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TITLE: OCCUPIED TERRITORIES HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES, 1993
DATE: JANUARY 31, 1994
AUTHOR: U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
OCCUPIED TERRITORIES
This report deals with territories under military occupation,
whereas most others in this volume describe practices within
sovereign states and deal with the relationship between
governments and their own citizens. Israel occupied the lands
known as the "occupied territories" (the West Bank, Gaza Strip,
Golan Heights, and East Jerusalem) as a result of the 1967 war.
Israel is not recognized internationally to have sovereignty
over any of the occupied territories. Israel has, however,
asserted sovereignty over and annexed East Jerusalem. The West
Bank and Gaza legal regime derives from Ottoman, Jordanian,
Egyptian, and British law, as modified by Israeli military
orders. Israel has extended its law and administration to the
Golan Heights. The United States considers Israel's occupation
to be governed by The Hague Regulations of 1907 and the 1949
Fourth Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of
Civilians in Time of War. Israel considers the Hague
Regulations applicable, but not the Geneva Convention, though
Israel states that it observes the Geneva Convention's
humanitarian provisions.
Israel has governed the West Bank and Gaza through the Civil
Administration (CIVAD), which is answerable to the Minister of
Defense. Most Palestinian municipalities have Israeli-
appointed mayors, the majority of elected mayors having been
dismissed in the early 1980's. Palestinians have not had the
opportunity to participate in significant political or economic
decisions regarding the occupied territories, except for East
Jerusalem, where Palestinian residents have largely boycotted
the Israeli political process. Israeli settlers in the
territories (about 5 percent of the population of the
territories, exclusive of East Jerusalem) are subject to
Israeli law and receive better treatment than Palestinians
under military occupation law. Israeli economic policies
discriminate in favor of Israeli interests and Israeli settlers
in the territories.
The security forces in the occupied territories have consisted
of the army (Israeli Defense Forces-IDF), the Shin Bet (General
Security Service-GSS), the police, and the paramilitary border
police. Crimes by Palestinians related to "security," as
defined by the authorities, have been tried in military courts.
The economies of the West Bank and Gaza Strip are small, poorly
developed, and highly dependent on Israel. The West Bank
produces many agricultural items and some light manufactured
goods. Gaza's economy is more focused on agriculture and
depends heavily on earnings from day laborers in Israel. Both
economies have suffered from the effects of the occupation, the
6-year-old Palestinian uprising (intifada) against Israeli
rule, the Gulf war and resulting cutoff of Arab funding, and
the March 29 closure of the occupied territories.
The first 5 months of 1993 witnessed a dramatic increase in
violence and confrontation. After a series of killings and
stabbings of Israeli soldiers and civilians in Israel and the
occupied territories during the first 3 months of 1993, the
Government on March 29 sealed off indefinitely the West Bank
and Gaza from Jerusalem and Israel. While proving an effective
measure in curbing Palestinian attacks against Israelis in
Israel, closure has severely constricted Palestinians' freedom
of movement and has caused a deterioration of economic
conditions (see also Sections 2.c. and 2.d.). The closure,
which was partially eased later during 1993, does not apply to
Israeli citizens, who are not required to obtain special
permits to cross into and out of the West Bank and Gaza.
On September 13, Israel and the Palestine Liberation
Organization (PLO) signed an historic Declaration of Principles
on a gradual transfer of authority from Israel to an interim
Palestinian self-governing authority. The Declaration lays out
a timetable for Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza Strip and
Jericho, scheduled to be completed in the first quarter of
1994. In addition, the Declaration calls for a redeployment of
Israeli security forces away from populated areas in the West
Bank by as early as July 1994, which is the target date for
election of a Palestinian council and for the dissolution of
the Israeli military-backed CIVAD which has administered the
occupied territories since 1981. Through this process,
Palestinians will also assume early responsibility for
functions such as the health sector; educational, cultural, and
social welfare affairs; tourism; and taxation. The
Palestinians are also to create a Palestinian police force for
the occupied territories. Israelis are to continue to control
external security, internal security, and public order in
Israeli settlements, foreign relations, and certain other areas
until an agreement on permanent status is achieved. This
historic agreement, when implemented, should fundamentally
transform the basic relationship between Palestinians and
Israelis.
Both Palestinian and Israeli opponents of the Declaration of
Principles have attempted to exploit the violence as a means of
derailing the agreement. The Palestinian Islamist extremist
organizations Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad launched a
number of attacks on Israeli soldiers and civilians between
September 9 and the end of the year. Armed settlers also
blocked roads, harassed Palestinian commuters, destroyed
Palestinian property, and fired at unarmed Palestinians. From
October through mid-December, six settlers were killed by
Palestinians, while eight Palestinians were killed by
settlers. As the occupying power, Israel remained obligated
under international occupation law to ensure, as far as
possible, public order and the safety of the civilian
population in the occupied territories. Violence in the
occupied territories also included killings of Palestinians by
other Palestinians because of alleged collaboration with Israel.
All of the 414 Palestinians deported to southern Lebanon in
December 1992 because of their alleged association with Hamas
and Palestinian Islamic Jihad were allowed to return in 1993,
with the exception of about 15 who chose not to return. Some
were then administratively detained.
There were credible reports that during 1993 Israel mistreated
and, according to those reports, in some cases tortured
Palestinians during arrest and interrogation, utilized
undercover units implicated in possible extrajudicial killings,
ordered administrative detentions, used heavy weaponry to
destroy houses in which IDF soldiers believed security suspects
to be hiding, limited freedom of movement, employed harsh tax
collection practices, and followed discriminatory policies in
land and resources use and trade. The longstanding U.S.
position is that several Israeli practices, such as the
transfer of prisoners outside the occupied territories and the
demolition or sealing of houses for security offenses as a form
of collective punishment, contravene specific provisions of the
Fourth Geneva Convention.
Apart from the major development reflected in the Israeli-PLO
Declaration of Principles, there were other improvements in the
human rights situation. Israel liberalized its policy on
family reunification for residents of the West Bank and Gaza
(see Section 2.d.), carried out significantly fewer
court-sanctioned demolitions of Palestinian houses (although
demolition orders were usually converted to orders for
sealings), and used curfews less frequently in the West Bank.
The nighttime curfew imposed on Gaza since 1987, however,
remained in effect, and general curfews were used extensively
throughout the year in Gaza. In October Israel released 617
Palestinian prisoners as a goodwill gesture following the
signing of the Declaration of Principles. As of the end of the
year, Israeli and Palestinian negotiators were discussing the
timing and numbers of additional releases.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
Credible sources report that undercover units disguised as
Palestinians killed 27 Palestinians as of late November. This
number represents a significant decrease from the 45
Palestinians reported killed by undercover units in 1992. As
in 1992, the task of the undercover units appeared to have been
to arrest activists wanted by the authorities for serious
crimes. The undercover units also focused on stone-throwers or
graffiti-writers. Human rights organizations continued to
charge that the undercover units targeted certain activists, in
some cases killing suspects under circumstances in which it may
have been possible to apprehend them without killing. Israeli
authorities acknowledge the operation of special undercover
units whose members circulate among Palestinian activists and
claim that such units observe standard rules of engagement
applicable to other IDF units and that all killings and
allegations of misbehavior are investigated. Investigations of
abuses by IDF troops are conducted by IDF investigators. These
investigations rarely result in imposition of serious
punishment. According to the Israeli Government, one
investigation into the killing of a child by an undercover unit
did result in an undercover unit lieutenant's conviction on
charges of negligence. The officer was sentenced to 6 months'
imprisonment and was demoted to the rank of sergeant.
According to some human rights groups, the General Security
Service (GSS) was responsible for at least one extrajudicial
killing--the death of Omar Khamis Yusef Al-Ghula, who,
according to eyewitnesses, was handcuffed and offering no
resistance when he was shot by a security officer on January
27. The Israeli Government states that members of an army
patrol shot and killed Al-Ghula, while he was in their custody,
when he attempted to draw a handgun. The military prosecutor
for Gaza investigated this case. He concluded that the
soldiers acted in accordance with the rules of engagement and
instructed that the file be closed.
Palestinian attacks against Israeli soldiers and civilians in
1993 resulted in the deaths of 49 Israelis in the occupied
territories, compared to 23 such deaths in 1992. Most deaths
were by knifing or gunfire. After a series of killings and
stabbings of Israeli soldiers and civilians in Israel and the
occupied territories in the first 3 months of the year, the
Government sealed off the West Bank and Gaza from Jerusalem and
Israel on March 29 for an indefinite period as a means of
reducing the number of Palestinian attacks on Israelis.
As of mid-December, 79 Palestinians had been killed by other
Palestinians, most often because of alleged collaboration with
Israeli security services but also because of disputes between
political factions or street gangs or because of personal
feuds. These killings included Palestinian women accused of
collaboration with Israeli authorities, infidelity, or
prostitution. (The Government of Israel claims that 139
Palestinians were killed by other Palestinians in 1993.)
Sixty-six of these killings took place in Gaza, a dramatic
decrease from 149 killings in 1992; in the West Bank, the
phenomenon continued a downward trend begun in 1992.
During the October to December period, there were credible
reports of IDF inaction during several settler attacks, which
occurred usually in retaliation for the killing of a settler,
on Palestinians and their homes and property. In late
December, the IDF appeared to investigate more vigorously two
separate incidents in which Palestinians were killed,
reportedly by settlers, and it appeared that by the end of the
year the IDF had begun taking stronger measures to protect
Palestinians from settler attacks. These measures included the
provision by the IDF's Judge Advocate General to IDF officers
of a 14-page handbook on how to deal with disturbances
involving Israeli citizens in the occupied territories.
According to that guidance, soldiers were authorized to arrest
Israelis if they were breaking the law.
Israeli authorities prosecute Palestinians accused of killing
other Palestinians as well as those accused of killing
Israelis, and, although there is no capital punishment,
sentences are severe. Palestinians suspected of killing
Israelis and alleged collaborators have been a principal target
of undercover unit operations. The Government also prosecutes
Israelis accused of killing Palestinians, though sentences
given to Israelis are generally much lighter than sentences
handed down to Palestinians convicted of killing either
Israelis or Palestinians. (See Section 1.e. for additional
information on trials; for further discussion of killings, see
Section l.g.)
b. Disappearance
There were no confirmed reports of disappearances.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
As in 1992, international, Israeli, and Palestinian human
rights groups and diplomats continued to provide detailed and
credible accounts of widespread abuse, which they claim in some
cases amounted to torture, of Palestinian and Palestinian-
American detainees, both immediately after arrest and during
interrogation. According to credible reports, hooding, forced
standing or tying up in contorted positions, prolonged exposure
to extreme temperatures, blows and beatings, confinement in a
small space, sleep and food deprivation, threats against the
detainee's family, and threats of death were common practice in
interrogation facilities. The apparent intent of these
practices was to disorient and intimidate prisoners, often with
the goal of obtaining confessions or information about third
parties. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)
in 1992 declared such practices to be violations of the Geneva
Convention.
In June the Israeli-Palestinian Association of Physicians for
Human Rights published a form reportedly used in the
interrogation section of Tulkarem Prison in the West Bank. The
form requested an examining physician to certify the medical
fitness of a detainee for interrogation and specifically asked
the doctor to indicate any medical "limitations" by reason of
which the prisoner should not be chained, forced to wear a
hood, or forced to stand for long periods. Subsequent to the
publication of the form, the Israeli Medical Association issued
a statement forbidding member physicians to answer such
questions. The Government asserts that the form, while
considered, was never put into use. Human rights groups
believe that IDF and prison service doctors have routinely been
called upon to certify prisoners for interrogation, whether or
not a specific form is required.
Torture is forbidden by Israeli law. Israeli authorities say
that torture is not authorized or condoned in the occupied
territories but acknowledge that abuses occur and state that
they are investigated. In 1987 the Landau Judicial Commission
specifically condemned "torture" but allowed for "moderate
physical and psychological pressure" to be used to secure
confessions and to obtain information; a classified annex to
the report defining permissible pressure has never been made
public. In a case brought by the Public Committee Against
Torture, the Israeli Supreme Court refused to halt the use of
"moderate physical pressure."
In April the director of the GSS, responding to a petition
before the Israeli Supreme Court, presented the court with an
affidavit in which he announced amendments to the GSS's policy
on interrogation. While the GSS was to continue to adhere to
principles contained in the Landau Commission Report, he listed
the following activities as prohibited: torture and
humiliation, denial of food, water, and access to a toilet; and
subjecting a detainee to extreme temperatures. Interrogators
were required to proceed in steps, starting with "psychological
pressure" and moving on to "additional pressure methods" in
accordance with regulations. Human rights groups assert that
despite these announced changes in policy, there was no
perceivable difference in treatment of suspects under
interrogation.
The Israeli Ministry of Justice established two units in 1992
to investigate allegations of misconduct by police and GSS
officers, including ill-treatment of detainees during
interrogation. As of late November, 61 complaints of
maltreatment during interrogation had been filed against GSS
interrogators during 1993. Investigations into most of those
complaints had not yet been completed. The Government claims
that during 1993 unspecified legal or disciplinary measures had
been taken in 13 cases, approximately half of which had been
initiated prior to 1993.
In 1993 six Palestinians died in detention, four from what
appeared to be natural causes. Human rights groups claim,
however, that lack of prompt and adequate medical attention
while in detention in at least three cases aggravated the
medical conditions of those three prisoners. The Israeli
Government states that all of these prisoners received medical
examinations, and none complained of chronic ailments.
According to credible sources, one detainee, a 23-year-old from
Gaza, was denied medical attention for smoke inhalation for at
least 3 days after his arrest. A second case was an apparent
suicide.
Most convictions in security cases are based on confessions.
An attorney is normally not allowed to see a client until after
interrogation is complete and a confession, if obtained, has
been made. The ICRC is not allowed access to detainees until
the 14th day after arrest. Human rights groups point to this
prolonged incommunicado detention as contributing to the
problem of abuse. Detainees frequently tell judges that
confessions were coerced. Human rights groups assert that
Palestinian detainees often fail to lodge complaints either
from fear of retribution or because they assume their
complaints will be ignored.
Charges of beatings and physical abuse by Israeli security
forces continued in 1993. The IDF says that it investigates
automatically every fatality but that it does not routinely
investigate nonfatal violent incidents unless a complaint is
made. According to the IDF, from January 1 to September 1
there were 11 indictments against 24 soldiers and officers for
"intifada-related offenses." Twelve soldiers were convicted
while none were acquitted. Five indictments are still
pending. No information was provided as to the sentences in
these cases.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
As of the end of 1993, a total of 9,573 Palestinians were
incarcerated in IDF (5,308) and prison service facilities. Of
those, roughly 68 percent had been tried and were serving
sentences, 29.6 percent were awaiting charges or trial, and 2.3
percent were detained administratively, i.e., sentenced to a
specific period of detention without formal charge or trial.
In October Israel released 617 Palestinian prisoners as a
goodwill gesture following the signing of the Declaration of
Principles. At the end of the year, Israeli and Palestinian
negotiators were discussing the timing and numbers of
additional releases.
Since the beginning of the intifada in late 1987, Israel has
routinely transferred Palestinian prisoners from the occupied
territories to detention facilities within Israel, especially
to the Ketziot camp in the Negev desert and Megiddo prison near
Afula. This practice, which continued in 1993, contravenes
Article 76 of the Fourth Geneva Convention. Estimates of the
number of Palestinian residents of the occupied territories
incarcerated within Israel range up to 7,000. In late 1993,
there were indications that Palestinian prisoners were being
transferred from detention centers in Gaza to facilities in
Israel prior to the Israeli withdrawal from Gaza scheduled to
begin on December 13.
The use of administrative detention for alleged security
reasons without formal charges or a full opportunity for
detainees to defend themselves continued in 1993. As of
October, 277 Palestinians were held in administrative
detention, compared to 520 held at the end of 1992.
Detention periods are for a maximum of 6 months and are
renewable. Evidence used at hearings frequently is declared
secret and unavailable to either the detainee or his attorney.
Israeli officials state that administrative detention is used
only when IDF legal advisors have determined that there is
sufficient evidence to detain a person and that the evidence
has been corroborated by two sources. They assert, however,
that the evidence cannot be presented in open court because to
do so would compromise the method of acquiring the evidence,
which is often provided by informers whose lives would be
jeopardized if their identities were known. Human rights
monitors contend that administrative detention is often used
when evidence against a suspect would not stand up in court.
District military commanders may order administrative detention
without formal charges. Detainees may appeal detention orders
or renewal of detention before a military judge. Attorneys may
question security service witnesses concerning the general
nature of that evidence. The Supreme Court may review rulings
by military judges and may examine secret evidence.
Any soldier may arrest without warrant a person who has
committed, or is suspected of having committed, a criminal or
security offense. Persons over age 12 are treated as adults by
the court system. Persons arrested for common crimes are
usually provided the opportunity for bail, access to an
attorney, and a statement of charges (although these
opportunities are sometimes delayed). Bail is rarely available
to those arrested for security offenses. Special summonses are
reportedly issued to Palestinians wanted by authorities for
security reasons. Israeli Military Order 1369 allows
authorities to sentence to 7 years' imprisonment any person who
does not respond to a special summons that is delivered to him
or a family member or is posted in the Civil Administration
office nearest his home address.
Persons may be held in custody without a warrant for 96 hours
and then must be released unless a warrant is issued. A
warrant may be issued by a police officer for two periods of 7
days each. For extensions beyond 18 days from the date of
arrest, the detainee has to be brought before a military judge,
at which point he is entitled to defense counsel. In 1992
Israeli authorities shortened this period to 8 days for minors
and those accused of less serious offenses (such as stone
throwing). A military judge may extend the detention for a
period of no longer than 6 months from the date of arrest. If
there is no indictment during this period, the detainee must be
released. If there is an indictment, a judge may order
indefinite detention until the end of the trial, though the
detention may be appealed.
In theory a detainee has the right to see a lawyer as soon as
possible. In the cases of security detainees, however,
officers routinely issue a written order to delay access to
counsel for up to 15 days for reasons of security or to conduct
the investigation. Higher ranking officials or judges may
extend this period by up to 75 more days for the same reasons.
In June the Israeli Supreme Court ruled that the fundamental
right to consult a lawyer required the Government not only to
inform a detainee of his right but also to advise the detainee
of any orders preventing him from seeing a lawyer. Israeli
regulations also permit prisoners to be held in isolation from
family and from other detainees during interrogation.
Israeli authorities claim that they attempt to post
notification of arrest within 48 hours; Palestinians assert
that families and lawyers are normally notified much later and
generally locate the detainee through their own efforts.
Notification to the U.S. Embassy or Consulate General of
detained Palestinian-American citizens has almost always been
through the family. The ICRC attempts to help by passing on to
families (by telephone) the information it receives from
Israeli prison officials. A senior officer may extend for up
to 12 days denial of notification of arrest to immediate family
members, attorneys, and consular officials. A military
commander may appeal to a judge to extend this period in
security cases for an unlimited time.
The Israeli authorities acted in a number of areas to improve
prison conditions in the occupied territories after Palestinian
prisoners staged an 18-day hunger strike in September and
October 1992 to protest prison conditions. Implementation of
the specific measures, however, was not uniform throughout all
detention facilities. In August 1993, prisoners at Hebron
prison staged a hunger strike to protest lack of water for
toilet and bathing facilities. The Israeli Supreme Court
agreed to consider a petition presented by the prisoners but,
as of October, the case had not been resolved. In the
meantime, Israeli authorities reportedly agreed to truck in
water supplies to meet prisoner needs. In September the
Association of Israeli-Palestinian Physicians petitioned the
Israeli Supreme Court to close the Ketziot Military Detention
Camp in Israel because of "inferior conditions of
imprisonment." The petition argued that the conditions at the
camp, which reportedly houses 4,900 Palestinian security
detainees, violated the Geneva Convention. Overcrowding (26
inmates to a tent), inferior diet, lack of adequate medical
care, and lack of arrangements for religious worship were cited
as key problems. At the end of the year, Ketziot camp was
still in use. According to the IDF Judge Advocate General, the
IDF has been granted a postponement to study the report of an
advisory panel. Consideration of the case by the Supreme Court
has been postponed until March 1994.
In December 1992, the United Nations Security Council adopted
Resolution 799, which called for the immediate return of 415
Palestinians who had been deported to South Lebanon earlier
that month because of their alleged association with Hamas--the
Islamic Resistance Movement and the largest Islamist
organization in the occupied territories--and the Palestinian
Islamic Jihad. Israel agreed in March to a two-phase plan to
return the deportees. In September 186 deportees returned from
the edge of the Israeli-declared security zone in South Lebanon
where they had been camped since December 1992. Upon their
return, the deportees were investigated by the Israeli
authorities, and some were freed while others were placed in
administrative detention. In mid-December, the remaining
deportees returned except for about 15 deportees who reportedly
elected to remain outside the occupied territories to avoid
imprisonment. Like those who had returned in September, the
197 who returned in December were subject to interrogation and
investigation. As of the end of the year, approximately 65
remained in detention.
In addition to the deportees in southern Lebanon, Israel
allowed 30 pre-intifada deportees to return to the occupied
territories in May as a confidence building measure. Among
those who returned was one former West Bank mayor elected in
1976 and later deported to Jordan.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
Palestinians accused of nonsecurity offenses are tried publicly
in local courts by Palestinian judges appointed by Israeli
officials, except where jurisdiction has been transferred by
military order. Since the beginning of the uprising, local
administration of justice has deteriorated seriously. At the
beginning of the intifada in December 1987, the intifada
leadership ordered Palestinian police and judges to resign.
Since then, Palestinian courts have functioned sporadically.
Palestinians accused of security offenses are tried in Israeli
military courts. Security offenses are broadly defined by
Israel and may include charges of political activity, such as
suspected membership in outlawed organizations. Following the
exchange of letters of recognition between Israel and the PLO,
membership in the mainstream Fatah organization ceased to be
considered a "security offense" by the Israeli authorities.
Charges are brought by military prosecutors, and suspects are
entitled to counsel. Serious charges are tried before
three-judge panels, and defendants are entitled to appeal the
judgments of such courts as a matter of right. Lesser offenses
are tried before single-judge courts. The Court of Military
Appeals may accept appeals of decisions by those courts based
on the law applied in the case, the sentence imposed, or both.
The right of appeal does not apply in all cases, and appeals
sometimes require court permission. In practice, it is rare
for Palestinians tried for security offenses to be acquitted,
though their sentences sometimes are reduced through the appeal
process.
Trials are delayed for several reasons: witnesses (including
Israeli military or police officers) do not appear; the
defendant is not brought to court; files are lost; or attorneys
fail to appear. These delays may constitute an additional
source of pressure on the defendant to plead guilty in order to
avoid serving a period of pretrial detention that would exceed
the sentence likely to apply in the context of a plea bargain.
In cases involving minor offenses, such as stone throwing, an
"expedited" trial may be held, in which a charge sheet is drawn
up within 48 hours and a court hearing scheduled within days.
In 1993 the IDF reported that approximately two-thirds of
detainees in military prisons had completed their trials.
By law, most military trials are public, although access is
limited. Consular officers are allowed to attend military
court proceedings involving foreign citizens, but there have
been delays in gaining admission.
Most convictions in military courts are based on confessions.
Israeli officials assert that Palestinians rarely cooperate as
witnesses to crimes, refusing to deal with Israeli
authorities. Physical and psychological pressures and reduced
sentences for those who confess contribute to the likelihood
that security detainees will sign confessions. Confessions are
usually recorded in Hebrew, which many defendants cannot read.
Israeli authorities say that confessions are made by and
repeated to the defendant in Arabic, although they are written
down in Hebrew because, while many Israeli court personnel
speak Arabic, few write it.
Crowded facilities and poor arrangements for attorney-client
consultations in prisons hinder effective legal defense
efforts. Palestinian attorneys report that appointments to see
clients are difficult to arrange and that prison authorities
often fail to produce clients when scheduled. In addition,
prison authorities often limit the time available to meet with
clients.
Israeli settlers in the occupied territories accused of
security and ordinary criminal offenses are tried in the
nearest Israeli district court under Israeli law. Civilian
judges preside over these courts, and standards of due process
and admissibility of evidence are not governed by military
occupation law. Settlers convicted in Israeli courts of crimes
against Palestinians regularly receive lighter punishment than
Palestinians convicted of crimes against either Israelis or
other Palestinians.
In 1992 an amendment to Israel's penal law provided greater
discretion in sentencing for cases of self-defense or necessity
where a defendant has used excessive force. Palestinians
raised concerns that this might result in unjustifiably lenient
sentences for Israeli settlers who use force. As of October,
however, the Israel state attorney's office was unaware of any
cases in which that amendment had been applied.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
Military authorities in the occupied territories may enter
private Palestinian homes and institutions without a warrant on
security grounds. Authorization by an officer of the rank of
lieutenant colonel is required prior to entry. Forced entries
are used in IDF operations and are sometimes accompanied by
beatings and destruction of property, including foodstuffs.
Undercover units have engaged in destructive and violent
behavior during searches, as well as harassment of families of
wanted Palestinians. Israeli authorities claim that forced
entry may lawfully occur only incident to arrest when entry is
resisted, that beatings and arbitrary destruction of property
during searches are punishable violations of military
regulations, and that compensation is due to victims in such
cases. The Government did not provide information regarding
such compensation.
In 1993 the security authorities sealed 27 houses for security
reasons, a decline from 33 sealed in 1992. Indicating the
continuation of a policy begun in 1992, the Israeli Government
reports, and some human rights groups agree, that no houses
were ordered demolished for security reasons in 1993. Other
credible sources, however, believe that three house demolitions
which occurred during 1993 were ordered for security reasons,
not because of building permit violations or during military
operations. Using bulldozers and other construction equipment,
security forces may demolish or seal the home of a suspect,
whether he is the owner or only a tenant, before any trial is
held. The final decision to seal or demolish a house is made
by a number of high-level Israeli officials, including the
coordinator of the Civil Administration. Owners of houses
ordered to be demolished have 48 hours to appeal to the area
commander, and final appeals may be made to the High Court. A
successful appeal generally results in the conversion of a
demolition order to sealing. When a house is demolished, the
land on which it sits is confiscated by the Israeli
authorities, and the house owner is not allowed to rebuild or
even remove the rubble.
Israeli authorities say there is a formal procedure whereby
owners may apply to regional military commanders for permits to
rebuild or unseal, but this procedure is rarely used. The
Israeli Government did allow two homes to be rebuilt after
being demolished, and four homes were permitted to be opened
after being previously sealed. The Government reports that 10
houses in Gaza and 10 in the West Bank were sealed in 1993.
During 1993, the IDF continued the practice of using various
heavy weapons, including rockets, to destroy houses in which
soldiers believed security suspects to be hiding (see Section
1.g.).
The security services sometimes monitor mail and telephone
conversations. The authorities sometimes interrupt telephone
service to specific areas.
g. Use of Excessive Force and Violations of Humanitarian
Law in Internal Conflicts
Estimates vary on the number of casualties caused by use of
excessive force in the occupied territories. Figures compiled
from press, Palestinian, international organizations, and
Israeli government sources indicate that a total of 184
Palestinians were killed by security forces in 1993, compared
to 158 in 1992. Estimates of the numbers of Palestinians
wounded vary; the number could be as high as 4,120. IDF
figures report approximately 890 Palestinians were injured as
of September 1 by the security services. Forty-nine Israeli
soldiers and civilians were killed by Palestinians in 1993 in
the occupied territories, and estimates of Israelis wounded
were about 366. Extremists associated with Hamas and
Palestinian Islamic Jihad were responsible for many of the
lethal attacks on Israelis.
After May it appeared that both the security forces and
Palestinian activists pursued less confrontational policies in
order to reduce violent clashes. The killing of an Israeli
settler near Ramallah in October began a cycle of killings and
reprisals which had not ended as of late December. Many of the
IDF observation posts erected in camps and cities throughout
Gaza, which had provoked violence, were removed in August. Of
the total number of Palestinians killed, the Israeli human
rights group B'tselem estimates that 37 were children aged 16
or under, 33 of whom were killed between January and June.
Many of these children were involved in demonstrations or were
near the sites of confrontations or incidents at the time they
were shot. In July, however, a soldier reportedly shot
10-year-old Ezzat Mattar while the boy was flying a kite in an
open field.
In a June report on IDF killings of Palestinian children under
age 16, B'tselem charged that the IDF pursued a deliberate
policy of opening fire in situations in which soldiers were not
in mortal danger. Citing the IDF's rules of engagement for
dispersing demonstrations and pursuing suspects which allow, in
the last resort, use of live fire, B'tselem declared that "the
many instances in which Palestinians in the territories have
been killed by soldiers...are unequivocal proof of the danger
inherent in such orders and of the need to change them."
B'tselem acknowledged that the IDF had no deliberate policy to
kill children but contended that "in hundreds of instances
security forces had the option of refraining from shooting, at
the risk of having suspects (the vast majority are
demonstrators or stone-throwers) escape, in order to ensure
that innocent people would not be hurt."
In its response to the B'tselem report, the IDF stated that
soldiers were under orders to act with the greatest care in
dealing with "riots" in which women and children participated
and noted that opening-fire regulations prohibited shooting at
children. Children were injured, the IDF said, because they
were near or among rioters or armed terrorists who endangered
the lives of IDF soldiers. The IDF statement attributed the
increase in deaths to the escalation of violence in the first
half of 1993.
Until April IDF regulations permitted the use of live
ammunition only when soldiers' lives were in immediate danger,
to halt fleeing suspects, or to disperse a violent
demonstration. In April the IDF issued an amendment to those
regulations permitting the use of live fire on an "individual
unlawfully carrying firearms." Palestinians asserted, and the
Government of Israel denied, that this modification ipso facto
allowed soldiers to open fire on anyone carrying a firearm. It
was not clear how soldiers were to determine if an individual
was authorized to carry a firearm. According to IDF policy,
soldiers are to direct fire at the legs only and at a fleeing
suspect only if they suspect a serious felony and have
exhausted other means of apprehending the suspect. In
practice, however, uniformed soldiers, police, and undercover
units used live fire in situations other than those described
above (see Section l.a.) and often shot suspects in the upper
body and head. Uniformed soldiers, police, and undercover
units also injured many bystanders (including children) by live
fire, rubber bullets, or beatings while pursuing suspects.
During 1993 the IDF continued the practice of using various
heavy weapons, including rockets, to destroy houses in which
soldiers believed security suspects to be hiding. These
demolitions took place almost exclusively in Gaza. Although
the IDF stated that no figures were available on the number of
houses damaged in these operations, human rights groups count
up to 220 houses or apartments either destroyed or partially
damaged by the IDF in the course of military operations in
pursuit of suspects. Israel defended this practice as a
necessary military operation and a measure to save the lives of
Israeli soldiers. The Israelis assert that the operations were
based on intelligence received that certain suspects were in
the reported places. In practice, IDF units regularly
evacuated houses in which they believed suspects to be hiding
and then fired rockets into the buildings. In several
instances, no suspects were found in the houses. Since late
1992, 177 Palestinian claims have been filed for damages to
homes by the security forces. Sixty claims have already been
settled to the sum of approximately $500,000 (one and a half
million NIS).
On a number of occasions, security forces forcibly removed
Palestinian suspects undergoing medical treatment from
hospitals or prohibited Palestinians in need of medical care
from crossing roadblocks or going out during curfews. The
Israeli Government asserts that a patient is removed only after
a doctor certifies a patient is fit for transfer; the transfer
must be made with a doctor present.
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
The Israeli authorities impose some restrictions on freedom of
speech. Israel prohibits, for example, public expressions of
support for Muslim extremist groups, such as Hamas, and other
banned organizations. For most of the year, the display of
Palestinian political symbols, such as flags, national colors,
and graffiti was punishable by stiff fines (usually the
equivalent of $150-300 for graffiti), or imprisonment.
Security forces often forced Palestinians to erase graffiti
found on their property, regardless of whether they were
responsible for it. Since September, after Israel and the PLO
signed the Declaration of Principles on the transfer of
authority, Israeli authorities have generally permitted
displays of the Palestinian flag or national colors, although
there has been no formal change of policy.
The Israeli authorities impose restrictions on the Arabic
press, citing security reasons. Arabic-language publications
in East Jerusalem must submit to the military authorities for
prior censorship all copy relating to the security, public
order, and safety of Israel and the occupied territories. Many
reports and editorials related to the uprising and Palestinian
political goals were permitted, but other articles and
editorials were routinely expurgated. Arabic translations of
news stories about the intifada, which had previously appeared
in the Hebrew-language press, were routinely censored from the
Arabic press.
A permit is required for publications imported into the
occupied territories. Imported materials may be censored or
banned for anti-Semitic or anti-Israeli content. According to
the Government, publications supporting Palestinian nationalism
are not censored or banned unless they advocate violence.
Possession of banned materials, such as uprising leaflets
espousing violence, is punishable by fine and imprisonment.
Reports by foreign journalists are subject to a system of
self-regulation.
No broadcast media originate from the occupied territories.
Jordanian radio and television is broadcast throughout the
occupied territories.
Israeli authorities continued to close individual secondary and
elementary schools for short periods, citing security problems
emanating from the schools. In addition, strike days called by
Palestinian activists continue to cause students to lose a few
days of school each month. In contrast, Palestinian
universities generally operated normally for the first time
since the intifada began in 1987.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
Military orders ban public gatherings of 10 or more people
without a permit. Until September, when Israel recognized the
PLO as the representative of the Palestinian people,
Palestinian political parties and other groups, including some
labor unions viewed as political, were banned. However,
student and professional associations have been allowed to
operate and hold democratic elections. Since the signing of
the Declaration of Principles in September, Israeli authorities
have permitted large-scale rallies in support of the agreement
in a number of towns. The authorities also permitted several
rallies organized by opponents of the agreement.
Private organizations are required to register with the
authorities, though some operate without licenses. Israeli
authorities permitted Palestinian charitable, community,
professional, and self-help organizations to operate unless
their activities were viewed as overtly political or supporting
the uprising.
c. Freedom of Religion
Freedom of religion is respected, and no group or sect is
banned on religious grounds. Muslim and Christian holy days
are observed, as are Jewish holy days in Jerusalem and the
settlements. All faiths operate schools and institutions.
Religious publications circulate subject to the laws for
publications described in Section 2.a. After the occupied
territories were sealed off in March, Muslim and Christian
Palestinians who wanted to visit or attend services at holy
places in Jerusalem were often unable to obtain permits to
enter the city. While some Palestinians were allowed to travel
by bus from the West Bank directly and only to the Haram
as-Sharif (where the al-Aqsa and Dome of the Rock mosques are
located), authorities often restricted access by male
worshipers under a certain age.
In April many Palestinian Christians protested the closure of
Jerusalem, which prevented their attending Easter Rites at the
Church of the Holy Sepulchre. While some congregations refused
to apply for permits, claiming it would establish a precedent
for Israeli control over holy sites, other Christians did apply
and found that their applications were denied or delayed.
Various sources alleged that Israeli police interfered with
passing of the "holy fire," one of the most important rituals
of the Greek Orthodox Church during the Easter season, by
extinguishing lanterns that worshipers at checkpoints were
using to pass the flame among themselves.
Israeli authorities also banned West Bankers and Gazans (even
those with permits) from entering Jerusalem on several major
Jewish holidays, citing this as a precautionary security
measure. These restrictions were not applied to Jewish
settlers in the occupied territories.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Occupied Territories,
Foreign Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
The escalation in violence both in the occupied territories and
inside Israel during the first 3 months of 1993 led the
Government to seal off indefinitely the West Bank and Gaza from
Jerusalem and Israel on March 29. By inhibiting the free
movement of goods and people, the closure caused deterioration
in economic conditions in the occupied territories and
disrupted patterns of religious, educational, cultural, and
family life as well as access to medical care. The March 29
closure constitutes the longest period during which the Israeli
security forces have employed this measure, which was first
used in 1991.
Closure severely constricted Palestinians' freedom of movement
between the West Bank and East Jerusalem, between the northern
and southern sections of the West Bank, and between Gaza and
the rest of the occupied territories. As during previous
periods of closure, any Palestinian wishing to enter Jerusalem
or Israel must obtain a special permit issued by the Civil
Administration. Any Palestinian found in Jerusalem without
such a permit is subject to a fine (usually the equivalent of
about $160) or arrest. Because most main roads pass through
Jerusalem, closure effectively divides the West Bank into two
parts, with the result that Palestinians from the north may not
travel to the south without special permission, and vice
versa. In addition, Gazans may only travel to Jerusalem and
the West Bank if they are able to obtain permits.
The closure had a serious effect on the economy of the occupied
territories. Of the 120,000 Palestinians who prior to March 29
worked in Jerusalem or Israel, only about half had received
permits to resume their employment by year's end. Palestinian
factories in the occupied territories, having lost their
markets in Jerusalem and Israel, were unable to pay their
workers. Unemployment rates in the West Bank were estimated at
25 percent before closure and are now estimated at 40 percent.
Palestinian businesses and institutions in Jerusalem suffered
because their West Bank clients were unable to enter the city.
The IDF states that the number of Palestinian workers who have
been issued permits since closure (about 52,000), added to the
number of Palestinians exempt from the permit requirement who
work in Jerusalem (15,000), is roughly equal to the number of
Palestinians (70,000) who had been legally permitted to work in
Israel and Jerusalem before March 29. The IDF maintains that
only Palestinians who had been working illegally in Israel and
Jerusalem lost their employment. After closure, however, the
Israeli Government significantly reduced the number of permits
issued to unskilled Palestinian day laborers allowed to work in
Israel or Jerusalem. Permits to enter Jerusalem and Israel
were valid for periods varying from a few hours to 3 months.
Permits were denied for a variety of reasons, including
security concerns and nonpayment of taxes. As of October, the
CIVAD had issued 268,309 temporary permits of varying duration
for various purposes to Palestinians from the occupied
territories who were not employed in Israel or Jerusalem.
In April Palestinian and Israeli human rights groups issued a
joint statement in which they condemned the closure. The
statement described closure as an illegal collective punishment
of the population of the occupied territories and as
"disproportionate to any legitimate security concern." As
noted in Section 2.c., many Muslim and Christian Palestinians
were denied the right to worship at holy places associated with
their faith because of closure. The closure also affected the
movement of health care personnel and prevented or slowed the
provision of health care services to some emergency and
critically ill patients in the West Bank and Gaza strip. In
October Israel eased certain restrictions on access to
Jerusalem as a "goodwill gesture." At the end of the year,
Palestinians employed in the city, women over 25, men over 50,
and children under 16 accompanied by a parent were the
categories of individuals not required to present permits. All
Palestinians entering Jerusalem, however, were still required
to stop at checkpoints and present either their permits or
identification proving they were exempt from the permit
requirement.
Israeli authorities also continued to issue "green" identity
cards, which identified the bearer as a security risk and
precluded travel in or through Jerusalem, as well as travel
abroad. "Green" cards generally were valid for 6 months,
renewable indefinitely. The issuance of such cards, like
administrative detention, is a form of punishment without
formal charge or trial.
The Israeli authorities continued to impose curfews and
military closures as security controls in 1993. Curfews were
more frequent in villages and refugee camps than in urban areas
but occurred less frequently in the West Bank than in previous
years. Curfews were still used extensively in Gaza in 1993,
including the continued imposition of a night-time curfew in
effect since 1987. Human rights groups criticized the
prolonged curfews, which do not apply to Israeli settlers, as a
form of collective punishment.
All Palestinians need permits, which require several
clearances, in order to travel outside the occupied
territories, and Israeli authorities have imposed travel
restrictions on certain political activists. However,
thousands of Palestinians in the occupied territories travel
abroad each year.
In 1991 Israeli authorities announced that bridge-crossing
permits to Jordan could be obtained at post offices without a
screening process. In July Israel announced that the
requirement for Palestinian males crossing the bridge into
Jordan to remain out of the occupied territories for 9 months
no longer applied to men above the age of 25. The requirement
remained in effect, however, for Palestinian males between the
ages of 16 and 25. In late 1993, Jordan tightened restrictions
on entry, with the result that Palestinians granted permission
to travel by Israeli authorities were sometimes denied
permission to enter Jordan.
Obstacles to emigration include the inability to obtain a
travel permit and the fear of losing residency. Restrictions
on residence, tourist visas, reentry, and family reunification
have applied only to Palestinians resident in the occupied
territories. Israel sometimes refuses to renew laissez-passers
of Palestinians from the occupied territories who live or work
abroad, on the grounds that they have abandoned their
residence, even though they may not have acquired foreign
citizenship. Palestinians who obtain foreign citizenship
ordinarily are not allowed to resume residence in the occupied
territories; those who acquire the right to residence elsewhere
or who remain outside the occupied territories for over 3 years
are often not permitted to resume residence. They are
permitted to return only as tourists and sometimes are denied
entry entirely. These restrictions do not apply to Israeli
settlers resident in the occupied territories. Israeli
authorities have limited family reunification for demographic,
political, and economic reasons. Most Palestinians who were
abroad during the 1967 war (estimated to be one-fourth of the
Palestinian population at that time) or who have lost their
residence permits for other reasons are not permitted to return
to reside permanently with their families.
Permanent residency permission or family reunification has
usually been denied to foreign-born spouses and children born
in the occupied territories to nonresident mothers, although
they were generally allowed to reside as temporary residents
with renewable permits.
In August the Israeli Government announced a change in its
policy on family reunifications. Following the presentation by
human rights groups of a series of petitions to the Israeli
Supreme Court, Israel decided to expand its policy on family
reunification for residents of the West Bank and Gaza by
offering to consider the cases of 6,000 immediate family
members who had arrived and applied for visitors' visas between
June 1990 and November 1992. As of the end of August, the
Israeli authorities had considered 3,249 applications from
residents of the West Bank and Gaza for family reunification,
of which they had approved 723 and denied 861. Still pending
were 1,781 applications, including 116 held over from previous
years. Israel also announced it would consider 2,000 new cases
annually, allowing the return of up to 5,000 persons. However,
immediate family members of Palestinian residents of East
Jerusalem were excluded from the new policy.
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government
The people of the occupied territories do not enjoy this
right. Israel's Ministry of Defense has ruled the West Bank
and Gaza through a military government and civil
administration. The Government of Israel has not recognized
the right of Palestinians to participate in policy decisions
concerning land and resource use and planning, taxation, trade,
and industry. Israeli authorities have permitted some
Palestinian municipalities, which have approved town plans, to
issue building permits within their boundaries. Municipal
elections were last held in 1976 in the West Bank; most mayors
elected then were later dismissed. Palestinians appointed by
Israel have filled most vacancies.
On September 13, Israel and the Palestine Liberation
Organization (PLO) signed a Declaration of Principles on a
transfer of authority from Israel to an interim Palestinian
authority. The Declaration lays out a timetable for Israeli
withdrawal from the Gaza strip and Jericho, scheduled to be
completed in early 1994. In addition, the declaration calls
for the redeployment of Israeli security forces away from
populated areas in the West Bank by as early as July 1994,
which is the target date for the election of a Palestinian
council, and for the dissolution thereafter of the Israeli
military-backed Civilian Administration (CIVAD), which has
administered the occupied territories. Through this process,
Palestinians will also assume early responsibility for
governmental functions such as the health sector; educational,
cultural, and social welfare affairs; tourism; and taxation.
The Palestinians will also create a Palestinian police force
for the occupied territories. Israel is to continue to control
external security as well as security and public order in
Israeli settlements, foreign relations, and certain other areas
until an agreement on permanent status is achieved. Although
Israel's annexation of East Jerusalem has not been recognized
internationally, East Jerusalem is governed as part of Israel.
Palestinian residents of East Jerusalem are permitted to vote
in Israeli municipal elections but have largely boycotted them.
No Palestinian resident of East Jerusalem sits on the city
council. In the November municipal election less than 7
percent of Jerusalem's Palestinian population voted. According
to the Declaration of Principles, negotiations on the final
status of Jerusalem are scheduled to start by 1996.
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
of Human Rights
Many local groups--Israeli, Palestinian, and mixed--monitor
human rights. Israeli authorities permit their publications
and statements to circulate in the occupied territories, and
they are allowed to hold press conferences. Some Palestinian
human rights workers encountered administrative obstacles to
their work in 1993, such as denial of permits to enter
Jerusalem (where their offices are located) after the occupied
territories were sealed off in March.
Although Israel normally permits international human rights
groups to visit the occupied territories, Israel declined to
accept the visit of the U.N. Human Rights Commission Special
Rapporteur for the occupied territories. The Government stated
that while Israel has always been open to individuals, groups,
and representatives of organizations concerned with human
rights, Israel was being asked to comply with a decision of a
body to which, unlike every other U.N. member state, Israel
cannot be elected because it is not a member of any regional
group. Israel generally cooperates with human rights
organizations, and officials are generally available for
meetings on human rights issues. Some of these organizations,
however, find that Israel's responses are inadequate. Not all
inquiries receive answers, and some groups' requests for
meetings with officials or access to detention facilities are
denied.
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Disability, Language, or Social Status
Women
Palestinian women living under military occupation face similar
human rights problems as do men in their contact with Israeli
authorities. In addition, many Palestinian women face poverty,
lack of education, and social repression. Palestinian society
is only now coming to recognize the problem of violence against
women. A major difficulty in dealing with this highly
sensitive issue is lack of resources: women's organizations
are working to raise consciousness and provide help and
intervention when needed, but funds are not available for
shelters or centers. The CIVAD has made no significant attempt
to relieve the situation, and Palestinian social institutions
have so far failed to focus on the issue.
Palestinians are governed by a mixture of Jordanian and
Egyptian law, British mandate law, and Israeli military
regulations. There are no laws guaranteeing women's rights in
the workplace. Palestinian women often work outside the home
and are prominent in many professions, including medicine, law,
and teaching. Personal status law for Palestinians is based on
religious law. For Muslim Palestinians, personal status law is
derived from Shari'a (Islamic) law. Women have certain rights
regarding marriage and divorce, inheritance, property
ownership, and children. Many women's rights activists
believe, however, that many women are not aware of their rights
and often fail to demand what is guaranteed to them by law.
Women's rights groups are active throughout the occupied
territories, dealing traditionally with social issues
(children, health, education) but have more recently begun to
venture out into practical training, women's rights education,
advocacy work, and political activism. The major concern of
women's groups is that women who have contributed significantly
to Palestinian political efforts will be relegated to
traditional roles in the interim period.
Children
There is no pattern of societal abuse of children. Palestinian
children have, however, probably suffered disproportionately
from the effects of military occupation and the intifada.
Since the uprising began in 1987, schools, which are often
overcrowded and underfunded, have been subject to frequent
closings by both the Israeli authorities and by Palestinian
activists enforcing strikes. Political tensions and lack of
funding have closed most of the few sports and recreation
facilities that existed for children. Encouraged by political
rhetoric and the example of older siblings, children have been
drawn into street violence and have frequently provoked it by
throwing stones. During 1993, credible sources report that 37
children (aged 16 and under) were killed by Israeli security
forces. While some had been involved in demonstrations or
rock-throwing incidents, others had been merely in the vicinity
of clashes when killed.
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities
Under the dual system of governance applied to Palestinians and
Israelis, Palestinians are treated less favorably than Israeli
settlers on a broad range of issues, including the right to due
process, residency rights, freedom of movement, sale of crops
and goods, land and water use, and access to health and social
services. Since the occupied territories were sealed off in
March, Muslim and Christian Palestinians have often been denied
access to holy places associated with their faith, while the
same restrictions have not applied to Jewish settlers (see
Section 2.c.). Israeli settlers involved in security
violations have been treated far more leniently than
Palestinians guilty of similar offenses. Offenses against
Israelis are investigated and prosecuted more vigorously than
offenses against Palestinians. Some Israeli agriculture and
manufacturing are protected against Palestinian competition
from the territories, whereas all markets in the territories
are open to Israelis. Significant disparities exist between
personal income taxes levied on Palestinians versus Israeli
settlers.
Despite tax reforms that took effect in January 1992, the
minimum taxable income applied to Israelis and Palestinians
differs markedly: while an Israeli pays no tax if his monthly
income is below about $1,000, Palestinians are liable for taxes
on any monthly income in excess of about $250. Corporate tax
breaks available to Israeli business people in settlements are
not applicable to Palestinians. Harsh tax enforcement
practices, including raids at night backed by Israeli soldiers,
are used against Palestinians who attempt to avoid paying
taxes. Tax raids directed at businesses and individuals
typically involve teams of tax inspectors, backed by soldiers,
who confiscate movable property and cash. Tax raids frequently
result in the temporary confiscation of identity cards as
well. According to the Declaration of Principles, direct tax
authority over non-Israelis will pass to the Palestinian
authority once the agreement is implemented. As of the end of
the year, transfer of that authority and other powers had not
yet been agreed.
People with Disabilities
There is no mandated provision of accessibility for the
disabled in the occupied territories. While some Palestinian
institutions for the care and training of disabled persons
exist, they generally suffer from chronic underfunding. This
sector has received little attention from Israel.
Section 6 Worker Rights
The applicable sections for West Bank and Gaza Palestinians
working in Israel are contained in the country report for
Israel.
a. The Right of Association
The labor law in the West Bank is Jordanian Law No. 21 of 1965,
as amended by military orders. It permits workers to join
unions without government authorization. It also permits
formation of unions by any group of 20 or more workers from the
same trade or workplace, with prior government authorization.
Nevertheless, Israeli authorities in the West Bank require all
proposed new unions to apply for a permit. During 1993 two new
unions were formed, but no new unions were licensed by the
authorities. Israeli authorities have licensed 31 unions out
of approximately 125 unions functioning in the West Bank.
The labor law in Gaza is Egyptian Military Order No. 331, which
supplements the prior British Mandate labor law and which has
been amended by Israeli military orders. It allows the
organization of unions on a workplace or craft basis. Since
1979, unions have been permitted to operate under strictly
enforced restrictions that permit only the 6 unions that
existed in 1967 to function in Gaza, under an umbrella
organization.
Palestinian residents of East Jerusalem are governed by the
same law as workers in Israel and are free to establish their
own labor unions. The Israeli authorities officially bar East
Jerusalem unions from joining the West Bank trade union
federations, though this restriction has not been enforced.
Individual Palestinian workers in East Jerusalem may belong to
both local unions, some of which are affiliated with a West
Bank federation, and the Israeli Histadrut Labor Federation.
West Bank unions are not affiliated with the Israeli Histadrut
Labor Federation. Palestinian workers who are not resident in
Israel or East Jerusalem are prevented by government order from
being full members of Histadrut. Nevertheless, all legal
Palestinian workers in Israel are required to contribute an
agency fee of 1 percent of their wages to Histadrut.
Palestinian workers also are required to contribute to the
National Insurance Scheme (NIS) which provides worker benefits,
e.g., unemployment, old age, maternity, and disability from
occupational accidents. Palestinian workers are not eligible
for all NIS benefits. (Israeli authorities maintain that the
Palestinians receive tax allowances and benefits through CIVAD
investment programs which adequately compensate Palestinian
workers.) The 1993 International Labor Organization (ILO)
Director General's report noted that: "Contrary to what is
maintained by the Israeli authorities, there is not a country
in the world that excludes such a high number of workers living
outside its territory from full social protection--which is
paid for by workers and employers--solely on the grounds that
their place of residence is outside the national territory."
The great majority of West Bank unions belong to either the
General Federation of Trade Unions in the West Bank (GFTU) or
the General Federation of Trade Unions in the West Bank -
Workers' Unity Bloc (WUB). Membership in the West Bank unions
was estimated at 100,000 in 1992, but deteriorating economic
conditions and the closure of the occupied territories
significantly reduced union membership in 1993. According to
the 1993 ILO Director General's report, membership in the GFTU
(the largest federation of unions) at most numbered 63,000, of
whom only 19,000 were full dues-paying members. The four
principal trade union blocs in the West Bank, including the
WUB, told an ILO mission that they were moving toward a full
reunification of the GFTU. The General Federation of Trade
Unions of the Gaza Strip consists of the six registered
unions. The GFTU participates in meetings of the International
Confederation of Arab Trade Unions (ICATU), although it is not
formally affiliated. Both the GFTU and the WUB have applied
for membership in the International Confederation of Free Trade
Unions (ICFTU). The GFTU and the Gaza Federation began a
dialog in 1993 with the Histadrut as a result of the
Declaration of Principles.
The West Bank unions are independent of the Government of
Israel. However, union organizations do reflect the prevailing
Palestinian political factions. Israeli authorities tend to
view unions more as political organizations than as labor
unions and occasionally inhibit union activities in the West
Bank and Gaza. Union leaders have been subject to harassment
ranging from arrests and administrative detention to
interrogation, denial of travel permits, and the refusal of
telephone and fax facilities.
Citing the reports of the ILO, the ICFTU's annual report for
1993 observed that a general fear of intimidation and possible
arrest by the Israeli authorities for participation in union
activities inhibits the development of union membership in the
territories. Like all organizations in the territories,
Palestinian labor organizations are subject to disciplinary
measures for engaging in political activities. All meetings of
10 or more non-Israeli citizens in the territories must have
prior CIVAD approval. During 1993, however, unions were able
to conduct meetings without reported interference. The Gaza
Federation was able in 1992 to hold its first May Day since
1967. According to the ILO's report, however, CIVAD told the
ILO mission that the IDF had prevented fundamentalists from
establishing what they considered to be a trade union front in
Ramallah.
Military Order 825 of 1980, officially applied in the West Bank
and unofficially in Gaza, requires that Palestinian unions
present lists of candidates for union office to the CIVAD for
approval 30 days before elections. The order authorizes the
CIVAD to remove from the lists any candidates who have been
convicted of a felony, including those sentenced for security
offenses. Despite this restriction, nearly half a dozen West
Bank trade unions held elections in 1992. West Bank unions
held no elections in 1993 due to internal organizational
difficulties and uncertainty about how the newly approved peace
accords would affect labor law and union structure.
There has been no dissolution of unions by administrative or
legislative action. Under prevailing labor law, unions have
the right to strike only after submitting a complaint to the
CIVAD for mandatory arbitration. Only one abbreviated strike
in the West Bank occurred in 1993, and the Israeli authorities
did not interfere. There are no laws that specifically protect
the rights of striking workers, and, in practice, such workers
have little or no protection from employers' retribution.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
A majority of workers in the occupied territories are
self-employed or unpaid family helpers in agriculture or
commerce. Only 40 percent of employment in the territories
consists of wage jobs, most in services provided by CIVAD, the
United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA), or
municipalities. Collective bargaining is protected. The CIVAD
does not record collective agreements because it does not
recognize some unions and union leaders. However, most
union-employer agreements are honored without interference from
the authorities; approximately 60 are currently in force in the
West Bank. According to the ILO Director General's report,
several labor committees, consisting of 3 to 5 members each in
businesses employing more than 20 workers, have been formed to
mediate labor grievances. The Center for Trade Union Rights,
headquartered in Bethlehem, is also active in conducting labor
courses and working with many different trade unions on the
spectrum of labor-related issues. Existing laws and
regulations do not offer real protection against antiunion
discrimination. The labor dispute ordinance of 1972
established a process for settling labor disputes in general
but does not deal specifically with antiunion discrimination.
There are no export processing zones in the occupied
territories.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
There is no forced or compulsory labor in the occupied
territories.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
A 1978 military order raised the minimum working age in the
West Bank and Gaza to 14. This order is not effectively
enforced, and underage labor is used in the agricultural sector
and in some West Bank and Gaza factories. Hours of young
workers are not limited compared to the regular work force.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
There is no minimum wage provision in the West Bank or Gaza.
In the West Bank, Jordanian law allows for a maximum workweek
of 48 hours with a required 24-hour rest period, except for
certain hotel, food service, and cinema employees, whose
workweek is 54 hours. In Gaza, Israeli authorities amended
this law to provide for a 45-hour workweek for day laborers and
a 40-hour week for salaried employees. There is no effective
enforcement of maximum workweek laws.
The Ministry of Labor's Office of Inspection services is
charged with enforcing health and safety standards in the West
Bank and Gaza and claims to have undertaken a small number of
inspections. Health and safety conditions in some factories do
not meet industry standards established by international labor
organizations.
[end of document]
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