Return to: Index of 1996 Secretary of State's Speeches/Testimonies ||
Electronic Research Collections Index ||
ERC Homepage
U.S. Department of State
96/12/10 Statement to North Atlantic Council Ministerial
Office of the Spokesman
U.S. Department of State
Office of the Spokesman
(Brussels, Belgium)
__________________________________________________________________
AS PREPARED FOR DELIVERY December 10, 1996
STATEMENT BY
SECRETARY OF STATE WARREN CHRISTOPHER
AT THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL MINISTERIAL MEETING
NATO Headquarters
Brussels, Belgium
December 10, 1996
Mr. Secretary-General, distinguished colleagues: I am honored to
speak with you once again on behalf of the United States.
In my four years as Secretary of State, I have had the chance to
address the North Atlantic Council on nine separate occasions. Because
of the importance President Clinton and I attach to our partnership with
Europe, and because of the central role NATO plays in assuring the
security of all our nations, this has been one of the most critical
responsibilities I have had. Our Allies, too, have been steadfast in
their commitment to the transatlantic partnership. Time and again, you
have reminded Americans how important our role in Europe continues to
be. I have delivered that message to our Congress and to the American
people. With their support, our Alliance has become stronger than ever.
The distance we have traveled and the achievements we have forged
together in these four years should inspire confidence in all our
people. Just think where we were at the beginning of 1993, think of the
uncertainties the Alliance faced then and the questions we had not yet
answered.
Many people wondered if America would maintain its commitment to
Europe. Others questioned NATO's relevance to the post-Cold War world.
We all agreed on the need to integrate Europe's new democracies, but we
had agreed on no strategy to actually do it. Russia was just embarking
a difficult and uncertain path toward market democracy. The war in
Bosnia was at the height of its brutality.
We met all these challenges by pursuing our interests together, as
16 allies, through this great Alliance. At their 1994 summit, our
leaders adopted a strategy to transform NATO and to build an undivided
Europe. In 1995, NATO acted to end the war in Bosnia and assembled a
peacekeeping coalition so broad that for the very first time, we could
say that all of Europe is united under a common flag in a common cause.
NATO's Partnership for Peace has become a permanent, unifying force in
Europe. France and Spain took historic decisions to participate more
fully in NATO. We have stood by democracy in Russia and offered it a
special partnership with the new NATO. Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan
have rid themselves of nuclear weapons. The OSCE has worked effectively
to uphold its principles from Bosnia to the Caucasus. The EU has laid
the groundwork for its own enlargement and built a stronger partnership
with the United States.
Because of what we have accomplished, there is really no question
today that America is staying in Europe. There is no doubt that NATO,
the EU, and the OSCE work, that they have evolved, that together they
provide the best hope for building a secure, democratic, integrated
continent. There is a broad consensus across the Atlantic about the
direction we are heading. NATO will continue be the central guarantor
of our security. NATO's European members will play a more visible role
in NATO. The Alliance will soon have new members. Russia is already
our partner, from the meeting rooms of Brussels to the muddy fields of
Bosnia.
This week, three events symbolize our progress. At the OSCE
summit in Lisbon, 55 nations adopted a comprehensive security model and
approved a new approach for conventional arms control in Europe. At the
Peace Implementation Conference in London, we came together to support
democracy and reconstruction in Bosnia. Today we are meeting as NATO
allies to advance the vision our leaders laid out at their 1994 summit.
At today's meeting, we are approving NATO's Stabilization Force
for Bosnia. We are approving a major enhancement of the Partnership for
Peace. We are continuing NATO's internal adaptation. We are declaring
that in today's Europe, NATO has no intention, no plan, and no need to
station nuclear weapons on the territory of any new members and we are
affirming that no NATO nuclear forces are presently on alert. NATO is
signaling its readiness to exchange liaison offices with Russia at our
major military commands.
Today, we have agreed that our leaders will meet at a summit in
the summer of 1997. We will consolidate our progress on the three broad
goals our leaders set forth in 1994: equipping NATO for new roles and
missions, reforming its internal structures, and extending its reach to
new allies and partners.
We will need to continue to set ambitious goals and to tackle the
hard issues head on, both at the summit and beyond. Many important
challenges still lie ahead. As NATO and the EU grow, we must ensure
that their doors stay open. We must work hard with our partners in
Russia and Ukraine to ensure their nations take their rightful place in
the new Europe. It will take time to overcome the acute economic
disparities between east and west and to help the nations of the former
Yugoslavia rejoin the European mainstream. We have to be vigilant in
defending human rights and political freedom: As the courageous young
people of Serbia have shown us, and recent developments in Belarus have
demonstrated, the struggle for democracy is not over in Europe. Of
course, we must continue to strengthen our transatlantic partnership, by
breaking down barriers between our peoples and economies and by meeting
global challenges together.
In 1999, our leaders will no doubt come together once again to
mark NATO's 50th anniversary. The event should be more than a
celebration of NATO's past, more than a ceremony to welcome new members.
It will be the moment NATO embarks on its next 50 years. It will be
time to chart a course for our New Atlantic Community well into the next
century. Though much has changed since NATO was founded, America's goal
will remain constant: a deeper partnership with a broader, more
integrated Europe on this continent and around the world. With that
goal in mind, let me take a few moments to discuss the issues on our
agenda for today, the coming summit and the years ahead.
Our most immediate task today is to finalize our approval of the
follow-on force for Bosnia. In just ten days, IFOR's mission will come
to an end. We will then proceed to a new mission, with fewer troops and
a new 18-month mandate. We can do this because IFOR has succeeded. Let
us pause for a moment to consider the tremendous debt of gratitude we
owe to the 60,000 men and women of IFOR. Some came from the most
experienced armed forces in the world; others came from nations and
armies that did not even exist a few years ago. They represent long
standing allies and former adversaries. All of them proved they are
equal to the task of building security in Europe under the toughest
conditions. All the non-NATO countries participating in IFOR will
remain in the Stabilization Force.
We have made progress thus far by taking a step-by-step approach
to progress in Bosnia. We ended the war. We separated the forces. We
oversaw the transfer of territory. We supervised democratic elections.
Now the institutions of a unified Bosnian state are being built. Each
step has taken Bosnia another step away from war. But our work is not
done.
IFOR and the High Representative have succeeded admirably in
laying the foundations for a normal, civil society in Bosnia. Now the
parties must take a greater share of the responsibility.
They must respect freedom of the press. They must honor arms
control agreements. They must assure freedom of movement and permit
refugees to return home with security; a great effort will be needed
from all of us to fulfill this requirement of the peace process. They
must make their joint institutions function effectively. A competent
and honest civil administration is essential. The OSCE is responsible
for supervising and organizing municipal elections, which will take
place in April. If we want the elections to succeed, and if we want to
see the OSCE play a more central and capable role in Europe, we must
provide our full financial and political support for its efforts.
Justice is also a precondition for lasting peace. There should be
no doubt about our determination to see war criminals punished. We
expect the authorities in Bosnia, Croatia, and Serbia to arrest war
criminals and turn them over to the Tribunal in the Hague. But we also
must see new and effective approaches to this urgent problem.
Our assistance to Bosnia will only make a difference if we insist
that the parties fulfill their obligations. Reconstruction in Bosnia is
not an end in itself. Fixing bridges and roads will not advance our
goals unless people and goods can move freely across them. Economic aid
will not lead to stable growth unless Bosnia's new institutions work
effectively to take advantage of it. Reconstruction assistance is meant
to support the peace process and to speed the fulfillment of Dayton's
central requirement -- a unified, multi-ethnic Bosnia -- and it will be
conditioned on the parties' compliance with that requirement.
We must make clear to Serbia and Croatia, too, that they will
rejoin the international community only as open, democratic societies.
Today, we join in condemning the Serbian government's decision to ignore
the results of the November 17 elections. That decision must be
reversed. The people of Serbia deserve what their neighbors in central
Europe have: clean elections, a free press, a normal market economy.
If President Milosevic respects their will, Serbia can enjoy the
legitimacy and assistance it needs. If he seeks to rule Serbia as an
unreformed dictatorship, it will only increase his isolation and the
suffering of his people.
The international community must continue to fulfill its
responsibilities as well. We must accelerate the delivery of
reconstruction aid to those parties who are fulfilling their
responsibilities. Our pledges must turn into projects on the ground so
that people will see the benefits of peace. But as President Clinton
has said, "it is still up to the Bosnian people to take responsibility
for rebuilding their country, reconciling with their neighbors, creating
a democratic national government and laying the foundation for a self-
sustaining peace."
The mission NATO has undertaken in Bosnia, the breadth of our
coalition, and our cooperation with organizations like the OSCE make it
plain that we have built a new NATO. The challenge we have faced in
Bosnia is also the kind of challenge a new NATO is more likely to face
in the post-Cold War world, and it shows us the potential NATO has for
assuring peace and stability. For years, many people thought of this
Alliance simply as bulwark against aggression in Europe. Now we
understand that it is the most potent, effective tool for military
coalition-building in the world.
That is one reason why we have launched NATO's internal
adaptation. It is why we introduced the Combined Joint Task Force
concept. We want to give NATO a permanent capacity to plan, to train
for, and to deploy complex missions like IFOR. These reforms will also
give NATO's European allies a tangible opportunity to play a more
visible, responsible role in the Alliance. Our European allies have
unparalleled experience in peacekeeping. They will now have the
opportunity to use NATO assets for WEU-led operations.
We have made significant progress since our Berlin ministerial on
NATO's internal adaptation -- on CJTF, NATO's relationship with the WEU,
the development of a European Security and Defense Identity, and on
command structure reform. We should complete that work between now and
the summit. Our goal is to strengthen NATO's ability to act to meet new
challenges, while preserving the qualities that have made it so
successful, including the unified command and the transatlantic link.
We are also moving steadily forward in our effort to bring
Europe's new democracies fully, finally and forever into our
transatlantic community. NATO enlargement must naturally begin with the
strongest candidates; otherwise, it would not begin at all. The nations
we invite first should be those that demonstrate most clearly that they
can meet the responsibilities NATO allies share. As President Clinton
has said, we also believe the new members should be admitted no later
than June, 1999, NATO's 50th anniversary.
As accession talks begin, each of us has a responsibility to make
the case to our people and our parliaments that enlargement will advance
our interests. The Alliance must also make clear that this process is
open-ended: that NATO's first new members will not be the last. NATO
should welcome the aspirations of those nations that continue to seek
membership after the summit and continue our intensified dialogue and
consultation with them. The prospect of enlargement has given every
potential member an incentive to develop a deeper relationship with
NATO, to uphold democracy at home, and to contribute to regional
stability; it is in our interest to preserve that incentive for a wide
group of states. NATO's new members will also have an obligation to
help keep the door open to others.
We must also ensure that all of Europe's new democracies, whether
they join NATO sooner, later, or not at all, have a chance to help guide
Europe's future. That is why we should work with our partners to create
the Atlantic Partnership Council as soon as possible. The Council will
be the collective voice of the Partnership for Peace. It will give our
partners a formal consultative mechanism with the Alliance and a
mechanism for cooperating with each other, not just directly with NATO.
It will be open to every member of the Partnership and of the North
Atlantic Cooperation Council, which it would replace.
Most important, the Council will help us shape the future of the
Partnership for Peace. The Partnership is an extraordinary success. It
held 16 military exercises in 1996; 25 are scheduled for next year. It
has made it possible to build the first truly European-wide military
coalitions. Today we are taking it to a new level. We have agreed that
the members of the Partnership should be able to participate in the full
range of NATO's missions; whenever and wherever NATO acts, our partners
should have a chance to stand with us. We have agreed to involve our
partners in the planning, in addition to the execution, of the missions
they join, as well as in the regular peacetime work of NATO's military
authorities. These steps should be implemented rapidly. I believe NATO
should also open a liaison office in those Partner countries that
request one. And we should consider any other enhancements that the
Atlantic Partnership Council may suggest.
Each of us, each of our partners, and many other nations are also
members of the OSCE. It is a vital pillar of America's engagement in
Europe. Its importance will grow as long as we uphold the principles it
promotes: respect for human rights and an open society. Of course, the
OSCE has become much more than a standard-setter: It has supported
elections across Europe; it was on the ground throughout the war in
Chechnya promoting dialogue and reconciliation. It is the inclusive and
necessary complement to the other institutions of our New Atlantic
Community. Bosnia is a case in point: We could not have secured peace
there without NATO; we cannot build democracy, the key to lasting peace,
without the OSCE.
At the OSCE summit, we agreed on the scope and parameters of
negotiations to adapt the Conventional Forces in Europe treaty.
Negotiations should begin immediately in the new year. We are poised to
eliminate old divisions between groups of states, to update the treaty's
system of limitations and to enhance stabilizing measures and
verification. Our goal is early progress. To that end, the Alliance
should prepare and table a comprehensive negotiating proposal early next
year.
Russia, too, should play a vital role in every institution and
every undertaking of our New Atlantic Community. This is possible today
because of the progress Russia has made under President Yeltsin's
leadership: elections have become a fact of life; free market ideals
are ascendant. It is essential because we can only build a new Europe
free of tyranny, division and war if Europe's largest nation is our full
partner.
We seek a fundamentally new relationship between the new Russia
and the new NATO. To achieve this goal, NATO must remain firm in moving
forward with its overall strategy; we must continue to avoid any
suggestion of uncertainty, ambiguity, or delay. At the same time, NATO
must signal its readiness to develop with Russia the details and
substance of a truly cooperative relationship.
The potential of that relationship is already on display in
Bosnia. Major General Montgomery Meigs, who commands the task force in
which American and Russian soldiers serve in Tuzla, said it best:
Today, "an attack on Russian members of Task Force Eagle is no different
than an attack on U.S. troopers." Russian and NATO soldiers in Bosnia
trust each other, depend on each other, defend each other. They have
been sharing common tasks for the last year; they will be for the next
18 months. Our job is to establish a permanent framework that extends
their spirit to other joint endeavors and keeps it thriving long after
the last foreign soldier has left Bosnia.
This relationship should be expressed in a charter between NATO
and Russia. Russia and the Alliance should establish a formal framework
for cooperating, consulting, training and responding to crisis together.
We are not seeking a rigid, legalistic treaty, but rather a process of
consultation and a regular pattern of security cooperation. There is
broad agreement that such a relationship is possible and in the interest
of both NATO and Russia. And we are now ready to move to a new stage on
every aspect of our security strategy. We look forward to working
closely with Russia to develop this vital element, so that Russia can
have the voice on European security matters that it deserves and Europe
needs.
I believe that Ukraine, too, can be, must be, and will be fully
part of the European mainstream. Ukraine has made immense progress in
overcoming a painful and difficult history. It has made it clear it
will do its part to help build a secure and integrated Europe. Today, we
have decided to move forward to define an enhanced relationship between
Ukraine and NATO. We should also encourage Ukraine to continue building
close ties with all its neighbors. The new Polish-Ukrainian
peacekeeping battalion, for example, is a tangible step in erasing
Europe's division. It should become an integral part of the Partnership
for Peace so that it can be employed in future missions like IFOR.
In all these areas, I have often remarked that our great challenge
is to carry forward the work that our predecessors began when they built
our Alliance after World War II. They launched the transatlantic
partnership and designed it to grow. We are strengthening our
partnership and extending to the newly free nations of Europe what
history denied them in 1945. It is not often that people have a chance
to revisit the great opportunities we did not grasp in the past. We do
-- and we are seizing it.
Today, we remember the achievements of Schuman, Bevin, Sforza,
Pearson, Acheson, and Marshall; we do not often think about the
countless obstacles, large and small, that stood in their way. Few
remember the understandings they had to reach before our leaders could
meet at Bretton Woods, in Washington, in Rome to launch the institutions
of the post-war period. Future generations may not remember the details
of our discussions here, either. But if we stay focused on what truly
matters, they will remember this: This was the time we fulfilled the
founding vision of NATO; this was the time we finished the half-century
task of building a free and secure Europe, but this time with no
divisions and no one left out. I am grateful for the opportunity to
have played my part in this enterprise and I know President Clinton is
determined to see it through.
(###)
To the top of this page