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TITLE: LIBERIA HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT, 1994
AUTHOR: U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DATE: FEBRUARY 1995
LIBERIA
In 1994 Liberia remained a country increasingly divided
factionally and geographically, even though warring factions
did conclude an agreement in late December on ending the
country's civil war. The Liberian National Transitional
Government (LNTG) was seated after much delay in March as the
successor to the Interim Government of National Unity (IGNU),
which along with the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL)
and the United Liberation Movement for Democracy in Liberia
(ULIMO) signed the July 1993 Cotonou Peace Agreement under the
aegis of the Economic Community of West African States
(ECOWAS), the United Nations, and the Organization of African
Unity. The Cotonou Accord did not, however, resolve the basic
factional differences over political power or lead to the
projected demobilization of the warring factions, or to planned
free elections. In fact, the three groups that signed the
Accord mushroomed to seven competing political-military groups
which renewed factional fighting, thereby preventing the LNTG
from extending its authority outside greater Monrovia and the
corridor to Buchanan (see Sections 1.g. and 3). Throughout
much of the year, the shifting factional military action served
to keep Charles Taylor's NPFL forces, which almost captured
Monrovia in late 1992, on the defensive.
In the confusing Liberian mosaic of political/military forces,
an eighth group, composed of civilian political parties and
other interest groups, convened a National Conference in August
to pressure the armed factions to disarm and implement other
Cotonou Accord provisions. The Conference strongly opposed a
new agreement reached on September 12 in Akosombo, Ghana, by
the Cotonou signatories, including the Armed Forces of Liberia
(AFL) replacing the dissolved IGNU, under the auspices of
ECOWAS Chairman Ghanaian President Jerry Rawlings. The
Conference participants insisted that the new accord
excessively favored warring-faction interests. While fighting
raged in Liberia between followers of the faction leaders
meeting in Ghana, Rawlings continued to consult with the
various Liberian parties, including the National Conference.
Their leaders signed the Akosombo Clarification Agreement
(three parties) and the Agreement of Acceptance and Accession
(five parties, including the National Conference) on December
21 in Accra. The Accra Accords provided for a cease-fire on
December 28 and established a 5-member ruling council to be
inaugurated in early 1995 to govern the country, including
conduct the November 1995 elections, until an elected
government takes over in January 1996.
The key military force supporting the LNTG remained the ECOWAS
Cease-Fire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG). At year's end, ECOMOG
was composed of 6,000-8,000 troops--down from 12,000 in
July--from six West African and two East African countries,
although over half of the force was Nigerian. Initially a
peacekeeping force, ECOMOG increasingly became the interim
Government's de facto army and, in addition, assumed many
police powers within the Monrovia perimeter. ECOMOG was
effective in its military role in maintaining relative calm
within the Monrovia-Buchanan perimeter and for promptly putting
down a September 15 coup attempt by a general from the Armed
Forces of Liberia (AFL), who deserted in 1990, and dissident
AFL supporters. Some ECOMOG soldiers have, however, also
earned an unenviable reputation for a variety of illegal
activities. ECOMOG reassigned several officers who were
believed by outside observers to be engaged in activities
detrimental to the peace process. Despite continuing criticism
of ECOMOG behavior by human rights monitors, the majority of
ECOMOG forces conducted themselves well during the year.
The civil war-ravaged economy, previously based primarily on
iron ore, rubber, timber, diamond, and gold exports, remained
stagnant. Continued disruption of economic activity, 80 to 90
percent unemployment across all sectors except government,
massive displacements of civilians, wanton destruction, and
looting have all devastated the productive capacity of Liberia
despite its rich natural endowments and potential
self-sufficiency in agriculture. Massive emergency operations
by the United Nations, as well as by American and other
Western-based relief agencies and nongovernmental organizations
(NGO's) continued throughout the year in ECOMOG-controlled
areas. However, they were periodically suspended in other
parts of the country because of fighting, harassment, and
detention of relief personnel; looting of relief agency
supplies and vehicles; and occasional seemingly arbitrary
security restrictions imposed by ECOMOG.
The number of human rights abuses unquestionably rose with the
increased level of conflict across the country, including the
massacre of over 65 civilians by inconclusively identified
attackers in a Monrovia suburb on December 15. There were many
credible charges that all factions flagrantly disregarded
fundamental humanitarian values. Human rights monitors also
criticized ECOMOG for incidents of human rights abuse. Since
1989, when Liberia's population was recorded at 2.4 million, an
estimated 300,000 persons, most of them civilians, have been
killed or wounded as a result of the conflict, and close to
800,000 have taken refuge in neighboring countries. An
estimated 1.1 million people have been displaced within Liberia
since the war began. Approximately 130,000 Sierra Leonean
refugees were also displaced repeatedly throughout the year,
some landing finally within the safe haven of Monrovia. In all
combat arenas, fleeing displaced persons reported villages
looted and burned; use of excessive force; arbitrary
detentions; impressment, particularly of children under the age
of 18 into the NPFL and ULIMO-Mandingo forces; torture;
individual and gang rape; summary executions; mutilations and
cannibalism. In the absence of progress on disarmament and
demobilization, the U.N. Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL)
began drawing down its 443-member staff in August. The
fighting and looting became so ferocious in September that all
humanitarian assistance outside the Tubmanburg-Monrovia-
Buchanan perimeter was halted, although several NGO's resumed
modest food deliveries into the interior in November and
December. No progress was made in resolving outstanding
incidents of past human rights abuses.
Although obeisance was paid to the 1985 Constitution, the Penal
Code, and the Labor Code, because of the violent conditions
obtaining up country and the overcrowding and destitute
conditions for a large percentage of people living in and near
Monrovia, the rights provided by these documents were largely
moot.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
Indiscriminate killings increased sharply from the previous
year. Although professing adherence to the rule of law, the
leaders of the warring factions condoned and, in some
instances, seemingly encouraged the murderous savagery that
affected the civilian population more than the combatants (see
Section 1.g.). Despite claims to be the national army, the AFL
acted as a warring faction, and AFL troops frequently engaged
in a variety of human rights abuses, including alleged
extrajudicial killings.
Individual ECOMOG soldiers, serving a dual role as peacekeepers
and peace enforcers, committed several extrajudicial killings,
such as the shooting death of a university professor on
November 1 for running a checkpoint. The soldier was awaiting
trial at year's end. In another case, ECOMOG court-martialed a
soldier for killing a civilian and reportedly executed him. In
contrast to the leaders of the warring factions, the ECOMOG
high command was committed to bringing soldiers involved in
crimes against civilians to justice. There were no reports of
ECOMOG soldiers committing political killings.
On March 21, a Turkish citizen convicted of murder reportedly
died of starvation in the Monrovia central prison. There was a
cursory investigation undertaken by the LNTG's National
Security Agency, but the authorities took no action to punish
those responsible for the prisoner's death. Inmates credibly
accused the guards of stealing the food provided for prisoners.
In the many killings committed by the warring factions, it was
often impossible to sort out whether they were politically
motivated or driven by tribal hatred. However, the savage
killing of a judge of Lofa County in January by the
ULIMO-Mandingo faction appeared to have clear political intent
(see Section 1.g.). There were also unconfirmed but credible
reports of Muslim ULIMO-Mandingo fighters executing civilians
in Lofa County for religious and ethnic reasons (see Section 5).
There were no reports that factions punished fighters for
politically motivated killings, but combatants of all factions
were routinely executed for offenses in the eyes of their
commanders, as in the case of Nixon Gaye, field commander of
the largest NPFL unit. He was shot August 27 in his reported
mutiny attempt against Charles Taylor and died of his injuries
along with an unreported number of his supporters. Dissident
NPFL cabinet ministers claimed Gaye was tortured to death after
being wounded. Charles Taylor admitted on December 23 ordering
the executions of several of his senior military commanders
because of alleged connivance in the September loss of Gbarnga.
b. Disappearance
In the area under LNTG/ECOMOG control, there were no known
disappearances. NPFL and ULIMO-Mandingo forces were
responsible for many unexplained disappearances, notably by
impressment of children (see Sections 5 and 6.d.). Many
families remained divided among those living in Monrovia, those
located in other parts of Liberia, and those who fled the
country and have not yet returned. The International Committee
of the Red Cross (ICRC) has a family tracing program but,
because of the inaccessibility of major sectors of the country
throughout the year, located only a small percentage of the
missing persons brought to its attention. In the wake of
fighting in Bong and Maryland counties in September and
October, a new wave of approximately 200,000 refugees flooded
into Guinea and Cote d'Ivoire. Many of these refugees were
unable to contact family members.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
While the 1985 Constitution prohibits torture and other
degrading treatment, inhuman treatment continued to be
frequent. In the greater Monrovia area under ECOMOG control,
with a better educated populace, a freer press, the presence of
national and international human rights and humanitarian aid
groups, there were fewer reports of torture than in the past
(see Section 1.d.). Although the Supreme Court ruled that
"trial by ordeal" or "sassywood"--commonly, the placement of a
hot metal object on a suspect's body to induce confession in a
criminal investigation--is unconstitutional, the Ministry of
Internal Affairs continued to employ licensed agents who
subjected suspects to this practice. A leading Monrovia-based
human rights group brought suit in March seeking compensatory
damages for injuries sustained by victims of the continuing
practice of sassywood. Tribal courts, which use this
traditional mode of justice, did not function because of the
disruptions of the civil war.
Eyewitnesses report that ECOMOG soldiers beat and humiliated
persons at ECOMOG checkpoints in Monrovia, often for curfew
violations. After ECOMOG detained prominent businessman and
Unity Party stalwart Peter Bonner Jallah in November 1992 for
allegedly abetting the NPFL surprise attack against Monrovia,
it released him in May. Jallah credibly claimed that ECOMOG
and the preceding government's intelligence officers had beaten
him in the head with a gun butt, administered electrical
charges to his body, burned him about the genitals with
gasoline, and handcuffed him so tightly that he now suffers
nerve damage in his hands (see Section 1.d.).
NPFL fighters stripped, beat, and tortured civilians at
numerous highway checkpoints in NPFL areas, usually in
connection with extortion or other forms of intimidation. The
NPFL reportedly detained and tortured two traditional chiefs
who went to NPFL headquarters in Gbarnga in August to convince
Charles Taylor to send representatives to the National
Conference in Monrovia.
Roving bands of ULIMO-Krahn and ULIMO-Mandingo fighters raided
villages in Cape Mount and Bomi counties, pillaging, beating,
raping, and murdering civilians as they went. There are
similar documented reports of primarily Liberian Peace Council
(LPC) depredations in the southeastern counties. On June 28,
ULIMO-Krahn fighters attacked the UNOMIL regional headquarters
in Tubmanburg, beat and tortured six U.N. observers, and
completely looted the headquarters.
All warring factions regularly committed various forms of
torture and mistreatment of civilians, including individual and
gang rape and other violence against women.
Conditions in government jails continued to be
life-threatening. Officials frequently denied prisoners
medical care, family contacts, and adequate food; cells
remained small, crowded, and filthy. Female prisoners were
held in separate cells in the central prison, but there were no
separate facilities for juvenile offenders. In 1994, however,
the LNTG and ECOMOG regularly granted human rights groups
access to prisoners in Monrovia, and these groups frequently
obtained needed medical treatment for their clients. In a
number of cases, the pro bono work of human rights groups and
interested individuals resulted in the release of prisoners,
especially those whose cases were pending "further examination."
The conditions of detention outside Monrovia were even worse.
When detained, prisoners were held in makeshift, substandard
facilities and subjected to various forms of mistreatment, both
physical and psychological--including beatings, rape, and
threatened executions. More often, however, displaced persons
reported that "authorities" either let prisoners go or shot
them on the spot.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
The 1985 Constitution prohibits arbitrary arrest and provides
for the rights of the accused, including warrants for arrests
and the right of detainees either to be charged or released
within 48 hours. In practice, police officers often
disregarded these rights and made arbitrary arrests. Many
police officers accepted bribes to arrest persons based on
unsubstantiated allegations. At times they failed to inform
detainees of the charges against them, and often charges went
unrecorded. The LNTG Ministry of Justice moved to protect
citizens' rights by issuing new procedural guidelines to the
Bureau of Corrections, limiting the persons authorized to
commit suspects to jail, and filing writs of dismissal for
detainees who were not processed correctly.
ECOMOG soldiers played the major role in policing the greater
Monrovia area, and citizens continued to turn to ECOMOG
soldiers rather than the unarmed police force to arrest and
detain alleged criminals. Detentions by ECOMOG peacekeepers
frequently did not satisfy internationally recognized
standards, and there were unconfirmed reports that ECOMOG
coerced confessions from suspects. ECOMOG did, however,
regularly allow NGO's access to prisoners in its various
detention centers. As a result of politician Peter Bonner
Jallah's 18-month detention without charge, the Center for Law
and Human Rights Education filed a writ with the Supreme Court
calling for a definition of ECOMOG's arrest and detention
powers. In its controversial September decision, the Supreme
Court stated that ECOMOG "as a peacekeeping force has no legal
right to arrest and detain any citizen." Toward year's end,
ECOMOG and various Liberian security and law enforcement
agencies established a "joint task force" intended to
appropriately apportion responsibilities and overall security
duties.
Although the AFL claims to be the national army,
ill-disciplined AFL troops frequently committed some of the
most serious human rights abuses (see Sections 1.a. and 1.g.).
For example, on June 24, AFL soldiers entered the UNOMIL
Demobilization Center at Schiefflin and detained the staff for
3 days after which they looted the Center. On September 15,
under the direction of a U.S.-domiciled former AFL general,
some AFL soldiers attempted a coup against the Government,
seizing the executive mansion. ECOMOG forces swiftly put down
the attempted coup and captured leader Charles Julue, 78 AFL
supporters, and 5 civilians. After a 3-week probe, ECOMOG
released 40 soldiers and detained 38 for court-martial. It
turned the five civilians over to the civilian judiciary. The
trial of the five began on October 14 but was suspended as of
year's end because of procedural and security issues. The AFL
court-martial of Julue, three other generals, and others began
on November 16 but suffered repeated delays due to security
concerns caused by dissident AFL soldiers.
While accurate arrest information was unavailable, charged and
uncharged pretrial detainees in the Monrovia area formed a
sizable portion of the total incarcerated population. Human
rights groups reported that approximately one-third to one-half
of the prisoners (average 75) at any given moment at the
Monrovia central prison compound had not been tried. Modest
reforms within the court system, such as limiting the time
frame for argument, reduced somewhat the backlog of judicial
cases. Except for the September coup suspects, there were no
known political/security detainees in the Monrovia area under
LNTG jurisdiction, but it was impossible to determine the
number of such detainees elsewhere in the country.
On April 5, ECOMOG released 800 NPFL fighters who had been held
for over a year following their capture during the NPFL's
October 1992 "Operation Octopus" attack on Monrovia. UNOMIL,
which had been charged under the 1993 Cotonou Peace Accord with
supervising a demobilization program, included the 800 in its
initial demobilization figure of 3,500.
The NPFL committed repeated arbitrary detentions in its
territory where martial law has been in effect since the war
began. NPFL fighters had almost unbridled power to make
arrests without warrants. They exercised that power often and
capriciously, detaining persons, including U.N. military
observers, on spurious grounds or without charge for periods
ranging from several hours to several weeks, as in the case in
May of an AFL colonel held for 1 month. The NPFL held 350
orphans, whom the NPFL abducted from Fatimah Cottage in October
1992, at Cuttington University College until the fighting
reached Gbarnga in September. At the height of the fighting,
the children fled, with most of them joining the 150,000
displaced persons still held by the NPFL at year's end near
Totota. UNOMIL was able to evacuate 58 of the orphans by
helicopter before the security situation made flights
impossible.
There were no reports of Liberians being subjected to forced
political exile.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
The court structure is divided into four levels with the
Supreme Court at its apex. Under the 1985 Constitution,
defendants have the due process rights conforming to
internationally accepted norms of fair trial. Most of these
rights, however, were ignored in practice.
By 1994 all levels of the court system, which had been
devastated by the years of civil war, were functioning in
Monrovia, although erratically. While corruption and
incompetent handling of cases remained a recurrent problem,
some progress was made in addressing problems in the judiciary,
including requiring that circuit court judges be law school
graduates. The 1994 LNTG budget included the judiciary for the
first time in 4 years, which resulted in judges being given
office facilities and vehicles. The Supreme Court, composed of
justices nominated by the warring factions, continued to
operate.
In addition to the resurrection of the modern court system,
customary law was also applied in Monrovia. The Ministry of
Internal Affairs subjected persons accused of occult practices
and other crimes to "trial by ordeal," submitting defendants to
physical pain to adjudicate guilt or innocence (see Section
1.c.).
In the case of two AFL soldiers whom a military court found
guilty of murder, a leading human rights organization on their
behalf appealed the death sentence to the Supreme Court. The
AFL, claiming no appeal was permitted from a court-martial
judgment, initially threatened to execute the prisoners but
subsequently delayed action after the Supreme Court issued a
restraining order. By year's end, the Ministry of Defense had
not constituted an appeal board.
Although in 1991 the NPFL also partially reactivated the court
system in areas under its control, legal and judicial
protections have been almost totally lacking since then. In
the areas controlled by the other factions, there was little
pretense of due process; swift judgment was meted out by the
faction leaders. Given the continuing war, it was not possible
to determine the total number of political/security detainees
(see Section 1.d.) or political prisoners among the prisoners
held by the factions.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
While the Constitution provides for these rights, there were
many serious abuses of privacy and home--including confiscation
of property and failure to obtain required warrants--by the
police and fighters of all the warring factions. According to
the Constitution, the police must have a warrant or a
reasonable belief that a crime is in progress, or is about to
be committed, before entering a private dwelling. In practice,
the police engaged in forced entry without a warrant to carry
out arrests and investigations.
Combatants of all the warring factions looted villages during
the year, with ULIMO-Krahn and ULIMO-Mandingo factions in Bomi
and Cape Mount counties and LPC and NPFL fighters in
southeastern counties and elsewhere drawing considerable public
outrage. These forces pilfered virtually any item of value and
regularly demanded scarce food and personal valuables from
already impoverished residents or displaced persons, often
robbing them of their clothes and physically abusing them,
particularly at checkpoints. Confiscation of private homes and
vehicles was common practice.
These factions also used forced entry for purposes of
intimidation. For example, AFL soldiers made two raids on the
Monrovia residence of a legislative representative to harass
the representative for his support of the new police director.
In one instance, an AFL soldier shot the representative's guard
in the leg. The representative sent a formal letter to the
Transitional Legislative Assembly accusing four members of the
AFL high command of attempted murder.
g. Use of Excessive Force and Violations of Humanitarian
Law in Internal Conflicts
In 1994 the warring factions inflicted considerably more harm
on noncombatants than on each other. All factions
indiscriminately ransacked villages and confiscated scant food
supplies. They deliberately targeted, tortured, and murdered
innocent civilians and regularly committed violence against
women, children, and the elderly.
The number and complexity of warring forces increased in 1994.
In addition to Charles Taylor's NPFL in the central counties,
the anti-NPFL ULIMO split in March into its two ethnic
components, the ULIMO-Mandingo faction and the ULIMO-Krahn
faction. While there was intra-ULIMO fighting in the western
counties, both ULIMO wings joined other groups, including the
AFL, in fighting NPFL-Taylor forces in central Liberia. Made
up of remnants of late President Samuel Doe's army, the AFL
controlled pockets of terrain along the road to Buchanan and a
few areas in and around the Firestone Plantation. The LPC, a
predominantly Krahn group drawing major support from active and
former AFL combatants, emerged in late 1993 and made serious
inroads in 1994 against the NPFL in the south and eastern
coastal region. Krahn ethnic loyalties closely linked the
ULIMO-Krahn, the AFL, and the LPC. The Lofa Defense Force
(LDF) provided sporadic challenge to ULIMO-Mandingo control of
the northwest.
The NPFL also suffered a schism. In August a trio of dissident
NPFL ministers, who took their LNTG cabinet seats in April,
declared Charles Taylor unseated as Chairman of the NPFL's
Central Revolutionary Committee. They joined other splinter
groups in an anti-Taylor coalition which participated with
ULIMO-Mandingo forces in a successful September attack on
Taylor's Gbarnga headquarters which he reoccupied in December
(see Section 1.a.).
There were many incidents throughout the year in which
civilians died. On June 9, LDF fighters reportedly massacred
or summarily shot 75 civilians at Russie village near Zorzor in
Lofa county. On June 22, ULIMO-Mandingos massacred nine
civilians, including women and children, in Brewerville,
Montserrado county. Witnesses confirmed that ULIMO troops
questioned the victims about their tribal backgrounds and then
killed or tortured them and threw their bodies into a well. In
late August, ULIMO-Krahn fighters massacred between 20 and 30
persons in Gbesseh town, Cape Mount county. In September there
were numerous reports of a "massacre" by ULIMO-Mandingo
fighters who attacked Phebe Hospital near Gbarnga, looting it
and killing an unknown number of civilians, including several
Phebe staff members. Subsequently, NPFL leader Charles Taylor
implied the killings of civilians at Phebe had been committed
by members of the NPFL. In mid-December, fighters of
undetermined affiliation attacked the Paynesville suburb of
Monrovia, shooting, hacking, and burning 66 civilians to death.
Credible reports indicated that NPFL, ULIMO-Krahn,
ULIMO-Mandingo, and LPC fighters committed acts of
cannibalism. In some instances, the fighters ate specific
organs in the belief that it would make the fighter stronger.
Human rights groups estimated that 3 to 6 percent of combatants
participated. Displaced persons reported seeing severed
extremities and extracted body parts, such as the heart of a
Lofa county judge displayed in the streets of Voinjama after he
was murdered by ULIMO-Mandingo forces. Often, it was
impossible to know where the victim came from or what had
happened; on September 21, a diplomat came upon an
unidentified, naked and tortured corpse (pieces of rope on the
deceased's wrist) along the main road through a Monrovia suburb.
The NPFL took credit for mining the Bong Mine-Kakata Road, the
feeder roads to the Monrovia-Buchanan Highway, and threatened
to mine the Totota-Kakata Highway if anyone attempted to save
the 150,000 displaced persons in Totota. Three mine explosions
elsewhere killed several civilians and two ECOMOG soldiers.
Relief organizations estimated that 1.1 million persons have
been internally displaced since the war began. Most of these
are dependent on humanitarian aid for survival. Upper Lofa
county, for instance, where a $1 million staging base in Vahun
had been gutted by ULIMO brigands in December 1993, remained
bereft of relief operations throughout the year because the
security situation was too unstable to allow relief workers to
return. Fierce fighting in other sectors of the country
hampered humanitarian work. Faction leaders and their
followers, suspicious of the possible supply of aid to the
enemy, often refused to allow international and humanitarian
relief agencies access beyond their checkpoints to distribute
food and supplies. U.N. and relief agencies reported
continuous harassment and detention of their staffs,
confiscation of vehicles, and looting of foodstuffs, medical
supplies, and gasoline.
In September interfactional warfare erupted in central Liberia
with such renewed brutality that over 200,000 Liberians fled
their homes, some to the bush and others into Guinea and the
Ivory Coast. U.N. agencies and NGO's withdrew their up-country
staffs after the NPFL took 43 U.N. observers hostage in various
sectors of NPFL territory and after millions of dollars of U.N.
and humanitarian assistance supplies and equipment had been
stolen. Assistance outside the Monrovia and Buchanan areas
ground to a halt in September but resumed to a few locations at
greatly reduced levels late in the year.
Various factions attacked ECOMOG peacekeeping forces throughout
the year and on a number of occasions took ECOMOG soldiers
hostage. At least eight ECOMOG soldiers lost their lives, and
many were wounded. Similarly, the warring factions detained
UNOMIL staff members and at times tortured them.
ECOMOG soldiers also inflicted suffering on the civilian
population. Individual soldiers committed a number of serious
illegal activities, including systematic looting not only of
small, easily transportable goods but also the stripping of
entire buildings for scrap to be sold abroad. Credible reports
indicated that members of ECOMOG facilitated the delivery
of--if not delivering--weapons and ammunition to the AFL, LPC,
and ULIMO combatants fighting to dislodge Taylor's NPFL.
Allegedly, some ECOMOG soldiers engaged in the illegal drug
trade (heroin and cocaine) and used Liberia as a transit point
for drugs coming in from Nigeria and Ghana for onward
shipment. ECOMOG soldiers were also accused of using children
as young as 8 years of age as prostitutes.
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
These freedoms are provided for in the 1985 Constitution and,
with some significant limitations, citizens generally exercised
these rights in Monrovia. Liberians are free to criticize the
LNTG and ECOMOG, although they usually show restraint and
self-censorship in favor of the temporary Governments.
Due primarily to continued economic stagnation, the number of
publications in Monrovia fluctuated from month to month. At
year's end, there were eight privately owned newspapers in
Monrovia. While a restrictive, Doe-era media law providing the
Ministry of Information wide discretion in licensing and
regulating journalists remained on the books, official press
censorship was not pervasive in Monrovia. Also, there were no
newspapers forcibly closed during the year. Reflecting local
opinion, most of the Monrovia press tended to be anti-NPFL; and
some journalists admitted to self-censorship in favor of the
interim governments.
Other journalists asserted that public calls by IGNU and
subsequently LNTG officials for a "more responsible" press had
a chilling effect on journalistic freedom. At times,
government officials and senior ECOMOG officers, offended by
articles, insisted on meeting privately with journalists.
Perhaps most chilling were the reported threats to individual
journalists by persons claiming to represent one or another of
the warring factions. After a group of citizens from ULIMO
territory published a statement in Monrovia that ULIMO should
relinquish control of the western counties to the LNTG, the
ULIMO leadership threatened physical harm to journalists who
published articles making such suggestions.
There was no overt general attempt to censor the press, such as
the mid-1993 directive from IGNU that journalists submit all
"war-related" stories to the Ministries of Information and
Justice for clearance on national security grounds. At that
time, the Press Union of Liberia (PUL) and newspaper publishers
objected to the measure as a prior restraint, but the PUL and
IGNU later compromised on guidelines for military reporting.
Those guidelines continued in effect and undoubtedly
constituted part of the basis for self-censorship. Except when
fighting became too widespread, international journalists were
able to visit contested zones and to file reports without
official censorship. Because of the fighting, journalists from
Monrovia cannot report on events in NPFL areas, and vice versa.
Outside Monrovia, residents of Liberia exercised extreme care
in their criticism of the various factions. Although NPFL
leader Charles Taylor affirmed publicly on several occasions
his support of free speech, citizens in his area were subject
to sanctions for criticizing the NPFL. There were two pro-NPFL
newspapers intermittently published in NPFL territory, but no
newspapers were printed in ULIMO- or LPC-controlled areas.
Both NPFL papers were initially denied permission to circulate
in Monrovia by the LNTG because they were not legally
"registered." LNTG officials seized copies of one of the
papers on at least one occasion.
ECOMOG, IGNU, and subsequently the LNTG supported a radio
station (ELBC) which broadcast progovernment (and at times
sycophantic) programming throughout 1994. Many credible
journalists alleged substantial censorship of ELBC. A
privately owned radio station began broadcasting from Monrovia
in October 1993 but limited its news and commentary in order to
avoid possible governmental interference. The NPFL continued
to operate intermittently at least one radio station, which
uncritically supported Charles Taylor.
The University of Liberia functioned throughout 1994 despite
some delays caused by financial problems. Academic freedom was
generally respected, although the university authorities and
most of the student body criticized pro-NPFL expression.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
The Constitution provides for the rights of peaceful assembly
and association. ECOMOG, apparently with full IGNU agreement,
imposed a nighttime curfew in Monrovia from 7 p.m. to 7 a.m.
after the NPFL attack in 1992; the curfew continued in force.
ECOMOG soldiers enforced the measure strictly and arrested
numerous persons for noncompliance. ECOMOG periodically meted
out corporal punishment to repeat curfew violators.
The LNTG and ECOMOG permitted political parties and other
groups to organize freely and hold public meetings in Monrovia,
but ECOMOG did prohibit an outdoor peace rally in July and
generally discouraged parades or demonstrations for security
reasons. The NPFL and ULIMO-Mandingo forces severely
restricted freedom of assembly and association in their areas.
In other factions' areas, residents felt intimidated and did
not attempt demonstrations.
c. Freedom of Religion
The 1985 Constitution recognizes freedom of religion as a
fundamental right, and Liberia has no established state
religion. There was no evidence of systematic violation of
religious freedom by warring factions, but there were isolated
and sometimes violent incidents of religious repression by
local fighters, especially by Muslim ULIMO-Mandingo forces (see
Section 1.a.).
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
The Constitution provides for freedom of movement throughout
Liberia as well as the right to leave or enter the country at
will. ECOMOG monitored freedom of movement at checkpoints
within Monrovia and around its perimeter.
Factional fighting interfered with freedom of movement, ranging
from resettlement of displaced persons to ordinary commerce and
travel. ECOMOG restricted the movement of civilians,
humanitarian aid and staffers at various times throughout the
year. All factions impeded the movement of relief workers and
supplies and extorted, humiliated, and harassed citizens at
checkpoints and makeshift barricades.
Of a total estimated population of almost 2.7 million at the
end of 1994, approximately 1.1 million Liberians have been
internally displaced since 1990, and 776,000 were refugees in
neighboring west African countries, many out of fear of ethnic
persecution. The number of refugees fluctuated depending on
the intensity and proximity of the fighting to population
centers. Many of the displaced went to Monrovia, including the
6,000 former refugees who returned to Liberia, reportedly
because of the security and more reliable relief supplies.
There were approximately 130,000 Sierra Leonean refugees in
Liberia as the civil war spilled over into Sierra Leone. Many
Sierra Leoneans suffered mistreatment by both ULIMO factions
and the NPFL as they were displaced from camps in western
counties and made their way to camps in Lofa county, where
approximately 70,000 reside, and camps in and around Monrovia.
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government
Despite constitutional and statutory provisions for free and
fair elections, Liberians could not exercise the right to
change their government. Implementation of the July 1993
Cotonou Accord and followup September 1994 Akosombo Agreement
lagged as the factions continued to argue at year's end over
the detailed arrangements and timetable for seating a new
transitional government, disarmament, and demobilization. The
December Akosombo Clarification Agreement postponed elections
until November 1995 and the installation of an elected
government until January 1996.
The LNTG installed in March 1994 is a weak transition
Government comprised of representatives of the signatories to
the Cotonou Accord--IGNU, NPFL, and ULIMO. There is a 5-person
Council of State appointed by the signatory factions, a
35-member Transitional Legislative Assembly (TLA) also
appointed by the factions, and the judiciary. At the end of
the year, it remained to be seen whether the factions could
implement the new LNTG called for in the December 21 Accra
agreements.
There are no restrictions in law on the participation of women
in politics; in practice, two women hold cabinet-level
positions in the LNTG, and a few hold positions in the
legislature and judiciary. Overall numbers of women in the
LNTG and the various political parties are small.
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
of Human Rights
The interim governments have permitted domestic and
international groups to operate freely. The few domestic human
rights organizations are relatively new and underfunded but
made progress improving their influence, visibility, and
performance.
There were no domestic human rights organizations extant
outside the ECOMOG-controlled areas due to the warring
factions' hostility to such organizations.
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Disability, Language, or Social Status
The 1985 Constitution prohibits discrimination based on ethnic
background, race, sex, creed, place of origin, or political
opinion, but discrimination exists in fact and in some cases in
law.
Women
The status of women varies by region, ethnic group, and
religion. Before the outbreak of the civil war, women held
one-quarter of the professional and technical occupations
available in Monrovia. Some women currently hold skilled jobs
in government, including in the Cabinet, legislature, and
judiciary. On the whole, however, the lot of women
deteriorated dramatically with the onset of war, the closing of
many schools, and the loss of their traditional role in
production, distribution, and sale of foodstuffs. In the past
3 years, several women's organizations formed in Monrovia and
Gbarnga to advance family welfare issues, to help promote
political reconciliation, and to assist in rehabilitating
former combatants as well as civilian victims of war. In urban
areas, women can inherit land and property. In rural areas,
where traditional customs are stronger, a wife is normally
considered the property of her husband and his clan and usually
is not entitled to inherit from her husband.
Women in most rural areas do much of the farm labor and have
only limited access to education. In the massive violence
inflicted on civilians during the conflict, women suffered the
gamut of abuses (see especially Sections 1.c. and 1.g.). Even
prior to the war, domestic violence against women was
extensive, but the Government, the courts, the media, and
women's groups never seriously addressed the issue. There are
several NGO's in Monrovia and Buchanan which have developed
programs for treating abused women and girls and increasing
their awareness of their human rights.
Children
In the civil war, the various sides have given almost no
attention to the welfare of children, whose education and
nurturing have been seriously disrupted. Many who were
disabled, orphaned, abandoned, or "lost" during a military
attack on their homes or villages, reportedly accepted the
protection and sustenance that joining a faction brought. Both
the NPFL and the ULIMO-Mandingos recruited and trained children
as cooks, spies, errand runners, guards, and in many instances
combatants. There were no precise figures on the number of
child soldiers, but some sources estimated that 10 percent of
the 40,000 to 60,000 combatants are under 15 years of age.
Many children are substance abusers and depend upon the
factions for supply. As a result, children have become both
victims and abusers in the conflict. Many suffer from
posttraumatic stress disorder. Some NGO's have initiated small
retraining and rehabilitation programs for a limited number of
former child fighters (see Section 6.d.).
International health experts have condemned female genital
mutilation (FGM), including clitoridectomy, as physically and
psychologically damaging to the girls and young women on whom
the operation is performed. In some instances, female health
professionals in the tribes have successfully participated in
the ceremony to the extent of providing hygienic conditions and
postoperative care. FGM is practiced primarily on young girls
by northern, western, and central tribes, particularly in rural
areas and among traditional societies. According to an
independent expert in the field, the percentage of Liberian
females who have undergone this procedure may be as high as 60
percent. Although there was one newspaper report of a failed
attempt to force a girl in Monrovia to undergo the procedure,
it was difficult to confirm the extent to which this procedure
was practiced in 1994 by Liberia's uprooted, displaced, and
often inaccessible population. The most extreme form of FGM,
infibulation, is not practiced in Liberia.
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities
Although the Constitution bans ethnic discrimination, it also
provides that only "persons who are negroes or of negro
descent" may be citizens or own land, thus denying full rights
to many who were born or lived most of their lives in Liberia.
There has been no legislative initiative to repeal this racial
test. The 1975 Economic "Liberianization" Law prohibits
foreign ownership of certain businesses, such as travel
agencies, retail gasoline stations, and beer and soft drink
distributors. This law resulted in the rejection of several
foreign-owned business proposals.
The roots of the civil conflict can be found in the historical
division between the Americo-Liberian minority, who, despite
representing less than 5 percent of the population, for over
150 years dominated the political, economic, and cultural life
of the country, and the indigenous ethnic groups. The latter
frequently complained of government discrimination in many
areas, such as access to education and civil service jobs and
to infrastructure development.
The authoritarian military-based regime established after the
1980 coup mounted by Sergeant Doe and other AFL noncomissioned
officers progressively exacerbated ethnic tensions while
subverting the democratic reforms embodied in the 1985
Constitution. During the Doe regime, resentment grew over
domination of government by Doe's ethnic group, the Krahns,
which represent approximately 4 percent of the population.
Throughout the civil war, the factions have used an
individual's language to identify ethnicity and often summarily
executed those from groups considered hostile. The ULIMO
faction split in March along Krahn-Mandingo lines and fought
each other and the NPFL. The NPFL, supported by the Gio and
Mano groups, waged war against four preponderantly ethnically
constituted factions, three of them Krahn: The predominately
Krahn AFL troops in and around Monrovia, the Krahn LPC along
the southern coast and north into (Krahn) Grand Gedeh county,
and the ULIMO-Krahns in Bong county. The ULIMO-Mandingos made
incursions against the NPFL in Bong county and from early
September until December held control of Gbarnga, the NPFL
stronghold (see Section 1.g.).
Religious Minorities
While the law prohibits religious discrimination, there were
claims of discrimination in practice. Some Muslims, who
represent a growing share of the population, believe that
Liberia's secular culture gives preference to Christianity in
civic ceremony and observances, and that discrimination spills
over into areas of individual opportunity and employment. The
Muslim education system stresses religious as opposed to
skills-based learning. As a result, the authorities frequently
by-passed Muslims for the highly sought-after technical and
bureaucratic jobs available in government. In addition, many
Liberian Muslims believe that their access to jobs and roles in
public life is restricted by an anti-Muslim bias in many
sectors of Liberian society with a predominately Christian
orientation.
People with Disabilities
The protracted civil war has produced a large number of persons
with permanent injuries in addition to persons disabled from
other causes. There is no legal discrimination against the
disabled, but in practice they do not enjoy equal access to
education, employment, and scant social services. There are no
laws mandating accessibility to public buildings or services.
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
The 1985 Constitution states that workers, except military and
police, have the right to associate in trade unions (see also
Section 6.b.). However, as with virtually all other organized
activity in the country, unions disappeared during the height
of the 1989-90 war. With the signing of the July 1993 Cotonou
Peace Accord, many industries planned to resume, and affected
unions began reorganizing and attempting to locate members.
However, union efforts to reorganize generally faltered in 1994
as factional fighting increased. The most active organization
was the Ship Workers' Union.
The 1985 Constitution is silent on the right to strike. While
the Labor Code provides for this right, the Doe government
issued a no-strike decree in 1980. Governments up to 1990
intimidated labor officials, assuring a generally docile work
force and labor environment. Neither of the subsequent IGNU
and LNTG legislative assemblies repealed or affirmed the
no-strike decree, which was not challenged in 1994 as there
were no strikes. During the year, the LNTG took no
discriminatory actions against organized labor.
In 1990 the U.S. Government suspended Liberia's eligibility for
trade benefits under the Generalized System of Preferences
because of its violations of worker rights.
Labor unions have traditionally affiliated freely with
international labor groups.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
With the important exception of civil servants, workers
(including employees of public corporations and autonomous
agencies) have the right to organize and bargain collectively.
In the past, labor and employers negotiated agreements freely
without government interference. In 1994 these rights were
largely moot because of the lack of economic enterprise,
especially in Monrovia, where only a few businesses resumed
operations, usually with reduced staffing. There were no
formal mechanisms in place for resolving complaints of
discrimination against union workers.
There was no activity in Liberia's one export processing zone
(EPZ) which has been inoperative since 1990 when fighting
reached the free port of Monrovia. When operational, labor
laws have the same force in the EPZ as elsewhere in the country.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
The Constitution prohibits forced labor, but even before the
civil war local authorities widely ignored this prohibition in
rural areas where farmers were pressured into providing free
labor on "community projects," which often benefited only local
leaders. The warring factions used forced labor during the
fighting, especially for moving equipment or supplies.
According to credible reports, ULIMO-Mandingo fighters also
used Sierra Leonean refugees to acquire food for them,
occasioning the flight and repatriation of approximately 5,000
Sierra Leoneans from Vahun, Lofa county.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
Under the Doe government, the law prohibited employment of
children under age 16 during school hours in the wage sector.
This law is still technically in effect, but there is no
enforcement. Even earlier, enforcement by the Ministry of
Labor was limited, and small children continued to assist their
parents as vendors in local markets and on family subsistence
farms. This practice persisted in 1994, particularly in those
areas where school had been closed because of the war. During
the conflict, the NPFL and ULIMO-Mandingos recruited young
children as soldiers, many of whom had been orphaned; some were
less than 12 years of age. Many of these children, especially
in the NPFL, remained under arms in 1994 (see Section 5).
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
The Labor Code provides for a minimum wage, paid leave,
severance benefits, and safety standards. Before the economy
collapsed, the legal minimum wage varied according to
profession but did not generally provide a decent standard of
living for a worker and family. (The minimum wage for
agricultural workers was approximately 90 cents per day, with
industrial workers receiving three or four times that amount.)
Often workers were forced to supplement their incomes through
other activities to maintain a minimal standard of living.
Those not displaced turned to subsistence farming. The minimum
wage was not enforced adequately by the Ministry of Labor.
The Labor Code provides for a 48-hour, 6-day regular workweek
with a 30-minute rest period for every 5 hours of work. The
6-day workweek may extend to 56 hours for service occupations
and to 72 hours for miners, with overtime pay beyond 48 hours.
In view of the low level of economic activity during 1994, most
employers ignored these various regulations, and there was very
little attempt at enforcement in the country.
Prior to 1990, there also had been government-established
health and safety standards, enforced in principle by the
Ministry of Labor. Workers did not have a legal right to
remove themselves from dangerous work situations.
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