| The State Department web site below is a permanent electronic archive of information released prior to January 20, 2001. Please see www.state.gov for material released since President George W. Bush took office on that date. This site is not updated so external links may no longer function. Contact us with any questions about finding information. NOTE: External links to other Internet sites should not be construed as an endorsement of the views contained therein. |
TITLE: MOROCCO HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES, 1993
DATE: JANUARY 31, 1994
AUTHOR: U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
MOROCCO
The Constitution of Morocco provides for a constitutional
monarchy with a pluralistic political system, a representative
Parliament, and an independent judiciary. Recent changes to
the Constitution ostensibly increase the power of the Prime
Minister and Parliament relative to the Crown. In practice,
however, ultimate authority rests with the King, who retains
the discretion both to dismiss ministers and to dissolve
Parliament in order to rule by decree. Two-stage parliamentary
elections in 1993 produced gains for opposition parties in the
first stage which were reversed, amid credible reports of
government manipulation, in the second stage.
The security apparatus comprises several overlapping police and
paramilitary organizations whose activities are coordinated by
the national government. The Direction de la Surveillance du
Territoire (DST), Surete Nationale, and judicial police are
under the Ministry of Interior, while the Gendarmerie Royale
reports directly to the Palace. Security forces continued to
commit human rights abuses, including torture. Evidence was
released, in the notorious "Tabit affair," showing that senior
Surete Nationale officers had systematically abused hundreds of
women over several years. (Several officials were tried and
convicted, while Tabit himself was executed--see Section 1.c.).
Morocco has a mixed economy based largely on agriculture,
fishing, light industry, phosphate mining, tourism, and
remittances from Moroccans working abroad. An illegal drug
trade also is a significant factor. Since the early 1980's,
Morocco has pursued an economic reform program that has
contributed to generally strong economic growth and low
inflation, although these developments have been set back by a
drought now in its second year. The Government recently
launched a program of privatizing state-owned enterprises.
The Government of Morocco took several steps in 1993 to address
human rights concerns, including establishing a Deputy Minister
for Human Rights, ratifying several international conventions
on human rights, and amending laws on polygamy, divorce, and
spousal support to mandate more favorable treatment of women.
The Royal Consultative Council on Human Rights (CCDH) formed
working groups to investigate various areas of human rights
concerns, opened dialogs with domestic human rights groups, and
recommended to the King that government ministries become more
responsive to inquiries about possible human rights abuses.
Closer scrutiny, however, reveals many of these steps to be
cosmetic. Credible reports of routine abuse of prisoners
continued unabated, and at least three deaths in custody can
reasonably be attributed to torture. Freedom of speech and
press continued to be restricted, especially in cases perceived
to affect the security of the State. Other principal problems
included limitations on the right of citizens to change their
government, arbitrary arrest and detention, a weak and
malleable judiciary, and restrictions on the freedoms of
travel, assembly and association, and religion, and additional
constraints on women's rights.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
Credible reports document that at least three persons died in
police custody in 1993 due to Moroccan security force
brutality. The most publicized police brutality case involved
the death on May 16 of Mustapha Hamzaoui in the jail at
Khenifra. Hamzaoui, a former law student and activist with the
left-wing Moroccan Association of Unemployed Graduates, was
arrested on May 15 on suspicion of verbally assaulting four
young women. According to Khenifra authorities, he was
interrogated twice while in custody and then committed suicide
by hanging. Alleging that the body bore evidence of multiple
cigarette burns and mutilated genitalia, Hamzaoui's family
refused to accept his remains without the performance of an
autopsy. Although the Ministry of Justice sent a physician to
examine the body, no autopsy report was made public. Khenifra
authorities subsequently released a statement confirming the
finding of suicide and impugning Hamzaoui's character. Despite
appeals and a legal motion filed by the OMDH, no further
government investigation or response has been made. Hamzaoui's
family is reportedly under government pressure to drop the
matter.
In another case, Abdellah Bentawet died while in detention in a
Tangier jail. He was arrested on June 1 after being involved
in an altercation. Members of his family allege that, while
they were visiting the detainee, a security agent began to beat
him and demanded payment of approximately $16 for his release,
which the family refused to make. On the following day,
Bentawet's family was informed that he had committed suicide.
Moroccan authorities have not responded to repeated requests by
human rights organizations for an investigation.
In a third case, Mounir Azzag, a 22 year-old Tangier resident
was arrested on October 9 after an argument with police about a
parking infraction. On October 11, his family was notified
that he had committed suicide while in custody. Called to the
morgue, his family reported that the body bore a large facial
cut and that the authorities refused to allow them to view the
entire body. An autopsy ordered by local authorities found no
indications of violence yet concluded that death was caused by
hanging.
The police involved in the Hamzaoui, Bentawet, and Azzag deaths
were all employed by the Ministry of the Interior. No
disciplinary actions have been instituted against them.
b. Disappearance
There were no reported permanent disappearances in 1993.
Temporary "disappearances" continued to result from the
practice of holding persons in pretrial incommunicado
detention, without notifying families or attorneys, for longer
than the legal limit of 48 hours.
In May the Moroccan Human Rights Organization (OMDH) published
a list of 24 persons who disappeared between 1973 and 1987,
most after arrest or conviction on charges related to political
activity. OMDH's requests to the Ministries of Justice and
Interior for information regarding the welfare and whereabouts
of these persons have gone unanswered. Other human rights
organizations have published much higher estimates of the
number of persons who have permanently disappeared after last
being seen in the custody of Moroccan security forces. The
Government has never acknowledged any such cases, including the
300 Sahrawis (native Saharans) released without comment in 1991
after detention for up to 15 years. As one of many examples,
repeated appeals to Moroccan authorities for information
regarding the fate of Abdelhaq Rouissi, a trade unionist who
disappeared after his arrest 29 years ago, have been met either
with silence or summary dismissal.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
Although the Government ratified the Convention Against Torture
in June, credible reports persist of security force involvement
in physical abuse, including torture and degrading treatment,
of detainees. Disinterested former prisoners reported that
detainees suspected of politically motivated crimes were more
likely than other detainees to be subjected to physical abuse.
Harsh treatment reportedly continued after conviction, with
guards subjecting prisoners to random violence and deliberately
depriving them of family visits, sleep, baths, blankets,
medical care, food, and access to study materials. There were
no reports that torturers were held accountable for their
actions in 1993. Moreover, although they have the power to do
so, prosecutors appear reluctant to order medical examination
in cases where torture is alleged.
The arrest and conviction in 1993 of a senior Surete Nationale
official revealed a disturbing record of systematic rape and
assault of women. One official, Mohammed Tabit, was found
guilty on hundreds of charges of rape and assault perpetrated
over a period of several years during which he served in
various posts within the Surete Nationale, including as
Commissioner of a Casablanca precinct. Under pretense of
police business, Tabit typically would lure his victims to a
Casablanca apartment where he would assault them while
videotaping his activities. He was assisted in his crimes by
several Surete Nationale officials. Tabit himself was
executed. In addition to those who were convicted in
connection with the affair, several high ranking government
officials were removed without comment. The press held those
personnel changes to be indicative of widespread knowledge
within the Government of Tabit's activities throughout his
career.
Prison conditions in Morocco are harsh. At least 15 persons
died in prisons in 1993 due either to illnesses contracted as a
result of unhealthy prison conditions or lack of medical care
for preexisting illnesses. Inmate hunger strikes to protest
prison conditions, especially by Islamist inmates (i.e.,
prisoners whose crimes were motivated by pursuit of the
doctrines of political Islam), have become commonplace.
Three prisoners died in a 2-week period in a single prison in
Casablanca, each within days of beginning a short sentence for
a minor crime. There is no evidence to establish overt
security force involvement in these deaths, which appeared to
result from a lack of basic medical care, sanitation, and
nutrition. Acknowledging the substandard conditions in
Moroccan prisons, CCDH has established a working group to
recommend improvements. However, the Government, citing
economic constraints, continued in 1993 to decline to invest
significant resources to improve penal living conditions.
Earlier reports of the closing and destruction of the Tazmamart
detention facility, notorious for its harsh treatment of
prisoners, have not been verified. After years of denials,
King Hassan acknowledged for the first time in a May interview
that the facility had existed. However, the Government refused
to comment on past or present activities at the Tazmamart site
or to provide an accounting of the prisoners who were confined
there, many of whom apparently died there. The few surviving
prisoners who were released from Tazmamart have indicated that
their continued liberty is conditioned upon their silence
regarding the circumstances of their imprisonment. There is no
indication that the Government is investigating Tazmamart
abuses for the purpose of bringing those responsible to justice.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
Legal guarantees of procedural due process in Morocco,
extensively revised in recent years, are frequently ignored.
Arrests usually take place in public, but police sometimes
refuse to identify themselves. Warrants are not always used.
The law requires that a detainee be brought before a judge
within 48 hours of detention (extendable to 96 hours upon
approval of the prosecutor) and informed of the charges against
him. Under the revised due process rules, incommunicado (garde
a vue) detention is limited to 48 hours, with a one-time
24-hour extension upon request by the prosecutor. An accused
person must be brought to trial within 2 months of arrest, with
up to five extensions of 2 months each allowed at the
discretion of the prosecutor. Detainees are denied counsel
during the initial period of detention when torture is most
likely to take place. Counsel is allowed only as of the first
cross-examination, and many cases are resolved without
cross-examination.
According to Moroccan human rights groups, compliance with the
new due process rules has been irregular. Some members of the
security forces, long used to indefinite precharge access to
detainees, continue to resist the new rules. Lawyers are
sometimes not informed as to the date of detention and are thus
unable to monitor garde a vue detention limits. However, there
were no known instances in 1993 of the once common practice of
indefinite incommunicado detention.
Moroccan law creates a limited system of bail that is rarely
used, although defendants are sometimes released on their own
recognizance. The law does not provide for habeas corpus or
its equivalent.
Under a separate Code of Military Justice, military authorities
may detain members of the military without warrants or public
trial.
Abdessalem Yassine, leader of the banned Islamist organization
Justice and Charity, remained under house arrest in his home
after 2 years of detention without trial. His family members
are only occasionally allowed to visit him. No other visits
are allowed. Indicative of its subordination to the Ministry
of the Interior, CCDH has not publicly questioned the propriety
of the Ministry's confinement of Yassine.
There are no known instances of Moroccans being sentenced to
exile.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
Morocco has a dual legal system: a secular system based in
part on French legal tradition and a parallel Islamic system
which adjudicates family matters and inheritance law for
Moroccan Muslims. The secular system includes courts of
original jurisdiction, appellate courts, and a Supreme Court.
Judges in this system are university-trained attorneys who have
undergone further specialized training prior to assuming their
positions.
Political and security offenses are not distinguished from
common criminal offenses under Moroccan law. All criminal
matters are tried in the secular courts. In general, cases are
brought before a court of first instance which may call for a
hearing quickly to bring cases to trial. The detainee is
informed of charges and questioned by the judge who decides if
the charges have merit. If the infraction is minor and not
contested, the judge may release the detainee or impose a light
sentence. If a lengthy investigation is required, the judge
may release detainees on their own recognizance. Criminal
cases are frequently resolved by confessions. Disinterested
former prisoners continued to report attempts by authorities to
extract confessions under duress.
The Islamic court system consists only of trial courts, and
their decisions may not be appealed. Although judges in this
system are clerics who traditionally were not trained in the
law, judges named to the bench in recent years have been
formally educated in Islamic law. Cases are decided on the
basis of the Koran or the derivative Shari'a and are often
tried without attorneys.
Both the secular and Islamic courts are susceptible to
extrajudicial pressures. Secular court judges are not well
paid. Cash payments to unscrupulous judges are widely reported
to be commonplace in routine criminal cases. Likewise, judges
hearing cases involving challenges to royal authority or state
policy are vulnerable to political pressure, especially from
the Ministry of Interior. The accused in such cases do not
enjoy the procedural safeguards needed to ensure a fair trial.
Comments made by the prosecutor during the Tabit trial, for
example, clearly indicated that the sitting judge was following
instructions from the Ministry of the Interior and the Palace.
Islamic court judges are paid by the parties for services in
settling inheritance cases, with compensation often a
percentage of the assets involved.
Aside from external pressures, the secular court system is also
subject to resource constraints. Consequently, criminal
defendants charged with less serious offenses often receive
only cursory hearings, with judges relying on police reports to
render decisions. Although the Government provides an attorney
at public expense for serious crimes (when the alleged offense
carries a maximum sentence of over 5 years), appointed
attorneys often provide inadequate representation.
Proceedings in the cases of three labor leaders convicted of
expressing antigovernment views were concluded in 1993. In May
the Court of Appeal upheld the conviction of Noubir Amaoui who
was sentenced in 1992 to 2 years in prison for defaming the
Government after a trial widely criticized for being
politically motivated and for procedural irregularities and
restrictions on public and press access. In July Amaoui was
granted a royal pardon and released. Driss Laghnimi was
convicted in 1993 for insulting the person of the King during a
public discussion between members of different unions. He also
received a royal pardon following denial of his appeal in
April. The Court of Appeal also upheld the conviction of Ahmed
Belaichi who was sentenced in 1992 to 3 years in prison for
"affront to the military" after a trial in which several
defense witnesses were not permitted to testify. He remains in
prison.
Moroccan human rights organizations periodically publish lists
of prisoners "of opinion," prisoners accused of armed
conspiracy or violence for political reasons, and prisoners
convicted following demonstrations or strikes. These groups
estimate that Moroccan prisons now hold 500 to 600 prisoners in
these categories, of whom approximately 100 are held for crimes
of politically motivated violence, and approximately 300 were
arrested in connection with strike or demonstration
activities. Because the Government defines several categories
of speech as criminal (see Section 2.a.), it regards political
prisoners as common criminals.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
The Constitution states that the home is inviolable and that no
search or investigation may take place without a search warrant
issued in compliance with the law. Current law stipulates that
a search warrant may be issued by a prosecutor on good cause.
This stipulation is not always observed, however, and there
continue to be reports of illegal searches of the homes and
offices of suspected political activists.
Government security services, generally operating under the
direction of the Ministry of the Interior, selectively monitor
certain persons and organizations, both foreign and Moroccan,
including their telephones and mail. University campuses are
under close surveillance, and there is an extensive informant
system, especially on campuses and in cities.
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
The Constitution provides for freedom of expression, but by
Moroccan law and tradition negative commentary is forbidden on
three topics: the monarchy, Morocco's claim to the Western
Sahara, and the sanctity of Islam. Statements on these
subjects may be deemed crimes against state security. In
addition, many Moroccans are careful not to criticize the
foreign or domestic policies of the Government for fear of
reprisal.
Mustapha Dadao, a Marrakech student arrested in 1992 for
allegedly shouting offensive slogans at a May Day rally, was
convicted in January of "insult to the King" and sentenced to 5
years. A year was added to his sentence when he commented that
his trial had been "superficial." Fifteen Oujda students were
convicted in January of "illegal demonstrations and
distribution of untruthful tracts susceptible of disturbing the
public order" and received sentences ranging from 1 month to
1 year. In March two students received 2-month sentences for
protesting against a new examination schedule. In June five
Khenifra youths received 3-month sentences for holding a
demonstration protesting the death in detention of Mustapha
Hamzaoui. (See Section 1.a.)
Press freedom is significantly restricted, though the limits
are not clearly defined. A 1958 decree gives the Government
the authority to register and license domestic newspapers and
journals. In practice, authorities use the licensing process
to prevent the publication of materials that they believe cross
the threshold of tolerable dissent. Offending publications may
be declared a danger to state security and may be seized; the
publisher's license may be suspended and equipment destroyed.
Article 55 of the Press Code empowers the Government to censor
newspapers directly by ordering them not to report on specific
items or events.
The Government tolerates satirical and often stinging
editorials in the opposition parties' dailies. The tone of
those editorials became especially sharp during the 1993
election campaigns. The press also continued in 1993 to report
allegations of torture and other harsh treatment, abuse of
authority, and prisoners' complaints of degrading conditions.
In particular, the flagrant abuses perpetrated by Casablanca
police officers revealed during the Tabit trial were widely
reported. In November the opposition news daily L'Opinion ran
a series of editorials critical of the state of democracy in
Morocco. The paper's editor was summoned to the office of the
Minister of Interior. The paper thereafter ran an open letter
to the Minister condemning his alleged threat to imprison the
editor. Other opposition papers have subsequently
editorialized in support of L'Opinion's stance against the
Minister.
Government control of the media generally is exercised through
directives and "guidance" bulletins from the Ministry of
Interior. The media regularly engages in self-censorship,
prompted by a desire to avoid the Government's attention and
possible sanctions. The Government owns the official press
agency, Maghreb Arab Press, and the Arabic daily Al Anbaa.
The Government owns the only television station receivable
nationwide without cable or satellite dish antennas. Dish
antennas are available, though expensive, and permit free
access to a wide variety of foreign broadcasts. Morocco's sole
private station can be seen in most urban areas with the rental
of an inexpensive decoder. Northern residents can receive
Spanish stations with standard antennas. The Government does
not impede reception of foreign broadcasts.
A great number of foreign news publications are available,
particularly from Europe and the United States. Although
generally tolerating a broad spectrum of opinion in the foreign
press distributed in Morocco, the Government continued in 1993
to ban those editions of foreign publications that contained
articles about Morocco deemed particularly offensive. For
example, distribution of the February 6 and March 29 editions
of Le Monde were blocked apparently because they contained
articles describing efforts of a major Moroccan company to
acquire a foreign radio station, offering an unflattering
appraisal of Moroccan-French relations, and questioning the
fairness of the Moroccan elections. Moroccan authorities
searched the hotel room of a British journalist, who was
preparing a story on the Tabit trial, questioned her regarding
her activities, and later confiscated her notes at the airport.
Moroccan universities enjoy relative academic freedom in most
areas, but the Government prohibits academic investigation of
the Islamic roots of the monarchy. Limited research and
publishing on Islam and Islamic fundamentalism is tolerated.
Ministry of Interior approval is a prerequisite to tenure in
all disciplines. Professors complain that the Ministry often
confers tenure on political, rather than purely academic,
grounds.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
Although the the Constitution provides for freedom of assembly
and association, this right is significantly limited by three
decrees, dating from 1935, 1939, and 1958, which permit the
Government to suppress even peaceful demonstrations and mass
gatherings. Several groups were subject to government
restraints on speech in 1993. In the aftermath of the Tabit
affair, 19 Moroccan women's groups organized a march in Rabat
against sexual harassment. It was to be the first of its kind
in Morocco and was expected to draw thousands of participants.
Without explanation, the Government denied permission for the
march.
Authorities broke up a variety of peaceful demonstrations in
1993, often injuring and arresting the participants. In April
a sit-in organized by the Moroccan National Association of
Unemployed Graduates to call attention to the lack of
employment available to recent graduates was forcibly dispersed
by authorities. In June a sit-in organized by a group of blind
students to publicize their ineligibility for unemployment
compensation was similarly disrupted by authorities. In
November several members of this group were injured or arrested
when police forcibly broke up another demonstration in front of
the Ministry of the Interior. The Government continued to
impede the ability of human rights groups to hold public
meetings, often by denying necessary permits.
Another effective restraint on assembly rights is imposed by
the Government's practice of closing mosques to the public
shortly after religious services, thereby removing any
potential for the practice, common in other Muslim countries,
of using mosque premises for political activity.
The right to form organizations is limited. Under a 1958
decree, persons wishing to create an organization must obtain
the approval of the Ministry of the Interior before holding
meetings. In practice, the Ministry uses this requirement to
prevent persons suspected of advocating causes opposed by the
Government from forming legal organizations. Islamist and
leftist groups have the greatest difficulty in obtaining
official sanction. Twenty-nine Islamist groups have been
active within Morocco. Membership in two of these groups,
Justice and Charity and Jama'a Islamia, has been outlawed due
to perceived antimonarchy rhetoric. Political parties must
also be approved by the Ministry of the Interior, which uses
this power to control participation in the political process.
c. Freedom of Religion
Islam is the official religion of Morocco. Ninety-nine percent
of Moroccans are Sunni Muslims, and the King bears the title
"Commander of the Faithful." The Jewish community of
approximately 7,000 is permitted to practice its faith, as is
the somewhat larger foreign Christian community. Members of
these religions are legally forbidden to proselytize, although
several dozen evangelical missionaries conduct services and
bible meetings which are attended by some Moroccan Muslims.
Although the Constitution provides for freedom of worship, only
Islam, Christianity, and Judaism are tolerated in practice.
The King has pronounced all other religions to be heresies.
The Baha'i community of 150-200 people has been forbidden to
meet or hold communal activities since 1983. According to
Islamic law and tradition, conversion of any kind from Islam is
strictly prohibited, and any attempt to induce a Muslim to
convert is punishable by imprisonment. In October Mustapha
Zmamda, a Moroccan Muslim, was sentenced to 3 years in prison
after he refused to discontinue correspondence with the
directors of a Christian radio program broadcast to North
Africa from France. A Brazilian missionary who hosted bible
meetings attended by Zmamda was fired from his teaching
position, reportedly after the Ministry of the Interior
threatened to revoke the operating license of his employer
unless he was dismissed.
The Government monitors Friday mosque sermons and the
curriculum of Koranic schools to insure that approved doctrines
are taught. Fundamentalist Islamic activities are sometimes
repressed but are largely tolerated so long as they remain
restricted to the propagation of Islam and educational and
charitable activities. Islamist groups that question the
King's status as Commander of the Faithful and those that
engage in violence are suppressed.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
Although freedom of movement within Morocco is provided for in
the Constitution, in practice security forces set up roadblocks
throughout the country and stop traffic at will. In some
regions the roadblocks have been maintained in the same places
for years, creating what some characterize as internal
frontiers. In the Western Sahara, which is administered by
Morocco, movement is restricted in areas regarded as militarily
sensitive.
The Interior Ministry restricts the freedom to travel outside
Morocco in certain circumstances. For example, it has refused
to issue passports to a number of Moroccans, including certain
political activists, former political prisoners, and Baha'is.
In February the OMDH published a list of 52 former political
prisoners, human rights monitors, lawyers, and others who
continued to be denied passports. In a series of spring
meetings, CCDH members met with Ministry of the Interior
officials and requested status reports on several passport
applications. By years' end the Ministry issued passports to
46 persons on the OMDH list. Some former political prisoners,
after being issued passports, were denied exit at border points
on the basis that government computers had not been updated to
reflect their eligibility to leave. There continued to be
reports of instances in which police seized passports at border
points or otherwise blocked the exit of Moroccans trying to
leave the country, usually without explanation.
Women must have permission from either their fathers or
husbands to obtain a passport. A divorced woman must have her
father's permission to obtain a passport and, if she has
custody of the children, she must have permission of the
children's father for passports to be issued to the children.
Although the King has characterized the male consent
requirement as contrary to Islam and the Constitution, no
changes in these provisions were made in 1993.
There are frequent allegations of corruption in the passport
offices; applicants are reportedly forced to pay gratuities to
obtain application forms and to make sure that the application
is not lost in the bureaucratic labyrinth. All Moroccan civil
servants must obtain written permission from their ministries
to leave the country each time they wish to do so.
Moroccans may not renounce Moroccan citizenship, but the King
has the rarely used power to revoke it. Tens of thousands of
Moroccans hold more than one citizenship and travel on
passports from two or more countries. While in Morocco they
are regarded as Moroccan citizens. As a result, the Government
has sometimes refused to recognize the right of foreign
embassies to act on behalf of dual nationals or even to receive
information concerning their arrest and imprisonment. Dual
nationals also complain of harassment by Moroccan immigration
inspectors.
Moroccan law encourages voluntary repatriation of Moroccan Jews
who have emigrated; Moroccan Jewish emigres, including those
with Israeli citizenship, freely visit Morocco. The law also
encourages the return of Saharans who have opposed Morocco in
the Western Sahara conflict. Returning former members of the
Polisario, a group seeking independence for the Western Sahara,
who are deemed to pose no threat to security are integrated
into Moroccan life.
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government
Moroccan citizens do not enjoy the right to change their
government by democratic means. The King, as Head of State,
appoints the Prime Minister, who is the titular head of
government. The Parliament has the theoretical authority to
effect change in the system of government, but has never
exercised it. Moreover, the Constitution may not be changed
without the King's approval. The Ministry of the Interior
appoints provincial governors. Municipal councils are elected.
Constitutional changes in 1992 vested in the Prime Minister the
power to nominate all other government ministers. However, the
King retained the right to replace any minister at will. Any
significant surrender of power from the crown to the Prime
Minister's office was further obviated by an April decree by
which the King greatly increased both the power and the pay of
the secretaries general of the ministries. The decree
effectively delegated to the secretaries general many of the
powers previously vested in the ministers. The secretaries
general serve at the pleasure of the King.
The first parliamentary elections in 9 years were held in
1993. Under reforms implemented in 1992, electoral commissions
were empowered to oversee the election process and to hear
complaints of irregularities, but the conduct of the elections
remained in the hands of the Interior Ministry. Of the 333
members of Parliament, 222 are elected directly by universal
adult suffrage, while 111 are elected indirectly by various
business, labor, and agricultural organizations. In the direct
elections held in June, opposition parties did very well. This
first phase of the elections received generally favorable marks
from international observers. Although informed observers
expected opposition parties to solidify their gains in the
indirect elections in September, the second stage left
opposition parties barely short of the strength needed to form
a coalition government and resulted in widespread charges of
election fraud and manipulation, ranging from the strong-arming
of association members responsible for nominating candidates to
the falsification of voting lists.
Several new parties were created during the elections. Sixteen
parties are now officially recognized by the Interior Ministry.
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
of Human Rights
There are three officially recognized nongovernmental human
rights groups: the Moroccan Human Rights Organization (OMDH),
the Moroccan League for the Defense of Human Rights (LMDDH),
and the Moroccan Human Rights Association (AMDH). LMDDH,
associated with the Istiqlal Party, and AMDH, associated with
the Party of the Socialist Avant Garde, have formed a
coordinating committee and generally issue joint communiques.
The LMDDH and the nonpartisan OMDH accepted invitations to
participate in CCDH activities. All three groups report that
ministries, usually Justice and Interior, invariably fail to
respond or even acknowledge their inquiries regarding
particular human rights cases. Investigations by Moroccan
human rights groups are generally conducted with neither
government hindrance nor cooperation.
As noted in Section 2.b., the authorities continued to impede
the ability of human rights groups to hold public meetings and
in one instance picked up a human rights group leader for
several hours of questioning about the group's activities.
At the urging of CCDH, the Government in 1993 allowed the first
visit by an international human rights group in 3 years. In an
interview prior to the arrival of a delegation from Amnesty
International (AI), King Hassan II pointedly attacked AI's
methods and credibility. Nevertheless, the delegation came
away, after 18 hours of meetings with the CCDH, encouraged by
the Government's willingness to engage in a human rights
dialogue. AI representatives returned in December.
In general, however, the Government does not cooperate with
international investigations of allegations of human rights
abuses in Morocco. It generally does not respond to inquiries
about specific political prisoners made by diplomatic
missions. If allowed in the country, human rights monitors are
generally refused access to people or conditions they want to
see.
In 1990, in response to criticism of Morocco's human rights
performance, the King created the CCDH, among whose
responsibilities was the representation of Morocco at
international human rights forums such as the United Nations
Human Rights Commission and with foreign nongovernmental
organizations. CCDH's powers are not commensurate with its
mandate from the King to expose and correct abuses of human
rights. While it proposes reforms to the Palace and some of
its recommendations, such as a reduction in the period of
permissible precharge detention, are implemented, its capacity
to investigate a particular report of abuse is limited to
making inquiry of the concerned ministry, usually Interior, and
awaiting a reply. CCDH has neither the authority to hold
government officers responsible for abuses nor the inclination
to condemn publicly the consistent failure of ministries to
respond to its inquiries.
A Moroccan government official served as interim president of
the preparatory commission for the 1993 World Conference on
Human Rights in Geneva.
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Disability, Language, or Social Status
Women
Moroccan women suffer various forms of discrimination, both
legal and cultural. Under the Criminal Code, women are
generally accorded the same treatment as men. Women are not
accorded equal treatment under family and estate law, which is
based on the Malikite school of Islamic law. In marriage, for
example, a husband may repudiate his wife, but the wife may not
repudiate her husband. The situations under which a woman may
sue for divorce are far fewer than those permitted to men.
Women inherit only half as much as their male siblings.
Moreover, even where the law guarantees equal status, cultural
norms often prevent a woman's exercise of those rights. When a
Moroccan woman inherits property from a father or husband, for
example, male relatives may force her to sign over her
interest.
Many well-educated women succeed in breaking into the
professional ranks, particularly in the areas of law, medicine,
education, and government service. There are, however, few
women in the top echelons of their professions. Women comprise
approximately 24 percent of the work force, with the majority
of them in the industrial, service, and teaching sectors.
Women have the right to vote and to run for office. Some women
have been elected to municipal councils and two women were
elected to Parliament in 1993. There are no women on the CCDH,
nor are there any women serving as government ministers.
Women suffer most from inequality in the rural areas. Rural
women perform most hard physical labor; the rate of literacy,
particularly in the countryside, is noticeably lower for women
than for men; and girls are much less likely to be sent to
school than are boys. Women who earn their secondary school
diploma, however, have equal access to university training.
The law and social practices governing violence against women
reflect Morocco's Islamic culture and the importance placed on
the honor of the family. The Criminal Code includes severe
punishment for men who are convicted of raping or violating a
woman or girl, and the defendant bears the burden of proving
his innocence. However, sexual assaults often go unreported
because of the stigma attached to the loss of virginity. A
rapist may be offered the opportunity to marry his victim in
order to preserve the honor of the victim's family. Although a
woman who is the victim of wife beating has the right to
complain to the police, as a practical matter she could do so
only if prepared to file for divorce and leave her husband's
home. The law excuses the murder or injury of a wife who is
caught in the act of committing adultery. A woman would not be
excused for committing violence against her husband under the
same circumstances.
The civil law status of Moroccan women is governed by the
Moudouwana, or Code of Personal Status, which is based in part
on the Koran. With the active support of the King, limited
reform of the Moudouwana, consistent with the mandates of the
Koran, were effected in 1993. The amendments allow a wife to
divorce a husband who announces an intent to take a second
wife; grant a wife unspecified allowance rights, based on the
husband's income, in cases where a husband files for divorce
without legal justification; and recognize a wife's priority of
right to custody of any children after a divorce. Women's
groups in Morocco unsuccessfully requested that the Moudouwana
changes include expanded rights to combat spousal violence, a
problem they believe to be commonplace. Presently, a wife's
charge of spousal abuse, even if proven, merely entitles her to
divorce with no mandatory economic support. Hence, victims of
spousal abuse are unlikely to report its occurrence to
authorities.
Children
Morocco launched in November a campaign to vaccinate children
against preventable diseases. However, the Government takes
little action to promote child welfare in the areas of child
labor (see Section 6.d.) and education. The announced
illiteracy rate is 55 percent, and the actual rate is higher,
especially in rural areas.
At year's end, the Moroccan daily 'L'Opinion summarized several
cases involving the physical abuse of young maids by their
employers. At least two 1993 cases were before Moroccan
courts. In the first, a Casablanca police officer and his wife
were arrested for severely beating a 6-year-old maid recruited
from poor rural relatives. In the second, a military officer's
wife from Meknes was arrested for the murder of a 14-year-old
maid who died after admission to a hospital exhibiting symptoms
of torture and starvation. After citing scores of examples of
the abuse of young girls employed as domestics, 'L'Opinion
concluded that documented cases were merely the "tip of the
iceberg" and accused the Government of callous indifference to
the problem.
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities
The Constitution affirms the legal equality of all Moroccans,
and the Government does not discriminate based on ethnicity.
The official language of Morocco is Arabic, and the languages
of instruction and the news media are Arabic and French.
Science and technical curriculums are taught in French, thereby
eliminating the large monolingual Arabic population from these
programs. Moroccan educational reforms over the past decade
have stressed use of Arabic in secondary schools. Failure to
similarly transform the university system has functionally
disqualified many students, especially those from poorer homes
where French tutoring is not practicable, from higher education
in lucrative fields.
People with Disabilities
A high incidence of disabling disease, especially polio, has
produced a large population of disabled persons in Morocco.
Wlhile the Ministry of Social Affairs contends that the
Government endeavors to integrate the disabled into society,
this in practice is left largely to private charities.
However, charitable special education schools are priced beyond
the reach of most families. Most typically, disabled persons
survive by begging. The Government recently initiated a pilot
training program for the blind. There are no laws guaranteeing
access for the disabled.
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
The Constitution guarantees "the right of association and the
right to join any trade union and political organization."
Workers are free to form and join unions, and the right is
exercised widely. According to the trade union federations,
well over a million of Morocco's 9 million workers are
unionized; 5 percent of the work force is a more accurate
estimate. Substantial numbers of workers in the public sector
are unionized.
Three of the 17 existing trade union federations dominate the
labor scene; all are organizationally independent of the
Government. They are the Union Marocaine de Travail (UMT), the
Confederation Democratique de Travail (CDT), and the Union
Generale des Travailleurs Marocains (UGTM). The UMT has no
political affiliation, the CDT is linked to the Socialist Union
of Popular Forces (USFP), and the UGTM to the nationalist
Istiqlal Party.
Unions are not entirely free of government influence. The
internal intelligence services of the Interior Ministry keep
the Government fully apprised of trade union activity, and the
selection of union officers and the carrying out of their
duties are sometimes subject to government pressure.
Within individual unions, the right to select one's own leaders
is usually recognized. However, some violations occur; in May
the UMT's national headquarters unilaterally replaced the
regional leaders in the town of El Jadida by forcefully
expelling the local leaders and replacing them with their own.
Under the Constitution, workers have the right to strike and do
so. Most work stoppages are intended to advertise grievances;
they usually last 24 hours or less. However, strikes can be
prolonged and arise not only from economic demands or working
conditions but also from union rivalries. Partially in
response to a royal warning not to disturb social peace prior
to the parliamentary elections, there were relatively few
strikes in early 1993, and the labor scene remained relatively
quiet after the June elections in anticipation of the formation
of a new, more prolabor government. Teacher trainees
performing 2 years of civil service conducted a sit-in and
hunger strike in the summer to demand permanent positions; the
first attempt at the sit-in in July was broken up by police,
and some protesters were arrested. A number of limited 1- and
2-day strikes closed most college and high school campuses for
several days in February and March as teachers struck over
longstanding grievances, including pay, working conditions, and
benefits. There were similar 2-day strikes in the public
health, railroads, and postal sectors in March.
The release from prison of CDT Secretary General Noubir Amaoui
and UGTM activist Driss Laghnimi in July was seen as a sign of
greater government willingness to cooperate with labor
following the success of prolabor parties in the June
legislative elections. The International Labor Organization
(ILO) Committee on Freedom of Association (CFA), reviewing
several complaints at its 1993 sessions about arrest of trade
unionists for participating in strikes or distributing material
expressing political opinions, expressed concern that the
Government had not respected workers' right to freedom of
association.
Unions and union federations are free to affiliate
internationally and do so actively. The UMT rejoined the
International Confederation of Free Trade Unions in 1990 after
an absence of many years.
Unions belong to regional labor organizations and maintain ties
with international trade secretariats.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
The Constitution includes labor organizations among the
entities that serve to "organize and represent the citizens."
An implied right to organize and bargain collectively is
exercised, but laws protecting collective bargaining are not
highly developed. The multiplicity of trade union federations
creates competition to organize workers. Any group of eight
workers may organize, and a worker may change trade union
affiliation. Thus, a single factory may contain several
independent locals or locals affiliated with more than one
labor federation.
In both the process of organizing and during collective
bargaining, labor laws are widely observed most often in the
corporate and parastatal sectors of the economy, where ad hoc
government mediation and arbitration procedures to promote
worker-employer negotiations are easily applied. These
mediation procedures do not in practice limit unions' freedom
to bargain collectively. The unions' most common complaint
against employers is that they refuse to negotiate seriously.
In the informal and underground economies and in the textile
and handicrafts fields, labor laws and regulations are poorly
enforced. Small employers, especially in the agricultural
sector, are often ignorant of labor laws and regulations.
While the right to organize and bargain collectively exists in
both the Constitution and labor law, the Government does not
always protect this right. As a practical matter, the unions
have no judicial recourse to oblige the Government to act when
it has not met its obligations under the law. Moreover,
political considerations often lead the Government to hinder
the full exercise of worker rights in an effort to control the
unions.
In some parts of the industrial and parastatal sectors there is
a long-established tradition of collective bargaining, but this
practice is not spreading to emerging sectors of the economy.
The wages of unionized workers are established through
practices that include discussions between employer and worker
representatives. However, wages for the vast majority of
nonunionized workers are set unilaterally by the employer,
ostensibly respecting the minimum wage law. In the industrial
sector, collective bargaining agreements are often invoked in
legal disputes when a worker claims to have been reprimanded or
dismissed for trade union activity. Employers usually cite
work-related reasons for the dismissals. An employer intending
to fire workers without replacing them must apply in advance to
the provincial governor through the Labor Inspector's office.
In cases where employers plan to replace fired workers, the
Labor Inspector provides replacements and mediates the cases of
workers who protest their dismissal. Any worker fired for a
serious infraction such as sabotage is entitled by law to a
court hearing.
Notwithstanding the constitutional provision noted above,
Morocco's ratification of ILO Convention 98 on the right to
organize and bargain collectively, and some case law, there is
no specific law prohibiting antiunion discrimination by
employers. Employers regularly fire workers for trade union
activity that they see as threatening to employer interests.
Reinstatement is sometimes ordered by courts, but legal
proceedings can be expensive and time-consuming. Labor
complainants are often vindicated in court proceedings, but
court decisions awarding damages and back pay can be difficult
to enforce. Ministry of Labor inspectors serve as
investigators and conciliators in labor disputes; however, the
inspectors are not very effective because they are few in
number, carry heavy workloads, and do not have the resources to
investigate all cases. In addition to pursuing their
complaints through the Ministry of Labor's inspectors, unions
increasingly are going directly to court with their
complaints. ILO committees repeatedly cited the Government in
1993 for failing to respond adequately to union allegations of
violations of trade union rights such as dismissing and
arresting trade unionists and repressing demonstrations. In
May the CFA concluded that protection against antiunion
discrimination is not satisfactorily guaranteed by the
Government.
Moroccan labor law applies equally to the small Tangier export
zone. The proportion of unionized workers there is about the
same as in Morocco as a whole.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
Apart from its ratification of both ILO conventions against
forced labor, Morocco has no legal or constitutional
prohibition against forced or compulsory labor, but, as far as
is known, it is not practiced.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
Children may not be legally employed or apprenticed before age
12. Special regulations govern the employment of children
between the ages of 12 and 16. Those under the age of 16 may
not work nights (between 11 p.m. and 5 a.m.) nor more than 10
hours a day. The normal workday is 8 hours; only in a few
exceptional professions are any workers permitted to work more
than 10 hours per day. In practice, children are often
apprenticed before age 12, particularly in handicraft work.
The argument is made that they need to acquire skills, such as
weaving or rug making, before they reach the age of 12. Five
years of primary education is compulsory, starting at age 7,
but enforcement in the countryside and poorer urban areas is
lax.
Safety and health conditions as well as salaries in enterprises
employing children are often substandard. The use of minors is
common in the rug-making and tanning trades, many of whose
products are exported. Children are also employed informally
as domestics and usually receive little or no wages. Poverty
and a pervasive cultural acceptance of child labor keep abuse
of the child labor laws prevalent nationwide. In 1993 a
Casablanca policeman and his wife were arrested for severely
beating a 6-year old maid, recruited from poor, rural
relatives.
The Ministry of Labor, through its corps of labor inspectors,
is responsible for enforcing child labor regulations. Child
labor laws are generally well observed in the industrialized,
unionized sector of the economy. However, the inspection
mandate of labor inspectors does not include domestic employees.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
There was no change in 1993 to the minimum wage of about $150
(1,350 dirhams) per month, effective as of May 1992. Despite
food, diesel fuel, and public transportation subsidies, a
family cannot maintain a decent standard of living on the
minimum wage of a single worker. The labor unions have long
called for a minimum wage of about $220. In many cases,
several members, some of them working in the informal economy,
combine their income to support the family. The minimum wage
is not enforced effectively in the informal and handicraft
sectors. It is enforced fairly effectively in the
industrialized, unionized sector, though members complain that
employers often, by means of deductions and other techniques,
pay their workers less than the law requires.
In an effort to increase employment opportunities for recent
graduates, firms are permitted to hire them for a limited
period for less than the minimum wage. Firms are not allowed
to replace them with other low-paid trainees when the limited
employment period ends. Most workers in the industrial sector
of the economy, except for those employed in garment assembly,
earn more than minimum wage.
Moreover, workers are customarily paid between 13 and 16
months' salary for every 12-month year. The informal sector
provides a safety net for those who would otherwise be
unemployed or underemployed. The extensive parallel economy
employs directly or indirectly an estimated 50 to 75 percent of
the working population, often in part-time jobs.
The law provides a 48-hour maximum workweek and a 24-hour rest
period, with not more than 8 hours (with certain exceptions)
for any single day, premium pay for overtime, paid public and
annual holidays, and minimum conditions for health and safety,
including the prohibition of night work for women and minors.
As with other regulations and laws, these are observed
unevenly, if at all, in the informal sector. Labor inspectors
endeavor to monitor working conditions, accidents, and labor
disputes, but lack sufficient resources and authority to
investigate many complaints and mandate full compliance with
the law.
[end of document]
Return
to 1993 Human Rights Practices report home page.
Return to DOSFAN
home page.
This is an official U.S. Government source
for information on the WWW. Inclusion of non-U.S. Government links
does not imply endorsement of contents.