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DATE:  JANUARY 31, 1994


Serbia and Montenegro, two of the constituent republics of the 
former Yugoslavia, proclaimed the establishment of the "Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia" in 1992.  The United Nations and the 
Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), as 
well as the international community, rejected the "FRY's" claim 
to be the sole successor to the former Yugoslavia and suspended 
Yugoslav participation in their organizations.  

Serbia/Montenegro's formal federal governmental structure is 
subsumed under an authoritarian state apparatus controlled by 
Slobodan Milosevic, reelected for a second 5-year term as 
President of the Serbian Republic in a December 1992 election 
that was judged by CSCE observers to have been neither free nor 
fair.  He dominates the political scene through his Socialist 
Party of Serbia (SPS), which holds the key administrative 
positions in both the Federal and Serbian Governments, and has 
generally succeeded in circumscribing Montenegrin autonomy.  
Serbia has two provinces--Kosovo and Vojvodina--but their 
political autonomy was abolished in 1990, and all significant 
decisionmaking authority is centralized in Belgrade.  

Because of Serbian responsibility in instigating and 
propagating violence on the territory of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, including human rights abuses on a massive scale, 
the United Nations imposed sweeping economic and political 
sanctions in 1992 and tightened them in 1993.  Despite claims 
to the contrary, the Belgrade regime sustained military, 
economic, and political support for ethnic Serbs responsible 
for massive human rights abuses and acts of genocide in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1992-93 and similarly aided Croatian 
Serbs occupying nearly a third of Croatian territory.  

Milosevic also wields absolute control over the Serbian police, 
a heavily armed force of some 70,000-80,000 which is guilty of 
extensive, brutal, and systematic human rights abuses, 
including extrajudicial killing.  It continued a pattern of 
gross human rights violations and systematic repression of 
ethnic Albanians in the Kosovo region.  

The economy, already under serious strain due to the cost of 
proxy wars in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina and the breakup of 
Yugoslavia, deteriorated markedly in 1993 under the impact of 

* The United States does not recognize the Federal Republic of 

U.N. sanctions.  The massive printing of money to keep the 
economy afloat resulted in hyperinflation of historic 
proportions.  By year's end, many goods, including food 
staples, had disappeared from stores and were available only on 
the black market for foreign currency.

Human rights violations increased in Serbia during 1993, but 
Montenegro's human rights record was not as poor.  Ethnic 
minorities continued to suffer most.  Systematic police 
repression in Kosovo, where some 90 percent of the population 
are ethnic Albanians, included killing suspects allegedly while 
they were fleeing or resisting arrest, beating detainees and 
prisoners to death, arbitrary arrests, and widespread 
harassment.  Paramilitary attacks and threats tolerated by the 
Belgrade regime resulted in the murder and dislocation of many 
Muslims in the Sandzak region.  Selective intimidation by 
police and others of members of the Croatian and Hungarian 
minorities in multiethnic Vojvodina spurred the emigration of 
non-Serbs.  This situation worsened after Belgrade authorities, 
over Montenegrin objections, expelled CSCE human rights 
monitoring missions at the end of July, despite a U.N. Security 
Council resolution calling for the missions' continuation.

The police also used heavy-handed violence against Serbian 
opponents of the regime.  During a spontaneous protest in 
Belgrade in June, police arrested and maltreated several dozen 
people, including opposition leaders Vuk and Danica Draskovic 
who were both severely beaten while in police custody.  More 
than a dozen Kosovar Albanians died at the hands of police, 
either while allegedly resisting arrest or in custody.  Police 
responsible for abuses are rarely prosecuted.  However, two 
Serbian police officers in Prizren were sentenced to short 
prison terms in December for the beating death of Aif 
Krasniqui, a Kosovar Albanian, while in police custody.  

Freedom of the press is greatly circumscribed.  One Serbian 
journalist was briefly kidnaped by unknown individuals, thought 
to be agents of the Government.  Belgrade authorities refused 
to renew the accreditation of two long-time foreign 
journalists, without official explanation.  The police 
sometimes interfere with peaceful assembly and travel and 
regularly enter homes and offices without warrants.  They 
monitor and harass opposition leaders and dissidents.  


Section 1  Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including 
           Freedom from:

     a.  Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing

Political violence in Serbia/Montenegro, including killings, 
resulted mostly from direct and indirect efforts by Serbian 
authorities to suppress and intimidate ethnic minority groups.  
Leaders of minority communities in the Sandzak, Vojvodina, and 
Kosovo reported numerous acts of violence and intimidation, the 
express aim of which was to disrupt and terrorize non-Serbs and 
Muslims to the point that they would flee their homes and the 
ultimate objective of "ethnic cleansing" would be achieved.

During the war in Croatia, Yugoslav army (JNA) soldiers and 
Serbian paramilitary forces were stationed throughout 
neighboring Bosnia and Herzegovina.  When sporadic outbursts of 
violence there escalated into full-scale war in April 1992, as 
Serbian nationalists attempted to establish an independent 
state within Bosnia and Herzegovina, the JNA armed Bosnian Serb 
irregulars and fought on behalf of Serbian forces until its 
nominal withdrawal in mid-May.  At that time, federal and 
republic authorities claimed that the personnel of the JNA in 
Bosnia, 80 percent of whom were Bosnian Serbs, were free to 
remain in Bosnia and Herzegovina to fight.  Approximately 
80,000 "volunteers" who "left" the JNA formed the core of the 
newly formed Serbian army of Bosnia and Herzegovina.  The 
federal and Serbian authorities continued to provide fuel and 
other materiel support to that army.  

Violence was most severe in the Muslim-populated region of 
Sandzak and the Albanian-populated region of Kosovo. 
Paramilitary groups regularly crossed the border from 
Bosnia-Herzegovina into Serbia and Montenegro to attack local 
Muslims without opposition from units of "FRY" army reservists 
stationed in border villages.  During these raids, paramilitary 
forces beat to death at least five elderly Muslims.  The 
Humanitarian Law Fund, a Serbian human rights organization, 
charged in a February report that "FRY" reservists 
intentionally allowed groups of armed Bosnian Serbs onto the 
territory of the State of Serbia and did not prevent the 
mistreatment and abuse of its non-Serb residents.  

In Kosovo at least 15 ethnic Albanians died at the hands of 
police during 1993, of which 7 took place after the CSCE 
monitoring missions left the area in late July.  In most cases, 
the authorities claimed that those killed were shot while 
fleeing or resisting arrest.  Police, however, appear to have 
resorted to deadly force with little or no attempt to apprehend 
the alleged suspects by other means.  During a raid on the 
market in Pristina, police arrested two brothers, shooting both 
of them as they broke away, and one died instantly.  In late 
August, during a raid on a house in the village of Cernille, 
also in Kosovo, police waiting to question two brothers shot 
and killed their 16-year-old brother as he and his two older 
brothers tried to run away.  

In other cases, persons died while in police custody as the 
result of torture and other mistreatment.  In February police 
arrested, imprisoned, and subsequently beat to death Adem 
Sequiri, an ethnic Albanian from Djakovica, Kosovo.  The 
official report of death cited blows all over his body as the 
cause of death.  In August Arif Krasniqi, an ethnic Albanian, 
died at the police station in Prizren 24 hours after his 
arrest.  His body showed clear signs of torture to his head, 
feet, and genitals.  Two policemen were charged in Krasniqui's 
death and sentenced to 3-year prison terms.  The convictions 
represented an exception to the general rule of official denial 
and failure to investigate police abuses.  

In a series of incidents along the Serbian-Albanian border, 
Serbian border guards were responsible for the death of 14 
Albanian citizens in Albania.  Serbian authorities defended 
their behavior, claiming that those killed were on the Serbian 
side of the border and had crossed it illegally, possibly for 
acts of terrorism.  Smuggling is rife in the area, but the 
authorities appear to have used deadly force with little effort 
to apprehend the suspected border violators.  In an effort to 
excuse the killings following one incident, a senior Serbian 
official said that the Serbian border guards involved were 

The Yugoslav Democratic Party of Gypsies complained that police 
had harassed and beaten Gypsies in the village of Strazilo, 
resulting in one death.

     b.  Disappearance

Bosnian Serb paramilitary forces operating with impunity in 
Serbia/Montenegro were responsible for disappearances in the 
Sandzak region.  In one case, paramilitary forces abducted at 
least 19, and possibly 24, Muslims from a Serbian train when it 
was forced to stop while in a Serb-controlled area of 
Bosnia-Herzegovina en route from Belgrade to Montenegro.  
Despite a meeting between Milosevic and families of the 
disappeared, no progress was made in finding the men.  Police 
held Milan Lukic, a Serb paramilitary leader in Bosnia, for 2 
days in Serbia in connection with the disappearances but 
released him after his troops threatened to blow up the 
Belgrade-to-Bar railway.  The paramilitary forces are presumed 
to have murdered the Muslims, although their bodies have not 
been found.

In February Bosnian Serb soldiers entered the predominantly 
Muslim village of Seliste (Montenegro) and took away two women, 
a 16-year-old youth, and two small children, returning the 
following night for more members of the same family.  Six of 
those taken, all over 60, were released after 3 weeks.  
According to some reports, Bosnian Serbs continued to hold the 
others, including a mother and two children under 5 years of 
age, in Cajnice, Serb-held Bosnia.  Those released described 
their treatment as brutal.

In April two Muslims, Hasan Mujovic and Mustafa Pulinac, who 
had abandoned their homes in Sjeverin (Serbia) following the 
kidnaping of some of its residents from a bus passing through 
Bosnian Serb-controlled territory in 1992, returned to check on 
their property.  Four masked men attacked Pulinac, but he 
escaped into the woods when Mujovic ran to his aid.  Mujovic 
has not been seen since.  Bosnian Serb officials in nearby Rudo 
reportedly had information as to his whereabouts but stated 
they were not responsible for the safety of citizens of another 

     c.  Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading 
         Treatment or Punishment

Federal law prohibits torture, but reports that police in 
Serbia severely beat people, whether under detention or at 
police checkpoints, numbered in the thousands.  Police 
routinely used violence indiscriminately against ethnic 
Albanians, justifying such repression as necessary to quell 
Kosovar Albanian demands for independence.  While overt police 
violence against Serbian opponents of the regime was 
comparatively rare, some cases occurred.

In a highly publicized instance, police violence was directed 
against Vuk Draskovic, leader of a major Serbian opposition 
party, and Danica Draskovic, a member of the party's executive 
committee.  Police arrested them at their party headquarters 
following a demonstration during which violence broke out in 
front of the Federal Parliament building on June 1.  Police 
severely beat them while dragging them from the party 
headquarters to police vans, where at least 10 policemen 
subjected them to further beatings.  During the initial 20 days 
of their detention, the Serbian Ministry of Justice denied that 
the couple had any serious health problems.  After a panel of 
medical experts examined them, however, Serbian authorities 
felt obliged to transfer them to a special clinic because of 
the severity of their injuries.  Mounting international 
pressure and domestic support for a hunger strike by Vuk 
Draskovic led President Milosevic to pardon the couple on
July 9.  

Police brutality contributed to and exacerbated the violence 
which erupted at the June 1 rally that provided the excuse for 
the Draskovics' arrest.  Police conducted sweeps, detaining 
some 30 opposition party members and 5 journalists; eyewitness 
reports confirmed that police clubbed and detained innocent 
bystanders, including journalists who identified themselves to 
the police.  One policeman died, and several others were 
injured as a result of the fracas.  

Police also badly beat a Serbian woman in Belgrade in October 
when she protested economic conditions while waiting in a 
ration line for flour.  The middle-aged woman was shown on 
television with severe bruises on her face.  The Serbian 
Minister of the Interior later apologized to the Serbian 
parliament and said the policemen who had beaten the woman were 
suspended and under investigation.  An opposition party called 
for the Minister's resignation, citing a growing pattern of 
police brutality and disregard for the law.

In Kosovo indiscriminate beatings of ethnic Albanians took 
place routinely, with a marked increase following the expulsion 
of the CSCE missions in July.  One Albanian human rights group 
took statements from 804 people beaten by police during a 
12-month period.  Many times that number were also reportedly 
beaten but did not register the assaults with human rights 
groups.  Those victimized included professionals associated 
with Albanian demands for independence, human rights monitors, 
and people without any discernible political affiliation.  In 
June the principal of a secondary school in Pristina, after 
being warned against continuing his work in the local Albanian 
private school system which Serbian authorities considered 
illegal, was arrested and badly beaten, likely suffering 
permanent damage to his hearing.  

Confident of their impunity and with no fear of reprisal, 
police brazenly abused and beat their victims in public view.  
For instance, in late August, during a raid on an ethnic 
Albanian village near Kamenica, Serbian police, conducting a 
fruitless search for weapons, allegedly badly beat two brothers 
in front of their family, causing the pregnant wife of one of 
them to collapse and miscarry.  A few days later, during a raid 
on the village of Cabra, Kosovo, an 80-year-old woman 
reportedly collapsed and died after witnessing the beating of 
her sons.  Victims of the raid were interviewed 3 days later, 
and witnesses saw evidence of severe beatings of several 

Police were exceptionally brutal after several attacks against 
security forces by unknown assailants.  An ethnic Albanian 
former policeman provided details of torture during 
investigations into the ambush of Serbian police in Glogovac in 
May, during which two policemen died.  One of several hundred 
Albanians rounded up after the ambush and taken in for 
questioning, he described how police beat and threatened some 
150 men.  A policeman hit a man next to him in the head with 
such force that it looked as if he would lose an eye.  Similar 
instances of mass arrests and police beatings occurred after 
other attacks on police (several policemen were wounded but 
none killed) in Pec and Prizren.  No one was charged with the 
attacks on the police.

The victims themselves, usually through ethnic organizations, 
provided accounts of police brutality carried out against 
minority members.  Human rights organizations independently 
confirmed many of these reports.   The sheer number of such 
reports, represented here by illustrative examples, is evidence 
of pervasive, systematic police brutality.

Most allegations of harsh interrogations and police brutality 
stem from incidents in police stations rather than in prisons.  
However, abuses were also known to occur after sentencing.  In 
July prison officials rejected the requests of ethnic Albanian 
prisoners serving sentences in Nis to be transferred to prisons 
in Kosovo, placed them in solitary confinement, beat them, and 
did not allow them parcels or family visits.  With the 
exceptions noted below, conditions in prisons generally meet 
minimum standards.  Prison facilities are for the most part 
built for that purpose and reasonably maintained.  

Prisons are divided into three categories:  open, low, and 
high-risk.  Due to the extremely low number of female inmates, 
lower category facilities for women are not available, and 
instead all female prisoners are confined in high-risk 
facilities, with far greater restrictions.  Female prisoners 
have reported that, although they are permitted writing 
materials, they are not allowed to keep what they write, 
whereas the men are.  Female prisoners are not given any 
opportunity for further education, though mandated by law, nor 
are their recreational facilities as well supplied as those of 
the men.  A new draft law to correct this situation was drawn 
up but not enacted by year's end.  

The number of political prisoners in Serbia/Montenegro is 
unknown.  At the end of 1993, there were at least 60 prisoners 
who had been convicted of political crimes.  The International 
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) was able to visit political 
prisoners after sentencing but not to gain access to those in 
pretrial confinement.  Numerous Albanian political activists 
were arrested because of their political activities in support 
of Kosovo independence and were detained briefly under 
misdemeanor laws.   

     d.  Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile

Federal law permits police to detain suspects without a warrant 
and hold them incommunicado for up to 3 days without charging 
them or granting them access to a defense attorney.  After this 
period, police must turn a suspect over to an investigating 
judge, who may order a 30-day extension and, under certain 
legal procedures, subsequent extensions of investigative 
detention up to 6 months.  During investigative detention, 
detainees theoretically have access to legal counsel, although 
in practice access is only occasionally granted.  

In May and June, there was a wave of arrests of Muslims in Novi 
Pazar (Sandzak) for illegal possession of weapons.  Many of 
those arrested had close ties to the Muslim Party of Democratic 
Action (SDA), which publicly advocates autonomy for Sandzak 
through peaceful means.  In September, while he was out of the 
country, a warrant was issued for the arrest of the leader of 
the SDA, Dr. Ugljanin.  The prosecutor later brought formal 
charges of fomenting rebellion against SDA members.  SDA 
leaders admit that some of those charged may have possessed 
weapons but point out that Serbian police as a rule have not 
prosecuted ethnic Serbs for violations of weapons laws, despite 
the proliferation of arms within the general population and the 
threatening activities of organized Serbian paramilitary groups.

Police arrested several dozen former political prisoners and 
activists of Albanian political parties and associations in 
Kosovo in August and September.  Some were later charged with 
threatening the territorial integrity of Serbia.  According to 
their attorneys, police had severely beaten them all during 
detention.  Police detained Salajdin Braha from Prizren, member 
of the ethnic Albanian Kosovo parliament, for 5 weeks, 
repeatedly beat him during this time, and then released him due 
to lack of evidence.  

Exile is neither legally permitted nor routinely practiced.  No 
specific instances of the imposition of exile as a form of 
judicial punishment are known to have occurred.  

     e.  Denial of Fair Public Trial

The court system comprises local, district, and supreme courts 
at the republic level, and a Federal Supreme Court to which 
republic Supreme Court decisions may be appealed.  There is 
also a military court system.

According to the Federal Constitution, the Federal 
Constitutional Court rules on the constitutionality of laws and 
regulations, relying on the republic authorities to enforce its 
rulings.  The Federal Criminal Code of the former Yugoslavia 
still applies.  

Under federal law, defendants have the right to be present at 
their trials and to have an attorney, at public expense if 
needed.  Both the defendant and the prosecutor may appeal the 
verdict.  The judiciary is not free from political influence or 
ethnic bias, as evidenced by the dismissal of ethnic Albanian 
judges in Kosovo following their refusal to take an oath of 
loyalty to Serbia, and judicial handling of charges against the 
Draskovics.  Serbian courts continue to sentence ethnic 
Albanians, reportedly including some minors, for political 
actions to terms of from 1 to 20 years.

Sandzak Muslims and ethnic Albanians and Hungarians still avoid 
military service.  Prosecution is rare, but force is sometimes 
used in mobilizing troops.  The draft is sometimes used as a 
means of harassing opposition figures.  In Vojvodina in late 
December, Sandar Balint, editor in chief of the Hungarian 
language publication Magyar Szo, was called up for military 
duty.  Balint is in his mid-forties.  However, ethnic Serbs in 
Vojvodina have reportedly been subjected to similar treatment 
by the military authorities.  

     f.  Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or 

Federal law gives republic ministries of interior sole control 
over the decision to monitor potential criminal activities, a 
power routinely abused.  Authorities routinely monitor 
opposition and dissident activity, eavesdropped on 
conversations (see Section 2.a. re Dusan Reljic), read mail, 
and tapped telephones.  A Serbian minister boasted in 
Parliament about the wiretapping of the leader of the main 
ethnic Hungarian party.  Although the law includes restrictions 
on searches, officials paid scant attention to such 

In Kosovo, police routinely subjected ethnic Albanians to 
random searches of their homes, vehicles, and offices on the 
pretext of searching for weapons.

Police at checkpoints throughout Kosovo, both between 
localities and within cities and towns, systematically stopped 
private vehicles and searched them and the passengers with no 
probable cause.  In a round-trip journey of 40 miles, 
independent observers noted four separate checks of a single 
vehicle.  Police often confiscated foreign currency from 
drivers and passengers, although it is not illegal to possess 
foreign currency.  Similar confiscations occurred in Sandzak.

Police deliberately timed raids on Albanian private schools in 
Kosovo to disrupt entrance tests for children to secondary 
schools.  Police subjected all those suspected of any form of 
involvement with private Albanian schools to searches of their 
homes and offices and often confiscated personal documents.

     g.  Use of Excessive Force and Violations of Humanitarian 
         Law in Internal Conflicts

Despite their denials, the Governments of Serbia/Montenegro and 
Croatia were deeply involved in the extensive and egregious 
violations of humanitarian law and abuses of basic human rights 
in Bosnia committed by Serbian and Croatian paramilitary forces 
there.  The Government of Serbia/Montenegro armed the Serbian 
forces in both Bosnia and Croatia, its citizens participated in 
the wars as members of paramilitary formations with government 
sanction, and it permitted regular troops to remain in Bosnia 
after May 1992 in the renamed "Serbian army" there.  In 
addition, it continued to supply the Bosnian Serb forces with 
fuel, food, and other supplies, even while these items were in 
critically short supply in its own territory.  The authorities 
in Belgrade have not sought to prosecute former regular army 
personnel for suspected war crime activities in either Croatia 
or Bosnia-Herzegovina.  

Members of ethnic minorities in Serbia were frequently 
subjected to intimidation, with the goal of provoking the 
emigration of non-Serbs.  The army and the police did not 
interfere with or try to prevent paramilitary forces and other 
extreme nationalists from carrying out numerous attacks and 
harassment against minorities designed to drive them from their 
homes.  In Vojvodina, paramilitary forces associated with such 
extremist groups as the Serbian Radical Party (SRS) led by 
Vojislav Seselj openly threatened Croats, Ruthenians, 
Hungarians, and others and waged a campaign to replace the 
non-Serbian population with Serbian refugees from Croatia and 

In the multiethnic Serbian province of Vojvodina, following the 
defeat of Prime Minister Panic in the December presidential 
elections, there was a resurgence of the campaign of harassment 
against non-Serbs.  In Hrtkovci, Vojvodina, the local mayor and 
his deputy, who had been imprisoned for incitement to violence 
against non-Serbs, were convicted on May 5 and given suspended 
prison sentences.  Harassment began anew of non-Serbs and of 
Serbs who defended them, as well as of Serbian refugees from 
Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina who refused to return to fight 
alongside local Serb paramilitary forces.

Many of these incidents were instigated by SRS chief and 
paramilitary leader Seselj and his followers.  In October 
Milosevic's ruling party denounced Seselj as a Fascist and a 
war criminal, guilty of paramilitary attacks and war crimes in 
Croatia and Bosnia.  Serbian authorities recently brought 
criminal charges against nearly 40 members of Seselj's 
paramilitary organizations, including accusations of smuggling, 
racketeering and rape.  Although the authorities described the 
charges as related to war crimes, press reports indicated that 
only one case was specifically connected to activities in 
Bosnia.  The timing of the charges had a highly political 
flavor, growing out of Seselj's conflict with Serbian President 
Milosevic, and do not appear to have been motivated by justice 
or the rule of law.  As of year's end, no legal action had been 
brought directly against Seselj or his Serbian Radical Party.  
In December Seselj and Zeljko "Arkan" Raznatovic, a 
paramilitary leader and a candidate in the elections for the 
Serbian Parliament, traded accusations of criminal activity on 
state-run television.  The charges included war profiteering 
and murder.  

Officially sanctioned violence and intimidations directed 
against the Croatian population of Vojvodina, which peaked in 
the summer of 1992, continued in 1993.  Conditions eased in the 
last months of the year following the arrest of some Seselj 
supporters directly implicated in these crimes.  Early in 1993, 
Croatian families in the Vojvodina town of Srijemska Kamenica 
received threatening telephone calls to move out or be killed.  
These calls were usually followed by visits from men offering 
property exchanges in Croatia.  Fearing for their lives, many 
families moved out.  Local authorities did not intervene and in 
at least one case actively participated.  In July in Kukujevci, 
Vojvodina, one prominent Croat, his wife, and elderly aunt were 
found shot dead.  He had been warned many times that he should 
move.  Several people, all of them members of the Serbian 
Radical Party, were arrested and charged with the crime.  

Significant numbers of ethnic Hungarians left the Vojvodina due 
to the prevailing atmosphere of fear, economic collapse, and 
insecurity.  Estimates range as high as 50,000, out of a total 
Hungarian population of 350,000.

Local Serbian authorities reportedly threatened and intimidated 
Albanian inhabitants in northern Kosovo into leaving their 
homes near the town of Leposavic, which is a mostly 
Serb-inhabited area, according to an international human rights 

Ceko Dacevic, a local Radical (SRS) and paramilitary leader, 
was the main instigator of attacks on Muslims in Montenegro.  
He enjoyed immunity from prosecution for a time as a member of 
the Federal Assembly.  In late March, members of his group 
burst into a local restaurant, forcing the owner at gunpoint to 
remove a picture of former President Tito and ordering him to 
close down the restaurant, which they said would be converted 
into an Orthodox church.  At the end of August, Serb extremists 
demolished a Muslim-owned cafe under the eyes of the police, 
who intervened only when a crowd of Muslims demanded they 
prevent the rape of the owner's daughter.  A week later police 
arrested a Muslim bystander as well as three of Dacevic's men, 
who were only briefly detained.  Harassment of Muslims in the 
Montenegrin Sandzak district of Pljevlja lessened following the 
arrest and trial of Dacevic.  

In 1993 more than 800 Bukovica (Sandzak) Muslims were forced to 
leave their homes and villages following threats from "FRY" 
army members and the kidnaping of some villagers during a 
violent attack by the Bosnian Serb army during cross-border 
sorties.  Many claimed they fled to escape "FRY" reservists, 
putatively stationed in the area to protect them but in 
practice making no attempt to do so, who in some cases beat and 
accused them of working for the Bosnian Government of President 
Izetbegovic.  The last three Muslim families in the village of 
Dekare moved to Pljevlja in April, following a late night 
incident at the home of one of them when "FRY" army members 
burst in and questioned them about weapons.  

A group of armed civilians opened fire on a Canadian company of 
the United Nations Protective Force (UNPROFOR) that was stopped 
at a police checkpoint in Serbia near the Bosnian border.  A 
French soldier with the Canadian company was wounded in the 
leg.  Serbian police were on the scene but did nothing to 
prevent the shooting or to pursue the attackers.  It was noted 
that SRS leader Seselj was attending an SRS meeting nearby and 
drove past the UNPROFOR convoy shortly before the shooting, 
rolling down the window of his car to shout obscenities at the 
UNPROFOR troops.  

On at least one occasion, armored personnel carriers, trucks, 
and armed troops of the Serbian militia prevented a 
humanitarian aid convoy from proceeding through Serbia to 
Srebrenica, Bosnia, claiming that the United Nations did not 
have permission to use that road.  

Section 2  Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:

     a.  Freedom of Speech and Press

Although freedom of press and speech is provided for under law, 
this right is not respected in practice.  The regime controls 
frequency allocations for broadcasters and has enormous 
influence on supplies and revenues for the print media.  
Although the regime continued to tolerate the critical 
independent but low-circulation print media of Borba and Vreme 
in Belgrade, most of the population nationwide is dependent for 
their news on electronic media firmly under government 
control.  The Government blocked the attempts of independent 
television station Studio B and independent radio station B-92 
to expand transmission of their broadcasts.  Republic 
authorities use provisions of the Federal Criminal Code to 
restrict freedom of speech.  

Shortages of newsprint and the deteriorating economy due to 
international sanctions enabled the Government selectively to 
direct supplies to favored publications and to reduce financial 
support to independent journals.  In Vojvodina, the Hungarian 
independent Magyar Szo resisted an attempt to have it merge 
with a Serbian publishing house, fearing financial 
mismanagement would force it to close.  The paper struggled on, 
overcoming a stoppage in March, but ceased publication 
temporarily in October due to financial problems and a shortage 
of newsprint.  At year's end, Magyar Szo was appearing twice 

Proposed press regulations to regulate foreign investment in 
domestic media would make illegal Serbian press connections 
with foreigners or foreign support of Serbian media under most 

Despite a precarious existence, Bujku, the only Albanian-
language newspaper, continued to be published.  It was forced 
to miss two issues in October because of their Serbian-run 
publishing house's alleged inability to obtain newsprint.  The 
publishing house itself had previously been in Albanian hands 
but was transferred to Serbian control by various financial and 
legal measures over objections from the Albanian management.  A 
hunger strike by Albanian writers in June failed to prevent 
control being tranferred into Serbian hands.  The paper is 
prepared independently and uncensored and clearly reflects the 
views of the ethnic Albanian democratic movement in Kosovo.  As 
such, it is the main source of information for the Albanian 

Publication of material critical of the Government, however, 
was tolerated, with a few notable exceptions.  A political 
cartoon deemed to incite ethnic, religious, and racial hatred 
resulted in the confiscation of all copies of an issue of 
Sandzak, a publication of the Muslim cultural society in Novi 
Pazar; the prosecutor brought criminal charges against its 
editor in chief.  Serbian police seized Rexhep Ismaili's book 
"Kosovo and the Albanians in the Former Yugoslavia" from a 
private printing house and confiscated all copies of it.  They 
also temporarily blocked distribution of "Thema", published by 
the Kosovo Association of Sociologists and Philosophers.  

On February 9, satirist Mihajlo Radojcic was sentenced to 5 
months in prison, with 2 years suspended, for "exposing the 
President of the Presidency of the Republic of Montenegro, 
Momir Bulatovic, to ridicule."  The President of the 
Association of Professional Journalists of Montenegro 
criticized the conviction and accused the Government of trying 
to eliminate free thought.  

Both local and international journalists were harassed and 
intimidated.  Dusan Reljic, foreign editor of the independent 
Vreme, a publication consistently critical of Milosevic, was 
kidnaped and questioned while blindfolded for 2 days in late 
September, shortly after the Serbian Minister of Information 
warned of "fifth column" elements among Serbian journalists.  
Reljic believed his interrogators were police or state 
intelligence agents.  

Progovernment media in January accused Roy Gutman, 
correspondent for Newsday, of being a spy involved in a Western 
media conspiracy against Serbia.  They made these charges on 
the same day that the Government threatened restrictions on 
certain foreign journalists.  During the June 1-2 
demonstrations in Belgrade, police confiscated or destroyed the 
equipment of many journalists whom they beat and threatened.  
The authorities expelled the Belgrade correspondent of the 
London-based, Saudi-owned Al Hayat from Serbia/Montenegro after 
13 years in residence, with 2 weeks' notice and no official 
explanation.  In early December, the Government refused, 
without explanation, to extend the accreditation of long-time 
London Times correspondent Desa Trevisan.  

Milosevic's control of the media and particularly state 
television is vital to the strength of his regime.  Through 
Serbian Radio and Television (RTS), the Government exerts 
editorial control over all news programming, which is used to 
spread ethnic hatred.  Blatant anti-Muslim or anti-Albanian 
propaganda, fanning the fires of religious and ethnic hatred, 
constituted a substantial portion of the regular news programs 
which RTS broadcast.  

In early 1993, RTS placed some 1,500 employees on involuntary 
leave.  The majority had publicly condemned RTS's encouragement 
of nationalistic and religious intolerance.  They were also 
members of the independent RTS union.  The director of Novi Sad 
Radio-Television ordered stricter application of the Serbian 
law on the official use of language and the alphabet, which 
resulted in the immediate deletion of all references in the 
Hungarian language from official programming.

Independent television station Studio B continued to struggle 
for survival.  It faced eviction from its premises in favor of 
a proregime firm.  Despite its having received frequencies 
approved by the International Telecommunications Union for 
repeater stations, Serbian authorities refused to approve them 
on the grounds that only the Serbian government could allocate 
frequencies on Serbian territory.  This attitude, combined with 
the hijacking in late 1992 of new equipment and its inability 
to buy suitable land from the government to house its 
transmitter, prevented Studio B from extending its range of 
reception beyond Belgrade.  Police broke into Studio B studios 
and confiscated video footage of the June 1 protest (see 
Section 1.c.).    

A new compulsory tax was levied on citizens of Serbia/
Montenegro as part of their electric bills beginning on 
October 1.  Revenue is to be used to subsidize RTS, thus 
further diminishing independent television's ability to 

Reports continued of threats and, on rare occasions, instances 
of physical violence directed against individuals or 
organizations who expressed criticism of Serbia's extreme 
nationalist ideology or of the "Yugoslav" army and security 
services.  For instance, a journalist who wrote for a Belgrade 
daily a piece critical of the army subsequently received death 
threats.  Several Belgrade University professors who expressed 
oppositionist views or simply failed to collaborate with the 
regime received death threats.  

In January Milosevic's government fired the Rector of Belgrade 
University, as well as the directors of the Modern Art Museum 
and the National Theater.  Some teachers were removed from 
their posts, and others reported receiving death threats.  
Legislation granted the State direct control of public 
enterprises.  The Education Ministry used this power to fire 
school principals.

The controversial university law was quietly modified by the 
Serbian assembly in May to give more control to the government 
regarding the founding of private and foreign universities and 
minority language instruction, requiring that an "opinion" (in 
other words, permission) be sought from the Ministry of 
Education.  The Government controls 50 percent of the 
membership of the University Council, the supreme ruling body 
of the University, as well as the chairman.  On June 22, the 
University Council elected the dean of the Agricultural faculty 
and SPS representative in the Federal Assembly as Rector of the 
University of Belgrade.  

In June Rexhep Osmani, chairman of the Kosovo Association of 
Albanian Teachers, was sentenced to 60 days in prison for 
organizing peaceful protests on Albanian education in October 
1992.  Professor Ejup Statovci, rector of the underground 
Albanian university of Pristina, was returned to prison in 
February to complete serving a 60-day sentence growing out of 
the same 1992 incident.  

     b.  Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association

Although freedom of peaceful assembly and association is 
legally provided for, these freedoms were severely restricted.  
Authorities arbitrarily enforced regulations, permitting some 
demonstrations and banning others.  They permitted supporters 
of National Peasant Party leader Dragan Veselinov to 
demonstrate in Belgrade in July for the release of Vuk 
Draskovic, whereas in late August police broke up a gathering 
of milk producers in Belgrade organized by Veselinov's party to 
protest the Government's pricing of milk.  When violence by 
protestors marred the spontaneous June 1 demonstrations at the 
Federal Assembly building, police riot teams broke up the 
gathering, indiscriminately beating and arresting participants 
and bystanders alike (also see Section 1.c.).

Ethnic Albanians involved with political groups are subjected 
to arbitrary arrest and detention, disruption and destruction 
of their meetings and offices, and confiscation of 
documentation and property.  During one such raid on the 
offices of the Democratic League of Kosovo, police arrested the 
local vice chairman and party members.  During their detention 
at the police station, police beat them and instructed them not 
to continue their political activities.  In another incident, 
the chairman and secretary of the office of the Democratic 
Alliance of Kosovo (LDK) in Glogovac were beaten at a police 
checkpoint.  The branch chairman was sent to Pristina where he 
was detained for 30 days for allegedly assaulting a police 
officer, during which time police beat and tortured him.  He 
faces a possible 5- to 15-year sentence.  During raids on 
schools, police arrested ethnic Albanian teachers and released 
them the same day as a form of harassment to discourage 
employment in private Albanian schools.  Police held many 
others for longer than 3 days but subsequently released them 
without filing charges or providing an explanation for their 

Disruptive and violent police raids frequently targeted 
meetings of ethnic Albanians.  In Mitrovice, police raided a 
peaceful gathering to commemorate the 60th anniversary of the 
murder of Hasan Prishtina, an ethnic Albanian hero.  Police 
broke up the gathering and indiscriminately beat the 
participants, including the elderly, children, and women.

Police detained and questioned a founding member of Arkadia, a 
gay rights group, about the group's activities.

Police arrested committee members of the Belgrade Islamic 
community in April and accused them of collecting money for 
arms while compiling data on the Islamic community.  

     c.  Freedom of Religion

There is no state religion, but the Government gives the 
Serbian Orthodox Church, to which the majority of Serbs belong, 
preferential treatment over other faiths and access to 
state-run television for religious events.

Although there are no legal restrictions on the practice of 
religion, the regime overtly and covertly promoted religious 
intolerance.  Police condoned periodic harassment of religious 
facilities used by ethnic minorities.  After the fire-bombing 
of Hungarian and Croatian Catholic churches in the Vojvodina, 
police investigations were generally perfunctory and 

Following the mining of a mosque in the municipality of Bar in 
October, the fourth such act of vandalism against Muslim 
religious sites in Montenegro, there was widespread 
condemnation from local authorities.

     d.  Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign 
         Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation

The Constitution provides for freedom of movement.  Exit visas 
are generally not required except for travel to Albania.  
Passports are available to most citizens of Serbia/Montenegro, 
but many Kosovar Albanians have had their right to travel 

Following Macedonia's imposition of a passport requirement for 
all citizens of the former Yugoslavia, there were increasing 
reports that Serbian border guards confiscated the passports of 
ethnic Albanians working abroad as they returned to Kosovo.  
Police also confiscated some passports during house searches.  
Serbian authorities on the Kosovo-Macedonia border delayed 
departure of a Kosovar Albanian delegation attending meetings 
on educational issues of the International Conference on the 
Former Yugoslavia.

The authorities detained two members of the Kosovo Helsinki 
Committee as they crossed into Kosovo from Macedonia following 
their attendance at a meeting in Tirana.  Serbian police seized 
the passport of a well-known ethnic Albanian journalist and 
political activist on the grounds that he had visited Albania 
without obtaining a Serbian exit visa.  Despite such cases, 
Serbian authorities have generally allowed ethnic Albanian 
leaders, including LDK leader Ibrahim Rugova, to leave the 
country and return, even though they consider his party and 
other ethnic Albanian parties illegal.

On May 1, Serbia tightened its refugee requirements, drawing up 
a list of "safe municipalities" and contending that those 
arriving from nationalist Serb-controlled regions of Bosnia and 
Croatia were no longer eligible for refugee status.  Only 
Montenegro continued to offer unconditional protection to 
refugees from Bosnia and Croatia.  There are approximately 
60,000 refugees in Montenegro, 10 percent of its population.  
As in Serbia, nearly 95 percent live with host families.  

Informed observers reported that Serbian police at times 
prevented Muslim refugees from entering Serbia by bus from 
Montenegro, while allowing Serb refugees on the same busses to 

Numerous reliable reports indicate that local minorities, 
especially in Vojvodina, have been forcibly displaced and Serb 
refugees moved into their homes.  

Section 3  Respect for Political Rights:  The Right of Citizens 
           to Change Their Government

The Constitution allows citizens to change their government, 
but their ability to do so is circumscribed by the Milosevic 
government's control of mass media and the electoral process.  
This is the case particularly in Serbia.  In the December 1992 
elections, opposition parties were denied equal access to the 
state-run media, voter registration lists omitted many eligible 
voters, international observers noted numerous voting 
irregularities, and serious questions were raised as to the 
accuracy of the vote count.  The CSCE report concluded that 
this election could not be deemed to be fair and democratic.  
The CSCE found conditions in Montenegro much better.  In the 
December 1993 Serbian parliamentary elections, similar doubts 
were raised as to the fairness of voting procedures.  

Parliamentary elections are held every 4 years.  In principle 
the ballot is secret, but in practice voting booths are often 
not available, and voters mark their ballots on open tables or 
behind small cardboard shields.  Voters, nonetheless, can 
obtain a degree of privacy.

Slobodan Milosevic dominates the political system in 
Serbia/Montenegro.  Although formally President of Serbia, one 
of the two constituent republics in the so-called Yugoslav 
Federal Republic, Milosevic, through his control of the Serbian 
police, the army, and the state administration, first weakened 
the authority of the Federal Government and then placed his 
followers in key positions, including Federal President and 
Federal Prime Minister.

In May the Serbian Socialist Party combined with the Serbian 
Radical Party to remove Federal President Dobrica Cosic, who 
had shown some degree of independence from Milosevic.  In a 
striking display of political ruthlessness, Cosic was summarily 
ousted following a single day's unscheduled debate in the 
Federal Parliament with no opportunity to defend himself.  
Democratic opposition deputies, who protested the unprecedented 
haste with which the Head of State was dismissed, were jeered 
and threatened by SRS deputies, one of whom subsequently 
attacked an opposition delegate in the lobby of Parliament, 
knocking him unconscious. This sparked the June 1 
demonstrations (see Section 1.c.).

A new law on the declaration of a state of siege carries the 
threat that martial law could be imposed over the objections of 
the Montenegrin republic.  Throughout 1993, party and political 
institutions in Montenegro functioned in fits and starts with 
some degree of adherence to democratic principles and the rule 
of law, as well as tolerance for opposition and ethnic minority 
views, at least in comparison with the situation in Serbia.  
Nevertheless, the Montenegrin government's sphere for 
independent action is greatly circumscribed by Milosevic's 
refusal to tolerate significant divergence from the Serbian 
party line.  

Section 4  Governmental Attitude Regarding International and 
           Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations 
           of Human Rights

Local human rights monitors, Serbs as well as members of 
minorities, worked courageously under difficult circumstances 
and despite public insinuations by ultranationalist leaders and 
sometimes government officials that they were traitors.  Police 
routinely searched human rights offices in Kosovo, confiscated 
documents, and harassed their employees.  

A number of independent human rights organizations exist in 
Serbia/Montenegro, researching and gathering information on 
abuses and publicizing such cases.  Several operate out of 
Kosovo, including the Council for the Defense of Human Rights 
and Freedoms and the Kosovo Helsinki Committee.  In the Sandzak 
region, a separate Council for the Defense of Human Rights and 
Freedoms monitors abuses against the local Muslim population.  
The Belgrade-based Humanitarian Law Fund and the Center for 
Antiwar Action (CAA) have a broader scope of activities, 
researching human rights abuses throughout the "FRY" and on 
occasion, elsewhere in the former Yugoslavia.  In addition to 
monitoring human rights abuses, the CAA sponsors symposiums and 
lectures and runs a small publishing house.  The activities of 
independent human rights agencies are carefully monitored by 
Serbian authorities but they are not generally subject to overt 
harassment.  Last July, however, local authorities seized files 
and computer disks belonging to the Council for the Defense of 
Human Rights and Freedoms in Pristina.  The materials have not 
been returned.  In August the CAA and two opposition groups had 
their offices robbed and documents stolen, pointing to 
political rather than criminal motives for the break-ins.  

The governments of Serbia and Montenegro formally maintain that 
they have no objection to international organizations 
conducting human rights investigations on their territories.  
However, they regularly attacked the findings of human rights 
groups.  The Federal Minister for Human Rights and National 
Minorities repeatedly charged the international community with 
selective application of international law, criticized the work 
of the CSCE monitors even as local Serbian officials praised 
that work, and denied human rights violations against minority 

On June 29, the "FRY" mission to the United Nations in Geneva 
rejected a proposal to allow envoys of U.N. Human Rights 
Rapporteur Tadeusz Mazowiecki entry to Serbia/Montenegro.  The 
refusal was based on the assertion that in previous visits, 
Mazowiecki had indulged in "malicious" misrepresentations and 
had applied double standards unfair to Serbia.  

The CSCE missions established in September 1992 and terminated 
by Milosevic in July 1993 experienced varying degrees of 
cooperation.  During a planned visit to villages bordering 
Bosnia in the Montenegrin part of Sandzak, the mission was not 
able to reach the villages because local officials failed to 
provide security guarantees.  However, relations with local 
officials were generally good.  Belgrade refused to extend the 
mission's mandate in July after insisting on linking its 
presence to Serbia/Montenegro's suspended status in the CSCE, 
and several Serbian and federal officials publicly accused the 
CSCE mission of inciting local populations.

Violent acts against ethnic minorities in the regions formerly 
monitored by the CSCE missions subsequently increased, 
particularly in Kosovo, including acts against former employees 
and associates of the missions.  Prizren police detained and 
questioned a Helsinki Watch representative and a British 
journalist while they were covering the aftermath of a trial of 
five Albanians accused of "endangering the territorial 
integrity of Yugoslavia."  They were released after 4 hours of 

Many foreign delegations visited all parts of Serbia and 
Montenegro without difficulty, but a Swedish delegation due to 
visit Kosovo on a refugee-related mission was denied visas.  

Section 5  Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, 
           Disability, Language, or Social Status

Federal and republic laws guarantee equal rights to all 
citizens, regardless of ethnic group, religion, language, or 
social status.  


Women have suffered numerous human rights abuses in the hostile 
atmosphere of oppressive nationalism fostered by the regime 
during the conflict and warfare over the breakup of 
Yugoslavia.  Women's rights activists have little access to the 
mass media and are therefore virtually unknown outside of 
Belgrade and Novi Sad.  Serbian women face rising levels of 
domestic violence and sexual harassment in the workplace.  Few 
women are represented in high-level political positions.  

Federal and republic laws prohibit discrimination against 
women, but the laws are not enforced.  In comparison to men, 
women have limited access to senior positions in political and 
economic life but are well represented in the professions, 
particularly as doctors and teachers.  According to women's 
rights monitors, as a result of the deteriorating economic 
situation, women were often the first to be let go.  The Police 
Academy no longer accepts female students.  Those women who had 
attended the school were hired in purely administrative 
positions, and there are no female police officers in uniform 
on the street.  Although women constitute 70 percent of the 
students enrolled at the Law Faculty of Belgrade University, in 
the workplace women comprise only 10 percent of public 
prosecutors and only 10 percent of judges at the Supreme Court 

Women are entitled to equal pay for equal work.  Maternity 
leave for employed women usually is granted for 1 year, and 
even longer in some cases, although the collapse of the economy 
has restricted such benefits in practice.  Legal penalties for 
spousal abuse are the same as those for abuse of other persons, 
but a complaint must be filed.  This is seldom done, according 
to women's rights groups, due to traditional attitudes.

According to women's rights monitors in Belgrade, these same 
traditional attitudes cause women's rights groups to be largely 
ignored.  One group reported a burglary at its offices, during 
which nothing was taken, and after which the group was evicted 
from those premises.  The reasons for the eviction are not 

Women's rights groups established an SOS hotline and opened a 
rape crisis center in Belgrade in September with the aim of 
assisting women raped in the war in Bosnia.  Some 5,000 calls 
have been received since the hotline was established in 1992.  
Most of the women who call are aged between 40 and 60, poorly 
educated, and unemployed.  Representatives claim that domestic 
violence against women and children has taken an upward turn as 
husbands, returning traumatized and armed from the war in 
Bosnia, are unable to find jobs and take their frustration out 
on their families.  The hotline reports that sexual harassment 
of women has increased and is tolerated by women from all 
levels of society who are fearful of losing their jobs.  

The Serbian Orthodox Church accused Serbian women of failing to 
give birth to enough children and demanded a ban on abortions 
earlier in the year.  The Church had insufficient political 
support and failed to achieve the ban.


The minimum age for employment is 16 years, although in 
villages and farm communities, younger children often assist 
with family agricultural obligations.  

     National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities

The ethnic minorities of Serbia/Montenegro continued to suffer 
discrimination in all respects, in addition to the abuses 
described elsewhere in this report.  There were credible 
reports that qualified Muslims or ethnic Albanians were fired 
from their jobs on the basis of religion or ethnicity.

Members of ethnic minorities were badly treated in the armed 
forces where they were viewed with suspicion and often outright 
hostility.  In early 1993, there appeared to be an increase in 
the number of Muslims being called to military service which 
may have reflected an effort to encourage Sandzak Muslims to 
leave the area.  A recently enacted law for the army contains a 
provision whereby recruits may serve in a civilian capacity for 
religious or other reasons of conscience; it remains to be seen 
whether it will be applied to minorities.  

There is a traditional prejudice against the substantial Gypsy 
(Roma) population.  The Yugoslav Democratic Party of Gypsies is 
not well organized and does not play a role in the political 
life of the country commensurate with its numbers.  The Gypsy 
population has the right to vote, and there is no legal 
discrimination, although traditional societal discrimination is 
widespread, and local authorities apparently condone and even 
participate in harassment and intimidation of Gypsies.  

     Religious Minorities

After the December 1992 election victory of Milosevic's 
Socialists and Seselj's Radicals, the regime moved to fire 
uncooperative employees and place its own handpicked candidates 
in senior positions at Serbian Radio and Television and other 
institutions.  Seselj mounted a campaign of treason accusations 
against dissidents and non-Serbs.  Increasing authoritarianism 
and intolerance created a fearful climate for members of all of 
Serbia's ethnic and religious minorities.  

The Humanitarian Law Fund stated that since August 1992 violent 
incidents against Muslims have been increasing.  The Fund 
accused military and paramilitary Serbian groups from Bosnia, 
reservists of the "FRY" army, and local police.  The government 
has not taken any effective action to protect the Muslim 
population in Sandzak from continuing violence.

Sandzak Muslim soccer fans and supporters of Zeljko "Arkan" 
Raznjatovic's All-Serbian Pristina Club clashed at Novi Pazar 
stadium during a soccer game.  Police arrested 50 Muslim 
spectators on a variety of charges, but none of Arkan's 
supporters were arrested.  

In Sandzak there continued to be reports of destruction of 
mosques and Muslim-owned businesses.  In Sjenica 17 Muslims in 
senior positions were fired and replaced by Serbs.  

     People with Disabilities

There is no formal legislation to guarantee equal rights for 
the disabled.  Attempts to introduce legislation have failed.  
An opposition party is lobbying to broaden existing legislation 
to provide equal rights for the disabled.  Public buildings are 
required to provide access for the disabled, but it is only 
recommended that private buildings provide such access.

Section 6  Worker Rights

     a.  The Right of Association

All workers (except military personnel) are legally entitled to 
form or join unions of their own choosing.  This right is 
formally respected.  Workers are no longer obligated to join 
and pay dues to the official unions.

The older semiofficial union umbrella organizations (the 
Council of Independent Trade Unions of Serbia--CITUS, the 
Council of Independent Trade Unions of Montenegro--CITUM, and 
their federal counterpart, the Council of Independent Trade 
Unions of Yugoslavia--CITUY) had offered material benefits to 
members, such as preferential access to lower cost commodities 
from government reserves, that the fledgling independent unions 
were unable to match.  These commodity reserves have dwindled, 
however, leaving union members facing much the same shortages 
as nonunion members.  Although statistics on the size of the 
organized work force are unreliable, the large bulk of Serbian 
and Montenegrin workers are probably members of the 
semiofficial CITUS and CITUM.  CITUS claims current membership 
of 1.8 million workers, while the more loosely affiliated 
Serbian independent trade union organization (Nezavisnost) has 
between 80,000 and 200,000 members.

There are reportedly no unions independent of CITUM in 
Montenegro.  Since mid-1991, union activity has generally been 
at a reduced level, either out of support for the Government or 
due to fears of being perceived as disloyal.

The right to strike is recognized and was exercised by both the 
independent and progovernment trade union organizations 
throughout 1993.  A 30-day notification of the intent to strike 
is required.  More than two dozen strikes were recorded, 
protesting lack of job security and the failure of wages to 
keep pace with hyperinflation.  Some unions called for the 
resignation of the Federal Government.  Additionally, there 
were two general strikes, one organized by the independent 
labor union on May 19 and the other organized by progovernment 
unions on August 5.  Both were poorly organized and failed to 
achieve the widespread work stoppages initially planned.  
During the course of the year, the Government successfully 
defused worker discontent by either partially or fully meeting 
union demands for wage increases.  Hyperinflation, however, 
eroded purchasing power so quickly that any wage increases 
rapidly disappeared in real economic terms.

The Serbian Interior Ministry has instructed Belgrade's public 
prosecutor to investigate leaders of a strike organized by the 
Kolubara Coal Miner's Union in December.  There have been 
reports of union activists being harassed and briefly detained 
by the police.  

In June 160 civil air controllers working for the Ministry of 
Traffic and Communications went on a hunger strike to protest 
low wages and hazardous working conditions.  The strike, which 
was bitterly fought, proved to be a negative turning point in 
government-labor relations but, more significantly, provided 
the Government with the impetus to pass a major new law that 
bans all public service workers from participating in strikes.

The Independent Trade Unions of Kosovo (ITUK), formally 
recognized by the Federal Government, continued to face huge 
obstacles at the local level in representing a work force that 
suffered from official repression, repeated mass dismissals on 
ethnic grounds, and consequent massive unemployment.  CITUS is 
well represented in Kosovo and has taken over the offices 
occupied by the Communist-era trade union.  According to ITUK, 
worker union fees deducted from paychecks are deposited with 
CITUS, and benefits are distributed only to Serbian workers.  
All ethnic Albanian workers pay union fees voluntarily.

     b.  The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively

This right is guaranteed by law, but Western-style collective 
bargaining is unknown.  Under U.N. sanctions, which have led 
the Government to freeze previously planned economic reforms, 
real collective bargaining is unlikely.  Plant management is 
not independent of the Government nor an effective bargaining 
partner for the unions.  Republic wage controls effectively 
usurped the role of enterprises and the semiofficial chambers 
of economy.  The republic governments have promised that no 
workers would be discharged as a result of the sanctions and 
guaranteed that idled workers would receive an income equal to 
50 percent of their former wages.

Privatization of social property (state enterprises) is another 
problem in which the rights and interests of workers are not 
well defined or understood.  

     c.  Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor

Forced labor is prohibited by law and is not known to occur. 

     d.  Minimum Age for Employment of Children

The minimum age for employment is 16, although in villages and 
farm communities younger children often assist with family 
agricultural obligations.  

     e.  Acceptable Conditions of Work

The republic governments guaranteed minimum wages, but delays 
and partial payments were pandemic.  The governments of Serbia 
and Montenegro continued strict wage controls in 1993.  
Unemployment and underemployment due to sanctions and other 
economic problems also reduced the number of families with two 
wage earners.  The minimum wage is insufficient to provide a 
worker and family a decent living standard.  By October the net 
minimum monthly wage in Serbia was only sufficient to feed a 
family of four for 2 or 3 days.  

The official workweek was listed as 40 hours, but many 
enterprises and workers worked fewer hours for lack of raw 
materials.  In general, sick leave and other benefits are 
generous.  Federal and republic laws and regulations on 
occupational health and safety were adequate, although 
enforcement was lax.

[end of document]


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