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TITLE: SOMALIA HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES, 1993
DATE: JANUARY 31, 1994
AUTHOR: U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
SOMALIA
Following 2 years of civil war and total anarchy, Somalia
continued in 1993 to be without central authority of any kind.
In the 2 years since the fall of Siad Barre in January 1991,
traditional means of social control and administration of
justice have not been reestablished. Even with the presence of
United Nations peacekeepers, many Somalis remain beyond the
rule and protection of recognized law and social order. Almost
20 percent of the population is displaced or has sought refuge
abroad. Communities, ravaged by war and famine, have
disappeared in some regions. Somalis of every clan and faction
live in fear for their lives and property. Traditional
authorities, unable to cope with the unprecedented conditions
of the country, have often withdrawn from their historical
function, leaving the clans and subclans without the restraints
that would serve to protect human rights.
The United Nations Operations in Somalia (UNOSOM) and its
predecessor the United Nations Task Force (UNITAF) have
attempted to protect the lives and property of both Somalis and
foreign relief workers. However, in doing so and in attempting
to carry out its mandate to support a broad agreement by
Somalis in March, 1993 in Addis Ababa, U.N. forces were
attacked and drawn into violent confrontations in which they
and Somalis were killed, creating an atmosphere of wariness
between the peacekeepers and some of those they were sent to
protect. Some foreign forces were accused of mistreatment,
even murder, of Somalis and in several instances from June to
October, 1993, U.N. peacekeepers were attacked and killed by
Somalis. In response, under the authority of the United
Nations, U.S. forces attacked and apprehended Somalis believed
to be responsible for the attacks upon U.N. peacekeepers.
UNOSOM detained these Somalis without trial. All but eight
were released by year's end.
In the months before the attacks on the peacekeepers, the
United Nations was largely successful in ensuring the flow of
food to the starving population by ending large-scale looting
of relief supplies and extortion of humanitarian agencies by
bandits and warlords. The early months of 1993 saw a rapid
drop in death and malnutrition rates measured by international
relief agencies. Despite this amelioration, lawlessness
continued in parts of Somalia. Conditions varied widely. In
some towns, a semblance of civic order remained, with local
populations respecting the traditional authority of clan
elders. However, no central authority was acknowledged; power
rested in the hands of clan-based warlords and heavily armed
gangs of looters; more than half a million refugees fled to
neighboring countries over the past few years; and there was no
functioning network of police, courts, or civil
administration. In the second quarter of 1993, the United
Nations made a start in addressing these problems.
The Addis Ababa accords, which the 15 major Somali faction
leaders signed in March, outlined steps toward political
reconciliation and the formation of a Transitional National
Council (TNC). The accords committed all signatories to
disarmament and the reconstruction of Somali society in a
fashion consistent with the Geneva Universal Declaration of
Human Rights.
Building on the March accords, the U.N. Security Council (UNSC)
passed several resolutions establishing and defining UNOSOM II.
UNOSOM II, created under UNSC Resolution 814, had broad
responsibilities, including the basic reconstitution of Somali
civic society and the creation of preconditions for the
observance of human rights. It was tasked with creating a
secure environment; promoting political reconciliation;
disarming clan factions; re-establishing the police and
judiciary; and prosecuting those responsible for serious
violations of international law.
Informal talks held among faction leaders in Addis Ababa in
November and December did not produce agreement on how to
implement the Addis Ababa accords, but did not repudiate their
commitments to these accords.
As UNOSOM II began the task of disarmament in Mogadishu, it met
sudden, violent resistance from one of the signatories of the
Addis Ababa accords. In response to a UNOSOM arms sweep, the
SNA (Somali National Alliance, led by Mohamed Farah Aideed)
reportedly organized an ambush of UNOSOM Pakistani troops on
June 5, killing 24 and wounding another 50. On June 6, the
UNSC passed Resolution 837, condemning the armed attacks upon
U.N. peacekeepers and authorizing the U.N. Secretary General,
under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter, to take all necessary
measures against those responsible for the attacks, including
arrest, detention, trial, and punishment. In November the UNSC
created a commission of inquiry to investigate this and other
incidents.
Throughout June, July, August and September, UNOSOM II forces,
including U.S. forces working with UNOSOM contingents, made
efforts to capture Aideed and other key SNA personnel in
accordance with UNSC Resolution 837. SNA forces countered by
conducting ambushes of UNOSOM forces in which armed attackers
were shielded by civilians, especially women. Peacekeepers
from Italy, Pakistan, Nigeria, the United States, and Morocco,
as well as hundreds of Somalis, died during such incidents. In
September and October, SNA rocket and mortar attacks on the
U.N. facility and U.S. Liaison Office in South Mogadishu became
more frequent. SNA forces unlawfully detained two
peacekeepers, a Nigerian and an American (see Section 1.d.),
the American after an attack October 3 on an SNA stronghold in
Mogadishu.
Outside Mogadishu, progress was made in reestablishing local
police forces and courts and with the establishment of new
district and regional councils.
Faction militia, bandits, and clan militia are routinely
charged with using intimidation, detention, rape, kidnaping,
murder, and looting to gain or maintain power over the Somali
population but these charges have been difficult to
investigate. Relations between UNOSOM forces and local
populations varied widely from region to region, and were often
dependent on relations between UNOSOM and local faction or
traditional leaders. In general, the forces enjoyed good
relations with the people, but there were some complaints that
Belgian, Canadian, and U.S. forces used extreme or
inappropriate force against Somalis, including incidents which
resulted in deaths. The governments involved launched
investigations, some of which continue, of these incidents.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
Political violence and banditry have been endemic to Somalia
since the overthrow of Siad Barre. Levels of violence were
significantly reduced with the establishment of UNITAF,
followed by UNOSOM II. Within areas controlled by UNITAF, the
efforts of volunteer, unpaid former policemen appear to have
aided the return of stability. However, in the past year,
attempts have been made on the lives of several politically
active Somalis. Although large scale interclan clashes in
Mogadishu diminished with an interclan cease fire in October,
gun fights between rival factions were still common and lethal
attacks by bandits in the city increased, as did interclan
fighting outside Mogadishu.
Some foreign forces were accused of extrajudicial killings.
Canadian peacekeepers stationed at Belet Weyne were alleged to
have been responsible for two civilian Somali deaths. On March
4, a Somali attempting to break into the Canadian base was shot
while fleeing, and allegedly shot again while lying on the
ground. While in Canadian custody on March 16, Shidane Omar
Aroni was allegedly beaten to death . Canadian authorities
conducted a full investigation and launched judicial
proceedings which had not been concluded by year's end. In
April, a U.S. Marine was convicted in a military court of use
of excessive force in an incident in which one Somali was
killed.
On July 7, at the height of the conflict between Aideed and
UNOSOM forces, six Somali distributors of the UNOSOM newspaper
were assassinated in Mogadishu. It is alleged this took place
at SNA or Aideed instigation.
On June 5, forces loyal to Aideed reportedly launched an ambush
against Pakistani peacekeepers, who had just completed a search
for arms at Aideed's radio station and other locations in
Aideed-controlled territory. Twenty-four Pakistanis were
killed, two of them executed after being taken captive. Women
were combatants in the attack and reportedly participated in
mutilating the bodies of the dead. The arms search had been
initiated after written notification to the SNA, and was in
accordance with the disarmament provisions of the Addis Ababa
agreement. Following the deaths of the Pakistani peacekeepers,
UNSC Resolution 837 authorized UNOSOM to take all necessary
measures against those responsible for the attack.
Fighting on June 17 between the SNA and UNOSOM began with an
ambush of Moroccan troops; women among the attackers reportedly
pulled grenades from under their clothes and threw them among
the Moroccan troops. Similar tactics were reportedly used to
ambush Nigerian troops on September 5.
b. Disappearance
Reliable information concerning politically motivated
disappearances was not available. Most observers assumed that
it was a frequent phenomenon, masked by massive displacement of
the population.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
Reports of torture in the aftermath of clan fighting cannot be
confirmed.
In Hargeisa on January 8, five women suspected of prostitution
were stoned to death, after having been buried up to the neck.
The instigator was a local religious leader, Sheikh Dahir. The
Sheikh reportedly acted without convening a formal Islamic
tribunal. No other incidents of this nature were recorded in
1993.
Independent sources alleged that Somalis held in Belgian
custody in Kismayo suffered mistreatment. Doctors who examined
released detainees found marks of burns on their bodies. The
Belgian Ministry of Defense launched an investigation, and
announced that military authorities had taken appropriate
action in cases of apparent misconduct. Thirteen cases were
still under investigation at years's end.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
All Somali factions reportedly held prisoners arbitrarily in
1993. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)
negotiated the release of 348 persons, mostly detained by the
United Somali Faction (USC), but some by the Somali Salvation
Democratic Front (SSDF), and the Somali National Force (SNF).
The SNA has accused the United Nations of violations of the
rights of the accused. Under the authority of UNSC Resolution
837, UNOSOM detained, but did not try, Somalis suspected of
complicity in the attack on Pakistani peacekeepers. For
reasons of security, the location and condition of the
detainees was not revealed to their families or the Somali
public, although regular visits by ICRC representatives were
permitted. The last of these detainees were released in
January 1994. When the SNA unlawfully detained a captured U.S.
pilot and one of the Nigerian peacekeepers, the ICRC visited
the detainees and assisted in their release.
Former National Police Commander Ahmed Jama Mousa claimed in a
deposition to UNOSOM that, during a military operation on
September 13, U.S. forces shot and wounded him outside his
home, invaded his home, beat, and detained him and three
unarmed members of his family for 5 days. Mousa has filed a
claim for compensation to UNOSOM. The U.S. Department of
Defense is investigating the incident.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
There is little structure for the administration of justice in
Somalia. UNOSOM has declared the Somali Penal Code to be the
law of the land, and in the few functioning UNOSOM-administered
courts that law is applied. It is impossible to judge the
impartiality of the administration of local justice.
Throughout the country local authorities have attempted to
administer some type of justice. Islamic law and traditional
mediation have been used to settle property crimes. However,
these methods are not governed by any universal code or
administration. A high proportion of Somalia's educated elite
has fled the country. The fear of renewed anarchy hampers
impartial justice; few Somalis feel confident of lasting
protection from retaliation based on clan loyalties.
Prosecution of Somalis for war crimes committed during the past
2 years is difficult. In April when humanitarian operations in
Baidoa were under the protection of Australian forces, one such
prosecution resulted in the conviction and execution of Hassan
Gutaale Abdul. He was tried under the Somali Penal Code for 31
murders. Eleven eyewitnesses testified. Both trial and appeal
were conducted by former Somali judges. However, contrary to
Somali law, the appeals panel sat the day after the trial,
instead of giving the defense the legally required 15-day
preparation period. Court officials purportedly feared they
could not hold Hassan Gutaale Abdul in jail for the prescribed
period. He was executed by gunshot immediately after the
handing down of the appeal verdict.
At the time of the Addis Ababa accords in March, an interim,
three-tier judicial system was planned, with courts of appeal,
regional courts, and district courts. It was envisaged that
these courts would operate under the 1962 Somali Criminal
Procedure Code and the 1963 Penal Code. Drafting of a new
constitution was to be delegated (see Section 3) to the
Transitional National Council (TNC).
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
These rights were constantly violated by the warring factions.
The civil conflict resulted in huge displacements of people and
the destruction of the infrastructure of the country. Although
these rights have not been systematically violated by a central
authority, there is no right of privacy in Somalia. Military
operations by the major factions have led to home searches and
evictions. Militia in Mogadishu, Kismayo, and other urban
centers occupy private homes and buildings without the
permission of the owners. Homes belonging to former government
members have been destroyed and the contents looted. Somalis
have been forced to flee their homes because of violence
directed at them. The relatively peaceful northwest and
northeast of the country suffered less disruption. At year's
end, no action had been taken to deal with property claims, a
problem that looms large as refugees and the displaced prepare
to return.
g. Use of Excessive Force and Violations of Humanitarian
Law in Internal Conflicts
Violations of humanitarian law in internal conflicts by Somalis
have been common since the civil war began in 1991. The use by
factions of women and children as human shields or combatants
in conflicts is well-documented. The brutalities of armed
looters who continue to roam Somalia are unlikely ever to be
completely catalogued. Humanitarian convoys and base camps
were the targets of these bandits. The Geddo region on the
border with Kenya, unprotected by UNOSOM deployment, suffered
severely. When the remnants of Somalia's judiciary formed an
association, they particularly wanted inquiries into war crimes
to focus on the looting of relief supplies. Except in regions
with UNOSOM protection, humanitarian aid workers were
constantly under threat, often in pay disputes with their armed
Somali employees. Three non-Somali humanitarian aid workers
were murdered in incidents of random violence.
In attempting to enforce the disarmament agreements reached in
the Addis accords, UNOSOM Pakistani peacekeepers were attacked
without warning, reportedly by the forces of the Somali
National Alliance, which controls south Mogadishu. UNOSOM's
efforts to capture key SNA leaders resulted in confrontations
with elements of the south Mogadishu population. Although UNSC
Resolution 837 authorized the U.N. to "take all necessary
means" against those responsible for the June 5 attack,
Medecins Sans Frontieres and the human rights group, Africa
Watch, alleged that UNOSOM forces, including U.S. forces,
violated international humanitarian law and that UNOSOM had
itself become a party in an internal conflict. The charges
included:
--that U.S. missile-firing helicopters on July 12 attacked
without warning the Abdi House, an SNA control center, killing
participants in a political meeting. In other incidents,
UNOSOM forces had issued warnings and called for evacuation
before striking at an inhabited target. UNOSOM apparently did
not issue a warning before this attack.
--that UNOSOM forces did not take adequate care to minimize
noncombatant casualities in a firefight at the Digfer Hospital
on June 17, during which five Somali patients died. UNOSOM
forces were pursuing SNA militia who had fired on them from
within the hospital, which turned out to be used by the SNA to
house troops and store arms, and as a intermittant command
center.
The 1994 Human Rights Watch World Report charges General
Aideed's forces with apparently using civilians to shield
troops and with violating the neutrality of hospitals on two
occasions, including the one noted above. Africa Watch notes
also reports that General Aideed's forces conducted summary
executions.
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
Most Somalis obtain news from British Broadcasting Corporation
and Voice of America Somali-language radio broadcasts. Brief
news broadsheets continued to be printed. UNOSOM has its own
broadcasts and newspaper (Maanta), but its radio signal is not
strong enough to be heard throughout the country. The major
factions also have radio stations. There has been a recent
increase of journals in Somalia. These publications are most
often pamphlets for one faction or another, but some are
developing a journalistic independence new in Somalia's recent
history. There have been no obvious attempts to restrict the
distribution of these local papers.
Aideed monopolized use of the national radio. His faction took
control of the station and used it and mobile transmitters to
broadcast harsh anti-UNOSOM themes. UNOSOM allowed Aideed to
broadcast without interference until the June attack on
peacekeepers, when the radio station was destroyed. Aideed
continues to broadcast freely from a mobile transmitter.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
Periodically, pro-Aideed forces held anti-UNOSOM rallies in the
Aideed-controlled area of south Mogadishu. Supporters of
Aideed-rival Ali Mahdi also held demonstrations, usually in
favor of UNOSOM actions, in north Mogadishu. Similar
demonstrations have been held wherever UNOSOM has offices,
mostly in urban centers. UNOSOM often monitored these
demonstrations, but did not interfere with unless violence
broke out. UNOSOM was accused of firing on protesters in an
incident in June following the attack on Pakistani
peacekeepers. The incident was under investigation at year's
end.
c. Freedom of Religion
Somalis are overwhelmingly Sunni Muslim, but the violence and
chaos, principally in Mogadishu, in 1993 made it difficult for
them to practice their religion in some locations in a mosque
or other formal setting. Local tradition and past law make it
a crime to proselytize for any religion except Islam.
Non-Sunni Moslems or orthodox Moslem sects are often looked on
with suspicion by more mainstream Somalis. Somalia has a small
Christian community, but these men and women often find it
necessary to conceal their beliefs. Foreign Christians
generally practice their religion without persecution as long
as the practice is private and does not include attempts to
ridicule or undermine Islam. Christian churches and cemeteries
have been desecrated, but these acts seemed to be more often
the work of looters and thieves than of zealots.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
The collapse of the Government has left the Somali people
without travel documents needed for international travel.
Those Somalis who remain in the country have difficulty leaving
as neighboring countries often refuse to accept their passports
or restrict entering Somalis as suspected immigrants. Travel
within Somalia continued to be dangerous in 1993, but this did
not deter huge movements of displaced people. Some left the
country as refugees; some moved within Somalia to feeding
centers; others returned to Somalia as repatriates.
After UNITAF's deployment it was expected that massive numbers
of refugees would return. Repatriation from neighboring Kenya
was slower than the UNHCR anticipated. A few thousands, out of
tens of thousands, have been repatriated by the UNHCR. An
undetermined but probably equal number repatriated themselves
without assistance. Unassisted repatriation is relatively easy
because many Somali refugees in Kenya and Ethiopia are nomads,
and borders in the region do not correspond to ethnic
boundaries. Though repatriation has been slow, the massive
outflow of population recorded in 1991-92 was halted, evidence
of the broad improvement of conditions in the southern 40
percent of Somalia in 1993.
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government
The Addis Ababa accords contained provisions for the
reintroduction of a political structure. The election of
district and regional councils, followed by establishment of a
Transitional National Council, and the drafting of a new
constitution, was the agreed process to bring about a political
consensus and reconciliation. More than 50 district councils
and 6 regional councils were established by Somalis with the
help of UNOSOM
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
of Human Rights
No local human rights organizations could function normally
under the conditions that prevailed during the year. But
international humanitarian organizations were generally welcome
in all parts of Somalia, regardless of local clan dominance.
The ICRC had access to prisoners held by the major factions and
by UNOSOM in urbal and some rural areas.
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Disability, Language, or Social Status
Women
Women are harshly subordinated in Somali society. Somali
culture is overwhelmingly restrictive and patriarchal. Women
suffered disproportionately in the Somali civil war and in the
strife that followed. Traditional rulers have reported
systematic rape and abduction of young women to serve as sexual
slaves to roving gangs. The population of Brava, an ethnic
minority, was especially hard hit. In February women from
Brava were still being held by SNA militia as far from their
homes as Baidoa. The same fate befell the women of Hamar Weyne
in Mogadishu, another minority group, when marauding Hawiya
reportedly raped scores of women inside a city mosque where
they had taken refuge. Women were often used as spoils of war
and denigrated to humiliate their clan or family.
Children
Female genital mutilation (circumcision), which has been
condemned by international health experts as damaging to both
physical and psychological health, is commonly inflicted at an
early age. An independent expert in the field estimates that
98 percent of Somali females have undergone this operation.
Other forms of abuse stem from the civil conflict. Children
were pushed by Somali factions into armed conflict with foreign
troops and other Somalis. In the conflict with UNOSOM in south
Mogadishu, Aideed's forces used civilians as human shields and
deliberately involved women and children in combat to reap
propaganda advantages from casualties and protection from
UNOSOM military action. In February Somali children were given
water pistols that looked very much like real guns. Children
claimed they were told to squirt U.N. soldiers with these
toys. This practice led to many near shooting incidents.
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities
More than 80 percent of Somalia's people share a common ethnic
heritage, religion, and nomadic-influenced culture. However,
clan affiliation has always been more important than political
and cultural unity. Under the pressures of social breakdown
and civil war, clan and subclan loyalties grew ever stronger.
The largest minority group consists of "Bantu" Somalis. They
are victims of visible discrimination even in refugee camps.
They fall into two major groups; those who claim to be
aboriginal Somalis, and those who are descended from east
African slaves brought to Somalia by Arab traders in the 14th
century. Somalis also practice a caste/subordinate clan
system. The Tumal and Mitgan are Somali clans despised for
their professions (leather and metal workers) and forbidden to
marry or mix with other Somalis. Educated Somalis have refused
to eat at the same table with members of these groups. In
fact, Somalis will often hesitate to discuss the existence of
these two groups. No Tumal or Mitgan organization has emerged
to champion their rights. Many "Bantu" refugees in Kenya fear
to return to Somalia, feeling that as a threatened minority
they would become still more vulnerable.
In Kismayo in July, two Bantu Somalis, members of one of
Somalia's minority populations, were killed by townspeople for
their part in assisting UNOSOM to resettle the displaced.
Townspeople feared the resettlement program threatened local
food distributions.
People with Disabilities
No reliable information was available on this topic.
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
Nothing remains of the General Federation of Somali Trade
Unions. Given the extent of the country's economic breakdown
and the lack of legal enforcement mechanisms, trade unions were
not able to function in 1993.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
Wages and work requirements in traditional Somali culture are
largely established by ad hoc bargaining, based on supply and
demand. There are no export processing zones.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
No information on this topic was available.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
The reestablishment of schools is only beginning. Formal
employment of children is unlikely; but children often
participate in armed militias.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
There was no organized effort to monitor acceptable conditions
of work during 1993.
[end of document]
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