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TITLE: RUSSIA HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES, 1993
DATE: JANUARY 31, 1994
AUTHOR: U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
RUSSIA
A year of political turmoil and crisis culminated in elections
for a new Russian Parliament and a concurrent referendum on a
new constitution on December 12. Voters elected a Parliament,
roughly divided among reformers, Communists, and extreme
nationalists, which convened for the first time in
mid-January. The majority of voters approved the Constitution
providing for a strong executive branch of government.
The conflict between the legislative and executive branches,
which characterized the political situation during 1992,
continued until September 21 when President Boris Yeltsin
disbanded the Congress of People's Deputies (CPD) elected in
1990 under the Soviet electoral system. After September 21,
the President ruled by decree. The national referendum on
April 25 had given President Yeltsin a strong vote of popular
support but had not succeeded in resolving the constitutional
crisis.
Initially refusing to accept its dissolution, the CPD voted to
remove the President and named an alternate government,
including "ministers" of interior, security, and defense who
sought to exert command over the armed forces. The Government
increasingly controlled public access to the so-called White
House, where the CPD was meeting. After a 10-day standoff
marked by bloody street clashes, demonstrators broke through
the government security cordon on October 3 and rallied at the
White House. Vice President Aleksandr Rutskoy and CPD Chairman
Ruslan Khasbulatov urged the demonstrators, some of whom were
armed with automatic weapons, to attack the nearby mayor's
offices and the Ostankino television facilities.
On October 4, army troops surrounded and assaulted the White
House. Given opportunities to surrender, some 300 persons,
including deputies and journalists, left the building
peacefully. While some deputies were detained and released,
Khasbulatov, Rutskoy, and the "ministers" of security,
interior, and defense were arrested. Another group of armed
militants remained in the building and battled government
forces, including Interior Ministry troops, which attacked with
tanks and armored personnel carriers. The number of persons
who died in the violence of October 3-4 is disputed. Estimates
in the press published in the immediate aftermath of the events
ranged widely; they eventually settled on more than 100 persons
reportedly killed at Ostankino and as many as 150 killed in the
fighting at the White House. The official death toll was set
at 147.
Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the Committee
for State Security (KGB) was broken into two organizations, the
Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) and the Ministry of
Security. Internal security became the responsibility of the
Ministry of Security. A presidential decree in December 1993
dissolved that Ministry and set up in its place a
counterintelligence service under the direct control of the
President. Laws passed in 1992 require them to respect human
and civil rights, outline rules and procedures governing their
activities and investigations, and establish presidential and
legislative oversight over each agency's activities.
The Government in 1993 continued to pursue the transformation
of a centrally controlled economy into a market-oriented
system. Fiscal and monetary stabilization were the central
issues. As the economy continued to adjust to market price
mechanisms, the Government began efforts to rein in credit and
deficit spending, paving the way for assistance from the
International Monetary Fund and the rescheduling of Russia's
official debt. Inflation continued at monthly rates of 20 to
25 percent for most of the year. Privatization continued
rapidly, and the Government sold off over half the retail
businesses and thousands of commercial and industrial firms.
Closings of inefficient firms or bankruptcies were few,
official unemployment remained low, and industrial output,
which had fallen by about 50 percent from 1990 figures, began
to level off.
Russia continued its progress on human rights during 1993,
despite some temporary setbacks as a result of the October
crisis. Freedom of speech, assembly, and association, other
than during the October crisis, were largely respected.
Soviet-era restrictions on freedom of religion and travel
continued to be eased. The 1991 law on exit and entry is
gradually being implemented, although some issues are
unresolved. There are no known political prisoners in Russia.
Despite significant progress in recent years, Russia's overall
human rights record is uneven, and some serious problems
remain. On October 3, President Yeltsin declared a state of
emergency in the capital. Several important human rights
problems occurred during the state of emergency. Press
freedoms were restricted, for example, by the introduction of
temporary censorship. Restrictions on freedom of travel were
imposed through enforcement of the "propiska" (residence
permit) system against dark-complexioned people. This resulted
in the expulsion from Moscow of thousands of people from the
Caucasus and Central Asia.
In spite of legislation to foster greater judicial
independence, the judiciary still reflects its Communist
heritage in personnel and practice. It is not yet fully
independent or empowered to act as a guarantor of human
rights. Other human rights problems include harsh prison
conditions; official discrimination against people from the
Caucasus; societal discrimination against people from the
Caucasus and Jews; societal discrimination and violence against
women; and governmental pressures against independent labor
unions.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
There were no reports of political killings by Russian
authorities in 1993. (See Section 1.g. for details of the
political violence in Moscow on October 3-4.)
Politics in the northern Caucasus, however, was marked by
considerable violence. In Chechnya, a journalist investigating
corruption in the Chechen government was killed in April in the
city of Grozny. Observers believe local authorities with
criminal ties were responsible. In June forces loyal to
Chechen President Dzhokhar Dudaev fired on a crowd of
protesters gathered in front of Grozny's city hall, killing 14
persons, including the democratically elected mayor of the city.
On August 1, Viktor Polyaichko, head of administration of the
State of Emergency Zone in north Ossetia and Ingushetia, was
assassinated. No persons have been charged in connection with
this incident.
b. Disappearance
No political disappearances or abductions are known to have
occurred in 1993. According to Ingush sources, several hundred
of the 687 Ingush who reportedly disappeared as a result of
fighting in north Ossetia in 1992 are still missing.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
The Russian Constitution specifically prohibits torture and
other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment.
However, some authorities still use force against persons in
custody or under suspicion. Human rights organizations
routinely receive credible complaints of police beatings during
questioning or at the time of arrest. In one case, police told
relatives of a victim that the injuries were caused by the
person's trying to escape out of a second-floor window.
Amnesty International was told by police that the injuries did
not occur as described and that the injured victim was
reportedly seen being wheeled out of the building into an
ambulance. Human rights groups reported that the authorities
took numerous persons into custody following the assault on the
White House and beat and mistreated them.
Russian detention and incarceration practices remain harsh.
Conditions in many prisons threaten the health and life of
prisoners. Many prisoners continue to suffer from mental and
physical abuse and mistreatment during interrogation, trial,
and confinement, according to a wide variety of reliable
sources. Excessive force by law enforcement personnel goes
unpunished, and victims are rarely able to seek redress.
There are approximately 827,000 inmates in the Russian prison
system, according to the Interior Ministry, and overcrowding is
a significant problem. In Moscow, for example, three prisons
designed to hold 8,500 inmates house 14,400 persons, according
to prison officials. Prisoners ill with infectious diseases in
some cases are not segregated from healthy prisoners.
Prisoners are frequently placed in unduly harsh punishment
cells for violations of rules. No administrative process
exists to ensure that prisoners are not arbitrarily or
inappropriately sent to such cells. Changes in procedures
instituted in 1992 limit the time a prisoner may be held in
such cells to no more than 60 days during a year and a maximum
of 15 days at a time. In labor camps, where prisoners live in
barracks, prisoners may only be placed in cells for a maximum
of 6 months per year.
Corrective institutions for women also house children. Like
other Russian prisons, these institutions are marked by
overcrowding and poor conditions. Pregnant women and mothers,
while incarcerated, are entitled to better conditions and food
than other prisoners. Few women inmates are believed to be
aware of these rights and therefore do not always benefit from
these entitlements.
The violent hazing of new recruits by other soldiers continued
in 1993. Cruel and degrading treatment of military conscripts
sometimes resulted in death. According to Ministry of Defense
statistics, during the first 8 months of 1993, 1,222 servicemen
died, of whom 25 percent reportedly committed suicide. The
Committee of Soldiers' Mothers uses the number of suicides to
illustrate the hazing problem. The Committee made some
progress toward easing such treatment through direct contacts
with military officials.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
Persons may be detained arbitrarily and arrested without
warrants. The Criminal Code requires that detainees be charged
or released within 72 hours. Under the 1992 law on the
procuracy, decisions on detention and custody are the
responsibility of the procurator's office. Criminal Code
amendments enacted in 1992 provide for court review of arrests
and empower judges to order the release of those arrested
pending trial. Detainees have the right to request a court
evaluation of the legality of detention. If the court finds
the detention illegal, the judge has the power to order an
immediate release. Nonetheless, the judicial system is unable
to cope with the increasing numbers of persons arrested for
crimes. Thousands of persons are held for extended periods of
time, often for more than a year, in pretrial detention,
without judicial review.
Access to defense attorneys has improved. The new Constitution
guarantees the right of a detainee to consult with a lawyer.
However, authorities denied the attorneys for former CPD
Chairman Ruslan Khasbulatov and Vice President Rutskoy access
to them during the initial days of their confinement. The
attorneys and families of the accused were later granted
access, as was the International Committee of the Red Cross.
Thousands of persons were detained during the weeks before and
after the October 3-4 violence. Most, but not all, were
released within the legally prescribed 72-hour detention
period. Of those charged with criminal offenses, most remained
in custody, though some were released under the legal
provisions described above.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
Government efforts to reform the legal and judicial systems had
limited effect in 1993. Russian courts, which have long served
as tools for enforcing state power, remain subject on occasion
to political influence. In July the Supreme Soviet passed a
law authorizing the phased introduction of trial by jury in
nine regions beginning in November. Russian legal reformers
hope that use of jury trials will spur the growth of a more
open and fair adversarial courtroom procedure. The first jury
trials were conducted in November and offered to defendants
accused of murder and other capital crimes. A criminal
defendant must be advised of his right to a jury trial by the
investigator during the preliminary investigation. Defendants
may choose to be tried before a judge and jury or, in accord
with traditional criminal procedures, before a judge and two
people's assessors. A defendant in a jury trial has the right
to appeal to the Supreme Court.
In general, Russian judges are poorly trained and have little
concept of a truly independent judiciary. The 1992 law on the
status of judges began to have some positive effect on judicial
morale. Monetary incentives attracted better candidates to
entry-level judicial positions. Judicial wages increased by
eight or nine times during 1993 and are now indexed to senior
executive pay scales.
President Yeltsin suspended the Constitutional Court's
activities on October 6, citing the Court's lack of
impartiality in the events leading to the violence of October
3-4. Prior to the Court's suspension, each side in the
political power struggle turned to the Court in the hope that
the Court's decision would add to its legitimacy. The Court's
most significant achievement during this turbulent period was
to promote the notion of the judiciary's independence and
authority, operating alongside the executive and legislative
branches of government. The Constitution adopted in December
envisages a prominent role for a Constitutional Court and an
independent judiciary.
Criminal defendants are permitted by law to have an attorney
represent them in court, and Russian courts routinely assign
defense attorneys to defendants who cannot afford one. The
criminal justice system continues to be based on the
presumption of guilt, and defense attorneys operate within a
system that remains biased against their clients. Russia's new
Constitution provides for the presumption of innocence, but it
remains to be seen whether and how this will work in practice.
Lawyers are often unable to work with their clients during the
early stages of an investigation and have only limited access
to evidence developed by government prosecutors. Many believe
that prosecutors feel confident in bringing weak cases to court
because they enjoy numerous built-in procedural advantages over
the defense. An overall conviction rate of better than 99
percent testifies to the limited ability of the defense to
present an effective case. Russia has no system of plea
bargaining.
In March the military collegium of the Supreme Court, handling
the trial of those persons accused of plotting the August 1991
coup attempt, instituted procedures to regulate public
attendance at the trial. More than a dozen news organizations
were granted credentials to cover the proceedings. The court
turned down a defense request in mid-October to allow more
media representatives to attend the trial. The trial, which
began in April, proceeded in fits and starts, with numerous
procedural delays because of illness among the defendants or
their attorneys. On one occasion, the court denied a defense
petition to dismiss the government prosecution team. The
defense alleged bias on the part of the Procurator General who
had published a book on the coup based, in part, on the
pretrial testimony of the defendants. The coup trial recessed
again in December due to claims of illness by three defendants.
In June the Tatarstan supreme court sentenced Tatar national
activist Zinnue Agliullin, chairman of the All-Tatar Public
Center, to 2 years in prison under Articles 70 (which prohibits
calls for the violent overthrow of the government and the
constitutional order) and 79 (which prohibits "organization of
mass disorder" and "armed resistance" to the authorities) of
the Russian Federation Criminal Code. In October 1992,
Agliullin publicly called for the "punishment" of the Tatarstan
president for "betraying the interests of the Tatar people."
Tatarstan authorities brought additional charges against
Agliullin in August under special Tatar anticrime legislation,
claiming that Agliullin owned a weapon allegedly found in his
apartment at the time of his arrest. Agliullin alleged that
the charges were politically motivated.
There are no known political prisoners in Russia. Hundreds of
persons captured in connection with the October 3-4 events were
held briefly and released. Those charged with crimes remain in
custody.
Thousands of persons remain incarcerated for violating laws
that prohibit a variety of commercial activities that are now
legal and commonplace. One such "crime" was speculation, in
which a person sells a commodity at a higher price than he or
she paid for it.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
The right to privacy is guaranteed by the Constitution. The
splitting of the KGB in December 1991 and President Yeltsin's
breakup of the Ministry of Security in December 1993 ended the
security services' status as a "state within a state." The
President's December decree calls for a trimming of personnel
and bureaucratic structures devoted to domestic intelligence
and places the internal security services under his direct
control. In a December 22 news conference, he announced that
police surveillance of the Russian people would now end and
that the domestic intelligence service would perform only
counterintelligence functions.
Authorities may search premises without a warrant but are
obliged to obtain one within 24 hours after the search. In
July President Yeltsin signed legislation that allowed
warrantless searches with 24-hour notification in cases of
terrorism or threats to national security. In spite of reforms
that divided the KGB into two separate organs, electronic
monitoring of residence is believed to continue, albeit at
reduced levels. Foreign radio broadcasts were not jammed.
g. Use of Excessive Force and Violations of Humanitarian
Law in Internal Conflicts
A week prior to the violence of October 3-4, armed supporters
of the disbanded Parliament, trying to take over a military
communications facility in Moscow, killed one police officer
and a civilian bystander. On October 3, responding to Vice
President Rutskoy's exhortation from the balcony of the White
House, hundreds of anti-Yeltsin demonstrators, some armed with
automatic weapons, attacked the Moscow mayor's office and later
the television facilities at Ostankino. More than 100 persons
were reportedly killed in the fighting at Ostankino. The
attackers suffered the majority of the casualties.
Police forces by themselves were unable to control the
situation in Moscow. On October 4, the Government used the
army to quash the rebellion. Approximately 1,700 troops, 10
tanks, and 20 armored personnel carriers were involved in the
assault of the White House. Occupiers of the building were
given opportunities to surrender before government forces
opened fire. After some shelling by the tanks, the occupiers
were given another opportunity to surrender. More than 300
persons left peacefully, but a number of the more militant
supporters of Parliament remained in the building and battled
government forces. Press estimates of the death toll range
between 150 and 200 persons. Military casualties were light.
Russian troops are still in place in many of the republics of
the former Soviet Union and are embroiled in a number of
controversial conflicts, some involving the Russian minorities
in the republics. (See the reports on Georgia, Moldova, and
Tajikistan.)
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
Freedom of speech and press was widely respected during much of
1993. Newspapers and magazines, most of which are independent
of the Government and some of which are privately owned,
functioned unhindered. However, during the events of
September-October, the Government restricted freedom of speech
and press.
In March the executive and legislative branches issued
conflicting decrees asserting control over the media.
President Yeltsin issued a decree placing radio and television
under his control. On March 28, the Parliament voted to
disband the Government's Federal Information Center (FIC) and
to put state radio and television under its own control. This
battle for control of the media continued throughout the year,
flaring up again on October 3 when supporters of the disbanded
Parliament violently attacked the country's television
broadcasting center. In a December decree, Yeltsin replaced
the Information Ministry and the FIC with a new media apparatus
in the presidential administration.
Following the Government's assault on the White House, it
imposed strict censorship for 2 days. Authorities on October 3
confiscated film from journalists leaving the country at the
airport. The newspapers Nezavisimaya Gazeta and Segodnya were
published with blank spaces (or spaces labeled "censored")
where three articles, to which government censors objected,
would have appeared. Censors ceased work after the second
day. However, the state of emergency empowered the Government
to suspend provisions of the media law and to continue to hold
publications "responsible" for the material they published
after the lifting of censorship. The Government advised
publications to consult with the Ministry of Information if
doubts about articles or their content arose. The Government
also pressured President Yeltsin's opponents to cancel a number
of press conferences during the first week in October. It
banned 15 newspapers and froze their bank accounts. In late
October, the President gave assurances that the Government
would respect freedom of the press. By November freedom of
speech and press largely returned to its pre-September 21
status. Three of the banned publications, the full-fledged
newspapers Pravda, Sovietskaya Rossiya, and Den (under the new
name Zavtra) resumed publication.
Police reportedly beat more than 20 journalists attempting to
cover the September/October events. Also in 1993, unidentified
assailants in Moscow severely beat three Central Asian
journalists covering their home region from Moscow. The
journalists believe members of the security services from
Tajikistan attacked them to intimidate them and force them to
cease reporting on alleged government repression there.
The investigation of Vil Mirzayanov, arrested in November 1992
in connection with the publication of an article in the
newspaper Moscow News about the existence of a chemical weapons
plant in the capital, began in the spring. Mirzayanov was
charged with revealing state secrets. During the pretrial
investigation, the Ministry of Security in April called in for
questioning the American correspondent resident in Moscow who
broke the story in the United States. The American journalist
answered the summons. The investigation was concluded in
summer, and the trial was set to begin in January 1994.
Many publications in Russia suffer from acute financial
problems which may affect their ability to function
independently. The Government directly subsidizes more than 20
publications. Indirectly, the Government subsidizes
publications by guaranteeing a percentage of their newsprint at
controlled prices. Paper and ink are controlled by
monopolies.
Television is a primary source of information for most
Russians. The two Russian television companies, Ostankino and
Russian State Television, transmit nationwide and to most of
the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). The Russian
Government owns both, but the degree of official supervision
has varied. Following President Yeltsin's disbandment of the
CPD on September 21, television coverage of politics was
markedly biased in favor of the President. In late September,
for example, the program "Krasny Kvadrat" was not allowed to
air because the Chairman of the Constitutional Court was a
guest. Less than a month later, the directors of Russian State
Television announced that the show would no longer be broadcast
at all. President Yeltsin ordered the program "600 Seconds"
off the air on October 4. The Government had also sought to
cancel the program in April.
On October 11, a new independent television news program
appeared, anchored by a journalist who left Ostankino because
of the Government's influence on content there. A December 22
edict by President Yeltsin provided a limited amount of time on
Moscow television's Channel 8 to NTV, Independent Television.
Television studios at the oblast (province) level that were
part of the central system during the Soviet era now operate
more or less independently. They function as affiliates,
opting to use programs from the national company and producing
local news programming independently. Local authorities
sometimes subject these affiliates to pressure.
All broadcasters and cable networks, both public and private,
use foreign broadcast material. In addition to the Russian
broadcasters, several joint venture cable companies now offer
programming in Moscow.
In the second year of post-Soviet existence, the environment
for academic freedom in Russia continued to improve. Russian
scholars enjoyed unprecedented academic freedom. Virtually all
institutions of higher learning, from universities to research
institutes, enjoy increased autonomy. University rectors and
department heads were selected in free and open elections.
Curriculums and textbooks were revamped, and many institutions
developed closer relations with Western universities. The
entrenched academic nomenklatura establishment, tinged with
much "old thinking," nonetheless continued to exert some
influence through their control of resources and privileges.
Educational institutions at all levels suffered from decreased
levels of government funding and support. Many operate at
subsistence levels.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
Organizers of demonstrations must apply for permission to local
authorities 10 days in advance, and officials must respond at
least 5 days before the scheduled event. According to a
presidential decree issued in May, requests for permission may
be submitted no earlier than 15 days and no later than 10 days
before the scheduled date. Participants in unauthorized
demonstrations are subject to civil and criminal penalties,
including fines, 15-day jail sentences, and stiffer
punishment. In April the Government issued a decree banning
demonstrations on Red Square and in its vicinity.
In the aftermath of the October assault on the White House, the
Government temporarily banned all public demonstrations. The
ban was lifted when the state of emergency expired on October
17.
During the year, there were many peaceful public
demonstrations, but a number of events were marked by
violence. Much of the violence occurred when anti-Yeltsin
groups clashed with the authorities. In September
demonstrators protesting President Yeltsin's disbandment of the
CPD gathered daily in front of the White House where it was
meeting. When the Government tightened security around the
area and prevented demonstrators from rallying there,
demonstrators clashed with the authorities in other parts of
the city. Unable to get to the White House, the crowd gathered
at a nearby metro station and blocked Moscow's ring road with
commandeered vehicles. A senior policeman died when he was
struck by a vehicle while assisting efforts to control a crowd.
May Day demonstrations by the National Salvation Front, Working
Moscow, and the Communist Workers Party of Russia turned
violent when protestors clashed with police after following an
unauthorized route for their march. One policeman was killed
in the melee.
Freedom of association is respected in practice. All public
organizations must register their bylaws and the names of their
leaders with the Ministry of Justice. Political parties must
also present 5,000 signatures and pay a fee to register. The
1991 Soviet law on public organizations allows the formation of
political parties and guarantees such organizations the right
to propagate their views. The law also bans groups advocating
violent change in the constitutional system or groups
undermining public order. In the aftermath of the October 3-4
violence, the Government banned 10 organizations because of
their alleged role in the events surrounding the violence.
Organizations registered with the Justice Ministry were allowed
to present candidates for the December parliamentary
elections. As of October 20, 126 organizations registered with
the Ministry planned to take part in the elections. The
Ministry suspended the registration of the 10 banned
organizations, denying them the right to participate in the
elections.
In April the Ministry of Justice launched an investigation into
the activities of the Communist Workers Party of Russia in
workplaces. Their activities were alleged to run counter to a
1991 Russian Federation decree "on the cessation of the
activities of organizational structures of political parties
and mass social movements in state bodies, institutions, and
organizations of the Russian Federation." In February the
Justice Ministry sought to ban a Russian Communist Party
conference, citing (erroneously) the November 1992
Constitutional Court decision which reaffirmed the Communist
Party's right to exist as a political organization. The
conference nonetheless took place without hindrance.
Otherwise, hundreds of organizations, representing a wide
political spectrum, functioned unhindered in 1993.
c. Freedom of Religion
Freedom of religion continued to expand in 1992, and the
visibility of religion increased dramatically. Religious
services and other programs were televised throughout the year.
Official and unofficial religious groups held seminars,
conferences, and revival meetings, frequently in public
facilities. Public advertising of religious services,
leafletting in subways and other parts of the city, and street
proselytizing in major cities was common. The press
extensively covered religious issues, including statements of
religious leaders and Orthodox Church events. Missionaries
from almost every world religion, as well as lesser known
sects, are present in Russia, and an increasing number of such
groups opened permanent offices.
Relations between the Russian Orthodox Church and the
Government have grown closer in recent years. The Patriarch
claims that the Church seeks no role in politics but has
insisted that the Church act as a moral influence in Russian
society. In March he appeared on national television to appeal
for political reconciliation between the legislative and
executive branches, while during the September/October crisis
in Moscow he mediated negotiations between presidential and
legislative representatives. In July the Orthodox Church
prompted the legislature to pass a proposed new law which
relied heavily on the Church's views and, if enacted, could
have further strengthened the Church's already preeminent place
among religious groups in Russia. The law would have required
all non-Russian organizations to register with the Government
before engaging in religious activity in Russia. After
President Yeltsin vetoed the bill, the September 21 dissolution
of the Congress of People's Deputies ended parliamentary
efforts to pass the bill over his veto.
Bureaucratic obstacles to complete freedom of religion still
exist due to the provision of the 1990 Soviet law on religion
requiring religious groups of 10 adults or more to register
with local authorities. Some groups view the requirement
itself as contradicting their beliefs and therefore refuse to
register. Although failure to register has not resulted in
harassment, groups must register to acquire the status of a
"juridical person" and to receive benefits, including access to
the media and the right to establish their own schools, own
property, and engage in social work. The registration process,
therefore, allows for obstructionist tactics by local
authorities, such as lost applications, endless reviews of
applications, or denial of adequate facilities. This problem
is most prevalent in cases of Protestants and the Russian
Orthodox Free Church. Individual Russian Orthodox believers
have prevented Pentecostals and other evangelical groups from
meeting, particularly in the northern Caucasus and the Russian
Far East. Violent attacks against non-Muslims by Muslim
believers in Chechnya were also reported.
The number of clergy and places of worship in Russia is still
inadequate for the population, but churches continued to open
in record numbers. Seminaries and other institutions of
clerical education continued to expand their enrollment,
limited only by their financial resources. Bibles, icons,
religious calendars, and memorabilia are on sale in street
kiosks and stores in major cities. There are no restrictions
on the importation of religious materials.
Young men who object to military duty because of their faith
continued to be subject to prison terms. Legislation providing
alternatives to military service for conscientious objectors
was pending, but there will be no resolution until after the
new legislative body convenes.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
Citizens were generally free to travel within the country. All
adults are issued internal passports which must be carried
during travel. Internal passports are also used to register
with local authorities visits of more than 3 days, although
this requirement is generally ignored by travelers not staying
in hotels.
The right to choose one's place of residence, though guaranteed
by law, continued to be restricted in practice. Under the
propiska registration system, all citizens must register their
place of residence. The system is enforced selectively and
often targeted against those who are not Russian, primarily
persons from the Caucasus and central Asia. Some officials
called for abolition of the propiska system, stating that it
infringes on the right of citizens to choose their place of
residence. However, officials in major cities, especially
Moscow, staunchly defended the system, predicting widespread
crime and homelessness if it were abolished.
During the weeks prior to and following the October 3-4
violence, city authorities reportedly deported from Moscow more
than 4,000 persons, most of whom were Caucasians or Central
Asians, because they were not officially registered.
Authorities in Moscow during that time also detained more than
20,000 persons for residency violations.
The new Constitution guarantees freedom of travel, including
emigration. The May 1991 Soviet law on emigration officially
came into force on January 1, 1993; however, actual
implementation has been gradual. Under this law, exit
permission and a formal invitation from abroad are no longer
required of travelers who are not emigrating. Passport offices
were overwhelmed by the flood of new applications, but despite
administrative delays many thousands of Russian citizens
traveled abroad during 1993.
Emigrants are no longer required to show an invitation from a
first-degree relative and need only show an invitation from any
relative abroad or permission to enter the country to which
they are emigrating. The implementing resolution for the new
law also annulled the 1967 decree under which emigrants to
Israel were required to give up their Soviet citizenship. The
new law, however, continues to restrict the emigration of
persons with access to state secrets. Special travel
regulations apply to some Russian scientists wishing to travel
abroad temporarily.
A government commission headed by deputy Foreign Minister
Lavrov was established in March to review emigration
applications refused on secrecy grounds. The commission
accepts individual appeals, contacts the government entity that
has placed the secrecy restriction on the person, and gives the
entity 2 weeks to respond. If no response is received within
the 2 weeks, the restriction is automatically lifted. Persons
also have the right to argue before the commission and to call
expert witnesses to challenge the continued secrecy of the
information in question. Since the commission began reviewing
cases this summer, many secrecy cases have been overturned.
The 1991 law also retains the requirement for intending
emigrants to obtain permission from close relatives in Russia.
If would-be emigrants are unable to secure the permission, they
may, theoretically, pursue a resolution of the problem in the
courts. However, to date no Russian court has accepted such a
case for review. The law also added a new emigration
restriction on draft-age men who have not yet completed their
obligatory military service.
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government
Under the new Constitution, the Russian people, in principle,
have the right to change their government. The President may
be impeached by a vote of two-thirds of the Federation Council
if the Duma by a two-thirds majority charges him with treason
or another serious crime and if the Supreme Court and the
Constitutional Court confirm the charge. The President may not
dissolve the Duma during the first year of its existence. It
is still not certain, however, that the Russian people have the
ability to change their government peacefully and
democratically. The constitutional crisis between the
executive and legislative branches, which began in 1992,
continued throughout much of 1993, leading to the events of
October 3-4 in Moscow. President Yeltsin was democratically
elected to a 5-year term in 1991 with approximately 60 percent
of the vote. On September 21, he disbanded the Russian
legislature, last elected in 1990 under Soviet electoral
rules. The legislature had repeatedly and arbitrarily blocked
efforts to introduce democratic and free market reforms.
President Yeltsin called for elections to a new Parliament on
December 12. A referendum on a new constitution was held
concurrently. In a mixed majoritarian and proportional
electoral system, Russian voters elected a 450-seat lower house
called the Duma and an upper house consisting of 2
representatives from each of the country's 88 constituent
administrative areas. (The Federation's 89th constituent
member, Chechnya, refused to participate in the elections.) To
qualify for the 225 proportional seats in the Duma, a party,
electoral bloc, or political movement had to obtain 100,000
signatures of which no more than 15 percent could come from a
single area. A group gained representation in the Duma if it
received more than 5 percent of the total vote. This minimum
percentage guarantees a group at least 11 seats. Candidates
for the majority seats were elected from 225 electoral
districts, each consisting of an average of 475,000 to 500,000
inhabitants. The new Parliament, split roughly four ways
between reformers, nationalists, Communists, and independents,
convened on January 11.
On April 25, in an attempt to resolve the conflict between the
executive and legislative branches, the Yeltsin Government
conducted a referendum on four questions: 1) confidence in the
President; 2) confidence in his economic policies; 3) early
presidential elections; and 4) early legislative elections.
According to a Constitutional Court decision on referendum
rules, a majority of votes by participants in the referendum
would suffice for the first two questions to carry, while a
majority of registered voters would suffice to carry the second
two questions. The majority of participants voted "yes" on all
four questions, but not in sufficient numbers, according to a
decision of the Constitutional Court, to be legally binding on
the questions of elections. The results strengthened the
position of President Yeltsin but did not resolve the political
impasse.
The Constitution provides for equal political rights for men
and women, but women do not occupy many leading positions in
politics and government. However, the "Women of Russia" bloc
received around 8 percent in proportional balloting. Members
of Russia's ethnic and religious minorities face no legal
limitations on political participation.
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
of Human Rights
Numerous nongovernmental human rights groups were active during
the year. Amnesty International, Helsinki Watch, the Moscow
Helsinki Group, Memorial, and the Center for Human Rights were
the most prominent. They investigated and publicly commented
on human rights issues; there were no reports of government
interference in their activities. Financing remained a problem
for many groups in light of Russia's difficult economic
situation. Russian authorities encouraged international
investigation of alleged human rights violations.
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Disability, Language, or Social Status
Human rights guarantees figure prominently in the new
Constitution. It remains to be seen whether these guarantees
will be respected. Both official and societal discrimination
still exist.
For the majority of Russians, homosexuality is socially
unacceptable behavior. Homosexuals are subject to violence and
discrimination by police and civilians. Local police also
continue surveillance of homosexuals and keep files on them.
Women
Women are entitled to the same legal rights as men, including
the right to participate in all areas of social, political, and
economic life. An extensive system of day-care and maternity
leave allows women to retain employment after having children.
The system has become less reliable, and in some cases reform
has meant that the families must pay directly for child-care
services. Women are well represented at many levels of the
general economy. Nonetheless, women often are not paid the
same as men for equal work and frequently are the first to be
laid off as enterprises reduce staff. Positions of influence
and prestige in both the Government and the economy are still
disproportionately occupied by men.
Violence against women occurs, but its extent is unknown.
Police often do not take an interest in cases of violence
against women. According to a rape crisis center in Moscow
started by a foreigner, some 16,000 rape cases throughout
Russia were reported to the authorities in 1992. The real
number is likely to be much higher but is not reflected in
either official or nongovernmental records. Incidents often go
unreported because of the belief that authorities will do
little about the matter and because of the victim's own shame.
In the case of spousal abuse, there are no specific legal
provisions against wife beating, and legal recourse such as
bringing charges of assault is seldom exercised in such cases.
Interest in women's issues is only beginning to grow and is
focused primarily on the effects of the transition to a market
economy. The "Women of Russia" electoral bloc, which received
8 percent of the vote in the December 12 election, focused its
campaign on the need for guaranteed health care, education, and
social welfare.
Children
The new Constitution assigns the Government some responsibility
for safeguarding the rights of children. While Article 38,
section 2, notes that "concern for children and their
upbringing are the equal right and duty of parents," section 1
stipulates that "maternity, childhood, and the family are under
the State's protection." Article 39 guarantees " social
security ... for the raising of children." Russia is a
signatory of the 1989 U.N. Convention on the Rights of the
Child. Russians from all political perspectives advocate a
greater state role in safeguarding the welfare of children and
all Russian citizens. The Government's efforts to develop an
effective "social safety net," however, are severely hampered
by economic problems.
Indigenous People
The State Committee for Development of the North, based in
Moscow, is tasked with representing the interests of indigenous
peoples. With only one full-time staff member, its influence
is limited. Local committees have been formed in some areas to
study and make recommendations regarding the preservation of
the indigenous peoples' cultures. Indigenous leaders criticize
these committees as lacking political influence. In September
Russian authorities sponsored an international conference on
the rights of indigenous peoples but drew relatively little
participation from indigenous groups from Russia or abroad.
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities
Discrimination against people from the Caucasus was most
evident in the weeks around the October 3-4 violence. The
Moscow authorities targeted persons with Caucasian features at
checkpoints around Moscow and during the state of emergency
ordered traffic police to stop all vehicles driven by "persons
of Caucasus nationality." A spokesperson for the traffic
police said that the purpose of these measures was to rid the
city of all illegal residents, most of whom are from the
Caucasus. The official noted that the order singled out those
from the Caucasus because they are easy to identify by their
"physiological and facial features." He also commented that
"most of these people are thieves and robbers," responsible
"for two-thirds of the crime" in Moscow. Human rights groups
in Moscow criticized the discriminatory procedures under which
thousands of persons were forced to leave the capital.
However, the crackdown provoked little negative response from
Muscovites, who blame much of the crime in the city on people
from the Caucasus. Vendors and merchants in the capital's many
markets and in city markets throughout Russia were also targets
of discrimination. Concentrating on persons that looked like
Caucasus residents, Moscow police forced many to halt their
business, confiscated wares, and subjected the vendors and
merchants to physical violence.
Following his arrest on October 4, former CPD Chairman Ruslan
Khasbulatov, who is himself a Chechen, refused to be
represented by a Chechen lawyer. He said a lawyer from that
part of Russia would not be able to mount an effective defense
because of discrimination.
Religious Minorities
Anti-Semitism is no longer condoned by the Government.
However, it continues to occur, its virulence varying by
region. Jewish leaders called for greater assertiveness on the
part of the central Government in combating anti-Semitism.
Anti-Semitism continues to exist among the people and is
manifested in acts of vandalism and verbal assaults on persons
who appear to be Jewish. A number of Jewish cemeteries were
desecrated, and on occasion rocks were thrown through the
windows of Jewish schools. In February the a high-ranking
figure in the Russian Orthodox Church published an article in
the newspaper Rossiskaya Gazeta which asserted that the
discredited "Protocols of the Elders of Zion" are a blueprint
for Russia's political crisis.
The authorities at times have been unwilling to take action
when anti-Semitic acts are committed. In the spring a group of
persons gathered in front of Moscow's Choral Synagogue, shouted
anti-Semitic slogans, and broke windows. Police refused calls
for assistance from the temple's leaders. Later in the year,
police refused to help a Jewish family regain its apartment in
Moscow after "criminals" took it over when the family was out
of the country.
In April the newspaper Pravda published a spurious article
linking Hasidism to satanic cults and blood ritual murders.
The newspaper later noted that the article contained unfounded
assertions and apologized to its readers. Although as a rule
the Russian Government does not respond to newspaper items, it
called the article "destructive in its manner" and criticized
it for inflaming "nationalist and religious dissension." On
December 30, fire destroyed one of Moscow's three synagogues.
The Jewish community believes, and the authorities suspect,
that arson was the cause of the blaze.
The expression of anti-Semitism was particularly evident in
politics. Street protestors opposed to President Yeltsin often
referred to him as a Jew, and antigovernment graffiti often
contained anti-Semitic imagery. Prior to the April referendum,
the Communist Party of Russia distributed election flyers that
criticized Yeltsin for having allowed Hasids to tread on the
"holy stones of the Kremlin."
People with Disabilities
The new Constitution stipulates that all persons are equal
before the law. It does not contain any specific prohibitions
directed at discrimination against disabled persons. There is
no known specific legislation that mandates accesibility for
people with disabilities.
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
The Russian Labor Code guarantees the right of workers to join
trade unions. Unions are required to register with local
authorities. Local authorities have historically used this
requirement to impede the establishment of new unions. The
primary obstacle to the exercise of this right has been the
special position occupied by the Federation of Independent
Trade Unions of Russia (FNPR), the successor to the Soviet-era
All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions.
The FNPR has largely retained the privileges and control
mechanisms of the old official union structure that existed in
the Soviet era. For example, it retained exclusive control of
the social insurance fund, from which it distributes worker
benefits such as vacations and sick and disability pay, and has
used these benefits to keep workers in the FNPR and to threaten
those workers contemplating leaving the official unions.
Leaders of the free, democratic labor unions consider the
FNPR's exclusive control of the social insurance fund the
primary obstacle to the growth of democratic trade unions. In
September, shortly after President Yeltsin dissolved the
Congress of People's Deputies, FNPR Chairman Klochkov led the
official unions into direct opposition to Yeltsin and called
for massive strikes in support of Khasbulatov and Rutskoy. In
response, the Government prepared to punish the FNPR. It took
over the social insurance fund and threatened to ban the FNPR.
The FNPR, however, forced Klochkov to resign and made peace
with the Government. As a result, no further steps were taken
against the FNPR. Moreover, although the social insurance fund
remained under the nominal control of the Labor Ministry, no
real changes were made in the operation or management of the
fund. As a result, independent union members seeking benefits
from the fund continue to face discrimination. The Government
has invited the FNPR to take an active role in preparing new
legislation for the fund.
Nominally, almost all of the Russian work force is organized.
In the Soviet period, all workers were required to join the
official trade unions. However, an increasing number of jobs
are located in the private sector or in the informal economy,
in which unions are much less active. The FNPR still claims to
represent about 65 million of Russia's 72 million workers.
However, labor officials and other observers estimate that it
has lost a significant portion of its membership, perhaps as
much as 30 percent. The membership of the independent unions
and independent unionlike organizations probably does not
exceed 3 million.
Labor unions in Russia are independent of the Government and
political parties. The FNPR has a formal agreement of
cooperation with the Civic Union, an alliance of centrist
parties, and one of the free trade unions has ties with the
Social Democratic Party of Russia.
The Labor Code recognizes the right of workers to strike.
However, the law includes numerous restrictions on that right,
prohibiting, for example, strikes for political reasons. The
law permits strikes only after all other means of resolving a
dispute have been exhausted. Strikes may be declared illegal
if they pose a threat to people's lives or health or if the
closing of a plant's operations might lead to severe
consequences. Strikes are also prohibited in several sectors:
railroads, city transport, civil aviation, communications,
energy, and the defense industry.
Numerous strikes occurred in 1993; however, most were either
short-term warning strikes or were settled quickly. Unlike in
Western market economies, labor disputes are rarely directed
against enterprise management. In fact, the FNPR and the
management of large state-owned industries normally cooperate
closely in pressing their demands against the Government. In
early 1993, the FNPR and the Government formed a tripartite
commission comprised of union, management, and government
representatives to protect workers' rights and standard of
living and avoid strikes and other labor disputes. This
arrangement reduced the number of strikes in 1993. The FNPR
withdrew from the commission in August and organized a series
of strikes and other worker protests to pressure the Government
to maintain subsidies to industries and increase workers' pay.
The FNPR was only moderately successful and decided to suspend
further strikes because of the political crisis in Moscow.
The Government did little to protect workers from management's
retribution in the event of a strike. FNPR-affiliated union
officials work in a close, subordinate relationship with
enterprise management. As a result, FNPR-led strikes were
usually approved in advance and supported by enterprise
management. Free union members and leaders face threats and
intimidation from enterprise management. Free union officials
contend that these actions are often taken with the passive
support of FNPR officials and local politicians.
During 1993, free union officials were increasingly aggressive
in pressing their case in the Russian courts, with moderate
success. For example, the Association of Trade Unions of
Yekaterinburg has been very active in employing law students
from the city's legal institute to assist member unions protect
worker rights. The head of the Association says the poor state
of the legal system is the primary hindrance to the protection
of workers' rights.
Unions are permitted to form and join federations or
confederations and may participate in international bodies.
The Government designated the FNPR to represent Russian workers
at the International Labor Organization (ILO) conference in
1993. The ILO Governing Body in 1993 addressed two freedom of
association complaints against the Russian Federation, one of
which was from the FNPR protesting a decision by local
government bodies prohibiting wage check-offs for union dues.
The ILO observed that government bodies should not interfere
with check-off arrangements reached through collective
bargaining between workers and employers but that such
deductions should not infringe on the right of workers to
belong to trade unions of their choosing.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
Collective bargaining is not widely practiced and still largely
misunderstood by workers and enterprise directors because
official unions, which include managers in their membership,
continue their close, subordinate relationship with
management. The tripartite commission reinforced this
misunderstanding by perpetuating the process whereby official
unions and enterprise managers spoke with a common voice,
requesting subsidies, for example, from the Government.
Some free unions understand the importance of creating in
Russia a system in which enterprise management is independent
of labor and the Government and is held responsible for
complying with the terms of contracts. Recently, as firms have
become privatized, the courts have started to compel
enterprises to comply with contracts.
Most wages continue to be set at the industry level by
government agencies or in national tariff agreements negotiated
in the Tripartite Commission. The Labor Code does not
explicitly prohibit antiunion discrimination by employers.
Such a prohibition is implied, however, in several sections of
the Labor Code. The Government admits that under current law
there is no mechanism for resolving labor disputes; it recently
undertook, however, to establish in the Labor Ministry a
service for the resolution of disputes. The legal basis for
conflict resolution and the full establishment of the service
were not expected until some time in 1994.
During 1993, the Government established a number of foreign
enterprise zones. Worker rights are not more restrictive in
these zones than elsewhere in the country.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
The Labor Code prohibits compulsory labor, and there are no
known reports that it occurs. However, as in other areas of
worker rights, the government apparatus for enforcing and
overseeing compliance with labor laws either does not exist or
is largely ineffective.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children.
The Labor Code does not permit the regular employment of
children under the age of 16. In certain cases, children aged
14 and 15 may work in intern or apprenticeship programs. The
Labor Code regulates the working conditions of children under
the age of 18, including prohibiting dangerous work and
nighttime and overtime work. Government enforcement is largely
ineffective, but there is no evidence that this prohibition is
violated in Russia. The responsibility for the protection of
children in this area is shared by the Labor Ministry and the
Ministry for Social Protection.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
The legislature sets the minimum wage, which covers all
workers. It is so low, however, that few workers actually
receive such a low salary. Even the minimum pension is higher
than the minimum wage. The minimum wage is insufficient to
provide a decent living for a worker and family. Its primary
purpose is to serve as a baseline for computing benefits,
pensions, and some wage scales. The minimum wage is set
quarterly. It was increased in July, for example, to just
under $8 (7,740 rubles) per month at the then exchange rate.
This is below the minimum pension of 14,000 rubles per month
and the poverty line of about 20,000 rubles per month. In
contrast, the average wage in September was $67 (about 80,000
rubles). A December 1 decree by President Yeltsin raised the
minimum wage to $12.25 (14,620 rubles).
The Labor Code provides for a standard workweek of 40 hours,
which includes at least one 24-hour rest period. The law
requires premium pay for overtime work or work on holidays.
Russian law establishes minimum conditions of workplace safety
and worker health, but these standards continue to be widely
ignored, and no effective enforcement mechanism exists.
Industrial deaths and injuries are very high, especially in
heavy industries such as mining. The free unions have been in
the forefront of efforts to improve safety and health
conditions.
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