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TITLE: CHINA HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES, 1993
DATE: JANUARY 31, 1994
AUTHOR: U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
CHINA
The People's Republic of China (PRC) remains a one-party state
ruled by the Chinese Communist Party through a 21-member
Politburo and a small circle of officially retired but still
powerful senior leaders. Almost all top civilian, police, and
military positions at the national and regional levels are held
by party members. Despite official adherence to Marxism-
Leninism, in recent years economic decisionmaking has become
less ideological, more decentralized, and increasingly market
oriented. Fundamental human rights provided for in the
Constitution are frequently ignored in practice, and challenges
to the Communist Party's political authority are often dealt
with harshly and arbitrarily.
Security forces, comprised of a nationwide network which
includes the People's Liberation Army, the Ministry of State
Security, the Ministry of Public Security, the People's Armed
Police, and the state judicial, procuratorial, and penal
systems, are poorly monitored due to the absence of adequate
legal safeguards or adequate enforcement of existing safeguards
for those detained, accused, or imprisoned. They are
responsible for widespread and well-documented human rights
abuses, including torture, forced confessions, and arbitrary
detentions.
A decade of rapid economic growth, spurred by market incentives
and foreign investment, has reduced party and government
control over the economy and permitted ever larger numbers of
Chinese to have more control over their lives and livelihood.
Despite significant income disparities between coastal regions
and the interior, there is now a growing "middle class" in the
cities and rural areas as well as a sharp decline in the number
of Chinese at the subsistence level. These economic changes
have led to a de facto end to the role of ideology in the
economy and an increase in cultural diversity. An example of
this is the media, which remains tightly controlled with regard
to political questions, although it now is free to report on a
wider variety of other issues.
The Government took some positive steps on human rights issues
during 1993. It released some prominent political prisoners
early or on medical parole; many had served long terms in
prison. The Government still has not provided a full or public
accounting of the thousands of persons detained during the
suppression of the 1989 democracy movement, when millions of
students, workers, and intellectuals defied the Government and
participated in public demonstrations. Most of these detainees
appear to have been released, however, some after serving
periods of detention without charges having been brought and
some after having completed their prison sentences. The
Government says it has released the remaining imprisoned or
detained Vatican loyalists among the Catholic clergy. Although
it continues to restrict the movements and activities of some
elderly priests and bishops, the Government announced in
November that two priests, whose movements had been restricted,
were free to return to their homes. The authorities also
allowed a number of prominent political dissidents to leave
China in 1993. In November the Government announced it would
give positive consideration to a request from the International
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) to visit China.
Nevertheless, the Government's overall human rights record in
1993 fell far short of internationally accepted norms as it
continued to repress domestic critics and failed to control
abuses by its own security forces. The Government detained,
sentenced to prison, or sent to labor camps, and in a few cases
expelled from the country, persons who sought to exercise their
rights of freedom of assembly and speech. The number of
persons in Chinese penal institutions considered political
prisoners by international standards is impossible to estimate
accurately. In 1993 hundreds, perhaps thousands, of political
prisoners remained under detention or in prison. Physical
abuse, including torture by police and prison officials
persisted, especially in politically restive regions with
minority populations like Tibet. Criminal defendants continue
to be denied legal safeguards such as due process or adequate
defense. In many localities, government authorities continued
to harass and occasionally detain Christians who practiced
their religion outside the officially sponsored religious
organizations.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
There were accounts of extrajudicial killings by government
officials in 1993. A few cases resulted in severe punishment
for the officials involved and were widely publicized as
admonitory examples. Local officials beat to death an Anhui
farmer in February after he protested the level of taxes and
fees. Those found directly responsible for the beating,
including a local public security official, received long
prison terms and, in one case, a death sentence. Other
officials were dismissed or disciplined. Also, in another
well-publicized case, the powerful local Communist party
secretary of a village near Tianjin was sentenced in August to
20 years in prison for obstruction of justice and other
offenses related to a December 1992 beating death. Those who
actually took part in the beating also received long prison
terms.
The official responses to other cases served to cover up
abuses, however. Credible reports indicated that a Shaanxi man
beaten by public security officials in March, during a raid on
an unauthorized Protestant gathering, died as a result of his
injuries and the lack of timely medical care while in police
custody. An official autopsy ascribed the death to an
unrelated illness.
Because the Government often restricts access to such
information, it is impossible to determine the total number of
such killings. However, according to a credible report issued
in 1993 by a human rights group, at least 12 persons died in
1992 as a result of torture while in police custody.
b. Disappearance
There were no reported cases in 1993 in which persons who
disappeared were suspected to have been killed by officials,
however, the Government has still not provided a comprehensive,
credible public accounting of all those missing or detained in
connection with the suppression of the 1989 demonstrations.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
Cases of torture and degrading treatment of detained and
imprisoned persons persisted. Both official Chinese sources
and international human rights groups reported many instances
of torture. Persons detained pending trial were particularly
at risk as a result of weaknesses in the legal system,
including the emphasis on obtaining confessions as a basis for
convictions and the lack of access to prisoners, even by family
members, until after formal charges are brought, a step that
can be delayed for months. Former detainees have credibly
reported the use of cattle prods and electrodes, prolonged
periods of solitary confinement and incommunicado detention,
beatings, shackles, and other forms of abuse against detained
women and men.
While generally refusing to allow impartial observers to visit
prisoners, officials stated that internal monitoring and laws
to prevent and punish abuses continue to be strengthened.
Procurator General Liu Fuzhi said in March that 2,800
procuratorate offices had been set up in jails and detention
centers to safeguard the welfare of detainees. In response to
a call by the Chairman of the National People's Congress (NPC),
a national-level procuratorial conference held in Shanghai in
early April focused on measures to improve the Procuratorate's
supervision of law enforcement personnel and government
officials who violate the civil rights of citizens. In August
the Guangdong provincial public security bureau issued a
regulation forbidding police torture during interrogations. In
April China told the U.N. Committee Against Torture that 339
cases of torture to extract confessions were investigated
during 1992, 209 cases were reported to the Procuratorate with
a view to prosecution, and 180 prosecutions were brought. No
information on convictions or punishments was provided. While
Chinese officials said in December that 23 prison officials had
been punished in serious cases of mistreatment of prisoners,
the number of actual incidents of torture and ill-treatment by
government officials is almost certainly far greater than this
number.
Conditions of imprisonment for political prisoners vary
widely. Some prisoners, including the student leader Wang Dan,
who was released in February, have stated they were treated
reasonably well. Credible reports indicate others have been
abused. Political prisoners are often intermingled with common
criminals. Credible reports persisted in 1993 that Liu Gang, a
political prisoner held at a Liaoning labor camp, suffers ill
health as a result of beatings and other mistreatment, and that
prison officials instigated some beatings by cellmates.
Officials strongly denied these allegations and arranged for an
interview with Liu and his jailers, which was published in
August by a Chinese English-language journal. They declined
repeated requests by foreign groups to allow access to the
jailed dissident by independent observers.
There was limited evidence that, at least in a few cases,
detained dissidents have been incarcerated in psychiatric
institutions and treated with drugs. The lack of independent
outside access to such persons made it impossible to verify the
reports. Shanghai dissident Wang Miaogen was detained by
public security officials in May and committed to a mental
institution after he attempted to protest the holding of the
East Asia games. Wang had earlier chopped off four of his
fingers in a protest over alleged persecution. Wang Wanxing,
detained in 1992 while attempting to stage a one-man protest on
Tiananmen Square, continued to be held in a Beijing-area mental
hospital.
Conditions in Chinese penal institutions are generally harsh
and frequently degrading, and nutritional and health conditions
are sometimes grim. Medical care for prisoners has been a
problem area, despite official assurances that prisoners have
the right to maintain good health and receive prompt medical
treatment if they become ill. In 1993 political prisoners who
reportedly had difficulties in obtaining timely and adequate
medical care included Wang Juntao, Chen Ziming, and Ren
Wanding. Medical paroles may be granted to ailing prisoners,
and 1989 detainee Li Guiren was released in January to obtain
medical treatment. Working conditions for prisoners in many
facilities are similar to those in ordinary factories, but some
prisoners working in penal coal mines and at other sites must
endure dangerous conditions (see Section 6.c.).
Political prisoner Qi Dafeng continued to serve a 2-year
sentence in a coal mine in Anhui, where he had been sent under
the nonjudicial "reeducation through labor" program in late
1992.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
China's Criminal Procedure Law proscribes arbitrary arrest or
detention, limits the time a person may be held in custody
without being charged, and requires officials to notify the
detainee's family and work unit of the detention within 24
hours. These provisions are subject to several important
exceptions, including the sweeping provision that notification
may be withheld if it would "hinder the investigation" of a
case. Senior judicial officials acknowledged in 1993 that
limits on detention are frequently ignored in practice or
circumvented by various informal mechanisms. In numerous
cases, the precise legal status or location of detainees is
unclear. Public security authorities often detain people for
long periods of time under mechanisms not covered by the
Criminal Procedure Law. These include unpublished regulations
on "taking in for shelter and investigation" and "supervised
residence" as well as other methods not requiring procuratorial
approval. According to the Chinese media, close to 1 million
detentions under "shelter for investigation" have been carried
out annually in recent years. No statistics were available to
indicate the usual length of these detentions, but at least
some lasted several months. Links between local officials and
business leaders have resulted in scattered detentions as a
means of exerting pressure in economic disputes. The legality
of detentions may be judicially challenged under the
Administrative Procedures Law, but such challenges are rare and
there is little evidence that this is an adequate or timely
remedy for improper actions. There is no judicially supervised
system of bail, but at the discretion of public security
officials some detainees are released pending further
investigation.
Political dissidents are often detained or charged for having
committed "crimes of counterrevolution" under Articles 90
through 104 of the Criminal Law. Counterrevolutionary offenses
range from treason and espionage to spreading counter-
revolutionary propaganda. These articles have also been used
to punish persons who organized demonstrations, disrupted
traffic, disclosed official information to foreigners, or
formed associations outside state control. Detention and trial
of dissidents on other charges is also possible. People
participating in unauthorized religious organizations may be
charged with criminal offenses such as receiving funds from
abroad without authorization or changing such funds on the
black market. Legal provisions requiring family notification
and limiting length of detention are often ignored in political
cases. Liao Jia'an, a university student in Beijing detained
in 1992 for peaceful expression of his political views, was
held for a year before being formally arrested in mid-1993 for
counterrevolutionary crimes.
A well-documented estimate of the total number of those
subjected to new or continued arbitrary arrest or detention for
political reasons is not possible due to the Government's tight
control of information. Individuals reported detained are
sometimes released without charge after several days or weeks
of interrogation. There were several reported lengthier
detentions of dissidents, including Sun Lin, Wang Miaogen, and
Zhang Xianliang, in Shanghai during 1993. Sun was released in
August after 5 months in detention. Democracy activists Qin
Yongmin, Yang Zhou, and Zheng Xuguang were detained in November
in connection with the formation of a group called the "Peace
Charter." Yang Zhou was released from detention on December
31, but the authorities had not provided information on the
status or location of the other peace charter detainees.
Several dozen Tibetans were also reported to have been detained
after participation in proindependence demonstrations or
activities (see Section 5). Gendun Rinchen, a Tibetan tour
guide who had been detained in May 1993, was released on
January 14, 1994
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
Officials insist that China's judiciary is independent but
acknowledge that it is subject to the Communist Party's policy
guidance. In actuality, party and government leaders almost
certainly predetermine verdicts and sentences in some sensitive
cases. According to the Constitution, the court system is
equal in authority to the State Council and the Central
Military Commission, the two most important government
institutions. All three organs are nominally under the
supervision of the National People's Congress. The Supreme
People's Court stands at the apex of the court system, followed
in descending order by the higher, intermediate, and basic
people's courts.
Due process rights are provided for in the Constitution but are
often ignored in practice. Both before and after trial,
prisoners are subject to severe psychological pressure to
confess their "errors." Defendants who fail to "show the right
attitude" by confessing their crimes are typically sentenced
more harshly. Despite official media and other reports that
indicate coerced confessions have led to erroneous convictions,
a coerced confession is not automatically excluded as
evidence. According to judicial officials, however,
confessions without corroborating evidence are an insufficient
basis for conviction.
Accused persons are given virtually no opportunity to prepare a
defense in the pretrial process, during which the question of
guilt or innocence is essentially decided administratively.
Defense lawyers may be retained only 7 days before the trial.
In some cases even this brief period has been shortened under
regulations issued in 1983 to accelerate the adjudication of
certain serious criminal cases. Persons appearing before a
court are not presumed innocent; despite official denials,
trials are essentially sentencing hearings. Conviction rates
average over 99 percent. There is an appeal process, but
initial decisions are rarely overturned, and appeals generally
do not provide meaningful protection against arbitrary or
erroneous verdicts. Like the initial court verdict, the
judgment of the Appeals Court is subject to Communist Party
"guidance."
Under the Criminal Procedure Law, persons "exempted from
prosecution" by procurators are deemed to have a criminal
record, despite the lack of a judicial determination of guilt.
Such provisions can be applied in "counterrevolutionary crimes"
as well as for ordinary criminal offenses. In August Shanghai
activists Sun Lin, Yao Tiansheng, and Han Lifa were "exempted
from prosecution" for counterrevolutionary offenses and
released.
Some officials have acknowledged that trials in China are
conducted too rapidly. These officials state that China's
70,000 lawyers, most of whom are engaged in commercial law, are
insufficient to meet the country's expanding legal needs and
point to the Government's intention to increase this number to
at least 150,000. Knowledgeable observers report that defense
attorneys appear in only a small number of criminal trials.
Under Chinese law, there is no requirement that the court
appoint a defense attorney for the defendant unless the
defendant is deaf, dumb, or a minor. When attorneys do appear,
they have little time to prepare a defense and rarely contest
guilt; their function is generally confined to requesting
clemency. Defense lawyers, like other Chinese, generally
depend on an official work unit for employment, housing, and
many other aspects of their lives. They are therefore often
reluctant to be viewed as overzealous in defending persons
accused of political offenses.
The need for adequate, independent legal aid is increasingly
understood in legal circles and within the Government. In many
cities, law firms are being organized outside the framework of
established government legal offices. These firms are
self-regulating and do not have their personnel or budgets
determined directly by the State. The Minister of Justice
announced in October that China would gradually increase the
number of autonomous law firms from the current total of 410.
The Criminal Procedure Law requires that all trials be held in
public, except those involving state secrets, juveniles, or
"personal secrets." Details of cases involving
"counterrevolutionary" charges, however, have frequently been
kept secret, even from defendants' relatives, under this
provision. The 1988 Law on State Secrets affords a ready basis
for denying a public trial in cases involving
"counterrevolution."
Lack of due process is particularly egregious when defendants
receive the death sentence. Chinese officials refuse to
provide comprehensive statistics on death sentences or
executions, but hundreds of executions are officially reported
annually. The actual numbers may be much higher. All death
sentences are nominally reviewed by a higher court. Reviews
are usually completed within a few days after sentencing and
consistently result in a perfunctory confirmation of sentence.
However, no executions for political offenses are known to have
occurred in 1993.
In addition to the formal judicial system, government
authorities can assign persons accused of "minor" public order
and "counterrevolutionary" offenses to "reeducation through
labor" camps in an extrajudicial process. In 1990 Chinese
officials stated that 869,934 Chinese citizens had been
assigned to these camps since 1980, with about 80,000 assigned
each year. Chinese officials reported 120,000 prisoners were
undergoing "reeducation through labor" at the end of 1993.
Other estimates of the number of inmates are considerably
higher. Terms of detention run from a normal minimum of 1 year
to a maximum of 3 years. The "labor reeducation" committee
which determines the term of detention may extend an inmate's
sentence for an additional year. Under a State Council
regulation issued in early 1991, those sentenced to
"reeducation through labor" may ask the committee to reconsider
their decision. Since 1990, "reeducation through labor"
sentences may also be judicially challenged under the
Administrative Procedures Law. While some persons have gained
reduction or withdrawal of their sentence after reconsideration
or appeal, in practice these procedures are rarely used, and
short appeal times, lack of access to lawyers, and other
problems weaken their potential assistance in preventing or
reversing arbitrary decisions.
The system of "reeducation through labor" sometimes is used by
security authorities to deal with political and other offenders
without reference to even the nominal procedures and
protections the formal criminal process offers. In Shanghai,
Fu Shenqi and Zhang Xianliang were given 3-year "reeducation
through labor" sentences in July for "provoking incidents" and
"inciting trouble" which disturbed public order.
Government officials deny that China has any political
prisoners, asserting that persons are detained not for the
political views they hold, but because they have taken some
action which violates the Criminal Law. The number of persons
in Chinese penal institutions considered political prisoners by
international standards is impossible to estimate accurately.
Hundreds, perhaps thousands, of political prisoners remained
imprisoned or detained. Estimates by some foreign researchers
of the number of political prisoners are much higher. Many if
not most people held for political offenses are charged as
counterrevolutionaries. Chinese officials said in December
there were 3,172 persons serving sentences for counter-
revolutionary crimes, down from a figure of 3,317 given to an
American human rights monitor in October. As part of the
October figure, officials also indicated that 560 persons
convicted of counterrevolutionary crimes had been paroled.
Those convicted of counterrevolutionary crimes make up 0.2
percent of the total prisoner population of 1.22 million, but
they are about 5 percent of total parolees. As recently as
November 1992, an Australian delegation was told there were
4,000 in prison for counterrevolutionary crimes. All these
estimates almost certainly include a substantial number of
persons convicted of espionage or other internationally
recognized criminal offenses. At the same time, the figures
exclude many political prisoners detained but not charged,
persons held in labor reeducation camps and an undetermined
number of persons sentenced for criminal offenses due solely to
their nonviolent political or religious activities.
Many prominent activists, including Chen Ziming, Wang Juntao,
and Liu Gang (all three held since 1989), remained imprisoned
in 1993. Some persons detained for political reasons were
released on parole before the end of their sentences. Those
released early included longtime political prisoners Wei
Jingsheng, Wang Xizhe, and Xu Wenli, and Tiananmen-related
detainees Wang Dan, Gao Shan, Zhai Weimin, Wu Xuecan, and Guo
Haifeng. Shanghai activist Fu Shenqi was released in March but
reimprisoned on other charges in June. Even after release,
such persons have a criminal record, and their status in
society, ability to be employed, freedom to travel, and
numerous other aspects of their lives are often severely
restricted. Economic reform and social change have somewhat
diminished these problems, but some people continue to
experience serious hardships. For example, the families of
political prisoners sometimes encounter difficulty in obtaining
or keeping employment and housing. Zhang Fengying, wife of
imprisoned activist Ren Wanding, remained in poor housing
conditions in 1993. Zhang and her teenage daughter were
evicted from their apartment in 1992. Ren's work unit owns the
apartment. While the work unit asserted it wanted to reassign
the housing to another worker, the apartment reportedly has
remained vacant.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
The authorities extensively monitor and regulate personal and
family life, particularly in China's cities. Most persons in
urban areas still depend on their government-linked work unit
for housing, permission to marry or have a child, approval to
apply for a passport, and other aspects of ordinary life. The
work unit, along with the neighborhood watch committee, is
charged with monitoring activities and attitudes. However,
changes in the economic structure, including the growing
diversity of employment opportunities and the increasing market
orientation of many work units, are undermining the
effectiveness of this system. Search warrants are required by
law before security forces can search premises, but this
provision is often ignored. In addition, both the Public
Security Bureau and procuracy apparently can issue search
warrants on their own authority.
The 1982 Constitution states that "freedom and privacy of
correspondence of citizens ... are protected by law," but,
according to a Western expert on Chinese law, legislation for
this purpose does not exist. In practice, some telephone
conversations are recorded, and mail is frequently opened and
censored. The Government often monitors and sometimes
restricts contact between foreigners and Chinese citizens,
particularly dissidents.
The Government has continued its effort to control citizens'
access to outside sources of information, selectively jamming
Chinese language broadcasts of the Voice of America (VOA) and
the British Broadcasting Corporation. Despite the effort made
to jam VOA, the effectiveness of the jamming varies
considerably by region, with audible signals reaching most
parts of China. A small but rapidly growing segment of the
population has access to satellite television broadcasts.
Authorities issued new regulations on the installation and
operation of satellite dishes in October, requiring permits for
operation and banning private ownership and operation except
under limited circumstances. However, China has not been very
successful in implementing past regulations restricting the use
of satellite dishes. Satellite television dishes are widely
available for sale, and a licensing scheme which nominally
controls purchase of the equipment is loosely enforced.
China's population has roughly doubled in the past 40 years to
nearly 1.2 billion people, over a fifth of all humanity. In
the 1970's and 1980's China adopted a comprehensive and highly
intrusive family planning policy. This policy most heavily
affects Han Chinese in urban areas. For urban couples,
obtaining permission, usually issued by their work units, to
have a second child is very difficult. Numerous exceptions are
allowed for the 70 percent of Han who live in rural areas.
Ethnic minorities are subject to less stringent population
controls. Enforcement of the family planning policy is
inconsistent, varying widely from place to place and year to
year.
The population control policy relies on education, propaganda,
and economic incentives, as well as more coercive measures,
including psychological pressure and economic penalties.
Rewards for couples who adhere to the policy include monthly
stipends and preferential medical and educational benefits.
Disciplinary measures against those who violate the policy
include stiff fines, withholding of social services, demotion,
and other administrative punishments, including, in some
instances, loss of employment. Unpaid fines have sometimes
resulted in confiscation or destruction of personal property.
Because penalties for excess births may be levied against local
officials and the mothers' work units, many persons are
affected, providing multiple sources of pressure.
Physical compulsion to submit to abortion or sterilization is
not authorized, but Chinese officials acknowledge privately
that there are still instances of forced abortions and
sterilizations in remote, rural areas. Officials maintain
that, when discovered, abuses by local officials result in
discipline or retraining. They admit, however, that stronger
punishment is rare and have not documented any cases where
punishment has occurred. A sharp reported drop in fertility
rates in 1991-92 sparked concern about a possible upturn in
incidents of coercion. One cause for worry about such
increased pressures was a policy change in early 1991 making
local political officials more directly responsible for success
in meeting family quotas. There was strong evidence, however,
that the magnitude of the reported fertility drop was sharply
exaggerated, in part because the policy change intensified
strong existing incentives for officials and families to
underreport births.
At least five provincial governments have implemented
regulations with eugenics provisions, beginning with Gansu in
1988. These regulations seek to prevent people with severe
mental handicaps from having children. National family
planning officials say they oppose such legislation, but the
Government has taken no action to overturn these local laws.
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
Freedom of speech and self-expression remain severely
restricted, although there has been an easing of the limits
imposed during the post-Tiananmen crackdown. Citizens are not
permitted to publish or broadcast criticism of senior leaders
or opinions that contradict basic Communist Party doctrine
which provides for a Socialist state under the party's control,
or to make speeches which contain such criticism or opinions.
The Government interprets the Communist Party's "leading role"
as circumscribing the various individual rights guaranteed in
the Constitution. People who violate these quidelines are
warned and often punished. Gao Yu, a former writer of a now
banned periodical, was charged in October with "leaking state
secrets abroad" in connection with articles published in Hong
Kong. Xi Yang, a Hong Kong reporter, was detained in September
for "stealing" financial secrets in connection with articles
published in Hong Kong.
Domestic television and radio broadcasting and the press remain
under party and government control and are used to propagate
the currently acceptable ideological line. A more lively
tabloid sector continued to expand in 1993, and the circulation
of major propaganda-oriented dailies continued to slip.
Radio talk shows also flourished and, although they generally
avoided politically sensitive subjects, they provided some
opportunity for Chinese to discuss, and sometimes question
officials about, public issues, including corruption. Under
official pressure, the film "Farewell My Concubine," which
caused controversy because of its implicit criticism of the
cultural revolution and portrayal of a homosexual relationship,
was withdrawn from distribution in July after showings in
Beijing and Shanghai. After further editing, it was rereleased
in September.
The Government has continued to impose tight controls on
colleges, universities, and research institutes. However,
Beijing University and Shanghai's Fudan University stopped
sending students to a full year of training and ideological
indoctrination at military camps, a requirement imposed in
1989. The heavy ideological control of academic institutions
and media censorship continued to force Chinese journalists and
scholars to exercise caution in 1993. Many scholars, including
some of China's most prominent, have been deterred from
exercising free speech and have declined opportunities to
publish or present papers on subjects that they fear could be
construed as sensitive. On some less sensitive but still
controversial subjects, such as economic policy, legal reform
and even civil rights issues, the Government has tolerated more
vigorous public discussion. Some authors who were considered
politically unacceptable after 1989, such as legal scholar Yu
Haocheng, were able to overcome bans and regain at least
limited ability to get articles published in 1993.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
While the Constitution provides for freedom of peaceful
assembly and association, these rights are severely restricted
in practice. The Constitution provides, for example, that such
activities may not infringe "upon the interests of the State,"
and in practice protests against the political system or its
leaders are proscribed. Demonstrations involving expression of
dissident political views are denied permits and suppressed if
held. Qin Yongmin was briefly detained several times when he
attempted to leave his native Wuhan for Beijing to protest
against the capital's bid to host the Olympic Games in the year
2000 (see Section 1.d). However, some small-scale
demonstrations on nonpolitical grievances are tolerated in
practice. In February there were two small demonstrations at
the gate of the Zhongnanhai leadership compound in Beijing by
women laid off from a state steel firm. In August authorities
also tolerated generally peaceful demonstrations in several
provinces by Muslims, sometimes numbering in the thousands, who
were protesting a book they found offensive. The book was
subsequently banned. Demonstrators protesting the same book in
Qinghai in October, however, were met with force when Muslim
demonstrators threatened to take their protest to Beijing.
According to credible reports, there were at least nine deaths.
Public security forces acted with more restraint than in the
past to demonstrations in Lhasa in May, which began with a
small protest on economic grievances but attracted hundreds of
additional participants, including many who shouted
proindependence slogans and some who threw rocks. Several
dozen persons were believed to have been at least briefly
detained in the wake of the protests, but reports of a handful
of deaths or serious injuries from the impact of tear gas
projectiles appeared to be erroneous. According to human
rights organizations, smaller scale protests were reported to
have occurred frequently in the Tibetan capital and resulted in
swift detention for the participants. Gendun Rinchen and
Lobsang Yonten were detained in May, apparently because of
alleged proindependence activities, and they were held through
the remainder of the year before being released in January
1994. Tibetan political prisoners like Yulo Dawa Tsering,
Ngawang Pulchung, and Jempel Tsering remained imprisoned in
1993. While repression continued, there was at the same time a
continuation of limited dialog on Tibet with representatives of
the Dalai Lama.
The Communist Party organizes and controls most professional
and other mass associations. All organizations are required by
1990 regulations to be officially registered and approved.
Ostensibly aimed at secret societies and criminal gangs, the
regulations also deter the formation of unauthorized political
or labor organizations. They have also been used to disband
groups, such as unregistered house churches, deemed potentially
subversive. Security forces maintain a close watch on groups
formed outside the party establishment.
c. Freedom of Religion
Religious freedom in China is subject to restrictions of
varying severity. While the Constitution affirms toleration of
religious beliefs, the Government restricts religious practice
outside officially recognized and government-controlled
religious organizations. The management and control of
religion is the responsibility of religious affairs bureaus,
which are staffed by officials who rarely are believers in
religion. Communist Party officials state that party
membership and religious belief are incompatible. This places
a serious limitation on religious believers, since party
membership is required for almost all high positions in
government- and state-owned businesses.
The Government, after forcefully suppressing all religious
observances during the 1966-76 cultural revolution, began in
the late 1970's to restore or replace confiscated churches,
temples, mosques, and monasteries. The official religious
organizations administer more than a dozen Catholic and
Protestant seminaries, nine institutes to train imams and
Islamic scholars, and institutes to train Buddhist monks.
Students who attend these institutes must demonstrate
"political reliability," and all graduates must pass an
examination on their theological and political knowledge to
qualify for the clergy. The Government permitted Catholic
seminarians from several cities to go to the United States in
1993 for additional religious studies. There have also been
increased contacts between China and the Vatican.
The Government supervises the publication of religious material
for distribution to ensure religious and political conformity.
Religious books are not permitted in ordinary bookstores, and
there are persistent complaints that the number of Bibles and
amounts of other religious materials allowed to be printed fall
far short of demand. Religious proselytizing is officially
restricted to government-registered and sanctioned places of
worship. Unauthorized proselytizing is proscribed and
sometimes punished, although some discreet proselytizing and
distributing of religious texts outside official channels is
tolerated. Local authorities have confiscated private property
under the guise of searching for illegal religious materials.
Officially sanctioned religious organizations are permitted to
maintain international contacts as long as these do not entail
foreign control, but proselytizing by foreign groups is
forbidden by law and regulation.
Buddhists are by far the largest body of religious believers in
China. The Government estimates that there are 100 million
Chinese Buddhists, most of whom are from the dominant Han
ethnic group. Other Buddhists belong to Tibetan, Mongolian,
and other ethnic groups. Han Buddhist leaders generally
cooperate with the Government, and there have been few
complaints of government restrictions.
In Tibet, however, where Buddhism and Tibetan nationalism are
closely intertwined, relations between Buddhists and secular
authorities continued to be tense in 1993. The Government
tightly controls Tibetan Buddhism and does not tolerate
religious manifestations that advocate Tibetan independence.
The Government condemns the Dalai Lama's political activities
and his leadership of a "government in exile," but recognizes
him as a major religious figure and has tolerated the open
veneration of the Dalai Lama by Tibetans. The Government has
spent large amounts of money on reconstruction of the main
sacred sites, including the Potala Palace and a grand stupa to
house the remains of the 10th Panchen Lama. Chinese officials
have also publicly asked the Dalai Lama to assist in the
process of finding the reincarnation of the 10th Panchen Lama,
who died in 1989.
The practice of religion in Tibet is hampered, however, by the
limits the Government imposes on religious education and on the
number of monks in the religious community compared to
traditional norms. Monks at some Tibetan monasteries known for
their opposition to Chinese rule face severe travel
restrictions and intense monitoring.
According to government figures, there are 17 million Muslims
in China. In some areas with large Muslim populations, there
continues to be concern regarding restrictions on the building
of mosques and the religious education of youths under 18.
Following the 1990 unrest in Xinjiang, the authorities issued
regulations further restricting religious activities and
teaching. China permits Muslim citizens to make the hajj to
Mecca, and the number of those making the hajj has
significantly increased in recent years. Nongovernment sources
indicate that about 5,000 Chinese made the hajj in 1992.
The number of Christians has grown rapidly in recent years,
albeit from a small base. Only those Christian churches
affiliated with either the Catholic Patriotic Association or
the (Protestant) Three-Self Patriotic Movement, which the
Government established in the 1950's to eliminate perceived
foreign domination of Christian groups, may operate openly.
Active unofficial religious movements pose an alternative to
the state-regulated churches. The unofficial, Vatican-
affiliated, Catholic Church claims a membership far larger than
the 3.7 million registered with the official Catholic church,
though actual figures are unknown. In addition to the 5
million persons who are officially counted as following
Protestantism, a large number of Protestants worship privately
in "house churches" that are independent of government control.
Sporadic repression in some areas has reflected official
concern over the Government's inability to control the rapid
growth of membership in Christian groups. There continued to
be credible reports in 1993 of efforts by authorities in some
areas to rein in activities of the unapproved Catholic and
Protestant movements, including raiding and closing a number of
unregistered churches. In March public security officials
disrupted a Protestant religious gathering in Shaanxi, beating
many of those present. One man beaten later died, apparently
of wounds suffered in the incident (see Section 1.a.).
However, authorities in many areas tolerate the existence of
unofficial Catholic and Protestant churches as long as they
remain small and discreet. In some parts of China, official
and underground churches seem to coexist and even cooperate.
The Guangzhou House Church of Pastor Samuel Lamb (Lin Xiangao)
continued to operate openly, although with frequent harassment
by authorities.
A number of religious activists remained imprisoned in 1993,
but others were released. There was some evidence that
authorities have increasingly used short-term detentions,
rather than long prison terms when dealing with unauthorized
religious activities. Some of those released from penal
detention were apparently placed under house arrest or other
restrictions. The number of Catholic clerics in penal
detention dropped sharply in 1992 and 1993, although the
whereabouts of some reported to have been released could not be
confirmed, and others remained under some restrictions.
Catholic Gansu bishop Casimir Wang Milu and Hebei priest Pei
Ronggui were released from long-term imprisonment during the
year. Ministry of Public Security officials told a visiting
U.S. official in October that there were no Catholic clerics
remaining in detention. In November Bishop Peter Chen
Jianzhang and auxiliary bishop Cosmas Shi Enxiang were
reportedly released from either prison or house arrest in "old
people's homes."
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
The Government uses an identification card system to control
and restrict individual residence location within the country.
This system's effectiveness has eroded during China's shift to
a more market-oriented economy. The need for a supplemental
work force in the areas of fastest economic growth has led to
official tolerance for a large itinerant population which is
not in compliance with formal requirements to obtain permission
to change residence. However, because this itinerant
population lacks official status, access to housing, schooling,
and the full range of employment opportunities can be
restricted.
Some former inmates have been denied permission, under the
"staying at prison employment" system, to return to their
homes, a provision applicable to those incarcerated in both the
"reform through labor" and the "reeducation through labor"
systems. For those assigned to camps far from their
residences, this constitutes a form of internal exile. The
number of prisoners subject to this restriction is unknown. A
Vice Minister of Justice told a British human rights delegation
in late 1992 that no former prisoners were subject to such
restrictions.
The Government routinely permits legal emigration and most
foreign travel but has placed obstacles in the way of foreign
travel by a few citizens on political or other grounds. Legal
scholar Yu Haocheng continued to be unable to obtain permission
to travel abroad. These obstacles extend to some dissidents'
family members who have not themselves been active politically
or accused of any wrongdoing by the Government. Other
dissidents, including Hou Xiaotian, Li Honglin, and Qian Liyun,
were eventually able to obtain the passports and exit permits
needed to leave the country.
Regulations issued in 1990 require those college and university
graduates who received free postsecondary education to repay
the cost of their education to the State by working for 5 years
or more before being eligible for passports to go abroad to
study. For those who have overseas Chinese relatives or have
not yet graduated, the regulations provide a sliding scale of
tuition reimbursement exempting them from the work
requirement. Implementation of these regulations has varied
from place to place, and most students wishing to go abroad
still managed to obtain passports. Persons subject to the
regulations on study abroad appear to have had little trouble
obtaining passports to visit relatives overseas. Political
attitudes, however, are still a major criterion in selecting
people for government-sponsored study abroad.
The Government has made a concerted effort to attract back to
China persons who have studied overseas. To reassure them,
Chinese citizens who return from overseas were exempted in 1992
from re-exit formalities, which had involved Public Security
Bureau clearances. However, official media have stated that,
before returning home, people who have joined foreign
organizations viewed by the Government as hostile to China
should quit them and refrain from activities that violate
Chinese Law. Procurator General Liu Fuzhi warned in 1992 that
people wanted by the public security authorities were not
covered by the official assurances extended to other overseas
scholars.
Some dissidents, such as Dai Qing and Liu Xiaobo, reentered
China without incident in 1993. In August labor activist Han
Dongfang, who had been allowed to leave for medical treatment
in the United States in 1992, was expelled shortly after he
returned. Han's passport was subsequently revoked by Chinese
authorities on the grounds that he had engaged in activities
hostile to China while overseas. Chinese border officials
frustrated Han's several subsequent attempts to return to
China. Another labor activist, Lu Jinghua, was refused entry
in June when she arrived at the Beijing airport. Lu had fled
China in 1989 before she could be arrested. A handful of
prominent dissidents overseas continued to have difficulty
extending or renewing passports.
The Government accepts the repatriation of citizens who have
entered other countries or territories illegally. In 1993, in
addition to the routine return of Chinese illegal immigrants
found in Hong Kong, China accepted the return of several large
groups of illegal immigrants from other countries, including
Mexico, Honduras, and the Marshall Islands. Citizens illegally
smuggled to other countries are often detained for a short time
after their return to China to determine their identity and any
past criminal record or involvement in smuggling activities.
As a deterrent and to recover repatriation costs, authorities
in some areas levy a fine of about $1,000 equivalent on
returnees.
China does not have legislation in place that would allow it to
grant refugee status and, with the exception of Vietnamese
refugees of Chinese ancestry, has generally repatriated persons
of other nationalities seeking to be recognized as refugees.
The Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Public Security, and Civil
Affairs, in collaboration with the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), are writing legislation that
would allow China to honor its obligation as a party since 1982
to the 1967 protocol relative to the status of refugees.
Although the Government denies having tightened its policy on
accepting Vietnamese refugees, in recent years very few such
refugees have actually been resettled in China. According to
the UNHCR, from 1989 to 1992 China granted admission and
provided resettlement to about 130 Vietnamese refugees who came
to China to reunite with their families and gave temporary
refuge to 35 Vietnamese who subsequently settled in third
countries. There were credible reports that larger numbers of
Vietnamese have remained in China without official harassment.
China has cooperated with Hong Kong to reduce the flow of
Vietnamese refugees into the colony. China has not
participated in the Comprehensive Plan of Action negotiated at
the International Conference on Indochinese Refugees in 1989
but generally has abided by its principles.
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government
Citizens lack the means to change their government legally and
can not freely choose or change the laws and officials that
govern them. Citizens vote directly only for county-level
people's congress delegates. People's congress delegates at
the provincial level are selected by county-level people's
congresses, and in turn provincial-level people's congresses
select delegates to the National People's Congress. According
to the 1982 Constitution, the National People's Congress (NPC)
is the highest organ of state power. It elects the President
and Vice President, decides on the choice of the Premier, and
elects the Chairman of the Central Military Commission. The
election and agenda of the NPC are under the tight control of
the Communist Party.
In some elections, voters are offered more candidates than
positions, allowing a modest degree of choice among officially
approved candidates. There were credible reports in 1993 that
the candidates most favored by authorities were defeated in a
handful of county-level elections and in at least two elections
of governors by provincial people's congresses.
As is the case with the NPC, the election and agenda of
people's congresses at other levels also remain under tight
control by the Communist Party, the paramount source of
political authority in China. The Constitution was amended in
1993 to ratify the existence of small "democratic" parties, but
these play only a minor consultative role at most, and all
pledge allegiance to the Communist Party. Thus, the Communist
Party retains an explicit monopoly on political decision-
making. The requirement that associations register and be
approved makes it difficult for independent interest groups to
form and affect the system. Within the Communist Party, a
closed inner circle of a few senior leaders reserves the right
to set ultimate policy directions. Some hold key positions
within the standing committee of the Politburo, the Central
Military Commission, or other organs, while others who are
nominally retired wield great influence on at least selected
issues.
Reversing previous moves to separate the party and government
apparatus, at the National People's Congress in April General
Secretary Jiang Zemin and several other senior party members
were named to hold concurrent government positions.
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
of Human Rights
There are no independent Chinese organizations that publicly
monitor or comment on human rights conditions in China. The
Government has made it clear it will not tolerate the existence
of such groups. Authorities in Shanghai took no action on a
March application by several persons to register a proposed
"human rights association." Public criticism of the
Government's human rights record can be interpreted as
"counterrevolutionary" activity and punished accordingly.
Limited academic study and discussion of concepts of human
rights have been promoted since 1991. Research institutes in
Shanghai and Beijing, including the Chinese Academy of Social
Sciences, have organized symposia on human rights, established
human rights research centers, and visited other nations to
study human rights practices in these countries. Such
activities appear to have originated in a desire to improve
China's image abroad and strengthen the Government's ability to
respond to criticism of its human rights record. Whatever the
motivation, this process of study and dialog has exposed more
Chinese to international standards and concepts of human
rights. Three official White Papers on human rights subjects
were published in 1991 and 1992. While the reports stridently
defended Chinese practices and glossed over fundamental
problems, they sparked a limited debate among academic experts
on human rights problems in China that continued in 1993.
Despite the Government's professed adherence to the United
Nations Charter, which mandates respect for and promotion of
human rights, Chinese officials accept only in theory the
principle that human rights are universal. They argue that
each nation has its own concept of human rights, grounded in
its political, economic, and social system and its historical,
religious, and cultural background. China was active in
international forums, including the World Conference on Human
Rights in June and the annual U.N. Commission on Human Rights
meeting in February, in support of this view and to deflect
attempts to discuss China's human rights record. China remains
reluctant to accept criticism of its human rights situation by
other nations or international organizations. Its officials
often criticized reports by international human rights
monitoring groups, as well as past Department of State reports
on human rights practices in China. By and large, Chinese
officials continue to insist that criticism of China's human
rights practices constitutes interference in China's internal
affairs. Nevertheless, in 1993 Chinese authorities expanded
their dialog with foreign governments on human rights issues in
talks with a number of visiting delegations from the United
States and other countries and also during visits abroad by
Chinese leaders.
Chinese authorities have refused most requests by foreign human
rights delegations to meet with political prisoners but did
allow U.S. human rights officials to visit Yulo Dawa Tsering in
Drapchi prison in Lhasa in October. Representatives of some
international human rights groups visited China in 1993 but did
so in an individual capacity and did not engage in an official
dialog with the Government. A private American human rights
monitor, however, did meet with midranking government officials
on several occasions to discuss specific human rights cases.
Finally, while China has continued to engage in a human rights
dialog with foreign critics, it has consistently taken the
position that human rights practices should be assessed not on
the basis of universal principles but rather in the context of
local economic, political, and cultural conditions. The
Government also maintains that human rights issues are internal
matters and that external intervention on human rights issues
constitutes interference with its sovereignty.
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Disability, Language, or Social Status
While laws exist to protect minorities and women, in practice
discrimination based on ethnicity, sex, and religion has
persisted. Minorities, however, do benefit from an official
policy of "privileged treatment" in marriage policy, family
planning, university admission, and employment, as well as from
disproportionate infrastructure investment in some minority
areas.
Women
The 1982 Constitution states that "women in the People's
Republic of China enjoy equal rights with men in all spheres of
life" and promises, among other things, equal pay for equal
work. In fact, most women employed in industry work in lower
skilled and lower paid jobs. Women hold relatively few
positions of significant influence within the party or
government structure. Persistent problems have remained with
regard to the status of women, who have often been the
unintended victims of reforms designed to streamline
enterprises and give workers greater job mobility. Many
employers prefer to hire men to avoid the expense of maternity
leave and child care.
Reports by women of discrimination, sexual harassment, unfair
dismissal, demotion, and wage cuts have continued. In 1992 the
NPC enacted legislation on the protection of the rights and
interests of women designed to assist in curbing these types of
sex-related discrimination. While the gap in the education
levels of men and women is narrowing, men continue to
constitute the majority of the educated class, particularly the
highly educated.
The Government continued in 1993 to condemn strongly and take
steps to prevent and punish the abduction and sale of women for
wives and prostitutes, abuse of female children, violence
against women, and female infanticide. It has severely
punished a number of people accused of such crimes. No
nationwide statistics were available on the extent of physical
violence against women. A May study on family violence
reported that in Shanghai from 29 to 33 percent of domestic
disputes from 1991-92 involved physical violence. In another
1993 study on the social status of women, 21.2 percent of urban
wives and 31.4 percent of rural wives said there was frequent
or occasional violence during family quarrels. The abduction
of women remains a serious problem in some areas where local
officials have resisted efforts of central authorities to stop
it. Many discriminatory practices are rooted in traditional
rural attitudes which highly value boys as prospective earners
and as future caretakers for elderly parents. A number of
provinces have sought to reduce the perceived higher economic
value of boys in providing old age support by establishing or
improving pensions and retirement homes.
In many areas, the ready availability of sonograms has
facilitated selective abortion of female fetuses, contributing
to a growing gap in the ratio of reported male and female
births. Insistence that local units meet population goals
exacerbates the problem, since traditional-minded parents often
wish to ensure they have one or more sons without incurring
official penalties. The Government has condemned sex-selective
abortion and stated it is tightening access to sonogram results.
Children
China does not condone violence against children, and physical
abuse can be grounds for criminal prosecution. In January
1992, China passed a national law on the protection of
juveniles. According to Chinese media, China's infant
mortality rate has declined to 45 per 1,000 live births, severe
malnutrition among children under 5 years of age has been
"virtually eliminated," 95 percent of children have received
immunizations, and primary school enrollment is at 97 percent.
In January an English-language magazine reported on the problem
of child abuse, noting that physical punishment was widespread,
citing four cases from 1992 where children died from abuse.
According to one study from Zhejiang province, 60 percent of
200 children surveyed said they would be beaten if they did not
do well in school. In addition, Chinese officials indicated in
October that there were about 200,000 homeless children in
China out of a total of 300 million children under age 18.
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities
The 55 designated ethnic minorities constitute just over 8
percent of China's total population. Most minority groups
reside in areas they have traditionally inhabited, with
standards of living often well below the national average.
Government development policies have helped raise minority
living standards but have at the same time disrupted
traditional living patterns. The Dalai Lama continued to state
his concern in 1993 that the Government's plan to develop
Tibet's economy would lead to a massive influx into Tibet of
Han Chinese. Tens of thousands of non-Tibetan entrepreneurs
without residence permits have come to Lhasa, capital of Tibet,
to engage in business.
In some instances, the Government has tried to adopt policies
responsive to minority sensitivities but in doing so has
encountered the dilemma of how to respect minority cultures
without damaging minority educational and economic
opportunities. In Tibet and Xinjiang, for example, there are
two-track school systems using standard Chinese and minority
languages. Students may choose which system to attend. One
acknowledged side effect of this policy to protect and maintain
minority cultures has been reinforcement of a segregated
society. Under this separate education system, those
graduating from minority schools are at a disadvantage in
competing for jobs, which require good spoken Chinese, in
government and business. These graduates must take remedial
language instruction before attending universities and colleges.
The Communist Party has an avowed policy of boosting minority
representation in the Government and the party, and a few
members of minorities occupy local and national leadership
positions. However, ethnic minorities are effectively shut out
of most positions of real political and decisionmaking power.
Some minorities resent Han officials holding key positions in
minority autonomous regions. Ethnic minorities in Tibet,
Xinjiang, Qinghai, and elsewhere have demonstrated against Han
Chinese authority, but central authorities have made it clear
that they will not tolerate opposition to Beijing's rule in
minority regions.
People with Disabilities
There is no legislation to ensure that buildings, even new
ones, are accessible to those with handicaps. A State Council
committee was established in October to coordinate policy
toward the disabled under China's 1990 law on the handicapped.
The results of the eighth 5-year plan for handicapped people,
which ended in 1992, were discussed in October; schools for the
disabled increased from 400 in 1988 to 1,000 in 1992, and
special education increased six-fold. But according to the
Disabled Person's Federation, only 6 percent of disabled
school-age children are receiving primary education. There are
40,000 welfare enterprises nationwide providing work for the
handicapped, and 1.26 million have benefited from
rehabilitation projects. Concern that the disabled will lose
jobs as enterprises emphasize productivity has led to the
creation of a pilot project in which all state enterprises will
be required to hire a certain number of disabled workers. The
handicapped still suffer from social isolation, especially in
rural areas, and some handicapped children are given to
orphanages. At the end of December, the Government announced
plans to adopt a new law on eugenics, but specifics of the law
were not available at year's end.
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
China's 1982 Constitution provides for "freedom of
association," but the guarantee is heavily diluted by
references to the interest of the State and the leadership of
the Chinese Communist Party. The country's sole officially
recognized workers' organization, the All-China Federation of
Trade Unions (ACFTU), ostensibly independent, is in fact
controlled by the Communist Party. Independent trade unions
are illegal. Though union officials recognize that workers'
interests may not always coincide with those of the Communist
Party, the Union Law passed by the National People's Congress
in March 1992 states that the union is a party organ and its
primary purpose is to mobilize workers for national
development. The 1993 revised Trade Union Law requires that
the establishment of unions at any level be submitted to a
higher level trade union organization for approval. The ACFTU
is the highest such organization, and it has not approved the
establishment of any independent unions. While the foreign
press has reported that some exist, because of severe
repression they operate only deep within the shadows. The vast
majority of workers have no contact with any union other than
the ACFTU. There are no provisions allowing for individual
workers or unofficial worker organizations to affiliate with
international bodies.
The ACFTU's primary attention remains focused on its
traditional constituency, state sector workers. The Trade
Union Law mandates that workers may decide whether to join the
union in their enterprise. By official estimate, 10 percent of
workers in collectively and state-owned enterprises have chosen
for their own reasons not to join. There have been no reports
of repercussions for workers who have not joined ACFTU unions.
Diversification of enterprise types over the last decade of
reform has vastly increased the number of workers outside this
traditional sphere of the ACFTU. In fact, over half of China's
nonagricultural work force is now largely nonunion and outside
the state industrial structure--in collectives, village and
township enterprises, private and individual enterprises, and
foreign-invested enterprises. In township and village
enterprises, one of the fastest growing sectors of the economy,
only one-tenth of 1 percent of workers are unionized.
Unemployed workers are not considered union members.
Workers in companies with foreign investors are guaranteed the
right to form unions, which then must affiliate with the
ACFTU. According to Ministry of Labor national statistics, 30
percent of foreign-invested companies now have unions. Other
official estimates show that about 10,000 trade unions with a
total of 500,000 members have been established in the nearly
20,000 foreign-funded companies in Guangdong province.
However, a 1993 embassy survey of foreign-invested ventures in
Beijing indicated the unionization rate diminished from 60
percent in 1991 to 40 percent in 1993.
The right to strike, which had been included in China's 1975
and 1978 constitutions, was not retained in the 1982
Constitution. In general, the union law passed in 1992
assigned unions the role of mediators or go-betweens with
management in cases of work stoppages or slowdowns.
Nonetheless, well-documented work stoppages occurred in several
locations in China during 1993. There were two highly visible
strikes in Guangdong's Zhuhai City, namely a 3-day strike over
wages at a joint-venture camera factory and a work stoppage at
a joint-venture electrical components factory. Ministry of
Labor officials broke with their past practice of denying the
existence of strikes in China by giving details about recent
strikes in Tianjin and Xian. Strikes in 11 foreign-invested
enterprises in Tianjin were widely reported in the Chinese
press. One particularly high profile case involved a
foreign-owned footwear factory at which 1,200 workers struck
over poor working conditions and alleged mistreatment of
several of the workers by the management. The 11 enterprises
were held up as examples of disregard for local regulations by
foreigners and indications of the need to establish unions in
foreign-invested enterprises. Strikes were uniformly resolved
in favor of workers, and enterprises were required to bring
facilities up to regulatory standards. Ministry of Labor
officials have not provided any statistics on how many strikes
occurred in 1993, but one Hong Kong newspaper reported that in
the first half of 1993 there were 190 strikes and protests
across China involving about 50,000 workers. It is not
possible to determine the validity of this estimate.
Credible reports by foreign human rights organizations indicate
that the Government has attempted to stamp out all clandestine
union activity and that independent unions and worker groups
feature prominently in lists of illegal organizations. In May
four men were detained and later formally arrested for the
crime of organizing a counterrevolutionary organization, the
Shanghai Autonomous Workers Federation. Two of these men were
released in early September. As noted in Section 2.d., labor
activists Han Dongfang and Lu Jinghua have been refused reentry
to China. The International Confederation of Free Trade Unions
(ICFTU) alleges that in May and June of 1992 the Public
Security Bureau (PSB) secretly arrested activists of the
clandestine China Free Trade Union Preparatory Committee and
appeared to have dismantled this organization. On May 15
another clandestine union group, the Free Trade Union of China,
issued a manifesto. Preemptive arrests took place just before
the June 4 Tiananmen anniversary. These included seven members
of the clandestine Liberal Workers Union detained by the PSB to
prevent them from circulating commemorative leaflets. Accurate
figures on the number of Worker Autonomous Federation detainees
still being held after the 1989 Tiananmen Square demonstrations
are not available. The ICFTU alleges that hundreds of workers
are still being held.
In response to an ICFTU complaint, the Governing Body of the
International Labor Organization (ILO) in March requested that
the Government modify "many provisions" of the Trade Union Act
that are contrary to the principle of freedom of association,
expressed concern at the severity of sanctions pronounced by
the courts against members or leaders of Workers' Autonomous
Federations, and asked that detained workers be released.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
Under a 1988 law and current regulations, collective bargaining
is permitted only by workers in private enterprises (which
employ less than 3 percent of workers). There have been no
reports of collective bargaining actually taking place. Most
private enterprises are small and nonunionized. Thus far,
without legal status as a collective bargaining body, the
ACFTU's role has been limited to consultations with management
over wages and regulations affecting labor and working
conditions and efforts to serve as a conduit for communicating
workers' complaints to the management of enterprises or
municipal labor bureaus. The ACFTU has shown itself concerned
with protecting workers' living standards in areas such as
unemployment insurance.
Before wage reform, workers' salaries were set according to a
uniform national scale based on seniority and skills.
Following wage reforms, a total wage bill for each collectively
and state-owned enterprise is set by the Ministry of Labor
according to four criteria: 1) As a percentage of profits, 2)
as a contract amount with the local labor bureau, 3) for money
losing enterprises, according to a state-set amount, and 4) as
an enterprise-set amount subject to ministry review.
Individual enterprises determine how to divide the total among
the workers, a decision usually made by the enterprise manager
in consultation with the enterprise party chief and the union
representative. Worker congresses have mandated authority to
review plans for wage reform, though these bodies serve
primarily as rubber stamp organizations. Wages are generally
equal for the same type of work within enterprises. Incentives
are provided for increased productivity.
The old permanent employment system is giving way to a more
flexible contract-based system. However, the percentage of
workers laboring under contract is still low, approximately 40
percent nationwide in state enterprises. Under the Labor
Contract System, individual workers may negotiate with
management over contract terms. In practice, only the very few
workers with highly technical skills are able to negotiate
effectively on salary and fringe benefits issues.
Worker congresses, held periodically in most Chinese
enterprises, theoretically have the authority to remove
incompetent managers and approve major decisions affecting the
enterprise, notably wage and bonus distribution systems.
However, worker congresses generally take place once a year and
serve essentially to rubberstamp agreements worked out among
factory managers, party secretaries, and union
representatives. In smaller enterprises it is not unusual to
find these three posts held by the same person.
A dispute settlement procedure has been in effect since 1987.
The procedure provides for two levels of arbitration committees
and a final appeal to the courts. Of the 50,000 cases brought
for arbitration in 1992, most were resolved at the first or
second level, with less than 5 percent reaching the courts.
According to Labor Ministry officials, most arbitration cases
are filed by contract workers or their employers, an
indication, they assert, that the new contract system provides
a clearer set of ground rules which both sides can attempt to
enforce.
Laws governing working conditions in China's special economic
zones (SEZ's) are not significantly different from those in the
rest of the country. However, wages in the SEZ's are
significantly higher than in other Chinese enterprises.
Unskilled laborers can expect much higher pay in southern China
generally, but highly skilled workers are the main
beneficiaries of the wage discrepancy.
The 1982 Trade Union Law prohibits antiunion discrimination and
specifies that union representatives may not be transferred or
terminated by enterprise management during their term of
office. Unionized foreign businesses generally report
pragmatic relations with ACFTU representatives. The ACFTU's
stated goal is to establish unions in all foreign-funded
enterprises within 2 to 3 years.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
Chinese penal policy emphasizes "reform first, production
second," but compulsory labor is an integral part of the system
both to rehabilitate prisoners and to help support the
facilities. Almost all persons the courts sentence to prison,
including political prisoners, are required to work, usually
for little or no compensation. China also maintains a network
of "reeducation through labor" camps (see Section l.e.), the
inmates of which generally must work. Reports from human
rights organizations and released prisoners demonstrate that at
least some persons in pretrial detention are also required to
work. The number of workers in prison for nonviolent
labor-related activity is not known. (See Section 1.e.)
According to prison authorities, prisoners in labor reform
institutions work a full 8-hour day and must also engage in
both ideological and basic literacy and skills training.
Justice officials have stated that in labor reeducation
facilities there is a much heavier emphasis on education than
on labor. Most reports conclude that work conditions in the
penal system's light manufacturing factories are similar to
those in ordinary factories, but conditions on farms and in
mines can be harsh. As is the case nationwide, safety is often
neglected, putting prisoners at risk, but there were no
available figures for casualties in prison industry.
Some penal facilities contract with regular industries for
prisoners to perform light manufacturing and assembly work. In
1992 Chinese newspapers reported that Chinese prison labor is
used for many types of production (examples in parentheses),
including heavy industry (coal, steel), light manufacturing
(clothing, shoes, small machine tools), and agriculture (grain,
tea, sugar cane). In 1991 the Chinese Government published a
reiteration of its regulations barring the export of
prison-made goods. On August 7, 1992, the U.S. and Chinese
Governments signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU)
prohibiting trade in prison labor products. The U.S. Customs
Service has issued detention orders barring a number of
products reportedly made by prisoners from entering the United
States and detained several shipments of such goods in 1993.
Under the MOU the Chinese have provided requested investigation
reports on 31 suspected facilities. Five facilities
investigated by the Chinese were found to have had prisoners
engaged in some aspect of export production at some point in
time, though not necessarily to the United States; of these,
two with export activities at the time of the investigation
reportedly received unspecified administrative sanctions. U.S.
officials have conducted on-site visits of three suspected
facilities and another facility visit has already been
scheduled. The detention orders on two of the visited
facilities were lifted, one in December 1993 and one in January
1994. The other case is still under study.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
Regulations promulgated in 1987 prohibit the employment of
school age minors who have not completed the compulsory 9 years
of education. Press reports indicate that dropout rates for
lower secondary schools (ages 12-15 years) in several southern
provinces exceed 9 percent (the national average is 2.2
percent). This suggests the booming economy in that region is
enticing more children to leave their studies to find jobs. In
poorer, isolated areas, child labor in agriculture is
widespread. Most independent observers agree with Chinese
officials that China's urban child labor problem is relatively
minor. No specific Chinese industry is identifiable as a
significant violator of child labor regulations. In 1991 the
State Council issued regulations imposing severe fines,
withdrawal of business licenses, or jail for employers who hire
laborers under 16 years of age.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
China does not have a labor code. A draft has been circulating
since mid-1992. Due to the complexity of incorporating myriad
existing regulations into the proposed unified code, it remains
unclear if it will be made law. Labor regulations continue to
be promulgated at both the national and provincial level, but
they are not uniformly enforced.
There is no minimum wage in China. However, the Ministry of
Labor is currently drafting minimum wage regulations.
Anticipating the issuance of the regulations, some local
governments, particularly those in more highly developed east
coast areas, have already drafted regulations on minimum
wages. On the higher end, in Zhuhai, Guangdong Province, the
minimum monthly wage has been set at $62 (350 yuan at the
official exchange rate). Generally the levels have been set to
provide for a decent standard of living for a worker and his
family. Minimum wage figures do not include free or heavily
subsidized benefits which employing work units commonly provide
in kind, such as housing, medical care, and education.
Factories or ministries are required to pay 70 percent of final
monthly wages to workers laid off because of a factory closing
or reduction in force, but there have been numerous reports of
violations of this policy.
The national standard workweek, excluding overtime, is 48 hours
with a mandatory 24-hour rest period. In the past, 3 to 12
working hours per week were generally spent in political study
or "education" on current social issues. In recent years, many
factories have abandoned political study either for regular
work or for an additional half day off each week. Starting in
1991, factories (including joint ventures) were allowed to
adopt shorter workweeks. Despite laws mandating a standard
8-hour workday throughout the country, there continue to be
reports of workers in the SEZ's regularly working 12 hours
daily.
Occupational health and safety are constant themes of posters
and campaigns. Every work unit must designate a health and
safety officer and the International Labor Organization has
established a training program for these officials. Moreover,
while the right to strike is not provided for in the 1982
Constitution, the Trade Union Law explicitly recognizes the
right of unions to "suggest that staff and workers withdraw
from sites of danger" and to participate in accident
investigations. Labor officials reported that such withdrawals
did occur sometimes in 1993. Nonetheless, pressures for
increased output, lack of financial resources to maintain
equipment, lack of concern by management, and a traditionally
poor understanding of safety issues by workers have contributed
to a continuing high rate of accidents. State prosecutors deal
annually with thousands of negligence and accident cases. In
November 1992, the Standing Committee of the National People's
Congress passed a law on mining safety, which established
standards and provided for enforcement, including fines and
imprisonment. Labor officials were unable to provide
statistics verifying the effects of the law, but they claimed
that despite substantially increased across-the-board
production in mining output, mine accidents were down in the
first half of 1993.
More than 15,000 workers died in industrial accidents in 1992,
63 percent of them miners. Because of the lack of legislation
to bring together diverse and often unpublished regulations in
other health and safety areas, compliance with existing
regulations is haphazard. Official Chinese press reports in
July announced the issuance of a State Council circular
stressing safety in production following "sharp increases in
job accidents in the first half of this year." Officials blame
the increases on lax enforcement of safety regulations in the
rapidly expanding rural, foreign-funded, and private industry
sectors.
As fires and explosions in southern China amply demonstrated in
1993, enforcement of China's safety regulations, particularly
in the booming light industry sector, continued to be lax. In
late November, 81 workers died in a blaze in a Shenzhen toy
factory because safety precautions were not taken and warnings
from the local labor ministry office had allegedly gone
unheeded. (###)
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