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TITLE: NIGERIA HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES, 1993
DATE: JANUARY 31, 1994
AUTHOR: U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
NIGERIA
At the end of 1993, Nigeria's military continued to rule the
country. Until August 27, General Ibrahim Babangida, who had
come to power in a 1985 coup, was the head of the military
regime. Under Babangida, Nigeria's main decisionmaking organ
in 1993 was the military-dominated National Defense and
Security Council (NDSC), which ruled by decree. Amid
controversy arising from his annulment of the June 12
Presidential election, Babangida resigned as President and
Commander-in-Chief on August 26, installing the Interim
National Government (ING), headed by businessman Ernest
Shonekan. The ING included many members of the earlier
Transitional Council, which had been responsible for managing
day-to-day governmental affairs under the oversight of the
NDSC. The ING was to organize a new presidential election and
hand over authority to an elected civilian president by March
31, 1994. On November 17, the military forced Shonekan to
resign, and General Sani Abacha assumed the titles of Head of
State and Commander-in-Chief.
Abacha established a military-dominated "Provisional Ruling
Council" (PRC), which ruled by decree, and named prominent
persons from around the country to head government ministries,
grouping them into a 32-member "Federal Executive Council"
(FEC). Although the FEC included some holdovers from the ING,
it also included some well-known prodemocracy and human rights
activists. The PRC quickly dissolved the national and state
legislatures and the local councils and replaced elected
civilian governors with military administrators. The military
regime announced it would hold a constitutional conference to
plot Nigeria's future, including a timetable for return to
democratic government. In the interim, the decree suspending
the 1979 Constitution remained in force.
Nigeria's tightly controlled transition to civilian, democratic
rule was supposed to end on August 27 with the inauguration of
a democratically elected, civilian president. From February to
April, Nigeria's two permitted political parties, the Social
Democratic Party (SDP) and the National Republican Convention
(NRC), staged presidential nominating conventions at the ward,
local government, state, and national level. On June 12, the
SDP's Moshood K.O. Abiola and the NRC's Bashir Tofa squared off
in what national and international observers characterized as
the freest and fairest election in Nigeria's history. But this
assessment did not address itself to the process leading to the
election, whose integrity suffered from the military regime's
extensive manipulation, including the exclusion of many
prospective candidates. From early official and unofficial
returns it appeared Abiola had won a landslide victory.
However, before formal results were announced, Babangida again
usurped the democratic process, annulling the June 12 results.
Babangida rationalized his action by claiming that he and the
NDSC had uncovered evidence of massive electoral fraud, but he
never presented evidence to the Nigerian people and never
released the June 12 results. Nigerians in the Southwest
responded to Babangida's announcement with public protests and
civil disobedience campaigns. In July the protests turned
violent, and more than 100 people were killed.
The bicameral National Assembly was installed in December 1992,
but the NDSC prohibited it from legislating on most areas of
national life. The ING used other bureaucratic and political
maneuvers to circumscribe sharply the Assembly's authority. In
November the PRC dissolved it. The basis of Nigerian
constitutional law during 1993 was unclear. Legal experts
could not always agree about what document formed the basis of
law at any particular point during a year when three different
governments held power. Questions of which constitution, if
any, was in effect are largely irrelevant. All three
governments derived their authority, directly or indirectly,
from military power--not from a constitution or a popular
mandate. Moreover, all Nigerian constitutions contain
essentially the same provisions regarding human rights, and
these form the basis of most judicial decisions, unless, as was
often the case, a decree specifically nullified a provision or
ousted judicial authority.
The Government enforces its authority through the Federal
Security System (the Armed Forces, the State Security Service,
and the national police) and through the courts. In 1992
Babangida announced the creation of the National Guard, which
was supposed to relieve the military of its internal security
role in situations in which the police were unable to maintain
public order. However, during July's prodemocracy
demonstrations, the National Guard remained in its barracks,
and Babangida deployed the army to help quell the
disturbances. In late October, the ING failed to fund the
Guard and announced plans to disperse its personnel to various
army units for additional training, effectively disbanding the
organization. The security forces committed many human rights
violations in 1993.
Most of Nigeria's 90-million population is rural, engaging in
small-scale agriculture. Nigeria depends on oil exports for
over 90 percent of its foreign exchange earnings and 80 percent
of its budget revenues. In order to cope with reduced oil
revenues, Nigeria adopted an indigenous Structural Adjustment
Program (SAP) in 1986. While the SAP was a success in some
respects, economic conditions for the average Nigerian remain
very difficult. The elites continue to prosper, but there is
widespread unemployment, underemployment, and inflation. Large
budget deficits financed by money creation pushed inflation
into the 80- to 90-percent range during 1993. The majority of
the Nigerian population lives in poverty.
Nigeria's human rights record worsened in 1993. Babangida's
erratic political course fueled increased economic distress,
heightened episodic civil unrest in urban areas and interethnic
violence in some rural areas, resulting in many civilian
deaths. The Babangida regime regularly relied on arbitrary
arrest and detention as a means of silencing its critics. It
closed media houses critical of Babangida's nullification of
the June 12 election and announced a series of draconian
decrees restricting press freedom. Like other military
decrees, they contained clauses prohibiting judicial review.
Security services routinely harassed human rights and
prodemocracy groups, journalists, and student activists. Other
human rights problems included extrajudicial killings, police
brutality, dangerous and unsanitary prison conditions, violence
and discrimination against women, and infringements on freedom
of speech, press, travel, and political and labor affiliation.
Shortly after its inauguration, the ING released detained human
rights activists and pledged to respect press freedoms.
Activists arrested during antigovernment demonstrations in
September were formally charged and released on bail. However,
other human rights abuses continued, and the ING failed to
honor its pledge to repeal the draconian press decrees. The
PRC permitted the closed media houses to reopen and withdrew
spurious charges against prominent human rights and
journalists, but, like the ING, it did not repeal the press
decrees.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
As in previous years, extrajudicial killings and excessive use
of force by police and security services were common. The most
deadly incident occurred in July after the regime deployed
police and military units to quell prodemocracy protests in
Lagos. There were credible reports that security forces may
have killed as many as 150 people. The regime asserted that
the death toll was much lower and that security forces
intervened only when confronted by violent criminals. While
the victims included hoodlums and looters, who used the
protests as cover to engage in violent criminal activities,
eyewitness accounts indicated that security forces often fired
randomly into crowds, killing innocent bystanders and peaceful
demonstrators.
Security forces in eastern Nigeria demonstrated a similar
willingness to use deadly force when confronted by peaceful
demonstrators. In May the Movement to Save the Ogoni People
(MOSOP), which alleges that the Government is systematically
violating the Ogonis' human rights (see Section 5), staged a
peaceful demonstration to protest an earlier violent
confrontation between MOSOP sympathizers and security forces.
According to eyewitness accounts, security forces fired into
the protesters, killing one of them.
Although there are no definitive statistics, Nigerian human
rights groups maintain that scores of people die annually while
in police custody. The claims, though difficult to
substantiate, are widely accepted by the Nigerian public and
consistent with other credible reports of police abuse,
including the use of torture to extract criminal confessions
(see Section 1.c.). In March the Civil Liberties Organization
(CLO) publicized the case of Johnny Eshiet, who died while in
police custody in September 1992. The Ikeja police arrested
Eshiet, a transport driver, after his vehicle was reported
missing. The CLO reports that police officers bound Eshiet's
hands and legs, hung him from the roof of an interrogation
room, and flogged him with metal wires in an attempt to extract
a confession from him that he arranged to have his vehicle
stolen. An eyewitness reported observing Eshiet lying in a
pool of blood after the interrogation. Plainclothes policemen
took Eshiet to the hospital where he later died.
Police and security services are seldom held accountable for
the use of excessive, deadly force or the death of individuals
while in custody. The Government made no effort to investigate
the conduct of security forces during July's prodemocracy
protests and, despite pressure from CLO, there was no effort to
investigate Eshiet's death. After the death in 1992 of an army
colonel, Domven Rindam, at a police checkpoint, however, the
authorities swiftly arrested and charged three policemen with
murder. The celebrated case was pending before a Lagos high
court at year's end. Rindam's death led police to dismantle
most checkpoints, but violent crime in some parts of the
country prompted police to maintain others. In June the press
reported that police killed a 21-year-old truck driver at a
checkpoint along the Port Harcourt-Aba expressway. No one was
charged with the crime. The attempt to punish Rindam's killers
contrasted sharply with the Port Harcourt case and raised
questions about the willingness to investigate extrajudicial
killings when the victims are nonmilitary.
b. Disappearance
No politically motivated disappearances were reported.
However, government detention practices have the effect of
causing many detainees to be "missing" for extended periods
(see Section 1.d.).
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
Constitutions in effect under the NDSC, the ING and the PRC
prohibit torture and mistreatment of prisoners and provided
criminal sanctions for such excesses, and the Evidence Act of
1960 prohibits the introduction of evidence obtained through
torture. Nevertheless, detainees frequently die while in
custody (see Section 1.a.), and there were credible reports
that police seeking to extract confessions regularly beat and
tortured suspects. For example, the CLO reported that after
police from the Adeniji Adele station arrested Uzoma Okorie and
Godson Erugo they stripped them naked, suspended them by their
wrists from the roof of a police interrogation room, and
flogged them. While beating Ms. Okorie, police placed the neck
of a beer bottle in her vagina. The CLO reports that police
rearrested and beat Okorie and Erugo after they tried to file a
complaint with the divisional police commander. In another
case, the CLO reports that police in Port Harcourt chained the
hands and feet of detainee Madufuro Igwe, suspended him upside
down from a ceiling fan, and flogged him with motorbike brake
wire.
In an interview with the CLO, Bertram Igwe, a public relations
officer of the Rivers State Police Force sought to rationalize
the use of torture: "There are helpless situations when you
know that a suspect is deliberately telling lies and there is
no other means you can use in cracking the case other than
softening him." The Constitutional Rights Project conducted a
nationwide police powers study that indicates Igwe's sentiments
are shared by a large number of police officers: 67 percent of
the officers interviewed conceded that, absent an efficient
means of investigating a crime, torture becomes the easiest
means of extracting information from suspects.
Conditions in Nigeria's prisons continue to threaten life.
Lack of potable water and sewage facilities and medical
supplies contribute to deplorable sanitary conditions. Disease
runs rampant in the cramped, poorly ventilated facilities. A
1993 study of the Ikoyi prisons by the Lagos-based National
Institute of Medical Research revealed that 28 percent of
inmates had tuberculosis. The Institute warned that an
epidemic could break out beyond prison walls unless steps were
taken to treat inmates. At most prisons, inmates are seldom
allowed outside their cells for recreation, and many must
provide their own food. In those cases, only those with money
or whose relatives bring food have something to eat. Poor
inmates rely on handouts from others to survive.
There are credible reports that inmates are denied food and
medical treatment as a form of punishment. It was widely
reported, for example, that Beko Ransome-Kuti and Ken Saro-Wiwa
were denied access to medical care after they were detained in
July (see also Section 1.d.). Saro-Wiwa suffers from a heart
condition, and his health deteriorated during his confinement.
In some cases, prison officials and police deny inmates food
and access to medical treatment to extort money from them.
Overcrowding in Nigerian prisons also remains a serious
problem. The CLO reported that cells designed to hold four
inmates at the State Intelligence and Investigation Bureau in
Port Harcourt often contain more than 30. In October 1992, the
Government created a task force on prison decongestion to
address this problem. The task force's mandate was to review
prison conditions, prisoners' jail terms, their conduct, and,
when appropriate, authorize prisoners' release. According to
former Secretary for Internal Affairs, Alhaji Abdulrahman, the
task force had freed more than 4,000 prisoners since beginning
its work. Many of those released had been detained without
charge or had spent years in prison waiting for trial (see
Section 1.d.).
While prison authorities are supposed to hand over to foster
homes children born to women in prison, many children remain in
detention with their mothers. Because prisoners are often
expected to provide for themselves, it is often less costly for
the Government to keep children in prison with their mothers
than it would be to place them in foster care.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
Nigerian criminal justice procedures call for trial within 3
months of arraignment for most categories of criminals.
Inefficient administrative procedures, petty extortion,
bureaucratic inertia, poor communication between police and
prison officials, and inadequate transportation still result in
considerable delays, often stretching several years, in
bringing suspects to trial.
Police are empowered to make arrests without warrants if there
is reasonable suspicion of an offense. These provisions give
the police powers that are often abused. Nigerian law requires
the arresting officer to inform the accused of charges at the
time of arrest and take him or her to the station for
processing within a reasonable time. The suspect is supposed
to be given the opportunity to engage counsel and to post
bail. Credible reports indicate that the police generally do
not adhere to these safeguards. Suspects are often held
incommunicado under harsh conditions for extended periods
without charge. Arbitrary detention occurs frequently.
Relatives and friends of wanted suspects are also commonly
placed in detention without charge in an effort to induce the
accused to present themselves to the police.
The State Security (Detention of Persons) Decree of 1984
(Decree Two) provides that the Government may detain without
charge persons suspected of acts prejudicial to state security
or harmful to the economic well-being of the country. When
invoked by the Vice President, the Decree suspends the
detainee's civil liberties and forbids judicial review of
actions taken within its provisions. Many Nigerians still
consider Decree Two the main threat to their basic freedoms
because the judicial ouster clause encourages arbitrary
detention by allowing officers to make arrests with impunity.
Also, the definition of what constitutes acts prejudicial to
state security or the nation's economic well-being can be very
broadly interpreted.
After July's prodemocracy demonstrations, the regime used
Decree Two to arrest and silence Beko Ransome-Kuti, Femi
Falana, and Gani Fawehinmi, leading members of the Campaign for
Democracy (CD), an umbrella human rights organization which was
openly critical of the regime's decision to nullify the June 12
election results. The CD had called for the July
demonstrations. The Government charged the three men with
conspiracy and sedition and held them in an Abuja prison for
almost 8 weeks. The regime ignored two court orders to produce
the activists in court and, citing its powers under Decree Two,
did not comply with a court order granting the detainees bail.
The ING released them on August 30 but did not honor a promise
to submit legislation to the National Assembly which would have
repealed Decree Two. The PRC subsequently withdrew the
charges, but Decree Two remains in force.
The regime detained Ken Saro-Wiwa, a leading human rights
monitor and government critic, on three occasions: for brief
periods on April 12 and 24, and for several weeks after June
21. Saro-Wiwa and MOSOP members maintain that the regime
invoked Decree Two to detain him in June. While press reports
that the regime planned to charge Saro-Wiwa with conspiracy and
sedition make the MOSOP's contention plausible, the regime
never publicly invoked Decree Two.
The above cases were not isolated. The Government routinely
detained human rights monitors, journalists (see Section 2.a.),
and political opponents for making or publishing statements
critical of the Government. In 1992 five human rights
activists, including Beko Ransome-Kuti, Gani Fawahinmi and Femi
Falana, were detained under Decree Two and charged with
treason. The case, which now appears to have become moot, was
adjourned to February 1994.
Most often the authorities did not charge the detainees with a
crime, held them for only brief periods, and questioned them
about their activities and statements. The regime detained
Ransome-Kuti without charge on three occasions before arresting
him in July and charging him with conspiracy and sedition.
Gani Fawehinmi claimed that the Government had detained him 23
times since 1969. Fawehinmi is suing Babangida, who allegedly
detained him 14 of the 23 times, for damages. In February the
regime detained Panaf Olakanmi, a CD member, for 3 days,
allegedly for possessing seditious materials. The same month,
security agents raided the CLO's Lagos headquarters (see
Section 4) and detained its President, Olisa Agbakoba and two
others. After questioning them about their human rights and
prodemocracy work, security agents warned the three men to
refrain from engaging in subversive acts. In March security
agents detained Funsho Omogbehin, a CLO member.
After the regime nullified the June 12 elections, its arrests
of human rights and prodemocracy advocates increased. The
regime detained leading supporters of Abiola, the apparent
winner of the June 12 election, including Oyo State politician
Lamidi Adedibu and former governor of Kano State Abubakar Rimi.
According to credible press reports, the Goverment asked
Adedibu to sign a statement renouncing his support for Abiola
and the June 12 elections. In August security agents detained
200 prodemocracy activists who staged a sit-in to protest
military rule and the nullification of the June 12 election
results. As the National Assembly prepared to consider a
motion endorsing an extension of Babangida's rule, security
agents intervened, frequently detaining members for
"questioning." Some members were held for as long as 24
hours. The authorities also arrested leading human rights
monitors and labor leaders in Kaduna and Jos. They released
the Kaduna monitors, who were not charged with a crime, after
several days in detention. However, they charged the Jos
activists, who were distributing prodemocracy leaflets, with
distributing seditious materials and then released them on bail.
Nigeria's total prison population is estimated at 65,000.
Human rights groups estimate that as much as 46 percent of this
population is awaiting trial. A precise figure for the number
of individuals detained without charge is unavailable. There
are no credible estimates of the number of political detainees.
There were no known instances of forced exile as a means of
political control.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
Decree One of 1984, the Basic Constitution (Modification and
Suspension) Decree, the first decree promulgated by the
military officers who overthrew the civilian regime of
President Shagari in 1983, left the institutional framework of
the judiciary relatively intact but established a parallel
system of military tribunals with sole jurisdiction over
certain offenses, such as coup-plotting, corruption, armed
robbery, and illegal sale of petroleum. A 1991 Decree amended
Decree One by providing that only sitting or retired civilian
judges may preside over tribunals hearing nonmilitary cases.
In most cases before the tribunals, the accused have the right
to legal counsel, bail, and appeal, though some tribunals
substitute a presumption of guilt for the presumption of
innocence, and conviction rates in the tribunals reportedly
exceed conviction rates in the regular courts. Sentences are
generally severe.
Convictions for armed robbery by the Special Robbery and
Firearms Tribunals, as well as convictions under the Treason
and Treasonable Offenses Tribunal, carry the death penalty with
no right of appeal. In the case of armed robbery, death
sentences are confirmed by the state governor. Until August
26, when General Babangida installed the ING, the NDSC was
responsible for confirming treason sentences. At year's end,
it was unclear what organ of the Government had assumed this
responsibility. Convictions before the Miscellaneous Offenses
Tribunal and the Recovery of Public Property Tribunal may not
be appealed in the regular courts, though there is provision
for appeal before the Special Appeals Tribunal.
The Government's reliance on tribunals, which operate outside
the constitutional court system, seriously undermines the
judiciary's independence and often results in legal proceedings
that deny defendants due process. For example, after 1992's
ethnoreligious disturbances in Zangon Kataf, the regime created
two special tribunals to try those allegedly involved in the
riots. Defendants charged before the tribunals were denied the
right to appeal the decisions. In early 1993, the tribunals
sentenced 15 people to death. One of the tribunal chairmen,
retired Justice Benedict Okadigbo, demonstrated little regard
for due process throughout the hearings. There were credible
reports that during the trial of six individuals, including
retired Major General Zamani Lekwot, Okadigbo expressed his
unhappiness with the defense attorneys' line of questioning and
threatened to jail them if they continued. Human rights groups
charged that proceedings before the Okadigbo tribunal were
subject to political influence and that Okadigbo was more
interested in securing convictions than in securing justice.
The resignation of a tribunal member, who alleged that the
other justices regularly met and gave judgments on cases
without consulting him, lent credence to these allegations. To
prevent human rights groups from challenging the tribunals'
decisions, the regime promulgated a decree which removed the
authority of the regular courts to hear any case regarding any
abuse of constitutional rights by the tribunals. In August
General Babangida commuted the sentences of those convicted by
the Zangon Kataf tribunals from execution to 5 years in prison.
The regular court system is composed of both federal and state
trial courts, state appeals courts, the Federal Court of
Appeal, and the Federal Supreme Court. Under the 1979
Constitution, courts of first instance include magistrate or
district courts, customary or area courts, Shari'a (Islamic)
courts, and for some specified cases, the state high courts.
The nature of the case usually determines which court has
jurisdiction. In principle, customary and Shari'a courts have
jurisdiction only if both plaintiff and defendant agree to it,
though in practice fear of legal costs, delay, and distance to
alternative courts encourage many litigants to choose these
courts.
Trials in the regular court system are public and generally
respect constitutionally protected individual rights. Lawyers
in court frequently referred to rights protected by the (then
suspended) 1979 and (unimplemented) 1989 constitutions, and in
cases where the Government had no direct interest, these rights
were generally respected. They include a presumption of
innocence, the right to be present, to confront witnesses, to
present evidence, and to be represented by legal counsel. Free
legal counsel is available through the Legal Aid Council for
persons charged with capital crimes, but the Council is
inadequately funded to provide assistance to all persons
charged with lesser crimes. There is a legal provision for
bail, but many human rights groups charge that it is
underutilized. Bail is denied to those charged with murder,
armed robbery, and drug offenses. There are no legal
provisions barring women or other groups from testifying in
civil court or giving their testimony less weight. The
testimony of women is, however, accorded less weight in Shari'a
courts. There is a widespread perception that judges in both
the regular and Shari'a courts are easily bribed, or "settled,"
and that the courts cannot be relied upon to render an
impartial judgment.
Despite Nigeria's established legal tradition, the judiciary's
independence and integrity are also undercut by the
Government's frequent refusal to respect court rulings. For
example, the regime ignored a court order requiring that it
produce detained human rights monitors Ransome-Kuti, Fawehinmi,
and Falana, in court (see Section 1.d.). While some judges,
like the justice who ordered the regime to show cause for its
detention of the editors of Tell magazine (see Section 2.a.),
are prepared to challenge the Government, many are not. This
was best illustrated in 1993 by a Supreme Court decision in a
case challenging the regime's authority to nullify the June 12
elections. The Supreme Court ruled that the decrees
represented the supreme law of the land.
In addition, there is a perception that in cases which touch
upon important government interests, the Government manipulates
the courts. Early in the year, prodemocracy groups threatened
to file a suit challenging the regime's decision to cancel the
1992 primaries and extend its rule by 8 months. The regime
responded by reminding Nigerians that the decrees on which its
actions were based contained judicial ouster clauses,
prohibiting judicial review of its actions. The regime, its
spokesmen said, was not subject to any court orders touching
upon the transition program. In June, however, the regime
chose to respect an Abuja high court restraining order
prohibiting the National Electoral Commission (NEC) from
releasing the June 12 results. This decision followed an
earlier government decision to ignore a court order forbidding
the NEC from conducting the elections. The regime's
selectivity did not escape the notice of Nigerians, many of
whom charged that the regime's newfound respect for the rule of
law was rooted in its unhappiness with the election results.
Shortly afterward, General Babangida nullified the election.
The two civilians and nine army officers, convicted in
connection with an April 1990 coup attempt after an unfair
secret trial before a Special Military Tribunal, continued to
be held incommunicado at year's end. Otherwise, there were no
reports of political prisoners in Nigeria.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
The 1979 and 1989 Constitutions provide for the rights to
privacy in the home, in correspondence, and in oral electronic
communications, but those Constitutions, as noted, were
suspended throughout the year. In fact, human rights leaders
allege that they are regularly followed and that their
organizations' telephones are cut or tapped by security
agents. Given statements made by police officials in late 1992
and early 1993 that "security agencies (were) monitoring the
activities of a human rights activist", these claims seem
credible.
Also, in January Nobel laureate Wole Soyinka complained that
immigration and customs officials harassed him at Murtala
Muhammed International Airport, and in June Soyinka charged
that security agents monitored his movements. Soyinka also
alleged that a police helicopter frequently hovered around his
home.
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
The 1979 Constitution provides for freedom of speech and the
press, and the three governments that controlled Nigeria during
1993 repeatedly reaffirmed their commitment to both
principles. In practice, however, the Babangida regime
regularly violated these guarantees and conducted a vigorous
campaign to silence its critics in the press. While the ING
did not routinely arrest and detain journalists, neither did it
honor its pledge to repeal decrees limiting freedom of the
press, nor did it permit media organizations closed by the
Babangida regime to reopen. The PRC permitted media houses to
reopen but did not repeal the objectionable decrees.
Security agents often prevented human rights monitors from
discussing the Government's human rights record and criticizing
the transition program. During April security agents detained
Abdul Oroh, the CLO's Executive Secretary, and Nimmo Bassey and
prevented them from speaking at the opening of a new CLO
chapter in Benin City. Also in April, Delta State police
prevented Ken Saro-Wiwa from delivering a lecture and forcibly
escorted him from the state. After General Babangida installed
the Interim National Government, Attorney General Clement
Akpamgbo announced that reference to the nullified June 12
election constituted a criminal act.
The Babangida regime regularly detained journalists, often
charging them with conspiracy or sedition, for publishing
material critical of the Government or which the Government
deemed inflammatory. In March after The Reporter, a northern
daily, published a front-page commentary titled, "Nigeria's
prevailing mess: (Babangida) to blame," the regime proscribed
the newspaper and jailed its editor, Mallam Hayatu. Also in
March, security agents arrested the editors of The News and
charged them with contempt of court, allegedly for publishing
sealed court documents. There are credible reports, however,
that the regime arrested the editors to punish them for their
magazine's consistent criticism of government policies. In
April the Government arrested Innocent Okoye, editor of The
Satellite, and Chris Okolie, publisher of Newbreed magazine
after they printed articles critical of the regime. The regime
arrested the editors of Tell magazine in May and again in
August. In the second instance, the regime ignored a court
order to produce the editors in court and provide a
justification for their detention. It subsequently released
the editors but charged them with possessing seditious
documents. The PRC dropped the charges on November 30.
The Babangida government waged an aggressive campaign (often
relying on informers) to silence Tell and The News, magazines
which consistently published articles critical of the regime
and its transition program. In April and May, security agents
seized thousands of issues of both magazines--at one point
seizing three successive issues of Tell. In May security
agents seized 42,000 copies of an edition of The News which
contained an article characterizing General Babangida as
"careless, incompetent, and unprincipled." The authorities
frequently detained vendors caught selling either magazine
without bringing charges. The regime justified its seizures of
Tell and The News by alleging that two unpublished decrees
proscribed the magazines' circulation.
On May 2, the regime promulgated the Treason and Treasonable
Offenses Decree, which permits it to prosecute "anyone who
conspires either with himself or any other person in Nigeria or
outside Nigeria by words or publication to disrupt the general
fabric of the country or any part of it." The Government may
impose the death penalty on individuals convicted under the
Decree, which is so broadly worded that almost any criticism of
the Government could violate its provisions. On May 22, the
regime, perhaps in response to intense domestic and
international criticism, reaffirmed its commitment to freedom
of the press and announced that it was "setting aside" the
Decree. The regime did not repeal the Decree, however, and on
the same day it made the announcement, State Security Service
agents seized 80,000 copies of The News.
In June the regime promulgated the Offensive Publications
(Proscription) Decree, Decree 35, which empowered it to
proscribe or order the seizure of any publication containing
any article or material likely to disrupt the transition to
democracy. Like the treason Decree, Decree 35 is so broadly
worded that almost any criticism of the transition program
could provide sufficient grounds for the seizure or
proscription of the publication in which it appeared.
Regime attacks on the press intensified after nullification of
the June 12 election results. In July it closed six media
houses, including the Concord group, owned by M.K.O. Abiola,
the apparent winner on June 12. All six media houses were
strongly critical of the regime's nullification of the election
and repeatedly urged the government to release and respect the
results. Secretary for Information and Culture, Uche
Chukwumerije, claimed the media houses were closed because they
had "mortgaged their professional ethics for money" and engaged
in "irresponsible journalism." Official anger over the media
houses' criticism is a much more plausible explanation for
their closure. The regime permitted two of the media houses to
reopen, though one was open only "commercially" and restricted
from publishing. The Babangida regime promulgated a decree
banning 10 publications of the other 4 media houses, including
The National Concord, The Punch, The Sketch, and The Observer.
The PRC allowed them to reopen in November.
Also in August, the Babangida regime promulgated Decree 43,
which prescribed new registration guidelines for all newspapers
and was designed to control the press and silence its criticism
of the regime. The guidelines require the payment of
registration fees of approximately $10,000 and approval of a
registration application by a newspaper registration board
whose members are appointed by the Secretary for Information
and Culture. The Decree lays out tough penalties, including
prison terms and fines, for the circulation of unregistered
newspapers and publication of false statements. It requires
also that every issue display the names and addresses of its
owners, publishers, and printers. Registration must be renewed
annually. In September the Interim National Government
intimated that it would delay enforcement of Decree 43 until
December. It also announced that it was the responsibility of
the National Assembly, not the ING, to repeal the Decree. The
Assembly was not able to do so before General Abacha's military
regime dissolved it.
Nigeria's universities were closed on May 3 because of a strike
by the Academic Staff of Universities Union (ASUU, see Section
6). In early October, the strike ended and the universities
reopened. The Government lifted its bans on the ASUU and the
National Association of Nigerian Students (NANS) in 1993.
Academic freedom is generally respected, although some groups
allege that government security agents maintain an active
undercover presence on the campuses and that university
authorities act at the behest of the Government to suspend or
expel student activists. Student political activists continued
to face harassment from university and security officials.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
Although all Nigerian constitutions have provided all citizens
the right to assemble freely and to associate with other
persons in political parties, trade unions, or other special
interest associations, only two political parties were
permitted in 1993, and the PRC dissolved them on November 18.
In addition, Abacha's first speech as Head of State declared
that "all processions, political meetings and associations of
any type in any part of the country are hereby banned."
The PRC's predecessors did not normally require permits for
public meetings indoors, and permit requirements for outdoor
public functions were often ignored. However, on the authority
of Decree Five the Babangida regime banned gatherings whose
political, ethnic, or religious overtones it feared might lead
to unrest. In January Osun State authorities, fearing protests
by prodemocracy activists, banned public demonstrations and
processions. In June Bauchi State authorities announced a
similar ban aimed at preventing prodemocracy demonstrations in
the wake of the regime's nullification of the June 12
election. Open-air religious services away from places of
worship remain prohibited in most states due to religious
tensions in various parts of the country.
Nigerians form and participate in a wide variety of special
interest organizations, including religious groups, trade
groups, women's organizations, and professional associations.
Such organizations need not register with the Government and
are generally permitted free association with other national
and foreign bodies. Members of the Nigerian Bar Association
(NBA) accused the regime of interfering with their right to
freedom of association, however. In February 1993, the regime
promulgated Decree 21, the Legal Practitioners (amended)
Decree, which empowered Nigeria's attorneys to manage the NBA's
affairs and conduct elections for its national executive
committee. After a disputed presidential election in 1992, the
NBA was thrown into crisis. The regime allegedly tried to take
control of the NBA by backing a candidate (ING Secretary for
Transport and Aviation and PRC Minister for Power and Steel
Alhaji Dalhatu) friendly to it but, having failed, used the
NBA's internal disarray as an excuse to try again by means of
Decree 21. The NBA was challenging Decree 21 in court at
year's end.
In May the regime banned several political organizations which
it contended were founded primarily along ethnic, tribal,
religious, or other parochial lines for the purpose of
sponsoring various political candidates. The organizations
remained banned under the ING and the PRC.
c. Freedom of Religion
Decree One (suspending most of the 1979 Constitution) and the
unimplemented 1989 Constitution prohibit federal and state
governments from adopting an official state religion. In
addition, the PRC has made it clear that, whatever emerges from
the planned constitutional conference, Nigeria will remain a
secular state. The 1979 and 1989 constitutional provisions for
freedom of belief, practice, and education in regard to
religion are generally respected. The Government instituted a
ban in 1987 (which is still in effect) on religious
organizations on schoolgrounds at the primary level.
Individual students retain the right to practice their religion
in recognized places of worship.
Distribution of religious publications is generally
unrestricted. There is a lightly enforced ban on published
religious advertisements, and religious programming on
television and radio remains closely controlled by the
Government. Both Christian and Muslim organizations allege
that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Immigration
Department were restricting the entry into the country of
certain religious practitioners, particularly persons suspected
of proselytizing. Religious practitioners operating schools,
institutions, or medical facilities generally were not
affected, nor were those seeking renewal of existing residence
permits.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
Nigeria's 1979 and 1989 Constitutions entitle its citizens to
move freely throughout the country and to reside where they
wish. They also prohibit expulsion or the denial of exit or
entry to any Nigerian citizen. In practice, Nigerians travel
abroad in large numbers, and thousands are engaged overseas in
work and study. Exit visas are not required.
However, the Babangida regime for political reasons
occasionally prevented travel. In June the regime seized Ken
Saro-Wiwa's passport and refused to release Olisa Agbakoba's
passport, which it had seized the previous year, preventing
them from traveling to Vienna to attend the World Conference on
Human Rights. The regime returned Saro-Wiwa's passport in
September after his release from detention (see Section 1.d.)
and Agbakoba's shortly afterwards. In September authorities
briefly seized and held Wole Soyinka's passport. Citizens
leaving Nigeria have the right to reenter, and citizenship may
not be revoked for any reason.
Nigerian law and practice permit temporary refuge and asylum in
Nigeria for political refugees from other countries. Nigeria
supports and cooperates with the Lagos office of the United
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). A Liberian
refugee camp, with an estimated population of 3,000, continued
to operate in Ogun state. There is also an undetermined number
of Chadian refugees residing primarily in the northern border
area. There were no reports that refugees were expelled from
Nigeria in 1993.
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government
Citizens did not have this right in 1993. Throughout most of
1993 the NDSC, headed by General Babangida, remained the
highest authority in the land. On August 26, Babangida
announced that he was leaving office and installed an Interim
National Government (ING) headed by Ernest Shonekan, a
civilian. The ING, which was supposed to organize new
elections and hand over power in March 1994, included a number
of officials, civilian and military, from the Babangida regime
and continued to rule by decree. The PRC, which took power
November 17, banned all political institutions and parties. It
announced plans for a constitutional conference, but national
elections before 1995 are unlikely.
After canceling presidential primaries in late 1992, General
Babangida promulgated Decree 52, which extended military rule
by 8 months until August 27, 1993, and laid out a new election
process and schedule. Presidential candidates were required to
win nominating conventions at the ward, local, state and,
finally, the national level before squaring off in June 12
elections. The 23 individuals who competed in the canceled
1992 presidential primaries were banned from contesting the new
election.
In 1989 the Government created the Social Democratic Party
(SDP) and the National Republican Convention (NRC), wrote their
manifestos, constitutions, and platforms, and gave them the
exclusive right to contest elections. From February to April
1993, the SDP and the NRC conducted nominating conventions
under the close supervision of the Government. M.K.O. Abiola
emerged as the SDP presidential candidate, while Bashir Tofa
secured the NRC nomination.
On June 12, Nigerians voted in what national and international
observers judged the freest and fairest election in the
country's history. However, this assessment did not take
account of the process leading to election day which was marred
by extensive manipulation by the military regime, including the
exclusion of many prospective candidates. Early official
results and unofficial returns appeared to indicate that Abiola
had won a landslide victory. However, before the National
Electoral Commission could announce formal results, an Abuja
high court issued a restraining order blocking their release.
The court issued the order after an organization seeking to
extend military rule filed a suit challenging the election's
validity. On June 23, General Babangida nullified the election
results, claiming that he and the NDSC had uncovered evidence
of widespread electoral fraud, but he never presented any
evidence to substantiate his allegation. Many Nigerians
believe that he canceled the election because he opposed the
results.
General Babangida's action in nullifying the June 12 election
results produced massive public protests and civil disobedience
campaigns. It lead to a standoff between Babangida and the
unofficial winner, Abiola, with strong elements of a struggle
between military and civilians. His action also ignited
longstanding ethnic animosities and briefly raised the spectre
of civil war. Subsequently, Olusegun Obasanjo, a former head
of state, and others played important mediating roles in
advocating an all-civilian interim government.
The ING, however, proved incapable of dealing with Nigeria's
problems. At the urging (some say demand) of General Abacha
and others, ING Chairman Shonekan resigned on November 17.
Abacha installed himself as Head of State and established the
military-dominated PRC. He also named a largely civilian
cabinet which included some prominent prodemocracy and human
rights activists. Reneging on an earlier promise, Abacha named
military officers rather than civilians to replace the elected
civilian governors whom he had dismissed. Local Government
councils were left in the hands of civilians, but Nigerians
will not have an opportunity peacefully to change their
government at any level until the proposed constitutional
conference completes its work and a timetable for the return to
democracy is implemented.
At the party conventions and in the June 12 election, voters
cast their ballots by a "modified open-secret system." Under
this system voters balloted privately but remained at the
conventions and polling stations while election officials
publicly tabulated the results.
Men continue to dominate Nigerian politics. However, there are
no legal impediments to political participation or voting by
women or any other minority group. One woman served in the
91-member Senate, and 6 women served in the 589-member House of
Representatives. Several women ran for President and at the
SDP convention one woman, Sarah Jibril, finished fourth in the
balloting. One woman held a cabinet position in the Interim
National Government, and there were two female deputy
governors. There is 1 woman in the 32-member FEC, but no woman
is a member of the PRC.
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
of Human Rights
Human rights groups across a broad spectrum are engaged in the
vocal and public campaign for the promotion of human rights in
Nigeria. Among the most active are: the Civil Liberties
Organization (CLO); the Committee for the Defense of Human
Rights (CDHR); the Constitutional Rights Project; the National
Association of Democratic Lawyers; Human Rights Africa; the
Legal Research and Resource Development Center; the National
Association of University Women; the International Federation
of Women Lawyers; and the Human Rights Committee of the
Nigerian Bar Association. A number of prominent authors,
including Nobel laureate Wole Soyinka, artists, educators, and
jurists, in addition to professional and labor organizations,
have spoken out frequently on human rights issues.
The Government often interfered with the activities of human
rights organizations, detaining their members (see Section
1.d.) and preventing them from criticizing the Government's
human rights record (see Section 2.a.). Detentions increased
after the Government nullified the June 12 election. In
addition to incidents outlined in other sections of the report,
in February police and security agents raided the CLO's Lagos
office and confiscated membership lists, financial statements,
and the manuscript of a report titled, "Prisoner in the
Shadows--a report on women and children in selected Nigerian
prisons." On the same day, security agents searched the home
of CLO President Olisa Agbakoba and the home of CDHR member
Chima Ubani. Security agents also detained Agbakoba (see
Section 1.d.). On occasion, the Government harassed family
members of human rights leaders.
High-level government officials regularly denounced the
activities of Nigeria's human rights community, often accusing
its members of participating in foreign-inspired plots to
destabilize the country. There are credible reports that the
State Security Service engaged in a campaign to discredit human
rights leaders by distributing leaflets and hanging posters
alleging that they were interested only in political
self-promotion or stirring up ethnic divisions (see also
Section 1.f.).
In June the regime sent a diplomatic note to all diplomatic
missions and international organizations present in Nigeria
deploring diplomatic contact with human rights groups, which it
labeled "subversive." The note threatened that the regime
would "take approriate measures to protect its national
security" if diplomats continued meeting with human rights
groups. U.S. and other diplomats continued to meet with such
groups. Foreign human rights groups are permitted to visit
Nigeria. The Government occasionally responds to domestic
human rights charges, though often not constructively. For
example, the Government often claims that its attacks on the
press (see Section 2.a.) are a response to irresponsible
journalism.
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Disability, Language, or Social Status
Women
There are no laws barring women from particular fields of
employment, but women often experience discrimination because
the Goverment tolerates customary and religious practices which
adversely affect them. Women do not receive equal pay for
equal work and often find it extremely difficult to acquire
commercial credit or obtain tax deductions or rebates as the
heads of households.
While some women have made considerable individual progress,
both in the academic and business world, most women are
underprivileged. According to a 1990 U.N. Children Fund's
(UNICEF) report, fewer than 10 percent of Nigeria's women are
employed in nonfarming occupations. Though women are not
legally barred from owning land, under customary land tenure
systems only men own land, and women gain access to land
through marriage. In addition, under law a woman may not
inherit her husband's property unless she can prove that she
contributed to the acquisition of the property. Many customary
practices do not even recognize a woman's right to inherit her
husband's property, and many widows are rendered destitute when
their in-laws take virtually all of the deceased "husband's
property," often leaving the woman with barely the clothes she
is wearing. Polygamy is widely practiced among all Nigerian
ethnic groups in both Christian and Islamic communities.
Reports of wife abuse are common, especially in polygamous
families. Police do not normally intervene in domestic
disputes, and they are seldom discussed publicly. In more
traditional areas, it is questionable whether the courts and
police actively intervene to protect women who formally accuse
their husbands if the level of alleged abuse does not exceed
customary norms in the area. Purdah, the Islamic practice of
keeping girls and women in seclusion from men outside the
family, is prevalent in parts of Nigeria's far north. A number
of factors affect the strictness with which seclusion is
enforced, including the husband's wishes and his socioeconomic
status.
An estimated 100,000 Nigerian women suffer from vesico-vaginal
fistula. Approximately 83 percent of the cases result from
prolonged labor among underage women. Another 13 percent
reportedly result from the primitive Hausa/Fulani practice
known as "gishiri cut," whereby a pregnant woman is cut open
through the genital organs, damaging the bladder or rectum, in
a frantic bid to release the fetus.
Children
The Government's commitment to children's welfare has been more
sporadic than deliberate, and it devotes only limited resources
to children's welfare, though the amount of money spent on
children's health projects has increased in recent years.
Nigerian laws designed to protect the rights of children, such
as child labor laws and the 1964 Children and Young Persons
Act, are often obsolete, inadequate, and seldom enforced.
Although the law stipulates that "no child shall be ordered to
be imprisoned" in Nigeria, juvenile offenders are routinely
denied bail and incarcerated along with hardened criminals.
Juvenile courts often ignore proper procedures, and there is
little effort to explain the nature of the offense to
defendants. The Government only occasionally condemns child
abuse and neglect and makes little effort to stop customary
practices, such as the sale of children into marriage. "Remand
homes," as Nigerian reform schools are known, are very
protective of their inmates, but necessary elements such as
varied and sufficient food, medical care, health precautions
and recreation are lacking.
Nigerian law provides that "no child should be engaged or be
employed in street trading." However, the Government condones
street trading, and young boys and girls are prevalent in
Nigeria's market stalls and hawking a variety of wares in the
ubiquitous traffic jams. Inordinate numbers of street children
are prevalent throughout Nigeria and many, known as "area
boys," often resort to crime and harassment of traders,
pedestrians, and drivers. The Government periodically rounds
up and detains these children with no regard for due process.
Despite government efforts, labor, political, and other
problems plague Nigeria's education system, and many children
go without any formal education. Parents are often forced to
remove children from school for economic reasons. There are
credible reports that poor families often sell their daughters
into marriage as a means of supplementing their incomes. There
are also reports that many young girls are forced into marriage
as soon as they reach puberty, regardless of age, to prevent
"indecency" associated with premarital sex.
The Government publicly opposes female genital multilation
(circumcision). Nigeria was one of five countries which
sponsored a resolution at the 46th World Health Assembly
calling for the elimination of harmful health practices,
including female genital mutilation. However, most Nigerian
ethnic groups circumcise young females. Nigerian experts
estimate that as many as 50 percent of Nigerian
girls/women--virtually 100 percent in the primarily Christian
south, and fewer in the Muslim north--have undergone female
genital mutilation which varies from simple removal of the
labia minora to removal of the clitoris to the most dangerous
form, infibulation. The age at which females are circumcised
varies from the first week of life to after a woman delivers
her first child. Some groups circumcise prior to marriage;
others during pregnancy, believing that if the head of the
child touches the clitoris during delivery, the child will
die. The Federal Ministry of Health and nongovernmental
organizations sponsor public awareness and education projects
to inform communities of the health hazards associated with
female genital mutilation.
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities
There is no official policy of discrimination against any of
Nigeria's 250 ethnic groups, and laws do not favor one group
over another. However, Nigeria has a long history of tension
among its diverse ethnic groups. Clashes between rival ethnic
groups in Delta, Rivers, and Taraba States often resulted in
bloodshed. Tradition continues to impose considerable pressure
on individual government officials to favor their own ethnic
group, and ethnic favoritism persists.
The Ogoni, an ethnic group indigenous to Rivers State in
eastern Nigeria (Nigeria's oil producing region), charge that
the Government engages in a systematic campaign to deprive them
of their land and its wealth. The Ogonis claim that the
Government seizes Ogoni property without fair compensation,
ignores the environmental impact of oil production on Ogoni
land, and fails to provide adequate social services, such as
water and electricity. The Movement to Save the Ogoni People,
which is campaigning for greater Ogoni autonomy, often
describes government policy towards the Ogoni as genocide.
While the confrontation between the Government and the Ogoni
has occasionaly turned violent (see Section 1.a.) and Ogoni
concerns about environmental degradation and the quality of
social services in the oil producing region have some merit,
accusations that the Government is engaged in a genocidal
campaign against the Ogoni are unfounded.
Religious Minorities
Nigerian law prohibits religious discrimination. Nonetheless,
it is commonly reported that government officials often
discriminate against persons practicing a religion different
from their own. Religious tensions often lead to violence, as
in 1992 when clashes between Muslims and Christians in Kaduna
State resulted in hundreds, perhaps thousands, of deaths. Many
Christian leaders allege that the civil disturbance tribunals
established to try those accused of inciting the Zangon Kataf
riots were biased against Christian defendants. The
composition of the six-member Okadigbo tribunal, which included
four Muslims, reinforced this impression. While it is unclear
if a defendant's religion influenced the tribunal's judgments,
accusations that the tribunal did not adequately safeguard
defendants' right to a free and fair trial are credible (see
Section 1.e.).
People with Disabilities
The Government called for private businesses to institute
policies ensuring fair treatment for the 2 percent of the work
force that it claims is disabled. It has not, however, enacted
any laws nor formulated any policy which specifically ensures
the right of the disabled to work, nor has it mandated what
action should be taken if employers discriminate against the
disabled.
While there is nothing which would indicate systematic
discrimination against the disabled, disabled workers must
compete in an economy in which many nondisabled are unemployed
and underemployed. In addition, Nigeria's poor infrastructure
makes it difficult for the disabled to get to work, making them
less attractive to employers. Few office buildings have access
ramps for wheelchairs, and many have elevators that work
sporadically, if at all. Public transportation, when and where
available, is not equipped to handle wheelchairs.
While the Government appears desirous of providing education
for all handicapped children and adults, Nigeria's economic
crisis and lack of adequate infrastructure make it difficult to
allocate sufficient resources to meet the disabled population's
needs.
Section 6 Worker Rights
The Babangida regime and the interim government that succeeded
it made few changes in labor law. The interim government
restructured the Nigeria Labour Congress in August, merging
unions to reduce the number of affiliates from 41 to 29.
a. The Right of Association
Nigerian workers, except members of the armed forces and
employees designated essential by the Government, may join
trade unions. Essential employees include firefighters,
police, employees of the Central Bank, the security printers
(printers of currency, passports, and government forms), and
customs and excise staff. Primary, secondary, and university
teachers were added to the list of essential personnel in May.
They fall into a special category, however, as they are allowed
to organize but not to strike. The National Labour Congress
(NLC), Nigeria's umbrella labor federation, repeatedly called
on the regime to reinstate unions in all sectors of the economy
except for the armed forces, firefighters, and police. Neither
the ING nor the PRC rescinded the relevant decree.
The vast majority (approximately 72 percent) of the Nigerian
work force is employed in agriculture. No agricultural workers
are unionized. Domestic workers, most of the informal sector,
and practically all small industries and businesses remain
nonunionized. Approximately 11.5 percent of the total work
force belong to unions. Government decrees and policy continue
to restrict labor freedoms. In contravention of the
International Labor Organization (ILO) Convention on Freedom of
Association, the Government has decreed a single central labor
body, the NLC, and deregistered all other union federations.
The Government continued to resist attempts by senior
government staff to form and register as an independent labor
association the Senior Staff Consultative Association of
Nigeria (SESCAN). It refused to register SESCAN affiliates as
authorized labor organizations and did not allow employers to
deduct SESCAN dues from employees' paychecks.
The NLC claims 3.5 million members out of a total work force of
over 30 million, but this figure is difficult to verify.
Although the population has grown and the work force has
increased, endemic economic problems have probably contributed
to a decline in union membership.
Under Nigerian labor law, any nonagricultural enterprise which
employs more than 50 employees is obliged to recognize trade
unions and must pay or deduct a dues checkoff for employees who
are members. The NLC has complained that some employers
deliberately organize their industries into multiple units
employing less than 50 workers to avoid unionization. When the
NLC called a general strike in August, the regime threatened to
withdraw the dues checkoff provision and make the payment of
union dues completely voluntary. Organized labor condemned
this proposal, and the ING dropped it when the strike ended.
The right to strike is recognized by law, except in the case of
essential services as defined by the Government. There are no
laws prohibiting retribution against strikers and strike
leaders. However, strikers who feel they are facing unfair
retribution may submit their cases to the Industrial
Arbitration Court. Its decisions are binding on all parties.
During 1992 and 1993, a rapidly declining economy and the
regime's annulment of the June 12 election resulted in a
growing wave of protracted labor disputes, culminating in the
NLC's August 28-September 6 general strike and a series of
general strikes sponsored by the Campaign for Democracy (CD)
and other government opponents. Although the security forces
detained and harassed some of the more outspoken labor leaders,
they did not make a systematic attempt to stop the strikes.
There were no mass arrests of striking workers or violent
confrontations between strikers and the security forces.
In May the regime promulgated the Teaching Essential Services
Decree, which declared education an essential service.
Although education-sector unions were not proscribed, the
Decree called for the dismissal of teachers who participate in
a strike that is longer than 1 week in duration. In July the
regime banned the Academic Staff Union of Universities, which
had been on strike since May, and issued dismissal notices to
striking university teachers. The strikers ignored the
dismissals, and the regime later rescinded the ban and
reinstated the strikers without penalty.
The ILO continues to criticize the Nigerian Labor Code, which
it asserts allows a number of practices that run counter to ILO
conventions. These include Nigeria's single trade union
system, the ban on organizing for certain categories of
workers, the broad powers of the Government to supervise union
accounts at any time, and restrictions on the right to strike.
In August 1991, the regime's Decree 32 amended a policy held
since 1975 which permitted international labor affiliation only
with the Organization of African Trade Union Unity (OATUU) and
affiliated pan-African labor federations. Decree 32 partially
repealed the ban by allowing affiliation with non-African
international labor organizations, but only for training and
education assistance.
The transition to civil rule program promulgated during the
Babangida regime made it illegal for the NLC to engage in
partisan politics. Despite this, the NLC publicly endorsed the
Social Democratic Party (SDP), and NLC President Paschal Bafyau
lobbied vigorously to be named the SDP's vice presidential
candidate in the June 12 election. Neither the NLC nor Bafyau
was sanctioned for their political activities.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
The labor laws permit both the right to organize and the right
to bargain collectively between management and trade unions.
Collective bargaining is, in fact, common in many sectors of
the economy. However, the Government retains broad authority
over labor matters and can intervene forcefully in labor
disputes which it feels contravene its essential political or
economic programs.
There are provisions against antiunion discrimination in the
Trade Dispute Act of 1976. Nigerian law further protects
workers against retaliation by employers for labor activity
through an independent arm of the judiciary, the Nigerian
Industrial Court, which handles complaints of antiunion
discrimination. The NLC has complained, however, that the
Nigerian judicial system is often slow to handle labor cases
and that this constitutes a denial of redress to those with
legitimate complaints. Courts have compelled several employers
to reinstate fired union activists.
The Ministry of Labor has tried to restrict its role to the
enforcement of minimum wage and freedom of association laws.
In January 1991 the Government abolished the uniform wage
structure for all government entities. Now each tier of
government--federal, state, local, and state-owned firms--is
free to negotiate its own level of wages, benefits, and
conditions of employment. As a result, negotiations,
previously conducted on a nationwide basis under the direct
supervision of the Labor Ministry, are now conducted on a
local, often plant-wide, basis with less government involvement.
General Babangida laid the cornerstone for an export processing
zone in Calabar on November 8, 1991. As of the end of 1993,
the regime had not addressed the shape of labor relations
within the zone.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
The 1979 Constitution (and the 1989 Constitution, which formed
the basis for most jurisprudence during 1993) prohibit forced
or compulsory labor, and this prohibition has long been
generally observed in practice. The ILO, noting that the 1989
Constitution had been suspended, asked the Government to
indicate how the ILO Convention against forced labor would be
enforced in the absence of constitutional guarantees. The ILO
has also pointed out that Nigerian legislation regarding
punishment for illegal strikes, breaches of labor discipline by
merchant seamen, and compulsory arbitration may be in violation
of the ILO Convention of the Prohibition of Forced or
Compulsory Labor.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
The 1974 Labor Decree prohibits employment of children under 15
years of age in commerce and industry and restricts other child
labor to home-based agricultural or domestic work. The labor
law prohibits the employment of children in agricultural or
domestic work for more than 8 hours per day. The 1974 Decree
allows the apprenticeship of youths aged 13 to 15 under
specific conditions. Apprenticeship exists in a wide range of
crafts, trades, and state-owned enterprises.
Primary education is compulsory in Nigeria, though the law is
rarely enforced and recent studies show declining enrollment.
The Government and UNICEF estimate that in 1987 primary school
enrollment probably peaked at around 61 percent, declined
steadily thereafter, and may have dropped below 50 percent
during 1993. The principal cause for the decline has been
continuing deterioration of public schools. This lack of
sufficient primary school infrastructure has denied some
families access to education, contributing to the number of
children on the employment market.
The ILO and UNICEF, in consultation with the NLC, have
concluded that child labor, while not yet endemic, is on the
increase in the unregulated and nonunionized informal sector
and could become a serious problem. Nigeria's export
industries do not employ children. The United Nations has
proposed a study to determine more precisely the extent of
child labor in Nigeria. It also proposes to work together with
the NLC, nongovernmental organizations, and the Nigerian
Government to devise strategies to combat child labor abuses.
Under the provisions of ILO Convention 123, the ILO requested
the Government to supply it with a list of Nigerian children
who may be employed in mining. The regime had not yet
responded to the request by year's end.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
The 1974 Labor Decree establishes a 40-hour workweek,
prescribes 2 to 4 weeks of annual leave, and sets a minimum
wage of $14 (450 Naira) per month. The Government's Structural
Adjustment Program (SAP), coupled with a high inflation rate,
has reduced the buying power of many Nigerian workers and led
many within the NLC to criticize the SAP as an unfair
imposition on the workers. The minimum wage as currently
stipulated does not allow a worker's wages to keep pace with
inflation nor provide a decent standard of living. Rising
inflation is a frequent cause of strikes. Nigerian labor law
stipulates that workers are to be paid extra for hours worked
over the legal limit. Labor law also states that workers who
work on Sundays and statutory public holidays must be paid a
full day's pay in addition to their normal wages. There is no
law prohibiting excessive compulsory overtime.
The 1974 Decree contains general health and safety provisions,
some aimed specifically at youth and female workers,
enforceable by the Ministry of Labor. Employers must
compensate injured workers and dependent survivors of those
killed in industrial accidents. The Labor Ministry, which is
charged with enforcement of these laws, has been largely
ineffective, and violations are common and go largely
unpunished. Workers have the right to remove themselves from
dangerous work situations without jeopardy to continued
employment. However, such requests are rare, as dire poverty
often compels workers to remain in dangerous jobs although they
may be fully aware of the possible consequences.
In 1991 Nigeria invited an ILO tripartite team from the
Committee of Experts (COE) to evaluate the country's labor
inspection system. The COE determined that Nigeria was not yet
fully in compliance with the relevant ILO conventions, as it
did not maintain adequate statistics on its inspection
program. Despite extensive ILO-sponsored training programs for
factory inspectors, at the end of 1993 the ILO had not yet
ruled that Nigeria was in compliance.
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