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TITLE: TAJIKISTAN HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES, 1993
DATE: JANUARY 31, 1994
AUTHOR: U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
TAJIKISTAN
Tajikistan was ruled in 1993 by a coalition of regional and
clan groupings which won a clear-cut military victory in a
civil war racking the country, particularly its southern
regions, during 1992. The winning coalition was supported by
Russian, Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), and Uzbek
forces. The Supreme Soviet (parliament) elected Imomali
Rahmanov, Kulyab regional executive chairman, as its Chairman
and Head of State in November 1992. Much of Rahmonov's support
came from the victorious People's Front forces which originated
in Kulyab and Kurgan-Tube, the Uzbek-dominated Hissar region
which aided in the battle of Dushanbe, and members of the
traditional northern economic elite of Leninabad. The defeated
opposition comprised a coalition of self-declared democratic
and Islamic groups and Islamic fundamentalists, a plurality of
whom originate from the Garm-Kartogin region of the country,
and Pamiris, who were traditionally underrepresented in the
ruling coalitions during Soviet and pre-Soviet rule.
The new Government gradually extended its control over all
major towns and most roads throughout the country except in the
Gorno Badakhshan Autonomous Oblast (GBAO) where, by agreement
with the regional authorities, its security forces did not
enter. In return, the regional authorities pledged to control
their own territory and to preclude operations by opposition
forces. Although the Government by and large respected the
agreement, the GBAO officials were unable to prevent armed
opposition elements and their foreign allies (Afghan mujahedin)
from using their territory for antigovernment attacks.
Opposition forces, based in Afghanistan and supported by mostly
fundamentalist Afghan forces, posed a serious military
challenge to the Government and to CIS (principally Russian)
units by staging frequent raids across the border in southern
Khatlon province and western GBAO. Although these raids and
incursions did not threaten central government control outside
the border areas, they caused casualties, blocked roads, and
interfered with the movement of relief supplies and refugees.
The Government worked to reconstitute the principal elements of
the former security forces: the Ministry of Interior, the
National Security Committee, and the new Ministry of Defense.
It sought to incorporate elements of the progovernment People's
Front militia into these security organs, with limited
success. Many People's Front units remained outside of central
government control. These units, as well as the Ministry of
Interior forces, committed numerous human rights abuses. The
National Security Committee's forces and those of the Ministry
of Defense were also responsible for abuses, though less
frequently.
The national economy, centrally planned and highly dependent on
cotton exports, continued to suffer from the effects of the
civil war, the severing of traditional economic ties to other
republics of the former Soviet Union, and a series of natural
disasters. The Government was unable to stem its collapse.
Human rights violations were widespread in 1993. The Rahmonov
Government was unable to follow a consistent policy to
eliminate regional abuses and bring about reconciliation and
political reform. While some senior government officials
personally intervened when advised of human rights abuses,
others reportedly acquiesced in or were complicitous in
violations. Among the most serious reported abuses were
government security forces' beating and torturing of detainees;
vigilante torture and killing of civilians of Pamiri or Garm
origin; government actions to curb political rights and a free
press; and opposition intimidation and killing of civilians.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a. Political and Extrajudicial Killing
Complete data on the number of political or extrajudicial
killings are not available, but international agencies recorded
at least 80 murders or disappearances in the period between
March and October 1993, and the number is certainly higher.
There is credible evidence that the progovernment People's
Front militias, which after the civil war were to a limited
extent incorporated into special battalions of the Ministries
of Defense and Interior and the National Security Committee,
were responsible for many deaths and disappearances.
No government or security official has been prosecuted for an
extrajudicial killing.
During the civil war and until the consolidation of the
Government's control over the capital, Dushanbe, in February,
hundreds of fighters and civilians on both sides of the
conflict disappeared or were murdered. The death toll was
estimated at over 20,000. Paramilitary forces loyal to the
Government were responsible for a pogrom against Pamiri and
Garm-origin males in Dushanbe from December 1992 to February
1993 which resulted in the death of scores of persons.
In the south, the locus of the civil war, fully armed special
battalion members, although technically subordinate to the
Ministries of Interior and Defense or National Security
Committee, dominated local civilian and security authorities.
The Government made no real effort to disarm the former militia
fighters. In at least one instance, regular army troops of the
Regar battalion were involved in the murder in Kabodian of
three returnees from Afghanistan. Field workers of the United
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in southern
Tajikistan reported 28 known cases of death or disappearance of
returnees since May 1993. The rate of deaths and
disappearances increased in the latter half of the year.
Opposition fighters, still active in the mountains to the
northeast of Dushanbe, along the Tajik-Afghan border, and in
the Gorno-Badakhshan region, conducted cross-border raids,
culminating in the deaths of several score Russian and Tajik
border guards. On July 13, 200 Tajik opposition and Afghan
mujahedin forces brutally murdered 26 Russian border guards and
several Tajik civilians in a raid. In addition, several local
officials in regions that were former strongholds of the
opposition were assassinated, presumably for cooperating with
the Government.
b. Disappearance
The disappearance of Pamiri and Garm-origin men from Dushanbe
and, in southern Tajikistan, of returnees from Afghanistan
continued throughout 1993. Disappearances which occurred
before March were referred by the international community to
the Ministry of Interior's Committee on Disappeared
Individuals. The Committee does not make public the number of
missing recorded on its list.
After February, law and order were gradually established in
Dushanbe; however, Pamiri and Garm-origin men continued to
disappear at the rate of one or two a month from the capital.
There has so far been no successful prosecution for the
disappearance or death of a returnee, though several arrests
were made and trials were pending at year's end.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
Credible reports indicate that Ministry of Interior forces used
torture, degrading treatment, and excessive force against
suspected supporters of the former opposition-dominated
government, despite repeated statements of senior government
officials to the contrary. Eyewitnesses and victims reported
credibly on beatings administered by Ministry of Interior
officials on the grounds of the Ministry of Interior complex in
Dushanbe, specifically in the basement of the old Ministry of
Interior building. In some instances, collaboration is
suspected between Ministry of Interior forces and local armed
groups, whereby Ministry of Interior forces avoid direct
involvement in the administration of beatings.
In southern Tajikistan, local police officials conducted
nighttime raids to search for weapons and ammunition.
Typically, police took people into custody and beat them until
they revealed the location of a hidden weapon.
Former chairman of the Tajikistan State Committee on Television
and Radio Mirbobo Mirakhimov (see Section 1.d.) accused the
Government of mistreatment during his pretrial detention. The
Government refused to permit Moscow-based Helsinki Watch
representatives to view Mirakhimov's colleagues without their
shirts on, raising suspicions that charges of physical
mistreatment were well founded.
Government forces, progovernment militias, and opposition
forces used rape as a weapon. During the February-March
battles between government and opposition forces in the lower
and upper Garm Valley, including the village of Nowabad, there
was credible evidence that both sides were guilty of rape.
Female refugees who returned to the southern districts of
Kabodian and Shaar Tuz were particularly vulnerable.
Progovernment militias kidnaped and raped scores of returnees,
and returnee women remained afraid to leave their collective
farms or villages.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
The Criminal Code has not been significantly amended since
independence, and abuses endemic to the Soviet legal system are
still evident. The system allows for lengthy pretrial
detention and provides few checks on the power of prosecutors
and police to arrest individuals. In addition, the Government
arbitrarily arrested political opponents and frequently held
prisoners in incommunicado detention. The breakdown of public
order during the civil war and continued immunity of armed
militia groups to prosecution further eroded the integrity of
the legal system.
Legally, police may detain persons arbitrarily and without
arrest warrants for a period of 72 hours, and the prosecutor's
office may do so for a period of 10 days, after which the
accused must be officially charged. At that point, the
Criminal Code permits pretrial detention for up to 18 months.
The first 3 months of detention is at the discretion of the
local prosecutor, the second 3 months must be approved at the
regional level, and the Prosecutor General must sanction the
remaining period in detention. There is no requirement for
judicial approval or for a preliminary judicial hearing on the
charge or the detention. In criminal cases, detainees may be
released and restricted to their place of residence pending
trial.
In southern Tajikistan, international observers reported that
police did not adhere to the 3-day detention rule; instead,
police arbitrarily detained persons, failed to notify families,
and released detainees or brought charges against them only in
those cases in which international workers or influential
friends of the detained intervened. In theory, detainees have
the right to counsel after 24 hours of detention, with counsel
to be provided free to the indigent. In practice, access to
legal counsel varies widely.
Officials of the former opposition-dominated government were
arrested on politically motivated charges of treason, with
indictments for the theft of state property added. Tajik and
Turkmenistan security forces arrested Mirbobo Mirakhimov,
Chairman of the State Committee on Television and Radio, in
Ashgabat on January 8, 1993, charging him with treason. Three
other television officials--Akhmadsho Kamilov, Khayradin
Kasymov, and Khurshed Nazarov--were seized in Kyrgyzstan on
January 17 and charged with conspiring in the violent overthrow
of the 1991-92 Nabiyev government by using the mass media to
promote the interests of the opposition. All four continued to
be held at year's end; no trial date has been set. In June a
Helsinki Watch delegation attempted unsuccessfully to visit
these four. It rejected the Government's restrictions on the
distance at which the prisoners could be viewed and the
Government's refusal to permit a visual examination of the
defendants to check for obvious injuries.
Another politically motivated arrest was that of well-known
poet Bozor Sobir, charged with inciting interethnic hatred and
provoking the seizure of members of Parliament in April 1992.
Sobir, the author of a poem denouncing Russian imperialism,
allegedly criticized the Nabiyev government at a series of
April rallies. In December Sobir was convicted and given a
4-year suspended sentence.
In September the Government formally denied requests by the
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) for access to
persons in pretrial detention, except on a case-by-case basis.
The Criminal Code prohibits access to those in pretrial
detention, which the exception of immediate family members,
except by special permission of the presiding judge. In highly
politicized cases, judges have denied regular access by family
members to those in pretial detention.
The issuance of arrest warrants for moderate members of the
opposition remaining in Tajikistan prompted the flight to
Moscow of deputy chairman of the Rastokhez Movement Abdukikir
Kholiqzoda and deputy chairman of the Democrat Party Abdunabi
Sattorov. The Procurator General, following international
community interventions with Head of State Rahmanov, quashed
these two warrants, as well as a third issued for the arrest of
former Democrat Party stalwart Saghib Nazarov. The warrants
culminated in the arrest of a fourth colleague, Democrat Party
executive member Oniho Bobonazarova, who was released from
prison and placed under house arrest following the personal
intervention of Head of State Rahmonov.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
The court system remains unmodified from the Soviet period.
There are several tiers of courts: the city, district,
regional, and republic levels, with a separate but parallel
military tribunal. Higher courts serve as appellate courts for
lower ones. Local, regional, and republic-level judges are,
for the most part, poorly trained and lack an understanding of
independent judicial function. At all levels of the court
system, officials are under the strong influence of local
political leaderships and armed paramilitary groups.
According to the law, trials are public, except in certain
cases involving national security or the protection of minors.
The court appoints an attorney for those who do not have one.
Defendants are permitted to choose their own attorneys but are
not necessarily permitted to choose among court-appointed
attorneys. Former opposition political leaders, including
Mirbobo Mirakhimov (see Section 1.d.), charge they were denied
access to an attorney. Officials dispute this, stating that
the prisoners had rejected the court-appointed attorneys.
Mirakhimov has since acquired counsel, although the courts
sentenced to death opposition commander Mullah Ajik without the
benefit of counsel after he refused the court-appointed female
attorney.
The procurator's office remains responsible for conducting all
investigations of allegations of criminal conduct. In theory,
the defendant and counsel have the right to review all
government evidence, to confront witnesses, and to present
evidence and testimony. No groups are barred from testifying,
and all testimony is given equal weight, regardless of
ethnicity or gender. Ministry of Justice and procuracy
officials contend that defendants benefit from the presumption
of innocence despite the unmodified Soviet legal statute which
presumes the guilt of someone who has been brought to trial.
In practice, the judiciary is subject to interference from
armed vigilantes and members of paramilitary groups whom the
Government is not able to control. Officials candidly admit
that many verdicts are decided "at the point of a
Kalashnikov." In southern Tajikistan, three chiefs of police
were murdered, and in the relatively stable region of
Tursunzade one judge was killed, presumably for their refusal
to bow to the demands of armed progovernment militias. In the
GBAO, armed opposition elements regularly intimidate local
authorities who lack the strength to defend themselves.
Throughout Tajikistan, the fact and fear of armed intimidation
affects the outcome of legal proceedings.
Opposition members and international human rights monitors,
including Helsinki Watch, charged the Government with abusing
the judicial system. For example, while gross abuses by
members of the progovernment militias have gone uninvestigated
and unpunished, two opposition political party officials in the
northern region of Leninabad were arrested and sentenced to 4
and 7 years, respectively, for the possession of bullets.
Opposition supporters further charged that police planted the
evidence implicating the arrestees. In January 1994, an
appeals court overturned the guilty verdict of one defendant.
Estimates of the number of political prisoners range from a
high of 200 to a low of 15. However, many persons currently in
self-imposed exile in the CIS are wanted by the Government on
charges that are political in nature
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
The Criminal Code provides for the inviolability of the home
and prohibits interference with correspondence. Police may
enter and search a private home with the approval of the
procurator. In some cases, police may enter and search without
permission, but they must inform the procurator within 24
hours. Police are permitted to enter and search homes without
permission if they have compelling reason to believe a delay in
obtaining a warrant would impair national security. There is
no judicial review of police searches conducted with or without
a warrant.
The procurator's office ordered thousands of random nighttime
raids on homes in Dushanbe, using as justification the
continued instability within Tajikistan. The raids were
ordered without prior evidence of wrongdoing. On many
occasions, officers conducting the raids reportedly extorted
money or goods from innocent people. Official sources stated
that government monitoring of correspondence also increased.
At the end of the war, members of the local population with
ties to the victorious special battalions, special battalion
members, and ethnic Kulyabis occupied thousands of homes
belonging to displaced persons and refugees. The Government is
working slowly to evict occupants and return homes to their
rightful owners. Nevertheless, at the district level, local
warlords have thwarted procurators' efforts and have even
offered armed protection to unlawful inhabitants.
International workers estimate that hundreds of homes remain
illegally occupied in the south and in the capital.
g. Use of Excessive Force and Violations of Humanitarian
Law in Internal Conflicts
During the final phase of the civil war, both the Government
and opposition were responsible for extensive violations of
human rights, including summary executions of captives,
disregard for civilian and noncombatant status, hostage-taking,
torture, rape, looting, and forced labor and conscription. The
Government entered the capital in December 1992, but fighting
between government and opposition forces continued until March
1993 when government forces ousted the opposition from the Garm
Valley. In the battle to retake the Garm, government forces
indiscriminately bombed and shelled city centers and villages,
killing and injuring civilian noncombatants. For its part, the
opposition brutally exploited the local civilian population.
In the Garm village of Nowabad, opposition leader Redzuan and
Afghan mujahedin forcibly conscripted young males and stripped
food and medicines from a local mental institution, resulting
in the death of 50 of its 300 patients.
The March truce with GBAO authorities, whereby government
forces were to remain outside the autonomous province in
exchange for provincial government assurances that opposition
forces would not be permitted to cross from Afghanistan or
conduct operations in the province, broke down in August.
Reacting to the opposition's buildup of Tajik opposition and
mercenary fighters (including volunteers from Afghanistan and
other states), the opposition's blockade of humanitarian
convoys from the capital to the GBAO, and the continued
military raids of opposition and Afghan mujahedin in the Darwaz
valley, the Government launched a 2-week offensive, with
Russian assistance, against opposition forces in the Darwaz.
According to credible reports, government forces, angered that
opposition forces would benefit from international assistance,
also turned back at least one humanitarian aid convoy.
In areas under its control, the Government moved quickly to
permit international aid agencies, including the UNHCR, the
ICRC, Doctors Without Borders, the Aga Khan Foundation, and the
World Food Program, access to the displaced and refugee
populations. Opposition forces closed the primary supply road
to the GBAO for several months. Once that route had been
opened, the Government resumed supply convoys into the
province. Opposition forces in the province continued to fire
on these relief convoys.
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
In theory, a 1991 law protects freedom of speech and press,
including the right to establish independent newspapers,
magazines, and radio and television centers. In practice,
freedom of expression is severely restricted. Journalists,
broadcasters, and individual citizens who disagree with
government policies cannot speak freely or critically.
Government control was exerted over the media through: the
dismissal of journalists and broadcasters even tangentially
associated with banned political parties; the criminal
prosecution of independent journals; self-censorship by editors
fearful of armed elements loyal to the Government; government
control of printing presses, the supply of newsprint, and
broadcasting facilities; and government subsidies for virtually
all publications.
In 1993 the number of daily and weekly publications was
dramatically reduced. Most of those still being published are
government publications. While deteriorating economic
conditions may have played a role in the closing of
publications, the fact that most publications no longer
circulating favored the opposition indicates that political
motives were a major factor in the closings.
Since the formation of the Rahmonov Government in December
1992, at least 30 journalists and broadcasters have fled
Tajikistan due to well-grounded fears of political persecution
or physical threats by armed members of militia forces. Since
January at least 7 journalists disappeared and are presumed
dead. None of the deaths can be linked directly to government
forces, but the journalists' political orientation clearly
suggests the involvement of government supporters. The
Ministry of Interior has not successfully investigated any of
these deaths. The local procurator's office initiated formal
investigations but did not bring charges in any of the cases.
The criminal investigation of the independent journals Charogi
Ruz, Adolat, Najot, Oriyon, Bomdod, Bokhtar, and Oinai
Sikandart followed the June decision of the Ministry of Press
and Information to suspend their publishing permits. In
addition, the Procurator General's office undertook a review of
all newspapers and journals to assess culpability in the
September 1992 overthrow of the previous government. Due to a
well-founded belief that criminal charges would be brought
against his paper, the certainty of his arrest, and threats
against his life, Charogi Ruz editor Dodojon Atuollo decided to
publish his journal from exile in Moscow. Faidmurodi Yoriyon,
a journalist for the opposition-oriented publication Farhang,
was arrested in January, and no information has been made
available on his legal status. Journalists for publications
believed to be sympathetic to the opposition who remain in
Tajikistan have regularly been called in for interrogation at
the procurator's office.
Generally, Soviet-era restrictions on criticism of government
figures apply: central newspapers may upbraid regional
officials; and the mass media may criticize those government
officials whom the Head of State, the Prime Minister, or their
deputies criticize. When a major daily, Evening Dushanbe,
attempted to print an article detailing the Procurator
General's charges of corruption against Prime Minister
Abdullajanov, however, armed senior supporters of the Prime
Minister destroyed the newspaper's linotype and all copies of
the article. Since that incident, armed men threatened the
family of editor Javohir Kobilov during nighttime visits. The
Procurator General agreed to investigate the case but forbade
the newspaper to use the charges.
There are no independent broadcast media in Tajikistan. The
State Committee on Television and Radio oversees the Republic's
television and radio channels and is subordinate to the
Ministry of Press and Information. The Dushanbe city
television network is subordinate to the city executive
committee, and regional television services fall under the
control of regional executive committees. Strict
self-censorship is practiced, and no news or programs critical
of the Government are broadcast.
Current political divisions and fear of retribution by the
Government's armed supporters limit academic expression. The
Government dismantled the Academy of Science's Institute of
Oriental Studies which was suspected of fomenting Islamic
"fundamentalism." However, Institute employees were not
prevented from finding employment with other Academy of Science
institutes and departments. In October arrest warrants
reportedly were issued for four leading opposition political
party figures who had retained senior positions at Tajik State
University despite strong pressure from the Attorney General
and the university rector to resign. Two of the professors,
deputy chairman of the Rastokhez movement Abdukokir Kholiqzoda
and deputy chairman of the Democrat Party Abdunabi Sattorov,
fled to Moscow. A third, Oinihol Bobonazarova, was later
arrested but then released and placed under house arrest
instead after the personal intervention of Rahmonov.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
The Constitution provides for freedom of peaceful assembly.
However, following imposition of a city curfew in January, only
the city commandant, who was originally the Minister of
Interior but is now a Ministry officer within the city
executive committee, has the power to grant permission for
public demonstrations. Freedom of association is circumscribed
by a requirement that all organizations must register with the
Ministry of Justice. In practice, strict control is exercised
over organizations and activities of a political nature, while
free assembly and association are permitted for nonpolitical
associations, including trade unions. No permits were issued
for antigovernment demonstrations in Dushanbe. A spontaneous
antigovernment demonstration took place in the city of Kulyab
following price increases in basic commodities, and similar
smaller demonstrations took place in the mountainous districts
of Leninabad. There was no government response to these
demonstrations.
Since the formation of the Government in December 1992, the
only political organization to operate freely is the Communist
Party. On June 21, the Supreme Court formally banned the
political parties that supported the former regime, including
the Democrat Party, the Islamic Revival Party (IRP), the
Rastokhez National Movement, and the Lali Badakhshan Movement
for the Autonomy of the Pamirs. Members of banned political
parties are carefully watched and periodically called in for
questioning.
c. Freedom of Religion
Church and state are separate in Tajikistan, and the Government
places no restrictions on religious worship. According to the
law on freedom of faith, the Committee on Religion under the
Council of Ministers registers religious communities. Among
those active in Tajikistan are the Islamic, Russian Orthodox,
Jewish, German Roman Catholic, Seventh-Day Adventist, Baptist,
and Baha'i. Islam is freely practiced by more than 90 percent
of Tajikistan's residents. All religious communities are
permitted to provide religious education, publish religious
materials of a nonpolitical nature, and maintain international
contacts and travel. Conversion is permitted and missionaries
are free to operate. Religious faith confers no particular
advantages in civil, political, economic, or military
structures. However, Muslims identified as adherents of the
IRP or more broadly supportive of political Islam have been
purged from government and military employment.
There are no official restrictions against any religious
group. The Qaziate (the Islamic Center and seat of the chief
Islamic judge--and senior cleric--in Tajikistan) was closed
from October 1992 to February 1993, at which time it was
elevated to the rank of Muftiate. The closure of the Qaziate
was related to the involvement of its former leaders in the
overthrow of the Nabiyev government and its overt support for
the opposition during the civil war. Akbar Turajonzoda, the
former "Qazi Kalon" (chief judge), was a leader of the
opposition. His position was abolished, and he was replaced as
the senior Islamic figure in Tajikistan by the new mufti.
The largest religious school (madrasah), reopened in the fall
of 1993, and other such schools operate around the country.
However, several schools accused of open support of the IRP in
the civil war were closed. Qaziate and IRP newspapers were
banned, and their editors are in exile. Mullahs openly
sympathetic to the IRP either fled the country following the
civil war, assumed a very low profile, or were arrested by the
Government. The Government announced the trial and death
sentence of mullah Ajik for his alleged torture and murder of
civilians and combatants during the civil war. It permitted
one mullah, who openly supported the opposition but did not
serve as a commander, to return from Afghanistan with his
extended family.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
The Government has stipulated two restrictions on travel within
Tajikistan. Tajiks and foreigners alike are prohibited from
travel within a 25-kilometer zone along the Republic's borders
with China and Afghanistan. In practice, international aid
workers and diplomats have traveled freely in these regions
without the Government's prior authorization.
On October 1, the Government announced that all residents of
Dushanbe and any travelers planning to stay longer than 3 days
in the capital would have to register with central authorities
and receive a permit. The move serves to prevent the migration
of refugees and internally displaced persons to the capital
from their homes in areas disrupted by civil war. Opposition
supporters accused the Government of attempting to discriminate
selectively in the issuance of Dushanbe residence permits
against suspected opponents of the Government.
With the exception of residence in Dushanbe, there are no legal
restrictions on changing residence or workplace. Current
regulations require registration at the local Ministry of
Interior office upon arrival and departure.
Tajik nationals who wish to travel abroad must obtain an exit
visa. There is no evidence these are withheld for political
reasons.
Tajikistan has no law on emigration. For the time being,
persons who wish to migrate within the former Soviet Union must
simply alert the Ministry of Internal Affairs to their
departure. Persons wishing to migrate beyond the borders of
the former Soviet Union must receive the approval of the
relevant country's embassy prior to the issuance of an
international passport. Persons settled abroad who do not
intend to return are required to inform the Tajikistan
interests section of the nearest Russian embassy or consulate.
Persons who have emigrated to countries within the former
Soviet Union may return freely to Tajikistan. Those who wish
to return to Tajikistan after residing elsewhere must submit
their request to the Tajikistan interests section. The
Government adjudicates each request on a case-by-case basis.
Reports indicate that persons, other than those who fled
Tajikistan for political reasons at the end of the civil war,
are freely permitted to return.
Some 80 percent of Tajikistan's 15,000-strong Jewish community
has emigrated to Israel through a travel program coordinated
between the Governments of Israel and Tajikistan. Several
hundred Jews who were disappointed with living conditions and
the cultural climate in Israel have returned to Tajikistan,
primarily to the Leninabad region.
Tajik citizenship is not known to have been revoked for
political reasons.
Approximately 90,000 Pamiri and Garm-origin nationals fled to
Afghanistan during the fall and winter of 1992, fearing
persecution by victorious progovernment militia forces.
Repatriation of the refugees commenced in the late spring,
following government amnesty decrees absolving all but the
opposition's political leadership from responsibility for acts
committed during the war. Approximately 40,000 refugees remain
in Afghanistan. Repatriation proceeded slowly due to continued
incidents of harassment, murder, and discrimination against
those returning to the southern Khatlon district and to the
capital. In addition, armed opposition elements in Afghanistan
sought to prevent refugees from returning, even threatening
death to those wishing to return.
Approximately 30,000 internally displaced Pamiris and Garmis
remain in the Gorno-Badakhshan region. Many of these are
fearful of retribution by vigilante groups and paramilitary
forces. In the southern region of Khatlon, particularly in the
districts of Kabodian and Shaar Tuz, confrontations erupted
between the local population and the displaced people,
resulting in widespread harassment, beatings, and tens of
deaths during the March-April period.
As a result of conflict and instability, as many as 90,000
Russian-speaking citizens left Tajikistan in 1993, and tens of
thousands of ethnic Tajiks moved to the northern region of
Leninabad. In September the Government permitted the UNHCR to
issue refugee documents for Afghan nationals residing in
Tajikistan.
The Government does not force refugees to return to countries
where they fear persecution. However, in March it unexpectedly
forced the return of approximately 50,000 internally displaced
persons from Dushanbe to their home regions in the south.
Progovernment paramilitary groups, including the special
battalions, and groups of local men who objected to this
decision for ethnic or economic reasons resisted the
Government's efforts to return these displaced persons to their
home areas. In addition to harassment, beatings, and rape,
several returnees were abducted and later found murdered. The
paramilitary groups are believed responsible for most of the
abductions.
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government
Citizens do not have the right to change their government
peacefully. Opposition political parties were banned, and
opposition political leaders were arrested and jailed or driven
into exile (see Section 1.d.). No parliamentary elections have
been held since independence, and only progovernment supporters
ran in the elections held in June 1993 to fill the seats of
parliamentarians who had been killed or were in exile, although
all but one of the seats was contested.
The Government, installed in December 1992 when the Parliament
voted to eliminate the presidential system, is composed
principally of Kulyab, Leninabad, and Hissar regional political
interests but has representation from all regions. Abdul Malik
Abdullajanov, who became Prime Minister in the Iskandarov
regime in the fall of 1992, retained his position, as did
several officials who served in both the Nabiyev and Iskandarov
administrations. Under the Rahmonov Government, the Cabinet of
Ministers and Presidium of the Supreme Soviet quickly polarized
into opposing bodies representing Leninabad and Kulyab regional
interests, resulting in a paralysis of the central Government.
In December Prime Minister Abdullajanov was forced to resign;
however, his replacement by fellow Leninabad native Deputy
Prime Minister Abdujalil Samadov ensures that the rivalry
between the two branches of government will continue.
The Parliament was last elected in February 1990 under Soviet
election laws and prior to the emergence of opposition
political parties. It reflects the Communist-era, old guard
power structure to a significant degree. The Parliament met
only twice after the December 1992 election of the Rahmonov
Government, in June and December 1993. At the June session,
senior government officials criticized the Nabiyev and
Iskandarov regimes' economic reform efforts and the work of
certain ministries. Former opposition leader Sohibnazarov, in
turn, criticized senior government leaders and was then
denounced by other deputies. Opposition deputies still
resident in Tajikistan were in attendance at the Parliament
session, including former acting president Iskandarov, and the
Government promised to ensure their security. However, deputy
S. Shoyev, a resident of Garm, was abducted along with his
brother from Dushanbe at the conclusion of the session. Their
bodies have not been found, but they are presumed dead (see
Section 1.b.).
In June the Supreme Court banned four opposition parties and
movements (see Section 2.b.) on the grounds that they had
formed armed units and conspired to overthrow the Nabiyev
government. The political parties were not represented by
lawyers, and only one opposition political member was permitted
to testify. The banning of the parties appears to have been
motivated by a desire to supress and harass political dissent.
There are no legal barriers to female participation in the
electoral process, although the elimination of Soviet-era
quotas has resulted in proportionate declines in women's
representation.
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
of Human Rights
Fear of armed, vigilante elements suppressed nascent human
rights organizations. Local citizens who served as de facto
human rights monitors in the past, including the former
director of the Women and Children's Hospital Sofia Hakimova,
received anonymous threats. The only local organizations that
are able to monitor human rights in Tajikistan are ethnic-based
groups which focus on freedom of emigration of minority
populations. These organizations enjoyed good working
relations with the Rahmonov and previous governments.
The Rahmonov Government discussed human rights and humanitarian
issues with representatives of international organizations,
including the United Nations Mission of Observers to Tajikistan
(UNMOT), the ICRC, and the UNHCR, all of which have offices in
Dushanbe. In addition, the Government held discussions with
Helsinki Watch and the Conference on Security and Cooperation
in Europe. In May senior government officials participated in
an UNMOT-sponsored human rights seminar which attracted more
than 100 participants.
In June a full-page attack on Amnesty International (AI) by the
Ministry of Interior was published in the Tajik and Russian-
language dailies. The Government was harshly critical of AI's
report on Tajikistan, charging that the organization was guilty
of biased reporting for not indicting the record of the
opposition government in 1992. The Ministry of Interior
accused AI of conspiring with opposition forces to overthrow
the Nabiyev government and of collaborating with opposition
figures in exile.
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Disability, Language, or Social Status
Women
One legacy of the Soviet era is the widespread participation of
women in the work force and in institutes of higher education.
There is no formal discrimination against women in employment,
education, or housing and in urban areas women can be found
throughout government, academic institutes, and enterprises.
In rural areas, women marry young, rarely receive university
education, and are less likely--due to the large family
size--to work outside the home. Conservative Muslim traditions
and ignorance in some villages result in an unknown number of
cases of wife beating going uninvestigated; however, women's
groups maintain that police officials and government organs
responsibly prosecute those complaints that are filed. No
official information is available on the prevalence of spousal
abuse, or prosecution of offenders, nor do nongovernmental
organizations exist which monitor this problem.
Children
The Government has an extensive, if crumbling, security net for
children. Women are provided with 3 years' maternity leave and
monthly subsidies for each child. Health care is free. In the
aftermath of the civil war, children returning from Afghanistan
suffered from malnutrition and experienced high mortality rates
in settlement camps. The Government has facilitated the work
of international relief organizations in areas affected by the
civil war, and public health officials reaffirm that maternal
and children's health remains a top government priority.
According to official figures, approximately 28 percent of the
budget is devoted to social welfare expenditures.
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities
In southern Tajikistan, Kulyabi-origin Tajiks dominate local
administrative and security offices, having displaced local
Tajiks and ethnic Uzbeks. Pervasive discrimination against
refugees returning from Afghanistan is perpetrated by some
local officials, collective farm directors, and the local
warlords technically subordinate to the Ministries of Defense
and Interior and the Committee on National Security. The
overwhelming majority have not been given their jobs back,
despite assurances from the Government of both employment and
back pay. Local government officials in the south have
informed international aid representatives that political
tensions preclude the return of the refugees to white-collar or
factory jobs. In practice, most refugees remain without a
source of income and subsist on international aid deliveries.
The Government's intervention has been insufficient and
inadequate to the task of reintegrating the returning
refugees. Government pledges to provide reconstruction
supplies and ensure physical security have not been fulfilled.
Returnees seeking to use the legal system to evict squatters
from their homes are shunted from office to office and lack the
material and financial resources to overcome bureaucratic
inertia. Local prosecutors willing to investigate militia
members suspected of the harassment or murder of refugees are
not provided with qualified staff, resources, or political
support. The murders of seven returnees in the Kabodian and
Shaar Tuz districts during the June-August period were
investigated only after international attention was brought to
bear, and even so no suspects have been arrested.
The language law promoting Tajik, the civil war, and the
unresolved border conflict with Afghanistan resulted in the
continued outflow of the Russian-speaking population which now
numbers approximately 250,000, down from 600,000 at the
beginning of 1992. In contrast to the attitude of the prior
opposition regime, however, government officials have
encouraged the Russian-speaking community to remain. The
school system has retained its trilingual (Tajik, Russian,
Uzbek) structure.
The Rahmonov Government, like governments which preceded it,
has discriminated against Afghan nationals by not affording
even minimal police protection to Afghans who are the victims
of criminal elements. In August the security guard at the
Afghan Consulate was murdered while on duty. Despite frequent
official protests, security organs did not seriously
investigate crimes against the Afghan community. In one case,
police ruled as suicide the case of an Afghan found hanging in
his apartment, despite the fact his arms were bound together.
People with Disabilities
The Law on Social Protection of Invalids adopted on January 1,
1992, stipulates the rights of the disabled to employment and
adequate medical care. However, employers are not required to
provide physical access to the disabled. High unemployment and
the absence of even basic technology to assist the disabled
results, in practice, in widespread discrimination.
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
According to the Law on Social Organization and the Law on
Trade Union Rights and Guarantees, all citizens are guaranteed
the right of association. Included in this guarantee is the
right to form and join associations without prior
authorization, to organize territorially, to form and join
federations and affiliate with international organizations
freely, and to participate in international travel.
Although there in no longer any requirement for a single labor
union structure, the Communist-era Confederation of Trade
Unions remains the dominant labor organization. It has,
however, shed its subordination to the Communist Party.
Virtually all nonagricultural workers are members. The
Confederation consists of 20 professional trade unions and
claims 1,689,000 members. The separate Labor Union of Private
Enterprise Workers has registered 3,000 small and medium
enterprises, totaling 40,000 members, some of whom have dual
membership in the Confederation. Both labor unions are
formally consulted by the Cabinet of Ministers during the
drafting of social welfare and worker rights legislation.
The law on tariff agreements and social partnerships mandates
that arbitration take place before a strike can legally be
called. Depending on the scale of the labor disagreement,
arbitration can take place at the company, sector, or
governmental level. In the event that arbitration fails,
unions have the right to strike. Both labor unions publicly
disavowed the utility of strikes in a period of deepening
economic crisis and high unemployment and espoused compromise
between management and workers. According to the
Confederation, there were no strikes in 1993.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
The right to organize and bargain collectively is codified in
the Law on Trade Union Rights and Guarantees, the Law on Social
Partnerships and Collective Contracts, and the Law on Labor
Protection. Participating in collective bargaining at the
company level are employees, members of the trade union, and
management. Negotiations involving an industry sector include
officials from the relevant ministry and members of the trade
union's steering committee for that particular sector.
Antiunion discrimination or the use of sanctions to dissuade
union membership is prohibited. Any complaints of
discrimination against a labor union or labor union activist
are immediately raised to the level of the Supreme Court and
investigated by the Ministry of Justice. Any employer found
guilty of firing an employee based on his union activity is
compelled to reinstate the employee.
There are no export processing zones.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
There is no explicit injunction in the Law on Labor Protection
or the Law on Employment prohibiting forced or compulsory
labor. However, these laws provide that a person has the right
to find work of his own choosing. Labor inspectors within the
local trade union structure enforce this principle. The Soviet
practice of compelling students to harvest cotton was outlawed
in 1989; in January-March 1993, however, students and other
state workers were used to pick cotton not harvested during the
civil war. The UNHCR received credible reports that local
officials and collective farm directors were responsible for
instituting forced labor of returnees and other presumed
supporters of the former government in the district of
Bokhtar.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
According to labor laws, the minimum age for the employment of
children is 16. With the concurrence of the local trade union,
employment may begin at the age of 15. While official data are
lacking, children from the age of 7 routinely perform
agricultural work, which is classified as "family assistance."
Trade unions report any violation in the hiring of minors for
work in enterprises.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
In consultation with trade union representatives, the
Government raised the minimum wage three times in 1993. The
minimum wage, however, does not provide a decent standard of
living for a worker and family. By December 1993, the minimum
wage was valued at only $1.25 (8,000 rubles) per month at the
official exchange rate; on the black market, the dollar value
would be about $0.82.
The legal workweek is 40 hours. The Government's established
occupational health and safety standards fall below
international standards and are not actively enforced. Work
standards are enforced by the state technical supervision
committee under the Cabinet of Ministers. According to
official data, more than a fifth of industrial workers worked
in substandard conditions.
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