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TITLE: HAITI HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES, 1994
AUTHOR: U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DATE: FEBRUARY 1995
HAITI
Haiti underwent profound changes in 1994. An illegal military
regime, which had assumed power after ousting President Jean-
Bertrand Aristide in a 1991 coup, retained firm control of the
country for the first 9 months. During this time, the level of
human rights abuses escalated. Meanwhile, the international
community was imposing additional pressures on Haiti--including
a near-total economic embargo--in response to the military
leaders' failure to abide by their agreements with the
international community in 1993 to step down from power.
The human rights abuses during these 9 months of the de facto
regime included political and extrajudicial killings by the
security forces and their allies; disappearances; and
politically motivated rapes, beatings, and other mistreatment
of citizens, both in and out of prison. Although the
Constitution places responsibility for public security and law
enforcement on the Haitian armed forces (Forces Armees d'Haiti,
or FAd'H, which include the police), under the de facto regime
the FAd'H and its various affiliates completely disrupted the
rule of law and used their monopoly of power for financial gain
as well as to subjugate and abuse the populace.
Paramilitary personnel in civilian clothes, including "attaches"
and provincial section chiefs (the latter were adjuncts to the
FAd'H, authorized under military regulations), both assisted
the FAd'H and conducted much of the intimidation and violent
repression. Other supporters, including a group that had
emerged in 1993 as the Revolutionary Front for Advancement and
Progress of Haiti (FRAPH), allied themselves with FAd'H
leadership. FRAPH consolidated its position throughout the
country in the first part of 1994, opening offices in most
towns and villages, and infiltrating poorer neighborhoods.
The human rights monitors of the United Nations/Organization of
American States International Civilian Mission (ICM), who
returned to Haiti in late January after having left in October
1993, documented the ongoing state of repression and brought it
to international attention. They were, however, themselves
subject to harassment and threats from the de facto authorities
and their allies. After April, lack of security confined the
ICM largely to Port-au-Prince and other main cities. The de
facto authorities expelled the ICM in early July 1994;
afterwards, other human rights and local organizations reported
an increase in violations.
On July 31, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC),
"gravely concerned" by the "deterioration of the humanitarian
situation in Haiti, in particular the continuing escalation of
the illegal de facto regime of systematic violations of civil
liberties," adopted Resolution 940, which called for the
formation of a multinational coalition to use "all necessary
means" to remove the illegal regime and return Haiti's
legitimate Government to power.
On September 19, the U.S.-led Multinational Force (MNF)
peacefully entered Haiti, 1 day after an accord worked out by
former President Jimmy Carter, former Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff Colin Powell, and Senator Sam Nunn, who
traveled to Haiti and negotiated on behalf of the U.S.
Government at the request of President Clinton. The accord
required General Raoul Cedras and the military regime he headed
to resign from power by October 15.
Following its deployment, the MNF worked to establish a secure
and stable environment, and it restored Haitian cabinet
ministers to their Ministries. Parliamentarians were able to
return to their offices to work on urgent legislation,
including an amnesty bill and a constitutionally mandated law
to create a national police force separate from the armed
forces and under the supervision of the Ministry of Justice.
Following the departure of General Cedras and other leaders of
the de facto regime, President Aristide returned to Haiti on
October 15, culminating the restoration to power of the
legitimate Government. The ICM monitors also returned during
this time.
Parliament adopted the amnesty legislation in early October and
the police bill in early November, as well as a law banning
paramilitary forces. The Government worked with U.S. officials
to evaluate members of the FAd'H and create an interim public
security force of 3,500, whose training included a human rights
component. This security force was deployed throughout the
country by year's end, under the supervision of International
Police Monitors (IPM's) from over 20 nations, and assisted by
police trainees. The Government also developed plans for a new
police academy to train between 3,000 and 4,000 new civilian
police in 4-month intensive courses beginning in early 1995.
In late December, the Government announced a reduction in FAd'H
personnel from 6,000 to 3,500.
Yearend MNF reports stated that a secure and stable environment
had been established and that political violence had been
drastically reduced. At the same time there was a noticeable
increase in crime, primarily around the capital. By the end of
1994, the executive branch had promulgated the police law but
not the amnesty bill. The mandates of all members of the
Chamber of Deputies, two-thirds of the Senate, and most
municipal offices neared an end. All three branches agreed to
select members for a Provisional Electoral Council to conduct
mandated legislative and municipal elections early in 1995.
Weakened first by years of government mismanagement and then by
international sanctions after the 1991 coup, the economy
deteriorated drastically in 1994, and the already difficult
living conditions of the general populace declined even more.
While contraband gasoline continued to enter the country, its
price soared, limiting citizens' ability to operate their
automobiles. Fuel shortages also curtailed public
transportation, isolated far-flung towns, and reduced the
availability of electric power. On the return of President
Aristide, however, the international community began to work
with the Government to rebuild Haiti's economy. Humanitarian
assistance programs were expanded, and programs to provide
access to medical care continued.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
In the 5-month period until its expulsion by the de facto
regime on July 13, the ICM recorded 340 cases of extrajudicial
killings and suspicious deaths. In the months following the
ICM's departure from Haiti, one coalition of local human rights
organizations reported 41 extrajudicial killings for the month
of July alone. Local organizations reported that extrajudicial
killings continued at that rate in August and early September.
Prior to September 19, military and police authorities,
assisted by their civilian adjuncts, were responsible for
several multiple killings and "security actions." In February
police killed at least six young men who belonged to a
political organization in a raid on a house in the Cite Soleil
neighborhood of Port-au-Prince. Police sources asserted the
deaths resulted from a gang dispute. ICM monitors, however,
found evidence of a well-planned police raid on the group. At
the end of April, military authorities in Gonaives, who were
seeking a pro-Aristide activist, opened fire on a wide area of
beach in the slum area of Raboteau, killing as many as 26
persons. They asserted the action was in response to a
terrorist attack on the police station, but there was no
evidence of any such attack. Also in July, citizens discovered
the shallow graves of 12 young men in Gressiers, near Leogane.
The police asserted that the 12 were car thieves killed in a
gun battle, but local residents reported hearing no shots
nearby, and the police did not explain the unorthodox burial.
In late June and July, the military commander in Les Cayes
department instituted a series of sweeps, allegedly seeking
those responsible for an attack on the military post in Camp
Perrin. At least five of the men the police arrested during
these sweeps died in police custody, following reported
beatings and torture.
Attaches, FRAPH members, and armed urban bandits called
"zenglendos" took advantage of the climate of impunity to carry
out both political and criminal killings. Following the murder
of a FRAPH member in late December 1993, unidentified
terrorists set fires which engulfed several blocks in Cite
Soleil, resulting in at least six deaths, many more missing,
and hundreds left homeless. Witnesses gave evidence supporting
FRAPH complicity. Armed civilians killed a group of four known
Aristide supporters in a late May attack, also in Cite Soleil.
In a high-profile incident, unknown persons shot and killed
Father Jean-Marie Vincent, an associate of President Aristide
and former activist priest, outside the chapter house of his
order in Port-au-Prince on August 28. An ambulance and police
investigatory team arrived within minutes, before the killing
had even been reported. A week later, an unidentified gunman
killed a local attorney in a drive-by shooting, within sight of
police headquarters, allegedly because of his work on a
prominent murder trial. The authorities, responding to intense
pressure particularly on the Vincent murder (see Section 2.c.),
claimed to have undertaken investigations but they made no
serious effort and never announced any results.
Through the first 9 months of 1994, residents continued to
discover the bodies of persons killed by gunshot or machete in
the streets of Port-au-Prince. Certain roads were particularly
well-known as drop-off sites for corpses, which sometimes
remained there for several days until health authorities picked
them up. Given the complete lack of police or judicial
investigation, it is difficult to determine how many of these
were politically motivated cases, as opposed to criminal, but
there is sufficient evidence to support the presumption that a
significant number were, in fact, political killings. FRAPH
members or other armed civilians reportedly had seized some of
these persons prior to the discovery of the remains. The de
facto government not only took no action to curb political
killings but even accused the ICM and other human rights groups
of purchasing cadavers and leaving them in the streets to
discredit the military regime.
Political violence was dramatically reduced in the weeks after
the entry of the MNF on September 19. While politically
motivated violence continued in isolated instances, it became
infrequent by early November, although there was a noticeable
increase in common crime, particularly around the capital. In
one instance, armed civilians attacked peaceful pro-Aristide
demonstrators in Port-au-Prince with grenades on September 29,
killing several people. A FRAPH attack against populist
marchers September 30 resulted in two dead. Anti-Aristide
elements remained, particularly in remote areas, where they
killed and intimidated local inhabitants in several instances.
Neighbors beat a well-known Haitian painter to death in early
October; some human rights groups alleged that the assailants
were attaches. The death of the deputy mayor of the central
plateau town of Mirebalais, who was found beheaded in early
November, may have been involved in a dispute with a local
section chief. In incidents in both Port-au-Prince and the
provinces, crowds beat--sometimes to death--individuals they
named as attaches, members of FRAPH or, in two cases in the
central plateau and northern provinces, members of the FAd'H.
The MNF also documented attacks against members of the Haitian
armed forces and FRAPH adherents. Two opposition members of
Parliament reported their houses were attacked during the
weekend of President Aristide's return to Haiti, and mobs tore
down police stations in several towns, including the capital.
At the end of the year, the U.N. Secretary General reported to
the UNSC that "following the arrival of the MNF and the
subsequent disintegration of the FAd'H, the human rights
situation has improved. Politically motivated violence and
human rights abuses have decreased, though individual acts
still occur sporadically and the ICM, for instance, has
investigated beatings of detainees by the FAd'H. It has also
received reports of violent attacks by former section chiefs,
attaches, or alleged FRAPH members. Since the killing of the
second deputy mayor of Mirebalais on November 4, 1994, however,
the ICM has not heard of any murder ascribed to the former
military or paramilitary forces."
b. Disappearance
The ICM reported 131 cases of disappearance or "seizures" from
January through June, and human rights organizations continued
to report disappearances throughout the summer and until the
arrival of the MNF. Historically, those who disappear in Haiti
either are never found or are found dead. There is credible
evidence of FRAPH and attache participation in many of these
reported disappearances. Information gathered by the ICM and
other human rights groups, as well as that uncovered in refugee
case investigations, indicates that both armed civilians and
military personnel in civilian clothing seized people and took
them to private "jails" where these armed groups mistreated and
sometimes killed their victims.
There were no reports of disappearances after the entry of the
MNF.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
Although the 1987 Constitution prohibits unnecessary force or
restraint, psychological pressure, or physical brutality, the
military regime and the de facto authorities largely ignored
these constitutional protections, and ill-treatment remained
widespread until the entry of the MNF in September. The de
facto authorities routinely employed brutal beatings with fists
and clubs, torture, and other cruel treatment on detainees.
When the MNF inspected the prison in Les Cayes, it found 40
detainees, some of whom had beating wounds on the buttocks
which went to the bone. The de facto authorities tolerated and
condoned widespread physical abuse of detainees, creating a
climate of impunity which resulted in some particularly vicious
activities. The authorities and their paramilitary adjuncts
reputedly made use of the "djak", in which a victim is tied in
a position which permits a more thorough beating by club, and
of "kalot marasa," a torture technique in which the assailant
claps both hands over a victim's ears simultaneously, bursting
the eardrums. In the southwest town of Chardonnieres, the
local corporal cut off the ear of an accused thief and carved
his initials in his flesh. The authorities disciplined
him--and then only nominally--only after he beat a priest who
was related to a senior officer.
Paramilitary assailants (and reportedly military officers in
mufti) increasingly used rape as an instrument of
intimidation. The ICM registered 52 cases of politically
motivated rape from January through May, and reports continued
to be received after the ICM's expulsion. In some cases, the
victim herself had been involved in some political activity. A
more common pattern, however, was the use of rape or other
sexual abuse as a means of intimidating a woman's politically
active male relatives and neighbors. In some instances,
assailants reportedly abused girls as young as 12 or 13 years
of age. The majority of such rapes occurred in the slums of
Port-au-Prince, although some cases were reported in the
provinces.
Prisoners and detainees suffered from a lack of the most basic
hygiene facilities as well as from inadequate food and health
care, including medical treatment for injuries received in
custody. In most prisons, prisoners and detainees had to rely
on family to bring food and medicine; there were many reliable
reports, including in both Les Cayes and Leogane, of the
authorities denying families entry for that purpose. The
authorities routinely violated the law by detaining children
together with adults. A nongovernmental organization (NGO)
that had performed prison monitoring was unable to continue in
1994, after threats and attacks forced its director into exile
in late 1993. The International Committee of the Red Cross
(ICRC) did, however, appoint a permanent representative in
Haiti and was able to obtain permission for some monitoring
from the de facto government. The ICM monitors were able only
occasionally to gain access to detainees, and not at all after
April.
After the MNF's deployment, the ICRC continued to monitor
prison conditions with a full team of delegates. Although the
MNF was able to make improvements, the military regime had
allowed the prisons to deteriorate so much that the Aristide
Government had not been able to develop a comprehensive
rehabilitation plan by year's end.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
Arbitrary arrest and detention were a persistent human rights
problem in Haiti since the 1991 coup. The ICM, in a last press
release before its July 1994 departure, simply listed this
category of violation at "several hundred."
According to the Constitution, the authorities may arrest a
person only if they apprehend the suspect during the commission
of a crime, or if an authorized judge has issued a warrant.
The authorities must bring the person before a judge within
48 hours of arrest. In practice, however, soldiers and
provincial officials regularly used arbitrary arrest and
detention to intimidate the people and to extort money from
them. The frequency of this practice makes it difficult to
determine the number of arrests on purely political grounds,
but the two were often interrelated. Provincial section chiefs
generally knew well the members of local grassroots
organizations and reportedly detained them during times of
political tension and released them upon payment of a bribe.
Police also sometimes arrested family members of a wanted man
and held them to force him out of hiding. For example, police
arrested 17-year-old Balaguer Metayer in November 1993 when
they sought his brother in connection with "terrorism" in the
Gonaives area. Despite strong international pressure and a
court order in Haiti, the police held the youth until August,
when they abruptly released him. Most arbitrary arrest cases
pass unnoticed outside the victim's family. In some instances,
international pressure succeeded in bringing about the release
of some detainees, such as Aristide supporter Gardy Leblanc in
Miragoane in August and an approved refugee applicant in the
southern town of Chantal.
The Constitution provides for the separation of the police from
the armed forces. President Aristide sent legislation to the
Parliament to fulfill this provision by creating a new civilian
police force under the supervision of the Ministry of Justice.
After parliamentary approval, the Government promulgated the
new law on December 26.
Following the restoration of the legitimate Government by the
Multinational Force, the international community initiated a
program to create an interim police force meeting
internationally recognized human rights standards to assume
public security responsibilities and to select, train, and
deploy a new civilian police force. The program included four
elements: International Police Monitors (IPM's), an Interim
Public Security Force (IPSF), police trainees from the U.S.
safe haven in Guantanamo, and a new police academy.
In consultation with U.S. officials and human rights
organizations, the Aristide Government evaluated former FAd'H
personnel for human rights abuses and criminal activities. The
nearly 3,000 personnel selected comprise the IPSF. To augment
the IPSF, a group of 964 police trainees from the migrants in
the U.S. safe haven in Guantanamo were selected and trained.
Both the IPSF and the trainees--who assist them by performing
routine police functions such as managing traffic--received
training that included strong human rights components.
At year's end, the interim police had been deployed throughout
the country, under the direct supervision of the over 1,000 law
enforcement personnel from some 20 nations who make up the
IPM's. The IPM's are deployed to each of Haiti's districts in
mentor the police and monitor their activities and prevent
violations of internationally recognized human rights standards.
By December, preparations by the Haitian Government and U.S.
officials were well advanced for the creation of a police
training facility to build a new, professional police force
recruited openly and fairly from throughout Haiti. The
academy, which was to open at the end of January 1995, would
train an initial complement of 4,000 police in a series of
4-month courses. These new police will replace IPSF personnel
as they graduate.
By the end of the year, the MNF, acting under the mandate of
UNSC Resolution 940 to use all necessary means to establish a
stable and secure environment, had detained approximately 30
persons, until such time as they could be turned over to a
competent Haitian judicial authority for eventual disposition
as may be appropriate under Haitian law.
The Constitution prohibits involuntary exile of citizens.
While some have left the country voluntarily for personal or
political reasons, the Government did not make use of exile as
punishment.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
The Constitution provides for an independent judiciary and the
right to a fair public trial. However, this right is widely
and severely abridged, primarily because the judicial system is
highly inefficient and corrupt after years of governmental
neglect and popular contempt dating back to the Duvalier era.
Political figures across the spectrum recognize that reform of
the judicial system is critical; it is understaffed and its
members lack training and adequate compensation.
The Constitution expressly denies police and judicial
authorities the right to interrogate persons charged with a
crime unless the suspect has legal counsel present or waives
this right. Nevertheless, interrogation without legal counsel
present is the norm, and the use of beatings and torture to
extract confessions was widespread prior to deployment of the
MNF. Governments since the Duvalier era have appointed and
removed judges at will and have exerted political influence at
every stage of the judicial process. Although the Aristide
Government has asserted it will select judges in accordance
with the Constitution, the Parliament has not yet adopted
legislation establishing the mechanisms necessary for selection
of judicial personnel.
The Code of Criminal Procedure fails to assign clear
responsibility to investigate crimes and divides authority to
prosecute among police, prosecutors, and investigating
magistrates. The Code stipulates two criminal court sessions
per year, each lasting 2 weeks, to try all major crimes
requiring a jury trial. Failure to reform the Code has
resulted in a huge backlog, with detainees sometimes waiting
for years in pretrial detention for a court date. For example,
during the August session of the criminal assizes, the court
heard only eight cases. At the beginning of September, there
were 534 civil prisoners at the national penitentiary, of whom
only a fraction were serving sentences. The rest were accused
persons held without bail. If ultimately tried and found
innocent, the detainee has no recourse against the Government
for time already served.
Although the Government began to plan reforms of the judicial
system, at year's end the system remained highly inefficient
and corrupt, and the Government had brought to justice few
perpetrators of human rights abuses. The Government did
initiate a system of "triage" in which three judges would
review the cases of persons for whom incarceration is no longer
appropriate. In addition, working with U.S. officials, the
Government began to select Ministry of Justice personnel to
receive training courses in basic administration of justice
issues.
Although the Constitution includes the right to counsel, there
is no law that the Government must provide counsel in the event
that the accused cannot afford it.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
The Constitution provides that no house search or seizure of
papers may take place except in accordance with the law.
Correspondence is also defined as inviolable.
Prior to September 19, soldiers and other armed persons
frequently entered private homes for illegal purposes in
Port-au-Prince and the provinces. In August there was a rash
of attacks on the homes of politicians, including
parliamentarians and the mayor of Petionville, the capital's
main suburb. Attaches and FRAPH members were involved in raids
on homes, but victims also reported seeing soldiers personally
known to them and dressed in civilian clothing among their
attackers. In addition, gangsters violently raided entire
neighborhoods of Port-au-Prince, taking advantage of their ties
to police and the general climate of impunity to steal and
rape. When the armed persons entered looking for a particular
individual, they frequently beat or otherwise harmed family
members during the search.
The police, along with armed civilians acting at their behest,
frequently used roadblocks to conduct illegal searches,
especially during periods of real or perceived political
tension. The discovery of pro-Aristide posters or literature
during a police search of a house or vehicle frequently
resulted in physical abuse and illegal arrest. There were
credible reports that police and military also seized private
correspondence during such searches.
After the arrival of the MNF and the restoration of the
legitimate Government, such abuses were dramatically reduced.
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
The Constitution provides for freedom of speech and the press,
and, in the last quarter of 1994, these rights were
increasingly exercised. The more open climate contrasted with
the first 9 months of the year when the military regime and de
facto authorities significantly abridged freedom of expression
and the press through intimidation and the resultant self-
censorship. The authorities routinely harassed radio and print
journalists and vendors of pro-Aristide publications. The de
facto regime increased restrictions on the press in late May
and again with the illegal institution on August 1 of a state
of siege, issuing a decree forbidding the press to publish
"foreign propaganda" or information that might "alarm the
populace." The decree threatened the broadcast media, warning
that their facilities were subject to military requisition. In
mid-August, the regime forbade the media to use statements and
information from foreign embassies and their press services.
The regime also restricted foreign journalists from traveling
outside of Port-au-Prince and entering certain "strategic
zones." The de facto authorities deported a U.S. news team in
August after filming at the airport and detained the team's two
Haitian employees for 10 days.
With an illiteracy rate of approximately 80 percent, broadcast
media, especially Creole-language radio, are the principal
means by which the populace receives information. For most of
the year, there were 14 radio stations in Port-au-Prince, 6 of
which offered news programming. Four radio stations operating
before the September 1991 coup closed permanently, but some
stations sympathetic to President Aristide, including Tropic
FM, continued to operate. Two independent daily newspapers
operate in Port-au-Prince. Pro-Aristide weeklies published in
Haiti and the United States were sold in the streets through
most of the year; in September, the locally published Libete
ceased operation, citing increased threats to distributors.
However, the journal resumed publication soon after arrival of
the MNF.
In the months following the restoration of President Aristide's
Government, several new journals appeared, among them a
U.S.-based magazine, strongly anti-Aristide in its outlook.
The press covered the activities of the newly restored
Government and the MNF extensively and without censorship.
Radio Antilles, a radio station that had gone off the air in
1991, returned on New Year's Day 1995. The national television
station was off the air for a time following the intervention,
but, just as it resumed broadcasting in December, the Minister
of Information dismissed its director, a Malval appointee,
sparking a mass resignation of employees.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
The de facto authorities severely restricted the constitutional
rights of freedom of assembly and association following the
1991 coup. Until the arrival of the MNF, the fear of a
military or paramilitary attack was sufficient to prevent most
meetings, including those of nonpolitical organizations, from
taking place. There were credible reports from all parts of
the country that the military engaged in a systematic effort to
inhibit association. In July police and armed civilians
attacked a regular meeting of the K-16 political coalition, led
by legitimate Port-au-Prince mayor Evans Paul and Senator
Turnep Delpe. The participants scattered; the police detained
one person for a day but killed no one. The police arrested
some community organizers, even of nonpolitical organizations,
and sometimes beat, harassed, or intimidated them into fleeing
their own communities. Grassroots liberation theology
organizations known as "Ti Legliz" remained a strong base of
support for President Aristide in the countryside. These
groups and their leaders were particular targets of military
and paramilitary harassment. The police prevented civic
education, community health, and literacy organizations from
operating normally.
In a report to the U.N. Security Council covering the end of
1994, the U.N. Secretary General said, "Haitians can now enjoy
their fundamental rights, in particular freedom of expression,
association and assembly. In a number of places, however,
people have said that they are afraid to meet or demonstrate,
because of continued activities by former FRAPH members or
attaches. Politically motivated arrests by local judicial
officials associated with FRAPH have occurred, but arrests for
the expression of political views have largely ceased. Large
numbers of displaced people have come out of hiding and
returned to their homes. Overall, there is a feeling of
liberty and a sense of security which did not exist
previously. This is particularly striking in the areas where
the MNF has been deployed. The flurry of acts of vengeance and
retribution which erupted immediately prior to, and after, the
return of President Jean-Bertrand Aristide on October 15, 1994,
was short-lived. The President has repeatedly called for
reconciliation and his appeals have been heeded by the
population."
c. Freedom of Religion
The Constitution protects the right to practice all religions
and faiths, provided that practice does not disturb law and
order. Religion is an integral part of Haitian life and
culture and is practiced widely. There are no government
restrictions on missionary activities, affiliation with
overseas coreligionists, religious instruction, or publishing.
There were few high-profile attacks on churches or church-
related organizations in 1994. There were, however, a number
of attacks on, and threats against, individual priests openly
supportive of Aristide or opposed to the de facto authorities.
The August murder of Father Vincent (see Section 1.a.) was
probably tied to his actual and symbolic role in organizing
citizens rather than his religious affiliation. At the same
time, unidentified persons threatened Pere Samedi, a Ti Legliz
priest active in the slums of Jeremie, and many churches
throughout the country bore anti-Aristide graffiti, as well as
slogans directed against socially activist priests. In Aquin,
gunmen fired upon the local Catholic church. A local army
officer in Chardonnieres arrested and beat a priest who was
distributing religious youth journals in early August, and
armed civilians attempted in July to attack a Belgian priest
active in the human rights community in Port-au-Prince.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
There are no legal restrictions on the movement of citizens
within the country. The departure of boat people is
technically illegal, but the authorities rarely enforced the
pertinent laws. Occasionally they took some token legal action
against organizers, and in a few instances they fired on
departing boat people to deter them by intimidation. Members
of the military and police also attempted to intimidate persons
applying at U.S. refugee processing centers in Haiti by
harassing and occasionally beating them. Individuals in the
military and under the de facto government occasionally
harassed repatriated boat people in isolated incidents, but the
authorities did not pursue a policy of general repression
against them.
The number of internally displaced persons increased due to
economic, political, and security concerns. Historically,
internal migration in Haiti has largely been from the
countryside to the city, but after the September 1991 coup many
Haitians reversed this flow, returning to their former abodes.
This migration continued at the same time that many rural
families also were moving into the capital and other cities in
pursuit of economic opportunities. One estimate by local human
rights organizations places the number of internally displaced
Haitians in 1994 at 300,000.
Departures by sea to escape the country's economic and
political problems continued. During the first half of the
year, the United States continued its policy of returning
Haitians interdicted on the high seas directly to Haiti under
the terms of the Alien Migrant Interdiction Operation
agreement. Both the de facto government and the restored
democratic Government cooperated in implementing the terms of
this agreement. The United States began offering the boat
people the option of shipboard refugee hearings in May and
discontinued involuntary repatriation completely in July,
taking them to safe haven at U.S. naval facilities at
Guantanamo, Cuba, instead. After the return of President
Aristide, the United States repatriated Haitians from the safe
haven. The Aristide Government also cooperated in the
repatriations of Haitian citizens from other countries,
including The Bahamas and Cuba.
After commercial flights to and from Haiti ceased in July, the
de facto government occasionally obstructed, but ultimately did
not prohibit, the departure of citizens across the land border.
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government
The September 1991 military coup forcibly abridged the right of
citizens to change their government. Coup leaders forced
President Aristide to flee the country, and most senior members
of his administration either went into hiding, fled the
country, or took refuge in foreign embassies. The continuing
adamant refusal of the military regime and its backers to allow
the people's will to be expressed was the root of most
politically motivated human rights violations. Voters elected
members of Parliament and such local officials as mayors along
with President Aristide at the end of 1990. The coup leaders
persecuted some local elected officials and ousted them from
office after the coup.
Despite international diplomatic efforts and sanctions, a
military triumvirate continued to control the security forces
and thus the country. Commander in Chief General Raoul Cedras,
Chief of Staff General Philippe Biamby, and Metropolitan Police
Chief Michel Francois adamantly opposed the return of the
constitutionally elected President. Members of Parliament
remained in place and played a continuing role in political
events. In early 1994, many members of Parliament, as well as
other politicians, worked together on a "parliamentary plan" to
resolve the political crisis.
After its failure, a group of renegade Senators, including
eight who had been elected in illegal elections on January 18,
1993, seized control of the Senate, effectively prohibiting the
legitimate Senate president from exercising the functions of
his office. The Chamber of Deputies was unable to achieve a
quorum during the summer of 1994, preventing the passage of any
legislation. In May the illegal parallel Senate rubberstamped
the appointment of de facto President Emile Jonassaint and the
nominations of his cabinet members, but all legal semblance of
a Parliament had disintegrated by September 12, the closing
date for the year's Chamber of Deputies session.
President Aristide had appointed Robert Malval Prime Minister
in 1993. He resigned in December of that year but continued as
acting Prime Minister until October. The military leadership
and the de facto authorities prevented him and his ministers
from carrying out most of their functions throughout the first
three quarters of 1994. Following the arrival of the MNF,
President Aristide convoked the National Assembly in special
session under terms of the Constitution to consider amnesty
legislation for coup-related crimes, a bill creating a national
civil police force separate from the military, and other
legislation. The Parliament passed both an amnesty bill and
legislation creating a new police force. With the end of
parliamentary and municipal mandates near, legislators,
politicians, and the President reached a consensus in December
on a Provisional Electoral Council (CEP). By year's end, the
CEP was drafting legislation necessary to carry out the
elections, which are expected to take place in April or May
1995.
There are no legal impediments to women's participation in
politics or government, but in practice the generally lower
societal status of women limits their role in these fields.
While there are only 3 women among the 79 members in the
Chamber of Deputies, there are also 3 women heading ministries
in the Aristide Cabinet, and 1 female Deputy Minister.
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
of Human Rights
About a dozen local human rights groups exist in Haiti, and
most grassroots organizations, whether geographically or
politically based, track violations against their members. By
September only a handful of attorneys offered pro bono legal
assistance to these groups, and all exercised caution as result
of threats to their safety. Prior to September 19, human
rights organization officials reported repeated threats. In
July, for example, gun-wielding civilians attacked a Belgian
priest active in the Haitian religious community and the human
rights field, but the attackers fled when local residents
challenged them. Local human rights groups managed to operate
freely enough to gather data on reported violations, and to
offer humanitarian assistance (e.g., shelter, food, medical
care) to those whom the authorities abused or persecuted.
The ICM, a team of international human rights observers under
joint United Nations and Organization of American States
auspices, returned to Haiti in January, after a 3-month
withdrawal. The monitors, who numbered about 90, remained
until July 13, when the de facto government declared the ICM to
be in illegal status and ordered its expulsion. Until then,
the military and the de facto civilian authorities largely
tolerated the ICM's activities, although local officials
intermittently blocked ICM monitors from access to prisons.
The monitors reported ongoing threats, however, from
paramilitary operatives and attaches. In March armed civilians
harassed a team of investigators in the central plateau town of
Hinche while local military officers stood by without acting.
In late April, a team in Borgne was the object of an
orchestrated military demonstration, apparently with the active
complicity of general staff officers from Port-au-Prince. The
international community generally recognized the ICM as both a
reliable investigatory body and a buffer, during its presence,
against more egregious violations, at least on the part of the
regime itself. The ICM resumed operation in October following
the arrival of the MNF.
Representatives of international human rights organizations
visited Haiti from time to time. These groups also faced
threats and harassment, but their high profile permitted them
to operate relatively freely. In May the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) visited to gather
information on the human rights situation. The IACHR attempted
to return in August, but the de facto authorities refused to
grant clearance for a charter flight to land. The IACHR
finally visited in October and noted the improvement in human
rights observance after arrival of the MNF. The ICRC
established a permanent representative in Port-au-Prince and
was able to perform some prison monitoring, although the de
facto government was slow in responding to requests to visit
detainees. Following the MNF's deployment, the ICRC continued
to monitor prison conditions at the National Penitentiary and
at prisons outside Port-au-Prince.
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Disability, Language, or Social Status
The 1987 Constitution does not specifically prohibit
discrimination on the grounds of race, sex, religion,
disability, language, or social status. It does, however,
provide for freedom of religion and guarantees equal working
conditions regardless of sex, beliefs, or marital status. It
specifically states that handicapped persons shall have the
means to assure their autonomy, education, and independence.
Women
Although women are often the breadwinners for rural and urban
poor families, they do not enjoy the same economic and social
status as men. In some social strata, tradition limits women's
roles; peasant women, for example, remain largely in the
traditional occupations of farming, marketing, and domestic
tasks. Poorer families sometimes ration education money to pay
school fees for male children only. Nonetheless, women have
occupied prominent positions in both the public and private
sectors in recent years.
Knowledgeable local authorities report that both criminal and
domestic violence and rape occur but are rarely reported or
prosecuted. After the MNF's deployment, victims increasingly
reported criminal incidents, including rape. In November and
December, victims reported one to two rapes per week in
Port-au-Prince. Existing laws and penalties against these
crimes would be adequate were they enforced.
Children
Rural families continued to send young children to serve as
unpaid domestic labor for more affluent city dwellers. The use
of children in this manner is not limited to the wealthy class;
middle and lower class families also follow the practice,
called "restavek." A 1991 U.N. study cited the estimated
109,000 restavek children as an example of slavery practiced in
the 20th century. Employers compel the children to work long
hours, provide them with poor nourishment, little or no
education, and frequently beat them or abuse them sexually.
Port-au-Prince's large population of street children includes
runaway restaveks, as well as children orphaned or separated
from their families. The abysmal state of the economy only
worsened the plight of such children, who are held in little
regard. Rumors of street children being targeted by
paramilitary operatives were probably based on the general
disregard for the well-being of such children. Local human
rights groups do not regard the plight of restavek children as
a priority and do not report on abuses of children or actively
seek to improve their situation. The Government took no
measures to protect or otherwise provide for the restaveks or
the street children.
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities
Some 99 percent of Haitians are descendants, in whole or in
part, of African slaves who won their war of independence from
France in 1804. The remaining population is of European,
Middle Eastern, North American, or Latin American origin.
There are longstanding social and political animosities among
Haitians, often tied to ethnic/racial heritage or class; some
of these animosities date back before Haiti's revolutionary
period.
There are two official languages: Creole, which is spoken by
virtually all Haitians, and French, which is spoken by about 20
percent of the population. The inability to read, write, and
speak French has long limited the political and economic
opportunities available to the majority of the population.
Many argue that the French-speaking elite have used language
requirements as an additional barrier to the advancement of the
Creole-speaking majority.
People with Disabilities
Despite the constitutional provision for means of autonomy for
the handicapped, there is no enacting legislation mandating
provision of access for people with disabilities. There is no
overt ill-treatment of people with disabilities, but, given the
desperate poverty in which the vast majority of Haitians live,
those with disabilities face a particularly harsh existence.
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
The Constitution and the Labor Code provide for the right of
association and provide workers, including those in the public
sector, the right to form and join unions without prior
government authorization. The law requires a union, which must
have a minimum of 10 members, to register with the Ministry of
Social Affairs within 60 days of its establishment. Union
membership, marginal before the 1991 coup and even more so now,
is estimated at 1 percent of the total labor force. There are
five principal labor federations: the Autonomous Central of
Haitian Workers, the National Confederation of Haitian
Teachers, the Federation of Unionized Workers, the
Confederation of Haitian Workers, and the Independent General
Organization of Haitian Workers. Each of these organizations
maintains some fraternal relations with various international
labor organizations.
Given the effect of the international sanctions on the formal
sector of the economy, and, with unemployment running as high
as 80 percent, unions were almost irrelevant, except as an
instrument for keeping track of and offering limited assistance
to their members. During the period of de facto rule, the
military continued to employ widespread repression and violence
against those who engaged in trade union activities. Many
union leaders closed their offices and went into hiding in the
aftermath of the 1991 coup. Armed civilians attacked a meeting
of officials of one of the large unions in August 1994 and beat
several of those present. Unions, as well as all other citizen
groups or assemblies, could meet only with the express written
permission of the military. Since the return of President
Aristide, labor unions, like other institutions of civil
society, have been free to associate. In meetings with the
Government and representatives of the international community,
unions have sought to encourage investment and an increased job
market for their members.
A tripartite commission of labor, management, and government
began to revise the Labor Code in 1986 and concluded its
negotiations in 1992. However, Parliament has yet to approve
the new Code. The revised Code recognizes the right to strike
but restricts the duration of certain types of strikes, as did
the previous code. It also stipulates that the Ministry of
Social Affairs must recognize workers' right to strike in each
case before a strike is legal.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
The Labor Code protects trade union organizing activities and
stipulates fines for those who interfere with this right.
While the de facto authorities curtailed union activities, job
losses as a result of economic conditions had a far more
damaging impact on union activities. Prior to the 1991 coup,
organized labor activity was generally concentrated in the
Port-au-Prince area, primarily in a large private sugar
refinery, in the assembly sector, and in state enterprises, all
three of which suffered drastic job losses following the coup.
Collective bargaining, which has never been widespread, was
nonexistent in 1994. Employers generally set wages
unilaterally. While Haiti has no export processing zones,
prior to the trade embargo it did have a sizable
export-oriented assembly sector. The Labor Code does not
distinguish between industries producing for the local market
and those producing for export. Many assembly sector companies
were the focus of developmental efforts; they received greater
outside scrutiny and were consequently somewhat more generous
with benefits and wages. Employment in the export assembly
sector, however, declined drastically from 1991 through 1994,
resulting in a loss of an estimated 34,500 jobs. As the
assembly sector contracted, unions that were particularly
strong in this sector declined accordingly.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
The Labor Code prohibits forced or compulsory labor, but the
Government rarely enforces these provisions. Children
continued to be subjected to forced domestic labor (see Section
5).
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
The minimum employment age for minors in all sectors is 15
years. Fierce adult competition for jobs ensures that child
labor is not a factor in the industrial sector. Children under
15 commonly work at odd jobs in both rural and urban settings
to supplement family income. The Ministry of Social Affairs is
responsible for enforcement of child labor laws, but the
International Labor Organization has criticized the enforcement
as inadequate.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
The law establishes a minimum wage, and a few weeks before the
September 1991 coup, Parliament set a new minimum wage of about
$1.85 (26 gourdes) per day for workers in the industrial
sector. Although the minimum wage technically became law
before the coup, the Government never published the legislation
in the official Gazette; nevertheless, companies in the
assembly sector adopted it. Even if the private sector applied
the revised minimum wage widely, it would not provide a worker
and family with a decent living. The minimum wage law also
applies to agricultural workers, but the authorities do not
enforce it. Thus the majority of wage earners, who work in the
agricultural sector, must survive on considerably less than the
minimum wage.
The Labor Code governs individual employment; it sets the
normal workday at 8 hours and the workweek at 48 hours, with
24 hours of rest on Sunday. It also establishes minimum health
and safety regulations. Employers in the industrial sector,
which is concentrated in the Port-au-Prince area and more
accessible to outside scrutiny, generally observe these laws in
practice. However, the Ministry of Social Affairs does not
enforce them. It also does not enforce Labor Code provisions
on health and safety. With more than 50 percent of the
population unemployed, workers are not able to exercise the
right to remove themselves from dangerous work situations
without jeopardy to continued employment.
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