| The State Department web site below is a permanent electronic archive of information released prior to January 20, 2001. Please see www.state.gov for material released since President George W. Bush took office on that date. This site is not updated so external links may no longer function. Contact us with any questions about finding information. NOTE: External links to other Internet sites should not be construed as an endorsement of the views contained therein. |
TITLE: IRAQ HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES, 1993
DATE: JANUARY 31, 1994
AUTHOR: U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
IRAQ*
Political power in Iraq is concentrated in a repressive
one-party apparatus under the domination of Saddam Hussein.
The provisional Constitution of 1968 stipulates that the Arab
Ba'ath Socialist Party (ABSP) governs Iraq through the
Revolutionary Command Council (RCC), which exercises both
executive and legislative authority. Saddam Hussein wields
decisive power as Chairman of the RCC, Secretary General of the
Regional Command of the ABSP, and President of the Republic.
Ethnically and linguistically, the Iraqi population includes
Arabs, Kurds, Turcomans, Yazidis, and Armenians. The religious
mix is likewise varied: Shi'a and Sunni (both Arab and
Kurdish) Muslims, Christians (including Chaldeans and
Assyrians), and Jews. Ethnic divisions have resulted in civil
uprisings in recent years, especially in the north and south.
The Government has reacted against the people in those areas
with severely repressive measures.
The Government's security apparatus, which includes militias
attached to the President, the ABSP, and the Interior Ministry,
has been responsible for widespread and systematic human rights
abuses; security forces play a central role in maintaining the
intimidation and fear on which government power rests.
The Government controls Iraq's oil-based economy and owns all
the major industries. Damaged by the Gulf war and subjected to
a series of U.N. sanctions as a result of Iraq's 1990 invasion
of Kuwait, the economy remains in poor condition. U.N.
sanctions ban all Iraqi exports and all imports except food,
medicine, and materials and supplies for essential civilian
needs. Iraq's failure to comply with United Nations Security
Council resolutions has led to repeated Security Council
extensions of the sanctions.
Iraq's abysmal record on human rights did not improve in 1993.
Systematic violations of human rights continued in virtually
all categories in 1993; these included mass executions of
political opponents, widespread use of torture, extreme
repression of ethnic groups, disappearances, denial of due
process, and arbitrary detention. Furthermore, tens of
thousands of political killings and disappearances remained
unresolved from previous years. Owing to the efforts that the
*Because the United States has no embassy in Iraq, this report
draws to a large extent on non-U.S. Government sources.
Government takes to conceal its human rights abuses, however,
it is difficult to know precisely the details and numbers of
such practices. Citizens do not have the right to change their
government, and the freedoms of expression and association do
not exist, except in Kurdish-controlled areas in the north.
Indiscriminate military operations in the south--which included
burning and razing of villages, emplacement of bombs in
civilian areas, and the forced relocation of noncombatant
inhabitants--were directed primarily against Shi'a Arabs living
in the southern wetlands. In the north, the regime maintained
an internal embargo on the importation of food, medicine, and
fuel. Elsewhere, it diverted humanitarian supplies to its own
supporters and the military. In violation of U.N. Security
Council resolutions, the Government also continued its flagrant
interference with the international community's provision of
humanitarian assistance. Relief workers were harrassed,
intimidated, and, in some cases, killed.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
The Iraqi regime has a long record of executing perceived
opponents. In 1993, as in past years, the U.N. Special
Rapporteur expressed dismay at Iraq's liberal use of the death
penalty for a full range of political offenses such as
insulting the President or the Ba'ath Party. Throughout the
fall of 1993, there were numerous credible reports that the
regime had executed a number of persons (including some members
of Saddam Hussein's family and tribe) who were allegedly
involved in a coup plot against him. High-ranking civilian,
military, and tribal leaders were reported among those killed.
The Free Iraqi Council (FIC), an Iraqi opposition organization
based in London, reported a mass execution of prisoners at the
Al-Radwaniyah prison near Baghdad in August (see also Section
1.c.). At the end of the year this incident remained
unconfirmed.
As in 1992, numerous Shi'a civilians from southern Iraq
reportedly were arrested and removed to detention centers in
the central part of the country. Shi'a witnesses who survived
arrest and detention later reported that some of their comrades
had been executed (see also Section 1.g.).
Political killings and terrorist actions also were frequent in
the north and often were directed against civilians and
third-country nationals involved in the relief effort. Seven
relief workers (one Australian, one Belgian, and five local
employees of international nongovernmental organizations) were
killed, and several others were injured.
In January an Assyrian delegate to the local legislature in the
north was killed under suspicious circumstances. That same
month, a car bomb in Irbil killed 11 civilians and injured 128;
regional authorities alleged that Iraqi authorities were
responsible. In January a man carrying explosives was arrested
in Dohuk; while in the custody of the local authorities, he
claimed he had been recruited by Iraqi forces to place the
explosives in a U.N. vehicle in exchange for 200,000 Iraqi
dinars. In many of these incidents, however, it was not
possible to determine who was responsible--Iraqi agents; local
Kurds who had been coerced or recruited for pay; agents of the
Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), the Turkish-based Kurdish
resistance movement; or lone perpetrators.
In 1993 new information was developed concerning the so-called
Anfal campaign ("Spoils" in Arabic) of 1988, in which tens of
thousands of Kurds reportedly lost their lives. The Anfal
remains the most prominent example of political killing in
Iraq. Most of the Kurds who were initially arrested during the
Anfal have never been seen again and are presumed to have been
killed in official custody (see Sections 1.b. and 1.g.).
b. Disappearance
As in previous years, Iraqis continued to disappear without
explanation, reportedly while in the custody of government
authorities. In February the U.N. Special Rapporteur reported
that he was continuing to receive "regular and consistent
reports on disappearances." He stated that he was in
possession of the names of 5,000 persons whose cases had not
yet been addressed by the U.N. Working Group on Enforcement on
Involuntary Disappearances. These were in addition to the
9,447 names that the Working Group already had transmitted to
the Iraqi Government in prior years and another 2,000 cases
that the working group is presently investigating.
Of the total number of disappeared persons for whom the U.N.
has documentation (more than 16,000 cases), the Special
Rapporteur noted that most date from the Anfal period but that
500 are as recent as 1992. Amnesty International (AI) reported
that it has the names of more than 17,000 Kurds who disappeared
during the Anfal and are presumed dead. It is not clear to
what extent the Amnesty International and U.N. records
duplicate each other or represent different lists of
disappeared Kurds.
As a result of his investigations, the Special Rapporteur
stated, he had arrived at the conclusion that the total figure
for disappeared Kurds during Anfal could number in the "tens of
thousands." Middle East Watch places the figure at between
50,000 and 100,000.
In addition to the Anfal disappearances, two other examples of
outstanding large-scale disappearances are the Barzani arrests
of 1983, in which thousands of relatives and tribesmen of the
late Kurdish nationalist hero Mustapha Barzani were rounded up
and taken into custody, and the al-Khoei case of 1991, in which
the late Grand Ayatollah Abdul Qasim al-Khoei and 108 of his
associates--including Iraqis, Iranians, Indians, Pakistanis,
Lebanese, and Bahrainis--were arrested. None of the Barzani
detainees were ever seen again. In the al-Khoei case, the
Ayatollah died while under house arrest in al-Najaf, and only
two of the persons arrested with him were ever seen again.
In 1993 AI, having received no satisfactory response to its
repeated inquiries to the Government in regard to the al-Khoei
disappearances, published a report on these unresolved cases,
calling Iraq's response "inadequate, vague, or contradictory."
Iraq has failed to return or account for a large number of
Kuwaiti citizens and third-country nationals taken to Iraq
during the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait and has denied any
knowledge of missing persons. U.N. Security Council resolution
(UNSCR) 687 requires Iraq to "facilitate" the search for and
the repatriation of those still missing. In March the
Government of Kuwait transmitted to the Government of Iraq,
through the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC),
the case files of more than 600 persons still believed to be
missing in Iraq. For the first time, Iraq publicized the names
of the missing. However, it stated that it had no information
indicating that the missing persons ever had been in Iraqi
custody.
Except for 15 who were reportedly executed in 1992, there has
been no accounting for a group of 146 Iraqi Turcomans from the
Kirkuk area, reported to have been detained since May and June
1992. A group of 19 Iraqi Army officers reportedly arrested in
the summer of 1992 also have disappeared.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
Although Iraq is a party to international human rights
conventions which abjure the use of torture and the
Constitution forbids the practice, torture is routinely
conducted by the Iraqi security services. The Special
Rapporteur reported in February, as he has in previous years,
that the Government of Iraq continues to engage in "systematic"
torture, both physical and psychological. According to persons
who have left Iraq after release from prison, techniques
employed by the security services include electric shocks
administered to the genitals and other sensitive areas,
beatings, burnings with hot irons, suspension from ceiling
fans, dripping acid on the skin, rape, breaking of limbs,
denial of food and water, and threats to rape or otherwise harm
relatives.
Certain prisons in Iraq have long been notorious for routine
mistreatment of prisoners. Al-Rashidiya prison, on the Tigris
River north of Taji, reportedly contains torture chambers in
its basement. Another prison, Al-Shamma'iya, located in east
Baghdad, is reportedly the site of both torture and
disappearances.
Al-Radwaniyah prison (see Section 1.a.), a former prisoner-
of-war facility near Baghdad, is reportedly the site of torture
and arbitrary killings, including mass execution by firing
squad. According to Middle East Watch, Al-Radwaniyah was the
principal detention center for persons arrested following the
civil uprisings of 1991. Many persons taken into custody in
connection with the uprisings have not been seen since. Two
executions by firing squad reportedly took place at
Al-Radwaniyah in 1992 and another in August 1993.
The Special Rapporteur and AI named both Al-Radwaniyah and
another Baghdad prison, Abu Ghraib, as sites where torture and
disappearances have recently occurred. Multiple executions
also reportedly took place at Abu Ghraib in the fall of 1993,
in retaliation for alleged coup plots against the Government
(see Section 1.a.).
Iraqi security forces are alleged to have engaged in the rape
of captured civilians during the Anfal campaign of 1988 and the
occupation of Kuwait and subsequent Gulf war of 1990-91.
However, the Iraqi Government has never acknowledged or taken
any action to investigate these reported crimes.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
Although the Constitution and Legal Code explicitly prohibit
arbitrary arrest and detention, these practices are widely
used. In his February 1993 report, the U.N. Special Rapporteur
cited more than 100 detention and interrogation sites,
including military and security bases and such unconventional
locales as mosques, public buildings, and supermarket basements.
In his November report, the U.N. Special Rapporteur reported
that approximately 100 persons were arrested in Basrah on
August 26, ostensibly because they were not carrying
identification papers. The Special Rapporteur also reported
that the regime continued in 1993 to target Shi'a clergy for
arbitrary arrest and other human rights abuses.
Several foreign nationals were arrested arbitrarily and held in
Iraq in 1993, and others who were arrested in previous years
remained in detention. On April 25 an American citizen and oil
worker living in Kuwait disappeared near the Iraqi-Kuwaiti
border and in May was charged by Iraqi authorities with illegal
entry and espionage. He was tried, found guilty of illegal
entry, and sentenced to 8 years in prison. Subsequently, he
was released on November 15. (See also Section 1.e. for
details of similar cases illustrating the lack of fair trial.)
While there is currently no known policy of exiling Iraqi
citizens abroad, the refusal of Iraqi authorities to allow tens
of thousands of Kurds and Turcomans to return to their homes in
Kirkuk and Mosul amounts to a policy of internal exile (see
Section 2.d.).
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
Although the Revolutionary Court system was abolished in 1991,
the change was cosmetic. Iraq retains a bifurcated judicial
system, encompassing distinct treatment for all cases deemed to
have a security component and a more conventional court system
to handle other charges. The President may override any court
decision, and there are no checks on his power.
The procedural rules applicable in the regular (i.e.,
nonsecurity) court system theoretically provide many basic
protections. However, the regime often assigns to the security
courts cases which, on their merits, would appear to fall under
the jurisdiction of the regular courts.
The regular courts provide for investigation by police and then
by an inquiry judge, who may refer a case to the courts or
dismiss it. Trials are open to public view, and defendants are
entitled to counsel--at government expense if the defendant is
indigent. Charges and evidence are available for review by
counsel. Judges try criminal cases; there are no juries.
Convictions may be appealed to the Court of Appeal and then to
the Court of Cassation, Iraq's high court.
There are no Shari'a (Islamic) courts as such in Iraq; however,
family courts administer Shari'a law according to Iraqi custom.
Special security courts have jurisdiction in all cases
involving espionage and treason, peaceful political dissent,
smuggling, currency exchange violations, and drug trafficking.
Defendants are often held incommunicado, and confessions
extracted by torture are admissible and often serve as the
basis for conviction. In theory, verdicts may be appealed to
the Chairman of the RCC. In practice, many cases appear to end
in summary execution shortly after trial.
An array of ABSP and presidential decrees defines political
dissent as encompassing a wide range of activities. Persons
suspected of engaging in dissent are routinely imprisoned
without charge or trial or after trials that do not meet
minimum standards of fairness.
Two British citizens, arrested in 1992 for illegal entry,
continued to be held for most of 1993. They had been given
prison sentences of 7 and 10 years, respectively. Referring to
these two cases in his February report, the U.N. Special
Rapporteur commented on the "disproportionately lengthy
sentences for the crimes allegedly committed." In December the
British prisoners were abruptly released after British
officials interceded with President Saddam Hussein. (See also
Section 1.d. for details of a similar case illustrating
arbitrary arrest.)
Because the Government rarely makes public acknowledgement of
arrests or imprisonments, it is difficult to estimate the
number of political prisoners. Many of the tens of thousands
of persons who have disappeared or been killed in recent years
were originally held as political prisoners.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
The Government frequently disregards constitutional protections
of the right to privacy, particularly in situations in which
national security is deemed to be involved. Iraq broadly
defines security offenses, and security authorities in
virtually all circumstances are exempt from the legal
requirement to obtain a search warrant before entering a
suspect's home. Among the targets of such abuse in 1993 were
the Shi'a Arabs of the southern marshes (see Section 1.g.).
Despite constitutional safeguards for the confidentiality of
mail and telegraphic and telephone correspondence, official
telephone monitoring and censorship of private mail are common
practice.
Pervasive networks of informers maintained by the security
services and the ABSP serve to deter dissident activity and
instill fear of the authorities. As the U.N. Special
Rapporteur noted in his February report, "The networks
incorporate multiple security and intelligence services which
are themselves supported by webs of agents and informants
watching one another and ultimately accountable to the
President alone."
g. Use of Excessive Force and Violations of Humanitarian
Law in Internal Conflicts
Throughout 1993, Iraqi armed forces conducted indiscriminate
land-based attacks against the civilian population in the
southern marshes. These wetlands historically have been
inhabited largely by Shi'a Muslims, who have been joined in
recent years by significant numbers of Iraqi army deserters and
refugees from other areas of Iraq. As a result, the marshes
have become the site of guerrilla resistance. The Allied
no-fly zone over southern Iraq, imposed in 1992, continued in
1993 to protect the Shi'a marsh dwellers from attacks by Iraqi
helicopter gunships and fixed-wing aircraft. In defiance of
the no-fly zone, Iraqi forces in 1993 stepped up their use of
land-based artillery to shell marsh villages.
In January a number of villages in the Al-Amarah marshes were
reported burned to the ground. In April opposition sources
reported that government forces had killed some inhabitants and
burned homes in two villages in Maysan governorate and had
removed survivors to other locations. In June, according to
the U.N. Special Rapporteur, civilian settlements in the
Al-Hammar marshes were subjected to a 4-day bombardment,
followed by a razing of their homes by armored vehicles and
tanks. In August opposition sources reported attacks on the
village of Al-Ksara in the Al-Aziz region of Maysan
governorate. Many of these attacks appeared targeted at
unarmed civilian populations, particularly suspected opposition
sympathizers. Many civilians were killed or wounded, and an
estimated 6,500 refugees fled to Iran, where they joined
between 50,000 and 60,000 who had fled in previous years.
Iraqi government efforts to divert water sources and drain the
marshes made considerable headway in 1993. The U.N. Special
Rapporteur as well as various human rights groups have reported
that, as the marshlands dry, Iraqi military units are able to
advance their land-based attacks on villages. In his November
report to the U.N. General Assembly, the Special Rapporteur
stated that he had viewed aerial and satellite photography
confirming the destruction of numerous villages in the
marshes. In March the European Parliament (EP) passed a
resolution characterizing the Baghdad leadership as "seeking
the destruction of the marsh Arabs of southern Iraq" through
the "systematic poisoning of water, the indiscriminate shelling
of civilians, and the destruction of the resources and
environment of the people by draining the marshes."
In 1993 a team of Middle East Watch and U.S. Government
researchers discovered, in a cache of Iraqi government
documents seized 2 years earlier by the Kurds, a 1989 Iraqi
plan to destroy the marshlands and the people living there.
The plan appears to have been approved at the highest levels of
the Government. Minister of Defense Ali Hassan Al-Majid, the
same military leader who supervised the Anfal campaign in 1988,
is now charged with directing the Government's so-called
development plan for the marshes. The U.N. Special Rapporteur
has noted the similarity between the "genocide-type operations"
directed against the Kurds and the operations currently being
conducted in the south. He concluded that "persons in the
highest echelons of Government hold special and individual
responsibility for a large number of the violations" and that
"international law would not afford immunities."
The U.N. Special Rapporteur also reported that he continued to
receive detailed accounts of the discovery of mass graves in
southern Iraq, which are thought to contain the bodies of
persons killed following the post-Gulf war civil uprising of
March 1991. None of these reported grave sites have yet been
investigated. However, forensic information obtained from mass
grave sites in northern Iraq by forensic specialists in 1992
was released in 1993; investigators found the remains of
hundreds of persons presumed killed in the Anfal campaign
carried out in 1988 by Iraqi military and security forces under
the leadership of Ali Hassan Al-Majid. In April a new mass
grave, containing up to 1,500 bodies, was found in Irbil in
northern Iraq, and another grave with up to 100 bodies was
found nearby. As of the end of the year, these graves had not
been examined by forensic specialists.
Based on forensic evidence obtained from previously examined
graves and extensive documentation that the Kurds seized from
Iraqi government offices during the civil uprisings of 1991,
Middle East Watch and Physicians for Human Rights now estimate
that between 50,000 and 100,000 Kurds were killed and up to
4,000 villages may have been destroyed during the Anfal
campaign. These human rights groups have built a substantial
body of evidence suggesting that Iraqi government efforts to
eliminate Iraqi Kurdish communities were widespread,
systematically planned, and ruthlessly implemented.
In northern Iraq, Operation Provide Comfort--the joint U.S.,
British, French, and Turkish command--continued in 1993 to
inhibit attacks from the air on the inhabitants of the region.
However, the Iraqi military forces continued intermittent,
sometimes heavy shelling of northern villages by long-range
artillery. The village of Al-Shariye was shelled every night
for a week in late September. Also in September, one person
was killed and two were wounded during shelling attacks on
Taqtaq, near As Sulaymaniyah. In May Iraqi soldiers reportedly
entered the security zone, firing on the town of Awaina,
located about 10 kilometers inside the zone. Artillery
shelling and bombardments reportedly preceded the attacks.
Attacks on humanitarian relief efforts in northern Iraq
continued throughout 1993. In the winter and the spring,
convoy trucks carrying relief supplies occasionally were
destroyed by bombs as they crossed through Iraqi-controlled
territory. In June and July, two U.N. guard offices were
attacked, four U.N. vehicles were bombed, and a motorcyclist
threw grenades onto loaded convoy trucks. Later in the summer,
attacks against nongovernmental organizations (NGO's) appeared
to accelerate. In one incident an NGO convoy was attacked by
rocket-propelled grenades, leaving one relief worker critically
injured. In another a bomb exploded on a Turkish truck
carrying U.N.-consigned medicines. In December a bomb exploded
in the offices of a Belgian NGO, killing two local employees.
Some of these incidents pointed to involvement by the Iraqi
authorities; in others, it was impossible to determine who was
responsible.
Innocent civilians were killed occasionally in fighting between
Kurdish guerilla forces and armed forces of the Kurdish
Islamist League, a pro-Iranian party. In late December 72
persons were reported killed and 250 wounded in such clashes in
Irbil and As Sulaymaniyah.
Civilians also were the occasional victims of armed raids by
the Government of Turkey, which conducted counterterrorism
operations along the Iraqi-Turkish border against the PKK
(Kurdistan Workers' Party). Relief workers reported that at
least two women and seven children were killed in a Turkish
raid near the northern town of Barzan on November 29. The
Government of Turkey says Iraqi civilian deaths were unintended.
The Kurdish population along the Iranian border suffered from
Iranian shelling of civilian villages, as well as from sporadic
Iranian military incursions into Iraqi territory.
Innocent civilians continued to be killed or maimed by
exploding landmines in northern Iraq. Many of the mines were
originally set to deter Iranian forces during the Iran-Iraq
war. However, the Iraqi army failed to clear the mines after
that war ended in 1988 and before it withdrew from the north in
1991. The mines appear to have been haphazardly planted in
civilian areas. The U.N. Special Rapporteur has repeatedly
reminded the Iraqi Government of its obligations under the Land
Mines Protocol, to which Iraq is a party, to protect civilians
from the effects of mines.
The U.S. Government in 1993 released to the U.N. Security
Council a document, based on interviews with victims and
eyewitnesses, charging that the Iraqi regime engaged in war
crimes (willful killing, torture, rape, pillage, hostage
taking, unlawful deportation, and related acts) immediately
prior to and during the 1991 Gulf war. The United States urged
the Security Council to create a commission of inquiry to
examine possible war crimes, crimes against humanity, and
genocidal actions perpetrated by the Iraqi Government.
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
Freedom of speech and of the press do not exist in areas under
Baghdad's control, and political dissent is not tolerated in
those areas. The Government and the ABSP own all print and
broadcast media and operate them as propaganda outlets for the
regime. Opposition views are not reported. The Government
periodically attempts to jam news broadcasts from outside Iraq
(e.g., the Voice of America, the British Broadcasting
Corporation, and radio stations maintained by Iraqi opposition
groups in neighboring countries).
In the northern security zone, which is protected by
international forces and is administered by a local de facto
government, several newspapers have appeared over the past
2 years, as have opposition radio and television broadcasts.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
Except in northern areas under the protection of international
forces, Iraqi citizens may not legally assemble or organize for
any political purpose other than to support the regime. Two
organizations, the Communist Party and al-Da'wa al-Islamiya
("Call of Islam") are outlawed; membership in either is a
capital offense. Though Iraqi authorities insist that the
penalty has never been invoked in such cases, the Special
Rapporteur has reported in previous years that persons have
been executed for membership in these groups. No new cases
were reported in 1993.
c. Freedom of Religion
Freedom of religion is circumscribed. The Government closely
regulates and monitors Islamic affairs under a 1981 law giving
the Ministry of Endowments and Religious Affairs authority over
places of worship, appointment of clergy, publication of
religious literature, and participation in religious councils
and meetings.
Although Shi'a Arabs (constituting between 55 and 60 percent of
the population) are the largest ethnoreligious group, Sunni
Arabs, who comprise only about 12 to 15 percent of the
population, have traditionally dominated Iraq economic and
political life. Despite legal guarantees of sectarian
equality, the Government has in recent years engaged in a
succession of actions directed at the clergy and followers of
the Shi'ite faith. Attacks on the Shi'a of the southern
marshes in 1993 were preceded by the Government's harsh
response to the spring uprising of 1991, in which government
forces damaged or totally destroyed Shi'a mosques, holy sites,
libraries, and archives. Iraqi security forces in 1993 were
still encamped in the shrine to Imam Ali at Al-Najaf, one of
Shi'a Islam's holiest sites. There were credible reports that
the security forces' desecration of the shrine included using
it as an interrogation center. Also in 1993, security forces
reportedly expelled foreign clerics from Al-Najaf, under the
pretext that the clerics' visas had expired.
The U.N. Special Rapporteur in 1993 cited the following
continued abuses of religious rights by the Government: a ban
on the call to prayer in certain cities, including Samara and
Balad; a ban on the broadcast of Shi'a programs on government
radio or television; a ban on the publication of Shi'a books,
even prayer books; and the prohibition of certain processions
and public meetings commemorating Shi'a holy days. Moreover,
the Government also intervened, through coercion, in the
selection of a replacement for the late Grand Ayatollah Abul
Qasim al-Khoei, who had died in government custody in 1992 (see
Section 1.b.). Late in the year, the Government appointed
al-Khoei's successor.
The Government has been less intrusive into the religious
affairs of Iraq's Christians--a small community of
approximately 300,000. Their freedom of worship in churches of
established denominations is legally protected, but they may
not proselytize or hold meetings outside church premises.
The Jewish community--which at its height following World War
II was estimated at 150,000 persons--has almost totally
disappeared. Only a few hundred remain, nearly all in
Baghdad. There is no recent evidence of overt persecution of
Jews, but the regime restricts contact with Jewish groups
abroad.
Iraqi law does not imposes penalties for conversion from one
religion to another. Muslims who convert may suffer a social
stigma, however.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
The Government maintains close control over the movement of
both citizens and foreigners. Within the country, sensitive
border areas and numerous designated security zones are
off-limits to all travelers; persons who either deliberately or
inadvertently stray into prohibited areas are immediately
arrested (see Section 1.d.). Police checkpoints can be found
on highways and outside major towns.
All citizens are presently limited to two trips outside Iraq
annually, and some citizens reportedly are prohibited from
international travel. Women are prohibited from traveling
outside Iraq alone.
There are no emigration restrictions for members of minority
groups, although emigrants often must leave behind substantial
property because of the difficulty of exporting assets.
Currency exchange violations are considered security offenses,
and penalties can be severe. In May the Government announced
that such violations resulting in devaluation of the national
currency are punishable by death.
The Government continued to pursue its discriminatory
resettlement policies, including demolition of villages and
forced relocations. In May the Iraqi security service in Mosul
ordered Kurdish residents to leave voluntarily within 30 days
to central and southern Iraq or face deportation to
Kurdish-controlled areas. Subsequently Kurdish families were
reportedly required to register at security checkpoints. By
late December, approximately 30 Kurdish families (200 persons),
reportedly fearing expulsion by the Iraqi Government, had fled
their homes in the Mosul area and had crossed into the
Kurdish-controlled zone.
The Government continued in 1993 to offer pecuniary inducements
to Arab families from central Iraq to resettle in the north.
However, the Government's resettlement policies were directed
primarily at residents of the south. The Special Rapporteur
noted in his November report that he had interviewed numerous
witnesses who testified that marsh Shi'a arrested during the
course of military operations are regularly taken to the main
southern cities and then transferred to detention centers and
prisons in central Iraq, primarily in Baghdad.
It is estimated that more than 6,500 Shi'a refugees, most of
whom had been displaced from their homes in the southern
marshes by the draining of the marshes and indiscriminate
shelling and burning operations of the Iraqi army, fled into
Iran during the summer of 1993. According to some estimates,
up to 40,000 other persons are still in imminent danger in the
marshes (see also Section 1.a.).
Several tens of thousands of some 1.5. million refugees who
fled the country in the wake of the regime's bloody suppression
of the civil uprising of 1991 remained abroad, mainly in Iran,
Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Turkey; lesser numbers are in Jordan
and Kuwait. Of the 1991 refugees, approximately 45,000 are in
Iran, 23,000 in Saudi Arabia, 6,500 in Syria, and 4,000 in
Turkey. Also still in Turkey are approximately 5,300 Kurdish
refugees who fled northern Iraq during the Anfal campaign of
1988, in the wake of chemical weapons attacks on their
villages.
The great majority of the refugees who fled in 1991,
particularly the Kurds, repatriated themselves either to the
area of northern Iraq, over which the allies have proscribed
overflights by Iraqi aircraft, or to other areas not under
government control. However, several hundred thousand Kurds
who returned to Iraq still were unable to go back to their
former homes in Iraqi-controlled territory.
Iraqi students abroad who refuse to return to Iraq are required
to reimburse the Government for education received at
government expense, whether in Iraq or abroad. Each student
wishing to travel abroad must provide a guarantor. The
guarantor and the student's parents may be held liable if the
student fails to return.
The Government also requires employees leaving government jobs
before 20 years of service to reimburse the State for the cost
of their education provided at government expense. Amounts due
can be recovered by confiscation, and nonpayment may result in
imprisonment of family members.
Non-Iraqi spouses of Iraqi citizens who have resided in Iraq
for 5 years must take Iraqi nationality or leave the country.
Naturalization is required after 1 year for the spouses of
Iraqi citizens employed in government offices. Many foreigners
have thus been obliged to accept Iraqi citizenship and become
subject to official travel restrictions. The penalties for
noncompliance include loss of job, a substantial financial
penalty, and repayment of the costs of education.
Iraq does not recognize the concept of dual nationality. Many
Iraqi "dual nationals," especially the children of Iraqi
fathers and mothers of non-Iraqi birth, have been denied
permission to leave Iraq to visit the country of their other
nationality.
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government
Iraqi citizens do not have the right to change their
government. Only in the Kurdish-controlled region in northern
Iraq have free and open local elections been held. Full
political participation at the national level is confined to
members of the Ba'ath Party (ABSP), estimated to number 1 1/2
million, or about 8 percent of the population. The ABSP
governs the country under the provisional Constitution of 1968,
and legislative and executive authority is vested in the RCC.
The National Assembly is completely subordinate to the
executive branch. General elections were last held for the
250-seat National Assembly in April 1989.
Saddam Hussein continues to wield decisive power over all
instruments of government. He is President of the Republic,
Chairman of the RCC, and Secretary General of the Regional
(i.e., Iraq-wide) Command of the ABSP. A personal or tribal
relationship with Saddam Hussein is much more important for
political advancement than is ABSP membership or ideological
affiliation. Almost all of Iraq's most powerful officials are
either members of the President's family or long-time family
allies from his home town of Tikrit. Although ABSP membership
is not required for appointment to senior military or
government positions or election to the National Assembly, it
can be a powerful aid in attaining political influence.
Opposition political organizations are illegal and severely
suppressed. Membership in the Communist Party is punishable by
death (see Section 2.b.). In 1991 the RCC adopted a law
theoretically authorizing the creation of political parties
other than the ABSP. In fact, the law merely reinforced the
preeminent position of the ABSP by prohibiting parties that do
not support Saddam Hussein and the present Government. New
parties must be based in Baghdad and are forbidden to have any
ethnic or religious character.
The Government does not recognize the various political
groupings and parties that have been formed among natural
opposition constituencies--the Shi'a of southern Iraq and the
Kurdish, Assyrian, and Turcoman communities in the north.
These political groups continued to thrive notwithstanding
their illegal status.
A unique political situation exists in northern Iraq, where
since 1991 all government functions have been performed by
local administrators, mainly Kurds. Following the March 1991
uprising, the Iraqi national administrators pulled out of
northern Iraq. Local civil servants stepped in to fill the
vacuum. In May 1992, local political parties participated in
elections to choose assembly representatives and de facto
government administrators, who manage the affairs of the
security zone--which is protected by allied military
forces--and adjacent liberated areas.
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
of Human Rights
In 1993 the Government continued to deny allegations of human
rights violations. It also refused to cooperate in the
investigation of alleged violations. The one authorized human
rights group in Iraq operates under official control and
routinely corroborates official denials of violations. The
Government did not allow the Special Rapporteur to visit in
1993 and objected to his recommendation that human rights
monitors be stationed throughout Iraq. In March the U.N. Human
Rights Commission called on the U.N. Secretary General to send
human rights monitors to "help in the independent verification
of reports on the human rights situation in Iraq." In December
the U.N. General Assembly endorsed the request of the Human
Rights Commission for monitors for Iraq.
Iraq has failed to comply with the provision of UNSCR 688
insisting that Iraq afford immediate, unrestricted access by
humanitarian workers to all those in need of assistance in all
parts of Iraq. In 1993 various organs within the U.N. system--
the U.N. Human Rights Commission, the U.N. Subcommission on
Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, and
the U.N. General Assembly--adopted resolutions condemning the
human rights violations of the Iraqi regime. These bodies also
called for the Iraqi Government to allow the U.N. Special
Rapporteur to visit the southern region to interview refugees.
Iraq has refused to give access to the Special Rapporteur.
Throughout 1993, the Government threatened, harassed, and
assaulted employees of the United Nations and nongovernmental
organizations (see Section 1.g.). The U.N. guard
contingent--which protects U.N. personnel and
operations--operated under severely reduced staffing in 1993,
following the Government's refusal in 1992 to allow new guards
into the country.
The regime has refused to renew its Memorandum of Understanding
(MOU) with the United Nations on U.N. operations in Iraq. The
United Nations has informed Iraq that the terms of the previous
MOU are still operative and that the Government must comply
with them. Nonetheless, the Government persisted in violating
UNSCR 688 by interfering with the international community's
provision of humanitarian assistance to the Iraqi people (see
Section 1.g.).
In October the Government definitively refused to implement the
provisions of UNSCR's 706 and 712, which would allow Iraq to
sell oil and purchase humanitarian goods, the equitable
distribution of which the United Nations would monitor.
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Disability, Language, or Social Status
Women
The Government claims that it is committed to equality for
women, who make up about 20 percent of the Iraqi work force.
Laws have been enacted to protect women from exploitation in
the workplace and from sexual harassment; to permit women to
join the regular army, Popular Army, and police forces; to
require education for female children; and to equalize women's
rights in divorce, land ownership, taxation, suffrage, and
election to the National Assembly. It is difficult to
determine to what extent these protections are afforded in
practice.
Familial violence against women, such as wife beating and rape,
is known to occur, but little is known about its extent. Such
abuse is customarily addressed within the tightly knit Iraqi
family structure. There is no public discussion of the
subject, and there are no official statistics. Excessive
violence against women is grounds for divorce and criminal
charges, but suits brought on these charges are believed to be
rare.
Continuing analysis of documents and testimony concerning the
Anfal campaign of 1988 indicate that many women and children,
including infants, were killed by firing squad and in chemical
attacks during that operation and that many more remain
unaccounted for.
Children
No information is available on whether the Government has
enacted specific legislation to promote the welfare of
children. However, the U.N. Special Rapporteur and various
human rights organization have collected a substantial body of
evidence pointing to the Iraqi Government's continuing
disregard for the rights and welfare of children.
The Government of Iraq's failure to comply with the terms of
U.N. resolutions has led to a continuation of economic
sanctions against Iraq. As a result, general economic and
health conditions throughout Iraq have deteriorated seriously.
Children have been particularly susceptible to the decline in
the standard of living; increases in child mortality and
disease rates have been reported.
Under these circumstances, the Special Rapporteur observes, the
Government of Iraq has special obligations to "take steps to
the maximum of its resources" to ensure that the most
vulnerable groups in the population have adequate food and
health care. The Special Rapporteur stated in his November
report that Iraq's ongoing refusal to implement U.N. Security
Council Resolutions 706 and 712 (which would permit a one-time
sale of oil in order to finance the import of humanitarian
goods), has had an adverse effect on vulnerable populations,
including children. The Special Rapporteur noted: "The
Government's failure to act (regarding 706 and 712) bears
heavily upon those in need and no doubt accounts for a
significant portion of the large increases in mortality rates."
The Special Rapporteur further reported that the Government's
policy of diverting humanitarian aid to its own supporters also
deprived vulnerable groups, including children, of essential
food and medicines.
Finally, the Special Rapporteur observed in his November report
that the ongoing bombardment of civilian settlements in the
southern marshes has resulted in the "deaths of large numbers
of innocent persons, including women, children, and the
elderly." The Special Rapporteur stated that he had
interviewed numerous orphans who had survived military attacks
which had killed their parents.
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities
The striking cultural, religious, and linguistic diversity of
Iraqi society is not reflected in the country's political and
economic structure. Sunni Arabs, who constitute only about 12
to 15 percent of the country's population, have effectively
controlled Iraq since independence in 1932. Shi'a Arabs, who
make up 55 to 60 percent of the population and live mainly in
the Baghdad area and the south, have long been economically,
politically, and socially disadvantaged. Like the Sunni Kurds
of the north, the Shi'a Arabs of the south have been targeted
for particular discrimination and abuse, ostensibly because of
their opposition to the Government. Actions against the Shi'a
have included large-scale forced resettlement and closure and
destruction of Shi'a institutions (see also Section 2.c.).
In the southern marshes, the traditional way of life of the
Shi'a--fishing, herding water buffalo, cultivating rice, and
selling hand-made reed mats--has all but been destroyed by
ongoing military operations. Credible reports describe a
continuing process of large-scale environmental destruction in
the marshes caused by the Government's burning, draining, and
water-diversion projects. The army has constructed canals,
causeways, and earthen berms to divert water from the
wetlands. Hundreds of square kilometers of marsh areas have
been burned, imperiling the marshes' fragile ecosystem. The
Government claims the marshes are being drained as part of a
land-reclamation plan that will increase acreage of arable
land, spur agricultural production, and reduce salt pollution
in the Tigris and Euphrates rivers. However, the evidence of
large-scale humanitarian and ecological destruction appears to
belie the Iraqi claim. The destruction also has alarmed many
in the international human rights community, including the U.N.
Special Rapporteur, who filed a special report on the situation
in the marshes in November.
Iraq's Kurds, who make up between 20 and 25 percent of the
population, historically have suffered political and economic
discrimination, despite the token presence of a small number in
the national Government (see Sections 1.a., 1.b., and 1.g.).
The outstanding current example of discrimination against the
Kurds and the Shi'a is the Government's ongoing embargo on the
north and the diversion of basic supplies in the south,
primarily to supporters of the regime. The total blockade of
the north includes humanitarian necessities such as food,
medicine, and fuel. Since August the embargo against the north
also has included massive electric power cut-offs in specific
areas, causing spoilage of medicines, breakdowns in local
water-purification systems, and loss of certain hospital
services. A disaster was averted only by the prompt action of
the United Nations and donor governments, who imported and
installed temporary generators to alleviate the crisis.
The repressive diversion of supplies in the south--combined
with the military burning and razing operations (see Sections
1.a. and 2.d.)--has limited the population's access to food,
medicine, drinking water, and transportation.
Citizens considered to be of Iranian origin must carry special
identification and are often precluded from desirable
employment.
People with Disabilities
No information is available on the Government's efforts to
assist people with disabilities or to indicate whether it has
enacted legislation or otherwise mandated provision of
accessibility for the disabled.
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
Although Iraq is a party to the 1919 Constitution of the
International Labor Organization (ILO), which guarantees the
freedom of association, trade unions independent of government
control do not exist in Iraq. The Trade Union Organization Law
of June 2, 1987, prescribes a monolithic trade union structure
for organized labor.
Workers in private and mixed enterprises and cooperatives--but
not public employees or workers in state enterprises--have the
right to join local union committees. The committees are
linked to trade unions, which in turn are part of provincial
trade union federations. At the top is a single umbrella
organization, the Iraqi General Federation of Trade Unions,
which is linked to the Ba'ath Party and is utilized to promote
party principles and policies among union members. The General
Federation is affiliated with the International Confederation
of Arab Trade Unions and the formerly Soviet-controlled World
Federation of Trade Unions.
Union members have not been systematically targeted for human
rights abuses.
The right to strike is heavily circumscribed by the Labor Law
of 1987, and no strike has been reported over the past two
decades.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
The right to bargain collectively is not recognized. Salaries
for public sector workers (i.e., the bulk of the employed) are
set by the Government. Wages in the much smaller private
sector are set by employers or negotiated individually with
workers.
The Labor Code does not protect workers from antiunion
discrimination, a failure that has been criticized repeatedly
by the ILO's Committee of Experts. There are no export
processing zones in Iraq.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
Compulsory labor is theoretically prohibited by law. However,
Iraq's Penal Code allows prison sentences--including compulsory
labor--for civil servants and employees of state enterprises
accused of breaches of labor discipline such as resignation
from the job. According to ILO commitee reports, foreign
workers in Iraq have been prevented from terminating their
employment to return home because of government-imposed penal
sanctions on persons who do so.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
Employment of children under age 14 is legally forbidden except
in small-scale family enterprises. Children are nevertheless
frequently encouraged to work as necessary to support their
families. The law stipulates that employees between the ages
of 14 and 18 work fewer hours per week than adults.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
The workweek in urban areas is 6 days, 7 to 8 hours per day,
for workers in the private and mixed sectors. These provisions
do not apply to agricultural workers, whose workweek and
workday vary according to individual employer-employee
agreements. Hours for government employees are set by the head
of each ministry.
Occupational safety programs are in effect in state-run
enterprises, and inspectors theoretically make periodic
inspections of private establishments. Enforcement varies
widely.
[end of document]
Return
to 1993 Human Rights Practices report home page.
Return to DOSFAN
home page.
This is an official U.S. Government source
for information on the WWW. Inclusion of non-U.S. Government links
does not imply endorsement of contents.