| The State Department web site below is a permanent electronic archive of information released prior to January 20, 2001. Please see www.state.gov for material released since President George W. Bush took office on that date. This site is not updated so external links may no longer function. Contact us with any questions about finding information. NOTE: External links to other Internet sites should not be construed as an endorsement of the views contained therein. |
TITLE: SOUTH AFRICA HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES, 1993
DATE: JANUARY 31, 1994
AUTHOR: U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
SOUTH AFRICA
South Africa underwent sweeping political change during 1993.
In December the Transitional Executive Council (TEC), a
multiparty, multiracial body, was given broad administrative
and monitoring powers in the period leading up to the April
1994 elections--the first elections in South Africa open to all
citizens regardless of race. The implementation of the TEC
marked the first time in South African history that the black
majority (75.5 percent) participated in the official political
process. Nevertheless, through most of the year South Africa
continued to be governed by a system that kept virtually all
real power in the hands of the white minority (13 percent of
the population). The National Party, in power since 1948 and
currently led by State President de Klerk, continued to rule
the country.
The Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP), the Conservative Party (CP),
and several other conservative groups suspended their further
participation in the negotiations process as a result of the
decision to hold the national election next April 27.
Subsequently, the remaining parties reached agreement on
establishing, in addition to the TEC, independent bodies to run
the election and regulate state-controlled media in the
pre-election period.
In December the Parliament ratified an interim constitution and
bill of rights which for the first time guarantee all South
Africans such rights as universal suffrage, equal protection
under the law, and freedom of speech, assembly, association,
and religion. The constitution is to be enacted by
proclamation on April 27, 1994; provision has been made to
enable earlier implementation of certain portions of the
constitution and bill of rights, but these steps had not been
taken by year's end.
The interim constitution also provides for the dismantling of
the homelands system, but at the end of the year the 10
homelands were still in place. The homelands are heavily
subsidized by the Government, some are fragmented parcels of
territory in impoverished rural areas, and all are
agriculturally backward areas without the infrastructure needed
for development. Of the four so-called independent homelands
(collectively known as the TBVC states), which only the South
African Government recognized as sovereign, Transkei, Ciskei,
and Venda are ruled by military governments, while
Bophuthatswana is governed as a one-party state. Authorities
in Bophuthatswana and Ciskei, in particular, continued to
suppress free political activity, especially that of the
African National Congress (ANC). The six so-called
self-governing homelands are Gazankulu, KaNgwane, KwaNdebele,
KwaZulu, Lebowa, and Qwaqwa. According to 1990 census data,
the homelands, which comprise 13 percent of the country's
territory, are home to 33 percent of South Africa's black
population.
The Government is backed by a powerful security establishment.
The South African Defense Force (SADF) has about 65,000 active
duty personnel, consisting of 25,000 white conscripts and
40,000 permanent force personnel, approximately two-thirds of
whom are black, Asian, or "coloured." Additionally, the armed
forces of the so-called independent homelands, which are
expected to be absorbed into the new national defense force,
number approximately 9,800. The reserve forces, which form the
bulk of available military manpower in South Africa, are all
white and consist of a citizen force of 180,000 and 155,000
reservists. The multiracial South African Police (SAP) numbers
112,000 and is 40 percent white. The officer corps in both the
SADF and the SAP is overwhelmingly white. The SADF assisted
the police in patrolling the so-called unrest areas and
continued to be active in responding to the heightened violence
in Natal and the Transvaal. Members of the SADF and the SAP
were responsible for human rights abuses during the year. The
Internal Stability Unit, a part of the SAP, has been
discredited by its heavy-handed tactics. The homelands
security forces continued to be funded by the South African
Government and were run largely by SAP and SADF members
seconded by the Government.
Some opposition groups and human rights organizations continued
to allege that a "third force," made up of rogue security force
members, engaged in or orchestrated various violent incidents
to upset the political transition. While credible evidence
existed of individuals within the security forces fomenting
violence, there was no evidence of a widespread, high-level
conspiracy within the security forces to undertake such
activities. In December the Commission of Inquiry Regarding
the Prevention of Public Violence and Intimidation, also known
as the Goldstone Commission, found "credible evidence" that a
five-man hit squad was responsible for the deaths in Natal of
ANC members as well as supporters of the IFP and other
organizations. The three men arrested in the case were former
members of the KwaZulu police and had received training from
the SADF. Further arrests were expected at the end of 1993.
Several paramilitary organizations and homelands security
forces outside the central Government were accused credibly of
human rights abuses, including targeting political opponents
for elimination and carrying out extrajudicial killings. The
KwaZulu Police were unequivocally charged by the Goldstone
Commission of operating a hit squad specifically targeting IFP
opponents. The Azanian People's Liberation Army (APLA), the
armed wing of the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC), claimed
responsibility for attacks on police and civilian targets. The
Afrikaner Resistance Movement (AWB) expressed determination to
defend Afrikaners against "black domination." Although
Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK), the armed wing of the ANC, suspended
its armed struggle, some of its operatives, particularly in
Natal, have been credibly accused of targeting political
opponents.
South Africa has a well-developed industrial economy based on
mining and manufacturing and smaller, but important, sectors
based on agriculture and services. It has a mixed economy,
with substantial government intervention and a number of
state-owned enterprises existing jointly with a strong private
sector. A chief characteristic of the private sector is the
high concentration of ownership by a small group of integrated
conglomerate structures.
Although South Africa's deepest and most protracted recession
since the 1930's appeared to have bottomed out in early 1993,
there has been no net increase in jobs in the productive
sectors in more than a decade, and per capita income among all
races has fallen. Unemployment in the formal sector is
approximately 40 percent. According to government statistics,
nearly half of all employable blacks are either unemployed or
work in the informal sector; 350,000 new job seekers of all
races were expected to enter the job market during the year.
Average per capita income in the homelands was lower than in
South Africa proper. Many of the employable residents living
in the homelands typically migrate or commute to more
prosperous areas of the country in search of work.
While the Government has increased spending on blacks in recent
years, major economic and social reform will be required to
reduce income disparities and to redress the socioeconomic
legacies of apartheid in such areas as education, housing, and
health care. Human rights groups estimate that 7.5 million
blacks have no permanent shelter.
Certain areas in South Africa are awash in violence, much of it
criminally motivated. Political violence, a component of the
overall violence continued at a high level in 1993. According
to the Human Rights Commission (HRC), 4,364 people died from
politically related violence during the year. Most observers
agreed that all parties, including the ANC, the IFP, and
government security forces bear some measure of responsibility
for the continuing pattern of violence, despite the 1991
National Peace Accord signed by State President de Klerk, ANC
President Mandela, IFP Chief Minister Buthelezi, and 23 others.
Positive developments in the area of worker rights continued in
1993, including the passage in September of legislation to
expand the legal rights of agricultural and domestic workers.
Bills to promote the equality of men and women and to protect
women against violence from their spouses were also enacted.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
Certain areas in South Africa are awash in violence, much of it
criminally motivated. Political violence, a component of the
overall violence in South Africa, continued at a high level in
1993; the HRC documented 4,364 politically related deaths
during the year. The HRC reported that over 250 police and
security personnel lost their lives in political violence
during the year; this was a record high. A major cause of
political killings was violent confrontations between ANC and
IFP followers. Another important cause of deaths was the
series of apparently random attacks by unknown terrorists
intent on disrupting South Africa's movement toward nonracial
democracy by aggravating tensions between the ANC and IFP.
Evidence of acts of political violence by individuals attached
to the military, police, and homelands police continued to
emerge in 1993. Human rights organizations alleged that in
some cases these individuals were part of a conspiracy--the
so-called third force--to disrupt the political transition. A
preliminary report of the Goldstone Commission concluded that
the PAC's military wing, APLA, may have used Transkei as a
springboard for attacks against members of the police, the
military, and white civilians in general. Other groups which
contributed to the high level of violence and extrajudicial
killings included rightwing organizations, local self-defense
units (SDU's), criminal gangs which claimed affiliation with
political parties, and ill-disciplined labor strike enforcers.
The ANC-IFP conflict often took the form of fighting between
hostel residents, usually but not always affiliated with the
IFP, and residents of nearby townships and informal
settlements, frequently identified with the ANC. Black South
Africans of all ages, gender, political affiliation, and ethnic
grouping were affected. Train and taxi commuters, passersby,
and people in their own homes were victims of violent attack.
Many township youths, some with affiliation to the MK or South
African Communist Party (SACP), formed armed SDU's, purportedly
to protect residents from outside attack. In fact, many SDU's
have been accused of vigilante-style murders of suspected
"informers" or IFP sympathizers, acts of intimidation, such as
demands for "protection" money from local shopkeepers, and
common crimes such as car theft. ANC leader Chris Hani said
shortly before his death that the ANC was unable to control
certain SDU's that had branched into criminal activities.
KwaZulu in Natal Province also experienced continuous high
levels of violence. Both IFP and ANC officials have made
credible allegations that their supporters were deliberately
targeted by the other party for assassination, as cycles of
revenge killings continued. According to the Independent Board
of Inquiry, 27 ANC officials were killed in 1993, while 12 IFP
officials were killed during the year.
Chris Hani was assassinated by a white rightwing zealot in
April. In October the Rand Supreme Court sentenced to death
the gunman and one accomplice, who was a leader in the CP. A
trial was to take place against another defendant for his role
in an alleged plot to assassinate SACP chairman Joe Slovo,
though the charges were subsequently dropped. In July police
officers and bodyguards for ANC Deputy President Walter Sisulu
clashed, resulting in the death of an ANC bodyguard.
Authorities investigating the incident reported the death to be
accidental.
On December 13, in a gruesome racist attack in Randfontein,
several white men in camouflage uniform forced two cars off the
road and shot their black occupants, several of whom were
children, killing three and injuring four.
Whites in South Africa were also the victims of violent
attack. In July masked gunmen shot and threw grenades at a
congregation attending services in St. James Church in Cape
Town, killing 11 and injuring over 50. Other whites were slain
in attacks on tour buses and private cars. Patrons of bars and
clubs were attacked in several incidents, including a highly
publicized December incident in which masked gunmen attacked a
Cape Town pub, killing four people. Although in many instances
responsibility for these attacks remained unclear, individuals
purporting to speak for APLA, the PAC's military wing, claimed
responsibility for some of them.
Government investigations of violent deaths in black areas have
been inadequate. ANC officials noted the disparity between the
hundreds of personnel devoted to round up black activists
suspected in the St. James Church massacre and the resources
deployed a week earlier when 33 people were killed in a violent
rampage in Tembisa Township in the Witwatersrand.
In late 1992, President de Klerk directed Lieutenant General
Pierre Steyn to investigate allegations of SADF involvement in
a destabilization campaign against the ANC and MK. Steyn
reportedly presented his findings to the Government during the
year, but no report was made public.
While credible evidence existed of individuals within the
security forces fomenting violence, there was no evidence of a
widespread, high-level conspiracy within the security forces to
undertake such activities.
In October various incidents occurred that implicated members
of the SAP in extrajudicial killings. In one incident
Wellington Mbili, a member of MK, the ANC's military wing, died
in police custody. Police claimed they shot Mbili in self
defense, but eyewitnesses said Mbili was handcuffed in SAP
custody following his apprehension.
According to the HRC, the number of deaths in detention
decreased from 123 in 1992 to 36 in 1993. The HRC said that
such figures are based on media reports, because the police
have been unforthcoming to the HRC. The decline in numbers may
be due in part to greater media scrutiny and to an agreement
permitting officials of the International Committee of the Red
Cross (ICRC) to make unannounced visits to detainees in police
stations throughout South Africa. Under the agreement, ICRC
delegates can meet detainees alone, make unannounced followup
visits and pass their findings to higher governmental
officials. However, deaths continued to occur under highly
suspicious circumstances (see also Section 1.c.).
On April 14, Sam Tambane, secretary of the ANC's Soweto branch,
and three others were killed when police opened fire on a crowd
protesting the assassination of ANC leader Chris Hani.
Independent witnesses denied police claims that they acted in
self defense. The Government announced an investigation into
the incident.
In February Michael Thithi, who claimed he was assaulted by
police during an interrogation, also reportedly witnessed the
beating death of his coaccused, Johannes Malekek Matsubukane,
during police interrogation.
Inquests conducted in 1993 concerning the deaths of
antiapartheid activists during the 1980's revealed that
operatives carried out political killings on the orders of
high-ranking government officials.
In December the Goldstone Commission released credible
evidence, based on an investigation conducted by the KwaZulu
Police Commissioner, that a number of hit squads had been
operating in Natal. The three men arrested in the case were
former members of the KwaZulu police and had received training
from the SADF. Further arrests were expected at the end of
1993. Goldstone reported the high "probability" that the hit
squad had been responsible for the murder of nine ANC members,
supporters of the IFP, and others. Violence in Esikhawini in
northern Natal decreased dramatically following the arrest of
the KZP officers implicated in the hit squad investigation.
In a separate incident allegedly involving KwaZulu Police
attacks on ANC supporters, the ANC claimed some of its
supporters in Khojane village were killed in September by
attackers from a nearby IFP/KwaZulu government military
training camps. Information about such training camps is often
shrouded in some mystery. For example, in September, after the
press reported on an alleged KwaZulu training camp in Umfolozi
Game reserve, IFP Chief Minister Buthelezi confirmed that the
KwaZulu Parliament had established a camp to train SDU's for
Zulu protection.
In May the Ciskei Council of State granted unconditional
indemnity from prosecution to all members of the Ciskei Defense
Force (CDF) involved in the 1992 Bisho massacre, in which CDF
troops killed 29 and injured hundreds of ANC marchers. In
October Oupa Gqozo, the homeland's military leader, was cleared
of charges that he murdered Charles Sebe, the former commander
of the CDF in 1991.
b. Disappearance
There were no known cases of antigovernment activists
disappearing during 1993.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
The Government has established guidelines and regulations
prohibiting torture of detainees. Any cases of torture were
violations of government regulations. Nevertheless, court
testimony and sworn affidavits continued to allege that members
of the SAP and homelands police mistreated detainees severely,
though the incidence of such violations continued to decline.
The HRC reported allegations of beatings, electric shock, and
partial suffocation.
Michael Thithi reported being assaulted by police during an
interrogation. A district surgeon reportedly found no signs of
the assault, but after Thithi disputed that report, another
court-ordered examination indicated that he had indeed been
beaten. In February, three ANC members charged with a 1992
murder alleged that they were severely beaten while in custody
of the Ciskei security police. The men were allegedly denied
medical attention after the assault. The ANC also alleged that
Robert Manope was assaulted by the Boputhatswana police after
being summoned to the Mogwase station and accused of recruiting
for the ANC. These allegations were backed with a medical
report indicating that Manope suffered extensive bruising over
most of his body.
Also according to HRC data, an MK member was assaulted and
tortured in a Soweto police station on May 21. She alleged
being hit with a rifle and pistol butts and subjected to
electric shock. In May a PAC member alleged being beaten and
threatened with indecent assault while undergoing interrogation
at a Durban police station. In August Sibusiso Zulu, accused
of murder in the March 1993 "Table Mountain Massacre" in which
six schoolchildren were slain, told the court that he was
assaulted by policemen during interrogation in an effort to
extract a confession from him.
On August 24, the Rand Supreme Court granted the ANC an interim
order interdicting the Ministers of Defense and Law and Order,
the heads of Modderbee and Boksburg prisons, and 8 East Rand
police station commanders and the forces under their commands
from assaulting, abusing, threatening, or ill-treating 123
detainees under their custody. The court action followed
allegations that a number of East Rand detainees had been
assaulted while in custody.
The ICRC has access to all detainees in South African and
homeland prisons and can report substandard prison conditions
to authorities.
In August the Motsuenyane Commission, an ANC-appointed body,
released results of its investigation of human rights abuses in
ANC camps during the organization's years of exile. The report
cited numerous instances of murder, torture, beatings, solitary
confinement, and imprisonment without trial and named
individuals directly and indirectly involved in the abuses,
some of whom are now high-ranking ANC officials. The ANC
accepted the conclusions of the report and made a public
apology, but did not respond to nor provide an accounting of
all those alleged to have disappeared or been mistreated. Many
observers criticized the ANC for not punishing the perpetrators
or compensating the victims. The ANC called for the
establishment of a truth commission to investigate human rights
abuses across the political spectrum and to arrange for victim
compensation. By the end of 1993, no such commission was
established.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
In November the multiparty negotiating council agreed to repeal
the Public Safety Act (PSA) and the Internal Security Act (ISA)
--laws permitting authorities to detain individuals without
charge. As of year's end, the necessary legislation was
approved but had not yet gone into effect.
The PSA authorized warrantless searches and detentions for up
to 30 days in order to combat or prevent public disturbance,
disorder, riot, or public violence, or in order to maintain or
restore public order in unrest areas. Several human rights
organizations criticized the Government for invoking the PSA
excessively in order to declare unrest areas. At the end of
the year, 15 magisterial districts remained unrest areas under
the PSA.
The ISA allowed the police to detain and interrogate persons
suspected of terrorism or subversion or of withholding
information about such crimes for a period up to 10 days
without arrest; continued incarceration required judicial
approval. A detainee did not have an automatic right to legal
counsel during the first 10 days of detention and the right to
legal advice was limited to the preparation of opposition to an
application by the authorities extending the detention period.
The ISA permitted 14 days of preventive detention.
The HRC reported that during 1993 a total of 622 people were
detained under the PSA or ISA. According to Lawyers for Human
Rights (LHR), the police generally do not block access to such
detainees.
According to the HRC, detentions in most of the so-called
independent homelands were down sharply. The HRC reported no
detentions in Transkei, Ciskei, or Venda during 1993.
Bophuthatswana, however, detained 153 people under security
legislation during 1993.
In many cities, street children were arrested and held in adult
jails or prisons while awaiting trial. While some were
arrested on criminal charges, many were arrested for such petty
offenses as loitering. These children were often held in
overcrowded cells, and sometimes suffered physical or sexual
abuse. Most jails and prisons have no educational or
counseling facilities.
There were no reported cases of exile.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
Judicial independence continued to strengthen in South Africa
in 1993, as it had in recent years. Allegations of political
interference with the courts are few and declining. Moreover,
during 1993 the South African bench took up a number of cases,
such as the Webster and Goniwe inquests, which further exposed
abuses during the apartheid era. The degree of politicization
in judicial selection appears to be diminishing. Members of
the Constitutional Court, which will come into effect in 1994
as the supreme judicial body on all constitutional matters,
including the bill of rights, will be appointed by a process
that further attenuates the influence of political parties.
Persons charged with common crimes are generally presumed
innocent until proven guilty, but Parliament has modified the
general presumption of innocence for some security offenses.
Both security-related and common criminal cases are tried in
civilian courts.
Although defendants in criminal cases may retain legal counsel,
a 1991 study found that 71 percent of those convicted in
ordinary criminal cases had no representation. A pilot public
defender's program, begun in Johannesburg in 1991, has been
highly successful. Courts usually appoint counsel for capital
cases when the defendant cannot afford a lawyer.
Intimidation of participants in the legal process undermined
the administration of justice. For example, several witnesses
to the murder of American Amy Biehl, who were prepared to
testify against her suspected murderers, were threatened and
intimidated from testifying, forcing the prosecution to drop
charges against several of the accused.
The judiciary is headed by the Appellate Division (court of
appeals) of the Supreme Court in Bloemfontein and six regional
supreme courts. Only 1 of the 142 judges of the appellate
division and the regional supreme courts is not white. Judges,
appointed by the State President, serve until age 70 and may
only be removed through impeachment by Parliament. By
tradition, judges of the appellate division and the supreme
courts are chosen from the senior ranks of the elite corps of
South African Supreme Court Practitioners (advocates).
According to the Ministry of Justice, only six nonwhite senior
advocates are practicing at the bar. The power of the
judiciary at all levels continues to be circumscribed by the
principle of parliamentary sovereignty, under which judges
possess no authority to alter, strike down, or refuse to
enforce laws of Parliament.
Serious offenses, including capital crimes, are tried in the
supreme courts. Lesser offenses are heard by magistrates,
career employees of the executive branch civil service. The
presiding judge or magistrate determines guilt or innocence.
Juries were abolished in 1969.
Prospects for nonwhite law school graduates to receive
"Articles of Clerkship," which qualify them for admittance to
the bar, were enhanced considerably. New routes of entry into
the profession are open, including credit for work at offices
of public defenders, university law clinics, and similar
community-based entities that offer legal assistance to
indigent clients.
So-called people's courts, which emerged in part due to the
black community's distrust of the existing court system,
continued to operate sporadically. These tribunals pass
"judgment" on criminal charges and carry out "sentences." The
people's courts are headed by mostly self-appointed "community
leaders" who often mete out "justice" based on rumors arising
from political or personal rivalries.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
Although the security forces retained the capacity and the
formal legal authority to engage in domestic surveillance
activities including the use of informers, the opening of mail,
and the monitoring of telephone calls, the dramatically changed
political environment diminished their willingness to engage in
these activities. This is not true of the local authorities in
Bophuthatswana and Ciskei, who continued to monitor the
political activities of the citizenry.
With the repeal of the PSA, police will no longer have broad
authority to conduct searches and seizures without warrants in
designated unrest areas. Even outside of unrest areas, there
has been an unequal application of the Law of Criminal
Procedure. White citizens have generally enjoyed protection
from unreasonable searches and seizures; black citizens have
usually not.
The legacy of apartheid has left vast numbers of South Africans
landless; more than 8 million people live in squatter camps.
Conflict continues between those who currently own land and
those who contend that the land was forcibly taken from
previous occupants. The Prevention of Illegal Squatting Act
gives landowners and local governments the authority to remove
black populations from "white" areas. Despite central
government authorities' increased tolerance of squatter
settlements, some local authorities continue to pressure
squatters to move. The problem of forced relocation of
residents of informal settlements is particularly pronounced in
rural areas where land owners are able to exploit the
provisions of the Act.
In Bophuthatswana conflicts between authorities and squatters
continued to deprive many residents of their homes. In
February Bophuthatswana authorities demolished an informal
settlement on disputed land in Marokolong without securing a
court order or a legal judgment on the dispute. At least 100
people were rendered homeless as a result.
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
Freedoms of speech and press are respected in practice. Both
the mainstream and the so-called alternate press kept the
public well informed and criticized both the Government and the
opposition.
The South African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC), once seen as
the Government's mouthpiece, underwent profound changes. A new
board of directors with a black woman as head was appointed.
In September Parliament passed legislation to create the
Independent Broadcasting Authority with power to license new
and privately owned broadcast outlets. A second bill
established the Independent Media Commission to monitor the
media coverage of the political campaign and to seek to ensure
a level playing field for all parties in the months leading up
to the April 1994 election. Radio news reporting, in
particular that of privately owned Radio 702, was reasonably
balanced.
Although rarely invoked, considerable legislation permitting
the Government to restrict and penalize the press remained on
the books. Under the Criminal Procedure Act the Government
subpoenaed a journalist from an Afrikaans-language newspaper
who refused to answer questions concerning an article he wrote
reporting remarks made by a black youth leader at an open
rally. The journalist received a 1-year prison sentence. The
sentence was under appeal at year's end.
Laws restricting the publication of information about the SAP,
SADF, petroleum issues, and prisons and mental institutions
remained on the books. The ISA allowed the Minister of Law and
Order to ban organizations and their publications.
Prohibitions against the publication of such materials as
pornographic material are in effect.
Opposition groups, and especially militant youths, continued to
harass and attack members of the press despite calls from
leaders for them to exercise restraint. In one incident, an
SABC cameraman was murdered by a gang of youths while covering
a story in Sharpeville, near Johannesburg. The result has been
de facto hindrance of the press from covering developments in
certain volatile areas.
There are no official restrictions on academic freedom.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
Political parties and organizations enjoy broad freedoms of
assembly and association. While the ISA gave the Minister of
Law and Order authority to ban political gatherings in order to
maintain public order, he has not used that authority in over 2
years. He did, however, frequently invoke his authority to
declare certain areas "unrest areas." All demonstrations or
public gatherings in an unrest area had to be approved by the
area police commissioner. Although decisions to prohibit an
event could be appealed to the courts, such appeals were never
successful. In some cases, authorities could deny permission
for a demonstration outside unrest areas if it was felt that
the event would threaten life or property.
In some of the homelands, local officials continued to obstruct
the right of peaceful assembly. Opposition political groups in
Bophuthatswana were routinely denied permission to meet or
organize and their "illegal" gatherings were forcibly
dispersed. Among the so-called self-governing homelands,
KwaZulu, the only one with its own security force, has a
particularly poor record. Local KwaZulu officials often used
their authority to hamper severely political activity by groups
other than the IFP and to harass non-IFP leaders. There were
many credible accounts of death threats to intimidate political
activity. For example, residents of Gerzinsila and Nyanini
Townships in Natal were forced to attend an IFP rally and told
that those absent from future rallies would be killed. In
addition, the climate of violence existing in many parts of
KwaZulu has resulted in so-called no-go areas where in some
cases ANC and in other cases IFP leaders cannot organize
meetings without risk to their lives. Such no-go areas also
exist in some urban townships. ANC and IFP sympathizers shared
culpability for this.
Many white landowners, fearing their workers might be
influenced by "radical" ideas of worker rights and political
empowerment, violently opposed efforts by the ANC and other
predominantly black political groups to hold public gatherings,
effectively preventing these groups from organizing.
Similarly, certain black groups have disrupted township
gatherings organized by representatives of predominantly white
political parties, such as the National Party and Democratic
Party. For safety reasons, the SAP urged whites to stay away
from some townships altogether.
c. Freedom of Religion
There are no restrictions on the expression and practice of
religious belief, nor on proselytizing.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
South Africans have no restrictions on movement throughout
their country and are free to travel overseas, emigrate, or
repatriate. Those choosing to emigrate, however, are limited
in the amount of money they can take out of South Africa.
The Government and private monitoring groups estimated that as
many as 500,000 Mozambicans, displaced by civil unrest or
economic hardship, were in South Africa. Approximately half
the Mozambicans in South Africa have settled in border transit
camps in the homelands of KaNgwane and Gazankulu, the only
places in South Africa where Mozambican refugees have enjoyed
some measure of protection. Under the Admission of Persons
Act, they are allowed to stay there temporarily because of
their ethnic ties with homeland residents. Although some of
these refugees have lived in the homelands since 1986, refugee
officials reported that some Mozambicans were slowly returning
to their country as the peace process continued to hold there.
In August the Government and United Nations High Commissioner
for Refugees (UNHCR) signed a long-negotiated agreement
allowing the UNHCR to assist refugees arriving in South
Africa. Until then, the ICRC and other nongovernmental
organizations housed and cared for the refugees. In October
the UNHCR and the Governments of South Africa and Mozambique
signed a tripartite agreement establishing a joint commission
and procedures for handling the organized, voluntary
repatriation of Mozambican refugees. Although the KaNgwane and
Gazankulu authorities did not participate in the negotiations
leading to the September and October agreements, they were kept
informed and welcomed these developments.
Despite these developments, involuntary repatriation of
Mozambicans from South Africa continued. Those Mozambicans
settling outside KaNgwane and Gazankulu are considered illegal
aliens under the Aliens Control Act. According to the Ministry
of Home Affairs, during 1993 the Government deported 80,261
illegal Mozambicans and 15,680 aliens from other (mostly
southern African) countries.
Despite the South Africa-UNHCR memorandum of understanding, the
tripartite agreement, and periodic representations on human
rights abuses, an electrified fence on the border between South
Africa and Mozambique remained in place as a deterrent measure.
The Government extended through 1993 its 1991 mandate to the
UNHCR to monitor the repatriation of South African exiles, most
of whom were affiliated in some way with antiapartheid
organizations while in exile. An estimated 7,000 exiles had
returned to South Africa prior to the 1991 agreement. As of
year's end, a further 10,836 persons had been cleared to return
under UNHCR auspices. The number of exiles who have actually
returned through the end of 1993 was 7,303.
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government
South Africa underwent sweeping political change during 1993.
In December the Transitional Executive Council (TEC), a
multiparty, multiracial body, was given broad administrative
and monitoring powers in the period leading up to the April
1994 elections--the first elections in South Africa open to all
citizens regardless of race. The implementation of the TEC
marked the first time in South African history that the black
majority (75.5 percent) participated in the official political
process.
Nevertheless, prior to establishment of the TEC, South Africa
continued to be governed by a system that kept virtually all
real power in the hands of the white minority (13 percent of
the population), while the black majority was denied any
meaningful share of power, or even representation, in the
national Government. While there existed parliamentary
chambers to represent South Africa's mixed race and Asian
population groups, members of those groups consistently
boycotted the elections for those bodies, most recently in
1989; in any case, the 1983 Constitution kept all real power in
the hands of the chamber for whites.
A transitional constitution, agreed to in November by the
negotiating parties and ratified by Parliament in December,
will govern the country beginning on April 27, 1994, and until
an elected constitutional assembly drafts a final one. The
future constitution includes an extensive, fully justiciable
bill of rights. It also provides for an independent judiciary,
including a constitutional court and nine provincial
governments directly elected by proportional representation.
The transitional constitution for the first time guarantees all
South Africans such rights as universal suffrage, equal
protection under the law, and freedom of speech, assembly,
association, and religion. The constitution is to be enacted
by proclamation on April 27, 1994. Provision was made to
enable earlier implementation of certain portions of the
constitution and bill of rights, but these steps had not been
taken by year's end.
Multiparty negotiations, suspended since June 1992, resumed in
April 1993. On July 2, most participating parties formally
agreed that the first nonracial election would be held on April
27, 1994, and that the body so elected would both write a final
constitution and form the basis for a multiparty transitional
government to rule the country for an interim period. The IFP,
CP, and several other conservative groups suspended their
further participation in the negotiations process as a result
of these decisions and later formed a coalition called the
Freedom Alliance. Subsequently, the remaining negotiating
parties reached agreement on establishing, in addition to the
TEC, an Independent Electoral Commission, Independent Media
Commission, and Independent Broadcasting Authority, all of
which are intended to level the playing field for all parties
in the preelection period. Parliament passed the enabling
legislation for these bodies in late September.
While the provisions of the interim constitution will require
dismantling the homelands system, at the end of the year the 10
homelands were still in place. Parliament, however, passed
legislation reinstating South African citizenship to people
residing in the homelands, enabling them to participate in the
April elections. The homelands are heavily subsidized by the
Government, some are fragmented parcels of territory in
impoverished rural areas, and all are agriculturally backward
areas without the infrastructure needed for development. Of
the four so-called independent homelands, which only the South
African Government recognized as sovereign, Transkei, Ciskei,
and Venda are ruled by military governments, while
Bophuthatswana is governed as a one-party state. Authorities
in Bophuthatswana and Ciskei, in particular, continued to
suppress free political activity, especially that of the ANC.
The six so-called self-governing homelands are Gazankulu,
KaNgwane, KwaNdebele, KwaZulu, Lebowa and Qwaqwa. According to
1990 census data, the homelands, which comprise 13 percent of
the country's territory, are home to 33 percent of South
Africa's black population.
The participation rate of women in the higher echelons of
government and politics has historically been extremely low.
Out of 308 members of the current Parliament, only 8 are
women. There is only 1 woman minister out of a total of 22,
and only 1 woman deputy minister out of a total of 12. There
are no women occupying director-general positions in government
departments.
In devising the interim constitution, the multiparty
negotiating council prohibited gender discrimination in the
bill of rights and provided for the primacy of the principle of
equal treatment of women over the right of traditional leaders
to exercise their tribal prerogatives. The ANC announced that
at least a third of its candidates for South Africa's new
democratically elected parliament will be women.
In the Supreme Court system, there are currently 142 serving
judges, only 1 of whom is a woman. A second woman has been
appointed and will assume her responsibilities in 1994. Out of
several hundred senior advocates practicing at the bar, only
five are female.
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
of Human Rights
The Government has permitted an increasingly broad range of
domestic and international organizations to monitor,
investigate, and report on human rights issues.
The U.N., European Union, Commonwealth of Nations, and
Organization of African Unity have stationed observer groups in
South Africa to monitor the violence. These observers attend
demonstrations, marches, and other mass events. They also
monitor the compliance by all participating organizations to
both the principles of the National Peace Accord and the
Goldstone Commission guidelines for marches and political
gatherings. In addition, the observers consult regularly with
the Government, political parties, community organizations, and
civic groups. The observer groups enjoyed near-total freedom
of access to all geographic areas, institutions, and
personalities, except in Bophuthatswana.
The United Nations Observer Mission in South Africa (UNOMSA),
Amnesty International, Africa Watch, the ICRC, and other
organizations are in general agreement that the Government has
improved its responsiveness to their requests for access to
information, officials, and facilities. In January Africa
Watch was for the first time granted access to detainees in
South African police stations and prisons. The Government
permitted the ICRC to increase the number of its delegates from
12 to 30 in order to visit more prisons and jails. The ICRC
characterized its relations with the South African Department
of Correctional Services as "good."
In contrast, human rights agencies made credible accusations
that some local authorities refused access to files and
intimidated investigators of alleged police brutalities and
unlawful detentions. For example, an attorney investigating a
case of unlawful police detention claimed that he was
confronted by a group of officers who forcibly entered his
home, physically threatened him, manhandled his wife, and
advised him to "stop what he was doing."
The treatment of human rights monitors by homeland governments
at times contrasted sharply with that by the South African
Government. While ICRC delegates have complete access to
prisoners and police station detainees in Bophuthatswana,
homeland authorities have not agreed to meet with ICRC to
discuss ICRC's program of basic medical and humanitarian
assistance to victims of violence. UNOMSA reports that despite
persistent efforts to observe events there, Bophuthatswana
authorities have invariably denied UNOMSA's requests for
permission to enter their territory. In a widely publicized
incident, a group of UNOMSA, Commonwealth, and OAU observers
were granted permission to attend an Ascension Day service in
Bophuthatswana in May, but, upon arrival, were barred from
entering the church and detained by police for an hour.
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Disability, Language, or Social Status
The transitional constitution passed by Parliament in December
includes a bill of rights which guarantees equal protection of
the law to every South African citizen, regardless of race,
gender, religion, disability, language, or social status. The
transitional constitution is to be enacted on April 27, 1994.
Women
Although gender discrimination, particularly against black
women, remained a serious problem, Parliament advanced the
rights of and protections for women when it passed the
Promotion of Equality Between Men and Women Act and the
Prevention of Family Violence Act in September.
The Promotion of Equality Between Men and Women Act eliminates
all remaining vestiges of a husband's traditional power over
his wife in property and financial matters. It also revokes
the power of courts to direct that women not be present at
certain trials, removes all legal differentiation between men
and women in matters of citizenship, makes the provisions of
the Sexual Offenses Act equally applicable to men and women,
abolishes certain provisions in the law which traditionally
discriminated against married and pregnant women, repeals the
prohibition against women entering premises where liquor is
sold, and eliminates the legal barrier which excluded women
from underground mining work and other high-risk occupations.
The Prevention of Family Violence Act simplifies the injunction
and arrest procedures related to domestic abuse against women
and children. The Act empowers judges and magistrates to
enjoin an offending spouse from engaging in certain behaviors
and, simultaneously, to issue an order authorizing the
automatic arrest of the spouse, if he or she breaks the
injunction. The resulting penalty can range up to 12 months'
imprisonment. The Act also places a legal obligation on
persons who have reason to suspect a child is being abused to
report that fact to the appropriate authorities, and makes it
possible for husbands to be convicted of marital rape.
Children
Black children in particular have suffered under South Africa's
apartheid regime which segregated much of the black population
in poverty-stricken homelands and fractured families by forcing
their income earners to migrate in search of work. Without
adequate parental guidance and protection, many children have
drifted toward a life of crime and delinquency and have been
caught up in the maelstrom of political violence.
By all statistical measures of social progress, it is clear
that the welfare, protection, and development of black children
have been almost completely neglected. For example, while the
infant mortality rate for whites is 6 per thousand, it is 66
per thousand for blacks.
During the year, the police's Child Protection Unit
investigated 17,124 crimes against children, involving such
crimes as rape, indecent assault, assault--both common and with
intent to do grievous bodily harm--and violations of the Child
Care Act, among others.
As South Africa makes the transition to a democratic, nonracial
society, the Government has noted the need to correct the
glaring shortfalls in support and services for the vast
majority of the country's children. Accordingly, a 1992
children's summit adopted a Charter for Children's Rights in
South Africa, which calls, inter alia, for the protection of
children from all types of violence.
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities
With a view to the April 1994 nonracial elections, the ruling
white minority began to share its closely held political powers
and prerogatives with nonwhites. The TEC, its subcouncils, the
IEC, IMC, and IBA are administered by people who are both
racially diverse and representative of a wide spectrum of
political thought and opinion. The transitional constitution
and bill of rights provides for a nonracial society as one of
the entrenched rights of all South Africans.
Despite the near-total repeal of the statutory foundations of
apartheid, pervasive discrimination and segregation persisted
in 1993. Nevertheless, some private firms and public
corporations have voluntarily instituted affirmative action
recruitment practices, even at the highest levels. Dr. Ivy
Matsepe-Casaburri, a black woman, was appointed to head the
SABC, long viewed as the principal propaganda vehicle of the
Government, and Mr. Yacoob Abba Omar, an Asian, was appointed
General Manager of Public Relations at ARMSCOR, the centerpiece
of South Africa's defense industry.
Persons born before 1991 are still classified in the race group
to which they were assigned at birth. Until September 1993,
the Government continued to discriminate in the payment of old
age pensions, with whites receiving the highest annuity,
"coloureds" and Asians somewhat less, and blacks the least.
Pension rates were equalized in like employment categories, but
disparity persisted between the pensions of management and
clerical workers, who were usually white, and those of manual
or unskilled laborers, who were usually black. The disparities
between managerial and clerical pensions, on the one hand, and
those of manual and unskilled laborers, on the other, are a
reflection of past race-based discrimination in job
opportunities.
In education the disparity in spending on blacks and whites
decreased but remained great. The average student-teacher
ratio in white schools is 20:1, while it is 38:1 in black
schools, excluding those in the homelands. Under current law,
primary school education is compulsory only for white, Asian,
and mixed-race children. Prior to May, the Government charged
matriculation examination fees, which prevented many poor black
students from taking the examination and from graduating. Of
black matriculants, 38 percent passed their 1992 final
examinations, whereas 95 percent of white matriculants did.
According to the Department of Education and Training, 328,890
students were enrolled in South African universities in 1993
(not including students in the so-called independent
homelands). Of these, 46.8 percent were white, 40.2 percent
were black, 7.2 percent were Indian, and 5.4 percent were
"coloured". During 1993 increasing numbers of white schools
opted to permit black students to enroll. The decision to
enroll black students depended upon the voted consent of white
parents.
The Government repealed its policy of mandatory military
conscription of exclusively white males. The Government and
the ANC began discussions on creating a new defense force which
would include some of the military wings of liberation
movements and some homeland armies. Although the Government
instituted affirmative action programs in the security services
over the last 4 years, over 90 percent of officers are white.
Significant changes, however, are in progress as more
minorities and women are graduating from the military academy.
People with Disabilities
South Africa has begun to move from a "medical-welfare"
conception of disability to one of civil rights and self-
empowerment.
The participants in the multiparty negotiations included
disability as a basis for nondiscrimination, along with race,
gender, ethnic origin, color, sexual orientation, age,
religion, conscience, creed, culture or language. In
preparation for the 1994 election, Lawyers for Human Rights and
Disabled People South Africa made representations to the
Government on such issues as ensuring that polling stations
will be architecturally accessible to wheelchair-using voters
and that blind voters are able to cast a secret ballot.
In 1991 Lawyers for Human Rights, a leading organization
fighting prejudice and discrimination, established a disability
rights unit. This unit has intervened in some 50 legal cases
and represented numerous disabled people less formally in their
dealings with the bureaucracy. The majority of these cases
involved either arbitrary determinations of ineligibility for
social assistance benefits or employer decisions denying equal
work opportunities on the basis of disability.
In 1986 architectural requirements were incorporated into the
National Building Code to ensure equal access to public
buildings for the physically disabled. However, these were
rarely enforced and, until recently, public awareness of them
was virtually nonexistent.
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
South Africa's Labor Relations Act entitles all workers in the
private sector to join labor unions of their choosing.
Membership in the 200 registered trade unions was approximately
2.9 million in 1993. An additional 360,000 workers were
members of the 46 unregistered unions, bringing union
membership to 3.26 million workers or 52 percent of the
employed, economically active population. Probably more than
half of all union members are black.
Groups historically excluded from labor law, especially
farmworkers, domestic workers, and public sector employees,
made some progress in 1993. The Basic Conditions of Employment
Act was extended to farmworkers and domestic workers, and
Parliament passed an Agricultural Labor Relations Act, after
considerable consultation with the Congress of South African
Trade Unions (COSATU) and the South African Agricultural Union
(a farmers' organization), which extends some trade union and
bargaining rights to farm workers. Nevertheless, domestic and
farmworkers do not have the right to strike, as defined by
South African labor law. The Parliament passed also a Public
Sector Labor Relations Act designed to consolidate and clarify
public sector labor law.
Nevertheless, South African labor relations continued to be
characterized by a patchwork of labor law and practice largely
designed to inhibit or restrict trade union organization and
activity. The result is an uneven and sometimes volatile labor
relations climate, in which trade unions must rely as much on
their own organization and strength as on their legal rights to
achieve their objectives.
Trade unions continued to accuse the Government and others of
using intimidation and violence to undermine trade union
activity. For instance, COSATU, the country's largest trade
union federation, claimed the KwaZulu government, in collusion
with the IFP and the South African Government, blocked COSATU
from organizing in northern Natal by denying meeting venues,
harassing union members, and killing union leadership. The
Goldstone Commission, during an investigation of the KZP,
declared on December 8 that credible evidence indicated the KZP
used hit squads to attack and kill ANC and COSATU members in
northern Natal. A SAP raid against organizations supposedly
linked to APLA resulted in the offices of the National Council
of Trade Unions (NACTU), South Africa's second largest trade
union federation, being ransacked by police and several of its
officers and affiliate members being detained.
COSATU is formally aligned with the ANC and the SACP. At a
September special national congress, COSATU declared its
support for the ANC in the April 1994 elections, and offered 20
federation and affiliate members to stand for election on ANC
slates. NACTU, while officially independent from political
groups, has considerable contact with the PAC and the Azanian
Peoples' Organization (AZAPO).
Historically, both federations have used strikes and
"stayaways" to facilitate liberation alliance objectives in
South Africa's negotiated transition to democratic government.
COSATU has played an especially important role in this regard.
Its mass action expertise, including its mobilization and crowd
control capabilities, were particularly evident during the
nationwide protests following Chris Hani's assassination.
Most private sector workers regardless of race enjoy the right
to strike. Work stoppages triggered by collective bargaining
disputes, and occasionally political issues, have been
commonplace. Industrial action during the first 9 months of
1993 was down nearly 23 percent from the comparable 1992
period, with strikes accounting for 2.4 million lost workdays.
Nationwide strikes by the South African Democratic Teachers
Unions (SADTU) and the South African Municipal Workers Union
(SAMWU) accounted for nearly all public sector strike activity,
or about 70 percent of the lost workdays.
Wage disputes provoked 67 percent of strike activity in 1993,
while grievances, retrenchments, and discipline accounted for
the remainder. The drop in strike activity during 1993 was
attributable to greater union concern regarding job security
and more sophisticated management labor relations techniques.
Strikers and union leaders are protected by law from
retribution by employers for union organizing and participation
in lawful strikes. Some companies, however, use what they
describe as retrenchments to remove shop stewards and other
union officials from the work force. Also, the patchwork
nature of South African labor law, the illegality of public
sector strikes, and the political nature of some stayaways and
other industrial action, leave ample room for employers to take
disciplinary actions against trade unionists. Ultimately, a
trade unionist's best protection in such circumstances comes
more from the strength of the union than the effectiveness of
the law.
Historically, public sector employees have been legally
prohibited from striking. A Public Sector Labor Relations Act,
which takes effect in January 1994, clarifies the collective
bargaining process for public sector employees but still
sharply restricts strike activity. COSATU has argued that the
Government's definition of essential services is too broad and
is specifically designed to block public sector strike
activity. As was evident by the increase in public sector
strike activity in 1993, the illegality of striking did not
deter major public sector unions.
South Africa does not restrict union affiliation with regional
or international labor organizations. COSATU and NACTU are
affiliated internationally only with the Organization of
African Trade Union Unity. Many of their affiliates, as well
as independent unions, are members of international trade
secretariats and have developed contacts with their
counterparts in North America and Western Europe.
A member of the International Labor Organization (ILO) from its
inception in 1919, South Africa withdrew from the organization
in 1964, but remained bound by the 12 ILO Conventions it had
ratified. A 1992 ILO fact-finding mission to South Africa made
numerous recommendations to bring the country's labor regime up
to international standards. To date, only a few of these
recommendations have been implemented.
Following COSATU protests, the Government did consult with
COSATU regarding the Public Sector Labor Relations Act. The
legislation passed parliament and will go into effect beginning
in 1994. COSATU, while acknowledging that the law clarifies
the collective bargaining process for public servants, argues
that the law's broad definition of essential services, and its
limitation of lawful strikes to 30 days, undercuts trade
unions' ability to bargain successfully. In November the ILO's
governing body voted to suspend its Declaration of Action
Against Apartheid. Should this decision be ratified by the
June 1994 ILO Conference, the ILO will be able to establish an
office in South Africa and resume direct, in-country contact
with the trade union movement.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
The Government does not interfere directly with union
organizing in the private sector and generally has not
intervened in the collective bargaining process. The law
prohibits discrimination by private sector employers against
union members and organizers. Complaints regarding employer
discrimination against union members can be brought to the
labor courts. In the case of a judicial finding against an
employer, the court can order reinstatement of a worker or
other compensation. Disputes over recognition are relatively
few.
Black unions have made increasing use of South Africa's
Industrial Council or centralized collective bargaining
system. COSATU views the centralized collective bargaining
system as crucial to trade union economic influence and has
sought to expand the subject of such bargaining beyond wages
and benefits to include industry restructuring, job grading and
training, and other personnel issues. It has severely
criticized business efforts in some sectors to do away with
centralized collective bargaining.
Much of COSATU's and other trade union federations'
participation in the National Economic Forum and the National
Manpower Commission--two tripartite forums representing
government, labor, and business--is designed to strengthen
trade union influence over labor and economic policy.
South Africa's labor law does not apply to the so-called
homelands, where union organizing is actively discouraged.
Nevertheless, trade union activity is on the increase in almost
all the homelands. The struggle between trade unions and
homeland governments, especially in Bophuthatswana, has been
intense and sometimes violent. Bophuthatswana enacted
regressive labor legislation in 1993 which outlaws all foreign
trade unions and criminalizes membership in or bargaining with
such unions. The law has also led to harassment and detainment
of union organizers representing various COSATU affiliates.
Management and black trade unions have voluntarily resorted to
private mediation services to resolve industrial disputes. The
Labor Relations Act establishes an Industrial Court to rule in
labor-management disputes. The most common complaints filed
with the Court concern dismissals, followed by unfair labor
practices. A Labor Court of Appeals oversees the Industrial
Court and can overturn its decisions.
South Africa has no export processing zones.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
The Constitution does not prohibit forced labor; however,
common law does not permit it, and it is not practiced.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
The Basic Conditions of Employment Act prohibits the employment
of minors under the age of 15 in most industries, shops, and
offices. The Mines and Works Act prohibits minors under 16
from working underground. There is no restriction, however, on
the age at which a person may work in agriculture. Use of
child labor on farms, often in harsh and dangerous conditions,
is common. Child labor in the informal economy is also
commonplace. Enforcement of existing child labor laws by the
Government is weak and reactive, depending largely on
complaints being lodged against specific employers.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
There is no legal minimum wage in South Africa. The Labor
Relations Act instead provides a mechanism for negotiations
between labor and management to set minimum wage standards by
industry. Over 100 industries come under the provisions of the
Act. According to a labor research service survey, cleaners,
who are among the lowest paid of organized workers, earned an
average monthly salary of approximately $247 (842 rand). The
same survey showed drivers earning $428 (1,456 rand) per month.
A comparison of wage information gathered by the Government's
Central Statistical Service and in a March 1993 study done by
the University of Port Elizabeth's Institute for Planning
Research regarding household subsistence levels, shows that in
the manufacturing sector alone, only 17 of 30 subsectors paid
an average wage to black workers higher than the subsistence
level salary. In the construction sector, average salaries for
all subsectors were below subsistence level. Wages paid to
workers in unorganized sectors, such as agriculture and
domestic household work, are also below subsistence level.
Most industries have a standard workweek of 46 hours, as well
as vacation and sick leave. Overtime is voluntary and limited
to 10 hours a week. The law does not mandate a 24-hour rest
break. The recent extension of the Basic Conditions of
Employment Act to farmworkers and domestic workers has, for the
first time, established workweek standards for both groups.
Attention to health and safety issues increased in recent years
but remained inadequate. The state-funded National
Occupational and Safety Association (NOSA) claims the number of
workers suffering disabling injuries annually has dropped
significantly over the last decade. Nevertheless, injury and
death at the workplace, especially in heavy manufacturing and
mining, is still common. The National Union of Mineworkers
(NUM) reports that two workers are killed every day in mine
accidents. In 1993 the Government agreed to the NUM's request
for a Mines Commission of Inquiry to investigate the
occupational health and safety laws, but only after several
mine accidents left nearly 70 miners dead.
South African occupational safety and health laws, while
requiring employers to avoid placing their workers at
unreasonable risk, do not give workers the right to remove
themselves from a hazardous job. An employee's decision to
leave a hazardous work site could possibly lead to dismissal,
but more probably would result in disciplinary action. The
occupational safety and health laws do provide protection for
workers who report or file complaints against unsafe working
conditions. Such workers may not be dismissed or reduced in
rank or salary because of their actions.
[end of document]
Return
to 1993 Human Rights Practices report home page.
Return to DOSFAN
home page.
This is an official U.S. Government source
for information on the WWW. Inclusion of non-U.S. Government links
does not imply endorsement of contents.