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TITLE: SUDAN HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES, 1993
DATE: JANUARY 31, 1994
AUTHOR: U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
SUDAN
Following the military coup that overthrew Sudan's
democratically elected government in 1989, Lt. General Omar
Hassan al-Bashir and other military leaders who staged the coup
formed the National Salvation Revolution Command Council
(RCC). The RCC suspended the 1985 transitional Constitution,
abrogated press freedoms, and dissolved all political parties
and trade unions. Chaired by Bashir, the RCC nominally ruled
Sudan until it dissolved itself in October, appointing Bashir
President of the Republic and transferring to him most of its
powers. Even prior to the RCC's dissolution, real power rested
with the Head of State, Bashir, a few other military officers,
and above all the National Islamic Front (NIF), headed by
Hassan al-Turabi. Though officially banned like the other
parties, the (NIF) effectively controlled the Government. NIF
members and supporters held most key positions in the
Government, security forces, judiciary, academia, and media.
With the abolition of the RCC, the NIF further tightened its
grip on the state.
The regime controls most of Sudan, outside of parts of the
south and the Nuba mountains controlled by factions of the
Sudanese People's Liberation Army (SPLA): SPLA Mainstream, led
by John Garang, and SPLA United, led by Riak Machar. The civil
war continued throughout 1993, marked by bitter fighting
between the SPLA factions that caused widespread suffering
among the southern population.
To supplement the Sudan People's Armed Forces (SPAF) and the
militia, the Popular Defense Forces (PDF), in 1993 the regime
created the Popular Police, which, like the militia, is infused
with Islamic ideology. The mission of the Popular Police
includes encouraging proper social behavior. Martial law and
the state of emergency remained in place in 1993, permitting
arbitrary actions such as indefinite detention of opponents.
Civil war, corruption, economic mismanagement, high inflation,
and over 3.5 million internally displaced persons have
devastated Sudan's primarily agricultural economy. Starvation
and malnutrition are rife. The war has left parts of Sudan
depopulated and without effective government. Reforms aimed at
privatizing inefficient state-run firms and stimulating private
investment have failed to revive a moribund economy saddled
with massive military expenditures.
The human rights situation remained dismal in 1993, with no
sign of improvement. The Government and the SPLA factions all
committed serious human rights abuses. SPAF and PDF abuses
included massacres, kidnaping and enslavement, forced
conscription, and rape. Government forces forcibly displaced
many civilians from the Nuba mountains, conducted forced
conscription, and kidnapped or enslaved civilians. In the
areas they controlled, government forces routinely harassed,
imprisoned--often incommunicado for lengthy periods--and
tortured hundreds of opponents. The SPLA factions also engaged
in widespread killings and other abuses. In the spring,
SPLA/Mainstream forces tried to murder an international relief
worker and a journalist operating in the south. The Government
maintained myriad secret police forces, both official and
unofficial. They routinely acted as if they were a law unto
themselves, harassing, imprisoning, and torturing without
restraint opponents and suspected opponents of the regime.
Government and SPLA hindrance of international relief efforts
remained a problem throughout the year, frequently interrupting
relief flows and often causing widespread suffering. The
Government continued to repress freedoms of speech, press,
assembly, association, and political choice. Discrimination
and violence against women continued. The same lack of
freedoms prevailed in SPLA-controlled areas. In the context of
the Government's Arabization and Islamization drive,
discrimination against non-Muslims continued and included
forced Islamization. In government-controlled areas of the
south and the Nuba mountains, some Islamic nongovernmental
organization (NGO) personnel, acting with the tacit approval of
local authorities, withheld food and key services from the
needy unless they converted to Islam. Fear of Arabization and
Islamization, including the imposition of Shari'a (Islamic
law), was a key cause of opposition to a united Sudan in the
south, where most of the largely black African population are
Christians or animists.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
Official and unofficial government forces committed an
undetermined number of political killings of persons suspected
of being members or collaborators of the insurgent SPLA.
Moreover, according to reliable eyewitnesses, in February and
March security forces shot to death about 30 persons on the
beach at Suakin. There is no evidence that the victims
received any trial; nor did the authorities give prior public
notice of the executions, as required under Sudanese law.
Asked about the executions, the authorities denied that they
took place. Reportedly, SPLA forces in the Nuba mountains
summarily executed local villagers who refused to provide them
with food or clothing. SPLA factions were suspected of
conducting both political killings and extrajudicial killings
(in addition to outright massacres during combat operations)
but conclusive proof was lacking.
There are credible reports that in 1993 government security
forces beat and tortured to death detainees. According to one
such report, retired Brigadier Camillo Odong N. Loyuk was
chained by his wrists and testicles to the bars of his cell
window and beaten until he died.
b. Disappearance
Scores of persons arrested by government security forces in
Juba, following SPLA attacks on the city in the summer of 1992,
remain unaccounted for and are feared dead, including two
employees of the USAID office in Juba, Dominic Morris and
Chaplain Lake, and Michael Mutto of the U.N.'s Juba office.
Thirty-four guards from Juba prison disappeared without a trace
after the security forces took them away for interrogation.
Disappearances of persons suspected of supporting the SPLA
continued to occur routinely throughout the war zones in 1993.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
Torture, previously uncommon in Sudan outside of the war zones,
has become routine at the hands of official and unofficial
security forces. Throughout 1993, beatings of suspected
opponents upon their arrest was commonplace. For example, when
government security forces arrested dozens of students for
demonstrating against the regime in the Khartoum area in
October, they were brutally beaten. According to reliable
accounts, while in custody some students were forced to stand
for hours, their hands manacled to the ceiling of a tiny cell.
Throughout the year the security forces continued to hold
opponents--including trade unionists, politicians, and
students--incommunicado, often for months, in safe houses known
locally as ghost houses. Many prisoners were beaten upon
arrival at the ghost houses before their interrogation began.
Torture and mistreatment of ghost house inmates often continued
throughout their incarceration. In a letter passed to his
relatives, Brigadier General Mohammad Ahmed al Rizk al Faki,
held in Suakin Prison, related that he had been subjected to
psychological and physical torture, including beatings,
electric shock, rape, and partial castration. According to
former inmates, mistreatment included whipping and clubbing;
shackling and suspension by the wrists; the application of
electric shocks; burning with hot irons; submersion in hot and
cold water; prolonged blindfolding; denial of food, water,
sleep, and access to toilet facilities; confinement in
overcrowded and unsanitary quarters; deprivation of medical
care; and psychological torture, such as mock executions, and,
in the case of some female prisoners, sexual abuse. The
Government has not prosecuted any security personnel for such
abuses, although they are widely known. These abuses could not
occur without the knowledge of the highest authorities. There
were recurrent reports that SPAF, PDF, and SPLA forces in the
field periodically committed rape. According to one credible
report, in March soldiers raped displaced women in Meiram when
the military train to Wau reached the town.
Conditions in official prisons are harsh. Almost all the
prisons were built before independence in 1956, are poorly
maintained, and many lack such basic facilities as toilets and
showers. Health care is rudimentary and food inadequate.
Minors are regularly detained with adults.
Sudan's 1991 Criminal Act, based on the Shari'a, prescribes for
some offenses specific "hudood" punishments, including
amputation, stoning, and lashing. The courts handed down
several amputation sentences during the year, but none was
known to have been carried out by year's end. The Government,
however, routinely meted out lashings in the north, most often
to persons convicted of consuming alcohol, following trials
that did not meet internationally accepted standards of
fairness. Angelican Bishop Elbersh was lashed publicly in 1993
for alleged adultery. On New Year's Eve 1993, the Government
arrested and lashed several young Muslim women whom it accused
of wearing immodest dress or consuming alcohol. In one
instance of flogging in November, Kamal Mekki Medani was
flogged despite medical evidence that he suffered from
hypertension and diabetes and might not be able to withstand
the punishment.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
The 1991 Criminal Code does not address periods of detention
and security arrest. Other laws allow the Government to detain
persons without charge and without reference to the judiciary.
The state of emergency introduced following the 1989 coup
authorizes the Government to arrest persons without warrant and
detain them indefinitely without charge or trial. Under the
National Security Act, the Government may detain a suspect for
interrogation for up to 72 hours. This is renewable for up to
a month with "justification," which is not defined.
The President has the power to authorize "precautionary
detention" for up to 3 months "to preserve the general
security." In practice, he delegates this authority to
subordinate officials. A person thus detained is supposed to
be notified "in suitable time", interpreted as within these 3
months, of the reasons for detention. The President may extend
the detention for 3 more months if a magistrate approves the
extension. In practice, these legal provisions are often
ignored as the authorities often detain opponents in ghost
houses indefinitely. On occasions when extensions are formally
requested, they are rarely, if ever, denied.
Sudanese law allows for bail except in the case of accused
murderers and political opponents of the regime.
In theory, indigent defendants receive legal counsel from the
Government in the case of crimes punishable by death or life
imprisonment. However, courts do not always inform defendants
of this right. Moreover, in some cases counsel is only allowed
to advise the defendant and may not address the court. Thus,
despite some theoretical protections, Sudanese arrested by the
Government, especially by the security authorities, are likely
to suffer arbitrary treatment, including, in many cases,
incommunicado detention.
Because of the regime's secrecy and arbitrary detention
practices, it was impossible to know the exact number of
political detainees and prisoners held at the end of 1993.
Throughout the year, the Government picked up hundreds of
suspected opponents throughout the country. Some were leading
figures, such as Democratic Unionist Party leader Sid'Ahmed Al
Hussein, whose arrest was widely noted. Others were less
prominent persons whose arrests were known only to their family
and friends. While many of those arrested were held for a few
days or weeks, others were kept for months. Reasonable
estimates of the number of political detainees and prisoners in
Sudan by year's end ranged between several score and several
hundred.
Moreover, the authorities often required suspected opponents to
report in the morning to the security offices, made them wait
until the evening, then forced them to return the next day.
This de facto arrest lasted for days, weeks, or in some cases
months, during which time the victims could not earn a
livelihood.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
The Government has made the judiciary largely subservient to
it. In a 1989 decree, the RCC assumed all power over Sudan's
Constitution and laws and gave control of the judiciary to the
Ministry of Justice. The October 1993 decree dissolving the
RCC gave the power to issue constitutional decrees to the
appointed, NIF-controlled transitional National Assembly. The
Chief Justice, formerly elected by sitting judges, is now
appointed. Since 1989 the authorities have replaced hundreds
of judges considered ideologically unacceptable. Many of the
new judges have ties to the NIF. They favor strict application
of the Shari'a; many have little or no legal training.
Sudan's judicial system includes the regular courts, both
criminal and civil, the special security courts, military
courts meant mainly for military personnel, and tribal courts
which are important in rural areas, where disputes often
involve land and water rights and family matters. The 1991
Criminal Act governs criminal cases. Civil cases are still
handled largely according to the 1983 Civil Transactions Act.
In keeping with Shari'a law, a woman's testimony in court is
worth one-half that of a man's. Military trials do not meet
international standards; proceedings are secret and brief. The
1991 trial of 53 officers accused of coup plotting lasted only
a few minutes. None of the officers had legal representation.
The 1989 Special Courts Act created three-person special
security courts to deal with a wide range of offenses including
violations of constitutional decrees, emergency regulations,
and some sections of the Penal Code, as well as drug and
currency offenses. Special courts, which have a mix of
military and civilian judges, handle most security-related
cases. Attorneys may advise defendants as "friends of the
court" but normally may not address the court. Sentences are
usually severe and implemented at once. Death sentences,
however, are referred to the Chief Justice and the Head of
State. Defendants may file appeal briefs with the Chief
Justice. These courts handle most security-related cases.
The Government officially exempts the three southern states,
whose population is mostly non-Muslim, from parts of the 1991
Criminal Act. However, the Act permits the possible future
application of Shari'a in the south, if the local legislative
assemblies, envisioned in the regime's projected political
system, so decide. Moreover, in 1993 the Government
transferred most non-Muslim judges from the south to the north,
replacing them with Muslim judges. There were no reports,
however, of hudood punishments, other than lashings, carried
out by the courts in government-controlled areas of the south.
Fear of the imposition of Shari'a remained a key issue in the
rebellion.
Parts of the south fell outside effective judicial procedures
and other governmental functions. According to credible
reports, SPAF and PDF units summarily tried and punished those
accused of crimes, especially so-called offenses against civil
order. In SPLA areas, there was some reliance on traditional
justice by village elders, but the SPLA ultimately ruled by
summary methods, including beatings, torture, and arbitrary
execution.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
The Government routinely interferes with its citizens'
privacy. Throughout 1993 searches without warrants, often at
night, continued, particularly against persons suspected of
political crimes. The Government maintained a wide network of
informants who conducted pervasive surveillance, constrained
only by resource and manpower limitations. Informers were
common in schools, universities, and workplaces. Former Prime
Minister Sadiq al-Mahdi, former Communist Party Head Mohammed
Ibrahim Nugud, and other key opposition figures were under
nearly constant surveillance. In addition, the Government
continued its practice of dismissing government employees
suspected of antiregime views--particularly members of the
military, over a hundred of whom were dismissed during the
year. Security personnel often opened and read mail, including
mail delivered by courier service.
They also examined registered mail before it was sent.
Telephones were often tapped. Government-instituted
neighborhood "popular committees," ostensibly a mechanism for
political mobilization, served as a mechanism for monitoring
households. These committees caused many Sudanese to be wary
of their neighbors who, for whatever reason, could report them
for "suspicious" activities. Security officers, for instance,
investigated Sudanese for "excessive" contact with foreigners.
The committees also furnished or withheld documents essential
for obtaining exit visas from Sudan. In high schools, students
were sometimes pressured to join proregime youth groups. Some
who refused were badly beaten.
g. Use of Excessive Force and Violations of Humanitarian
Law in Internal Conflicts
The civil war was marked by bitter fighting between the rival
SPLA factions and a major government summer and fall offensive
aimed at sealing off Sudan's border with Uganda. Government
forces, pro-government tribal militias, the PDF, and the SPLA
factions commonly used excessive force and constantly violated
humanitarian norms by attacking civilian targets. Neither side
tried to investigate or punish those responsible. Sudan's Air
Force bombed indiscriminately, often using the crude tactic of
dumping bombs from transport planes on targets, including
civilian villages, in SPLA areas. In late December, the Air
Force bombed villages in the vicinity of Mundri in Western
Equatoria and Chukundum in Eastern Equatoria. In addition,
there were reliable reports that SPLA forces in the Nuba
mountains frequently killed local villagers who would not give
them food and other assistance.
All sides in the conflict were guilty of massacring civilians.
SPAF and PDF troops accompanying the February-March military
train from Babanusa to Wau fanned out in front of the train,
killing or capturing civilians they found in their path,
stealing cattle, and burning houses, fields, and granaries.
Hundreds were killed. More starved to death after losing their
crops, food supplies, and cattle.
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
The Government severely curtailed freedom of speech following
the 1989 coup. In 1993 a climate of intimidation and
surveillance, fostered in part by the Government's informer
network, continued to inhibit open, public discussion of
political issues. Radio, television, all of the print media,
and the Sudanese News Agency (SUNA) remained under the
Government's control and reflected its policies. The media
rarely mentioned, and always negatively, opposition figures.
All the print media were government-owned and controlled. The
press--the Arabic-language dailies Modern Sudan, Victory, and
National Salvation; the English-language daily New Horizon; and
various weeklies and monthlies--strongly advocated government
policies. They almost never criticized the Government, and on
the few occasions they did, the criticism was benign.
The Government appointed the chief editors of the print media,
alleviating the need for formal daily censorship. Sudan
television news had a permanent military censor to ensure that
the news reflected government views. For most of 1993, the
Minister of Information was an army brigadier. In early 1993,
the Government closed the local offices of the daily As-Asharq
al-Awsat and detained its chief correspondent, Mohammed Abdel
Sayyid, in a ghost house. The Government accused him of
espionage, treason, and illegal possession of government
documents. In the face of a mounting campaign of international
pressure, the Government released him after a month and a
half. It never brought his case to trial.
The Government adopted in mid-1993 a new Press Code that called
for privatizing existing state-owned print media and allowing
the creation of new, private newspapers. By the end of the
year, however, no existing newspapers had been privatized, and
no new private newspapers were created. Many local journalists
were skeptical about the new Code and complained that it did
not take their views into consideration. They further noted
that it restricted coverage of many issues, from military
affairs to subjects that could raise religious or racial
tensions or exacerbate social differences.
The regime complained of an anti-Sudan bias among the
international, especially Western, media. In the second half
of 1993, the Government permitted a number of foreign
journalists to enter Sudan and allowed them a degree of
freedom, letting them meet with a wide spectrum of leaders,
including some from the opposition, and allowing them to visit
war zones. The Government, however, monitored the journalists'
movements closely and on at least one occasion confiscated part
of a television crew's film.
The Government routinely confiscated issues of foreign
publications entering Sudan that had material it judged hostile
to the regime. Many respected journalists who worked in the
local media before 1989 have quit the profession, and many have
left Sudan.
Academic freedom does not exist in Sudan. The climate of
intolerance fostered by the regime--fed, for instance, by the
dismissal after the coup of many academics considered
antiregime--and its practice of brutally repressing suspected
opponents had a chilling effect on academic debate. The
Government used political and ideological criteria in
appointing new faculty.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
These freedoms were severely restricted. The declaration of
the state of emergency and martial law on June 30, 1989,
effectively eliminated the right to protest. Only government-
sponsored gatherings were permitted. The security forces broke
up demonstrations sponsored by nongovernment organizations. In
October and November, police used tear gas and baton charges to
disperse students and others who were protesting in the
Khartoum area. When riots broke out in Gedaref in February and
El Obeid and Er Rahad in October, security forces fired on the
crowds, killing several persons in each locality. Apart from a
few indigenous NGO's involved in relief work and the Sudan
Industries Association, all other private associations were
either government- or NIF-controlled.
c. Freedom of Religion
Under Sudanese law, Muslims may proselytize freely, but
non-Muslims may not proselytize Muslims. The 1991 Criminal Act
makes apostasy by Muslims punishable by death, although there
are no known cases in which this sentence has been applied.
Some Muslim converts to Christianity were, however, harassed in
1993 by local authorities. Two villagers from a small
community of Arab Christians at Abdullahi, near Umm Rawaba,
were arrested in August, imprisoned for several days, and
threatened with death if they did not convert back to Islam.
The Foreign Missionary Societies Act of 1962 subjects public
Christian religious activity to close government supervision.
It forbids the construction of churches without government
permits; none has been issued for over 10 years. Missionary
groups need licenses to proselytize; the licenses specify where
they may operate and restrict their activities outside these
areas. Foreign missionaries need special permission, which is
difficult to obtain and easy to lose, to work in Sudan The
Sudan Catholic Bishops' Conference (SCBC), the Sudan Council of
Churches (SCC), an umbrella group that includes all of Sudan's
Christian churches, and the Copts all faced restrictions
stemming from the Act, which local officials often interpreted
capriciously. Christians have generally experienced few
problems building churches in government-controlled areas of
southern Sudan. In the predominately Muslim areas of northern
Sudan, however, Christians have not received a government
permit to build a church, and no new churches have been built,
since the early 1970's.
Non-Muslims complained throughout 1993 of pervasive,
multifaceted pressure in favor of Islam and against other
religions. The authorities regard Islam not just as a faith,
but also as the basis of Sudan's Arab culture. Thus, almost
every subject matter in the schools is infused with Islam and
the Koran, to which Muslims and non-Muslims alike are exposed.
In the popular defense forces, all trainees, including
non-Muslims, received indoctrination in the Islamic faith.
There were reliable reports in some war zones, particularly the
Nuba mountains, that government forces closed churches and
restricted the movements of Christian clergy. In
government-held parts of the south and the Nuba Mountains, some
Islamic NGO personnel withheld food and key services from the
needy unless they converted to Islam. The local authorities
appeared to condone, at least tacitly, these practices.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
Government restrictions hampered freedom of movement. All
Sudanese needed to obtain exit visas before leaving the
country. Numerous individual Sudanese and some categories of
persons (such as policemen and other security personnel) were
often denied exit visas. The authorities kept lists of
political figures and other Sudanese not permitted to travel
abroad. In one case, the authorities refused leading southern
Sudanese opposition politician Eliaba Surur permission to
attend the U.S. Institute for Peace Conference on Sudan because
of his dissident activities in Khartoum. Security officials
sometimes made arbitrary decisions on the issuance or
cancellation of exit visas. In addition, as tensions with
Egypt rose in the first half of 1993, Sudanese authorities
denied most requests for travel to Egypt.
An evening curfew, imposed when the new regime seized power in
1989, was lifted in November.
Some former political detainees were forbidden to travel
outside of Khartoum. Other Sudanese were able to move about
the country, but those who failed to produce an identity card
at one of the numerous checkpoints risked being arrested and
even beaten. This was especially true of southerners in the
north.
Nondiplomatic foreigners needed permits, which were hard to
obtain and often refused, well in advance for all in-country
travel outside of Khartoum. (Diplomats could travel freely to
many locations.) Foreigners had to register with the police on
entering the country, seek permission to move from one location
to another, and register again at each new location within 3
days of arrival. Foreign NGO staff sometimes faced
difficulties in obtaining entry visas or work or travel permits
once they were in country.
Tens of thousands of persons, largely southerners and
westerners displaced by famine and civil war, continued to live
in squatter slums in the Khartoum area. In a reprise, on a
smaller scale, of the massive destructions of squatter
settlements in 1992, in 1993 the Government razed hundreds of
these squatter dwellings. Thousands were made homeless; some
were forced to relocate to primitive resettlement sites outside
the city, where conditions were harsh and distances from
employment opportunities great. Many of these people had been
in Khartoum for years; some even had title to the land. The
Government promised to give those who had titles new plots of
land elsewhere. NGO's attempting to provide food or health
care in the resettlement camps often had problems securing
access from the Government.
Sudan was generally hospitable to refugees. At the end of the
year, the refugee population (largely composed of Ethiopians
and Eritreans) was about 630,000, about half of whom received
assistance from the United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees (UNHCR). There were no reports of forcible
repatriation of refugees in 1993. UNHCR resettlement of
refugees to third countries proceeded smoothly.
Refugees could not become resident aliens or citizens of Sudan,
regardless of their length of stay. However, a large number of
refugees were tolerated and found employment, although
typically in menial occupations, in the cities, especially in
the capital area.
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government
The people of Sudan had neither the right nor the ability to
change their government peacefully. In 1992 the RCC instituted
an appointed "Transitional National Assembly" (TNA). The main
activity of this rubber-stamp body, however, was to ratify
legislation proposed by the executive. The RCC dissolved
itself in October, making its chairman President of the
Republic and transferring to him most of its powers. The
courts had no authority to review acts of the RCC or the Head
of State.
Claiming that sectarian bickering was harmful to Sudan, in 1989
the regime abolished all political parties. In 1990 the RCC,
rejecting both multiparty and one-party systems, adopted a
Libyan-style political structure based on ascending levels of
nonpartisan assemblies, some of whose members are elected in
nonpartisan elections, and the others government-appointed.
The Government is currently implementing the system, which the
NIF is thoroughly manipulating and controlling, at the
provincial and state levels. The lack of basic freedoms of
assembly, speech, and press, the absence of political parties,
the rigging of the participatory process, and the significant
proportion of appointed members make the system essentially
undemocratic.
Government rhetoric gave high priority to ending the civil
war. Yet, by the end of the year, despite Nigerian mediation
and peace talks with both SPLA factions in Abuja, Nigeria, and
with SPLA/United in Nairobi, Kenya, there had been no progress
toward peace. For much of the spring the Government and the
SPLA observed a cease-fire, which collapsed in the summer as
the Government launched a major offensive. The rival SPLA
factions continued to fight intermittently throughout the
year. At year's end several efforts at mediation between the
SPLA factions and the SPLA and the Government were under way,
conducted by neighboring states, church groups, and former U.S.
President Carter. However, the commitment of the various
warring parties to peace was unclear, and prospects for
successful negotiations seemed dim.
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
of Human Rights
The Government tried to stamp out any domestic criticism on
human rights issues, frequently and vehemently denying any
human rights abuses. Almost all of the relatively few local,
independent human rights monitors have been arrested and
detained at one point or another since the 1989 coup. In 1991
the Government created the Sudan Human Rights Organization
(SHRO)--not to be confused with the previous SHRO, which the
regime dissolved after the 1989 coup--to defend its human
rights record. This organization has yet to criticize the
Government. In an attempt to demonstrate the regime's concern
for human rights, the TNA adopted in 1993 the "Sudan Document
of Human Rights" and created a Human Rights Committee. The
latter, however, has been no more critical of government human
rights abuses than has the SHRO.
The Sudan Catholic Bishops Conference (SCBC) and the Sudan
Council of Churches (SCC) continued to seek to monitor and
publicize human rights abuses, especially those involving
religious discrimination.
The Government was highly defensive about foreign criticism of
its human rights record. It vehemently attacked Amnesty
International for criticizing Sudan's human rights record. In
September the Government allowed Gaspar Biro, the U.N.'s
Special Rapporteur on Human Rights in Sudan, to visit the
country. Although Biro was able to travel to some sensitive
areas, including the Nuba mountains, the Government tried to
restrict his access to dissidents. It arrested several persons
for meeting or trying to meet with him--including several
spouses of political prisoners. The police clubbed and
arrested the women as they assembled peacefully in front of the
U.N. offices in Khartoum where Biro was working. The
Government subsequently accused Biro and the U.N. Human Rights
Commission of being biased against Sudan.
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Disability, Language, or Social Status
Women
Sudanese laws and traditions favor men over women, and women
traditionally have been relegated to segregated roles. Islamic
laws of inheritance award additional property to men, while
assigning them the duty of caring for their extended families.
Under traditional Shari'a law, a woman inherits half as much of
the estate as a man with the same degree of kinship.
Discrimination against women in professional positions
continued to increase in 1993.
Though there are no women in the highest ranks of government,
women in lesser positions play a modest role in day-to-day
government operations. The TNA included some women members.
The NIF did not, however, encourage women's involvement in
politics, viewing this as contradicting their traditional
role. Education was open to both sexes, and many women
obtained university training. Women, however, traditionally
receive less education and have fewer opportunities than men.
Small numbers of women were found in the professions, the
police, and the military. They also formed sexually segregated
units within the PDF.
Since 1991, government directives require that women working in
government offices and female students and teachers conform to
Islamic dress codes. This is defined as nondecorative,
"modest" clothing covering the entire body except for the face,
hands, and feet. The Government enforces the new regulations,
particularly in the schools and other public institutions. On
New Year's Eve several Muslim women were arrested and lashed
for wearing clothing that did not conform with the Government's
version of modest dress.
Violence against women appears to be common although accurate
statistics do not exist. Wife beating reportedly is common.
The Government did not address the issue of domestic violence
against women; nor was it discussed publicly. The police do
not normally intervene in domestic disputes, and there were no
reports of court cases involving violence against women in
1993. For a variety of cultural reasons, many women are
reluctant to file formal complaints against such abuse. Women
refugees were particularly vulnerable to harassment and sexual
abuse.
Among some southern tribes, rape is common. No blame attached
to the practice, although the man involved must pay the woman's
family if she becomes pregnant. Among some ethnic groups,
wives are taken on a trial basis lasting up 4 years. The
husband may dissolve the marriage during this period by
returning the wife to her family, although he must pay a price
for each child born during this time. Such wives reportedly
are able to contract further marriages and are not stigmatized
by having been returned.
Children
The Government demonstrated no significant concern for the
rights and welfare of children. A considerable number of
children suffered serious abuses, including occasional
enslavement, in the war zones.
Female genital mutilation (circumcision) remains common in
Sudan. Reports indicated that the practice, though illegal, is
widespread, especially in the north. Some reports suggest that
over 90 percent of northern Sudanese females have been so
mutilated, with consequences that sometimes has included severe
urinary problems, infections, and even death.
The so-called Pharaonic mutilation (infibulation), the severest
of the three types, is the most common and is usually performed
on girls between the ages of 4 and 7 years. Because few
physicians will perform the operation, it is most often done by
paramedical personnel in improvised, unsanitary conditions,
with severe pain and trauma to the child. Southern women
displaced to the north reportedly are increasingly imposing
circumcision upon their daughters, even if they themselves have
not been subjected to it.
The Government's Administration for the Rehabilitation of
Street Children runs several camps near Khartoum and other
cities for children who are found living in the streets. The
management of several of these camps is entrusted to an Islamic
NGO. Children in the camps may not leave without permission,
and undergo a militarized regimen that includes strict
discipline and physical and military exercises. Health care
and schooling in the camps is reportedly poor. All the inmates
must study the Koran, although there is reason to believe that
a number of them are not Muslims.
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities
Sudan's population of 24.9 million (1993 census) is a
multiethnic mix of over 500 Arab and African tribes, with
scores of languages and dialects. There are primarily two
cultures in Sudan: the Arab, Muslim culture in the north and
central areas and the non-Muslim, black African culture in the
south. The west has a smaller population of Muslim black
Africans. Northern Muslims, who form a majority of about 16
million, have traditionally dominated the Government. Most
southern ethnic groups want independence, or, at a minimum, the
right to self-determination.
The NIF-dominated regime pursued religious, ethnic, and
ideological discrimination in almost every aspect of society.
The Muslim Arab majority in the north practiced widespread
discrimination against the several million displaced non-Arabs
from the south. Residents in Arabic-speaking areas who do not
themselves speak Arabic are discriminated against in education,
jobs, and other opportunities.
The Arabization of instruction in higher education
discriminates against non-Arabs. To compete for study at a
university, students completing high school must pass
examinations in four subjects: English, mathematics, Arabic,
and religious studies. The examinations for all the subjects
except English are given in Arabic, disadvantaging those whose
native tongue is not Arabic. As the entire university
curriculum is now in Arabic, this disadvantage continues
throughout higher education. Widespread popular attitudes in
northern areas stereotype darker-skinned non-Arabs as inferior
and lazy.
Religious Minorities
In government-controlled areas of the south, there was evidence
of a policy of Islamization, as non-Muslim civil servants were
often replaced by NIF supporters. In the north, some
non-Muslims lost their jobs in the civil service, the
judiciary, and other professions. Copts noted that whereas a
decade or two ago they were well-represented in key professions
like banking, in recent years the Government has hired no Copts
for such jobs. In 1993 few non-Muslim university graduates
found government jobs at all. Frequent dismissals in the
police and army purged professionals to make room for NIF
supporters. Businesses owned and operated by non-Muslims
experienced overt discrimination, such as denial of trading
licenses, or petty harassment.
The Khartoum State government decreed in 1993 that women could
not enter official buildings unless their dress met Islamic
standards of modesty. All Sudanese public school girls,
regardless of faith, must wear Islamic-style uniforms and
scarves. In 1993 the State of Khartoum also put pressure on
local private Christian schools in an attempt to make their
female students wear scarves.
Although Sudanese law recognizes Sudan as a multireligious
country, official tolerance of non-Muslims remained low in
1993. Muslims are in the majority in Sudan and predominate in
the north, but they are in the minority in the mostly Christian
or animist south. There are also 1 to 2 million or more
displaced southerners, mostly Christians or animists, and about
half a million Christian Copts in the north. The Government
holds that Islam, the dominant faith, must inspire the state's
laws, institutions, and policies. The Government, however,
states that other religions should be respected and freedom of
worship guaranteed. Seeking to demonstrate a commitment to
freedom of religion, the Government invited the Pope to visit
Sudan, which he did for a day in February. Yet, despite
official statements about tolerance, many non-Muslims faced
various restrictions on their freedom to practice their
religion.
People with Disabilities
The Government has not enacted any special legislation or taken
other steps to mandate accessibility to public buildings for
the disabled.
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
Although Sudan had a strong labor union movement during the
Government of Sadiq al-Mahdi, the RCC abolished the precoup
labor unions and forbade strikes. Stiff punishments, including
the death penalty, were prescribed for violations of labor
decrees. Government officials condemned--usually
falsely--union activists as "Communists." Many labor leaders
were dismissed from their jobs or detained, although most of
those arrested were later freed. In 1993, however, the
Government detained scores of union activists suspected of
antiregime activities. In May the International Labor
Organization (ILO) Committee on Freedom of Association deplored
the Government's detention of four trade unionists and its lack
of response to allegations of torture against three of them.
In September 1989, the regime established preliminary,
government-controlled steering committees to manage union
affairs, pending the drafting of new laws on union
organization. The Sudan Workers Trade Unions Federation
(SWTUF), the leading blue-collar labor organization, with about
800,000 members, was restored with its leadership unchanged and
its assets returned, but under tight government steering
committee control. Besides SWTUF, there was a Professional and
Employees' Trade Union Federation.
The Government established further steering committees in
1990. A new labor law went into effect in 1992, and union
elections at the local level took place that year, after a
delay to permit the steering committees to arrange the
outcomes. The elections resulted in government-approved slates
of candidates voted into office by prearranged acclamation.
The Government continued to forbid strikes, and there were none
in 1993. Unions remained free to form federations and
affiliate with international bodies, such as the African
Workers' Union and the Arab Workers' Union.
The U.S. Government in 1991 suspended Sudan's eligibility for
trade benefits under the Generalized System of Preferences
because of its violations of worker rights.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
An RCC constitutional decree of June 30, 1989, suspended the
right to organize and bargain collectively. These rights were
restored to organizing committees in September of the same
year. However, government control of the steering committees
and the continued absence of labor legislation allowing union
meetings, filing of grievances, and other union activity
greatly reduced the value of these rights. Although local
union officials raised some grievances with employers, few
carried them to the Government. No collective bargaining takes
place in practice. Wages are set by a government-appointed and
-controlled wage council which includes representatives from
the Ministries of Labor and Finance, the private sector, and
the trade unions.
The Government announced in 1993 the creation of two export
processing zones on the Red Sea coast. At year's end, however,
it was unclear whether or not Sudanese labor laws would apply
fully in these zones.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
Sudanese law prohibits forced or compulsory labor.
Nonetheless, slavery has persisted in Sudan. The taking of
slaves, particularly in war zones, and their export to parts of
central and northern Sudan were recurrent practices in 1993.
The captives were forced to do agricultural and domestic work,
and some women were made to serve as concubines. Although in
some cases local authorities took action to stop instances of
slavery, in others the authorities chose to look the other
way. There were a number of unverified reports that some
captives were being exported to Libya. The International Labor
Organization (ILO), in its 1993 World Labor Report, noted that
traditional slavery survived in modern-day Sudan and "even
seemed to be on the increase" in the context of the ongoing
civil war. Also in 1993, the ILO's Committee of Experts on the
Application of Conventions and Recommendations expressed regret
that the Government of Sudan had failed to provide its report
responding to allegations of slavery. The annual ILO
conference in June therefore cited Sudan for the third time in
a "special paragraph," its severest form of criticism.
The SPLA often continued to force southern men to work as
laborers or porters or forcibly conscripted them into SPLA
ranks. In disputed territories, this practice was implemented
through raids, while in areas firmly under SPLA control it was
done through the SPLA-appointed village leaders.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
The legal minimum age for workers is 16, but the law is loosely
enforced by inspectors from the Ministry of Labor in the
official or wage economy. In addition, gross poverty in Sudan
has produced widespread child labor in the informal,
unregulated economy. In rural areas, children traditionally
assist their families with agricultural work from a very young
age.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
The legislated minimum wage is enforced by the Ministry of
Labor, which maintains field offices in most major Sudanese
urban centers. Employers generally respect the minimum wage.
Workers who are denied the minimum wage may file a grievance
with the local Ministry of Labor field office, which is then
supposed to investigate and take appropriate action if there
has been a violation of the law. In late 1993, the Government
increased the minimum wage to approximately $15 (4,900 Sudanese
pounds) per month. Given Sudan's soaring inflation, however,
living standards for the average Sudanese worker continued to
deteriorate. Conservative estimates by nongovernmental
institutions estimate that in a major urban center, a Sudanese
family of 4 required by the end of 1993 at least $36 (12,000
pounds) per month to meet its most basic needs.
The workweek is limited by law to 6 days and 48 hours, with a
day of rest on Friday. Although Sudanese laws prescribe health
and safety standards, working conditions were generally poor
and enforcement by the Ministry of Labor minimal.
[end of document]
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