Return to: Index of 1993 Secretary of State's Speeches/Testimonies || Electronic Research Collections Index || ERC Homepage
U.S. Department of State 93/06/10 Intervention at NAC Ministerial, Greece Office of the Spokesman Intervention by Secretary of State Warren Christopher at the North Atlantic Council Ministerial Meeting Athens, Greece June 10, 1993 U.S. Leadership After the Cold War: NATO and Transatlantic Security Mr. Secretary General: I am honored to be here in Athens to take part in this meeting of the North Atlantic Council. This is the first formal meeting of the NAC in ministerial session since President Clinton took office. I therefore want to elaborate upon the basic statement I made in February in Brussels on U.S. policy toward NATO and, more broadly, transatlantic security. But first let me thank Manfred Woerner for his letter setting out the principal issues for our meeting today. I am impressed with the soundness of both his analysis and his conclusions. In meeting with you today, I am following every U.S. Secretary of State of both political parties over four and a half decades. America's commitment to the security of Europe is not bound by party, and, like the Treaty of Washington itself, it is not bound by time. Among us, we have built the most successful alliance in history. We should never lose sight of that stunning truth. The values and interests we share remain in force--and the challenges we face remain formidable. Above all, safeguarding the security of our countries and maintaining stability throughout Europe remains the core responsibility of NATO. The United States will sustain its unparalleled military strength. We will continue to maintain substantial, effective forces in Europe--about 100,000 troops--to ensure our ability to meet our solemn security commitment. Beyond Europe, we are revitalizing the American economy, forging a new partnership with Russian reform, working for peace between Israel and its Arab neighbors, creating a new framework for our relations with Japan, pressing for reform in China, finding new ways to protect the global environment, and promoting human rights and democracy worldwide. The end of the Cold War is making American leadership even more important--and we accept the challenge. Along these lines and as I indicated to the Secretary General this morning, President Clinton proposes that there be a summit meeting with his fellow NATO Heads of State and Government before the end of this year. He sees such a meeting as an important opportunity to assess with his colleagues how to continue to strengthen the alliance, and to adapt its agenda to the challenges of the post-Cold War world. We would be interested in hearing your views and discussing how we can obtain maximum use from such a meeting. For the past few years, NATO has been setting its course for the future. But there has been an important continuity in our mission: to keep the peace; to promote the freedom and security of our member states and peoples; to reinforce unbreakable links across the Atlantic. And there is an important new mission: to help the emerging democracies to the East share in the benefits we have gained from this alliance. The entire international community continues to search for effective means to end the killing in Bosnia-Herzegovina, bring about a lasting and equitable peace, and guarantee that this tragic conflict does not spread. In pursuit of these goals, the United States and other Security Council members agreed in Washington on May 22 on a Joint Action Program. It represents a step forward, seeking to increase pressure on those who have stood in the way of peace in Bosnia. We all recognize that these are interim steps, not a comprehensive solution to this tragic situation. A negotiated settlement--that is agreed by all three parties and implemented in good faith--remains our goal. And let me state again that new and tougher measures remain on the table, should they be needed to reach that goal. NATO is already supporting the Joint Action Program through enforcement of the No-Fly Zone and sanctions enforcement in the Adriatic. NATO can and should make several decisions today to demonstrate unity and purpose on this issue--including further support of the Joint Action Program. As you know, last Friday the UN Security Council enacted Resolution 836, creating "safe areas." Resolution 836 authorizes UN member states to use air power to support UNPROFOR troops in implementing the safe areas. I believe NATO should join us in protecting UNPROFOR personnel with air power if they are attacked and request assistance. The United States is already committed to this, and we want to join our efforts with those of other allies in a NATO operation. Such an operation should be based on the structure already in place for No-Fly Zone enforcement. As an additional contribution, the United States is prepared to provide airlift to nations contributing troops to UNPROFOR's safe area operations if they need this assistance. Further, as a means to increase pressure for a settlement, we should press our Eastern partners for enforcement of the UN sanctions against Serbia. We should strongly endorse all efforts to enforce sanctions in the region. These sanctions must be unrelenting. Everyone should understand that the United States will insist on the isolation of Serbia and Montenegro from the community of nations until all UN requirements are met. Pariah status is the price that must be paid for the aggression that is taking place. Sanctions are also possible against Croatia if it supports aggression and ethnic cleansing in Bosnia-Herzegovina. We recall well the pledge trumpeted by the Belgrade authorities to close the frontier with Bosnia-Herzegovina. The world wants them to live by their word--and is watching with growing disappointment as they conduct business as usual. Long-term pariah status must also be attached to those guilty of atrocities. We intend to pursue vigorously the indictment and prosecution of those who have committed war crimes in the former Yugoslavia. Those who have committed such atrocities must pay for their crimes. This conflict must not be allowed to spill over. We must prevent a wider Balkan war, which would threaten NATO allies and several emerging democracies. It is essential that everyone in the region understand that aggression against the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia would have grave consequences. The United States will support an increase in the international presence in that Republic. I am pleased to announce today that we have offered the UN a reinforced company team to augment the UN contingent already in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. These troops underscore the seriousness of our warning to Belgrade and the Bosnian Serbs. This offer of U.S. troops to the UN has both symbolic and tangible significance. Neither can we permit a crackdown in Kosovo that could lead to an expansion in the conflict. The U.S. has made it clear to the Serb authorities that such a move will not be tolerated. NATO should also support an increase in the CSCE long duration missions in the former Yugoslavia, particularly in Kosovo. I plan to discuss this with the CSCE Chairman-in-Office and Secretary General when I visit Vienna next Monday. Together these steps underscore the seriousness of our warnings to Belgrade. Today we must also reconfirm NATO'S readiness to assist the United Nations in implementing a negotiated peace settlement. Credible provisions for implementing such a peace settlement will be fundamental to its prospects for success. The United States reaffirms its commitment to participate with the UN and NATO in implementing and enforcing that agreement, including the possible use of ground forces. Finally, I believe we all recognize that the West missed opportunities to head off this horrible problem. I hope we learn that we must work together earlier to help prevent conflicts before they erupt. We must develop mechanisms to deal more quickly and creatively with crises. Further, we must give high priority to the development of peacekeeping capabilities. Mr. Secretary General, we have been preoccupied with Bosnia. But we must also create the basis for tomorrow's security in the North Atlantic area and throughout Europe. This alliance can succeed only if we make our political and economic linkages as strong as our military ties. We must strengthen bonds between North America and the European Community. Indeed, European security today is a compound of political, economic, social, and military efforts. Preserving common security across the Atlantic requires us to focus not only on renewing NATO, but also on concluding the GATT Round. Transatlantic relations cannot be overly compartmentalized--either in substance or, increasingly, in institutions. In this new era, we must show our parliaments and peoples that we share burdens as we share risks. The drastically diminished threat after the Cold War leads us to reduce our military spending. But if any of us cuts spending to the point of imperiling the common needs of the alliance--even worse, if there is a free-fall in defense spending--then the alliance faces not only a crisis of confidence but a corrosion of capability. The United States will maintain its military commitment and responsibilities in Europe. But President Clinton and I must be able to show the U.S. Congress that the allies are doing the same. Sharing must be a visible NATO principle: sharing of burdens; sharing of responsibilities; sharing of decisions. Mr. Secretary General, I believe that between now and our next meeting, which I hope will be a Summit, we need to achieve progress in five important areas. First, we must strengthen the unique qualities of NATO cooperation. Never before have so many nations joined together to confront common challenges. Never before have the military forces of so many countries worked together so effectively, both in NATO's integrated command and in informal arrangements. Never before have the defense industries of so many countries adopted the same standards and made possible such a multiplication of military strength. These achievements must not be squandered. We must maintain our ability to act when our interests are challenged. Despite the grave situation in the former Yugoslavia, there is no fundamental challenge to the political order in Europe that could produce a new Continent-wide war. Sustaining that achievement will depend in part on reinforcing our alliance, our practices of cooperation, our robust military defenses and command structures. If the cooperative linkages among our defense industries are permitted to erode as defense budgets fall, each member nation and the whole alliance can lose the benefits of this special "force multiplier." That's why the Defense Trade Code of Conduct is so important. We must also continue updating NATO's common infrastructure program to ensure that we invest in assets essential to meeting new challenges. Second, we must help to make and keep the peace in Central and Eastern Europe. For many countries, the "unfreezing of history" has vastly complicated the transition from Communism to democracy. Peacemaking and peacekeeping are most effective when they are preceded or accompanied by timely political efforts to reduce tensions and settle disputes. NATO must be able to take political decisions for early, sustained, and credible engagement. Its military leaders must have confidence in the ability of this Council to provide timely and effective political direction. Different member states will approach situations with different political sensitivities in mind, and with different peacekeeping structures that they might prefer. But we should also work to develop core NATO peacekeeping procedures that will balance political acceptability and military effectiveness. We don't need to "reinvent the wheel" each time NATO's peacekeeping capabilities are needed. These capabilities are especially important to help new democracies succeed-- and to draw our NACC partners firmly to the West. Third, we must work more effectively with other institutions with goals similar to NATO's. The U.S. commitment to European security will continue to be expressed first and foremost through NATO. We reaffirm that "the alliance is the essential forum for consultation among its members, and the venue for agreement on policies bearing on the security and defense commitments of allies under the Washington Treaty." But while NATO is central to our common purposes, it is not alone in pursuing goals consistent with the broadest definition of security. The UN, CSCE, EC, the NACC, the WEU and the Council of Europe have valuable roles to play--and each should be energized. Important progress has been made in developing complementary, interlocking institutions. But NATO needs to build more effective links for crisis prevention, management and communication among them to meet new challenges to European security. With the United Nations, we should extend planning beyond ad hoc arrangements to a more systematic relationship. We must also seek to ensure that NATO states that are not members of the UN Security Council are nonetheless more engaged in reaching decisions that affect their interests. The United States supports the idea of establishing a contact group consisting of key contributors to peacekeeping activities. The United States welcomes the development of a European security and defense identity. This will make our own commitment even more effective. Such an identity can also sustain and build popular support, in Europe, for meeting European commitments and responsibilities. We also welcome the opportunity to work even more closely with France in alliance defense activities, and we look forward to expanding that cooperation. NATO must develop closer ties with the WEU. But we should also recall our declared intention "to preserve the operational coherence we now have and on which our defense depends." And we must act on the premise that although the military capabilities of the two institutions are separable, they must not be seen as separate. Fourth, we must create the basis for continent-wide security. In declarations of the North Atlantic Council since 1990, we have accepted the mandate for developing a system and practices of security that span the continent. All states need to implement reductions already placed on Cold War weaponry and further reduce any residual risks. And states left outside the security system could in time pose dangers to it. Outreach activities with NACC partners--and work with the CSCE--are vitally important. CSCE's innovative work on crisis management and conflict prevention is one of the most promising security experiments underway in Europe today. Securing the full benefits of ending the Cold War depends on consolidating the place of the post-Communist states in the community of democratic nations. Western Europe has succeeded in replacing a thousand years of strife and turmoil in Europe with a new approach to security grounded in basic human values and the rule of law. Now the great test is whether it can be achieved in the East. At an appropriate time, we may choose to enlarge NATO membership. But that is not now on the agenda. Most important, we should intensify and expand the work program for the NACC and broaden its mandate. This institution has already proved its worth in involving post-Communist states with the West. It can and must become much more. For example, the NACC states should step up joint consultations, joint activities on peacekeeping, exchange of personnel, training in civil-military relations and joint exercises. We are once again prepared to contribute $500,000 to the NATO budget to support NACC activities, provided other allies contribute a proportionate share. By our next meeting, we should agree upon an expanded NACC agenda, designed to draw post-Communist states more closely into the structure of security for the heart of Europe. At the same time, we should develop new ways for those European nations not in the NACC to participate in NATO work. As Secretary of Defense Aspin reported to the Defense Planning Committee (DPC) two weeks ago, the United States is developing a strategic partnership with Russia, agreed upon by Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin at Vancouver. We want to build similar relationships, based on commonly shared values and principles, with all the new post-Communist states. In building more partnerships, we will of course work closely with our NATO allies. We do not see these relationships as mutually exclusive or as a substitute for other bilateral or multilateral relationships. President Clinton is also initiating a strategic partnership with Ukraine. Of course, it remains important that Ukraine fulfill its Lisbon Protocol commitments, ratify START I, and accede to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty as a non-nuclear state. Ukraine and other newly independent states of the former Soviet Union must also be integrated into European institutions--such as the NACC and CSCE--as the best assurance of their independence, security, and territorial integrity. I would be glad to report to you on Secretary Aspin's and Ambassador Talbott's recent trip to Ukraine in detail during the discussion period after lunch. In recent years, the West has created a series of ad hoc means of coordinating policy toward the post-Communist states in a number of areas, especially economic policy. But as yet, we have no shared strategic framework to link nations across the old East-West divide. We should strengthen the NAC--along with the NACC--as a central forum to discuss broad strategic policy. We need to ensure that we develop an approach that reaches out to Russia and all the new states of the region. Fifth and finally, just as we recognize the importance of extending NATO's role eastward on the continent, we must intensify cooperation on threats to allied interests arising from beyond Europe. We have learned that we must act against other threats to our common security from outside the North Atlantic area--whether or not the allies act together or through the institutions of the alliance. We face no more urgent security threat than the potential spread of weapons of mass destruction and the means of delivering them. NATO governments must work to achieve the unconditional and indefinite extension of the NPT at the 1995 Review Conference. But we must do even more. Proliferation is the emerging arms control agenda of the Nineties--and we must be prepared collectively to take stronger action. States seeking to threaten the peace by acquiring these weapons must know that we will oppose them. Our proliferation agenda must also encompass new partners. Above all, we should cooperate with Russia and the NIS. All NATO governments have a direct interest in the rapid and safe dismantling of the former Soviet Union's nuclear forces. This task is beyond the means of any one nation. And it will involve much greater costs if we do not combine our efforts to accelerate denuclearization now. Mr. Secretary General, between now and our next meeting, let us work together to achieve concrete results in each of these five areas. Let us take specific steps to maintain NATO's strength, improve peacemaking and peacekeeping, cooperate more closely with other institutions, extend security cooperation eastward, and respond to threats from beyond the Continent. President Clinton has nominated a top-flight individual, Dr. Robert Hunter, to be the new U.S. Ambassador to NATO. We are eager to have him join the allies on the Council very soon. I have asked him to work closely with you in these key areas so that we can register progress at our next meeting. Mr. Secretary General, I know that I have proposed an ambitious agenda for the North Atlantic Council during the next several months. But I believe it is an agenda appropriate to the challenges. We seek not to find new tasks to justify an old alliance, but to use this enduring alliance to face new tests. This agenda demonstrates that the North Atlantic Alliance is vital to us all. Thank you. (###)