Recent Events in the Middle East
Mr. Chairman, distinguished members of the subcommittee: I am pleased to appear before you again to review recent developments in the Middle East.
In the two months that have passed since I last testified before you, the region has taken a historic step toward peace with the conclusion of the May 4 accord between Israel and the PLO and the transfer of authority in the Jericho area and the Gaza Strip from Israel to the Palestinian Authority. Jordan and Israel also have made significant progress: They have agreed to hold negotiations in Jordan and Israel this July. It is our hope that these dramatic achievements will encourage governments in the region to move forward in other areas of activity in the peace process. While the process remains fraught with difficulties and dangers, there are, indeed, encouraging signs that the momentum toward peace is building.
Mr. Chairman, my statement today will cover the peace process, Yemen, Gulf security, and our democratization and commercial policies in the region. Let me begin by reviewing the various tracks of the peace process.
Update on the Peace Process: Bilateral Negotiations
Over the past six weeks, the peace process has taken several large steps forward. And the United States has been actively involved. On the bilateral track, Israelis and Palestinians signed two important agreements. In Paris, on April 29, the two sides concluded an economic agreement that will have far-reaching implications for their relations in the period ahead.
Five days later, on May 4, at a dramatic ceremony in Cairo, Israeli Prime Minister Rabin and PLO Chairman Arafat signed an agreement to implement the first part of the Declaration of Principles relating to Gaza and Jericho. Secretary Christopher, who had been in the region for more than a week to advance the peace process, was on hand to witness the signing.
By the middle of May, authority had been transferred to the Palestinians in Gaza and Jericho. On a second trip to the region-- following the Cairo ceremony--the Secretary visited Jericho to see first-hand the situation on the ground. He was able to witness the implementation process moving forward amidst great enthusiasm by the local Palestinians.
With Palestinians now assuming self-government responsibilities in Gaza and Jericho, it is important that we expedite the aid promised at the Conference to Support Middle East Peace. Secretary Christopher has been urging other donors to join us in reallocating pledges to meet the start-up needs of the Palestinian Authority. Donors have responded positively. At the June 9-10 meeting of the Ad Hoc Liaison Committee--AHLC--key donors pledged to reallocate $42 million to meet Palestinian cash- flow needs this summer. We are pleased that most of these resources will be steered through the Holst Peace Fund. Administered by the World Bank, this fund was specifically set up to deliver cash quickly and accountably. The United States has helped lead this process by reallocating an additional $10 million for the Holst Fund in 1994. This meets the AHLC target of allocating 25% of total 1994 pledges for start-up costs.
Total pledges for start-up costs now exceed $130 million and should rise further at the mid- July meeting of the Consultative Group. The donor response is extraordinary, but it must also be temporary. Palestinian self-help efforts--collecting taxes and tapping the resources of the Palestinian Diasporaas well as cooperation between the PLO and Israel in implementing the economic aspects of the Cairo protocol are critical for economic progress.
Last week's meeting of the U.S.-Jordanian- Israeli Trilateral Economic Committee in Washington moved the Jordan-Israel track forward in substantial ways. The parties initialed bilateral agreements--on water, energy, the environment, borders, and security- -which will constitute parts of an eventual peace treaty. They also agreed to establish a commission on these issues which will meet openly in their two countries beginning next month. For the first time since Camp David, representatives of Israel and an Arab state are planning to meet publicly on each other's territory as a demonstration of their commitment to peace.
On trilateral issues, the parties agreed to a number of new ventures, including:
-- A road link between Jordan and Israel near their respective Red Sea ports; -- Tourism coordination and development of a transboundary cultural heritage park; -- Discussion of civil aviation matters; -- Comprehensive development planning for the Jordan Rift Valley; and, -- To supplement the road project, the two parties agreed to form a commission to examine border demarcation in the immediate vicinity next month.
These are clear signs of tangible progress since Jordan and Israel signed the Common Agenda last September. They demonstrate that the parties are serious about finding common ground on which to base future relations.
The U.S. also has been seeking opportunities to move forward the Syria-Israel negotiations. During his two recent trips to the region, Secretary Christopher had extensive discussions on this subject in Syria and Israel. It is clear from the Secretary's exchanges--and our subsequent follow-up--that these negotiations have entered a new, more substantive phase. Instead of focusing on only one or two key elements, the parties are looking at a more comprehensive, package approach. This allows each side to present its ideas not only on the nature of peace and withdrawal, but on issues such as timing, phasing, and security arrangements.
At the same time, significant gaps remain both on substance and procedure. There is still a great deal of work to be done. The U.S. is committed to doing everything possible to advance the Syria-Israel track in 1994. Lebanon and Israel are also continuing their effort to reach agreement on a political frame of reference dealing with the key issues of land and peace.
The multilateral peace process also has broken new ground in important ways. We are currently in round six of the plenary working group meetings. In this round, the five working groups have increased their emphasis on concrete projects designed to bring the benefits of peace home to the people of the region. The groups have approved, and in a few cases implemented, small-scale projects on the ground. For example, the Arms Control and Regional Security--ACRS--Group is establishing a communications network, patterned after CSCE, among regional participants. In April, the Water Group approved an Israeli proposal for rehabilitating water systems in small communities--the first time an Israeli proposal was endorsed in the multilaterals.
The multilaterals also are beginning to sketch a picture of what the region might look like-- and how the countries of the area might cooperate--once a comprehensive Arab-Israeli peace is achieved. Both the Steering Group and the Arms Control and Regional Security Group are actively considering draft declarations of principles or guidelines for conducting relations in the future.
In the current multilateral round, four of the five working groups and the Steering Group have met or will meet in Arab states. Hosts thus far include Qatar, for the ACRS group; Oman, water; and Egypt, refugees. The Regional Economic and Development Group--REDWG--is meeting this week in Morocco. The Steering Group will convene in Tunisia next month. Israeli participation in the meetings in Qatar and Oman created major news events in Israel-- and is a sign of a changing Middle East.
The current situation in the Republic of Yemen, Mr. Chairman, reminds us that even as the region inclines toward peace, the international community must remain vigilant to prevent--to the extent possible--local rivalries from flaring into violence.
Yemen's progress since the unity agreement of 1990 toward democracy and economic reform broke down with the outbreak of fighting in early May. Both before and since this test of arms began, the U.S. has been encouraging the parties to seek a resolution of their differences through political dialogue and negotiation. We continue to believe that reconciliation is not beyond reach.
The situation on the ground remains unclear. Northern forces achieved the upper hand early in the fighting and now occupy positions within artillery range of Aden. They also have advanced in the east toward the town of al- Mukalla, a key port and the interim capital of the south since former Vice President Ali Salim al-Bidh declared the south's independence on May 20. Despite the announcement of a cease- fire and the presence of a special envoy of the UN Secretary General in the region, fighting appears to be continuing along these fronts with an increasing prospect for large-scale civilian casualties in Aden and elsewhere, an outflow of refugees to neighboring areas, and a requirement for humanitarian relief.
The U.S. shares the special concerns of Yemen's neighbors over the adverse consequences for the stability of the Arabian Peninsula of continued fighting. The U.S. is opposed to the imposition of unity by force, just as we are opposed to an act of secession in the midst of war. That is why we supported the passage of Security Council Resolution 924, with its clear call for:
-- An immediate cease-fire; -- A resumption of political dialogue; and -- A halt to the supply of arms to the parties from the outside.
Unfortunately, that call has not been heeded by the parties. The continued fighting is now threatening serious humanitarian consequences. If the fighting does not end immediately, we are concerned that interested parties will feel it necessary to take actions which will undo the prospects for a cease-fire and a return to the negotiating table.
UN Special Envoy Lakhdar Brahimi has been in Yemen and the Gulf over the weekend talking to both sides. We have been vigorously urging our interlocutors in Yemen to give his mission a chance. There needs to be an immediate cease- fire. This should be followed by the establishment of a joint military committee, comprising elements from the north and south, which can oversee and monitor the cease-fire. The work of the joint military committee can be supplemented by an international presence. We do not believe that this is an appropriate task for UN forces, which are already stretched thin. If UN Envoy Brahimi feels that an international presence is necessary, we would support the concept of this being handled in an Arab or Islamic context.
Mr. Chairman, the situation in Yemen calls for maximum restraint on all sides. Those who choose now to continue the fighting risk losing the support of the international community and plunging Yemen into a prolonged crisis that will not serve the interests of anyone who genuinely seeks a better future for Yemen.
Let me now turn to our broader security concerns in the Gulf region. My visit to the Gulf, May 4-13, provided an excellent opportunity to engage with our friends and partners in the region on the critical issues we confront there. The scene had been set by the Secretary's very productive meeting with the Gulf Cooperation Council foreign ministers in late April and his clear reiteration of U.S. policy to "remain determined and vigilant in this region, constantly aware that there are threats to peace and security in the area."
I found that, without exception, the ties which were forged by our common effort to liberate Kuwait remain strong and healthy. There is continued, broad agreement on the nature of the threat we face in the region.
We will continue to work closely with the Gulf Cooperation Council to contain the threats to regional stability posed by Iran and Iraq. But containment alone is insufficient and represents only one side of the picture. We need to work with our friends to develop a strong regional deterrent to those who would threaten its security or stability. Our recent reassessment of U.S. defense strategy reaffirmed the importance of the Gulf to American interests and committed major U.S. defense assets to a continuing mission in the region. Our goal is to complement, not replace, the Gulf states' own collective security efforts.
I must report, however, that the United States is disappointed with the slow progress of the Gulf Cooperation Council's efforts to promote its members' collective security. The council leaders did announce some steps to improve cooperation at their summit meeting last December, and we have been encouraged by an increase in the number of intra-council exercises. Nevertheless, our assessment is that internal differences within the council over long-standing issues, such as border disputes, continue to obstruct more meaningful cooperation.
I stressed throughout my discussions in the region that the council states must find a means for addressing and resolving these differences and that, in the meantime, they should not allow disputes among friends to delay their response to real dangers from regional foes. Advancing this perspective will remain a high priority for the U.S. in our continuing dialogue on security issues with our friends in the region.
The primary threats to Gulf security today come from two sources--Iran and Iraq. In my March 1 statement to the subcommittee, I detailed our many concerns about Iranian behavior. I will not repeat those here except to say that Iran's hegemonic ambitions toward the Gulf and aggressive posture in support of militant Islamic movements and in opposition to the peace process are continuing unabated.
I would, however, like to review briefly developments in U.S. policy toward Iraq. The Security Council met in May for its regular 60- day review of Iraq sanctions. The council agreed unanimously that Iraq has not complied with the relevant Security Council resolutions and that sanctions must remain in place.
UN Resolution 687 ended the war and established the terms of the cease-fire. It was designed to ensure that Iraq did not again threaten the peace. Indeed, its preamble reaffirms "the need to be assured of Iraq's peaceful intentions." That is still the right standard. Clearly, Iraq is not meeting it. Baghdad has not taken the legal steps necessary to reverse its 1990 incorporation of Kuwait; it has not accepted the UN's delineation of the border. It has never accounted for hundreds of Kuwaiti MIAs, as required by Resolution 687.
Baghdad continues active repression of Shi'a in the south and Kurds in the north, creating dangerous areas of instability on Iraq's borders. UN Security Council Resolution 688 requires an end to this repression. Baghdad likewise continues to use terror in violation of Resolutions 687 and 688, as we saw in the recent assassination of an Iraqi dissident in Beirut.
The conclusion is inescapable: Nothing fundamental has changed in Baghdad; the nature of the current regime is the same as it was in August 1990 and in April 1991, when Resolution 687 was passed. Iraq's modus operandi differs only as a function of the intrusiveness of current UN activities. What cooperation we have seen on weapons of mass destruction issues has been based solely on the tactical calculation that this approach looks like the shortest path to ending oil export sanctions. That clearly is not an adequate basis for giving up the principal lever the international community has over Iraq's long-term behavior.
With sanctions still in place--and likely to remain so--the U.S. continues to seek ways to relieve the suffering of the Iraqi people. The U.S. and other members of the Security Council have put in place a way for Iraq to sell limited quantities of oil to purchase needed humanitarian supplies. Saddam Hussein refuses to do so. He prefers the suffering of his people to the loss of police-state control which might occur if the UN were to monitor who gets humanitarian supplies.
To offset Baghdad's efforts, the U.S. continues to support international relief. Our commitment to provide protection and humanitarian assistance to the people of northern Iraq and to support the continuation of Operation Provide Comfort remains absolutely firm, as President Clinton made clear in his remarks after the tragic shoot-down of two American helicopters over northern Iraq on April 14.
It should be clear that we have no quarrel with the people of Iraq. Indeed, a government in Baghdad that lived in peace with its people and respected Security Council resolutions would find us ready to move quickly to lighten the burdens of the Iraqi people.
Democratization and Human Rights Issues
I would like to add here a note on democratization. While there has not been as much progress as we would like, there have been some recent, notable steps.
Jordan is among the countries in the Middle East that have made measurable progress toward democracy. Its emerging democratic system took a further step forward last November when multi- party elections were held for 80 seats of its lower house of parliament. The elections were conducted in a fair manner, and they demonstrated that the Jordanian people are taking an active interest.
Since the end of the Gulf war, several Gulf Cooperation Council states have inaugurated or expanded efforts to promote popular participation in government and more open societies. Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Bahrain now have operating advisory councils which provide citizens institutionalized access to government. During my recent visit to the Gulf, I found developments in Oman and Kuwait of particular interest. Sultan Qaboos of Oman made clear his interest in building institutions to enhance the role of the Omani people in their government within the framework of his country's political culture and traditions.
In Kuwait, the National Assembly is a vibrant, growing part of government and society and is clearly enjoying greater authority than at any time in its history. I had the memorable experience of being the first foreign official to appear before a committee of the National Assembly when I met with the foreign affairs committee for a good and spirited exchange. This was followed quickly by a visit to the U.S. by a Kuwaiti parliamentary delegation which was very productive and which hopefully will contribute to the further development of that institution in Kuwait.
Moving west, I would also like to mention to the committee some noteworthy developments in Egypt. The Egyptian Government has achieved some important successes recently in its battle against terrorism. A number of key terrorist operatives have been apprehended since the beginning of the year. Although it is still too soon to draw firm conclusions, there has been a marked drop in the level of terrorist violence in the past four months.
As we applaud the government's successes, we are concerned that democratic values and respect for human rights not become casualties of the war against terrorism--in Egypt and elsewhere. We have raised with the Government of Egypt the death in custody of a lawyer, Mr. Abdel Harith Madani, as well as other human rights concerns. In addition, we will be watching with keen interest the progress of the National Dialogue, which got underway this month, involving the government and opposition political parties, professional syndicates, and other national institutions.
Egypt also has made progress on its economic reform program, selling off several public enterprises. However, we believe that Egypt must accelerate its efforts to establish the basis for a market economy by pursuing deregulation, privatization, and macroeconomic reforms more aggressively. Doing so would provide a solid foundation for the economic growth necessary to prevent unemployment from rising further.
U.S. Commercial Interests
We support economic liberalization in Egypt and throughout the region because that is a prerequisite for prosperity and stability. Prosperity also means more opportunities for U.S. trade with and investment in the Middle East.
Under the direction of President Clinton and Secretary Christopher, our ambassadors in the Middle East view promotion of trade and investment as a key part of their work. Successes this year include decisions by Saudi Arabia to purchase $6 billion worth of McDonnell Douglas and Boeing airframes and engines to replace their civilian airfleet and an AT&T communication system worth approximately $4 billion. These sales demonstrate how our partnership with U.S. firms can translate into large orders for goods produced by American workers.
U.S. embassies have been active elsewhere in the Gulf helping American businesses to secure, for instance, more than 500 construction contracts in Kuwait worth approximately $5 billion and a $98-million contract to dredge a channel in Doha. We will continue to be active in seeking commercial opportunities for U.S. business.
One of the impediments to economic expansion in the region is the Arab boycott of Israel. In light of the latest advances in the peace process, the boycott simply does not make sense. In the wake of an Israeli-PLO economic agreement, the boycott is not merely an anachronism; it is an economic dinosaur. The boycott stultifies the region's economic growth at a time when promoting trade and economic development is critical to the area's stability. U.S. policy is clear: The time has come to end the boycott. (###)
The Middle East Peace Process
The current phase of the Middle East peace process was launched at the Madrid conference convened by the United States and the former Soviet Union October 30-November 1, 1991. Former Secretary James A. Baker III laid the groundwork for the conference in a series of trips to the region between March and October 1991.
The co-sponsors' letter of invitation to the conference laid out the framework for the negotiations, including:
-- A just, lasting, and comprehensive peace settlement based on UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338.
-- Direct bilateral negotiations along two tracks, between Israel and the Arab states and between Israel and the Palestinians.
-- Multilateral negotiations on region-wide issues, such as arms control and regional security, water, refugees, environment, and economic development. These talks would complement the bilateral negotiations.
The bilateral negotiations are now conducted on four separate negotiating tracks: Israel- Syria, Israel-Lebanon, Israel-Jordan, and Israel-Palestinian.
The first major breakthrough in the negotiations occurred on the Israeli- Palestinian track. Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization conducted secret negotiations, in parallel with the Washington talks, which culminated in the signing of the Israel-PLO Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government in Washington, DC, on September 13, 1993.
As part of the agreement, Israel recognized the PLO as the representative of the Palestinian people. For its part, the PLO recognized Israel's right to exist in peace and security, accepted UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338, and renounced use of terrorism and violence.
Israeli Foreign Minister Shimon Peres and PLO Executive committee member Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazin) signed the Declaration of Principles in a ceremony on the White House south lawn. The signing was witnessed by Secretary Christopher and Russian Foreign Minister Kozyrev in the presence of President Clinton, Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, and PLO Chairman Yasir Arafat.
On October 13, 1993, the agreement entered into force, and negotiations on implementation began. Nearly seven months later, at a ceremony in Cairo on May 4, 1994, Prime Minister Rabin and Chairman Arafat signed an agreement on the Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area. The new agreement set out terms for implementation of the Declaration of Principles and included annexes on withdrawal of Israeli military forces and security arrangements, civil affairs, legal matters, and economic relations. The Cairo ceremony was hosted by Egyptian President Mubarak and formally witnessed by Secretary Christopher and Russian Foreign Minister Kozyrev.
The U.S. has pledged to support efforts to implement the Israel-PLO agreement. "Not simply to give peace a chance, but to ensure that it will not fail"--in Secretary Christopher's words--the U.S. and Russia co- sponsored an international donors conference in Washington, DC, October 1, 1993. "The Conference to Support Middle East Peace" mobilized international resources to produce tangible improvements in the daily lives of Palestinians in Gaza and the West Bank.
The conference was a tremendous success. More than 46 countries and international institutions participated, pledging more than $2 billion in aid to Palestinians in Gaza and the West Bank for the next five years. More than $600 million was pledged for the first year alone.
Important progress also has been achieved on the Israel-Jordan track. On September 14, 1993- -just one day after the signing of the Israel- PLO agreement--Israel and Jordan signed a substantive common agenda mapping out their approach to achieving peace.
On October 1, 1993, Jordanian Crown Prince Hassan and Israeli Foreign Minister Peres met at the White House with President Clinton. They agreed to set up two groups: a bilateral economic committee and a U.S.-Israeli-Jordanian trilateral economic committee. There have been four meetings of the committee. The most recent was on June 6-7, 1994, in Washington, DC.
In its role as full partner and active intermediary in the peace process and as part of its commitment to a comprehensive peace, the U.S. also continues to seek progress on the other two bilateral tracks, Israel-Syria and Israel-Lebanon. The Israelis and Syrians face the challenge of overcoming differences about withdrawal, peace, and security. The Israelis and Lebanese are attempting to make progress on arrangements for security talks and to address the broader political issues in their negotiation.
Secretary of State Christopher has said:
The implementation of the Israeli-Palestinian agreement represents only part of a larger task in the Middle East. We must nurture a comprehensive reconciliation between Israel and the rest of the Arab world. We must achieve a peace between the people of Israel and the rest of the Arab world. We must achieve a peace between the people of Israel and the peoples of Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon. . . . We will work tirelessly to ensure that all the children of the region can come to know, in President Clinton's words, "a season of peace."
On January 16, 1994, President Clinton met with President Asad of Syria in Geneva for talks on the peace process and bilateral relations. President Asad stated his country's commitment to work together to "put an end to the Arab- Israeli conflict." He called for ". . . a new era of security and stability in which normal, peaceful relations among all shall dawn anew."
During 1994, the Israelis and Syrians have deepened their engagement on the elements of peace. Seeking to energize the Israeli-Syrian track and in fulfillment of the U.S. role as active intermediary, Secretary Christopher held detailed talks with Prime Minister Rabin and President Asad during visits to the region in spring 1994.
The Multilateral Talks
-- Thirty-six parties attended the Moscow organizational meeting in January 1992. There was consensus to establish five working groups: Arms Control and Regional Security, Environment, Regional Economic Development, Refugees, and Water Resources.
-- The Arms Control and Regional Security Group is focusing on confidence-building measures as well as arms control issues, including information exchange, maritime measures, and verification.
-- The Regional Economic Development Working Group is addressing infrastructure, training, and tourism development in the region, including the West Bank and Gaza.
-- The Environment Working Group is enhancing regional parties' abilities to deal with maritime pollution, wastewater treatment, environmental management, and desertification.
-- The Water Resources Working Group is doing workshops and studies on water conservation, water sector training needs, desalination, and enhancing water data availability.
-- The Refugee Working Group is addressing family reunification, training and job creation, public health and child welfare, and social and economic infrastructure.
-- The sixth round of working group plenaries began in mid-April 1994. Significantly, four of the five working groups, as well as the Steering Group, are holding plenaries in the Middle East. Specifically, the Water Resources Working Group convened in Muscat, Oman, April 17-20, 1994; the Arms Control and Regional Security Working Group in Doha, Qatar, May 3-5, 1994; and the Refugees Working Group in Cairo, Egypt, May 10-12, 1994. Ahead are plenaries of the Regional Economic Development working group in Rabat, Morocco, June 15-16, 1994, and the Steering Group in Tunis, Tunisia, July 12-13, 1994.
All plenaries were held outside the Middle East during the first three rounds. The first time regional parties hosted working groups occurred last fall during the fifth round--specifically, the Refugee Working Group in Tunis (October 12- 14, 1993) and the Environment Working Group in Cairo (November 15-16, 1993).
-- Holding the plenaries in regional sites fosters greater regional cooperation and underscores participants' commitment to the multilateral talks, the peace process, and the goal of regional cooperation.
-- Between plenary sessions, each of the working groups has sponsored several inter- sessional seminars and activities.
-- A number of concrete projects and useful studies have emerged from the multilateral process. For example, a World Bank study of infrastructural needs in the West Bank and Gaza, commissioned by the Regional Economic Development Working Group, has been an invaluable tool for the international donors effort created by the Conference to Support Middle East Peace.
-- The multilaterals are not a substitute for the bilateral negotiations. They are designed to complement and to enhance the possibility of progress in the bilateral tracks: Syria and Lebanon have not yet agreed to join the multilateral process.
JUNE 14, 1994 (###)
Middle East Peace Process: Meetings Following the Madrid Conference
Madrid Peace Conference
October 30-November 1, 1991
Bilateral Arab-Israeli Negotiations
Round 1 November 3, 1991, Madrid, Spain
Round 2 December 10-18, 1991, Washington, DC
Round 3 January 7-16, 1992, Washington, DC
Round 4 February 24-March 4, 1992, Washington, DC
Round 5 April 27-April 30, 1992, Washington, DC
Session I: August 24-September 3, 1992
Session II: September 14-24, 1992, Washington, DC
Session I: October 21-29, 1992
Session II: November 9-19, 1992, Washington, DC
Round 8 December 7-17, 1992, Washington, DC
Resumption of Talks
April 27-May 13, 1993, Washington, DC
June 15-July 1, 1993, Washington, DC
August 31-September 14, 1993, Washington, DC
January 24-February 3, 1994, Washington, DC
February 15-25, 1994, Washington, DC
Multilateral Working Groups
Multilateral Steering Group (U.S./Russia: co- chair)
Round 1 January 28-29, 1992, Moscow, Russia
Round 2 May 27, 1992, Lisbon, Portugal
Round 3 December 3-4, 1992, London, U.K.
Round 4 July 7, 1993, Moscow, Russia
Round 5 December 15, 1993, Tokyo, Japan
Round 6 July 12-13, 1994, Tunis, Tunisia
Arms Control and Regional Security (U.S./Russia: co-lead organizer) Round 1 January 28-29, 1992, Moscow, Russia Round 2 May 11-14, 1992, Washington, DC Round 3 September 15-17, 1992, Moscow, Russia Round 4 May 18-20, 1993, Washington, DC Round 5 November 2-4, 1993, Moscow, Russia Round 6 May 3-5, 1994, Doha, Qatar
Water Resources (U.S.: lead organizer; Japan
and EU co-lead)
Round 1 January 28-29, 1992, Moscow, Russia
Round 2 May 14-15, 1992, Vienna, Austria
Round 3 September 16-17, 1992, Washington, DC
Round 4 April 27-29, 1993, Geneva, Switzerland
Round 5 October 26-28, 1993, Beijing, China
Round 6 April 17-20, 1994, Muscat, O
Environment (Japan: permanent gavel holder; EU
Round 1 January 28-29, 1992, Moscow, Russia
Round 2 May 18-19, 1992, Tokyo, Japan
Round 3 September 26-27, 1992, The Hague, Netherlands
Round 4 May 24-25, 1993, Tokyo, Japan
Round 5 November 15-16, 1993, Egypt
Round 6 April 6-7, 1994, The Hague, Netherlands
Economic Development (EU: lead organizer; U.S.
and Japan co-lead)
Round 1 January 28-29, 1992, Moscow, Russia
Round 2 May 11-12, 1992, Brussels, Belgium
Round 3 October 29-30, 1992, Paris, France
Round 4 May 4-5, 1993, Rome, Italy
Round 5 November 8-9, 1993, Copenhagen, Denmark
Round 6 June 15-16, 1994, Rabat, Morocco
Refugees (Canada: lead organizer)
Round 1 January 28-29, 1992, Moscow, Russia
Round 2 May 13-15, 1992, Ottawa, Canada
Round 3 November 11-12, 1992, Ottawa, Canada
Round 4 May 11-13, 1993, Oslo, Norway
Round 5 October 12-14, 1993, Tunis, Tunisia
Round 6 May 10-12, 1994, Cairo, Egypt
JUNE 14, 1994 (###)
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