment in the border areas in road, hospital,
and school construction has been modest at best and economic
development among minorities has continued to lag, leaving many
living at barely subsistence levels. Since the focus of the
hostilities against armed insurgencies has been in the border
areas where most minorities are concentrated, those populations
have been disproportionately victimized by the general
brutalization associated with the military's activities.
Since only people who can prove long familial links to Burma
are accorded full citizenship, ethnic populations, such as
Muslims, Indians, and Chinese, continued to be denied full
citizenship and to be excluded from government positions.
People without full citizenship are not free to travel
domestically and are barred from certain advanced university
programs in medicine and technological fields (see Section
2.d.). Anti-Chinese sentiment continued to increase.
People with Disabilities
Official assistance to persons with disabilities is extremely
limited. There is no law mandating accessibility to government
facilities. While there are several small-scale organizations
to assist the disabled, most must rely on traditional family
structures to provide for their welfare. Since 1986 Burmese
authorities have permitted representatives of the ICRC to
upgrade provision of orthopedic prostheses. Because of
landmines and train accidents, Burma has one of the highest
rates of amputee injuries in the world.
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
There continued to be no functioning trade unions. Workers
were not free to form such groups, and leaders of unofficial
labor associations remained subject to arrest. Workers
continued to be unable to strike, and there were no reported
instances of attempts to do so.
In July 1989, the United States suspended Burma's eligibility
for trade concessions under the Generalized System of
Preferences Program, pending steps to afford its labor force
internationally recognized worker rights.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
Workers do not have the right to organize and bargain
collectively to set wages and benefits. The Government's
Central Arbitration Board, which theoretically provides a means
for settling major labor disputes, continued to exist on paper
but in practice was dormant. Township-level labor supervisory
committees remained in place to address various low-level labor
concerns.
The Government unilaterally sets wages in the public sector.
In the private sector, wages are set by market forces. The
Government pressures joint ventures not to pay salaries greater
than those of ministers or other high-level employees. Joint
ventures circumvent this with supplemental pay, including
remuneration paid in foreign exchange certificates, as well as
through incentive and overtime pay and other fringe benefits.
Foreign firms generally set wages near those of the domestic
private sector but follow the example of joint ventures in
awarding supplemental wages and benefits.
No special export processing zones exist.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
The law does not contain provisions prohibiting forced labor.
As the military stepped up its program of road, rail, dam, and
other infrastructure projects, its recourse to forced labor
also increased. It was conservatively estimated that many
hundreds of thousands--if not more--of ordinary citizens were
compelled to contribute labor to these public works,
undertakings unsanctioned by any democratically elected
authority. Two very large projects using forced labor drew
international attention. From April to July, almost the entire
adult population of Mandalay city was forced, along with
thousands from outlying areas, to contribute labor or money to
rehabilitate the moat around the Mandalay palace compound in
preparation for the "Visit Myanmar Year." In southern Burma,
tens of thousands of villagers were dragooned into clearing
terrain and building embankments in harsh conditions along the
route of the new Ye-Tavoy railway.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
Although the law sets a minimum age for the employment of
children, in practice the law is not enforced. Working
children are highly visible in cities, mostly working for small
or family enterprises. Children are hired at lower pay rates
than adults for the same kind of work, and economic pressure
forces them to work not only for their survival but also to
support their families. Arts and crafts is the only sector
producing for the export market which employs a significant
number of children. Despite a compulsory education law, almost
40 percent of children never enroll in school, and only a
quarter complete the basic education course.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
Surplus labor conditions and lack of protection by government
authorities continue to dictate substandard conditions for
workers, despite recent annual economic growth of at least 5
percent. The Law on Fundamental Workers Rights of 1964 and the
Factories Act of 1951 regulate working conditions. There is a
legally prescribed 5-day, 35-hour workweek for employees in the
public sector and a 6-day, 44-hour workweek for private and
parastatal sector employees, with overtime paid for additional
work. The law also allows for a 24-hour rest period per week
and workers have 21 paid holidays a year. Such provisions
actually affect only a small portion of the country's labor
force.
Only government employees and employees of a few traditional
industries are covered by minimum wage provisions. The minimum
monthly wage for public employees (based on the market exchange
rate) is $6.00 (600 kyat), but this sum is supplemented by
various subsidies and allowances. The general daily minimum
wage is $0.20 (20 kyats). These wage rates apply to the lowest
level of government workers and some manual laborers; workers
in the private sector are much better paid. The actual average
wage rate for casual laborers in Rangoon rose slightly in 1994
to about three times the official minimum, still well below
subsistence levels. Wage increases continued to lag far behind
inflation.
Numerous health and safety regulations exist on the books, but
in practice the Government has not made the necessary resources
available to those charged with their enforcement. By 1994 an
International Labor Organization-supported training program for
members of factory safety committees had reached about 400
persons, out of an estimated 2.43 million workers employed in
registered and unregistered enterprises.
(###)
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