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TITLE: GEORGIA HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES, 1993
DATE: JANUARY 31, 1994
AUTHOR: U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
GEORGIA
Two years after declaring its independence from the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics, Georgia continued in 1993 to
struggle with severe political instability, internal armed
conflict, economic ruin, and runaway crime. Symptoms of
anarchy appeared, and aspects of Georgia's effort to
consolidate democracy were set aside.
The national Parliament was elected in nationwide elections in
1992; Eduard Shevardnadze was elected Chairman of that
Parliament in the same elections. A November 1992 law
established the Chairman of Parliament as Head of State. The
Chairman subsequently named a Prime Minister and Cabinet of
Ministers. That Cabinet, and other executive branch officials,
report to Shevardnadze.
Mounting public criticism culminated in a change of government
in August-September which led to a confrontation between
Shevardnadze and the Parliament over the latter's right to
confirm ministerial appointees. Shevardnadze suddenly resigned
on September 14 but within 24 hours agreed to return if
Parliament declared a state of emergency and suspended its own
activities for 2 months, which it agreed to do to avoid further
crisis. The state of emergency banned demonstrations and
limited freedom of the press.
The continuation of the armed conflict in Abkhazia, a breakaway
region of Georgia, was a major factor in the general
deterioration of the country's political and economic
stability. The Russian Government brokered a cease-fire accord
in late July but made little apparent effort to hold the
separatists to the agreement. The uneven implementation of the
cease-fire conditions gave the Abkhaz separatists a clear
military advantage, which they used in a major September
offensive. This offensive, in which volunteer Russian
Federation combatants reportedly participated in far greater
numbers than Abkhazians, captured the capital, Sukhumi, and the
remaining Georgian-held cities. The separatist forces
committed widespread atrocities against the Georgian civilian
population, killing many women, children, and elderly,
capturing some as hostages and torturing others (see Sections
1.a. and 1.g.).
Meanwhile, armed Zviadists, supporters of former president
Zviad Gamsakhurdia, continued acts of banditry during the year
and succeeded in late summer in seizing control of additional
cities and blocking rail lines. The former president himself
returned to Georgia in September, and the long-simmering
conflict boiled over into civil war. After initial losses,
government forces recaptured most of the territory seized,
including the key port town of Poti.
The Government unsuccessfully tried to eliminate paramilitary
forces in favor of establishing a single unified army. The
regular army, however, totals only a few thousand men, poorly
armed, trained, and equipped. The National Guard, once the
largest armed force, was integrated into the Army during 1993.
The most prominent and best equipped paramilitary group, the
Mkhedrioni, led by Djaba Ioseliani, was the principal armed
defender of Shevardnadze's Government during the civil war with
Gamsakhurdia. The members of the "Kommandatura," organizations
created to enforce the state of emergency, were the principal
enforcers and often included members of the Mkhedrioni. All
these forces, including the police on a less frequent basis,
committed human rights abuses during the year, including using
their powers to repress the opposition and rob and intimidate
the population. The Intelligence and Information Service,
later renamed the Ministry of Security, a successor to the
Committee for State Security or KGB, is active in internal
security and antiterrorist affairs. It also engaged in abuses,
including the intimidation of opposition figures and repression
of their viewpoints.
Georgia's multiple conflicts helped fuel a continuing downward
spiral in the economy. When Russia cut off a supply of cash
rubles in the spring, Georgia began printing its own
"coupons." Hyperinflation followed, poverty spread
dramatically, and bread lines lengthened. Industrial
production came to a near standstill, as transport lines ceased
functioning and trade with ex-Soviet republics diminished.
The armed conflicts with Abkhazians and Zviadists brought forth
allegations of human rights violations on all sides, including
the killing of prisoners and civilians and looting of
villages. Law enforcement officials were credibly reported to
have carried out arrests without warrants, physically abused
detainees, and exceeded the legal time limits on pretrial
detention without filing charges. Freedoms of speech and
press, and of assembly and association, were severely
curtailed, especially for Zviadists, and the state of emergency
imposed censorship not only on military subjects but also on
political discourse.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
In the war in Abkhazia, Georgian military or paramilitary units
were credibly reported to have killed some prisoners.
Abkhazian separatists killed members of the Georgian Government
in Sukhumi after capturing that city. They tortured and killed
the Georgian Prime Minister of Abkhazia after taking him
prisoner in late September and killed many working-level
officials. They also killed large numbers of Georgian
civilians who remained behind in Abkhaz-seized territory. It
is credibly reported that volunteers from the Russian
Federation fighting with the separatists carried out many of
the killings.
Zviadists shot to death a senior officer of the Georgian air
force in October in Mengrelia, when he traveled to the area for
preagreed negotiations. Zviadist forces also executed a
Georgian journalist captured in Mengrelia during the height of
the civil war.
b. Disappearance
Many Georgians caught in Abkhazia when the separatists launched
their September offensive are unaccounted for. Over 1,000
people are still reported missing. Many are presumed to have
been killed.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
Members of the police, paramilitary groups, the intelligence
service, and the armed forces have been credibly accused of
routinely beating detainees in order to extort information or
force confessions. Some senior government officials attempted
to reform the practices of these organizations, but stiff
resistance limited their effectiveness. No perpetrators of
abuses within the official community are known to have been
prosecuted or punished for their actions.
Law enforcement officials were credibly reported to have
frequently beaten detainees, arrested despite an apparent lack
of evidence linking them to a specific crime, in order to
extort payments from prisoners' families to effect their
release. In one case, officials severely beat a man accused of
robbery and demanded that he pay them a sum equivalent to the
value of the goods stolen, although there was no evidence to
substantiate their allegations of criminal activity. They are
credibly reported to have tortured the victim by hanging him by
his arms for extended periods.
Physical abuse directed at political detainees continued in
1993. Several Zviadists arrested in connection with terrorist
acts committed or allegedly planned in 1992 claimed they were
subjected to physical abuse in 1993. In some instances, the
perpetrators of the abuse were already convicted prisoners with
whom the detainees had been placed in violation of prison
regulations. The Zviadists alleged that these prisoners were
acting as proxies for the Government. In one case, a convicted
murderer who beat an elderly Zviadist was tried and convicted
for the attack. In other instances, detainees told a
parliamentary human rights committee that officials had beaten
them. According to the committee chairman, their claims were
probably valid.
After the outbreak of civil war in October in western Georgia,
there were widespread arrests of Zviadists. An elderly
Zviadist newspaper editor, Irakli Gotsiridze, subjected earlier
to intimidation (see Section 2.a.), was arrested without a
warrant and held at the Tbilisi Kommandatura. (Normally a
military post, the Kommandatura was used to hold political
prisoners after the state of emergency was declared.) Members
of the paramilitary or armed forces beat him so severely that
he suffered damage to his ribs and lungs. Despite repeated
requests, the Government delayed access to the editor for over
30 days after the beating and failed to provide him with proper
medical care.
Paramilitary or armed forces members on October 13 detained
another supporter of the ex-president, Tamaz Kaladze, who had
earlier headed a petition campaign calling for Shevardnadze's
resignation, and severely beat him. Eyewitnesses who saw him
soon after his detention reported that he had severe bruising
on his neck, blood coming from his ears, swollen face and eyes,
and complained of severe pain in his kidneys. Kaladze was also
beaten on the balls of his feet, given electrical shocks, and
nearly suffocated when guards held a plastic bag over his
head. Kaladze was eventually released, after a total of 38
days in jail; Gotsiridze was released after 36 days.
It is also credibly reported that members of the Kommandatura
staged fake executions to terrorize the prisoners.
Prison conditions declined, along with the general economic and
political situation. In general, prison administrators did not
receive enough money to provide prisoners' meals in accordance
with Soviet-era regulations. Meals were often Spartan as a
result, although in some places of detention prisoners'
relatives were permitted to bring them food. Conditions in
many places of detention other than the prisons can be
extremely primitive, with no bathing facilities, no place to
lie down, and no toilet.
Medical care for prisoners also suffered from the shortage of
funding and breakdown of governmental operations and
authority. At least one prisoner died in custody in 1993 when
authorities were unable to move him to a hospital for several
days because of gasoline shortages and a lack of police escorts.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
Soviet-era legislation and practices with regard to arrest and
detention remain largely unreformed, and such legal protections
as exist are often ignored in practice. Under existing law, an
arrest order issued by a procurator is required for arrests.
If a person is caught in the act of committing a crime, he may
legally be detained without a warrant. However, the law
requires the detaining officer to inform a procurator of the
detention immediately and to obtain an arrest order as soon as
possible. A person may be legally detained for 72 hours
without an arrest order, but the procurator must issue either
an arrest order or an order for the prisoner's release upon
expiration of that period. If held over for further
investigation, a detainee must be formally charged with a crime
within 10 days. There is no bail.
The normal period of permissible pretrial detention is
considered to be 2 months, but that period may be legally
extended twice, up to a total of 6 months, by the Deputy
Procurator General. The Procurator General may extend pretrial
detention up to a maximum of 1 year. A detainee may ask the
procurator to determine if his detention is legal. A detainee
has the right to demand immediate access to a lawyer and to
refuse a statement in the absence of counsel. The detaining
officer must inform the detainee of those rights and must
notify his family of the detainee's location as soon as
possible.
A detainee's family may ask to see him, but the investigator
handling the case may refuse access if he believes it would
hamper the investigation. Once the investigation is finished
and the investigative results have been forwarded formally to a
court pending trial, family members are allowed to visit their
detained relatives only to discuss a possible change of
attorneys. The presence of an attorney is mandatory during
interrogation of a minor or of an individual accused of a
capital crime. The presence of a teacher or a parent is also
obligatory during questioning of a minor.
In practice, law enforcement personnel and paramilitary groups
that often act on behalf of the Government often ignored these
legal protections. Authorities frequently detained people
arbitrarily and exceeded time limits for detention and filing
charges. People do not always have access to a lawyer or do
not hire a lawyer because they are not informed of their
rights. In a characteristic case, the investigator handling
the case of a Zviadist scientist detained and beaten in October
said that the case was still being investigated and no formal
charges had been filed, so an attorney was not yet needed.
Families are often not notified of the whereabouts of their
detained relatives. Instances of such abuses involve both
politically motivated detentions and those for criminal
offenses.
The Soviet-era administrative code permits administrative
detention without a warrant for several kinds of violations,
including participating in an illegal demonstration and curfew
violation. The law on the state of emergency passed by the
current Parliament is the legal basis for administrative
violations and sentencing during the state of emergency.
Either a senior Interior Ministry official or an administrative
judge must confirm the detention. In the former case,
materials must be sent to a judge within 3 hours, who must then
decide the case within 24 hours. There is no formal trial in
administrative cases. Although the judge should consult with
the accused, he is not required to consult with witnesses nor
make a lawyer available if the defendant requests one. The
maximum sentence is 15 days.
Under legislation establishing a state of emergency in
September, the Ministry of the Interior retained the right to
confirm the validity of detentions, a right shared by the city
"kommandants". The kommandants are, under the state of
emergency, responsible for law and order in the city, and their
authority supersedes that of all other law enforcement bodies.
The Government abuses the administrative law system, using it
to extend politically motivated detentions. Under the state of
emergency in effect from early fall through the end of the
year, the kommandants and senior Ministry of Internal Affairs
officials in Tbilisi legally assumed authority to confirm
administrative law detentions. This has contributed to the
abuse of the administrative violation system for politically
motivated detentions. Aside from the fact that an independent
judge does not review the case, defendants are not always told
what they have been charged with and to what term they have
been sentenced and are sometimes not released on time even if
sentenced. Even when a state of emergency was not in effect,
the administrative system was sometimes used as a mechanism for
short-term politically motivated detentions. When a number of
Zviadist sympathizers were detained in Tbilisi in October after
the civil war began, administrative violations were often
cited, incredibly, as the reason for those detentions.
Arbitrary detentions of Zviadists occurred throughout the
year. On one such occasion, all the leaders of the Zviadist
"Roundtable" organization were arrested as they held a meeting.
They were released hours later. When the civil war broke out,
Tbilisi authorities arbitrarily detained a large number of
known Zviadist sympathizers.
Government paramilitary groups, including the Mkhedrioni, were
responsible for serious abuses of the legally established
system of protections. The Mkhedrioni appeared to operate with
impunity in intimidating and detaining Zviadists or suspected
Zviadists without legal sanction, though such actions appeared
to lessen throughout the course of the year. When the
Mkhedrioni detained persons, they would sometimes bring them to
a jail facility belonging to an official agency of the
Government. They would sometimes simply bring individuals to
their staff headquarters, question them, and release them. At
times, those detained would be turned over to regular law
enforcement personnel. Police officials also frequently
brought Zviadists in for questioning in a practice that
appeared to amount to direct intimidation of political
activities. This pattern reached its height during the civil
war with Gamsakhurdia's supporters. The Mkhedrioni also
participated in the increasingly common practice of detaining
persons for ransom, and they did so in western Georgia when
they were deployed there for the civil war. For their part,
Zviadist forces also arbitrarily detained a senior official of
the Tbilisi Government when he passed through Mengrelia while
fleeing the fall of Sukhumi. He was held for several weeks
before being released.
The Government states that all detained members of the
political opposition were terrorists or had committed specified
violations. However, the detentions of many Zviadists after
the civil war flared up in late September were often tacitly
acknowledged to be preventive detentions. Zviadist forces
contend, credibly, that many people were detained in 1993
solely for political reasons, usually for short periods, and
some were detained several times.
Law enforcement personnel, members of the paramilitary, and
kommandatura workers often arbitrarily detained people for the
purpose of extorting payments from them or their families.
Detainees were usually released after such payments were made.
The paramilitary, Kommandatura, army, National Guard members,
and, at times, police engaged in robbery, intimidation, and
even murder for personal gain.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
Political instability and weaknesses in the judicial system
sometimes infringed on the right to a fair trial. Georgia's
legal structure is a hybrid of laws from Georgia's brief period
of pre-Soviet independence, the Soviet era, the Gamsakhurdia
presidency, and the State Council period. The court system
consists of district courts, a city court for Tbilisi, and the
Supreme Court of the Republic. The two autonomous republics
within Georgia each have their own supreme court, theoretically
subordinate to the Georgia Supreme Court.
In theory, Georgian citizens are by law guaranteed the right to
a fair public trial at which defendants have the right to be
present. They have the right to an attorney immediately after
arrest, at public expense if needed. They are entitled to
confront prosecution witnesses and present witnesses and
evidence on their behalf. There is a presumption of innocence,
and defendants have the right to appeal to either the procuracy
or the Supreme Court.
In practice, the judiciary is vulnerable to political or other
forms of influence, particularly at the local level. Certain
supervisory rights exercised by the procuracy further limit the
independence of the judiciary. As part of the Soviet-era
system still in effect in Georgia, the procuracy has the right
to suggest that the Supreme Court review one of its own
decisions. By contrast, the judiciary has little influence
over the procuracy. Some members of the judiciary engage in
corrupt practices, including taking bribes and being influenced
by instructions received from individuals both inside and
ouside the Government. The practice cometimes referred to as
"telephone justice," i.e., that an official calls a judge and
tells him how to resolve a case, continued in 1993. The
societywide fragmentation of authority and collapse of order in
1993 presented judges with an increasing number of power- or
weapon-wielding figures outside government who demanded, often
successfully, certain outcomes in the cases under their
jurisdiction.
It is difficult to estimate the number of political prisoners
detained during the course of the year, though their numbers
probably exceeded 100. By year's end it appeared all had been
released. In 1993 the Government brought to trial over 40
persons, all of them Zviadists, accused of terrorist acts or
plotting to commit such acts in 1992. One case ended with the
conviction of all 20 defendants in the "Kvareli" trial, in
which those captured from an armed Zviadist group established
in eastern Georgia in 1992 were tried. The court threw out
several charges brought by the Government; most defendants were
convicted of banditry, and some of conspiracy to commit
terrorist acts and diversions. Another trial convicted three
persons of banditry, terrorism, and kidnaping for the 1992
kidnaping of government official Sandro Kavsadze. The maximum
sentence received by any defendant was 15 years. Another trial
just under way as the year closed is examining charges against
approximately 20 persons charged in connection with 1992 car
bombings targeting Mkhedrioni leaders and with other alleged
terrorist plots. Though Zviadists claim that those detained in
the above cases are political prisoners, the Government denies
that accusation, noting it has solid evidence supporting the
charges. The Zviadist claim at this point does not appear to
be valid. The Zviadists also claim that some of the defendants
were repeatedly pressured to sign statements or confessions.
That claim is likely valid.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
A warrant issued by a prosecutor is required legally for a
search, but entry into homes without judicial sanction by both
paramilitary forces and law enforcement representatives is
common. Government intelligence agencies are widely believed
to monitor telephone conversations, but it is difficult to
determine how general the practice is.
It is widely believed that the appointment of a new security
minister sympathetic to Moscow signaled the beginning of a
closer cooperation between the Committee for State Security
(KGB) and Georgian intelligence. By law, there is supposed to
be legislative oversight of the intelligence service; however,
the oversight is completely ineffective.
The jamming of radio and television broadcasts is no longer
practiced, and receipt of foreign publications is unimpeded.
g. Use of Excessive Force and Violations of Humanitarian
Law in Internal Conflicts
The armed conflict in Abkhazia wreaked havoc for most of the
year. The separatists violated a short-lived cease-fire in
March, and fighting between Georgia and the Abkhazians
continued until the Russians brokered a cease-fire in July.
The Russian Government made little apparent effort to hold the
separatists to that agreement, however, and its uneven
implementation gave the Abkhaz separatists a clear military
advantage. They exploited that in a major September offensive
to seize control over all of Abkhazia, with the subsequent
human tragedy that unfolded.
Even before their offensive, Abkhaz forces had waged a
documented campaign of indiscriminate warfare that included
repeated heavy shelling and aerial bombardment of
civilian-populated areas of Sukhumi in which hundreds of
noncombatants were killed. Georgian forces also shelled
opposing civilian areas, though on a much more limited scale.
Russian military forces are reported also to have shelled
Georgian civilian areas in response to Georgian shelling of
Abkhaz positions located together with Russian military
positions.
The separatists launched a reign of terror against the majority
Georgian population, although other nationalities also
suffered. Chechens and other north Caucasians from the Russian
Federation joined local Abkhaz troops in the commission of
atrocities. The summary execution of Georgian troops and
civilians in the captured areas triggered a massive flight of
displaced persons which international relief organizations
roughly estimated at 230,000-250,000 people. The Abkhazians
shot down four aircraft, two of them civilian flights, during
the last days of their successful siege of Sukhumi. They also
shot at, and barely missed, an aircraft carrying a team of
Georgian officials engaged in formal negotiations with the
Abkhazians. The entire Georgian population (47 percent versus
17 percent Abkhazians, prior to the September offensive) and
most of the rest of the non-Abkhazians fled from Abkhazia as
the result of the activities of the Abkhaz separatists.
Those fleeing Abkhazia made highly credible claims of
atrocities, including the killing of civilians without regard
to age or sex. Corpses recovered from Abkhaz-held territory
showed signs of extensive torture. The ethnic Georgian Prime
Minister of Abkhazia, Dzhuli Shartava (see Section 1.a.), was
one such victim: his body was covered with severe bruising;
his arms, legs, hands, and feet had been broken; his nose had
been mutilated; his ears cut off; and his kneecaps shot before
death--reportedly for "refusing to kneel." An elderly Russian
woman, resident in Abkhazia for 35 years before fleeing her
village on September 16, reported that separatist forces seized
nine villagers after they took control of the area and killed
them all. She saw the body of her 30-year-old male neighbor,
which showed evidence of massive beating; splinters had been
inserted under his nails, and his skull had been crushed.
The Abkhazians also accused the Georgians of human rights
violations, including an "ethnic cleansing" campaign. There is
little evidence to support allegations of ethnic cleansing,
although it is probable that some ethnic Abkhazians were forced
to move from Georgian-held territory in isolated instances.
Both sides were charged with occasionally killing injured
soldiers captured on the battlefield. One injured Abkhaz
soldier disappeared from the Sukhumi hospital where he was
being treated; it is likely Georgian forces killed him. While
specific incidents are difficult to confirm, these charges are
probably accurate.
Conflict between Zviadists and the Tbilisi Government erupted
into open civil war during the summer. Zviadists seized cities
controlling rail and road lines to the port of Poti just before
the Abkhazian separatists launched their successful offensive
on Sukhumi. They captured Poti after the fall of Sukhumi, as
well as a series of other towns, but lost most of their
captured territory as a result of a government counteroffensive
in October.
Both sides in this struggle accused the other of abusing
prisoners and engaging in banditry and looting from civilians
wherever they were deployed. The accusations are credible.
Members of the National Guard and Mkhedrioni engaged in many
forms of criminal activity, sometimes stealing cars, robbing
homes, and looting the countryside.
The Zviadist armed forces, for their part, also stole cars,
exacted "customs" fees from those traveling through their
territory, hijacked railroad freight, and stole large stores of
humanitarian aid after capturing Poti.
One government fighter captured by Zviadist forces reported
after his release several days later that they had beaten and
tortured him and several of his fellow prisoners while in
detention. He appeared on television at the time, his face
showing obvious signs of severe beating. Georgian officials
claim many other prisoners suffered similar treatment. In
October the Zviadists executed a captured Georgian journalist
covering the war in Mengrelia, along with three government
troops captured at the same time.
Peacekeeping forces succeeded in separating the combatants in
South Ossetia, and the cease-fire was essentially observed.
However, isolated killings of both civilians and peacekeeping
troops occurred. Many Ossetian displaced persons returned to
Tskhinvali, but Georgian displaced persons were still afraid to
return, as Georgian authorities and peacekeeping forces in
practice had been unable to guarantee their security. Ethnic
Ossetians who fled to Ossetia from other regions of Georgia
during the height of the conflict also had not been able to
return to their homes.
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
Freedoms of speech and press were curtailed in 1993,
particularly for supporters of the former president and
especially after the imposition of the state of emergency in
September. The emergency legislation called on the various law
enforcement organs to "control" media reporting on military
activities and antigovernment information. A committee, headed
by paramilitary chief Djaba Ioseliani, indicated that formal
censorship of military information would be complemented by
extensive review of material published and broadcast and
"recommendations" to individual journalists on improving their
work.
As the civil war flared in mid-October, Shevardnadze announced
that it would be necessary to close some newspapers and cancel
some television programs, and increased restrictions on the
media followed. Radio and television access was limited for
some non-Zviadist opposition elements. Opposition parties
Charter 91 and the National Independent Party (NIP) both
claimed they were denied access to television air time formerly
given freely. Some opposition politicians credibly claimed the
restrictions were aimed at muting public criticism of
Shevardnadze's decision to take Georgia into the Commonwealth
of Independent States.
Following the state of emergency, only three newspapers, all
official, continued publishing without interruption. The
single government-run printing office prevented all independent
newspapers from publishing for a short period for "technical
reasons." Restrictions targeted Zviadist publications,
although other independent organs also came under attack. The
Zviadist newspaper Iberia Specter, after putting up with
various restrictions, was closed down by the Government in
early fall. Authorities justified the closing by claiming the
Specter published calls for the violent overthrow of the
Shevardnadze Government. Nevertheless, the Government has not
been able to prove its claims as yet. The paper's editor,
Irakli Gotsiridze, was also harassed personally. Unidentified
assailants twice fired shots through the windows of his
apartment. The police have not identified the perpetrators.
Gotsiridze was arrested and severely beaten in October when he
went to a police station to complain about the arrests of some
colleagues (see Section 1.c.). The staff of the Zviadist
newspaper Samreklo also claimed that its chief editor was
threatened and that shots were fired at his apartment. He fled
Tbilisi as a result.
Editors of non-Zviadist independent papers Seven Days and Droni
asserted they also were subject to severe repression. Seven
Days reported that the Mkhedrioni detained one of its
journalists for 2 days and seized her notes.in August when she
passed through Mengrelia on the way back from Abkhazia. On
September 17, 10 armed and masked men ransacked the newspaper's
offices, destroying the computers and beating up 4 men. The
attack came just after the newspaper criticized the appointment
of a National Democratic Party (NDP) leader as a Cabinet
member. The Seven Days' staff claimed that NDP members had
done the ransacking in retaliation, citing a number of private
and public statements by NDP leaders that lent credence to that
claim. After the ransacking, Droni published a short story
criticizing the incident as inconsistent with democracy. Their
chief editor stated that a senior NDP official immediately
threatened that bodily harm would come to her if she were not
more careful in the future. NDP senior officials refuted the
accusations against their party.
Another Zviadist newspaper, Free Georgia, continued to struggle
in 1993 against a 1992 order that closed it down. The judge
who issued the order explained his action as a temporary
measure intended to get the paper's editorial staff to come to
his chambers to discuss the case so it could come to trial.
Though members of the editorial staff eventually met with him
to discuss the case, they represented themselves as
"individuals" and declined to accept responsibility in the
case. The procuracy initiated the case by sending a
notification to the Supreme Court suggesting it examine the
banning of the paper because of published material that
provoked the 1992 coup atempt. The procuracy, however, failed
to provide supporting materials to the Court. The judge's
actions appear to have been sincere, but the legal reasoning
behind the order closing the paper apppears questionable.
The newspaper's editor continued to push unsuccessfully for its
reinstatement. She was subsequently fired from her teaching
job at the university. The university's administrators claimed
her dismissal was due to her repeated failure to show up for
classes. The Zviadists claimed that her dismissal was based on
her political views and that she was absent only for a few
months when whe was forced to flee to Moscow because of threats
against her.
Self-censorship continued to be widespread in the Georgian
media throughout the year. While some political party
newspapers criticized government policies, most avoided open
opposition, particularly direct criticism of Shevardnadze,
often focusing on the crisis situation instead. Fear of
retaliation by paramilitary groups also played a role.
The broadcast media are affected by the same kinds of
psychological and physical barriers to freedom of expression as
the print media. The second television channel--nominally, but
not fully independent in practice--continues to operate since
its establishment in 1992. However, efforts to control the
media in October included restrictions on the second channel's
programming. The official television channel and radio station
engaged in self-censorship.
Freedom of speech and press were also limited in the autonomous
Republic of Ajara, where voices critical of that republic's
leadership found little opportunity to voice their opinions in
public forums. An opposition newspaper was ransacked and
banned.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
The right to peaceful assembly was limited in 1993, and,
following the state of emergency in September, demonstrations
were legally prohibited. The only demonstration attempted in
Tbilisi was prevented by government troops.
Legislation in effect prior to the state of emergency required
that demonstration organizers notify city authorities of an
impending demonstration 2 days in advance; permits were not
required, but the authorities had the right to determine if the
suggested location was acceptable. Zviadists refused to comply
with the law's provisions requiring registration in advance.
In the first half of the year, the authorities often responded
to Zviadist defiance by using extensive manpower to prevent
demonstrations in Tbilisi from taking place.
When demonstrations occurred, government forces usually
dispersed them with force and detained some demonstrators. The
dispersals often involved beatings. Zviadists claimed that
demonstration participants were also sometimes followed as they
left demonstrations and beaten or threatened. A demonstration
dispersed on April 5 involved both beatings and threats. A
demonstration dispersed on April 14 also allegedly involved
some beatings. A massive police and nonuniform presence
blocked a May 26 (Independence Day) demonstration from ever
getting under way.
In Tbilisi, the authorities did permit some unregistered
Zviadist demonstrations to take place. On April 9, a day of
national mourning for the Georgians commemorating a Soviet
armed attack on peaceful demonstrators, the Zviadists were
allowed to stage a large rally and march in the center of
Tbilisi. In midsummer, the Zviadists were also allowed to
stage two rallies in a large Tbilisi park. When government
officials were partially in control of parts of Mengrelia, they
permitted demonstrations to take place there unimpeded.
Demonstrations in Poti also were generally staged without
interference.
With some exceptions, freedom of association was generally
observed in 1993. Organizations are legally required to
register with the Government. Several Zviadist organizations
did not attempt to register officially but were not forced to
disband. The leaders of the non-Zviadist opposition political
party, Citizens League, formed originally in 1989, claimed they
were harassed and that their members were intimidated from
conducting a program of activities. The Communist Party is
banned. Some individuals claim that the Government
occasionally erects bureaucratic obstacles to the registration
of unfavored organizations, but there is no evidence to suggest
that any serious impediments exist, although the Zviadist
organizations have avoided testing the bounds.
c. Freedom of Religion
Freedom of religion and of worship was widely observed in
1993. The Government abandoned the emphasis given during
Gamsakhurdia's rule on the primacy of the Georgian nationality
and the Georgian Orthodox religion. However, representatives
of the Georgian Catholic Church are still trying to recover
possession of churches which they first lost during the
Soviet-era repression of religion and which were subsequently
given to the Georgian Orthodox Church during the Gamsakhurdia
period. The Government's Commission on Inter-Ethnic Relations
and Human Rights recommended that two churches be returned to
the Catholics; thus far it appears that none has been offically
turned over. Local officials have shown some resistance to
community efforts to construct new mosques in predominantly
Muslim areas, although that resistance appears to be lessening
and does not appear to have been based on directives from the
authorities. The Jewish community experienced no government
interference in practicing its religion. Although religious
groups, missionaries, and foreign clergy would be required to
register in order to benefit from government benefits and
recognition, there appeared to be no requirement for them to do
so.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
The old Soviet system of registering residency remains in
place, although its enforcement is uneven. If a person were
arrested and were discovered to be nonresident in an area, that
persons might be forced to leave. However, the authorities and
law enforcement personnel do not routinely check people's
documents to determine who is a legal resident. People can
(and do) live for extended periods somewhere other than where
they are registered.
Both foreign and internal travel, as well as emigration, are
unrestricted, although there are practical problems with
traveling in the areas of conflict.
The Abkhaz separatists' seizure of control over all Abkhazia in
late September, as well as the terror and human rights abuses
that accompanied that seizure, caused a massive flow of
displaced persons, including virtually every ethnic Georgian.
There are an estimated 230,000 to 250,000 displaced persons in
Georgia, and there has been no sign that the separatists would
allow the displaced persons to return to their homes.
The Government provided assistance in facilitating the
emigration of Jewish Georgians to Israel.
There is continuing controversy over the desire of former
residents, primarily Muslims, of the Mskheti region--deported
from Georgia in 1944 by Stalin--to return to that area. Over
200,000 Mskhetians now living in central Asian republics and
parts of Russia face significant popular opposition to their
return, and the Government has been reluctant to take a formal
position. Although some very small-scale programs have led to
the return of some Mskhetians, the Government is clearly
hesitant to permit the return of most of them, possibly fearing
additional discord and problems resulting from attempts to
resettle them. In south Ossetia, many Ossetian displaced
persons returned to Tskhinvali, but Georgian displaced persons
remain afraid to return. Ossetian displaced persons from other
areas in Georgia for the most part have also not been able to
return to their homes.
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government
Georgia's Parliament and Parliament Chairman Eduard
Shevardnadze, who is head of the executive branch, were elected
in nationwide elections conducted in October 1992. Those
elections were judged by international observers to have been
free and fair, although widespread technical violations were
reported, and some regions not under Tbilisi's control chose
not to participate in the polling. Deputies were elected
according to a mixture of direct elections in individual
districts and party lists voted on in larger regions.
According to the election law promulgated before those
elections, deputies and the chairman were elected for 3-year
terms.
Parliament's ability to function was limited in 1993. Tensions
with its Chairman, Shevardnadze, increased during the year as
the latter became increasingly disdainful of the legislature's
ineffectiveness. Tensions between the legislature and the
Cabinet of Ministers also grew, with each accusing the other of
responsibility for the nation's problems. The tensions between
Shevardnadze and Parliament came to a head just before the
crises in Abkhazia and Mengrelia peaked in September.
Shevardnadze suddenly resigned his post in early September
after parliamentary member and Mkhedrioni chief Dzhaba
Ioseliani criticized his plan to introduce a state of
emergency. Shevardnadze came back into office a day later,
buoyed by massive popular demand and on the condition that
Parliament approve a nationwide state of emergency and then
suspend itself for 2 months. Parliament, enjoying little
popular support, agreed to do so.
The Abkhaz war prevented the functioning of the elected
parliament in that republic. Policies of the leadership of the
autonomous Republic of Ajara prevented that republic's
parliament from functioning effectively; it did not meet in
plenary in 1993. South Ossetian separatists scheduled
elections for December, though the Georgian Government does not
recognize an autonomous status for that region. The elections
did not take place, probably due to internal differences among
South Ossetian leaders.
Minorities and women are less represented in the new Parliament
than they were in the Gamsakhurdia-era parliament or in the
Soviet-era supreme soviet. The participation of women in
politics is generally limited, partly by longstanding cultural
traditions and partly in response to a perception that women
were frequently ex-president Gamsakhurdia's most fervent
supporters.
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
of Human Rights
Among domestic human rights groups, the All-Georgian
Association for Human Rights, founded in 1990, claims about 300
members. The Association has not met with overt official
restrictions, but the Government has at times been
uncooperative. For instance, the association has not been able
to gain permission to visit prisoners. The organization has
also not been able to get articles on human rights violations
against Zviadists published in the official or non-Zviadist
independent press. In October two members of the association
were arrested for several days. Members of the pro-Zviad
Helsinki Union's Commission on Human Rights were sometimes
detained for short periods. These detentions appeared to be
for political reasons.
A government Commission on Interethnic Relations and Human
Rights was formed soon after Shevardnadze's return in 1992.
The Commission had limited influence on the behavior of the
procuracy, National Guard, Interior Ministry, and paramilitary
groups. Commission members do not have any statutory right to
demand visits with detainees and are thus dependent on law
enforcement officials' goodwill to obtain eyewitness
information on alleged abuses. On several occasions, however,
Commission members succeeded in gaining access to prisoners and
in rectifying abuses in both the detention process and
elsewhere in the Government.
The Government welcomed the visits of international
organizations. A permanent mission of the Conference on
Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) to Georgia is still
operating after its establishment in late 1992. The CSCE
Chairman-in-office, Swedish Foreign Minister Af Ugglas, visited
Georgia in October and traveled to south Ossetia. A permanent
U.N. Mission to Georgia continues to function and expand. A
U.N. special mission to examine human rights violations in the
Abkhaz conflict came to Georgia, also in October. The United
Nations conducted a seminar for Georgian human rights workers
in April. Two Helsinki Watch missions visited Georgia to study
human rights problems.
The members of the permanent International Committee of the Red
Cross (ICRC) mission in Georgia were permitted by both sides to
travel freely throughout the conflict zone in Abkhazia. Both
sides generally allowed the ICRC access to prisoners, although
it is likely they did not get to meet with all of them.
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Disability, Language, or Social Status
There are no legal or constitutional prohibitions against
discrimination. Georgia's constitutional situation is
extremely vague. A new constitution is being drafted; for now
the country operates on a mixture of the Soviet-era
constitution and the 1921 constitution.
Women
Government concern about the status of and discrimination
against women is minimal. Georgian society generally shares
this low-level concern. There is no perceptible women's
movement, nor are there academic programs in women's studies.
There is a widely accepted stereotype that the majority of
Gamsakhurdia's supporters are somewhat irrational women. This
image has had a negative impact on the viability of women's
involvement in Georgian politics.
Women's access to educational resources is unimpeded, but women
are found mostly in traditional occupations where their labor
is usually low-paid and often part-time. The more traditional
women's fields are considered to be the arts, languages, and
social sciences. Careers that involve technical skills,
applied sciences, or supposedly "more complex" reasoning are
heavily male-dominated. This disproportion is generally
explained by the students as due to the financial prospects in
a field. Men are expected to choose a field in which they can
support themselves and their families, women a field that will
enrich them personally but not take away too much from family
life.
Statistics on violence against women are not available.
According to sociologists and legal specialists, however,
incidents of rape and domestic violence are relatively rare in
Georgia. However, the societywide upsurge in all forms of
crime, including violent crime, appears to have resulted in an
increase of violent crime against women, including rape.
Children
The severe economic crisis that gripped Georgia throughout 1993
meant in essence that government expenditures for the welfare
of any group within society were inadequate to meet its needs.
Although spending on children's welfare within the context of
total government resources reflected, in relative terms, an
adequate commitment to that vulnerable group, children, like
adults, suffered as a result of the Government's inability to
increase spending levels to compensate for hyperinflation.
There are no children's rights advocacy groups. Neither are
there juvenile or family courts in Georgia.
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities
Government advocacy of the supremacy of the Georgian
nationality, language, and religion ceased with Gamsakhurdia's
departure from power. The nationalistic feelings that it
aroused in the population, however, appear to have lingered and
have been compounded by the poor economy. Non-Georgians
experience harassment, usually because of competition for
scarce resources. As one Georgian human rights activist
described it, there are three castes of non-Georgians. Jews
are in the highest caste, Russians and Armenians in the second
caste, and Azeris in the third. The lower the caste, the more
frequent the problems. Local police are sometimes indifferent
to requests for assistance from non-Georgians. Local officials
sometimes also engage in discrimination against non-Georgians.
However, central authorities, when notified of complaints of
harassment or other forms of discrimination, usually tried to
rectify the situation.
The Georgian Government provides funding for ethnic schools,
and the teaching of non-Georgian languages is freely
permitted. In Azeri-populated areas, where Georgian is not the
primary language, the wider availability of Azeri-language
schools and the poor quality of Georgian-language instruction
have produced graduates who face limited professional
opportunities in Georgia because of their poor command of the
language.
People with Disabilities
Statistics on the treatment of individuals with disabilities
are unavailable. There is no legislative or otherwise mandated
provision of accessibility for the disabled. The law on labor
does include one section on people with disabilities, which
includes the provision of numerous special discounts and
favorable social policies for those with disabilities,
especially disabled veterans. Severe discrimination against
the disabled does not exist, though individual cases of
discrimination probably do occur on a limited basis.
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
The Labor Code and other Soviet-era legislation allow workers
and employees to freely form unions and associations operating
on their own charters. In order to acquire legal status,
unions and associations must register with the Ministry of
Justice.
A single Georgian Confederation of Trade Unions (GCTU) includes
about 30 different sectoral unions. There are no legal
requirements that a union join the GCTU. However, no
significant unions operate outside its framework. Membership
in the GCTU is declining rapidly, due to lack of worker
interest.
Strikes are not legally permitted under the state of emergency;
they are permitted at other times. However, at year's end, the
Government was considering legislation that would permit them.
In practice, the authorities allowed strikes to occur
unimpeded. For example, when miners went on strike in the town
of Tkibuli, the Government allowed the strikers to receive
two-thirds of their regular pay. The draft bill under
consideration would also prohibit any type of management
retribution against striking workers.
In general, the extreme economic crisis gripping the country
throughout the year kept Georgian workers away from the picket
line. There were only a handful of strikes, and these almost
always took place at individual enterprises. Tbilisi's metro
workers went on a short "warning strike" in September,
demanding higher wages. The resulting public outrage, largely
due to the fact that metro workers were earning considerably
more than the average Georgian, deterred the employees from
carrying out their threat of longer strikes.
There are no legal prohibitions against affiliation and
participation in international labor bodies. Georgia is not a
member of the International Labor Organization (ILO).
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
The Soviet-era Labor Code allows for collective bargaining, and
it is freely practiced. The Government is becoming less
involved in negotiations between management and workers, even
in cases concerning state-owned enterprises, and has largely
restricted itself to enforcing the minimum wage.
The Labor Code prohibits antiunion discrimination by employers
against union members. According to the Code, employers may be
prosecuted for antiunion discrimination, and, if found guilty,
would be required to reinstate the employees and pay them back
wages. The Department of Labor Inspections within the Ministry
of Labor investigates complaints, although their extremely
small staff (about 11 members) did not allow for effective
investigations in 1993.
There are no export processing zones in Georgia.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
The Labor Code prohibits forced or compulsory labor and
provides for sanctions against violators. Violations are rare,
and the Department of Labor Inspection investigates charges.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
According to the Labor Code, the minimum age for employment of
children is 14 years. Between 14 and 16 years, total hours
worked during the week may not exceed 30 hours. The minimum
age is widely respected, and officials know of no sectors where
the rule is violated. Because of the inadequate resources of
the Department of Labor Inspection, enforcement of this
provision is often left up to the unions themselves.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
A nationally mandated minimum wage applies only to the
government sector. Private sector employers are free to
bargain on any wage, and a private contract specifying a wage
lower than the minimum (for government workers) is not
prohibited. The minimum wage rate is adjusted every month for
inflation, although in practice the hyperinflation of 1993
means the minimum wage met only a fraction of basic consumer
needs. In mid-September, the minimum wage was about $0.75
(9,200 coupons) per month.
The Labor Code contains provisions for a 41-hour workweek.
Before Parliament adjourned in September, it was considering
legislation establishing a standard 40-hour workweek. The
Department of Labor Inspections investigates complaints of
violations. There is a 24-hour rest period in the week.
The Government has not addressed the issue of occupational
safety and health standards. In general, workers may obtain
higher wages for hazardous work, and, according to the Labor
Code, may refuse to work when such work might endanger their
lives. Nevertheless, labor experts consider these provisions
inadequate safeguards for worker well-being.
[end of document]
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