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TITLE: BURMA HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES, 1993
DATE: JANUARY 31, 1994
AUTHOR: U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BURMA
Burma is ruled by a highly authoritarian, military regime that
has been condemned for its serious human rights abuses.
Heading the latest version of a military dictatorship that has
presided over the country with an unyielding grip for more than
three decades is the State Law and Order Restoration Council
(SLORC), which took power in September 1988 after harshly
suppressing massive prodemocracy demonstrations. Longtime
dictator General Ne Win, whose policies had pushed Burma to the
margins of the international community and driven the country
into a deep economic decline, resigned shortly before SLORC's
emergence. Nevertheless, he continued to wield the power
behind the scenes.
The SLORC, headed by the armed forces commander and composed of
senior military officers, permitted a relatively free election
in 1990. However, it failed to honor the results--which were
an overwhelming rejection of military rule--or to cede power to
the victorious party headed by prodemocracy movement leaders.
Instead, the SLORC attacked the coalition of winning political
parties through detentions, house arrests, and intimidation.
Since General Than Shwe became Chief of State in April 1992,
the SLORC has taken some modest steps to lessen its harsh rule,
including reopening the universities and releasing over 2,000
political prisoners. In January 1993, the SLORC inaugurated a
national convention to begin work on a new constitution.
However, SLORC officials stage-managed the proceedings and
overrode even limited opposition, interrogating and harassing
delegates who attempted to deviate from the regime's position,
and even sentenced one prodemocracy delegate to 20 years in
prison for distributing information critical of the convention
proceedings. It seems clear that the SLORC's domination of the
convention, which has no mandate from the people, is to ensure
adoption of a constitutional blueprint effectively guaranteeing
the military's continued hold on power.
The Government reinforces its rule via a pervasive security
apparatus led by the Directorate of Defense Services
Intelligence (DDSI) and the National Intelligence Bureau
(NIB). Control is buttressed by restrictions on contact with
foreigners; surveillance of government employees and private
citizens; and arrests, detentions, harassment, intimidation,
and mistreatment of political activists. The Government
justifies its security measures as necessary to maintain order
and national unity, although several longstanding insurgent
groups have reached accommodations with the SLORC in recent
years and the others pose little threat to major population
centers.
Burma is primarily an agricultural country, although it also
has substantial mineral, fishing, and timber resources. After
Ne Win's 26-year rule reduced southeast Asia's richest land to
a U.N.-designated "least developed country," the SLORC
abandoned the "Burmese Way to Socialism" in 1988, opening up
the economy to permit private sector expansion and attract
investment and badly needed foreign exchange, which has
resulted in a limited improvement in the economy. The
Government has hindered development of the private sector,
however, by failing to address fundamental problems:
restrictions on private commerce; constantly changing rules and
regulations; overcentralized decision making; a bloated
bureaucracy; a greatly overvalued currency; poor civilian
infrastructure; and grossly disproportionate military spending.
There was no marked increase in the level of human rights
abuses in 1993, in large measure because the SLORC had already
been so successful in intimidating the Burmese people. At the
same time, Burmese authorities took only limited steps to
correct longstanding, serious human rights violations. The
Government's use of forced labor--especially as porters for the
army--as well as forced resettlement of civilians continued,
causing hundreds of deaths due to disease, harsh treatment, and
overwork. Five hundred or more Burmese remained in prison for
political reasons, including more than 40 parliamentarians
elected in 1990; approximately 200,000 Rohingyas (Burmese
Muslims from Arakan State) remained in refugee camps in
Bangladesh; a few thousand students and dissidents continued as
exiles in Thailand; and roughly 71,000 Burmese live in ethnic
minority camps in Thailand near the Burma border.
Nobel Laureate Aung San Suu Kyi remained under house arrest,
her fifth year of detention by the SLORC, without being charged
or having access to legal proceedings. The SLORC persisted in
denying basic freedom of speech and assembly, and arbitrary
intrusions into private life remained pervasive. In a closed
trial, in October, the regime sentenced 12 dissidents,
including one of the delegates to the National Convention, to
20 years in prison for distributing anti-SLORC information.
The SLORC ignored a comprehensive resolution on Burma adopted
by consensus in 1993 at the U.N. Human Rights Commission
(UNHRC) calling for an end to human rights violations in Burma,
the unconditional release of Aung San Suu Kyi and all other
political prisoners, and the implementation of the 1990
elections.
On the positive side, the SLORC commuted all death sentences
handed down since it took power; released over 700 persons
believed to be political prisoners; permitted the first-ever
meetings between political prisoners and foreign visitors; and
allowed additional family visits to Aung San Suu Kyi. Over
50,000 Rohingyas returned to Arakan State in 1993, and the
Government signed a Memorandum of Understanding in November
with the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) providing
for a presence in Arakan State to monitor the repatriation and
reintegration of Rohingyas from Bangladesh.
Nonetheless, on balance, in view of the persistent abuses by
the SLORC, including its use of forced labor, its wholesale
denial of basic political rights, and blatant manipulation of
the national convention, Burma must continue to be judged a
serious violator of international human rights norms. The
expressions of deep concern by the international community
about the human rights situation in Burma in successive
resolutions adopted since 1991 by the UNHCR and the U.N.
General Assembly have failed thus far to have an appreciable
impact on the SLORC's behavior.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
Although secret, extrajudicial killings reportedly were carried
out in recent years, there were no such reports in 1993. As in
the past, credible sources reported many deaths among those
impressed for forced labor projects and porterage.
There were no confirmed incidents of summary executions of
civilians in 1993. In late February, U Win Ko, a deputy-elect
of the National League for Democracy (NLD) and finance minister
in the opposition National Coalition Government of the Union of
Burma (NCGUB), was murdered in Kunming, China. Burmese
authorities have denied any involvement, and independent
sources suggest other parties were responsible. U Hla Pe, who
served as the NCGUB's Minister of Education and Health and
Minister of Information, was murdered in Bangkok in mid-June.
There is, however, no evidence as to the perpetrators.
b. Disappearance
The number of disappearances in 1993 was probably little
changed from the previous year, but accurate estimates are
impossible since the Government will not provide information on
these cases. Family and friends assume that those who have
disappeared are under detention or have died in jail. Family
members can generally determine that relatives have been
arrested, but the process of obtaining information can take a
long time. Some who disappeared were later reported as
arrested. Others may have dropped out of sight or quietly
attempted to leave the country for fear of arrest.
Authorities rarely responded to inquiries from families
concerning the whereabouts and welfare of disappeared or jailed
relatives. The few replies routinely consisted of only general
statements that such people were arrested for violations of
existing laws.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
Fragmentary evidence documents that mistreatment of political
detainees continued to take place in Burmese prisons and
detention centers operated by the security services. There has
been a decline in the number of detentions, during which the
worst abuse reportedly occurs. Political detainees are held
incommunicado, with family or lawyers unable to visit during
what can be a protracted pretrial period. The most common
forms of maltreatment during this period were sleep and food
deprivation coupled with round-the-clock interrogation.
In recent years, severe beatings and forcing prisoners to squat
or assume unnatural positions for lengthy periods have also
been reported, and techniques designed to intimidate and
disorient prisoners prior to interrogation have been routine.
Such practices as electrical shocks to the genitals,
suffocation, and cigarette burns have also been reported in the
past, but there were no confirmed reports of these practices in
1993.
During 1993 there were no reports alleging torture of convicted
political prisoners or deaths linked to the conditions of their
imprisonment. Khin Maung Myint of the leftist People's
Progressive Party (PPP) died in prison in 1993, apparently of
natural causes after repeated stays in a prison medical
facility despite his family's request for his transfer to a
civilian hospital. Interviews by U.S. citizens and
Congressional visitors on private travel with SLORC-selected
prisoners at Insein prison near Rangoon indicate an overly
harsh prison regimen, i.e., little exercise, no reading or
writing materials for many if not most prisoners, poor
nutrition, years of solitary confinement for some, and illness
induced by sleeping on concrete cell floors. Student leader
Min Ko Naing, who met with two visiting American Congressmen at
Insein Prison in August, displayed the effects of serious
physical and psychological abuse. A few prominent prisoners,
such as former NLD Chairmen Tin Oo and Kyi Maung, were provided
limited reading material and bungalow accommodations. Those
interviewed acknowledged receiving medicine as well as
supplemental food brought by their families during 15-minute
visits permitted every 2 weeks.
The Government continued to bar the International Committee of
the Red Cross (ICRC) from visiting detainees or convicted
prisoners of any kind.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
Arbitrary arrest and detention are practiced routinely by the
SLORC. Throughout the year at least scores of political
activists were detained for low-level political protests, such
as handing out opposition flyers, painting political graffiti,
or shouting opposition slogans. Some detentions coincided with
the startup of sessions of the national convention or with
various political anniversaries. Shortly after the January 9
launching of the national convention, for example, the
authorities announced the arrest of 23 activists including Nay
Lin, a youth organizer for the Federation of Trade Unions of
Burma, who allegedly painted graffiti on a Rangoon wharf. Some
students were picked up for staging a brief demonstration on
June 7 at a suburban campus of Rangoon University. Several NLD
members, including at least one successful candidate in the
1990 election, were detained after taking part in a
wreath-laying ceremony at Aung San's tomb. Between June and
August, the authorities also arrested 12 persons, including the
writer Ma Thida and the successful NLD candidate and delegate
to the national convention, Dr. Aung Khin Sint, for
distributing opposition literature. In what was widely
recognized as a warning to others, all were convicted in
mid-October and given harsh 20-year prison sentences.
While most detainees were members of political parties or
engaged in overtly political activities, businessmen and other
private citizens were also subject to arbitrary detention,
particularly as the increase in private economic activity in
1993 led to additional scrutiny of businesses by security
forces.
The military again extended the house arrest of former NLD
General Secretary and Nobel Peace Laureate Aung San Suu Kyi.
The decision was taken under the provisions of the Law to
Safeguard the State from the Dangers of Subversive
Elements--also the basis for her initial year of house arrest
which began in 1989. As amended in August 1991, the law
authorizes 1-year extensions of arbitrary detention without
charge or trial for up to 5 years. Aung San Suu Kyi has never
been formally charged. The authorities have offered her an
opportunity to substitute foreign exile for her current house
arrest, but she declined to leave the country. The military
Government again allowed her husband and two sons to visit her
in 1993. The authorities refused a proposed visit by a group
of fellow Nobel Laureates seeking her release.
There is no provision in Burmese law for judicial determination
of the legality of detention. Bail may be granted by civilian
courts in some circumstances. The number of political
detainees not sentenced by year's end was impossible to
determine accurately.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
Throughout 1993 the Government continued to rule by decree and
was not bound by any constitutional provisions guaranteeing
fair public trials or any other rights. Until abolished in
September 1992, military tribunals exercised jurisdiction over
all cases involving defiance of orders issued by the SLORC or
local commanders. These tribunals could mete out only three
sentences--the death penalty, life imprisonment, 3 years or
more imprisonment with labor--regardless of existing laws. On
January 1, however, a government decree codified an existing
moratorium on capital punishment by commuting all previous
SLORC-imposed death sentences to life imprisonment. It also
capped all other prison terms at 10 years for anyone convicted
during the SLORC era.
After denying for years that it held any political prisoners,
in April 1992, the Government announced its intention to free
those persons "detained politically" who did not represent a
threat to state security. Between that time and the end of
1993, the SLORC announced the release of more than 2,000
persons, although fewer than 200 were publicly identified. The
failure to identify most released persons invites suspicions
about whether they were actually political prisoners, but
opposition activists believe this was generally the case.
Reliable sources indicate that some of those released in 1993
were monks imprisoned for participating in 1988 prodemocracy
rallies and a 1990 boycott action, including prominent Rangoon
Abbot Thu Mingala; prodemocracy businessman Ye Htoon; and
numerous Karens and others suspected of supporting the 1991
Irrawaddy Delta insurgency.
The 1992 decree also implicitly acknowledged that political
prisoners had been held not only in Rangoon's Insein Prison but
also in over 20 upcountry locations--many of which were still
believed to hold some political prisoners at the end of 1993.
The remaining political prisoners included former military
officers Tin Oo and Kyi Maung, both of whom had served as
chairmen of the NLD, comedian Zargana, student leader Min Ko
Naing, and lawyer U Nay Min.
Since September 1992, civil courts have handled civil and
criminal cases, as well as political trials. Civilian courts
have reportedly become fairer in handling nonpolitical cases
since 1988, but remain plagued by corruption, inordinate delays
in processing cases and appeals, and poor training and
unprofessional behavior on the part of some court officers.
Some basic due process rights, including the right to a public
trial and to be represented by a defense attorney, are
generally respected by civilian judges. Judges are appointed
by the Supreme Court with the approval of the SLORC (which also
names justices to the Supreme Court). At present, judges must
be at least law officers with legal training. Defense
attorneys are permitted to call and cross-examine witnesses,
but their primary purpose is to bargain with the judge to
obtain the shorest possible sentence for their clients. Cases,
almost all political, which are tried in courtooms in prison
compounds are not open to the public. In such cases, while
defendants may have access to a defense attorney, counsel
appears to serve no purpose other than to provide moral
support. Reliable reports indicate that in political cases due
process is largely ignored and verdicts manipulated.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
The State continued to intrude extensively into the lives of
private citizens during 1993. Forced entry and warrantless,
unannounced searches of private homes were often conducted.
Through its extensive intelligence network, the Government
closely monitored the travel, whereabouts, and activities of
many Burmese, particularly those known to be politically
active. Security personnel selectively monitored private
correspondence and telephone calls. Contacts or communications
involving foreigners were subject to especially intense
scrutiny, and government employees were required to obtain
advance permission before meeting with foreigners. Despite
some efforts by the Government to improve its image by meeting
in October with the head of the British Broadcasting
Corporation Far Eastern Service, official propaganda continued
in 1993 to take aim at various foreign news services, and
private citizens were generally unable to subscribe directly to
foreign publications. Two international newsmagazines were
distributed through official channels and were available to the
public at large, but censors occasionally banned issues or
deleted articles criticizing local conditions or reporting
opposition activities. Foreign radio broadcasts remained a
prime source of information for the people and even for the
military, despite the Government's hostility to this news
source. The authorities sought to register the growing number
of television satellite receivers but appeared ready to
tolerate their use. Some foreign journalists, including
television crews, continued to be granted access to the
country, but their movements and contacts were closely
monitored.
In its most intensive and egregious infringement of privacy
rights, the Government continued its program of forced
resettlement, involving an estimated half-million urban
residents throughout Burma since 1989. While most of those
forced to move were described as "squatters," some people had
been living in and paying rent on their former home sites for
many years and had constructed permanent houses. The
Government has made people move, almost totally at their own
expense, to "new towns" which are far from their previous
residences. "New town" occupants often live on former rice
paddy land, subject to flooding in the rainy season, without
adequate transportation, medical facilities, shelter, or
sanitation. In 1993 conditions at some resettlement sites
improved, but, according to international observers, such
improvements were often unable to keep pace with the rate of
new arrivals. Some outside experts accept the Government's
explanation that the resettlement program serves legitimate
long-term urban planning objectives, but they do not endorse
the forceful methods used to move people.
g. Use of Excessive Force and Violations of Humanitarian
Law in Internal Conflicts
The Burmese Army has battled diverse insurgencies for more than
four decades in conflicts that have resulted in widespread
human rights violations, including mistreatment and killing of
prisoners, rape, neglect of the sick and wounded, impressment
of civilians for porter duty, and indiscriminate attacks on
civilians. While the Government was responsible for the bulk
of these abuses (the Burmese armed forces nearly doubled the
number of combat units since 1988), insurgent groups have also
violated humanitarian principles. Insurgent groups, such as
the Karen, Mon, and Karenni, continued to engage in small-scale
fighting, mostly in remote areas, to try to gain greater
autonomy from the dominant ethnic Burman majority. Some
receive limited outside support from private international
humanitarian and religious organizations. The Shan United Army
(SUA) also claims to be fighting for greater autonomy but
engages primarily in drug trafficking. Several former
insurgent groups with which the Government now has cease-fire
accommodations likewise are important narcotics trafficking
organizations. The continued suspension of large-scale
military offensives against insurgents in Karen state and
elsewhere, together with ongoing government efforts to reach a
peace accord with the Kachin Independence Army (KIA), sharply
reduced the level of fighting during 1993.
In 1993 the use of forced porterage continued, with attendant
casualties. Most of these deaths, roughly estimated to be in
the hundreds, were from disease and overwork, though reports of
mistreatment and rape were also common. The Burmese military
also continued to use corvee labor and prison labor in combat
areas. There were unconfirmed reports, for example, that on at
least two occasions a combined total of as many as 700 inmates
from a prison near Rangoon were taken to work as porters in
eastern Burma. Credible reports from multiple sources
indicated that porters have carried ammunition, supplies, and
the wounded under the harshest conditions. Other well-placed
sources also note that they are subject to hostile fire as well
as maltreatment at the hands of Burmese soldiers. When porters
are wounded, ill, or unable to continue their work, some have
been reportedly left unattended to die. At the end of their
service, survivors often have had to find their own means to
return home. It was also credibly reported that some members
of the military used sham threats of impressment to extort
money from villagers.
Forced rural resettlement displaced ethnic minority villagers
in Karen and Kayah states and contributed to an increase of
about 6,000 Burmese in camps on the Thai side of the border.
Local sources reported some amelioration of conditions
following the completion of the railroad to Loikaw for Catholic
villagers in Kayah State who had been resettled in March 1992,
and that many returned to their original homes. Reports from
Karen State suggest rural relocation schemes continued to play
a key role in the Government's counterinsurgency strategy.
Despite this evidence that the Burmese authorities were not
prepared fully to implement their obligations under the Geneva
Conventions, in April and November the Government for the first
time permitted the International Committee of the Red Cross
(ICRC) to conduct two short seminars on humanitarian law for
groups of military officers.
Antigovernment groups were responsible for violence causing
civilian and military deaths, including reported killings of
civilians during attacks on villages and ambushes or mining of
transportation routes. In two separate incidents in February
and March, over 100 confirmed civilian deaths resulted from
military conflicts involving the narcotics-trafficking Shan
United Army. Credible reports indicate Karenni insurgents
executed at least eight captured Burmese soldiers, and civilian
deaths in a transport train blown up by a land mine were
attributed to Mon activists. Additionally, reliable multiple
sources indicated that Karen insurgents resorted to forced
labor for porterage and impressed youths into military service.
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
Severe restrictions on freedom of speech and the press
persisted throughout 1993. Although the degree of enforcement
varied, the Government generally continued to demonstrate
little tolerance for opposing views or criticism. Private
citizens remained reluctant to express opinions for fear of
government informers. The U.N. Human Rights Commission (UNHRC)
Special Rapporteur deplored the "pervasive atmosphere of fear
and repression" in Burma in his report adopted by the UNHRC in
March. The Government exercised strict censorship of all news
and publications produced in the country.
Nevertheless, private magazines found it possible to publish
articles on once taboo economic subjects, and some former
political prisoners were allowed to publish on nonsensitive
topics. The government-controlled press and broadcast services
continued to publish some limited criticism and satire in
1993. The Government adopted a tolerant approach toward the
increasing activities of the United States Information Service
in Rangoon, permitting it to distribute publications and
organize discussions which treated themes involving human
rights and fundamental freedoms. The authorities' actions in
attempting to register private satellites dishes and impose
fines on the many Burmese who had set up unauthorized satellite
television receivers slowed the spread of access to uncensored
television news and other programming from abroad. No seizures
of satellite receivers, however, were reported in 1993.
The Government made heavy use of its monopoly of television and
radio to pursue its political policies and, with the exception
of coverage of some aspects of the national convention, did not
accord air time to opposing views. The same was true of all
newspapers--two national dailies in Burmese and one in English,
as well as daily papers published by the Rangoon city
government and the Central (Mandalay area) Military Command. A
revamping and renaming of the country's main daily in April
resulted in increased publication of locally edited
international wire service news, but that paper, as well as
other newspapers, remained staunchly official organs, with
military officials appointing editors and vetting editorials.
Especially for domestic news, journalists had to hew to strict
publishing and broadcast guidelines. All forms of
media--domestic and imported books and periodicals, stage
plays, motion pictures, and musical recordings--were officially
controlled and censored. Persons working in these fields
admitted to exercising self-censorship lest they run afoul of
the authorities.
University teachers and professors remained subject to the same
restrictions on freedom of speech, political activities, and
publications as other government employees. These included
warnings against criticism of the Government; instructions not
to discuss politics while at work; and strictures against
joining or supporting political parties, engaging in political
activity, and meeting foreign officials. While all teachers
remained subject to dismissal for political disloyalty, some
left the profession voluntarily to escape the political
pressure.
The universities, closed for several years after the 1988
disturbances, were open for most of 1993. However, they were
closed from December 1992 until mid-February in what many
believe was a move to avoid student demonstrations during the
startup of the politically sensitive national convention.
Meanwhile, on the main campus of Rangoon University, fences
built around the various faculties prior to the university's
reopening remained in place, reportedly to help control
potential student unrest. In a move also widely believed
intended primarily to disperse and isolate students, a fifth
national university opened outside Rangoon in November.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
The Government does not respect the right to freedom of
peaceful assembly. A prohibition on outdoor assemblies of more
than five people was unevenly enforced, but political
demonstrations were strictly banned.
Political parties were required to request permission from the
authorities even to hold internal meetings of their own
membership. The military's intimidation generally served to
discourage public expressions of antigovernment sentiments. In
the few reported instances of unauthorized political activity,
security forces generally intervened swiftly to detain or
imprison participants in unauthorized meetings and to halt
distribution of antigovernment leaflets. The authorities
reportedly were quick to deploy a large-scale force in Mandalay
in September when a spontaneous demonstration unexpectedly took
on political overtones.
The right of association existed only for those organizations,
including trade associations and professional bodies, permitted
by law and duly registered with the Government. Moreover, the
Government severely restricted the activities of even these
organizations. Ten political parties remained formally legal
at the end of 1993--down from 75 at the beginning of 1992--but
they were virtually paralyzed through arrests, intimidation,
and surveillance. In February the authorities permitted a
large private funeral to be organized for the wife of one-time
oppositionist and former Prime Minister U Nu. While the
Government denied visas to two sons living abroad, it permitted
a daughter active in the Burmese opposition in India to attend.
c. Freedom of Religion
Freedom of religion is provided for in law. Despite the
privileged position of Buddhists in government service, this
right is widely observed in practice although there have been
human rights abuses against some believers. Buddhist pagodas,
Muslim mosques, and Christian churches operate openly with
minimal interference, at least in those areas of central Burma
accessible to independent observers. Christians, Muslims, and
animists are particularly numerous among minority ethnic
groups. While generally allowing these groups to practice
freely, security services monitor the activities of religious
communities. The Government requires all religious
organizations to register and subjects religious publications
to the same control and censorship imposed on secular ones.
Restrictions on unauthorized religious groups remained in
force, and the military continued to monitor activities in and
around Buddhist monasteries and pagodas. The SLORC has been
largely successful in halting political activism among the
Buddhist clergy.
Religious groups can and did establish links with
coreligionists in other countries, although such links were
reportedly monitored by the Government. The Catholic Church,
for example, maintained ties to the Vatican. While foreign
religious representatives were usually allowed only to obtain
visas for short stays, in some cases they were permitted to
preach to Burmese congregations. Though permanent missionary
establishments have not been permitted since the 1960's, some
foreign Catholic nuns and at least one priest continued to
reside upcountry, most working in homes for the aged.
As part of its large-scale "urban development" program in
recent years, the Government has taken control of several
Christian and Muslim properties throughout Burma, including
cemeteries. On the other hand, school authorities in Rangoon
eventually exempted Muslim students from bowing to their
teachers, when those students complained the action resembled a
practice used in Buddhist worship.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
Although Burmese citizens have the legal right to live anywhere
in the country, both urban and rural residents have been
subject to arbitrary relocation. Except for limitations in
areas of insurgent activity, Burmese citizens could travel
freely within the country but had to inform local authorities
of their temporary place of residence. People staying
overnight with friends or relatives within their home cities or
villages were also required to report this to the authorities.
People who failed to report either guests or intentions to stay
overnight to the authorities were theoretically subject to a
jail term, and arrests were occasionally made. Noncitizen
residents, including ethnic Indians and Chinese born in Burma
who hold foreigners' registration cards, had to obtain prior
permission to travel.
Though travel strictures continued to ease, the Government
maintained controls on departure from the country. While the
authorities simplified certain requirements for obtaining a
passport, other requirements plus bureaucratic procedures and
corruption still presented formidable hurdles. Those traveling
abroad to work, however, encountered fewer difficulties,
particularly as Burmese authorities sought to increase hard
currency earnings from the taxes they impose on such persons'
earnings. Emigrants, by contrast, were required to reimburse
the Government for "educational expenses" before receiving exit
permission and were severely limited in what they could take
with them.
Burmese citizens who left legally were generally allowed to
return to visit relatives, and those wishing to extend their
stays found it easier to obtain permission to do so. Even some
who had stayed abroad illegally and acquired foreign
citizenship found it easier to return to visit or do business.
In a move widely believed to be intended to encourage wealthy
older overseas Burmese to retire in Burma, the Government
announced in May that Burmese abroad would have 2 years to
reapply for citizenship lost through naturalization in another
country. At about the same time, the Ministry of Home Affairs
announced that Burmese abroad holding expired travel documents
could obtain new passports or an extension of their old ones.
Obtaining these benefits, however, remained subject to
government approval on a case-by-case basis. Moreover, some
Burmese living abroad, particularly those who had traveled or
remained abroad illegally, continued to fear subjecting
themselves to potential punitive action by Burmese authorities
if they should return to Burma. By September, 14 persons had
been allowed to resettle in Burma, and another 14 had had their
Burmese passports extended or replaced.
In 1993 foreigners were allowed into the country in increasing
numbers on an individual, rather than only on a tour group,
basis. The authorities also took several steps to liberalize
travel for foreigners within Burma, though large areas of the
country remained off limits on security grounds. Tourist and
family visit visas are routinely granted for 2 to 4 weeks, and
can be extended on a case-by-case basis. However, select
foreigners, such as human rights advocates and political
figures, continued to be denied entry visas unless traveling
under the aegis of a sponsor acceptable to the Government. A
private voluntary organization, Medecins Sans Frontieres/
Holland, is now operating in Burma and has foreign personnel
assigned to Rangoon on a permanent basis.
In April 1992, following the flight into Bangladesh of an
estimated 265,000 Muslims from Arakan State in order to escape
military repression, the Governments of Bangladesh and Burma
signed a Memorandum of Understanding providing for the
voluntary repatriation of the refugees. However, Burma, unlike
Bangladesh, did not accept a role for UNHCR in the repatriation
process at that time. In the absence of an adequate
international monitoring presence in Burma, most Rohingyas were
reluctant to return to Arakan. After a private visit by High
Commissioner Sadako Ogata to Burma in late July and subsequent
talks between the Burmese authorities and UNHCR representatives,
the Government of Burma signed a Memorandum of Understanding
with the UNHCR in November which provides that the UNHCR will
have a presence in Arakan State and will have access to all
returnees. The agreement is intended to cover the monitoring
and administration of the return to Burma in safety and dignity
of about 200,000 Rohingyas who remain in refugee camps in
Bangladesh. Of those who fled between late 1991 and mid-1992,
some 50,000 were repatriated to Burma in 1993.
Foreign refugees or displaced persons may not resettle or seek
safe haven in Burma. The Government treats people claiming to
be refugees as illegal immigrants and expels or imprisons them.
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government
Burma is governed solely by the military, and the Burmese
people do not have the right or the ability peacefully to
change their government. Since 1988 active duty military
officers have occupied many important positions throughout the
bureaucracy, particularly at the policymaking level. Despite
the appointment of several civilians to the Cabinet in 1992,
military or recently retired military officers have continued
to occupy most cabinet-level positions, numerous director
general and subordinate posts, and key positions once held by
technocrats in the economic ministries.
In the 1990 election the NLD and associated parties achieved an
overwhelming victory. The SLORC subsequently set aside the
results and disqualified, detained, arrested, or drove into
exile many successful candidates, including most of the NLD
leadership. By the end of 1993, 174 of the 485 deputies
elected had either been disqualified, resigned under pressure,
gone into exile, been detained, or died. At least 46
successful candidates from the election or prominent NLD
activists were serving prison sentences. In 1992 the SLORC
held discussions with selected representatives of the few
political parties which had not been banned outright, with a
view to staging a national convention to write a new
constitution without the participation of most leading members
of the democratic opposition. The national convention finally
opened on January 9 and continued intermittently throughout the
year until September 16, when it finally adjourned until the
following January. Of the approximately 700 delegates
attending, only about 150 held mandates from the 1990
elections. Members of six of the eight interest groups
represented were selected by the SLORC. Using these groups as
a majority, the Government forced through its own rules, its
own agenda, and finally its own principles for a new
constitution, guaranteeing continued military control of the
Government. During an intermediate stage, representatives of
the NLD and minority groups were able to put forward some
proposals clearly at odds with government preferences. But the
authorities carefully controlled the level of visible
opposition by censoring presentations, declaring unwelcome
documents off-limits to the public, forbidding discussion from
the floor, and intimidating individual delegates behind the
scenes. There has been no genuine public discussion of the
process that will be used to arrive at a new constitution.
One NLD victor in the 1990 election and national convention
delegate, Dr. Aung Khin Sint, was convicted and sentenced to 20
years' imprisonment for distributing opposition literature to
his fellow delegates.
In some regions where government forces exercise limited or no
control, including in cases where the Government has reached an
accommodation with former insurgent groups, indigenous
populations have considerable autonomy in running their own
political and economic affairs. Even in government-controlled
areas, they generally retain their social and cultural
institutions.
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
of Human Rights
No internal human rights organizations are allowed to exist.
The Government continued to oppose outside scrutiny of its
human rights record but permitted somewhat greater access in
1993 for some journalists, nongovernmental organizations, and
foreign government officials wishing to examine the country's
human rights situation. Burmese authorities allowed UNHRC
Special Rapporteur Professor Yokota to conduct another
fact-finding mission in the country in November 1993.
In 1991, 1992, and again in 1993, the U.N. General Assembly
(UNGA) adopted increasingly strong resolutions urging the
Burmese Government to end human rights abuses and undertake
genuine democratic reform. The 1993 UNGA resolution called on
the Government to release unconditionally Aung San Suu Kyi and
other detained political leaders and to respect the expressed
will of the Burmese people by implementing the results of the
1990 elections.
The UNHRC Special Rapporteur appointed in March 1992, Professor
Yozo Yokota, visited Burma in December 1992 and presented his
report in February 1993. He returned to Burma in November 1993
to fulfill his mandate as Special Rapporteur. The report
offered a harsh catalog of human rights abuses in Burma and
called for far-reaching remedial action. In later reviewing
the report, the UNHRC took special aim at the refusal of
Burmese authorities to accord Dr. Yokota the "full and
unreserved cooperation" and access to persons of his choice
that had been conditions of his mission. The Government, for
its part, disputed the Special Rapporteur's mandate and
rejected many of his findings.
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Disability, Language, or Social Status
Women
Women in Burma in general have traditionally enjoyed a high
status, exercising most of the same basic rights as men and
taking an active role in business. Consistent with traditional
culture, they keep their own names after marriage and often
control family finances. However, participation of women
remained low in the minuscule industrial sector and in the
bureaucracy; a few professions, such as forestry and geology,
are entirely barred to women. Women do not consistently
receive equal pay for equal work. There continued to be no
women's rights organizations in Burma or government agency
specifically devoted to safeguarding women's interests.
There was no nationwide pattern of violence directed
specifically against women. However, reliable reports
continued to indicate that many Burmese women and children in
the border areas were forced or lured into serving as
prostitutes in Thailand by criminals and criminal
organizations. Recruitment of these women generally occurred
in remote areas where Burmese officials were unable to prevent
the practice. In 1993, impressment, including of women, for
military porterage duties continued, with attendant casualties.
Although Burmese culturally view rape with great abhorrence, in
1993 there continued to be a consistent pattern of reports
alleging rapes of ethnic minority women in border areas by
Burmese soldiers.
Children
In mid-July the Government issued a law stipulating children's
rights and containing provisions covering their protection and
custody, education, employment, and judicial treatment.
Burmese authorities also adopted in September a "National
Program of Action" for the survival, protection, and
development of the country's children. By year's end it
remained unclear whether the Government intended to give the
program the political impetus needed to ensure the
interministerial cooperation and resource allocation required
to make it a success.
Government and UNICEF figures indicated the plight of children
to be worse than was earlier realized. Infant mortality is
high (94 per 1000); 37 percent of children under 3 are severely
or moderately malnourished; 31 percent of children aged 5
through 14 suffer from iodine deficiency; only 62 percent of
children enroll in primary school; and only 25 percent of
children complete the prescribed 5-year course.
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities
Burma's numerous ethnic minorities, which have their own
distinct cultures and languages, have been underrepresented in
the Government and largely excluded from the military
leadership. Despite recently increased government investment
in the border areas in road, hospital, and school construction,
economic development among minorities continued to lag and many
still live at the subsistence level.
Since only people who can prove long familial links to Burma
are accorded full citizenship, some people not of ethnic
Burmese ancestry, primarily Indians and Chinese, continued to
be denied full citizenship and to be excluded from government
positions. Individuals without full citizenship are also
barred from certain advanced university programs in medicine
and technological fields and are often the object of
prejudice. However, Indian and Chinese minorities continued to
play an important role in the economy--a situation resented by
many Burmans.
In Arakan State, some Rohingyas, who in general do not enjoy
full citizenship, have also have been denied national identity
cards. Though a limited number of outside observers were able
to visit Arakan State, albeit on a government-controlled basis,
credible reports continued to emerge of discrimination and
travel restrictions for Muslims in the area. The
well-documented human rights abuses which precipitated the
original Rohingya exodus, however, appeared to have largely
subsided. At the same time, claims that Buddhists from
elsewhere in Arakan State were being resettled nearer the
border in previously Muslim areas were reliably confirmed.
Multiple, reliable sources indicated that the military
occasionally required minority populations in the border
regions to provide without compensation vehicles, equipment,
and lodging for soldiers.
Religious Minorities
The SLORC continued to associate itself closely with the
majority Buddhist religion, giving wide publicity to the
participation by its members in various Buddhist rites and
ceremonies. While this reportedly was a cause of concern among
some members of other religions, the Government in fact
continued to permit members of the major non-Buddhist faiths to
practice their religion. Religious organizations, however,
remained subject to registration and censorship controls
applicable to the entire population. Restrictions on Muslims
in Arakan State appear to be result primarily from their lack
of full citizenship and to discrimination on ethnic grounds.
People with Disabilities
Official assistance to persons with disabilities is extremely
limited. There is no law mandating accessibility to government
facilities for those with disabilities. A small number benefit
from the services of the Mary Chapman School for the Deaf in
Rangoon, which recently began receiving government patronage,
or from modest religious-associated assistance programs funded
through private donations. Most disabled persons, however,
must rely on traditional family structures to provide for their
welfare, and many become destitute. The principal exception is
disabled members of the military, who receive medical
attention, rehabilitation, and financial assistance, though
most veterans receive such benefits only for a few years after
discharge. Reliable reports indicate that high-ranking
officers receive better treatment than the rank and file.
Since 1986 Burmese authorities have permitted representatives
of the ICRC to work in Burma to upgrade provision of orthopedic
prostheses. Because of both landmines and train-related
accidents, Burma has one of the highest rates of amputees in
the world.
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
In 1993 there continued to be no right of association among
workers in Burma. Workers were not free to form or join trade
unions of their own choosing, and leaders of unofficial labor
associations, such as youth organizer Nay Lin of the Federation
of Trade Unions of Burma, were subject to arrest. A new labor
law was promised in connection with the drafting of a new
constitution, but it is doubtful the document will ensure the
right of workers to organize freely. At a minimum, any trade
unions which might form are expected to be firmly under
government control. Workers are not permitted to strike, and
there were no reported instances in 1993 of attempts to do so.
In July 1989, the United States suspended Burma's eligibility
for trade concessions under the Generalized System of
Preferences program, pending steps to afford its labor force
internationally recognized worker rights. In 1990 the U.S.
Government declined a formal request to reconsider the
suspension.
In June 1993, the International Labor Organization (ILO)
Conference cited Burma in a "special paragraph", its strongest
form of censure, for its longstanding failure to take "the
necessary measures in legislation and practice to guarantee to
all workers and all employers without any distinction and
without prior authorization the right to organize even outside
the existing trade union structure should they so wish."
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
Workers continued not to have the right to organize and bargain
collectively. Government arbitration boards, which once
theoretically provided a means for airing labor disputes, were
abolished in 1988. The Government unilaterally sets wages in
the public sector. In the private sector, wages are set by
market forces. In a job-scarce economy, this means employers
determine wage levels. The Government pressures joint ventures
not to pay salaries greater than those of ministers or other
high-level employees. Joint ventures circumvent this via
supplemental pay, including remuneration paid in foreign
exchange certificates, as well as through incentive and
overtime pay and other fringe benefits. Foreign firms
generally set wages near those of the domestic private sector
but follow the practice of joint ventures in awarding
supplemental wages and benefits.
No special export processing zones exist.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
Burma's legal code does not prohibit forced labor. The
military routinely employed corvee labor on its myriad building
projects and, according to credible reports, officials accepted
bribes to excuse some people from work. Forced labor was used
in constructing the railroad line opened in 1993 to Loikaw,
capital of Burma's Kayah State.
The Burmese Army has for decades impressed civilian males to
serve as porters. According to reliable reports, in 1993 the
army continued to abduct youths off the streets, chiefly in
minority areas but also in some urban areas of central Burma.
Women were also occasionally impressed as porters, cooks, and
laundresses for soldiers in frontline areas, according to
credible reports. Military authorities commonly permitted
conscripts and their families to pay them money in lieu of
porter duty.
In June a Burmese diplomat in Singapore organized the
confinement and forced return to Burma of a group of 11 Burmese
seamen transiting Singapore en route from Australia to Thailand
after the men prevailed in a wage dispute with the help of the
International Transport Federation. All remained free in 1993
but are unable to regain employment abroad.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
Children aged 13 to 15 may work 4 hours a day. The "Child Law"
of July 14, 1993, governs most matters concerning children
under the age of 16. It gives each such child the right to
"engage in work in accordance with law and its own volition."
To date, the "law" referred to includes both the Factories Act
of 1951 and the Children Pledging of Labor Act, this latter
being an Indian law from 1933 still on the books. In theory,
the penalty for employers disregarding this regulation was 2
years in prison, but there were no reports of any prosecutions
in 1993 for illegally employing children, despite the fact
that, in cities, working children were highly visible. They
were hired at lower pay rates than adults for the same kind of
work, and economic pressure forced them to work not only for
their survival but also to support their families. Burmese law
requires children to attend school through the fourth standard,
usually reached between the ages of 12 and 15. The Department
of Basic Education estimated, however, that 38 percent of
children aged 5 to 9 never enroll in school. Of those who do,
less than 30 percent complete the fourth grade. Two-thirds of
Burma's primary schoolchildren, principally in rural areas,
leave school for economic reasons. In the higher grades, the
drop-out rate for girls is double that for boys.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
Depressed economic conditions and lack of attention by
government authorities continued to dictate substandard
conditions for workers. The Law on Fundamental Workers Rights
of 1964 and the Factories Act of 1951 regulate working
conditions. There is a legally prescribed 5-day, 35-hour
workweek for employees in the public sector and a 6-day,
44-hour workweek for private and parastatal sector employees,
with overtime paid for additional work. Workers have 21 paid
holidays a year.
Only government employees are protected by minimum wage
provisions. The minimum wage was raised in March to $3 per day
(20 kyats) at the official exchange rate, but less than $0.20
at the unofficial, free market rate. The Government raised
wages for public employees by 25 percent in March, but pay in
the state sector remained far below the amount needed to
provide a decent standard of living or counter the practice of
taking bribes. The actual average wage rate for casual
laborers in Rangoon was about twice the official minimum.
Wages continued to lag far behind inflation.
To protect health and safety at workplaces, there are numerous
regulations pertaining to room size, ventilation, fire hazards,
and the availability of latrines and drinking water. In
practice, these were seldom enforced, particularly in the
private sector. (###)
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