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TITLE:  KENYA HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES, 1993                             
DATE:  JANUARY 31, 1994
AUTHOR:  U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

                           KENYA


Kenya reintroduced multiparty democracy in 1991, but President 
Daniel Arap Moi continued to control a governing system in 
which power is centered in the office of the President and the 
President's party, the former single party, the Kenya African 
National Union (KANU).  Under the 1963 Constitution the 
President has extensive powers over the legislature and the 
judiciary.  Nevertheless, while KANU holds a majority in the 
unicameral National Assembly, it no longer has the two-thirds 
majority required to pass constitutional amendments.  In 1993 
the ruling party applied extensive pressures to entice or 
coerce opposition Members of Parliament (M.P.'s) to defect to 
KANU.

After 2 years of inaction, the Government finally took some 
action to curb the ethnic violence centered in the Rift 
Valley.  On September 3, the Government announced the 
establishment of security zones in the hardest hit areas.  
Citing the Preservation of Public Security Act, the Government 
outlawed the possession of weapons, movement of livestock at 
night, and the publication of any information on the areas of 
violence without government consent.  The Government prevented 
opposition M.P.'s, domestic and international human rights 
figures, and journalists from entering the areas.  The 
Government made little effort to investigate credible 
allegations of the involvement of government officials in 
instigating the clashes or in shielding fighters from 
prosecution.

Kenya has a large internal security apparatus that includes the 
police Criminal Investigation Department (CID), the 
paramilitary General Services Unit (GSU), and the Directorate 
of Security and Intelligence (DSI or Special Branch).  The CID 
and Special Branch investigate criminal activity and also 
monitor persons the State considers subversive.  The internal 
security apparatus has been used to intimidate and harass 
politicians, opponents of the Government, and dissidents, 
sometimes employing torture or other mistreatment.  The 
Government gave security forces special dispensation from 
prosecution for actions in the security zones, though human 
rights groups received no evidence of abuses in the zones.

Kenya's economy, despite the dominance of public and 
state-owned enterprises, includes a well-developed private 
sector for trade and light manufacturing as well as an 
agricultural sector that provides food for local consumption 
and substantial exports of coffee, tea, and other commodities. 
The tourism industry leads coffee and tea exports as the top 
foreign exchange earner but suffered reduced growth in 1993, 
due in part to the worldwide recession.  The economy plummeted 
in 1993 as excess growth of the money supply fueled inflation, 
shortages of goods, and labor unrest.  Although it has 
decreased over the last several years, the high population 
growth rate continued to contribute to a serious and growing 
problem of unemployment.

Although the controversial December 1992 general elections 
brought about a modest strengthening of democratic 
institutions, the KANU-led Government has yet to reconcile 
itself to a new era of multiparty politics.  The year witnessed 
serious setbacks in the Government's commitment to human 
rights, ethnic and political tolerance, and the rule of law.  
The Government failed adequately to respond to the continuing 
ethnic violence which has claimed over one thousand lives, or 
to stop many of its officials from inflaming this violence in 
other areas through war-like statements.  In 1993 the 
Government used the security forces to intimidate its political 
critics, arresting 36 of the 85 opposition M.P.'s and many 
journalists and labor leaders.  Security forces also broke up 
peaceful demonstrations and political meetings and disabled two 
privately owned printing presses.  The Government abridged 
worker rights in facilitating a "coup" to replace the top union 
leadership with party loyalists.  Societal discrimination and 
domestic violence against women, especially rape and female 
genital mutilation, remained serious and widespread problems.

RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

Section 1  Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including 
           Freedom from:

     a.  Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing

There were no reported instances of specifically targeted 
political killings by government forces, but there was one 
clear example of an extrajudicial killing.  In mid-September 
three truckloads of plainclothes security police forced their 
way into the compound of Central Organization of Trade Unions 
Secretary General Joseph Mugalla in Kakamega.  Mugalla was 
absent, but the police harassed his wife and beat up his 
nephew, who had attempted to question the police.  He died the 
following day from the beating.  As of the end of 1993, the 
Government had taken no action to prosecute those responsible.


Substantial evidence exists of the complicity of high-level 
government officials instigating and promoting the ethnic 
clashes, which have so far claimed over 1,000 lives and 
displaced 250,000 people (see Section 1.g.).

While most of the many deaths in prison resulted from disease 
and lack of medical care (see Section 1.c.), some may have 
resulted from beatings or other use of excessive force by 
police or prison guards.  On the night of November 2, police 
shot Jackson Mutonye Ndegwa in the leg and arrested him 
following a raid on Ndeiya Chief's Camp, an arsenal near 
Nairobi.  Police reported he died of his injuries the next 
morning, although he was reportedly interrogated the previous 
night.

Mob violence also continued to be a major problem.  As of 
year's end, 508 people had been murdered in such violence, an 
increase from 1992.  Most victims were either suspected thieves 
or were accused of being sorcerers.  While blame for public 
executions by civilians cannot directly be ascribed to the 
Government, Kenyan security forces have not made suppression of 
mob violence a priority--this in spite of the public statements 
by President Moi that mob violence must stop.  The conduct of 
security forces was mixed, as some police officers braved 
violence themselves to rescue would-be victims, while in other 
incidents there were reports of police turning a blind eye to 
such activity.

The trial of Jonah Anguka for the February 1990 murder of 
former Foreign Minister Robert Ouko continued in 1993.  The 
Government produced no more than circumstantial evidence to tie 
Anguka to the murder, and human rights advocates continued to 
claim that Anguka was a scapegoat for powerful government 
officials.  As the final arguments in the case were being 
prepared, the presiding judge, Justice Fidahussein Abdulla, 
died of apparently natural causes.  The Chief Justice ruled 
that Anguka would have to undergo a second full trial.

     b.  Disappearance

There were no reports of disappearances.

     c.  Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading 
         Treatment or Punishment

Torture is proscribed under the Constitution, but credible 
allegations of torture, police brutality, and abuse of 
prisoners, often to coerce confessions, continued.  Police also 
used brutal methods to break up unregistered political meetings 
and even some registered ones (see Section 2.b.).

The police subjected prisoners arrested for "political" 
offenses, including sitting M.P.'s, to particularly brutal and 
degrading treatment.  The day before the May 20 Bonchari 
parliamentary by-election, opposition M.P. Ferdinand Obure went 
to the local police station in Kisii town to demand information 
about supporters of one of the principal opposition parties, 
the Forum for the Restoration of Democracy/Kenya (FORD/K), 
arrested the previous day.  After an altercation with a police 
superintendent, the police arrested and jailed Obure.  The M.P. 
was brought into court on a stretcher later that day, with 
bruises on the back, chest, and legs, consistent with his 
testimony that he had been beaten in custody.  In court the 
prosecutor stated that Obure had been injured when he fell to 
the floor while assaulting the officer.  The authorities 
charged Obure with causing a disruption in a police station and 
released him on bond.  His case had not come up for trial by 
year's end, and it was expected that the charges would be 
dropped.

There were other instances of prisoners being brutalized by 
police, including credible allegations of torture.  For 
example, Stephen Kariuki Muigai, arrested along with Koigi wa 
Wamwere in November, suffered torture to his knee and ankle 
joints and under the toenails.  Credible medical evidence of 
the torture was provided to police and the courts.  At the end 
of the year, the Government had taken no action to respond to 
the allegations.  Also, defense council in the Ndeiya Chief's 
Camp case charged that a private physician could confirm that 
several of the prisoners had been tortured.

In early January, the authorities prevented the personal 
physician for the "Treason Four" (including former M.P. Koigi 
Wa Wamwere) from visiting his patients in detention, although 
at least one was very ill and allegations of food poisoning had 
been reported in local newspapers.  The physician initiated 
action in the High Court to gain access to the prisoners as 
stipulated by Kenyan law.  The prisoners were released before 
the case was decided.

Conditions in prison are life threatening, due in part to 
inadequate resources and in part to the Government's 
unwillingness to address deficiencies in the penal system.  
Standards of food and health care continue to fall short of the 
basic provisions in the Prisons Act, especially for nursing 
mothers, who have their infants with them.  A lack of quality 
food and bedding materials and flooded or unheated cells are 
common.  Sexual abuse is also common in Kenyan prisons and 
rarely punished.  Women prisoners are subject to the same harsh 
prison conditions as men but are subject to even greater sexual 
abuse.

In April an assistant government minister reported in 
Parliament that 977 inmates had died in prison in the previous 
3 years.  (There are approximately 34,000 prisoners in Kenya, 
of whom approximately 3,000 are women.)  Those deaths were 
attributed chiefly to disease; the assistant minister admitted 
that Kenyan prisons did not have resident doctors, and only one 
prison had a doctor permanently assigned to it.

     d.  Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile

The Constitution provides that most arrested or detained 
persons (other than those detained under the Preservation of 
Public Security Act or PPSA) shall be brought before a court 
"as soon as is reasonably practicable," which would be within 
24 hours of the arrest or from the start of detention.

The Constitution was amended in 1988 to allow the police to 
hold persons suspected of capital offenses for 14 days prior to 
being brought before a court.  Capital offenses include such 
crimes as murder and treason.  A legislative amendment passed 
at the end of the 1993 parliamentary session would exclude 
weekends and holidays from this 14-day period, potentially a 
significant increase in the time prisoners can be held without 
trial.  In practice, suspects of all types are often held 
incommunicado for 2 to 3 weeks before being brought before a 
court.  Often, family members bring law suits to compel 
authorities to produce "missing" prisoners.

The PPSA allows the State to detain a person indefinitely 
without charges or trial upon a determination that it is 
necessary for the "preservation of public security."  This 
includes "prevention and suppression of rebellion, mutiny, 
violence, intimidation, disorder and crime, unlawful attempts 
and conspiracies to overthrow the Government or the 
Constitution," and several other grounds.  No persons were 
detained under the PPSA in 1993, though a number were arrested 
under the Rift Valley "Security Zones" Regulations announced 
under the authority of the PPSA (Section 1.g.).  Furthermore, 
the courts evidenced an increased willingness to grant bail in 
political cases.


On April 28, KANU lawmakers defeated a parliamentary motion 
which would have suspended detention without trial.  In the 
debate over the bill, the Attorney General said he appreciated 
the need for a comprehensive review of the Constitution but 
that the motion was premature.  The Vice President promised 
that the Law Reform Commission would produce a paper on 
constitutional reform by the end of the year.  At the end of 
July, the Attorney General announced the formation of 11 task 
forces to examine the Penal Code and some of the more 
controversial sections of the Constitution.  At the end of the 
year, only two of the commissions had met.

The police continued to arrest and question government critics 
without provocation, and often without warrant.  For example, 
Central Organization of Trade Unions (COTU) Secretary General 
Joseph Mugalla gave a Labor Day speech May 1, saying that COTU 
would proceed with a national general strike if labor demands 
for a 100-percent wage increase and dismissal of Vice President 
George Saitoti were not met.  The Minister of Labor walked out 
without giving his speech, and the ceremonies ended abruptly.  
Security police, without any warrant, tried but were thwarted 
from picking up Mugalla at a Labor Day luncheon.  Later the 
same day, they arrested him, his deputy Boniface Munyao, and 
Shoe and Leather Workers Secretary General Joseph Bolo, 
purportedly for having called a strike.  Mugalla was released 
May 7, the others earlier, but the charges were still pending 
at year's end. 

On May 31, police broke up a licensed Forum for the Restoration 
of Democracy/Asili (FORD/A) political meeting in Kiambu, after 
M.P. Martin Shikuku made comments critical of the Government.  
The police arrested FORD/A M.P. Kamau Icharia and Shikuku the 
following day, held them overnight, and released them the day 
after without charges.  The arrest of opposition M.P.'s was a 
frequent occurrence after the August recess, so that in 
September, more than half of FORD/A's 30 M.P.'s were out on 
bond at the same time.

On June 9, police attempted to arrest FORD/A M.P. Njenga Mungai 
inside Parliament, in connection with statements he made 
earlier on the need for Kikuyus to defend themselves in the 
Rift Valley.  Under Kenyan law, M.P.'s are protected from 
arrest while "going to, attending at, or returning from a 
sitting of the Assembly."  Assistant Minister of State in 
Charge of Internal Security Jackson Kalweo issued a statement 
in Parliament expressing regret over the incident and announced 
that the Government would investigate fully the police officers 
involved.  No disciplinary or any other action had been 
announced by year's end.

A number of Kenyans were arrested for incitement, sedition, and 
other offenses related to their alleged involvement in tribal 
clashes.  On September 22, former detainee Koigi Wa Wamwere was 
arrested along with six others for possession of seditious 
literature within one of the announced security zones.  Wamwere 
was found with copies of a broadsheet called The Wailing Molo, 
which accused the Government of responsibility for the ethnic 
clashes, and a flyer from the National Democratic and Human 
Rights Organization (NDEHURIO), an organization which Wamwere 
founded earlier in the year.  On September 24, the presiding 
judge refused the defendants' appeal to the High Court, holding 
that there were no substantive constitutional issues at stake, 
and denied bail pending a hearing on October 6.

At the end of the year, while there were no detainees held 
under the PPSA, a number of prisoners were held without bail 
and denied opportunity within a reasonable time to answer 
government charges, including Koigi wa Wamwere and more than a 
dozen others held for the attacks on the Bahati and Ndeiya 
police arsenals.  The Government arrested them on criminal 
charges, though it has yet to present any evidence of their 
guilt in court.  There is reason to believe that some of these 
prisoners are being held for their political beliefs, 
associations, or expressions.

     e.  Denial of Fair Public Trial

The legal system, as defined in the Judicature Act of 1967, is 
based on the Constitution, laws passed by Parliament, and 
common law or court precedent.  Customary law is used as a 
guide in civil matters affecting persons of the same ethnic 
group so long as it does not conflict with statutory law.  
Kenya does not have a jury system.  The court system consists 
of a Court of Appeals, a High Court, and two levels of 
magistrates' courts where most criminal and civil cases 
originate.  In 1989 High Court Justice Norbury Dugdale ruled 
that the courts have no power to enforce the "Bill of Rights," 
which is a part of the Constitution.  In spite of numerous 
legal challenges that the ruling effectively subsumes the 
judicial branch of government under the executive, his decision 
has not been overruled.

Civilians are tried in civilian courts; verdicts may be 
appealed to the Kenyan High Court and ultimately to the Court 
of Appeals.  Kenyans do not have a right to government-provided 
legal counsel except in certain capital cases.  Most persons 
tried for capital offenses are provided counsel free of charge 
if they cannot afford it.  For noncapital charges, however, 
free legal aid is not generally available outside of Nairobi.  
In the absence of legal advice from Kituo Cha Sheria ("the law 
center" in Swahili), poor people sometimes plead guilty to a 
variety of offenses, including political offenses.  Military 
personnel are tried by courts-martial, and verdicts may be 
appealed.  Attorneys for military personnel are appointed on a 
case-by-case basis by the Chief Justice.  The Chief's Authority 
Act gives low-level administration officials, called chiefs, 
wide-ranging powers, including the power to arrest and hold 
individuals and to restrict a person's movement without trial.  
Although the Kenya Law Reform Commission has recommended that 
the law be abolished, no progress has been made in this 
direction.

The President has extensive powers over the judiciary.  He 
appoints the Chief Justice and the Attorney General and 
appoints High Court judges with the advice of the Judicial 
Service Commission.  While it has not been tested, he has 
authority to dismiss judges, the Attorney General, and certain 
other officials upon the recommendation of a special 
presidentially appointed tribunal.

The Government's actions often result in the denial of a fair 
trial.  For example, the arrests and prosecutions of 
journalists accused of sedition have been marked by unwarranted 
delays and undue harassment of defendants.  On May 19, in the 
face of domestic criticism and international pressure by human 
rights groups, the Government dropped sedition charges against 
six editors and employees of Society magazine.  Although there 
had been no action on the charges for a whole year, the editors 
were still forced to travel to Mombasa every month for court 
hearings (also see Section 2.a.).

The Government's use of the legal system to prevent its critics 
from using the courts to stop government harassment was evident 
in the Fotoform case.  Fotoform Limited had been the printer of 
a number of independent publications.  In April the police 
forced their way into the Fotoform plant and dismantled and 
confiscated the printing press.  Fotoform immediately filed an 
injunction to compel the Government to return the printing 
press parts, since the police had not obtained a warrant before 
seizing them and because Fotoform had not yet been charged with 
sedition.  The Government defended its use of prior restraint 
with regard to seditious publications.  Three months later 
(despite Government assurances that the case would be 
expedited), on July 21, the High Court denied Fotoform the 
injunction, saying it did not want to prejudice the sedition 
cases filed after the seizure against the Fotoform manager and 
the editor of Finance magazine.  The Government filed the 
sedition cases ex post facto to meet the legal requirements of 
the seizure but did not receive the Attorney General's 
permission to prosecute.  On September 24, the Government 
withdrew all charges against Fotoform but did not issue an 
order to return the press parts.  In the meantime, the 
Government's various actions had put Fotoform out of business.

The Government has also switched the venue for several 
controversial cases in order to ensure a hearing before a 
progovernment magistrate or in a progovernment area.  In 
particular, several of the cases related to the ethnic clashes 
and the demolition of kiosks in Nakuru were transferred from 
Kikuyu-dominated Nakuru to Kericho or other towns in the 
Kalenjin heartland.

Notwithstanding the Government's influence on the judiciary and 
its use of the legal system to harass its critics, the courts 
have occasionally acted independently of the executive.  The 
courts rendered several judgments against the Government.  For 
example, in mid-March an appellate tribunal found that the 
Government unjustly detained and tortured plaintiff Wanyiri 
Kihoro in 1986.  Calling the police action "repugnant," the 
court awarded Kihoro damages although it was powerless to 
punish the offending officers absent action by the Government.  
The court's finding was deemed to be a precedent.  A number of 
other former detainees have filed suit against the Government 
for unlawful detention or are contemplating doing so.

     f.  Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or 
         Correspondence

Searches without warrants are allowed under the Constitution in 
certain instances "to promote the public benefit," including in 
security cases.  Although judicially issued search warrants are 
generally obtained, security officials often conduct searches 
without warrants to apprehend suspected criminals or to seize 
property suspected of having been stolen.  The authorities 
continue to search homes of suspected dissidents without 
warrants, and evidence so obtained has been admitted to support 
convictions.  Security forces employ a variety of surveillance 
techniques, including electronic surveillance and a network of 
informers.  In particular, police surveillance of political 
opponents and some of their visitors is routine.  Opposition 
leaders and human rights monitors also charge the Government 
with staging or promoting physical attacks on those critical of 
the Government (see Section 2.b.).

On February 26, a hooded police squad tore apart a pharmacy in 
Nairobi's Hilton Hotel and arrested proprietor John Makanga, 
for alleged "incitement" due to his activities on behalf of 
victims of ethnic clashes.  The police had no warrant for his 
arrest and never filed charges against him.  Human rights 
groups criticized the Government for the brutality of the 
arrest and the wanton damage inflicted on his place of 
business.  The Kenyan press described the brutal, unlawful 
arrest perpetrated by hooded police officers, in a very public 
place, as a politically motivated warning rather than an 
exercise of criminal justice.

On May 8, police officers and youths alleged to be KANU thugs 
demolished small, fully stocked market stalls in Nakuru town.  
Government officials first denied any knowledge of the 
operation (which involved uniformed administrative police and a 
municipal bulldozer), then refused permission for the 
shopowners to rebuild, citing an unexplained "security 
threat."  Human rights groups charged that the demolitions 
targeted ethnic groups thought to be generally supportive of 
the opposition.  Since that time, market stalls have been 
demolished in other major cities, including Nairobi and 
Kisumu.  In most cases, no warning was given, and the legal 
authority to demolish the structures was dubious.

Although Kenyans are, in theory, free to choose their political 
affiliation, government employees were routinely told to 
support the ruling party or be fired.  At a public rally on 
February 14, President Moi warned civil servants to be loyal to 
KANU or face dismissal, since KANU had won the December general 
election.

     g.  Use of Excessive Force and Violations of Humanitarian
         Law in Internal Conflicts

The so-called ethnic clashes in the Rift Valley, which have 
largely targeted ethnic groups not supportive of the ruling 
party, continued to cause numerous deaths and displacements.  
Substantial evidence exists of the complicity of high-ranking 
government officials in financing, arming, and then shielding 
the attackers from prosecution.  Only one clash-related case 
has resulted in a conviction, and that was overturned.  
According to separate reports by a parliamentary special 
committee, the Catholic Bishops of Kenya, the National Council 
of Churches of Kenya (NCCK) (a Protestant umbrella group), the 
National Elections Monitoring Group (NEMU), the Kenya Human 
Rights Commission, the Robert F. Kennedy Memorial Center, and 
Africa Watch, the Government bears primary responsibility for 
the destruction and loss of lives.  Nearly 1,000 people have 
died and between 150,000 to 300,000 have been displaced since 
the clashes began in 1991.

On September 3, the Government announced the establishment of 
security zones in the hardest hit areas around Molo, Londiani, 
Elburgon, and Burnt Forest.  Citing the Preservation of Public 
Security Act, the Government outlawed the possession of 
weapons, movement of livestock at night, and the publication of 
any information on the areas of violence without government 
consent.  Opposition M.P.'s and domestic and international 
human rights figures were prevented from entering the areas, as 
were journalists.  Human rights groups complained about the 
security forces' monopoly on information, and the draconian 
nature of the legislation establishing the zones.

Security personnel were given shoot-to-kill authorization on 
the mere suspicion that a crime might be committed.  
Unauthorized entry into or movement within the zones was 
sufficient to constitute a crime.  Security personnel were 
empowered to requisition private vehicles, prohibit the 
movement of residents, and demand forced labor, as well as 
given expanded powers of search and arrest.  The regulations 
also absolve the Government and security forces of any 
responsibility for death and destruction, specifically 
prohibiting suits for compensation.  At year's end, there were 
no reports that this new authority had been grossly abused.  

Government critics, press and church sources, and human rights 
groups blame the Government for the violence and claim that it 
initially sponsored the clashes to prove its oft-repeated 
assertion that multiparty politics are incompatible with 
Kenya's multiethnic society.  The resulting deaths and 
destruction have aggravated traditional tribal rivalries, and 
the clashes now proceed even without active encouragement from 
the Government.  The NEMU report on the clashes stated, 
"initially, it appeared as if the aim was to curtail the 
multiparty crusade.  However, it has more recently taken the 
form of ethnic cleansing--the removal of all ethnic groups 
except the Kalenjin, Maasai, Turkana, and Samburu from the Rift 
Valley."


High-level government officials continue to make inflammatory 
statements without government response, and Kenya's security 
forces seem unable or unwilling to contain the violence.  
During the eruption of ethnic fighting in Mombasa on November 
28, armed police at the scene did not intervene.  The 
Government sought to frustrate the hopes of the displaced 
wishing to return to their homes; it harassed groups offering 
them legal or financial assistance, allowed insecurity to 
persist in troubled regions, rejected seemingly legitimate land 
claims, and allowed members of progovernment ethnic groups to 
take over farms and property left behind.  The promotion of a 
district commissioner, alleged to be involved in the clashes, 
to his current post of Rift Valley provincial commissioner was 
a further disquieting sign.

Section 2  Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:

     a.  Freedom of Speech and Press

The Constitution provides for freedom of speech and press and 
outlaws discrimination on the grounds of political opinion.  
However, there are numerous de jure and de facto restrictions 
and inhibitions on the exercise of free speech.  Freedom of 
speech is often breached by security forces acting without 
warrant and often undercut by overly broad judicial 
interpretations of antiquated sedition and libel laws.  For 
example, on January 19, police arrested FORD/K M.P. Paul Muite 
under Section 66 of the Penal Code, which prohibits "any false 
statement, rumor, or report which is likely to cause fear and 
alarm to the public or to disturb the public peace."  He had 
earlier accused the Government of perpetuating a climate of 
insecurity in Northeast Province in order to exercise greater 
political control over the Province.  In spite of government 
harassment, however, opposition political and human rights 
groups continue to present their views to the public.

Radio is the medium through which most Kenyans get their news.  
The Government controls the single radio station and its 
affiliate television station, the Kenya Broadcasting 
Corporation (KBC), which produces both televison and radio 
news.  They typically avoid stories critical of the Government, 
give a large share of news time to government or ruling party 
functions, and have consistently failed to give equal and 
accurate coverage to opposition activities.  A second 
television station, Kenya Television Network (KTN), adheres to 
self-imposed guidelines.  Government influence on its editorial 
content, both directly and through the chairman of the board, 
increased markedly, until March, when KTN stopped broadcasting 
its popular local news program under government pressure.  In 
December KANU, acting on the President's orders, replaced the 
legal officers of KTN.  KANU Secretary General Joseph Kamotho 
claimed that, in spite of frequent denials during the year, the 
party was KTN's legal owner.

To protect its radio and television monopoly, the Government 
has refused to issue any license for a private radio station, 
though there have been a number of expressions of interest.  On 
September 27, the Government announced a restriction "for 
security reasons" on receive-only television dishes "until 
licensing procedures can be worked out."

The print media includes three daily newspapers providing 
national coverage.  The printed press is vibrant and 
independent, though under government pressure to self-censor.  
The two independent daily newspapers, the Nation and the 
Standard, give extensive coverage to political events and often 
print editorials critical of government policies.  The weekly 
newspapers and magazines, many of which take a more strident 
tone in their criticism of the Government, also have 
substantial audiences, though they have borne the brunt of 
government harassment.

During 1993 the Government used the police force and antiquated 
colonial sedition laws to arrest editors, dismantle printing 
presses, harass vendors, and impound magazines (see also 
Section 1.e.).  Among the many instances of government 
censorship of the press were the following:

--On February 3, the editor of Finance magazine Njehu Gatabaki 
was charged with three counts of sedition in connection with an 
issue of Finance which described President Moi's large holdings 
in British banking institutions.  Gatabaki was held several 
days in jail, then released on bond.  On June 14, he was 
rearrested at the High Court (where he had gone to file a 
petition for the Government to return his passport (see Section 
2.d.), charged with sedition for the sixth time, and jailed for 
approximately 48 hours.  He was then released on bond and 
surety of approximately $4,400.  Gatabaki has never had one of 
his sedition cases come to trial, and by the end of October all 
of the charges pending had been dropped.

-- On May 30, police impounded 6,000 copies of the Presbyterian 
Church of East Africa magazine Jitegemea (Kiswahili for 
self-reliance).  The issue accused the Government of genocide 
for fomenting the ethnic clashes in Rift Valley and for 
targeting Kikuyu shopowners by demolishing kiosks across the 
country.  The Government charged editor Jamlick Miano with 
sedition, his third arrest for sedition since the July 1992 
inauguration of the magazine.  On June 26, the Government 
withdrew six charges of sedition against Miano originally filed 
in July 1992, though the latest charges had not been withdrawn 
by the end of 1993.  While Miano remained free on bail, the 
repeated impoundments of Jitegemea and arrests of Miano have 
probably resulted in the paper's demise.

-- On August 2, plainclothes police raided Colourprint, printer 
for Finance magazine among others.  The police seized negatives 
and plates along with 10,000 copies of Finance magazine, the 
sixth time in 14 months that Finance was impounded.  Earlier on 
February 10, police acting without a warrant confiscated plates 
and other printing materials from Lengo Press, a Christian 
printing house.  Earlier that day, Lengo had distributed a copy 
of The Watchman, a purportedly religious magazine which is 
sharply critical of the Government.

The Government does not specifically restrict the activities or 
reporting of Nairobi's extensive international press corps, 
though in covering the Rift Valley violence, international 
reporters are bound by the same security restrictions as Kenyan 
journalists.  A number of books remain banned, including a 
Kiswahili play based on George Orwell's "Animal Farm" and a 
number of works by emigre Kenyan author Ngugi wa Thiong'o.

The public universities have become further politicized since 
the return of multiparty politics.  Government, KANU, and 
university officials attempted to pressure faculty and staff to 
support the ruling party.  Opposition leaders were successfully 
barred from college campuses, professors thought supportive of 
the opposition were sidelined, and senior academics who 
publicly support KANU were rewarded by an entrenched patronage 
system.  A network of police informants continued to monitor 
both students and professors at the universities, although some 
observers claim the number of informers may have declined in 
recent years.  The Government maintained its refusal to allow 
the operation of the Student Organization of Nairobi University 
(SONU), although that body is called for in the university 
constitution.  Likewise, the Government refused registration to 
a nationwide union of university professors in late 1993.  When 
the dons went on strike, the universities fired the leaders and 
halted the paychecks of hundreds more in early January.


     b.  Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association

Freedom of assembly, while provided for in the Constitution, is 
seriously limited by the Public Order Act, which gives 
authorities power to control public gatherings.  The Act makes 
it illegal to hold an unlicensed meeting of 10 or more persons 
without approval from the district commissioner, but it does 
not in theory apply to persons meeting for "social, cultural, 
charitable, recreational, religious, professional, commercial, 
or industrial purposes."  In practice, meetings under all those 
categories fall under the jurisdiction of the Public Order Act.

The Government continued to restrict the right of peaceful 
assembly by refusing to register meetings and by breaking up 
both unlicensed and licensed meetings.

In March police prevented human rights advocate Wangari Maathai 
from holding a seminar on the ethnic clashes in Nakuru town.  
Cordoning off the Catholic cathedral, which was to be the site 
of the seminar, armed police with dogs forcibly prevented 
anyone from entering the compound.  After the initial meeting 
was canceled on March 2, Maathai tried and failed twice more to 
hold the meeting.  The provincial commissioner said that the 
proposed meeting was a threat to public security and accused 
Maathai of incitement.

On March 23, a group of opposition supporters stood peacefully 
outside Parliament demonstrating against the President and KANU 
parliamentarians attending the state opening of Parliament.  
They were attacked by youths dressed in traditional Maasai 
clothing and carrying metal-studded clubs, whips, and 
machetes.  The ample number of security police present took no 
action to halt the violence.  Observers reported that the 
"Maasai" had military-type haircuts, wore military watches, and 
in other ways did not resemble Maasai.  After widespread 
accusations that the attack was carried out by members of 
Kenya's security forces, the Daily Nation reported that 
Minister of Education and KANU General Secretary Joseph Kamotho 
admitted at a public function that the "Maasai Moran" were 
really KANU youthwingers and had been provoked by chants of 
"Moi must go" into violence.  Though an embarrassed Kamotho 
later retracted the statements, the Nation explained that a 
senior editor had confirmed the story that same evening with 
Kamotho and pledged to stand by it.

The authorities routinely denied opposition parliamentarians 
permission to meet their constituents.  For example, on August 
18, M.P. Kenneth Matiba was conducting a meet-the-people tour 
of Murang'a and Embu districts when truckloads of police broke 
up a short meeting in Murang'a and prevented him from 
addressing any meetings in Embu.

The Societies Act governs freedom of association; it states 
that every association must be registered or exempted from 
registration by the Registrar of Societies.  Nongovernmental 
organizations (NGO's) protested requirements that they register 
every 5 years as an attempt by the Government to control human 
rights and charitable activities.  Nevertheless, after heavy 
government pressure, most local NGO's had to apply for 
registration in 1993.  Koigi wa Wamwere's human rights group, 
NDEHURIO, was denied registration in 1993.

Since the repeal of Section 2(a) of the Constitution in 
November 1991, Kenyans have in theory been free to join the 
political party of their choice, and 10 parties have been 
registered.  Nine registered parties participated in the 
December 1992 elections:  KANU, FORD/Kenya, FORD/Asili, the 
Democratic Party, the Social Democratic Party, the Kenya 
National Democratic Party, the Kenya National Congress, the 
Labor Party Democracy, the Kenya Social Congress, and the Party 
of Independent Candidates of Kenya.  The Government refused to 
register at least three, including the Islamic Party of Kenya 
(IPK), the Democratic Movement, and the Socialist Alliance of 
Peasants and the Proletariats of Kenya.  At least 14 other 
parties applied but did not receive a response from the 
Government.  These included at least 2 environmental parties, 
which were refused registration by the Attorney General as 
threats "to the security of the State."

IPK followers on Kenya's coast continued to protest their 
exclusion, and the party designated a chairman and other 
officers to press their case.  Though the Societies Act nowhere 
prohibits religion-based political parties, the Attorney 
General maintained his position that registering sectarian 
parties would contradict the spirit of the law, which 
proscribes organizations "incompatible with peace, welfare, or 
good order in Kenya."

On July 2, uniformed police surrounded the headquarters of the 
Central Organization of Trade Unions (COTU) to prevent a 
meeting of the COTU governing council, which had been scheduled 
in May and announced publicly.  The authorities cited 
"security" reasons for their actions, but the purpose was to 
install new progovernment labor leadership (see Section 6.a.).


University faculty went on strike at the end of 1993 to protest 
the lack of action, after 18 months, on their request to 
register the University Academic Staff Union (UASU).  The 
university management responded in early 1994 by firing more 
than 24 professors and withholding the salaries of more than 
200 others.

     c.  Freedom of Religion

Kenya has no state religion.  Freedom of worship is 
acknowledged in the Constitution and generally allowed, but 
churches new to Kenya must obtain government approval to be 
registered.  Many Kenyan Muslims charge that the Government's 
antipathy towards the IPK is proof of an anti-Muslim bias, 
though Government officials deny this.

On July 17, President Moi held a KANU political rally in 
Kapsabet.  As is often the case, local authorities instructed 
students to attend.  At the nearby Kapsabet girls' high school, 
the school's headmistress interrupted a group of Seventh Day 
Adventist students, who were conducting a religious service, 
and ordered them to attend the rally.  When a number refused 
(the Government claims there were 12, though area parents 
claimed 84 students), the school authorities expelled them from 
school.  After an outcry by the press and the National Teachers 
Union, the local district commissioner instructed the 
headmistress to readmit the students and stop interfering with 
their religious freedom.  By the end of July, the students had 
been readmitted to school but were assigned manual labor as 
punishment.

     d.  Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
         Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation

By law citizens may travel freely within the country.  However, 
ethnic clashes and the establishment of security zones 
resticted the ability of many Kenyans to travel, particularly 
to those parts of the Rift Valley most affected by the violence.

The Government does not generally prohibit emigration of its 
citizens but in 1993, as in past years, prevented travel abroad 
by some of its critics.  The Government does not regard 
provision of passports to its citizens as a right and reserves 
the authority to issue or deny passports at its discretion.

In June the Government denied Finance magazine editor Njehu 
Gatabaki permission to depart Kenya in order to attend the 
World Conference on Human Rights in Vienna.  Gatabaki had been 
appointed by the newly formed Association for a Free and 
Independent Press to deliver a speech on press freedom in Kenya 
at the Conference.  In court, the Attorney General's office 
argued that Gatabaki's passport could not be released due to 
pending sedition charges against him and since Gatabaki had not 
applied 14 days in advance.  The chief magistrate accepted that 
argument, and Gatabaki was prevented from attending the Vienna 
Conference.

The Government also prevented a former "sedition" detainee, 
Augustine Kathangu, who is suing the Government for unlawful 
confinement, from traveling outside the country.  Mr. Kathangu 
continued to petition the principal immigration officer to 
return his passport seized in 1991 or to issue a new one.  

In October security officers boarded a loaded commercial 
airliner, seized the passport of KTN Director Jared Kangwana, 
and prevented him from departing on a business trip.  Kangwana 
maintains that the act was part of a government intimidation 
campaign to force him to relinquish control of KTN to the 
ruling party.  Since the Government took no action to institute 
criminal proceedings against Kangwana and ultimately succeeded 
in forcing Kangwana to cede the company to KANU, his 
allegations appear credible.

The Government has been quick to use its deportation powers 
against selected foreign citizens it viewed as overly 
critical.  In February it deported Anders Breidlid, a Norwegian 
citizen, immediately after he landed at Kenyatta airport in 
Nairobi, apparently in retaliation for his work on behalf of 
Kenyan political prisoners.  In May the Government deported 
Father Oliver Ryan, an Irish priest living in the Rift Valley, 
in response to comments he made blaming government officials 
for condoning tribal conflict in the Rift Valley.  Father Ryan 
was the third expatriate priest to be deported for such 
comments since the ethnic clashes began.

In 1991 Kenya was inundated by Somali, Ethiopian, and Sudanese 
refugees, fleeing chaos and conflict in their home countries.  
Kenya has accepted most asylum seekers, though sometimes entry 
is delayed, resulting in hardship and denial of assistance.  
None of these refugees has been granted legal status other than 
that of asylum seeker.  In 1990 there were 14,000 refugees; at 
the end of 1993 there were about 375,000 refugees residing in 
camps, and the Government estimated that 100,000 refugees were 
living outside the camps in cities and rural areas.  The United 
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) puts the latter 
figure at about 20,000.  Somalis account for about 75 percent 
of the total.

In July 1,300 refugees being assisted by an Islamic aid 
organization in Mandera were forcibly expelled, ostensibly for 
what the Government believed was fundamentalist activity.  
UNHCR maintained the refugees were not politically active and 
protested their refoulement.

Africa Watch reported that hundreds of Somali women in the 
camps in the northeast were victims of rape or violent attack 
by armed bandits and, to a lesser extent, by Kenyan police 
officers.  The report blamed the Government for failing to 
recognize the seriousness and urgency of the problem.  The 
UNHCR launched a project at the end of 1993 to assist these 
women and to improve security in the camps.

Refugees outside the camps are extremely vulnerable to arrest, 
and those who purchase false identification documents and visas 
put themselves even further at risk.  There is increasing 
violence in the northeast, where most of the camps are situated 
and cross-border incursions by armed Somalis occur.

Section 3  Respect for Political Rights:  The Right of Citizens
           to Change Their Government

The right and ability of Kenyan citizens to change their 
government through free and fair elections has yet to be 
demonstrated.  The general elections on December 29, l992, for 
the Presidency, Members of Parliament, and local government 
officials, and the preceding campaign period, were marked by 
violence, intimidation, fraud, and other irregularities.  The 
President, backed by the former single party, KANU, continues 
to dominate the political system.

However, as a result of the 1992 legislative elections, six 
opposition parties won seats in the National Assembly and their 
M.P.'s were able, in Parliamentary debates, to point out 
instances of government mismanagement and malfeasance.  KANU 
holds 114 seats in the 200-seat Assembly; the six opposition 
parties hold the remainder.

Nonetheless, the power of the Assembly is limited.   The 
President under the Constitution has the power to open and 
dissolve Parliament, and the law prohibits the discussion in 
Parliament of all matters before the courts.  This law and its 
interpretation by the Speaker of the Assembly severely limit 
the scope of parliamentary debate on most controversial 
political issues.  The Speaker and his deputy consistently 
ruled in favor of KANU on parliamentary procedure.  Speaker Ole 
Kaparo also ruled that the conduct of the President is not a 
subject appropriate for debate in Parliament, cutting off 
opposition allegations of high-level government corruption and 
malfeasance.

KANU used a variety of pressure tactics to entice opposition 
M.P.'s to defect to KANU and by year's end, four had done so, 
and its attempts to attract opposition officials had much 
greater success among lower level national or branch 
officials.  Opposition figures charged that the defections were 
the result of a KANU campaign of bribery and blackmail.

By law, the defection of a sitting M.P. requires a by-election 
in that constituency.  On May 20, by-elections were held in 
Migori and Bonchari constituencies.  They were observed by the 
U.S. International Republican Institute and a number of Kenyan 
groups, including the National Elections Monitoring Unit.  In 
an election which the observer groups said was relatively fair, 
though with instances of bribery and intimidation by government 
officials, an opposition candidate won in Migori.  In Bonchari, 
the defecting M.P. won on a KANU ticket in an election that 
observers said was marred by wide-scale intimidation, 
vote-buying, and polling irregularities.

The Government and KANU harassed opposition parties in two 
other by-elections on October 12, in Hamisi and Makuyu 
constituencies.  For example, the authorities arrested the 
FORD/A candidate in Makuyu on September 11, for possession of 
seditious documents.  Although no charges had been filed, the 
district commissioner canceled all FORD/A political meetings, 
and police barred the candidate from attending even church 
services in the area.  Shortly before the election (which he 
won), the Ford/A candidate was allowed to hold several public 
rallies.  The Attorney General had not given his permission to 
prosecute the case by the end of 1993, and Ford/A did not 
expect formal charges to be brought against their now-sitting 
parliamentarians.

There are no legal restrictions on the participation of women 
in politics, and there have been some limited improvements in 
the exercise of women's political rights.  Nonetheless, their 
role is restricted by traditional attitudes, and the December 
election resulted in the election of only 6 women M.P.'s--which 
was still the highest number ever elected.  No women were 
appointed to the new Cabinet, although one woman serves as an 
Assistant Minister.  In intraparty elections, the Democratic 
Party elected a woman to the number-three party position, and 
25 percent of the party's national office holders are women.  

Section 4  Governmental Attitude Regarding International and 
           Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations 
           of Human Rights

Kenya has a vibrant, vocal, and thriving human rights 
community.  A number of domestic human rights organizations 
exist and often issue statements critical of government 
officials and policies.  The Kenya Human Rights Commission 
produces a regular series of often critical reports on human 
rights in Kenya and reacts to specific abuses, without 
government harassment.  The Institute for Democracy, formerly 
the National Elections Monitoring Unit (NEMU), continues to 
monitor parliamentary by-elections with generally good 
cooperation from the Elections Commission.  Legal organizations 
such as the Kenya chapters of the International Commission of 
Jurists and the Kenya Law Society continue to cover human 
rights issues as a major priority.  A large pool of Kenyan 
human rights lawyers conduct pro bono representation of 
defendants and serve as an accurate if informal source of human 
rights information.

President Moi and his officials do not accept the international 
community's right to comment on Kenya's internal affairs.  They 
routinely criticize international human rights groups and 
diplomats resident in Nairobi for "meddling."  On August 5, 
President Moi accused diplomats resident in Nairobi of 
supporting opposition parties and "subversive activities" by 
the media.  Also in August, the Government criticized visitors 
Kerry Kennedy Cuomo from the U.S.-based Robert F. Kennedy 
Center for Human Rights and Lord David Ennals from Britain's 
House of Lords for their comments on Kenya's human rights scene.

Section 5  Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, 
           Disability, Language, or Social Status

Kenya is an ethnically diverse country; the Constitution and 
laws prohibit discrimination on the bases of race, sex, 
religion, language, or social status.  Nonetheless, both legal 
and societal discrimination persists against women and some 
ethnic minorities and religious groups.


     Women

Women's rights are protected by the Constitution and the 
Government continues verbally to support full equality for 
women.  Nevertheless, women continue to be discriminated 
against in many legal matters, including inheritance and 
divorce.  The role of women in business, legal, and political 
life is further limited by cultural prejudices.  According to 
Kenyan human rights monitors, many other problems stem from a 
lack of awareness of the judicial system and legal rights.  
Both the Kenya chapter of the International Commission of 
Jurists and the Kenya chapter of the Federation of Women 
Lawyers conduct outreach paralegal programs to inform women, 
especially in rural or poor urban areas, of their rights.  
Although women are increasingly active in the modern 
economy--they constitute about 60 percent of the industrial and 
agricultural work force, the number of women in professional 
roles is still limited.  Female unemployment is double that of 
men, women sometimes receive lower rates of pay than men 
performing the same job, and disparities in fringe benefits 
occur, e.g., some businesses give housing allowances to men but 
not to married women.

Societal discrimination is most apparent in rural areas, where 
women account for 75 percent of the agricultural work force.  
Rural families are more reluctant to invest in educating girls 
than in educating boys, especially at the higher levels.  The 
number of girls and boys in school are roughly equal at the 
primary and secondary levels, but men outnumber women almost 
two to one in higher education.  According to 1990 estimates, 
only 58 percent of women over 15 can read and write, while 80 
percent of the men are literate.

Polygyny is not legal for people married under the Christian 
Marriage Act, but it is permitted for those who marry under 
African customary law.  Kenya's law of succession, which 
governs inheritance rights, provides for equal treatment of 
male and female children, though in practice most inheritance 
issues do not come before the courts.  Women are often excluded 
from extralegal inheritance settlements, have appointed 
"guardians," or are given smaller shares than male claimants.

Domestic violence against women is a serious and widespread 
problem.   Wife beating is common, and rape is widespread.  The 
press reported major incidents of domestic violence, especially 
rape.  On January 14, a gang of armed men broke into a school 
in Siaya and raped 15 girls.  The Government and women's groups 
condemn such violence, and the law carries penalties up to life 
imprisonment for rape, but the traditional culture permits a 
man to discipline his wife by physical means and is ambivalent 
about the seriousness of rape.  The police rarely intervene in 
domestic disputes, and the judicial system has not been an 
effective means of redress for domestic violence.  Most accused 
are acquitted because courts will not convict without medical 
evidence and witnesses.  

Cultural attitudes toward women were exemplified by the threat 
of KANU M.P. Paul Chepkok who in February warned 
environmentalist and human rights advocate Wangari Maathai that 
he would circumcise her according to Kalenjin (his tribe) 
tradition if she ever set foot in Rift Valley Province again.  
Maathai's alleged offense, according to Chepkok, was "tribal 
incitement" for her efforts to raise money to resettle 
displaced clash victims.  No disciplinary action was taken 
against Chepkok, and no KANU leader condemned his threat.  In 
rural areas, and often in urban areas as well, many women who 
are victims of rape, domestic violence, and incest are 
reluctant to provide information about the crime to police 
authorities or women's organizations.  Cultural prohibitions 
against going outside clan or ethnic groups with such charges 
is a major cause of what is probably a significant 
underreporting of the number of such attacks.  Fear of 
retaliation is another.  While antirape organizations and the 
press now bring a greater number of cases to light, the rate of 
prosecution remains very low.

     Children

In late 1993, the Attorney General announced the formation of a 
task force to draft laws related to children's rights, decrying 
the absence of protective legislation.  The commission is 
expected to announce its findings and the Attorney General is 
expected to table a draft bill in Parliament in the first half 
of 1994.  Education is the single biggest expenditure in the 
government budget.

Female genital mutilation (circumcision) remains widespread, 
especially among Kenya's nomadic peoples, despite the 
Government's stated opposition.  It is usually performed at an 
early age and has been condemned by international health 
experts as damaging to both physical and mental health.  
Neither the Government nor women's groups have reliable 
information about the extent of the problem, but, according to 
an independent expert, the percentage of females who have 
undergone this procedure may be as high as 50 percent.  In 
practice, the Government leaves opposition to such practices to 
women's groups, and prosecutions are not made.  In September, 
after press reports of a forced genital mutilation of a 
middle-aged woman in Meru, a government minister denounced the 
act, but no further action was taken.

     National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities

Kenya is an immigrant country.  All of its major ethnic groups 
arrived within the last thousand years, conquering or 
assimilating those who were there before.  The history of 
postindependence has been marked by ethnic competition and some 
conflict, but nowhere near the dimensions of the clashes which 
began in 1991 following alarmist statements made by government 
figures.  The Kikuyu are the largest ethnic community, 
comprising approximately 21 percent of the population.  The 
Luhya, Luo, Kamba, and Kalenjin are the next largest 
communities, each making up over 10 percent of the population.

High level government officials continued to voice strong 
anti-Kikuyu sentiments, aggravating tribal animosities and 
sparking anti-Kikuyu violence.  For example, KANU M.P. Shariff 
Nassir warned Kikuyus against extending their business 
activities to Mombasa.

Though the Government often accuses opposition political groups 
of preaching "tribalism," government officials are the most 
vigorous proponents of ethnically based attacks.  Minister 
Ntimama made a point of explaining to reporters the difference 
between indigenous and native Kenyans--"indigenous" tribes 
being those like his own Maasai who had a right to live in the 
Rift Valley, and "native" peoples, including the Kikuyu, Luhya, 
Kisii, and Luo, who could only live in such areas by the 
sufferance of the indigenous tribes.  A number of KANU Rift 
Valley politicians continued verbal attacks on immigrants to 
those areas, variously demanding obedience to KANU or the Rift 
Valley's indigenous peoples.

The Government has singled out ethnic Somalis as the only 
ethnic group in Kenya required to carry an additional form of 
identification stating that they are Kenyan citizens.  Ethnic 
Somalis must still produce upon demand their Kenyan 
identification card and a second identification card verifying 
"screening."  Both cards are also required in order to apply 
for a passport.


     People with Disabilities

Government policy does not discriminate against people with 
disabilities in employment, education, or other state 
services.  There is no mandated provision of accessibility for 
the disabled, however.  In late 1993, the Attorney General 
appointed a task force to investigate claims of discrimination 
and to propose new legislation protecting the rights of the 
disabled.  The commission is expected to complete its work 
early in 1994.

Section 6  Worker Rights

     a.  The Right of Association

Except for central government civil servants and academic 
staff, all workers are free to join unions of their own 
choosing.  As few as seven workers may establish a union, 
provided that objectives of the union do not contravene Kenyan 
law and another union is not already representative of the 
employees in question.  The Government may deregister a union, 
but the Registrar of Trade Unions must give the union 60 days 
to challenge the deregistration notice; an appeal of the 
Registrar's final decision may be brought before the High Court.

The Kenya Civil Servants Union was deregistered in 1980 by 
President Moi.  The Central Organization of Trade Unions (COTU) 
has sought since 1989 to reverse this decision.  The ban was 
lifted theoretically in 1991, but no action ensued while a 
government committee reviewed options.  In August a number of 
Members of Parliament said the union must be reinstated by 
October, and on September 13, 16 officials announced formation 
of their union and demanded registration by the Government.  No 
further action ensued on the civil servants union.

There are at least 33 unions in Kenya representing 
approximately 350,0000 workers, or about 20 percent of the 
country's industrialized work force.  Except for the 150,000 
teachers who belong to the Kenya National Union of Teachers 
(KNUT) and four other smaller unions, which the Government has 
registered, all other unions are affiliated with one central 
body, the COTU.

The Government created COTU in 1965 as the successor to both 
the Kenya Federation of Labor and the Kenya African Workers 
Congress.  This amalgamation was effected allegedly to 
eliminate instability and rivalries within the nation's trade 
union movement.


The 1965 decree establishing COTU gives the President power to 
remove from office the central body's three senior leaders, and 
Rule 5 of the COTU constitution accords nonvoting membership on 
COTU's managing body, the executive board, to a representative 
of the Labor Ministry as well as of KANU.  Until the COTU 
"coup" of July 2 (see below), however, all secretaries general 
of unions within COTU, including those who staged the coup, 
maintained that the COTU-KANU connection was obsolete in the 
multiparty era.

Early in 1993, COTU Secretary General Joseph Mugalla, a strong 
supporter of KANU and President Moi, responded to a challenge 
by some union secretaries general and many shop stewards to 
address the deterioration in socioeconomic conditions, as the 
value of the Kenyan shilling had plummeted by some 50 percent.  
He called for an across-the-board 100 percent wage increase and 
dismissal of Kenyan Vice President George Saitoti.  The call 
culminated in a walkout by Minister of Labor Masinde during 
Labor Day ceremonies, the arrest of Mugalla and senior 
associates on Labor Day, and a 2-day national strike, which was 
observed in key sectors nationwide, even after the Minister 
declared it illegal (see also Section 1.d.).

On July 2, security police blocked off a meeting of the COTU 
governing council at COTU headquarters.  Delegates from all 
over Kenya returned instead to their hotel in the industrial 
suburb of Ruiru for a briefing and then returned home.  A 
splinter group consisting of a small group of voting members, 
however, met at KANU headquarters in Nairobi, with the Minister 
of Labor and other senior ministry officials present, and 
claimed to elect new COTU leaders, although the next elections 
were scheduled for 1995.  The group was led by KANU stalwarts 
Johnson Ogendo (textiles) and Ali Mohamed (postal workers).  
Mohamed later justified the action in a letter to the 
International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU), 
claiming that the Government could not have interfered in COTU 
because there was no distinction between the two.

Without waiting the normal 7-day period to verify the 
elections, and disregarding a legal challenge by the legitimate 
COTU leadership, the registrar immediately registered the new 
group.  On August 2, a judge lifted a temporary injunction 
against the new group on grounds that the registrar is an 
officer of the Government and that his action could not be 
challenged through an injunction.  On December 27, the High 
Court ruled that the new group had hijacked a COTU governing 
body meeting to hold elections and ordered the registrar to 
delete the new entries from the register.  This had the effect 
of reinstating the old leadership, but the Government claimed 
instead that all COTU offices were now vacant.  An appeal of 
the High Court ruling by the new group was to be heard in 
January 1994.

No international group recognized the new COTU leadership.  The 
ICFTU ordered its affiliates to break off contact, and all 
international bodies ceased giving aid to COTU, canceling 
conferences and seminars scheduled to take place in Kenya.  
Mugalla, a member of the International Labor Organization (ILO) 
governing body, attended its meeting in Geneva in September and 
remained the internationally recognized Secretary General of 
COTU.  Government harassment of Mugalla and his family as well 
as those who did not support the July 2 labor "coup" continued 
(see also Section 1.f.).

The Trade Disputes Act permits workers to strike provided that 
21 days have elapsed following the submission to the Minister 
of Labor of a written report detailing the nature of the 
dispute.  During this 21-day period, the Minister may either 
mediate the dispute himself, nominate a person to investigate 
and propose a solution, or refer the matter to the Industrial 
Court, a body of 5 judges appointed by the President, for 
binding arbitration.  Once a dispute is referred to mediation, 
fact finding, or arbitration, any subsequent strike is 
illegal.  In 1993 Minister Masinde declared illegal several 
strikes, including a threatened teachers' strike, even when the 
required 21-day notice had been given, on grounds that all 
other means of resolving the dispute had not yet been 
exhausted.  Kenyan labor legislation is silent on the issue of 
national strikes. 

The military, police, prison guards, and members of the 
National Youth Service are precluded by law from striking.  
Other civil servants, like their private sector counterparts, 
may strike following the 21-day notice period (28 days if it is 
an essential service, e.g., water, health, education, air 
traffic control).  However, the Labor Minister may at any time 
preempt a strike involving civil servants by referring the 
dispute to the Industrial Court for resolution.  The 2-day 
national strike of May was the most important strike action of 
the year.  The Islamic Party of Kenya also held a 1-day strike 
in Mombasa in September, but for political, not socioeconomic, 
reasons.  A strike by 200,000 teachers set for July 15 was 
narrowly averted when KNUT Secretary General Adongo allowed the 
issue to go to court, but many teachers stayed home, angry at 
the KNUT for having acquiesced to the Government.

Internationally, COTU is affiliated to both the continentwide 
Organization of African Trade Union Unity and the ICFTU.  Its 
affiliates are free to establish linkages to international 
trade secretariats of their choosing.

     b.  The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively

While not having the force of law, the 1962 Industrial 
Relations Charter, executed by the Government, COTU, and the 
Federation of Kenya Employers, gives workers the right to 
engage in legitimate trade union organizational activities.

Both the Trade Disputes Act and the Charter authorize 
collective bargaining between unions and employers.  Wages and 
conditions of employment are established in the context of 
negotiations between unions and management.  The Government has 
promulgated wage policy guidelines limiting wage increases to 
75 percent of the annual rate of inflation.  In 1993 COTU 
called for the removal of wage guidelines.  Collective 
bargaining agreements must be registered with the Industrial 
Court for the purpose of guaranteeing adherence to these 
guidelines.  In 1993, 1,875 agreements were registered with the 
Court, of which 250 were newly signed in 1993.  Some 1 million 
workers (union and nonunion) were covered by these accords.

The Trade Disputes Act makes it illegal for employers to 
intimidate workers.  Employees wrongfully dismissed for union 
activities are generally awarded damages in the form of lost 
wages by the Industrial Court; reinstatement is not a common 
remedy, but in 1993, after the national strike of May 3-4, most 
workers won reinstatement.  More often, aggrieved workers have 
found alternative employment in the lengthy period prior to the 
hearing of their cases.

The ILO's Committee of Experts (COE) observed in its 1993 
report that the Government, in accordance with Article 10 of 
Convention 143, should promote equality of opportunity and 
treatment for migrant workers, including trade union rights.

Legislation authorizing the creation of export processing zones 
(EPZ's) was passed in November 1990.  The EPZ Authority has 
taken a gradualist approach to their development and has 
decided that local labor laws will apply generally in the 
zones, including the right to organize and bargain 
collectively.  In practice, the EPZ Authority grants many 
exemptions.  For example, the Government is waiving aspects of 
the law that prevent women from working at night because women 
prevail in a number of industries in the zones.

     c.  Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor

The Constitution proscribes slavery, servitude, and forced 
labor.  Under the Chiefs' Authority Act, a local authority can 
require people to perform community services in an emergency, 
but there were no known instances of this practice in 1993.  
People so employed must be paid the prevailing wage for such 
employment.  The COE has found these and other provisions of 
Kenyan law to contravene ILO Conventions 29 and 105 concerning 
forced labor.

     d.  Minimum Age for Employment of Children

The Employment Act of 1976 proscribes the employment in any 
industrial undertaking of children under the age of 16.  This 
enactment applies neither to agricultural sector, where about 
70 percent of the labor force is employed, nor to children 
serving as apprentices under the terms of the Industrial 
Training Act.  Ministry of Labor officers nominally enforce the 
minimum age statute.  Children often work as domestics in 
private homes, in the informal sector, and in family businesses 
and farms.  Given the high levels of adult unemployment and 
underemployment, the employment of children in the formal wage 
sector in violation of the Employment Act is not a significant 
problem.  Education is not compulsory in Kenya.

     e.  Acceptable Conditions of Work

The legal minimum wage for blue collar workers in the wage 
sector varies by location, age and skills, with 12 separate 
scales.  After a May increase, the lowest minimum monthly wages 
were $12.25 (833 shillings) in rural areas and $21.70 (1,476 
shillings) in urban areas.  Violations of the minimum wage 
guidelines are not a recurring problem in the modern wage 
sector.  Despite nominal wage increases, inflation on the order 
of 25 or 30 percent and a decline in the value of the shilling 
helped erode workers' living standards during 1993.  Most 
workers continued to lead a marginal existence and had to rely 
on second jobs, subsistence farming, or the extended family.

The Regulation of Wages and Conditions of Employment Act limits 
the normal workweek to 52 hours.  Nighttime employees, however, 
can be employed for up to 60 hours a week.  As is the case with 
respect to minimum age limitations, the Act specificially 
excludes agricultural workers from its purview.  An employee in 
the nonagricultural sector is entitled to 1 day of rest in a 
week.  There are also provisions for 1 month of annual leave 
and sick leave.  Kenyan law provides that the total hours 
worked (i.e., regular time plus overtime) in any 2-week period 
for night workers may not exceed 144 hours; the limit is 120 
hours for other workers.  The Ministry of Labor is tasked with 
enforcing these regulations, and reports of violations are few.

The Factories Act of 1951 sets forth detailed health and safety 
standards; the Act was amended in 1990 to encompass the 
agriculture, service, and government sectors.  The 65 health 
and safety inspectors attached to the Ministry of Labor's 
Directorate of Occupational Health and Safety Services have the 
authority to inspect factories and worksites if they have 
reason to believe that a violation of the Act has occurred, or 
upon receipt of a complaint from a worker.  As a result of the 
1990 amendments, the Directorate's inspectors may now issue 
notices enjoining employers from practices or activities that 
involve a risk of serious personal injuries.  Previously, only 
magistrates were vested with this authority.

Such notices can be appealed to the Factories Appeals Court, a 
body of four members, one of whom must be a High Court judge.  
Factory inspections increased from 3,000 in 1992 to 16,132 in 
1993, due to an ILO-funded project.  This altered the previous 
practice of responding only to worker complaints.  "Whistle 
blowers" are not protected by the Factories Act. Kenya's 
workmen's compensation regulations do not yet comply with 
provisions of ILO Convention 17.


[end of document]

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