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TITLE: NIGERIA HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES, 1994
AUTHOR: U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DATE: FEBRUARY 1995
NIGERIA
General Sani Abacha, who seized power in a palace coup on
November 17, 1993, remained Head of State throughout 1994.
Under Abacha, the main decisionmaking organ is the
military-dominated Provisional Ruling Council (PRC), which
rules by decree. The PRC oversees the 32-member Federal
Executive Council composed of some of Nigeria's most prominent
politicians. Like previous military regimes, Abacha and the
PRC claimed they would eventually hand over power to a civilian
government, but the PRC did not reveal a timetable, although it
initiated a "constitutional conference" over which it had
strong influence. Pending a new constitution, some provisions
of the 1979 Constitution were observed, although the decree
suspending it was not repealed. The regime failed to clarify,
however, which aspects of the Constitution remained in effect.
Although the regime occasionally made reference to rights or
guarantees outlined in the Constitution to suit a particular
purpose, it just as often reminded the public of the continued
suspension of constitutional rights.
Despite several positive initial steps, the PRC showed little
respect for human rights after its first month in power, and
the political and economic climate steadily deteriorated
throughout 1994. New political forces steadily gathered in
support of Chief Moshood K. O. Abiola, who on June 12, l993,
had won the presidential election, in what national and
international observers characterized as the most free and fair
election in Nigeria's history, but which was quickly annulled
by then military head, General Ibrahim Babangida. In
particular, opposition figures united in a new organization
called the National Democratic Coalition (NADECO), which
campaigned for an immediate return to civilian rule through a
"sovereign" national conference. Abiola declared himself
President of Nigeria on June 11, 1994.
The Government continued to enforce its authority through the
Federal Security System (the military, the state security
service, and the national police--all of whom were responsible
for serious human rights abuses) and through decrees blocking
action by the opposition in the courts. Starting in May and
June, the Government cracked down hard on the opposition,
arresting NADECO members. With Abiola in prison awaiting
trial, General Abacha convened a constitutional conference, but
the labor movement, led by the National Union of Petroleum and
Natural Gas Workers (NUPENG) and the National Labor Congress
(NLC), responded with massive strike action, demanding that
General Abacha release Abiola and hand over power to a civilian
government. The ensuing strikes brought economic life in Lagos
and much of the southwest to a standstill for almost 8 weeks.
By the middle of September, the military Government became
increasingly confident, escalating further the crackdown on its
opponents. In the face of the Government's tough actions, most
striking workers, fearing arrest and dismissal, soon returned
to work, and most of the fight went out of organized labor. At
the end of the year, the economy continued its downward slide.
While Nigerian elites continued to prosper, unemployment,
underemployment, and inflation increased markedly. Nigeria
depends on oil exports for over 90 percent of its foreign
exchange earnings and 75 percent of its budget revenues. In
order to cope with reduced oil revenues, Nigeria implemented an
indigenous structural adjustment program (SAP) from 1986 to
1991. While the SAP was a success in some respects, economic
conditions for the average Nigerian remained very difficult,
and successive military governments increasingly abandoned
reform by printing money that fueled inflation.
Nigeria's human rights record remained dismal in 1994. General
Abacha's policies heightened episodic civil unrest in urban
areas. Security forces used excessive force to control the
situation, killing and wounding a number of persons, including
peaceful protesters. The Abacha Government regularly relied on
arbitrary detention and mass arrest as a means of silencing its
many critics. To consolidate its hold on power, the regime in
August announced a series of harsh decrees restricting press
freedom and civil liberties which, like other military decrees,
contained clauses prohibiting judicial review of any government
action. Security services stepped up routine harassment of
human rights and prodemocracy groups, including labor leaders,
journalists, and student activists.
Other human rights problems throughout the year included
extrajudicial killings; police torture; dangerous and
unsanitary prison conditions with many deaths; violence and
discrimination against women; and infringements on freedom of
speech, press, travel, and political and labor affiliation.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
As in previous years, police and security services commonly
engaged in extrajudicial killings and excessive use of force to
quell antimilitary and prodemocracy protests. The most deadly
incidents occurred in July and August after the Government
deployed police and military units to put down protests in
Lagos and other cities in the southwest. There were credible
reports that security forces may have killed from 20 to 50
people in the Lagos area alone. Government reports of deaths
resulting from the riots were much lower, and the Government
asserted that security forces intervened only when confronted
by violent criminals. While the victims included hoodlums and
looters, who used the protests as cover to engage in violent
criminal activities, eyewitness accounts indicated that
security forces often fired randomly into crowds, killing
innocent bystanders and peaceful demonstrators.
Nigerian human rights groups maintain that scores of people die
annually while in police custody, though there are no
definitive statistics, and the claims are difficult to
substantiate. They are, however, accepted by the Nigerian
public and remain consistent with other credible reports of
police abuse, including the use of torture to extract
confessions. The Civil Liberties Organization (CLO), a
nongovernmental organization (NGO), publicized the case of
Anthony Imo, who died while in police custody in February.
Police arrested Imo, a "patent medicine" seller, in Kano and
accused him of selling fake pharmaceuticals. Reportedly
tortured by police while in custody for several hours, Imo was
taken by police to a local hospital where he later died,
apparently from brain damage.
The Government seldom holds police and security services
accountable for the use of excessive, deadly force or the death
of individuals while in custody; it made no effort to
investigate the conduct of security forces during the July and
August prodemocracy protests and denied that protesters died at
the hands of government forces. The Government has thus
fostered a climate of impunity in which these abuses flourish.
According to the Committee for the Defense of Human Rights
(CDHR) and the CLO, in January a police patrol in Delta state
shot seven men they suspected of being armed robbers. The
police maintain the seven fired upon them while trying to run a
checkpoint near Warri. In an exchange of fire, the police shot
two of the men and arrested the rest of the party. The police
then reportedly executed all seven prisoners soon after,
including a 70-year-old man.
Extrajudicial killing remained common in eastern Nigeria,
particularly as conflict between members of the Movement for
the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP) and government forces
escalated throughout the year. In April, spurred by increased
violence in the oil-producing area, the Government deployed
large numbers of police and military to Ogoniland. Credible
reports of increased killings and beatings at police
checkpoints and other areas accompanied the deployment. To
quell the upsurge of violence in the area, the military
administration of Rivers state promulgated a draconian decree
imposing the death sentence for "civil disturbances occasioning
death," and also for crimes such as "attempted murder." The
administration set up a special court, the Civil Disturbances
Tribunal, to try such cases.
Human rights groups and the press corroborated MOSOP claims
that hundreds of people died in the violence which continued
unabated despite the military presence and the actions of the
Rivers state government. The commander of the military forces
in Ogoniland, Major Paul Okuntimo, admitted publicly his forces
killed six people from June to August, stating that two were
shot when they fired on soldiers, one while trying to escape
from detention, and "the remaining three...as a deterrent to
their like."
b. Disappearance
There were no reports of politically motivated disappearances;
however, government detention practices have the effect of
causing many detainees to be "missing" for extended periods
(see Section 1.d.).
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
The 1979 Constitution (suspended) and the 1989 Constitution
(never implemented) prohibit torture and mistreatment of
prisoners and provide criminal sanctions for such excesses, and
the Evidence Act of 1960 prohibits the introduction of evidence
obtained through torture. Nevertheless, detainees frequently
die while in custody (see Section 1.a.), and there were
credible reports that police seeking to extract confessions
regularly beat and torture suspects. For example, reports
circulated in September that the military beat and nearly
tortured to death detained NADECO members. Detainees are
regularly kept incommunicado for long periods of time (see
Section 1.d.).
In its early months in power, the Abacha regime formed the
Lagos State Environmental Task Force as part of its "war on
indiscipline and corruption." Under the direct supervision of
the Lagos state administrator, Colonel Olagunsoye Oyinlola, the
Task Force grew increasingly brutal in its attempts to rid
Lagos of illegal street traders and mountains of garbage. Task
Force soldiers routinely beat and arrested anyone they
perceived as being "undisciplined," usually unarmed market
women and traders, but also including jaywalkers, errant
drivers, children, and young traders who hawk goods on Lagos
streets. The Constitutional Rights Project publicized the case
of one of its lawyers, Kolawole Olaniyan, who was beaten and
horsewhipped after protesting being pressed into a work gang by
Task Force soldiers on March 16. Armed soldiers reportedly
stopped the bus in which he was commuting and forced the
occupants to clean up piles of refuse nearby. Soldiers also
targeted young women in short skirts or trousers, humiliating
them and sometimes stripping them naked for wearing "immodest
clothing." The Government neither acknowledged nor denied that
such practices occurred; the perpetrators went unpunished.
Conditions in Nigeria's prisons remain life threatening. Lack
of potable water, sewage facilities, and medical supplies
contribute to deplorable sanitary conditions. Disease runs
rampant in the cramped, poorly ventilated facilities. Prison
inmates are seldom allowed outside their cells for recreation,
and many must provide their own food. In those cases, only
those with money or whose relatives bring food regularly have
something to eat. Poor inmates rely on handouts from others to
survive. There are credible reports that prison officials and
police deny inmates food and medical treatment as a form of
punishment or to extort money from them. For example, the
prison authorities denied Ken Saro-Wiwa, leader of MOSOP, who
suffers from a heart condition, access to medical care and food
appropriate to his medical condition during his detainment in
January and again during his subsequent detention, while
ignoring continued requests by Saro-Wiwa's personal physician
to see him (see Section 1.d.). There were also credible
reports that prison officials kept Saro-Wiwa in chains for at
least part of his detention.
Severe overcrowding in Nigerian prisons remains a serious
problem. For example, Ikoyi prison in Lagos, built to house
about 800 inmates, holds over 2,000. The CDHR estimated that
2,000 people die each year in prisons from disease, although
the Government admits only to a much lower mortality rate. A
correspondent for the Vanguard newspaper reported the death of
40 inmates from tuberculosis in the Warri federal prison since
the end of 1993. The Ita Oko detention camp was most likely
reopened to ease the burden on other overcrowded facilities.
The Government derives considerable savings from the practice
of leaving many children born in prison with their jailed
mothers rather than placing them in foster homes.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, and Exile
The regime repeatedly engaged in arbitrary arrest and detention
(see below). Police are empowered to make arrests without
warrants if there is reasonable suspicion of an offense and
often abuse this power. Nigerian law requires the arresting
officer to inform the accused of charges at the time of arrest
and take him or her to the station for processing within a
reasonable time. Suspects must be given the opportunity to
engage counsel and to post bail. However, police do not
generally adhere to these safeguards. They often hold suspects
incommunicado under harsh conditions for extended periods
without charge; arbitrary detention occurs frequently. Police
also commonly place relatives and friends of wanted suspects in
detention without charge in an effort to induce the accused to
turn themselves in.
The State Security (Detention of Persons) Decree of 1984
(Decree Two) provides that the Government may detain without
charge persons suspected of acts prejudicial to state security
or harmful to the economic well-being of the country. When
invoked by the Vice President, the decree suspends the
detainee's civil liberties and precludes judicial review. Many
Nigerians still consider Decree Two the main threat to their
basic freedoms because the judicial ouster clause encourages
arbitrary detention and fails to define what constitutes acts
prejudicial to state security or the nation's economic
well-being.
During the year, the Government expanded its authority to
detain opponents by promulgating a series of new decrees. One
of them, Decree 11, authorizes the PRC Vice Chairman or the
Commissioner of Police to detain persons for up to 3 months.
Another, Decree 14, forbids courts to order the Government to
produce prisoners in court, effectively suspending the right of
habeas corpus. The PRC relied heavily on arbitrary arrest and
detention throughout the year in an effort to silence its
critics. In February, after the Government announced a ban on
regional political organizations, security forces arrested and
detained without charge retired general and former presidential
candidate Shehu Musa Yar'Adua. In March the Government cracked
down on human rights groups' activities throughout the nation.
The authorities arrested Femi Falana, chairman of the National
Association of Democratic Lawyers and two members of the
Campaign for Democracy (CD) in Lagos on March 11, but never
charged them. Security operatives earlier in the month
arrested Oyo state chairman of the CD, Gbenga Awosode, and
Kwara state CDHR chairperson, Josephine Okei. Security forces
broke up an antiwar rally organized by the CD on March 15 and
arrested and detained eight CD members, including Femi Falana
and founding member Frederick Fasehun.
In the wake of protests against the constitutional conference
in May and June, the Government expanded its crackdown,
arresting hundreds of prodemocracy agitators. In the wave of
arrests, the Government detained and charged with treason
several former senators, who declared they had reconvened the
disbanded National Assembly, including Senate President Ameh
Ebute and Senators Bola Tinubu, Polycarp Nwite, N.A. Okorofor,
and Abu Ibrahim. They were released on bail, but the charges
against them remained pending. The authorities also arrested
and released Tokunbo Afikuyomi, member of the disbanded House
of Representatives and former aide to General Abacha's Minister
of Foreign Affairs Baba Gana Kingibe, and a number of NADECO
members, such as former governor of Plateau state Air Commodore
Dan Suleiman; former governor of Benue state Air Commodore
Jonah Jang; former governor of Anambra state C.C. Onoh; former
governor of Oyo state Bola Ige; and the highly respected
politician and statesman, Anthony Enahoro. The authorities
detained human rights figures around the country, including CD
chairman and NADECO member Beko Ransome-Kuti, who went on a
hunger strike to protest the conditions of his detention.
The Government arrested on charges of treasonable offenses in
late June Chief Moshood K.O. Abiola, widely believed the winner
of the annulled June 12, 1993, elections, who declared himself
President and Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces of
Nigeria. The Government kept Abiola in isolation for weeks
before moving him to Abuja and commencing his trial (see
Section 1.e.). Credible reports emerged that Abiola had been
humiliated while in custody, and that his family and doctor
were only sporadically allowed access to him. In September the
regime allowed Abiola's personal physician and other doctors to
examine him. Despite the doctors' findings of a serious heart
condition, the regime refused pleas from his family and others
that he be released for urgent tests that could be performed
only in Lagos or abroad.
In August and September the regime continued to silence
opposition to its rule. It arrested again Chief Anthony
Enahoro on August 18, jailing him in the Port Harcourt prison.
His family complained that security forces refused them access
to see him and that his doctor was unable to assess the
75-year-old Enahoro's medical condition. Enahoro was released
without charge in late December after being moved to the Port
Harcourt military hospital. Beko Ransome-Kuti was again
arrested without charge on September 15, after security
operatives entered the offices of the CDHR with a warrant and
seized a number of documents. After holding Ransome-Kuti
incommunicado for 1 week, the Government charged him with
writing threatening letters to the managing directors of Agip
and Shell oil companies and released him on bail. In early
November, the federal High Court in Lagos ruled that only the
federal Attorney General could prosecute cases of treasonable
felony, and that because the Government's case against
Ransome-Kuti had been filed at the state court level, it was
invalid. The Government ignored the ruling, rearresting
Ransome-Kuti on November 9, this time also accusing him of
receiving 6 million Naira from Abiola to "bomb government
installations and strategic buildings." The new Attorney
General of the Federation, Michael Agbamuche, defended the
Government's actions, saying that the Government had the right
to overturn judicial decisions "in certain circumstances."
Ransome-Kuti was released on bail soon after, and the case
continued at year's end. Noted civil rights activist and
lawyer Gani Fawehinmi was arrested on October 1 after
announcing the formation of a new political party, the National
Conscience (NC). He was released several days later.
Throughout the year, government forces harassed and detained
from time to time other members of MOSOP, including Ken
Saro-Wiwa's brother, Owens Wiwa. Saro-Wiwa also remained in
prison at year's end, without access to a lawyer, his family or
a doctor. In November the Government announced the formation
of a military tribunal to try Saro-Wiwa and other MOSOP members
for complicity in the murders of four Ogoni chiefs (see Section
5).
The labor movement confirmed that the following labor leaders
were in detention at year's end: Frank Kokori, General
Secretary of NUPENG; R. Addo, first president of the Petroleum
and Natural Gas Senior Staff Association (PENGASSAN); P.
Aidelomon, a PENGASSAN branch chairman; Wariebi Kojo Agamene,
president of NUPENG; and Olu Aderibegbe, Chairman of the Edo
state NLC.
The above cases were not isolated. The Government routinely
detained human rights monitors, journalists (see Section 2.a.),
and political opponents throughout the year for making or
publishing statements critical of the Government. Most often
the authorities did not charge the detainees with a crime, held
them for brief periods, and questioned them about their
activities and statements. Nigeria's total prison population
is estimated at 65,000. Human rights groups estimate that as
much as 46 percent of this population awaits trial. A precise
figure for the number of persons detained without charge is
unavailable, and there are no credible estimates of the number
of political detainees.
There were no known instances of forced exile as a means of
political control, although several NADECO members were in
self-imposed exile in the United States and the United Kingdom
at year's end.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
In its efforts to suppress opposition to its rule, the regime
first bypasssed the regular courts in favor of "tribunals" and
then declared itself above the law by prohibiting court review
of any government action (see below).
Decree One of 1984, the Basic Constitution (Modification and
Suspension) Decree, the first decree promulgated by the
military officers who overthrew the civilian regime of
President Shagari in 1983, left the institutional framework of
the judiciary relatively intact. However, it established a
parallel system of military tribunals with sole jurisdiction
over certain offenses, such as coup plotting, corruption, armed
robbery, and illegal sale of petroleum. A 1991 decree amended
Decree One by providing that only sitting or retired civilian
judges may preside over tribunals hearing nonmilitary cases.
The PRC retained the tribunal framework.
In most cases before the tribunals, the accused have the right
to legal counsel, bail, and appeal, though some tribunals
substitute a presumption of guilt for the presumption of
innocence, and conviction rates in the tribunals reportedly
exceed conviction rates in the regular courts. Sentences are
generally severe. The Government's reliance on tribunals,
which operate outside the constitutional court system,
seriously undermines the judiciary's independence and often
results in legal proceedings that deny defendants due process.
The Government's frequent refusal to respect court rulings also
undercuts the independence and integrity of the judiciary. In
November the federal Government circumvented a ruling by the
Kaduna High Court granting Abiola bail by filing an appeal to
the Supreme Court, further calling into question the relevance
of judicial decisions. The Government ignored court orders in
July requiring that it allow Punch, a daily newspaper closed
down by security forces, to reopen. In August a federal High
Court ruled the Government in contempt of court for ignoring
the ruling. The Court declared the closure of the paper
illegal and unconstitutional and ordered the police to vacate
the premises, which they did after an additional 11 days.
Within 2 weeks, the Government shut down Punch by decree.
Seriously damaging the shred of credibility the judiciary
retained, the regime in August declared itself above the law.
Decree 12 of 1994, enacted on August 18, states that "no act of
the federal military government may be questioned henceforth in
a court of law," and "divests all courts of jurisdiction in all
matters concerning the authority of the federal government."
When Attorney General Olu Onagoruwa criticized the decrees as
being unconstitutional, the PRC fired him.
The regular court system is composed of both federal and state
trial courts, state appeals courts, the federal Court of
Appeal, and the federal Supreme Court. Under the 1979
Constitution, courts of the first instance include magistrate
or district courts, customary or area courts, Shari'a (Islamic)
courts, and for some specified cases, the state high courts.
The nature of the case usually determines which court has
jurisdiction. In principle, customary and Shari'a courts have
jurisdiction only if both plaintiff and defendant agree to it.
In practice, fear of legal costs, delay, and distance to
alternative courts encourage many litigants to choose these
courts.
Criminal justice procedures call for trial within 3 months of
arraignment for most categories of criminals. Inefficient
administrative procedures, petty extortion, bureaucratic
inertia, poor communication between police and prison
officials, and inadequate transportation continue to result in
considerable delays, often stretching several years in bringing
suspects to trial.
Trials in the regular court system are public and generally
respect constitutionally protected individual rights, including
a presumption of innocence, the right to be present, to
confront witnesses, to present evidence, and to be represented
by legal counsel.
There are no legal provisions barring women or other groups
from testifying in civil court or giving their testimony less
weight. The testimony of women is, however, accorded less
weight in Shari'a courts. There is a widespread perception
that judges are easily bribed, or "settled," and that the
courts cannot be relied upon to render an impartial judgment.
An internal government report submitted to General Abacha in
June, later printed in the press, called the judiciary a
"disaster institution" and recommended that the federal
Government correct the institution's lack of independence and
funding, as well as put an end to corruption and bribery among
judges.
The number of political prisoners (as distinct from political
detainees) held by the Government was also unknown. At year's
end, M.K.O. Abiola remained in prison, despite a November
ruling by the Kaduna federal High Court of Appeals granting him
bail on the condition that he "not disturb the peace." The
regime refused to honor the ruling, however, and appealed the
decision to the Supreme Court. Abiola's trial on treason
charges remained suspended indefinitely on orders from the
regime. Other long-term political detainees, such as Ken
Saro-Wiwa, continued to be held without trial.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
Provisions of the 1979 and 1989 Constitutions provide for the
rights to privacy in the home, in correspondence, and in oral
electronic communications. However, the military Government
regularly interfered in the lives of its citizens, and if the
authorities desired to use a warrant in a particular search
case, they often secured it from a military tribunal rather
than a regular court. Human rights leaders reported that
security agents regularly followed them and cut or tapped their
organizations' telephones.
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
There is a large and vibrant press, which is frequently
critical of the Government. Nonetheless, the Government
directly owns or controls many newspapers and has shut down
several others. The Government granted broadcasting rights to
private radio stations for the first time in 1994.
Constitutional provisions providing for freedom of speech and
the press are not enforceable since no constitution is in
effect. The Abacha regime often publicly declared its support
for these freedoms; however, the Government attempted to
confine public political dialog to the constitutional
conference. The regime also increased its systematic
intimidation of the press through legal and extralegal means
throughout 1994.
The regime used a variety of methods to muzzle its many
critics. In January it seized the entire print run of the
weekly newsmagazine Tell, and soon after indicted the editor in
chief of Razor magazine for sedition and three Newswatch
magazine executives on other spurious charges. During the week
building up to the anniversary of the June 12 election, the
Government detained and otherwise harassed dozens of
journalists, along with prodemocracy activists. Security
forces on June 11 occupied the offices of M.K.O. Abiola's
Concord group newspaper Punch, charging that the buildings were
used to store weapons. On August 14, security forces occupied
the offices of the Guardian, Nigeria's most respected daily
newspaper, disrupting its production.
Following a number of court decisions favoring the press over
the summer, in August the Government issued a series of decrees
proscribing for 6 months three newspaper publishing houses.
These new decrees granted the Abacha regime and its agents
legal immunity from challenges to any actions taken to
implement the decrees, even when the action predated the decree
itself. In December the Government extended the decrees
indefinitely.
The Government also summarily deported foreign journalists,
including two correspondents of Cable News Network.
The military Government used a number of other means to
intimidate the press. These included a regulation banning
government offices from advertising in nongovernment media,
periodic directives to government offices forbidding the
purchase of certain publications, personal attacks in
government-controlled media against journalists and others who
challenged government policies, and threats of harassment
against potential advertisers and financial backers of
antigovernment newspapers and magazines.
While academic freedom is generally respected, the military
Government closed universities sporadically due to continued
social unrest and strikes by the Academic Staff Union of
Universities and other university unions calling for
implementation of the June 12, 1993, elections, a return to
civilian democracy, and improved funding for the university
system. Some student groups believe university authorities
follow government directives to suspend or expel activist
students.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
The two Constitutions provide citizens the right to assemble
freely and associate with other persons in political parties,
trade unions, or other special interest associations. However,
the Government proscribed all political activity one day after
coming into power in 1993. On August 17, General Abacha
announced that "individuals or groups may henceforth canvass
political ideas, but they cannot form political parties for
now."
Permits are not normally required for public meetings indoors,
and permit requirements for outdoor public functions are often
ignored. However, the Abacha Government retained the authority
of Decree Five of the Babangida government, which banned
gatherings whose political, ethnic, or religious overtones
might lead to unrest. Open-air religious services away from
places of worship remain prohibited in most states due to
religious tensions in various parts of the country.
Religious, professional, and other organizations need not
register with the Government and are generally permitted free
association with other national and foreign bodies. The PRC
retained a ban on several political organizations which it
contended were founded primarily along ethnic, tribal,
religious, or other parochial lines for the purpose of
sponsoring various political candidates.
c. Freedom of Religion
Decree One (suspending most of the 1979 Constitution) and the
suspended 1989 Constitution prohibit federal and state
governments from adopting an official state religion. The PRC
reaffirmed the secular nature of the State in its instructions
to the constitutional conference. The 1979 and 1989
constitutional provisions for freedom of belief, practice, and
education in regard to religion are generally respected. The
Government instituted a ban in 1987 (which is still in effect)
on religious organizations on campuses of primary schools,
though individual students retain the right to practice their
religion in recognized places of worship.
Distribution of religious publications is generally
unrestricted. There is a lightly enforced ban on published
religious advertisements, and religious programing on
television and radio remains closely controlled by the
Government. Both Christian and Muslim organizations allege
that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Immigration
Department continue to restrict the entry into the country of
certain religious practitioners, particularly persons suspected
of proselytizing. While it has not officially outlawed the
practice, the Government discourages proselytizing in the
belief that it stirs up religious tensions, particularly in the
north.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
The two Constitutions entitle citizens to move freely
throughout the country and reside where they wish. However,
increasing violent crime in many parts of the country prompted
police to set up roadblocks and checkpoints, where officials
commonly engaged in extortion, violence, and excessive use of
force.
Those Constitutions also prohibit expulsion or the denial of
exit or entry to any Nigerian citizen. However, women must
often provide permission from a male family member before they
are granted a passport, and the Government, like its
predecessors, occasionally prevented travel for political
reasons.
For example, in July the Government seized the passport of an
opposition leader, Chief Sobo Sowem Imo, as he attempted to
exit the country through the Lagos airport. In September the
Government confiscated the national passport of noted social
critic and Nobel Laureate Wole Soyinka, who, a few days before,
had filed a suit against the Abacha regime challenging its
legal right to rule. In October immigration authorities again
prevented Soyinka from leaving the country, seizing the U.N.
laissez-passer issued to him as a UNESCO goodwill ambassador.
Soyinka subsequently left the country clandestinely. In
November the Government seized Bar Association President
Priscilla Kuye's passport, preventing her from traveling after
she had already boarded an international flight.
Journalists reported harassment at the nation's airports by
security officials throughout the year, including having to
fill out a special exit and entry form detailing their
movements abroad, reasons for making their trip, and friends
and associates overseas. Security officials temporarily
confiscated the passports of journalists who refused to
complete the form.
Nigerian law and practice permit temporary refuge and asylum
for political refugees from other countries. The Government
cooperates with the Lagos office of the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in dealing with an estimated
3,000 Liberian and an undetermined number of Chadian refugees.
There were no reported cases of forced repatriation of refugees
in 1994.
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government
Citizens could not exercise this right in 1994, and there was
little indication that General Abacha's military regime was
willing to permit them to do so on any basis other than a
process tightly controlled by the regime. Throughout the year,
the regime committed numerous, repeated, and egregious human
rights abuses in its effort to prevent citizens from opposing
it by peaceful political means.
After coming to power, the Provisional Ruling Council headed by
General Abacha promised a return to civilian, democratic rule
but did not provide a timetable. The regime instead announced
the convening of a constitutional conference to prepare a
transition program. Citizens were not to be given the
opportunity peacefully to change their government at any level
until the constitutional convention completed its work. As
protests against the regime mounted in May and June, the
Government arrested a number of ex-politicians who attempted to
reconvene disbanded democratic institutions. Those arrested
included Chief M.K.O. Abiola, the acclaimed winner of the
aborted June 12, 1993, election, who declared himself President
on June 11.
In July the National Union of Petroleum and Natural Gas Workers
called a strike demanding that General Abacha release Abiola
and hand over power to a civilian government. Other unions
joined NUPENG, and the ensuing strikes brought life in Lagos
and much of the southwest to a standstill for almost 8 weeks,
while rioting and civil disobedience erupted throughout the
country, particularly in the southwest. By September the
regime cracked down on its opponents, and most elements of
resistance dissolved. As noted, it committed numerous,
repeated, and egregious human rights abuses in its effort to
prevent citizens from opposing it by peaceful political means.
At the end of the year, the regime continued to consolidate its
hold on power, although General Abacha indicated that he might
lift the ban on political activity early in the new year. He
also repeated his commitment to "respect the decision of the
constitutional conference" regarding a transition to civilian
rule, but stated that the Government "reserved the right" to
review any decision made by the conference. His promises
encouraged many members of the so-called political class to
form associations and quasi-political parties in anticipation
of another transition program. However, most Nigerians,
preoccupied by increasing economic hardship and ethnic
polarization, and weary of repeated military promises of
democratic rule, remained politically impassive.
Nigerian politics remain dominated by men. However, there are
no legal impediments to political participation or voting by
women or any other minority group. One woman served in the
91-member Senate, and 6 women served in the 589-member House of
Representatives. There is one woman in the PRC's Federal
Executive Council.
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
of Human Rights
The Government permitted local human rights groups to operate
but often interfered with their activities, detaining their
members and preventing them from criticizing the Government's
human rights record (see Sections 1.d. and 2.a.). High-level
government officials regularly denounced the activities of
Nigeria's human rights community, often accusing its members
and the independent press of participating in foreign-inspired
plots to destabilize the country.
Notwithstandng the Government's hostile attitude, human rights
groups remained engaged in a vocal and public campaign for the
promotion of human rights. Among the most active are: The
Civil Liberties Organization; the Committee for the Defense of
Human Rights; the Campaign for Democracy; the Constitutional
Rights Project; the National Association of Democratic Lawyers;
Human Rights Africa; the Legal Research and Resource
Development Center; the National Association of University
Women; the International Federation of Women Lawyers; and the
Human Rights Committee of the Nigerian Bar Association. A
number of prominent authors, including Nobel Laureate Wole
Soyinka, artists, educators, and jurists, in addition to
professional and labor organizations, spoke out frequently on
human rights issues as well.
The Government sometimes prevented foreign human rights
monitoring groups and individuals from visiting Nigeria or
mistreated them while they were there. For example, in April
the Government refused visa requests by representatives of the
Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization, invited by
Shell Oil and MOSOP to investigate the situation in Ogoniland.
In June security agents beat and detained for 4 days Nick
Ashton-Jones, a representative of the British environmental
awareness group Pronatura, and two Nigerian human rights
activists, Oronto Douglas and Uche Onyeagocham, reportedly for
meeting with detained MOSOP secretary Leedum Mitee in Port
Harcourt. The Government admitted Amnesty International
representatives to the country in December but denied them
access to detainees.
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Disability, Language, or Social Status
Both the 1979 and 1989 Constitutions provide citizens the right
to freedom from discrimination based on "community, place of
orgin, ethnic group, sex, religion, or political opinion."
However, customary and religious discrimination against women
persists, while tension between the Government and disaffected
minority ethnic groups is on the rise.
Women
There are no laws barring women from particular fields of
employment, but women often experience discrimination because
the Government tolerates customary and religious practices
which adversely affect them. While the number of women in the
formal sector increases every year, women do not receive equal
pay for equal work and often find it extremely difficult to
acquire commercial credit or obtain tax deductions or rebates
as the heads of households. While some women have made
considerable individual progress, both in the academic and
business world, most are underprivileged. Though women are not
legally barred from owning land, under customary land tenure
systems in some parts of Nigeria only men own land, and women
gain access to it through marriage or family. In addition,
many customary practices do not recognize a woman's right to
inherit her husband's property, and many widows are rendered
destitute when their in-laws take virtually all of the deceased
husband's property. In other areas, the widow herself is
considered part of the property, and she too may be "inherited"
by the husband's eldest male relative. Polygyny is widely
practiced among all ethnic groups in both Christian and Islamic
communities.
Reports of wife abuse are common, especially wife beating in
polygynous families. Police do not normally intervene in
domestic disputes, and they are seldom discussed publicly. In
more traditional areas, it is questionable whether the courts
and police actively intervene to protect women who formally
accuse their husbands if the level of alleged abuse does not
exceed customary norms in the area. Purdah, the Islamic
practice of keeping girls and women in seclusion from men
outside the family, is prevalent in parts of Nigeria's far
north. Women also bear the brunt of attacks for social and
religious reasons, particularly for "immodest" or
"inappropriate" behavior.
Children
The Government only occasionally condemns child abuse and
neglect and makes little effort to stop customary practices,
such as the sale of children into marriage. It remains only
sporadically committed to children's welfare. While the amount
of money spent on children's health projects has increased in
recent years, laws designed to protect the rights of children
are often obsolete, inadequate, and seldom enforced. Although
the law stipulates that "no child shall be ordered to be
imprisoned," juvenile offenders are routinely denied bail and
incarcerated along with hardened criminals.
There are credible reports that poor families often sell their
daughters into marriage as a means of supplementing their
incomes. There are also reports that many young girls are
forced into marriage as soon as they reach puberty, regardless
of age, to prevent "indecency" associated with premarital sex.
The Government publicly opposes female genital mutilation
(FGM), and Nigeria cosponsored a resolution at the 46th World
Health Assembly calling for the elimination of harmful health
practices, including FGM. However, it has taken no action to
abolish the procedure, and nearly all ethnic groups subject
young females to it. Nigerian experts estimate that as many as
50 percent of Nigerian women, primarily in the Christian south
but less in the Muslim north, have undergone FGM, which varies
from simple removal of the clitoral hood or labia minora to
excision of the clitoris and the most painful and harmful form,
infibulation.
The age at which females are subjected to FGM varies from the
first week of life to after a woman delivers her first child.
The federal Ministry of Health and NGO's sponsor public
awareness and education projects to inform communities of the
health hazards associated with FGM, and the press openly
condemned the practice on a number of occasions.
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities
There is no official policy of discrimination against any of
Nigeria's 250 ethnic groups, and laws do not favor one group
over another. However, Nigeria has a long history of tension
among its diverse ethnic groups. Clashes continued between
rival ethnic groups in Delta, Rivers, Benue, Cross River, and
Taraba states, often resulting in bloodshed. Tradition
continues to impose considerable pressure on individual
government officials to favor their own ethnic group, and
ethnic favoritism persists. The Ogoni, an ethnic group
indigenous to Rivers state in eastern Nigeria (Nigeria's
oil-producing region), maintain that the Government continues
to engage in a systematic campaign to deprive them of their
land and its wealth.
The Ogonis claim that the Government seizes Ogoni property
without fair compensation, ignores the environmental impact of
oil production on Ogoni land, and fails to provide adequate
social services, such as water and electricity. MOSOP, which
campaigns for greater Ogoni autonomy, often describes
government policy towards the Ogoni as genocide. The
confrontation between the Government and the Ogoni has
increasingly turned violent (see Section 1.a.), and Ogoni
concerns about environmental degradation and the quality of
social services in the oil-producing region have some merit.
Despite this, accusations that the Government is engaged in a
genocidal campaign against the Ogoni are unfounded.
Other ethnic minorities, particularly in Delta, Rivers, and
Akwa Ibom states, have echoed Ogoni claims of environmental
degradation and government indifference to their development.
Groups such as the Ijaw, Itsekiri, and Urhobo have grown
increasingly vocal in expressing their unhappiness, while the
prevalence of ethnic conflict and confrontation with government
forces increased in these areas.
Religious Minorities
Nigerian law prohibits religious discrimination. Nonetheless,
it is commonly reported that government officials often
discriminate against persons practicing a religion different
from their own. Religious tensions often lead to violence, as
in April when clashes between Muslims and Christians in the
northern city of Jos resulted in hundreds of deaths and the
partial destruction of the city's main market. A predominantly
Christian city in a Muslim-dominated part of the country, Jos
had long been championed as an example of Nigerian religious
tolerance. Residents in an overwhelmingly Christian part of
the city rioted when the military administrator of Plateau
state (a Muslim from Kano) chose a Muslim rather than a
Christian for the position of local government administrator.
In September Muslims attacked and killed some Christian
residents of the northern town of Potiskum, capital of Yobe
state. In response, the Christian Association of Nigeria
issued a strong statement condemning the killings and alleging
official indifference to the incident.
People with Disabilities
While the Government called for private businesses to institute
policies ensuring fair treatment to the 2 percent of the work
force that it claims is disabled, it has not enacted any laws,
including on accessibility to buildings and public
transportation, nor formulated any policy which specifically
ensures the right of the disabled to work.
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
The Abacha Government has left basic labor legislation in
place, essentially the 1974 Labor Decree. However, there are
no constitutional safeguards preventing the Government from
interfering in the administration of labor unions, and the
Government added new decrees further restricting worker
rights. Nigeria has signed and ratified the International
Labor Organization's (ILO) Convention on Freedom of
Association. On November 3 and 4, the ILO Committee on Freedom
of Association heard a complaint by the International
Confederation of Free Trade Unions, the World Confederation of
Labor, and the Organization of African Trade Union Unity
against the Nigerian Government's labor policy. The ILO ruled
that the Government's interference in the administration of
labor unions and its restriction of worker rights is in direct
contravention of ratified conventions. The Committee
recommended that the Government remove appointed administrators
from labor bodies, restore suspended union executives and allow
them access to the premises of union headquarters, and restore
dues check-off. At year's end the Government had not responded.
Workers, except members of the armed forces and employees
designated essential by the Government, may join trade unions.
Essential employees include firefighters, police, employees of
the central bank, the security printers (printers of currency,
passports, and government forms), and customs and excise
staff. In May 1993, the Government promulgated the Teaching
Essential Services Decree, declaring education an essential
service. The Decree did not, however, proscribe education
sector unions. The National Labour Congress (NLC), Nigeria's
umbrella labor federation, has repeatedly called on the
Government to reinstate unions in all sectors of the economy
except for the armed forces, firefighters, and the police.
The vast majority (approximately 72 percent) of the work force
is employed in agriculture. Agricultural workers are not
unionized. Most of the informal sector and practically all
small industries and businesses remain nonunionized.
Approximately 11.5 percent of the total work force belong to
unions.
In contravention of the ILO Convention on Freedom of
Association, the Government has decreed a single central labor
body, the NLC, and deregistered other unions. Government
interference makes it difficult for the NLC to represent
Nigerian workers effectively. The NLC claims 3 million members
out of a total work force of 30 million, but this figure is
difficult to verify. The Government continued to resist
attempts by senior government staff to form and register as an
independent labor association the Senior Staff Consultative
Association of Nigeria (SESCAN).
The right to strike is recognized by law, except in the case of
essential services. There are no laws prohibiting retribution
against strikers and strike leaders, but strikers who feel they
are facing unfair retribution may submit their cases to the
Industrial Arbitration Panel, whose decisions are binding on
all parties.
In 1994 the labor movement engaged in large-scale strike
action, including two general strikes, in support of K.O.
Abiola and the prodemocracy movement. In response, the
Government enacted decrees dismissing the executives of the
NLC, PENGASSAN, and NUPENG and prohibiting legal challenges by
offended unions to these decrees. The courts subsequently
cited the latter in dismissing an NLC legal suit asking the
courts to declare these decrees null and void.
The crippling strike by petroleum workers began on July 4 and
officially ended on August 17, when the Government dismissed
the petroleum unions' executives. In the strike's aftermath,
the Government continued to detain petroleum union leaders,
including NUPENG General Secretary Frank Kokori and a number of
other ranking labor leaders. By September, petroleum workers,
frustrated by a lack of support from other Nigerians, returned
to their jobs.
Under the labor laws, any nonagricultural enterprise which
employs more than 50 employees is obliged to recognize trade
unions and must pay or deduct a dues checkoff for employees who
are members. The NLC has complained that some employers
deliberately organize their industries into multiple units
employing less than 50 workers to avoid unionization. The
Government threatened to withdraw the dues checkoff provision
and make the payment of union dues completely voluntary if
unions pursue strikes. This was the case in August 1993 when
the NLC called a general strike and again in September 1994 at
the conclusion of the petroleum strike.
In August 1991, the Government's Decree 32 amended a policy in
effect since 1975 that permitted international labor
affiliation only with the Organization of African Trade Union
Unity and affiliated pan-African labor federations. Decree 32
allowed affiliation with non-African international labor
organizations, but only for training and educational
assistance. Since Decree 32, the NLC and SESCAN opened
negotiations with the International Confederation of Free Trade
Unions seeking formal affiliation. The removal of the NLC
executive and the protracted political confrontation have
precluded further progress on these applications.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
The labor laws provide for both the right to organize and the
right to bargain collectively between management and trade
unions. Collective bargaining is, in fact, common in many
sectors of the economy. Laws further protect workers against
retaliation by employers for labor activity through an
independent arm of the judiciary, the National Industrial
Court, which handles complaints of antiunion discrimination.
The NLC has complained, however, that the judicial system is
often slow to handle labor cases and that this constitutes a
denial of redress to those with legitimate complaints.
There have been no significant reforms in labor practice since
January 1991, when the Government abolished the uniform wage
structure for all government entities. This allowed each tier
of government--federal, state, local, and state-owned
firms--freedom to negotiate its own level of wages, benefits,
and conditions of employment. As a result, negotiations
previously conducted on a nationwide basis under the direct
supervision of the Labor Ministry, are now conducted on a
local, often plantwide, basis with less government involvement.
At year's end, there were no functioning export processing
zones.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
The 1974 Labor Decree and the 1989 Constitution prohibit forced
or compulsory labor. While this prohibition is generally
observed in practice, the Lagos Task Force soldiers used forced
labor to clean up community streets (see Section 1.c.). The
ILO, noting that with the 1989 Constitution suspended Nigeria
may not be able to enforce the ILO Convention against Forced
Labor in the absence of constitutional guarantees, pressed the
Government for its views on this point, but at year's end the
Government had not replied.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
The 1974 Labor Decree prohibits employment of children under
15 years of age in commerce and industry and restricts other
child labor to home-based agricultural or domestic work. The
law further stipulates that children may not be employed in
agricultural or domestic work for more than 8 hours per day.
The Decree allows the apprenticeship of youths aged 13 to 15
under specific conditions. The Government does not
specifically regulate service of apprentices over the age of 15.
Primary education is compulsory, though rarely enforced, and
recent studies showed declining enrollment due mainly to the
continuing deterioration of public schools. This lack of
sufficient primary school infrastructure has ended some
families' access to education, forcing them to place their
children on the employment market. The ILO and the U.N.
Children's Fund, in consultation with the NLC, have concluded
that child labor, while not yet endemic, is increasing and
could become a serious problem (see Section 5).
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
The 1974 Labor Decree sets a minimum wage, which is reviewed on
an ad hoc basis. The last review in 1991 was undertaken by a
tripartite group consisting of representatives of the NLC, the
Nigeria Employers' Consultative Association, and the Ministry
of Labor. It raised the monthly minimum wage from 250 naira to
450 naira per month, but the rapid fall in the true market rate
of the naira (down to approximately 100 to the dollar by year's
end), rendered the legislation essentially meaningless. The
minimum wage as currently stipulated does not keep pace with
inflation and does not provide a decent living for a worker and
family. The deteriorating economy, coupled with a high
inflation rate, has reduced the buying power of workers,
leading to a marked decline in their standard of living. The
high inflation rate is a frequent cause of strikes demanding
large wage increases.
The 1974 Labor Decree also establishes a 40-hour workweek,
prescribes 2 to 4 weeks of annual leave, and stipulates that
workers are to be paid extra for hours worked over the legal
limit. The Decree also states that workers who work on Sundays
and statutory public holidays must be paid a full day's pay in
addition to their normal wages. There is no law prohibiting
excessive compulsory overtime.
The 1974 Decree contains general health and safety provisions,
some aimed specifically at young or female workers. Employers
must compensate injured workers and dependent survivors of
those killed in industrial accidents. The Labor Decree does
not provide workers the legal right to excuse themselves from
dangerous work situations without loss of employment. The
Labor Ministry, which is charged with enforcement of these
laws, has been largely ineffective, and violations are common
and go largely unpunished. The Government has failed to act on
various ILO recommendations since 1991 to update its moribund
inspection and accident-reporting program.
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