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TITLE: PAKISTAN HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES, 1993
DATE: JANUARY 31, 1994
AUTHOR: U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
PAKISTAN
Pakistan is an Islamic republic in which power is shared
between the Prime Minister, as the leader of the National
Assembly, and the President. The Chief of Army Staff also
wields considerable influence on many major policy decisions
and is the third member of the unofficial "troika" which
governs the nation.
This division of power was clearly illustrated in 1993, when
Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and President Ghulam Ishaq Khan
engaged in a struggle for power that led to a compromise
brokered by the Chief of Army Staff. Both the President and
Prime Minister resigned, a neutral caretaker government was
formed, and elections for the National Assembly and provincial
assemblies were held. The national and provincial assembly
elections held on October 6 and 9 were generally seen by both
international and domestic observers to have been relatively
free and fair, and resulted in a new Government under the
leadership of Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto of the Pakistan
People's Party (PPP). PPP candidate Farooq Leghari was chosen
President in indirect elections held November 13. In the early
months of the new Parliament, both the Government and
opposition participated in the legislative process, engendering
considerable free and open public debate of issues.
Responsibility for internal security rests primarily with the
police, although paramilitary forces, such as the Rangers and
Frontier Constabulary, are charged with maintaining law and
order in frontier areas. Police forces are under provincial
control, as are paramilitary forces when assisting in law and
order operations. Both forces committed human rights abuses in
1993. The military continued its traditional role as the
guarantor of law and order when the police force, which is
poorly equipped and trained, fails to meet its mandate. The
army and paramilitary forces, under the nominal control of the
Sindh provincial government (but under the effective control of
the army and central Government), continued their operation
begun in May 1992 to help restore law and order in Sindh
province, sparking credible charges of human rights violations
by the army units involved and of selective targeting of
certain political elements in Sindh.
Pakistan, a poor country with a per capita income of $414, has
a mixed economy of both state-run and private industries and
financial institutions. The Constitution assures the right to
private property and of private businesses to operate freely in
most sectors of the economy. The Government is pursuing an
ambitious program of economic reform, emphasizing the
privatization of government-owned financial institutions,
industrial units, and utilities. Cotton textiles and apparel,
rice, and leather products are the principal export products.
There was no significant change in the human rights situation
in 1993, with serious problems remaining in several areas.
Government harassment of political opponents declined during
the year, especially after the neutral caretaker government
took power in July. However, repression against a Sindh-based
political party continued. The arbitrary detention, arrest,
torture, and other abuse of prisoners and detainees continued
to be a serious problem, and there were no significant efforts
to reform the police or judicial systems or to prosecute and
punish those responsible for abuses. Religious zealots
continued to discriminate against and persecute non-Muslims,
basing their activities in part on discriminatory legislation
against religious minorities. The Government did little to
curb these activities. Sectarian riots between the Sunni and
Shi'a communities were less intense, but religious and
ethnic-based rivalries resulted in numerous murders and
occasional civil disturbances. Traditional social and legal
constraints kept women in a subordinate position in society,
and significant restraints remained on workers' rights. The
use of child and bonded labor remained widespread in spite of
legislation to restrict these practices.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
Extrajudicial killings, often in the form of staged "police
encounters"--shootouts resulting in the death of suspects--
continued in 1993. Most of these killings occurred in rural
Sindh as part of the army's law and order program "Operation
Cleanup." The frequency of such deaths at army hands, however,
appeared to decline in 1993. There were also scores of
credible reports from the media and human rights monitors
concerning prisoners' deaths while in police custody, including
reports of instances in which prisoners alleged to have been
killed in shootouts probably died as a result of police torture.
In May, Azeem Tariq, chairman of the Mohajir Qaumi Movement
(MQM) political party, was assassinated. Tariq was a
controversial figure who had enemies within his own party as
well as in the security forces. Two persons were arrested and
charged with Tariq's death; their trial had yet to begin at
year's end.
In July a man in Islamabad accused of passing counterfeit
currency was found hanging by the neck in the jail's bathroom
following police interrogation. The police claimed the death
was suicide, but the medical report did not support this cause
of death and said there was evidence of torture. Following
widespread news coverage of the case, former Prime Minister
Sharif ordered an investigation, but no police officials are
known to have been charged or punished.
In late July, Nazeer Ahmed was arrested by police in Karachi
for alleged theft and severely tortured for several days until
his death on August 3. The police official who arrested and
allegedly tortured Ahmed reportedly sought revenge because of a
personal vendetta. Ahmed had reportedly been subjected to
numerous types of torture, including having his testicles
ruptured with pliers. The case is being investigated by local
authorities. One of the five police officials accused of
torturing Ahmed to death had been arrested by year's end.
Law enforcement personnel were rarely charged or tried for
killings, which are estimated to have numbered in the hundreds
in 1993. According to government figures, 660 prisoners died
in Pakistani jails during the past 5 years, all reportedly from
natural causes.
Security forces also used excessive force which resulted in
deaths of suspects. One such case occurred in May when
Islamabad police stopped a businessman at a checkpoint and
ordered him to prove his relationship to the woman traveling in
his car. During the ensuing altercation, the businessman was
shot and killed. At year's end the accused police officer
remained in jail pending trial.
The October elections were among the most peaceful in
Pakistan's history. Still, numerous acts of violence,
including the assassination of candidates, occurred. Ghulam
Haider Wyne, former Punjab Chief Minister and a Pakistan Muslim
League (Nawaz Group) candidate for the National Assembly, was
assassinated while campaigning in his home district. The
police stated that the killing was an act of revenge by a local
criminal gang for the killing of one of its members by the
police, which occurred while Wyne was Chief Minister. Two
Pakistan People's Party provincial assembly candidates also
were murdered during the campaign. No arrests were made in any
of these cases. Several unsuccessful assassination attempts
against candidates were reported during the campaign, and a
number of political workers from various political parties were
killed or injured.
During 1993 numerous bombs were detonated in various parts of
the country, especially in Sindh and Punjab provinces, causing
some deaths. The Government has been unable to determine the
groups or individuals responsible. Some observers believe the
bombings are unrelated attacks aimed at rival ethnic or
religious groups. Ethnic and sectarian tensions continued to
be a cause of politically motivated killings, as leaders of
both Shi'a and Sunni organizations were assassinated. Ethnic
and religiously motivated riots also continued to occur,
although to a lesser extent than in 1992. The most serious
riot occurred in August, when Sunni and Shi'a organizations
clashed in Gilgit, leaving 12 dead and leading to the arrest of
more than 100 persons.
Tribal violence in Balochistan often resulted in bloodshed. A
continuing dispute between two factions of the Bugti tribe in
Balochistan turned increasingly violent and led to the
assassination of several tribal leaders. Some 27 persons were
killed when two factions of the Magsi tribe clashed near Jhal
Magsi, Balochistan.
b. Disappearance
There were no reports of government-instigated disappearances.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
There continued to be persuasive evidence of police
mistreatment, including torture, of detainees. Police and
jailers routinely use force to elicit confessions and compel
persons under detention to incriminate others. Beating,
whipping the soles of the feet with rubber whips, sexual
assault, and prolonged isolation continue to be serious
problems. When deaths result, suicide or natural causes are
the commonly offered explanation.
Police frequently use the threat of abuse to extort money from
prisoners and their families. Whole families have been
detained to force a relative, the subject of an arrest warrant,
to surrender.
There were continuing credible reports of the sexual abuse of
women by police. Some women under detention are reportedly
coerced by police officers to trade sexual favors for their
release; other women are simply raped. Although there is
increasingly widespread press coverage in the English-language
print media of such cases, this abuse is often not reported due
to societal taboos, police intimidation, and family pressure.
There are few policewomen to perform matron duties, despite
regulations requiring that policewomen be present for the
questioning or detention of female suspects in station houses.
Despite the promulgation of regulations in 1991 to prohibit
police from keeping women overnight in custody, women are
arbitrarily detained overnight and are sexually abused. Upon
release, these women are often ostracized by their family and
friends and barred from their homes. Government efforts to
bring an end to sexual abuse by the police have had little
effect. Police accused of abuse are seldom tried and
punished. Police assigned to investigate abuses by other
police generally shield their colleagues from such charges, and
courts seldom charge policemen with offenses. Those who
attempt to bring charges against police are often threatened
and drop the charges. However, in December four police
officers from Swabi were convicted in Peshawar for illegal
confinement and rape of a woman. They are appealing the
conviction. In an effort to reduce police abuse of women, in
the final 3 months of 1993 the new Government of Prime Minister
Bhutto announced plans to open "women's police stations"
staffed by female personnel. As of year's end, one women's
police station had been opened in Rawalpindi.
There continued to be credible reports that some ethnic
political parties tortured opponents and, in some cases, used
torture to enforce party discipline among their own members.
There were credible reports that the dissident rival faction of
the MQM tortured some members of the mainline MQM.
The Hadood Ordinances, promulgated by the central Government in
1979, were an attempt to make Pakistan's Penal Code more
Islamic. These Ordinances provide harsh "hadd" punishments for
violating the Islamic Code of Behavior, including stoning to
death for unlawful sexual relations and the amputation of limbs
for other crimes. In practice, the standards of evidence for
imposing these punishments are exceptionally high, and to date
they have never been carried out. Nonetheless, these laws
apply to Muslims and non-Muslims alike, and weigh most heavily
on women. A woman who reports a case of rape to the
authorities or files for a divorce can find herself charged
with adultery under these ordinances. All consensual
extramarital sexual relations are considered violations of the
Hadood Ordinances. The predominantly male police force
reportedly uses the Hadood Ordinances to threaten people on the
basis of personal and political animosities. Some human rights
monitors believe that international pressure and publicity
surrounding the Hadood Ordinances have reduced the number of
Hadood cases. They report that, in contrast to past years,
women are now frequently granted bail for Hadood offenses, and
convictions have been markedly reduced.
Three classes of prison facilities exist. Class "c" cells
generally hold common criminals. They often have dirt floors,
no furnishings, and poor food. The use of handcuffs and
fetters is common. Prisoners in these cells reportedly suffer
the most abuse, such as beatings and being forced to kneel for
long periods. Conditions in "b" and "a" cells are markedly
better, with the latter reserved for "prominent" persons.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
Pakistani Law permits the Deputy Commissioner (DC) of a local
district to order detention without charge for 30 days for
persons suspected of threatening public order and safety. This
preventive detention is renewable by the DC for 30 days at a
time, up to a total of 90 days. For other alleged criminal
offenses, a suspect may be held for 24 hours by police without
charge. If the police can provide material proof that the
physical detention of the accused is necessary to conduct the
investigation, the court may extend detention without charges
to a total of 15 days. In practice, laws on detention are not
strictly observed. Police often hold prisoners without charge
until challenged by the court and then release them if they do
not have a case. The police are not required to notify anyone
when an arrest is made. There are allegations that the police
sometimes detain citizens arbitrarily without charge or on
false charges in order to extort payment for their release.
The law on pretrial detention has recently been amended to
require that suspects be brought to trial within 30 days of
their arrest. However, in a case without complications, a
trial will ususally commence about 6 months after the initial
filing of charges. Family and lawyers are legally permitted to
visit inmates. In practice this access is generally granted.
The Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) have a separate
legal system, the Frontier Crimes Regulation (FCR), which
recognizes the doctrine of "collective responsibility." Under
the FCR, legal procedures provide that fellow tribesmen of a
suspect may be indefinitely detained or the village blockaded
by the Government pending surrender or punishment of the
suspect by the tribe. Such authority continued to be exercised
in 1993; in one case, over 40 members of the Afridi tribe were
detained within the settled districts due to attacks by other
Afridi tribesmen against a government road project.
The Sindh provincial government detained hundreds of MQM Party
workers and linked them to unsolved criminal cases, often with
little evidence. Many of the PPP workers who were arrested in
1992 have been granted bail while they await trial on criminal
counts. Some 200 political activists are still being held in
Sindh.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
Pakistan's judicial system involves several different court
systems with overlapping and, in some instances, competing
jurisdictions. There are civil and criminal tracks with
special courts for high-profile cases and the federal Shari'a
appeals courts for certain Hadood offenses. The progression in
the civil legal system is: civil court, district court, high
court, and Supreme Court. The progression in the criminal
system is: magistrate, sessions court, high court, and Supreme
Court. The special courts were created to handle sensational
cases or cases of great public interest. Such cases are
referred to the special courts by the Federal Government. The
Federal Shari'a court and the Shari'a bench of the Supreme
Court serve as appeals courts for certain convictions in the
criminal court under the Hadood Ordinances. In addition, the
Federal Shari'a court may and does overturn legislation if it
is not consistent with the tenets of Islam. However, these
cases may be and are appealed to the Shari'a bench of the
Supreme Court.
The courts traditionally experience pressure from the
executive. Critics point to the President's power to transfer
high court justices or to decline to grant new appointees
tenure as devices that provide the executive undue influence
over the provincial high courts and especially over the lower
levels of the judicial system, the special terrorist courts,
and the so-called "speedy courts." Judges in the special
courts are retired jurists who are hired on renewable contracts
and many of whose decisions are influenced by their desire to
maintain their position. However, the provincial high courts
and the Supreme Court exhibited independence, deciding a number
of important cases against the Government. For example, the
Court ruled that President Ghulam Ishaq Khan's dismissal of
Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif was unconstitutional (see Section
3). Nevertheless, the judicial process continued to be impeded
by bureaucratic infighting and inactivity and the overlapping
jurisdictions of the different court systems. The creation of
the "speedy courts" to speed up the judiciary system has not
significantly eased the backlog of cases. Scores of positions
in the lower magistracy remained unfilled. Persons in jail
awaiting trial often are held for periods longer than the
sentence they would receive if convicted. This problem is
especially acute among Africans and citizens of other South
Asian countries jailed for having overstayed their visas or for
being involved in the drug trade.
The civil judicial system provides for an open trial,
cross-examination, representation by an attorney, and appeal of
sentences. Attorneys are appointed for indigents only in
capital cases. There are no jury trials. Owing to the limited
number of judges, the heavy backlog of cases, and outdated
court procedures, cases routinely drag on for years. In both
the Hadood and standard criminal codes there are bailable and
nonbailable offenses. According to the criminal procedures
code, the accused in bailable offenses must be granted bail and
the accused in "nonbailable" offenses should be granted bail if
accused of a crime where the sentence is less than 10 years.
In July the 1992 presidential ordinance revoking the statutory
right to bail in cases where trials proved lengthy was allowed
to lapse without being renewed. However, human rights groups
credibly complain that bail is set, often purposely, at
unreasonably high levels for indigent defendants.
A 1990 Shari'a court decision resulted in the Islamic concepts
of Qisas (roughly an "eye for an eye") and Diyat ("blood
money") being made part of the Penal Code, through the Qisas
and Diyat Ordinance. The ordinance allows compensation to be
paid to a victim's family in lieu of the accused receiving
punishment. As a result, wealthy or influential persons can
often escape punishment for such crimes as murder and assault.
In one case, a convicted murderer received no punishment
because he paid blood money to the victim's family, while his
accomplices received sentences of life in prison. The right to
seek pardon or commutation is not available to defendants under
the ordinance. The Hadood, Qisas, and Diyat ordinances apply
to both ordinary criminal courts and Shari'a courts. Appeals
of certain Hadood convictions involving penalties in excess of
2 years' imprisonment are referred exclusively to the Shari'a
courts.
Under the Hadood Ordinances, evidence for cases involving the
harsh "hadd" punishments (see Section 1.c.) is given different
weight depending on the religion and sex of the witness. A
non-Muslim may not serve as a witness against a Muslim
offender, but may offer testimony against another non-Muslim.
Testimony of females is not admissible for the awarding of
"hadd" punishments (as prescribed in the Koran, e.g.,
amputation, stoning, and lashes). In cases involving financial
matters, the testimony of two women is required for the
evidence to be admissible. The evidential laws that apply to
awarding the lesser "tazeer" punishments are roughly based on
English common law.
There continued to be charges that magistrates and police,
under pressure to achieve high conviction rates, persuade
persons in custody to plead guilty without informing them of
the consequences. Politically powerful persons also attempt to
influence magistrates' decisions and have used various forms of
pressure, including the threat of transfer, to do so.
Magistrates also perform a wide variety of administrative
functions for the provincial governments, reducing the time
they devote to their judicial duties.
Administration of justice in the Federally Administered Tribal
Areas (FATA) is normally the responsibility of the elders and
maliks (appointed leaders) of individual tribes who, in
response to complaints, conduct public hearings according to
the dictates of Islamic law and tribal custom. There is no
professional legal representation for the accused, no provision
for bail, and no appeal. The usual penalties consist of fines,
even for murder, although the Government's political agents
directing the assemblies of elders and maliks (jirgas) have the
authority to levy prison terms of up to 14 years. In more
remote areas outside the effective jurisdiction of the
political agents, jirgas occasionally levy harsher,
unsanctioned punishments, including flogging or death by
shooting or stoning. A photograph of a public flogging in the
tribal areas was prominently featured in a local paper in
September. The accused received five lashes for selling and
using heroin. Paramilitary forces under the direction of the
political agents frequently perform punitive actions during
enforcement operations. For example, in raids on criminal
activities the authorities have been known to damage
surrounding homes as extrajudicial punishment of residents for
having tolerated nearby criminal activity.
Cases referred to the Federal Shari'a court are heard jointly
by Islamic scholars and high court judges using ordinary
criminal procedures. Cases referred to the Shari'a bench of
the Supreme Court are heard jointly by Islamic scholars and
Supreme Court judges using ordinary criminal procedures.
Judges and attorneys must be Muslim and be familiar with
Islamic law. Within these limits, defendants in the Shari'a
court are entitled to a lawyer of their choice. If accused of
a bailable offense, defendants in the Shari'a court are
entitled to bail and may be granted bail for nonbailable
offenses, as noted above.
The Suppression of Terrorist Activities (Special Courts) Act of
1975 established special courts to try cases involving crimes
of a "terrorist" nature (e.g., murder and sabotage)
expeditiously. In 1987 another ordinance was passed
establishing special "speedy trial" courts to circumvent the
judicial backlog. The Twelfth Constitutional Amendment, passed
by Parliament in July 1991, created another tier of special
courts to deal with particularly heinous crimes. Cases
involving bomb blasts, sabotage, highway robberies, banditry,
or kidnaping may be brought before these three types of special
courts, and the Government may transfer cases from any other
court to one of the special courts, or from one special court
to another (within the same province).
In 1991 the President promulgated new versions of the Terrorist
Affected Areas (Special Courts) Ordinance and the Special
Courts for Speedy Trials Ordinance which made referring cases
to special courts the exclusive domain of the Federal
Government. Each special court has a list of scheduled
offenses over which it has jurisdiction. For the "speedy
courts," the criteria is that the case is sensational or has
received widespread public attention. This determination is
made by the Federal Government. The ordinances also
established that an appeal to a speedy court ruling goes to the
Supreme Appellate Court rather than to the high courts. In
addition, the Government may refer a broader range of cases
involving violent criminal offenses to the special courts.
Many legal experts believe the special courts do not provide
for a fair trial. Time constraints on investigations and
trials, including the strict limitation on adjournments,
detract from the accused's right to an adequate defense. Some
critics contend that the special courts' procedures have
effectively repudiated the presumption of innocence. They also
cite the encroachment of the federal authorities upon the
provincial government's constitutional authority to administer
justice and the inherent unfairness of parallel courts to which
cases may be assigned arbitrarily. Another problem faced by
those brought to trial under the special courts is obtaining
bail. Under the special courts' provisions, bail is denied if
it appears to the court that it is reasonable to believe the
accused committed a scheduled offense.
Government officials and some attorneys argue that, in spite of
their shortcomings, the special courts are necessary due to the
judicial backlog. They also claim that all requirements of the
rules of evidence still apply, the accused has the right to
counsel, and the judges must meet the same standards as those
appointed to a high court. They note that decisions of the
speedy trial courts may be appealed. However, for these courts
only one appeal is allowed and it may only be made through a
special appellate bench appointed by the Government. In late
1993, the Bhutto Government announced that it would not refer
any new cases to the special courts and would allow the
constitutional authority for special courts to lapse in July
1994.
In 1990 President Ghulam Ishaq Khan, after dissolving the
Bhutto government, established special "accountability"
tribunals to try members of previous federal and provincial
governments on criminal and corruption charges. However, only
members of the Bhutto government, all of whom belong to the
PPP, were charged with corruption and misconduct. No members
of other political parties were ever brought to trial. Trials
under these tribunals continued in 1993, although bail had been
granted in all cases. International observers maintain that
the accountability tribunals have not met the minimum standards
for due process needed to ensure fair trials and that the trial
procedures prevented the accused from presenting a full
defense. Some Pakistani attorneys and judges, however,
maintain that the actual conduct of the tribunals has been
balanced and fair. In early 1993, bail was granted to Asif
Zardari, husband of Benazir Bhutto, in his accountability and
criminal cases. At year's end, Zardari was still under trial
in one remaining accountability case. He has been acquitted in
the 12 other cases. In the remaining "Presidential reference"
cases, most notably the seven against Prime Minister Benazir
Bhutto and the appeal of the conviction of former Law Minister
Iftikhar Gilani, there was no movement in 1993. These cases
remain before the accountability tribunals.
There are individuals in Pakistan imprisoned for attempting to
exercise their human rights, including those charged with
blasphemy, and some political workers who may be imprisoned on
trumped-up charges. In addition, there are others who were
convicted in trials which may not have been fair. While it is
not possible to cite a specific number, it is likely that the
number of political prisoners could be as many as a few hundred
(see appendix A for the definition of "political prisoner") at
year's end.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
Police are required by law to obtain a warrant from a
magistrate to search a house. (No warrant is required to
search a person.) However, police often enter a home without a
warrant. In the absence of a warrant, a policeman is subject
to charges of criminal trespass. In practice, policemen are
seldom, if ever, punished for illegal entry. Pakistan
maintains several domestic intelligence services which monitor
politicians, political activists, suspected terrorists, and
suspected foreign intelligence agents. Informed sources
maintain that wiretapping is commonplace, mail is occasionally
intercepted and opened, and surveillance is often used.
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
The Constitution provides for freedom of speech and the press.
Pakistanis are generally free to discuss and debate public
policy issues. However, some laws restrict free speech, such
as laws against bringing Islam or the armed forces into
discredit or ridicule and the Shari'a bill signed by the
President in 1991, which calls for promoting Islam through the
mass media and the censoring of "objectionable" and "obscene"
material. In addition, the Pakistan Penal Code mandates the
death sentence for anyone convicted of blaspheming the Prophet
Muhammad. Most of those accused of blasphemy are Ahmadis or
Christians. Two persons have been convicted of blasphemy and
sentenced to death. Their cases are on appeal. (See Section
2.c.)
The press enjoys a high degree of freedom, but some
restrictions apply. A government-owned press trust still
controls two newspapers, an English-language daily and an Urdu
daily. One of the two main wire services is controlled by the
Ministry of Information, the other is privately owned. There
are numerous privately owned newspapers, and their circulation
far exceeds that of the government-owned newspapers.
There was relatively free discussion of government policies and
open criticism of the Government in the privately owned press.
The press routinely reports remarks critical of the Government
made by opposition politicians, and editorials reflect a broad
spectrum of views. Government newspapers and wire services,
however, are circumspect in their coverage of the news and
generally follow the government line. Press criticism of the
military is usually circumspect.
The Constitution provides for the death penalty for those who
damage the Constitution by any act, including publishing
statements against the spirit of the Constitution. Reporters
and editors generally exercise self-censorship in these areas.
However, the Government exploits the privately owned
newspapers' dependence on government advertising, an important
source of revenue for them, as a way of influencing editorial
policy. The duty-free importation of newsprint is also
controlled by the Government, nominally on the basis of a
newspaper's circulation. Journalists complain that newspapers
that criticize the Government are provided less than their due
and must pay market prices to make up the difference.
Incidents of harassment of individual journalists, including a
spate of burglaries at journalists' homes, occurred in 1993,
though the incidence was less than in previous years. The
Sharif government harassed news organizations that criticized
it, primarily by using the tax laws to threaten foreclosure.
Two prominent newspapers had substantial tax bills levied
against them far in excess of the taxes levied on other
newspapers with comparable tax liabilities. The cases were
reportedly resolved when the news organizations agreed to
change editorial content and transfer some personnel.
The Government owns and operates all radio and all but one
semiprivate television station and strictly controls the news
they carry. The Shalimar Television Network (STN), a
semiprivate television station, provides programs with
considerable independence from government oversight. STN began
broadcasting Cable News Network (CNN) programs in 1990; CNN is
shown live, but segments considered socially offensive are
censored by the Government. Satellite television reception,
which has become increasingly widespread, is not subject to
censorship or scrambling. During the first half of 1993, the
Sharif government severely limited the amount of coverage given
to opposition activities during government-controlled news
broadcasts. In contrast, the news broadcasts during the tenure
of the two caretaker governments displayed greater
objectivity. Nevertheless, many media watchers complain the
government-controlled media continues to avoid reporting on
controversial domestic subjects.
After passage of the Shari'a law, there was a significant
increase in censorship of "objectionable material" on
television, which continued in 1993. The Ministry of
Information keeps close watch on advertisements broadcast by
STN, editing or removing those deemed objectionable.
Conservative religious and political groups have been active in
promoting their own code of morality for Pakistani society.
The Shari'a bill's passage in 1991 bolstered these groups'
efforts by placing greater pressure on individuals to conform
to Islamic sensibilities. In early 1993, there was a campaign
by religious groups and provincial governments to crack down on
"obscene" video cassettes. While no guidelines were
established on obscene material, media reports stated that
thousands of video cassettes were destroyed by police officials
and over 100 persons were arrested. Some were reportedly
sentenced to several years imprisonment.
However, literary and creative works remain generally free of
censorship. Obscene literature, a category broadly defined by
the Government, is subject to seizure. Authorities have
occasionally banned or confiscated books and magazines dealing
with sensitive political topics. A bookstore in Islamabad was
raided and temporarily closed by police on December 18
following reports that the store was selling the book
"Encyclopedia of Religion," which allegedly contains remarks
offensive to Islam and images of the prophet Mohammad. The
Muslim owner was charged with blasphemy under Section 295 C of
the Penal Code. The case was pending at year's end. However,
dramas and documentaries on once taboo subjects, including
corruption, social privilege, narcotics, violence against
women, and female inequality, are now shown on Pakistani
television.
A Print, Press, and Publications Ordinance requires the
registration of printing presses and newspapers and allows the
Government to confiscate newspapers or magazines deemed
objectionable. Foreign books must pass government censors
before being reprinted, although the importation of the books
is freely allowed. Publications are occasionally banned,
usually for objectionable religious content or political
views. The provincial government of Balochistan banned two
books which allegedly promoted secessionist political movements.
Academic freedom is generally recognized by government and
university authorities. The atmosphere of violence and
intolerance fostered by student organizations, typically tied
to political parties, is a threat to academic freedom. On
campuses, well-armed groups of students of varying political
persuasions clash frequently and intimidate other students,
instructors, and administrators on matters of language,
syllabus, examination policies, doctrine, and dress.
Human rights groups remain concerned about the implementation
of a 1992 Supreme Court ruling that prohibits student political
organizations on campuses. While they acknowledge the ruling
led to a reduction in violence on campuses in 1993, they
question the legality of school officials determining guilt or
innocence and expelling students they find guilty of belonging
to a political organization.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
Peaceful assembly was generally permitted. District
magistrates occasionally exercised their power under Section
144 of the criminal procedure code to ban meetings of more than
four people when demonstrations seemed likely to result in
violence. This provision was invoked frequently and
arbitrarily in Sindh Province during the first half of 1993.
Political parties had to apply for special permission to hold
any outdoor political rallies. The Sindh government during
this period tended to allow its supporters to hold rallies and
to block its opponents from doing so. Section 144 was also
applied by the national and provincial interim governments in
numerous locations throughout Pakistan during the fall general
election campaign. While imposition of Section 144 may not
have been necessary in every instance to maintain security,
there is no indication that the interim governments applied
section 144 in a biased manner. When it was imposed in Karachi
during the election campaign, for example, rallies of all major
parties were banned.
Most political leaders were able to travel freely and address
large rallies; however, leaders of politico-religious parties
were sometimes barred from travel to certain areas if their
presence was deemed likely to increase sectarian tensions.
Article 17 of the Constitution provides for freedom of
association subject to restrictions by government ordinance and
law. There have been no recent cases of banned groups or
parties.
c. Freedom of Religion
Pakistan is an Islamic republic with a population that is 97
percent Muslim. The Constitution requires all laws to be
consistent with Islam. With notable exceptions (see below),
members of minority groups may practice their own religion
openly, maintain links with coreligionists in other countries,
and travel for religious purposes. Conversions are permitted,
but the Government prohibits proselytizing among Muslims.
Minority groups fear that the 1991 Shari'a law's goal of
"Islamizing" all aspects of Pakistan's government and society
may further restrict freedom to practice their religion. The
religious legislation has encouraged an atmosphere of religious
intolerance which has led to acts of violence directed at
Ahmadis and Christians. For example, in 1993 a landlord from
Sindh province bulldozed over 30 homes, a church, and a school,
destroying a 30-year old Christian village, rather than wait
for a civil court's order in a land dispute. No action had
been taken against the landlord as of the year's end.
A 1974 constitutional amendment declared Ahmadis to be a
non-Muslim minority because they do not accept Muhammad as the
last prophet of Islam. The Ahmadis, however, look on
themselves as Muslims, for whom many Muslim practices are an
important feature of their religion. In 1984 the Government
inserted Section 298(c) into the Pakistan Penal Code which made
it illegal for an Ahmadi to call himself a Muslim and banned
Ahmadis from using Muslim terminology. The punishment is up to
3 years' imprisonment and a fine. Section 298(c) has been used
since 1984 to harass Ahmadis. According to an Ahmadi rights
organization, as of the end of 1992 at least 2,133 Ahmadis had
criminal cases brought against them, most of which were still
pending before the courts. New cases were brought during 1993.
Attacks on Ahmadi places of worship continued in 1993. On June
20 three youths attempted to set fire to an Ahmadi house of
worship in Lahore while Ahmadi elders were praying there. The
incident was reported to the police, but no action was taken.
In 1986 legislation was passed inserting Section 295(c) into
the Pakistan Penal Code, making blaspheming the Prophet
Muhammad a capital offense. The law was apparently aimed at
Ahmadis but has been increasingly used against Christians and
Muslims as well. In 1992 the Senate unanimously adopted a bill
to amend the blasphemy law so that the death penalty is
mandatory in cases of conviction for defiling the name of the
prophet Muhammad, and in 1993 a bill was introduced to extend
the law to include defiling the names of the Prophet Muhammad's
family and companions. The latter bill, generally supported by
anti-Shi'a groups as a means of persecuting the Shia's, had yet
to be acted upon. According to a respected Pakistani human
rights organization, since 1986, 107 Ahmadis have been charged
with blasphemy under section 295(c) in at least 25 separate
cases. As of the end of 1993, there had been no convictions.
One case had been dropped, and two persons had been acquitted.
At least four Ahmadis were charged with blasphemy in 1993.
Eight Christians have reportedly been charged with blasphemy.
Two other Christians were stabbed to death by their accusers
without formally being charged. Of those charged before 1993,
Tahir Iqbal died under mysterious circumstances in jail in 1992
while awaiting trial, Gul Masih was convicted in 1992 and his
appeal was still pending, and Sarwar Masih was still awaiting
trial. One individual was acquitted in January but remains in
fear for his life from local religious groups. Four of the
eight were charged in 1993. In one case, three Christians were
arrested in May and accused of writing blasphemous words on a
mosque wall in violation of Section 295(c). One of those
accused was Salamat Masih, a 13-year-old illiterate boy.
Salamat was released on 50,000 rupees bail ($1,666) on November
8. At year's end, the two adults remain in prison. In another
case, Anwar Yaqoob Masih was charged with blasphemy following
an argument with a shopkeeper over 1 rupee (less than 4 cents)
worth of candy. When the shopkeeper, who was a friend of Anwar
Masih, refused to press charges, a local Muslim religious
leader filed the charges instead.
The most prominent case of a Muslim charged with blasphemy is
that of Dr. Akhtar Hameed Khan, a noted social worker, who was
charged with blasphemy in both Sindh and Punjab provinces. In
1992 charges were dropped in Sindh. However, the charges were
not dropped in Punjab, and at the end of the year he remained
subject to arrest in that province.
Three Muslims are known to have been charged with blasphemy in
1993. Mohammad Arshad Javed was convicted of blasphemy and
sentenced to death in February, despite being found insane by
two government-appointed doctors. His case has been appealed
to the Lahore High Court.
In late 1992, the Supreme Court issued a ruling favorable to
the Ahmadis by granting bail to members of an Ahmadi family
accused of using Islamic expressions on wedding invitations.
In its ruling, the Court observed that use of Islamic
expressions by Ahmadis "does not create in a Muslim, or for
that matter anyone else, any of the feelings of hurt, offence
or provocation, nor is it derogatory to the holy Prophet
Muhammad."
In 1993, however, the Supreme Court ruled against the Ahmadis
in a major case regarding the constitutionality of Section
298(c). Rejecting the argument that it violated the
fundamental rights of freedom of speech and freedom of religion
guaranteed in the Constitution, the Court upheld the law. The
judge writing for the majority found that Islamic phrases are
in essence a copyrighted trademark of the Islamic religion.
Therefore, use of the Islamic epithets by Ahmadis was
equivalent to copyright infringement and violated the Trademark
Act of 1940. The majority also found that use of certain
Islamic phrases was equivalent to blasphemy. Ahmadis and some
human rights monitors fear the Supreme Court judgment upholding
the law will lead to more cases being brought against Ahmadis
and possibly more rapid convictions.
Pakistani passports carry a designation of religion which the
Ahmadis find especially vexing. Ahmadis are classified as
"non-Muslims" on their passports, leading Saudi authorities to
prevent them from performing the religious pilgrimage, the
hajj. Despite having issued an order in 1992 requiring that a
similar designation be included on the national identity card,
the Government did not submit implementing legislation in
1993. Although the order has not been formally withdrawn,
widespread protests in 1992 appeared to have persuaded the
Government to abandon the proposal, which is a longstanding
demand of fundamentalist religious parties.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
Pakistanis generally enjoy freedom of movement within the
country and to travel abroad. The Government occasionally
prohibits movement of individuals within Pakistan through
"externment orders" when it believes their presence will lead
to a threat to public order. Travel to Israel is legally
prohibited. Pakistanis succeed in traveling to Jerusalem for
religious purposes. Government employees must obtain "no
objection certificates" before traveling abroad. Students are
also required to have these certificates from their
institutions. The Sharif government briefly used the exit
control list during 1993 to prohibit the travel of political
opponents. The prohibitions were lifted following the
dismissal of the Sharif government in July. In November the
Bhutto Government also placed restrictions on the exit of
certain businessmen involved in an investment scandal. The
exit control list continues to be used against serious
criminals.
With the exception of those on the exit control lists,
Pakistanis have and regularly exercise the right to emigrate.
More than 3 million Afghans fled to Pakistan as a result of the
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the ensuing civil war
there. The movement and employment of Afghans in Pakistan has
generally not been restricted, and many Afghans reside outside
the camps set aside for them in the Northwest Frontier Province
(NWFP), Punjab, and Balochistan. With the change of government
in Kabul in 1992, over a million Afghans returned to their
homes. Repatriation continued in 1993, although at a much
lower rate. The outbreak of new fighting in Kabul in early
1993 among different factions of the Government sparked a new
flow of thousands of refugees into Pakistan. Despite its
reluctance in August 1992 to accept new refugees, the
Government subsequently allowed as many as 80,000 new refugees
to enter Pakistan.
Approximately 1.4 million Afghan refugees remain in Pakistan,
where they have greater security, more economic opportunities,
social welfare benefits, and a better human rights situation
than in Afghanistan. Security concerns among the refugees,
including intraparty rivalries that mirrored the unsettled
conditions in Afghanistan, have improved as the political
parties focused their energies on disputes inside Afghanistan.
There has also been an improvement in the access of women and
girls to education and health care as group leaders gradually
begin to accept the benefits of these services. Nevertheless,
life in the camps can be frustrating. The many refugees who
have found employment are outside of the limited security net
provided by Pakistani labor laws. The refugees have limited
access to legal protection and are for the most part dependent
on group leaders to negotiate disputes in Pakistani society and
within their own society.
Hundreds of illegal Bangladeshi immigrants are held in prisons
throughout Pakistan, charged with immigration violations.
Almost all of these detainees are without the documents
necessary to prove Bangladeshi citizenship. Many of the women
are alleged to be in Pakistan as a result of trafficking in
women for purposes of prostitution, and some are detained under
the Hadood Ordinances. The Government, with the help of the
Bangladesh Government, took steps in 1990 to document and
repatriate some of these Bangladeshis, but the influx
continues, and few are able or willing to return to
Bangladesh. Many are released from jail into the custody of
their exploiters, and the cycle repeats itself.
The repatriation to Pakistan of the Biharis (Urdu-speaking
immigrants from the Indian state of Bihar who went to East
Pakistan, now Bangladesh, at the time of partition in 1947)
continued to be a contentious issue. Approximately 250,000
Biharis have been in refugee camps in Bangladesh since 1971,
waiting to be brought to Pakistan. Their repatriation
continues to be a Pakistani political issue tied to the
country's various ethnic problems. While the Mohajir
community, made up of Pakistanis who emigrated from India
during partition, actively supports Bihari repatriation, ethnic
Sindhis oppose the move. In 1992 the Government of Pakistan
announced that repatriation of the Biharis would begin. In
January 342 Biharis were flown to Pakistan and placed in
temporary housing in central Punjab. No further repatriation
occurred in 1993.
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government
The citizens of Pakistan have the right and the ability to
change their government peacefully. The President, who is
indirectly elected, is given the power to dissolve the
Government by Amendment 8 to the Constitution. This
controversial authority was used twiceduring 1993 by former
President Ghulam Ishaq Khan. In April the President dissolved
the Government, but his decision was overturned by the Supreme
Court. In July the President again dissolved the Government,
this time at the Prime Minister's request, in a political
compromise which allowed for new elections in October. The
national and provincial assembly elections held on October 6
and 9 were seen by both international and domestic observers to
have been relatively free and fair. Although some losing
candidates alleged voter manipulation and fraud, they failed to
produce compelling evidence. Election observers documented
several problems, however, including outdated and poorly
prepared electoral rolls which disenfranchised some legitimate
voters while allowing some fraudulent voting to take place.
Some individuals were arrested and summarily fined for
violating election laws on polling day. Despite these isolated
incidents, there is no compelling evidence that vote
manipulation changed the outcome of the elections in any
constituencies. Following the elections, in which the Pakistan
People's Party (PPP) won a plurality of seats in the National
Assembly, Benazir Bhutto was elected Prime Minister. In the
November 13 indirect presidential elections, PPP-supported
candidate Farooq Leghari was selected President.
With certain exceptions, Pakistanis aged 21 and over have the
right to vote by secret ballot. In August the National
Election Commission informed a human rights organization that
bonded laborers and nomads, of which there are several million,
are not qualified to be registered voters because they do not
"ordinarily reside in an electoral area, nor do they
own/possess a dwelling or immovable property in that area."
Political parties have been allowed to operate freely since the
lifting of martial law in 1985 and 1986, and in 1988 the
Supreme Court struck down a law banning unregistered political
parties from participating in elections.
Local governments and the provincial and national assemblies
are directly elected. The Senate is elected by the members of
the four provincial assemblies. The President is indirectly
elected by an electoral college consisting of the members of
the national and provincial assemblies and the Senate. The
Constitution provides that members of the national and
provincial assemblies shall serve terms of 5 years, unless the
Assembly is dissolved. The Senate is not subject to
dissolution by the President. The President is elected every 5
years and senators are elected for 6-year terms.
The more than 2 million Pushtun ethnic people living in the
FATA do not participate in direct election of their National
Assembly representatives and have no representation in the NWFP
provincial assembly. In keeping with local traditions, FATA's
National Assembly members are elected by the tribal maliks who
have been appointed in the NWFP Governor's name by the central
Government's political agents. People living in this area have
expressed dissatisfaction at having no representation in any
legislature. The vast majority of Pushtun ethnic people,
however, live outside the FATA and, while retaining their
tribal identity, are fully integrated into the political,
social, and economic life of Pakistan.
Because of a longstanding territorial dispute with India, the
political status of the Northern Areas (Hunza, Gilgit, and
Baltistan) has never been resolved. As a result, more than 1
million inhabitants of the Northern Areas are not covered under
any constitution and have no representation in the national
Government. The area is administered by a civil servant
appointed by the Government of Pakistan. While there is an
elected Northern Areas Council, this body serves in an advisory
capacity to the Federal Government and has no legislative
authority. The people of this region do not enjoy the
democratic right to change their government. In 1993 the Azad
Jammu and Kashmir (AJK) High Court ruled that the Northern
Areas should be incorporated into the semiautonomous state of
Azad Jammu and Kashmir and its citizens be given a right to be
represented in the AJK legislative assembly. The Federal
Government is appealing the ruling to the Supreme Court of the
AJK.
On May 5, by-elections were held in Sindh Province to fill 20
vacant provincial assembly seats. The MQM, an urban-based
party in Sindh, boycotted the elections because it alleged the
provincial government and army prevented it from campaigning
openly. Partly as a result of the MQM's boycott, there was
only a 5 percent voter turnout in the by-elections in Karachi
and Hyderabad.
The Constitution requires that the President and Prime Minister
be Muslims. Members of minority religious groups are not
permitted to vote in Muslim constituencies. They must cast
their ballots in countrywide, at-large constituencies reserved
for them in the national and provincial assemblies, an
arrangement that has been widely criticized. Many Ahmadis,
disputing their designation as non-Muslims, have refused to
exercise this option. Minorities, especially Christians and
Hindus, complain that this system of separate electorates has
marginalized their voting power, allowing the local Muslim
candidates to ignore them as a voting block. As a result,
minority areas receive significantly less development funds and
other government assistance.
Although women participate in government, as evidenced by Prime
Minister Bhutto, gender roles make it difficult for most of
them to succeed in politics, and women are underrepresented in
political life at all levels. At the federal level, the
statute creating 20 reserved seats for women in the National
Assembly lapsed in 1990, and its renewal was not supported by
the Government then led by Benazir Bhutto. In 1993 the Senate
Standing Committee on Women's Development recommended the
restoration of the reserved women's seats. Despite statements
by the Sharif government that the seats would be restored, no
legislation was submitted. In the October elections, only 11
women were nominated by the political parties to stand as
candidates for general seats in the National Assembly and of
these only 4 were elected.
Some women are often dissuaded from voting in elections by
family, religious, and social custom in the rural areas of
Pakistan. In some areas, women are discouraged from voting by
the authorities' failure to provide separate voting facilities
for women who observe "purdah" (seclusion of women from public
observation) restrictions. The lack of women's polling booths
is a very limited problem and contrary to government policy.
However, where it occurs it may represent a deliberate attempt
by local officials in very traditional areas to discourage
women from voting.
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
of Human Rights
There are a number of domestic human rights organizations, and
new human rights and legal aid groups continue to form and are
generally free to operate without government restriction.
Their reports receive extensive coverage in the press. There
was, however, one reported incident of official harassment of a
human rights organizations. In March federal security agents
raided the Lahore headquarters of the Human Rights Commission
of Pakistan (HRCP), a leading nongovernmental human rights
organization. The security agents detained several staff
members, including the director, and confiscated posters
critical of President Ghulam Ishaq Khan. No charges were
brought against HRCP members, nor were any of the federal
security agents involved in the incident disciplined. The
local police and civil authorities deny any knowledge of the
raid.
In 1993 the Senate formed a permanent committee on human rights
to advise the Government on various aspects of human rights,
including child and bonded labor, women's issues, and abuse of
prisoners. The committee has yet to take any specific action.
Persons affiliated with various international human rights
organizations have been permitted to visit Pakistan and travel
freely.
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Disability, Language, or Social Status
Women
In 1991 the Government passed the Shari'a Bill, a law aimed at
bringing all aspects of government and society in Pakistan into
conformity with the tenets of Islam. Human rights monitors and
women's groups feared that the law would have a harmful effect
on women's and minority rights. The final version included
language ensuring that women's and minority rights protected
under the Constitution would not be affected. No enabling
legislation has been passed, and the Shari'a law's direct
impact on these groups remained limited. Nonetheless, its
passage influenced popular attitudes and perceptions,
contributing to an atmosphere in which discriminatory treatment
against women and non-Muslims is more readily accepted.
Aside from the specific Shari'a legislation, some Islamic
leaders continued to stress a conservative interpretation of
Islamic injunctions to justify discrimination against women.
Many Pakistanis interpret the Koran's injunctions on modesty to
mean that women should remain either at home or veiled. It
remains accepted practice to assign women subordinate roles in
the civil, political, and managerial hierarchies.
Despite clear injunctions in the Koran and the civil laws that
provide for the right of women to inherit, in practice women
generally do not receive (or are pressed to surrender) their
due share in family inheritance. In rural Pakistan the
practice of a woman "marrying the Koran" is still widely
accepted if her family cannot arrange a suitable marriage or to
keep the family wealth intact. A woman who is married to the
Koran is forbidden to have any contact with males, including
her immediate family members, over 14 years of age. A petition
filed in a Lahore court in 1992 challenging the practice has
yet to be heard. Both civil and religious laws protect women's
rights in cases of divorce, but, as in the case of inheritance
laws, many women are unaware of them, and often the laws are
not observed.
In 1992 the Supreme Court invalidated the requirement that a
husband give written notice of a divorce to a local union
council. Thus, the husband's statement of divorce, with or
without witnesses, is the defining legal step and one which he
can confirm or deny at will. The woman, lacking written proof
of divorce, remains legally and socially vulnerable. Human
rights organizations expressed concern that a woman could be
charged with adultery if her former spouse were to deny having
divorced her. This occurred in February, when a district and
sessions court sentenced Nasreen Bibi to be stoned to death and
sentenced her second husband to 100 lashes when her first
husband denied divorcing her. Upon appeal, the Federal Shari'a
court acquitted both Bibi and her husband because there was
sufficient evidence to prove they had entered into marriage in
the belief that Bibi was divorced.
Although a small number of women study and teach in the
universities, postgraduate employment opportunities remain
largely limited to teaching, medical services, and the law.
Nevertheless, an increasing number of women are entering the
commercial and public sectors. Karachi lawyers estimate that
the number of women judges in civil courts there has increased
to about 30 percent of the total. There are reports that women
who apply to professional colleges face discrimination. Women
may now participate in international athletic competition,
although few do.
In rural areas, women in small farm families generally work
alongside men in the fields. However, they remain subordinate
to men and suffer discrimination in education, employment, and
legal rights.
There is no reliable information on the extent of domestic
violence against women in Pakistan, primarily because it is
viewed as a private matter, and many women do not even
acknowledge domestic violence as a serious problem. While
abusive spouses may be charged under Pakistani law for assault,
in practice cases are rarely filed. Police usually return to
her abuser a victim who tries to file a complaint. Legal
experts report there have been no reported convictions of men
for domestic violence.
Rape is a widespread problem in Pakistan. Marital rape is not
a crime under Pakistani law, and rape of a another man's wife
is a common method of seeking revenge in rural and tribal
areas. A nongovernmental organization called War Against Rape
(WAR), which is dedicated to publicizing the problem and
providing victim assistance, reported that, in 1992, 1,300
cases of rape were filed in Punjab province. They
conservatively estimate that, because of social and family
pressures against reporting rape, the actual number of rapes is
at least four times that number . A WAR study of 60 publicly
reported rape cases in Lahore during January found that police
officials were allegedly implicated in nearly 20 percent of
these cases. Police are frequently unresponsive in
investigating rape cases, especially when police officials are
implicated. WAR also estimates that one third of the victims
are under 18 years of age.
In the interior of Sindh, Balochistan, and Southern Punjab, the
primarily Baloch tribal custom of Karo Kari exists in which men
and women believed to have had sexual relations outside of
marriage are both murdered to protect the honor of the women's
family. Such cases are rarely reported to the police or
seriously investigated. While the problem is widely
acknowledged to exist, reliable statistics are unavailable.
One magazine that investigated the problem estimated there were
hundreds of cases each year. While Karo Kari technically means
the killing of both persons, women are more frequently killed,
while the man is often able to pay compensation to the
"wronged" family.
In 1993 the press continued to draw attention to the problem of
so-called "dowry deaths," in which women are burned to death,
allegedly in kitchen stove accidents. Many of these deaths are
believed to be murders perpetrated by husbands or in-laws. It
is difficult to differentiate criminal "dowry deaths" from
common kitchen stove accidents that occur as a result of the
use of unsafe wood or gas stoves combined with the highly
flammable material commonly worn by women in Pakistan. Women
also continued to be killed or mutilated by male relatives who
suspect them of adultery. Few such cases are investigated
seriously.
Women's organizations operate throughout the country but
primarily in Pakistan's urban centers. Many concentrate on
educating women about existing legal rights. Other groups
concentrate on providing legal aid to poor women in prison who
may not be able to afford an attorney.
Children
The Government commits a share of its national budget to
children's welfare but does not publish the figures for such
expenditures. Parts of the budgets for health, education, and
various social service programs are components of the total
federal child welfare expenditures. In addition to the federal
expenditures, each province also commits funds to similar
programs. Despite a 1962 law that requires each province to
designate areas where primary education is compulsory, none of
the provinces has designated such areas. Therefore, in fact,
primary education is not compulsory. Schools are available in
most localities but they have very limited space, staff, and
resources. According to government figures, less than 65
percent of children between 5 and 9 attend primary school and
more than 50 percent of those drop out before finishing their
primary education. Many observers believe even these figures
are optimistic. The Government claims that overall literacy is
about 30 percent, although many educators believe actual
functional literacy is about 15 percent. The budget introduced
by the Government in July reduced education expenditures by
nearly 2 percent.
Legal rights for children are theoretically protected by
numerous laws which incorporate elements of the U.N. Convention
on the Rights of the Child. Legal enforcement of these laws,
however, is frequently lacking. According to an independent
study, 12,198 children under 21 years of age were detained
while under trial in Punjab province during 1991. Some 2,095
were eventually convicted, of whom 129 were under 14. Federal
law allows, but does not require, offenders under the age of 14
to be placed in reform schools; however, no such facilities
exist. There is only one jail in each province set aside for
convicted prisoners under age 21. Although Punjab and Sindh
provinces have laws mandating special judicial procedures for
child offenders, in practice, children and adults are
essentially treated equally.
According to the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF),
Pakistan has one of the highest reported ratios of males to
females in the world. One of the reasons for the high ratio of
males is the preference for boys within the family structure.
According to one study, female children are provided less food
and medical care than male children, leading to a higher
percentage of female children dying before their 5th birthday.
Many observers believe female infanticide occasionally occurs,
especially in poorer areas where the family may not be able to
support the child.
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities
Discrimination on ethnic and linguistic grounds underlies
ethnic conflicts in several areas. In Sindh there continue to
be conflicts between Sindhis and Mohajirs (Urdu-speaking
immigrants originally from India).
Non-Punjabis throughout Pakistan resent what they see as
Punjabi domination of the bureaucracy, the police, and the
armed forces. Social stratification also contributes to
discrimination. Socially prominent Pakistanis generally suffer
less at the hands of officials than those less well off, partly
because of their ability to reciprocate favors and partly
because of the general deference accorded social "betters" in
Pakistani society.
Religious Minorities
There is much discrimination against religious minority groups
in employment and education, and several International Labor
Organization bodies expressed concern in 1993 that Pakistani
laws facilitate discrimination in employment based on
religion. In Pakistan's early years, minorities were able to
rise to the senior ranks of the military and civil service.
Today, many are unable to rise above mid-level ranks. Because
of the lack of educational opportunities for some religious
minority groups, discrimination in employment is believed to be
increasingly prevalent. Christians, in particular, have
difficulty finding jobs above those of menial labor.
Officially designated as non-Muslims, Ahmadis in particular
suffer from harassment and discrimination and have limited
chances for advancement in the public sector. Young Ahmadis
and their parents complain of increasing difficulty in gaining
admittance to good colleges, forcing many children to go
overseas for higher education. They complain that charges are
often filed against them for the purpose of harassment or
extortion and that the police will not accept their complaints
when they and their property are attacked; few cases ever come
to trial. Among religious minorities, there is a belief that
the authorities, even if they do not prosecute them, afford
them less protection under the law than is afforded Muslim
citizens. There were several incidents in 1993 in which
Ahmadis were physically assaulted by both police and civilians.
Many Christians continue to express the fear of forced marriage
of Christian women to Muslims, although some human rights
monitors believe the practice is relatively rare. Many
Christians also believe they are subject to harassment by the
authorities. They cite difficulty in obtaining permission to
build churches and the blasphemy laws as primary examples.
People with Disabilities
Pakistan has no laws requiring equal accessibility to public
buildings for disabled persons.
According to a 1987 government study, more than 10,000 disabled
children were enrolled in the 158 special education centers
administered by the Government and nongovernmental
organizations. This represented about 1.7 percent of the
estimated population of disabled children in Pakistan.
Pakistan law reserves 1 percent of public sector jobs for
disabled persons, although human rights monitors say this quota
has never been met. The caretaker government of Prime Minister
Qureshi announced in September that the quota would be raised
to 2 percent.
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
The right of industrial workers to form trade unions is
enunciated in the Industrial Relations Ordinance (IRO) of 1969
but is subject to major restrictions in some employment areas.
In practice, labor laws place significant constraints on the
formation of unions and their ability to function effectively.
Workers in export processing zones (EPZ's) currently are
prohibited from forming trade unions, although a proposal to
apply Pakistani labor laws to the EPZ's was before the Cabinet
for decision. As part of the Government's trade policy over
the past year, the Finance Act of 1992 extended this
prohibition to all export-oriented units that export at least
70 percent of their production, although this decision has not
yet been implemented.
The All Pakistan Federation of Labour (APFOL) charges that
trade unionists seeking to organize workers employed in the
construction of the Islamabad-Lahore Motorway were arrested and
mistreated by police while in custody. APFOL also alleges that
some 500 workers were terminated from the project, which is
being carried out by the Daewoo Corporation, and that the
government of Punjab went to court to block the registration of
the union. Government of Punjab officials deny that any abuses
took place while the workers were in police custody. The
Punjab Secretary of Labor said in December that the government
had dropped its objection to the registration of the union and
that the union would be allowed to register. In October the
Federal Government also rescinded its previous application of
the Essential Services Act to the motorway project. The
Essential Services Act severely restricts normal union
activities in sectors associated with the "administration of
the State."
The right of unions to strike is severely constrained by
legally required conciliation proceedings and cooling-off
periods and especially by the Government's authority to ban any
strike found to cause "serious hardship to the community" or
prejudice to the national interest, or in any case after any
strike has continued unresolved for 30 days. Strikes continue
to be rare; when they do occur, they are usually illegal and
short. Police do not hesitate to crack down on worker
demonstrations.
Union members make up only about 13 percent of the industrial
labor force and 10 percent of the total estimated work force.
Contract labor continues to flourish, undercutting the power of
the unions and exploiting workers willing to work on temporary
contracts. These workers receive fewer benefits and have no
job security.
Trade unions of all political orientations are permitted, and
the political leanings of labor leaders cover the entire
spectrum. While many unions remain aloof from party politics,
it appears that the most powerful are those associated with
political parties. After the PPP came to power in 1988, it
successfully organized trade unions under the banner of the
People's Labor Bureau (PLB). The PLB's main competitors are
the Jamaat-i-Islami's National Labor Federation and the
MQM-backed labor unions.
Labor federations are free to affiliate with international
federations and confederations. International Labor
Organization (ILO) committees have criticized Pakistan for
years for its failure to abide by Convention 87 regarding
freedom of association and Convention 98 on the right to
organize and bargain collectively, both of which it has
ratified. The charges, repeatedly raised by Pakistani trade
unions, have focused on the limitations on union formation,
strikes, and collective bargaining. Except for lifting the ban
on an airline employee union, no Pakistani government has made
any serious effort to change the laws criticized in the ILO
reports. Even the employers' members of the ILO Conference
Committee in 1993 accused the Government of bad faith in
failing to take remedial action it had promised. The decision
to extend union membership to certain state-owned enterprises
had been taken during the Bhutto government's previous tenure
but had not yet been implemented when her government fell in
1990. The administration of former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif
subsequently reversed this decision. There is a proposal
before the Cabinet to allow employees of other government
entities, including Pakistan Television, to form unions.
The ILO continues to encourage the Government to lift
prohibitions against union activity in EPZ's and with respect
to radio, television, and hospital employees, as well as to
rescind the existing ban on strikes. Pakistan was also asked
to amend any provision of the IRO, the Press and Publications
Ordinance, and the Political Parties Act which impose
compulsory prison labor in a manner inconsistent with ILO
Convention 105. In response to a request by Pakistan, the ILO
agreed to provide technical assistance to bring the country's
labor laws into conformity with the world body's conventions.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
The right of workers to form associations and freely elect
representatives to act as collective bargaining agents is
established in law. Section 15 of the IRO specifically
prohibits antiunion discrimination by employers. Current laws,
however, place major limitations on the extent and
effectiveness of such activities. Industrial workers have the
right to organize and bargain collectively under the IRO,
although large sections of the labor force do not enjoy similar
rights. Agricultural workers, who are not defined as
"industrial workers" under the IRO, have the right to organize
and form associations, but they are not guaranteed the right to
strike, bargain collectively, or make demands on employers.
Under the Essential Services Maintenance Act of 1952 (ESA),
normal union activities are severely restricted in sectors
associated with "the administration of the State," which covers
a wide range of government services and state enterprises, such
as education, health care, oil and gas production, and
transport.
For each industry found subject to the ESA, a finding that must
be renewed every 6 months, a specific determination is made by
the Government as to what constitutes the limits of union
activity. In cases in which collective bargaining has been
barred, individual wage boards decide wage levels. The Minimum
Wage Ordinance of 1961 provides the authority under which
minimum wage boards are formed. Minimum wage boards are
constituted at the provincial level and are comprised of an
industry representative, a labor representative, and an
at-large member generally chosen from the senior ranks of the
provincial labor ministry. A chairman provided by the
provincial labor ministry presides over the board's
deliberations, and additional industry and labor
representatives may be added at the discretion of the
chairman. Despite the presence of a labor representative on
the minimum wage board, labor organizations are generally
dissatisfied with the board's findings. Disputes are
adjudicated before the National Industrial Relations
Commission. A worker's right to quit may also be curtailed
under this act, and a fired worker has no recourse to the labor
courts. Collective bargaining and even strikes take place in
some job areas covered by the act, e.g., the nationalized
banks. Most unions continue to call for the abolition of the
ESA.
The ILO has advised the Government that a 1980 ordinance
permitting it to exempt EPZ's from the provisions of any law is
inconsistent with the requirements of ILO Conventions 87 and
98. An EPZ, with its own labor regulations, including
regulations governing how workers may bargain collectively, is
functioning in Karachi. Over the years, the ILO has also
expressed concern about the ban on trade union activities in
several specific organizations, including the government-run
Pakistan television station. It has asked that collective
bargaining rights be given to bank officers and employees,
denouncing the practice in the foreign banking sector of
granting false promotions to employees in order to remove them
from the category of workers having the right to organize.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
Forced labor is specifically prohibited by law. However,
critics argue that the ESA's limitation on some employees'
rights to leave their jobs constitutes a form of compulsory
labor. The Government informed the ILO's Committee on the
Application of Standards in 1990 that amendments were under
consideration to rectify the problem and that steps had been
taken to address other forced labor issues. However, the
Government has taken no further action on the ESA issue.
Illegal bonded labor is widespread. Bonded labor is common in
the brick, glass, and fishing industries and is found among
agricultural and construction workers in rural areas. The
total labor force in Pakistan is approximately 33.8 million
people, and while there are no reliable figures available on
the number of bonded laborers, conservative estimates put the
figure at several million. In late 1992, a private jail was
discovered in the Sindh province in which over 200 people had
been incarcerated for up to 10 years. The detainees were being
used to provide forced labor on the surrounding farmland. The
local landlord, who owned the jail, was not charged in the
case, but his son was charged and is currently a fugitive. The
detainees continue to be held by local police at the private
jail as material witnesses in the case. Human rights monitors
believe that such private jails are common, particularly in
Sindh, Balochistan, and Southern Punjab.
In the brick kiln industry, a workers' association succeeded in
bringing the plight of bonded brickmakers in Punjab before the
Supreme Court. The Court's 1989 compromise ruling reinforced
prohibitions on forced labor and forcible collection of debts
and limited salary advances to 1-week's wages but upheld the
legality of existing debts. The Court granted laborers the
right to work wherever they wished and to make arrangements
other than bonded labor to pay their existing debts.
The Bonded Labor System (Abolition) Act, adopted in March 1992,
is the first law officially recognizing the existence of bonded
labor in Pakistan. It outlaws the bonded labor system, cancels
all existing bonded debts, and forbids lawsuits for the
recovery of existing bonded debts. In principle, the law
enables laborers to work where they wish and should result in
all bonded debt recovery cases brought by employers being
thrown out of court. The new legislation was not yet fully
implemented but offers a basis for court cases which could
improve the bonded labor situation.
However, little progress was made in 1993 in the industries
employing bonded laborers. A significant impediment to the
law's implementation is the absence of any credible enforcement
mechanism at the provincial level, as required by the law.
While enforcement of antibonded labor statutes has always
rested with the provinces, enforcement mechanisms historically
have been deficient. Provinces have at their disposal cadres
of labor inspectors, but their numbers are consistently
inadequate to meet the requirements of the law. Plans exist
for the formation of "vigilance committees" which would assist
in the collection of information concerning possible labor code
violations. As of the end of 1993, however, none of the
vigilance committees had been constituted. Accordingly, no
bonded labor petitions had been accepted by provincial courts,
which are designated by federal law as having jurisdiction. In
addition, resistance to the new law among employers was strong,
reports of violations continued to appear, and the workers'
movement was divided over the issue. Due to the lack of
employment alternatives, many workers voluntarily returned to
bonded labor at the kilns and elsewhere. The newly formed
Senate Human Rights Committee announced in 1993 that bonded
labor was to be one of its highest priorities.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
Despite legal limitations, child labor is common. Child labor
is limited by at least four separate statutes and Article 11 of
The Constitution. The Employment of Children Act of 1991
defined the child as "a person who has not completed his 14th
year of age." The Act also set 7 hours as the maximum workday
for a child, inclusive of 1-hour's rest after 3 hours of
continuous work, and reiterated restrictions against the
employment of children in hazardous industries. The Act
remains essentially unimplemented and did little to promote
much needed enforcement mechanisms.
While much child labor is in the traditional framework of
family farming or small business, the abusive employment of
children in larger industries and government business is also
widespread. Child labor is widely employed in the carpet
industry, much of which is family-run, cottage industry
production. This appears to be the only export industry in
which child labor is employed on a significant scale. Although
there are no reliable official statistics, unofficial surveys
and occasional press articles suggest that violations of
existing laws are common. Unofficial estimates indicate that
one-third of Pakistan's total labor force of 33 million is made
up of workers under age 18. The employment of children is
sometimes linked with stories of child prostitution and abuse.
The manager of the ILO program on the elimination of child
labor visited Pakistan in December to discuss the development
of a program for the elimination of child labor in Pakistan.
The ILO has earmarked $600,000 for project development over the
next several years, which will include a grassroots campaign to
raise awareness about child labor, as well as a review and
revision of Pakistani legislation on child labor.
A Punjab labor department study concluded that about a million
children are engaged in carpet weaving, mostly in the cottage
industry, throughout Pakistan. In addition to suffering
work-related health problems and receiving beatings if they try
to avoid work, these children remain uneducated, 42 percent
never having attended school and 58 percent having dropped
out.
The smuggling of young Pakistani children to the Gulf countries
reportedly continued. Most of the boys, many of whom are
preschool age, are used as jockeys in camel races. Thousands
of young Pakistanis reportedly have been smuggled to the Gulf
in recent years. In some cases the children, usually from
rural areas, were kidnaped. In other cases, poor parents are
said to have sold their children to the traffickers.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
Labor regulations are governed by federal statutes applicable
throughout the country. The minimum wage is approximately $50
(1,500 rupees). Although this wage is ostensibly enough to
support a small family, minimum wage benefits are extended to
only a minority of the work force by virtue of an extensive
list of exempted activities. The law, applicable nationally,
provides for a maximum workweek of 54 hours, rest periods
during the workday, and paid annual holidays. These
regulations specifically do not apply to agricultural workers,
to workers in Pakistan's numerous small factories with fewer
than 10 employees, and to the small contract groups of under 10
workers into which factory work forces are increasingly
divided. Due in part to a lack of education, many workers are
unaware of the regulations protecting their rights. In
September the Government amended laws relating to workmen's
compensation, payment of wages, old-age pensions, social
security, workers' children education, gratuity, and workers'
share in companies' profits to expand those benefits to workers
earning approximately $100 or less per month. Previously, the
ceiling on salary for the receipt of such benefits was set at
about $50 per month.
Enforcement of labor regulations, the responsibility of
provincial governments, has generally been ineffective. The
attention given to enforcement varies among the provinces in
proportion to the significance of industrial labor. In all
cases, limited resources, corruption, and inadequate regulatory
structures hamper the effort. In general, worker health and
safety standards are poor, and little is being done to improve
them. Organized labor is occasionally able to press for
improvements, and some legal protections apply, although they
are weakly enforced.
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