U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
OFFICE OF THE SPOKESMAN
JANUARY 24, 1995



                                STATEMENT BY
                             SECRETARY OF STATE
                             WARREN CHRISTOPHER
                                 BEFORE THE
                      SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE
                             JANUARY 24, 1995



Thank you, Mr. Chairman.  It gives me great pleasure to appear
for the first time before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
of the 104th Congress.  I look forward in the coming year to
working closely with the Committee to advance our vital national
interests, beginning with our discussion today of implementation
of the Agreed Framework between the United States and North
Korea.

Before taking your questions, Secretary Perry and I will review
this Administration's strategy for resolving the North Korea
nuclear issue, how it advances our interests in Asia, and how it
supports our overall efforts to stop the spread of weapons of
mass destruction.  As I said in my speech last week outlining
this Administration's foreign policy, curbing the proliferation
of weapons of mass destruction is among the most vital security
challenges facing the United States today.

The Agreed Framework is the product of months of determined
diplomacy and firm negotiation.  It attains all our strategic
objectives.  It safeguards our allies South Korea and Japan.  It
lifts the specter of a nuclear arms race from Northeast Asia.
It bolsters a nonproliferation regime essential to global
stability.  And it provides a basis for a potential reduction of
tensions in the region.  I am pleased to report that
implementation of the Framework is proceeding smoothly.

Mr. Chairman, the United States has an enduring interest in a
stable, non-nuclear Korean peninsula.  Thirty-seven thousand
American troops stand ready to defend that interest on what is
now the world's most fortified frontier.  They carry on a
commitment to South Korea's freedom and prosperity that was
first sealed by the lives of more than thirty thousand brave
Americans almost half a century ago.  As President Clinton said
before South Korea's National Assembly, "that sacrifice affirmed
some old truths:  vulnerability invites aggression; peace
depends on deterrence."  We came to the Framework negotiations
with those cardinal principles foremost in mind.

We are also under no illusions about the Democratic People's
Republic of Korea.  North Korea remains an isolated,
totalitarian regime.  In the past, it has regularly engaged in
aggression and terrorism, from the seizure of the USS Pueblo in
1968 to the attack on South Korean cabinet members in Burma in
1983, and the bombing of a South Korean airliner in 1987.

The recent shootdown of an unarmed American helicopter reminds
us that tensions on the peninsula remain high.  North Korea
fields a 1.1 million man army, much of it deployed along the
DMZ.  Its artillery threatens the capital of South Korea.  Its
ballistic missiles under development can reach the coast of
Japan.  And its sales of missile systems to the Middle East
undermine peace and security.  Beyond its internal repression,
North Korea's past behavior toward its neighbors and the world
has often placed it at odds with the international community.

Over the last decade, successive administrations watched with
concern as North Korea pursued its nuclear program, its
development of ballistic missiles, and its build-up of forces.
In 1987, during the Reagan Administration, North Korea's 5
megawatt reactor became operational.  And in 1989, during the
Bush Administration, North Korea unloaded an unknown amount of
spent fuel that may have been reprocessed into plutonium.

When North Korea sought to remove its nuclear program from the
constraint of international safeguards, President Clinton moved
quickly to meet the potential global threat posed by its nuclear
ambitions.  Left unchecked, North Korea would soon have been in
a position to produce hundreds of kilograms of plutonium for
nuclear weapons--and to provoke a destabilizing nuclear arms
race in Northeast Asia.  It would also have been able to sell
nuclear material or nuclear weapons to rogue states in the
Middle East--just as it has sold them ballistic missiles in
recent years.

Our goal in crafting the Framework was thus three-fold:  to stop
the North's existing nuclear program; to devise a larger
strategy that would address the threat posed by the North's
missile program and conventional build-up; and to reduce
tensions in the region by bringing North Korea out of its
international isolation into the broader community of nations.

The Clinton Administration's direct involvement with the nuclear
issue began in March 1993, when North Korea announced its
intention to withdraw from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty
(NPT).  That declaration--coming after the International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA) was unable to resolve discrepancies in the
way the North accounted for its plutonium stocks--raised
international alarm about North Korea's nuclear program.

After the IAEA reported its findings to the Security Council and
the North announced its withdrawal, the Council invited member
states to take up the matter with North Korea. When the United
States first began to do so, we had two objectives.  First, we
wanted North Korea to remain in the NPT and accept full-scope
IAEA safeguards, including special inspections.  This would
ensure the integrity of the NPT as the linchpin of global non-
proliferation.  Second, we wanted the North to implement the
North-South Declaration on Denuclearization, which it had
negotiated with South Korea in 1991.  That declaration would
help ensure a non-nuclear Korean peninsula by requiring
abandonment of any reprocessing capability and acceptance of a
bilateral inspection regime.

In the first two rounds of negotiation in June and July of 1993,
we made it clear to the North Koreans that we could only engage
in dialogue so long as they accepted safeguards to assure non-
diversion of nuclear material, refrained from separating any
more plutonium and remained in the NPT.  If they violated any of
these conditions, we would turn to the Security Council for
sanctions.  We were determined not to lose any ground while
talks were under way.

To ensure the success of our approach, the United States
conducted intensive consultations with our allies South Korea
and Japan, and other Security Council members.  And to ensure
the security of South Korea in a period of heightened tension,
we also accelerated modernization of our military forces there,
a subject that I know Secretary Perry will address.  We
negotiated with North Korea from a position of strength.

Some critics of the Framework say that we negotiated with no
sticks in hand.  Let me assure them that the Patriot missiles,
Apache helicopters, and Bradley fighting vehicles that we sent
to South Korea were not armed with carrots.

When North Korea took the unacceptable step of unloading fuel
from its 5 megawatt reactor last spring, we were prepared to
pursue a sanctions resolution in the Security Council, and to
counter any hostile reaction.  And the North Koreans knew it.

After Kim Il Sung made a commitment to freeze North Korea's
nuclear program if the United States would agree to resume
talks, President Clinton responded immediately by defining what
an acceptable freeze would mean--that is, what North Korea would
have to agree to if talks were to resume.  The President set a
new, higher standard for maintaining dialogue with the North by
insisting that a freeze include a commitment not to reload and
operate its 5 megawatt reactor--not to produce any more
plutonium.  This went beyond the North's previous commitment not
to undertake any reprocessing or separation of plutonium.  The
North quickly accepted these terms--our terms--and we moved to a
new round of talks in Geneva.

The North Korean leadership made this decision because it
understood that if it did not, the United States would pursue
sanctions and was prepared to deal with the consequences.  We
had achieved a position of advantage--which we would carry into
the negotiations when they resumed--because a consistent policy
had been supported by successful diplomacy at the United Nations
and evident military readiness on the ground.

Our determined diplomacy also enabled us to expand our
objectives.  When the third and final round of negotiations
opened last fall, we still wanted to bring North Korea back into
compliance with its IAEA safeguard obligations.  But the North's
interest in light-water reactors (LWRs) opened the door to a
more far-reaching solution:  dismantlement of its existing
nuclear facilities.  Even under IAEA safeguards, these
facilities posed a threat by enabling the North to continue
accumulating weapons-grade plutonium, and to do so at an
accelerating rate.

We went back to the table in Geneva determined that any
resolution of the nuclear issue must show that the United States
would not walk away from a material violation of the NPT and
international safeguards.  There would be no settlement that did
not include full NPT compliance.  Beyond that, the United States
would not stand by while North Korea accumulated significant
amounts of weapons-grade plutonium, even under IAEA safeguards.
There could be no settlement that left intact the North Korean
capability to produce and possibly export large quantities of
weapons grade material.  We succeeded in securing both of these
objectives.

In close consultation with our allies South Korea and Japan, we
ultimately concluded an Agreed Framework that addresses all our
concerns about the North Korean nuclear program.  Let me outline
what it requires.

First, the Agreed Framework immediately froze the North Korean
nuclear program.  The North agreed not to restart its 5 megawatt
reactor.  It agreed to seal its reprocessing facility and
eventually dismantle it.  It agreed to cooperate with the United
States to store safely the spent fuel from the 5 megawatt
reactor--rather than reprocess it--and eventually ship it out of
the country.  In short, North Korea's capacity to separate or
produce plutonium was ended.  All these steps are now taking
place under the careful scrutiny of the IAEA.

Second, the North agreed to freeze construction of its 50 and
200 megawatt reactors and ultimately dismantle them.  Absent
this agreement, the two reactors would have been capable of
producing enough plutonium for dozens of bombs each year.

Third, under the Agreed Framework, North Korea will remain a
party to the NPT.  As such, it must fully disclose its past
nuclear activities.  North Korea is obligated to cooperate with
whatever measures the IAEA deems necessary--including special
inspections--to resolve questions about its nuclear program.

Let me stress that as a result of the Framework, North Korea
must fulfill additional obligations beyond its NPT requirements.
These include no more reprocessing of spent fuel, the shipment
of the spent fuel containing plutonium out of the country, and
dismantlement of the gas graphite reactor system.

In return for these steps, North Korea will receive some
benefits.  We will lead an international effort to provide North
Korea with proliferation-resistant, light-water reactors. It
will also receive heavy fuel oil shipments as an interim energy
source until the light water reactors come on line early in the
next century.  Almost all financing for the LWRs will come from
others, primarily South Korea and Japan.  We expect the heavy
fuel oil to be provided by the United States and other concerned
countries.

Under the Agreed Framework, initial work on the LWR project will
begin, but there will be no delivery of any significant nuclear
components for the reactors until North Korea complies fully
with its safeguards obligations.  Put another way, the North
Koreans will not receive critical equipment or technology for
LWRs until the IAEA is satisfied that questions about past North
Korean nuclear activity are resolved.

Also under the terms of the Agreed Framework, the North has
agreed to resume its dialogue with the Republic of Korea.  This
was a critical provision for South Korea and the United States
if the Framework was to stand the test of time.  Finally, under
the Framework, the United States will move carefully toward more
normal relations with North Korea.  To ensure smooth
implementation of the Framework, we will open a liaison office
in Pyongyang, and North Korea will open a liaison office here.
I would stress, though, that full normalization is explicitly
linked to the North's willingness to resolve many issues of
concern to us.  We have made clear to the North Koreans that our
agenda begins with their ballistic missile development and
export activities, and their destabilizing conventional force
deployment.

We designed the structure of the Agreed Framework to maximize
the benefits and minimize the risks to the United States, South
Korea and Japan.  Let me explain how:

First, the burden of up-front performance falls on North Korea,
not the United States.  The North had to freeze immediately all
construction of its 50 and 200 megawatt reactors.  It had to
refrain from refueling and restarting the 5 megawatt reactor and
from taking any steps to reprocess existing spent fuel and to
separate plutonium.

The steps we are taking in response are carefully calibrated.
Last week, we provided 50,000 tons of heavy oil to North Korea,
equivalent to less than one-half of one percent of its annual
electrical energy production capability, and worth less than $5
million at current market prices.  We are helping it safely
store spent fuel until it is shipped out of the North.  As an
alternative to reprocessing, this is profoundly in our interest.
We also have moved very selectively to ease commercial sanctions
on North Korea.  And we are moving ahead with the North Koreans
to resolve issues related to establishing liaison offices.

The most significant benefits for North Korea will come several
years later, after we have had time to judge North Korean
performance and intentions.  As I noted earlier, the most
important benefit that the North will receive under the Agreed
Framework, the sensitive nuclear components for LWRs, will not
be provided until the North fully complies with its safeguards
obligations, which includes accounting for its past activities.

Second, the structure of the Framework enables us to monitor
closely North Korean compliance.  This is not an arrangement
that relies on trust.  The IAEA is in North Korea monitoring the
freeze and has received excellent cooperation.  Beyond this, we
have our own national technical means to verify the North's
compliance.

Third, the Framework is also structured so that we are not
disadvantaged in any significant way if the DPRK reneges on its
commitments--at any time.  The path to full implementation has
defined checkpoints.  If at any checkpoint, North Korea fails to
fulfill its obligations, it will lose the benefits of compliance
that it so clearly desires.  If the North backs out of the deal
in the next several years, for example, it will have gained
little except modest amounts of heavy oil and some technical
help in ensuring the safe storage of spent fuel.  Should the
North renege when it is required to submit to IAEA special
inspections, Pyongyang will still be left with only the empty
shells of two LWRs.  Even if that happens, we will still have
benefitted greatly.  Why?  Because the North's entire nuclear
program will have been frozen for years.

Fourth, the Framework places highest priority on the elements of
the North's program that most acutely threaten U.S. security.
That means the accumulation of plutonium.  For example, we
insisted that the Agreed Framework provide for the removal of
spent fuel from North Korea without being reprocessed.  That
fuel (enough to build about five bombs) was a direct threat to
our allies if it were ever reprocessed.

Let me now address the question of when the North would account
for its past activities.  It was vital to secure an unambiguous
commitment from the North to accept whatever measures the IAEA
deemed necessary--including special inspections--to account for
its past nuclear activities.  From a national security
perspective, when those inspections were conducted was less
critical.  The information to be obtained is not perishable.  We
encourage the North to accept those inspections even before they
are required to under the Framework.  But the more pressing
security imperative was to stop plutonium production and secure
an agreement to dismantle North Korea's nuclear program.

We are cautious but hopeful about the continued smooth
implementation of the Framework's terms.  The North has frozen
its nuclear program and is moving forward in discussions with
the IAEA to enact additional verification measures.  It is
cooperating with American experts to ensure safe storage of the
spent fuel at its Yongbyon nuclear plant--cooperation which has
included the first visit by American technicians to Yongbyon.

At the same time, we have made important progress toward
establishing the Korean Energy Development Organization (KEDO),
the international consortium that will have a key role in
implementing the Agreed Framework.  It is KEDO that will ensure
the provision of light-water reactors to North Korea, the heavy
oil shipments, the safe storage of the spent fuel and its
eventual shipment out of North Korea.  South Korea will play a
central role, and Japan will play a significant role, in the
financing and construction of the LWR project.  Both countries
strongly support the Framework as in their national interest,
and have demonstrated that support with their significant
commitment to finance its implementation.

After several productive meetings with the Republic of Korea and
Japan on KEDO, we have also begun to approach other potential
members of KEDO in Asia and Europe.  We hope to hold the first
KEDO meeting next month in the United States.

The United States is spending some $5 million to pay for the
first shipment of heavy fuel oil and relatively modest
additional funds for placing the North's spent fuel in safe
storage for eventual shipment.  In keeping with our central role
in KEDO and our vital interest in implementation of the
Framework, this Administration believes we should supplement the
significant financial contributions that will be made by the
Republic of Korea and Japan over the next decade.  We will
accordingly seek to reprogram funds in FY 1995, and new funds in
the 1996 budget to contribute to KEDO and its projects.

Specifically, in Fiscal Year 1995, up to ten million dollars
will be allocated by the Department of Energy to finance safe
storage of North Korea's spent fuel.  That will forestall any
reprocessing and allow its eventual shipment out of the country.
Up to 5.4 million dollars of reprogrammed State Department funds
will be spent on establishing KEDO, which all three partners
agree will be a small organization with a staff of about 35.

We anticipate that budget requests to support this enterprise in
1996 and subsequent years will be on the order of tens of
millions of dollars, a modest contribution in comparison to the
billions of dollars our KEDO partners will contribute.  They
represent a wise investment in regional security.

Regional security, ultimately, is what the Agreed Framework is
designed to protect.  The North's efforts to develop nuclear
weapons and the means to deliver them have been a clear and
immediate threat to our allies South Korea and Japan.
Continuing tensions on the Korean peninsula in turn have been a
threat to security and prosperity throughout Asia, the world's
most dynamic economic region.

The Agreed Framework not only stops North Korea's nuclear
program in its tracks.  It provides a basis for reducing
tensions in the region by opening the way for the establishment
of more normal political and economic relationships between the
United States and North Korea, and prospectively between North
and South Korea.  As part of the Framework, North Korea has
pledged to resume dialogue with South Korea on matters affecting
peace and security on the peninsula.  We have made clear that
resuming North-South dialogue is essential to the success of the
Framework--so important that we were prepared to walk away from
the Framework if North Korea had not been willing to meet that
condition.

We are determined to use our engagement with North Korea to
address other troubling aspects of its behavior, including its
conventional force posture, ballistic missile activities, and
past support for terrorism.  But development of more normal
relations between North Korea and the United States will not
affect our close ties with the Republic of Korea.  That
relationship, built on a rock-solid alliance, shared democratic
values, and thriving economic ties, will remain unshakeable.

The benefits of the Framework also extend well beyond our
interests in Asia.  The Framework supports our overarching goal
of a strong global nonproliferation regime.  It maintains the
integrity of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.  It prevents
future North Korean sales of nuclear weapons or materials to the
Middle East.  And it gives us an opportunity to curb North
Korean sales of missile technology to those same countries.

These two goals--peace and security in Asia and effective global
nonproliferation--have always commanded strong bipartisan
support.  And I believe that by furthering these goals in a
manner consistent with the national interest, the U.S.-DPRK
Agreed Framework is worthy of that same bipartisan support.

Our negotiations with North Korea have reflected constancy and
resolve.  We saw a threat to our interests.  We took diplomatic
and military steps to confront that threat.  And then we
negotiated from a position of strength to secure an accord that
removed that threat and advanced our interests.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.  I look forward to
answering your questions.