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U.S. Department of State
95/11/27 Interview: NPR "All Things Considered"
Office of the Spokesman
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Office of the Spokesman
__________________________________________________________________
For Immediate Release November 27, 1995
INTERVIEW OF
SECRETARY OF STATE WARREN CHRISTOPHER
ON
NATIONAL PUBLIC RADIO - ROBERT SIEGEL
"ALL THINGS CONSIDERED"
Washington, D.C.
Monday, November 27, 1995
MR. SIEGEL: Secretary of State Warren Christopher writes in the New
York Times today that the question of sending U.S. peacekeepers to
Bosnia is an acid test of American leadership.
The Secretary of State joins us from the State Department. Welcome, Mr.
Christopher.
SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER: Thank you, Robert.
MR. SIEGEL: I would like to ask you, first, how you would answer those
who say that the fighting in Bosnia, however atrocious it may be, just
doesn't involve vital interests to the United States and, therefore, it
isn't worth risking American lives.
SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER: On the contrary. It involves some of our most
vital interests. First, our leadership as the superpower remaining, we
have a very strong interest in vindicating our leadership.
Robert, we started down this path toward peace in the midst of the
summer. We were able to persuade NATO to launch a bombing campaign
after those terrible incidents in Sarajevo. We were then able to get a
cease-fire and get the parties committed to having a single, multi-
ethnic state. Then we persuaded them to come to Dayton, and now we've
reached an agreement.
I think that our leadership would be very severely criticized around the
world if we didn't follow through. That's point number one.
Point number two, I think we have a very strong interest in ensuring
that this peace agreement has the best chance to succeed that it
possibly can so we don't have a broader war in Europe.
If the peace agreement fails because of the lack of implementation,
almost certainly the conflict will spread and thus spread our very
strong interest in peace and stability in Europe.
Finally, our values are very much involved in this decision. Americans
shuddered at the pictures we've seen over the last four years --
concentration camps, starvation, mass graves. I think as a great
nation, we have a considerable stake in vindicating our values.
I would say that we have very strong and vital national interests
involved.
MR. SIEGEL: Here's a situation that might arise in Bosnia after
peacekeepers are sent. Let's say there were sniper fire from some
Bosnian Serb irregulars in Sarajevo. According to this peace agreement,
whose responsibility would it be to suppress the snipers? Would it be
the Bosnian army's responsibility or would it be NATO's responsibility?
SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER: Let me first say that we don't expect any mass
or organized resistance here. I think there would be very few people in
that country that would want to take on NATO. NATO will go in with
heavy forces, well armed, and well trained; perhaps the best trained
armies in the world.
If there are some occasional efforts, if there are some rogue elements
that try to test us, NATO will be prepared to respond. That would be
part of their task, to ensure their authority is not challenged during
the period that they're there.
MR. SIEGEL: But we all understand testing them to mean a force that
might actually fire on the peacekeepers. But what if there were gunfire
from one group of Bosnians against another group of Bosnians? Would it
be the role of the peacekeepers to suppress those who are initiating
that fight and actually attack them?
SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER: The task of the peacekeepers would be to carry
out the military annexes of the agreement. Those annexes provide for a
separation of forces. They would try to ensure that the parties to
agreement keep the agreement.
The NATO forces -- IFOR -- will not act as the police force within the
country. They will not be trying to keep the civil peace. They'll be
carrying out the military annexes of the agreement.
I think you'll find strong and robust rules of engagement. But they are
to carry out the military annex and not to resolve civilian
controversies within the country.
MR. SIEGEL: You wrote in your article in the New York Times today that,
"Without our troops, an agreement that serves our interest will not
carried out." But you've also described this as an agreement that
serves the interest of the parties that signed it.
Why is it, indeed, in their interest -- and if they see it that way --
why must American forces be there to make them do something that they
have agreed to?
SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER: You're quite right that all three parties have
agreed to what was negotiated in Dayton, and moreover each of the three
presidents has sent a letter to President Clinton, urging that NATO
troops come in and saying that they will do all they can to ensure their
safety.
At the same time, Robert, I think it's only understandable that after
four years of a bloody, bitter war, that the three countries need some
help in carrying out the agreement. They need to have the confidence
that is engendered by having NATO there to assist in the separation of
forces. This is a mission of limited duration in order to give the
parties an opportunity to settle in to the rhythms of peace.
MR. SIEGEL: How long a duration is it?
SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER: What the military people have said is that they
believe that the task can be carried out in about a year, and that's the
best estimate that I have for you today. We would expect elections to
be held between six and nine months after the implementation force goes
in, and I think that could be a very important confidence-building
mechanism in itself.
MR. SIEGEL: During the time that U.S. forces would be in Bosnia during
that -- however long it might be -- year, could you imagine them
beginning that mission with Bosnian Serbs still expressing themselves as
against it in some way or not accepting it?
SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER: Robert, let me tell you where that stands. As
you know, in Dayton, President Milosevic of Serbia was explicitly
authorized to negotiate for the Bosnian Serbs. In addition to that,
there was a mixed delegation composed both of Serbs and Bosnian Serbs.
When the agreement was signed by President Milosevic of Serbia, I urged
him to get the signature of the Bosnian Serbs as well. Indeed, he
committed himself in a letter to me to do that within ten days.
Of considerable interest to me, he produced the signatures from the
Bosnian Serbs within two days. So I think the trend is going in the
right direction. It's not surprising to me that there is some
opposition to the agreement; that the nature of compromises is that
there is going to be probably some people who unhappy with this
agreement. But I think when they see the pluses in the agreement --
also when they see the strength of the force that's there to implement
it -- I believe we'll not have any mass or organized opposition -- not
from the Bosnian Serbs or from the other parties.
MR. SIEGEL: What about smaller scale opposition, though, in the forms
of protests, demonstrations?
SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER: I don't think we can rule out that there will be
some sporadic violence, separated probably by long periods of time or
perhaps geographically separated, and the IFOR troops will be prepared
to deal with anything that attempts to stop them in their mission, and
they'll deal with that quite aggressively and firmly.
MR. SIEGEL: Before letting you go, which I will in just one moment, I
just want to clarify what you said earlier. If such events of violence
were committed by one group of Bosnians against another group of
Bosnians, the peace agreement would see that as a civilian problem.
It's not for IFOR to deal with? Do I understand that?
SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER: Yes. I think that, under military annexes,
would not be regarded as part of the duties of IFOR. IFOR is there to
provide a separation of forces between the Bosnian Serbs, on the one
hand, and the Federation forces on the other hand.
Clearly, if there is something done in the presence of IFOR, IFOR will
deal with that, just as they have dealt with some sporadic instances of
lawlessness in Haiti. Clearly, the NATO forces are not going to stand
by and see some gross violation of civil rights, but that's not the
central part of their responsibility.
The focus here is on the military annexes. Military annexes focus on
the separation of forces between the parties in insuring that the war
that they've carried on between the elements there does not restart.
MR. SIEGEL: Secretary of State Christopher, thank you very much.
SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER: Thank you.
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