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U.S. Department of State
93/05/18 Testimony on Foreign Assistance Priorities After the Cold War
Office of the Spokesman

Statement by
Secretary of State Warren Christopher
before the 
House Foreign Affairs Committee

Washington, DC
May 18, 1993

Mr. Chairman, I appreciate this opportunity to appear before you, Mr. 
Gilman, and the committee.  Together, we face the challenge of crafting 
a foreign policy for a new era of unprecedented change, hope, and 
opportunity.  The Clinton Administration approaches this task with the 
conviction that strong public support for foreign policy at home is 
essential to American effectiveness abroad.

Today, domestic issues and foreign issues are inseparable.  The American 
public expects our foreign policy investments to pay dividends in 
economic growth and the advancement of democratic ideals.  As our 
Administration goes forward, we expect to deliver on those expectations.

As I mentioned to the full committee in January, when we met informally, 
President Clinton has identified three overarching goals for our foreign 

First, elevating national and global economic growth as a primary 
foreign policy goal;

Second, updating our forces and security arrangements to meet new 
threats; and

Third, organizing our foreign policy to promote democracy, human rights, 
and free markets abroad.

Russian Aid

All three of these overarching policy goals would be greatly advanced by 
the success of Russian democracy and economic reform.  We must take 
strong action to cooperate with Russia.  The results of the referendum 
were a significant victory for democracy and economic reform.  But the 
worst mistake we could make would be to assume that all of our work had 
been done.  It's only begun.

As President Clinton has said, helping ensure the success of Russian 
democracy is the supreme security challenge of our era and is in our 
deep self-interest.  An investment today in Russia's democratic future 
is an essential investment in America's future.  By making this 
investment, we can help turn what was our most dangerous adversary into 
an enduring partner.  This, I believe, is a critical mission.

International Affairs Budget

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, you've already seen the 
details of the President's April 8 budget request, so I'd only like to 
stress one very important point that often gets lost in the details with 
regard to the Budget Function 150 account.

Historically, international affairs spending has represented just over 
1% of our total federal expenditures, a modest investment, indeed, in 
furtherance of our nation's vital international objectives.  The FY 1994 
budget marks a first step in redirecting our foreign policy, refocusing 
our foreign affairs funds, and reforming our foreign policy structures 
to help meet the three overarching goals that President Clinton has set 
forth for the post-Cold War era--supporting democracy, promoting growth, 
and strengthening security.

The FY 1994 budget is, by necessity, a transitional budget.  Changes in 
some of the details of our budget request are possible and probably even 
likely.  Our post-Cold War world is itself undergoing a profound 
transition.  The new challenges and opportunities we face in the world 
require fundamental changes in the direction of our foreign policy as 
well as a fundamental restructuring of our foreign policy institutions.

I believe we've made a good, strong start, but much remains to be done.  
We intend to work very closely and cooperatively with this committee 
during your deliberations on our funding request.


Mr. Chairman, I know this committee has very important responsibilities 
with respect to funding UN activities.  The FY 1994 international 
affairs budget requests nearly $700 million in contributions to the 
United Nations and other international peace-keeping operations.  We've 
also requested $300 million in FY 1993 supplemental funds to meet 
unanticipated needs for international peace-keeping.

Millions spent now on multilateral preventative diplomacy--emergency 
refugee support and peace-keeping--may save hundreds of millions in 
defense and international relief later.  At a time when we're calling on 
the United Nations to do much more, we cannot support it less.

The end of the Cold War has unleashed long-suppressed conflicts in the 
Balkans, the former Soviet Union, and elsewhere.  It has also opened up 
new possibilities for international cooperation, and I believe we must 
seize them.

Development, Economic, and Security Assistance

I know that Brian Atwood, our new USAID Administrator, appeared before 
you only last week and set forth our approach to redefining the role of 
U.S. assistance.  I won't repeat what he said, but I would like to 
reinforce some of the main points he made.

During the Cold War, geopolitical and security concerns dominated our 
economic assistance program.  In the post-Cold War era, however, we must 
now target our assistance to address today's priorities:  global growth 
and domestic job creation; transnational challenges such as disease, 
environmental degradation, global population growth, and migration; and 
promoting sustainable economies and stable democracies.

In the past decade, we mobilized our assistance against communism.  Now, 
we can and must mobilize ourselves for democracy, for free markets, and 
for a secure international environment in which they can flourish.  
Today, our watchwords must be empowerment, partnership, and 

During the Cold War, the imperative of assisting national governments 
resulted in the rise of large, highly centralized aid bureaucracies 
focusing on government-to-government relations.  Now we can build 
economic, civic, and cultural partnerships between peoples.  We must 
support democratic values through individual empowerment.  Foreign 
assistance will serve as our venture capital in mobilizing America's 
major asset--our robust civil society--in support of political and 
economic freedom worldwide.  Forging broad and non-traditional 
partnerships with our allies and with international financial 
institutions will help us do more with less, a key challenge in an era 
of vast possibility and tight budgets.

Our focus on individual empowerment and partnerships will also enhance 
our effectiveness.  Our foreign assistance programs will be result-
oriented, not expenditure-oriented.  National entitlements will be 
phased out, and our institutions will be made flexible enough to ensure 
that assistance can go where we find cooperation and reform are 
manifest.  Where scarce development resources cannot be used 
effectively, our assistance programs should be reduced or redirected.

To be effective--to get results--the Agency for International 
Development itself must be reorganized.  We seek greater efficiency and 
smaller overseas missions.  At the same time, we will work to strengthen 
USAID's central policy direction.  We'll foster teamwork and 
accountability throughout the Agency, and we'll ensure better agency 

Dr. Wharton and his Function 150 Task Force will forward their report on 
USAID to me shortly.  Before commenting, I want to review it in depth.  
I hope that consultations with this committee and other key committees 
will begin soon so we can discuss the report and I can get your 
reactions to it.

Mr. Chairman, I want to acknowledge publicly the role of this committee-
-and its Chairman and ranking minority member--in the reform of our 
foreign assistance programs and institutions.  As Mr. Gilman said, the 
recommendations of your 1989 task force will be largely adopted by the 
Administration.  I look forward to continuing to rely on your leadership 
and support in the coming months.

I want to highlight four budget proposals that reflect some of our 
foreign aid priorities.

First, we are requesting development funding for Africa at $800 million.  
In addition, we will continue to provide over half a billion dollars in 
humanitarian and other assistance to Africa;

Second, we're requesting a $100-million increase in population programs, 
including a $50-million contribution to the United Nations Family 
Planning Agency;

Third, we have requested enhanced funding to address global 
environmental concerns; and

Fourth, we will also undertake democracy-building programs around the 

Our development assistance should be judged not on the basis of funds 
obligated but on the basis of results achieved, and the same applies to 
security assistance.

Security assistance can help strengthen friends and allies so they can 
play a larger role in promoting regional stability, defending themselves 
against aggression, and participating in peace-keeping activities.  The 
Clinton Administration does not view security assistance in isolation 
but in terms of how it can serve the mutually reinforcing and 
overarching goals of our foreign policy.

Nonproliferation and disarmament are among the greatest national 
security challenges facing us today.  The proposed FY 1994 budget 
reflects an integrated, government-wide approach to nonproliferation and 
arms control.  We're requesting funds for  the establishment of a new 
$50-million Non-Proliferation Fund.  Departmental resources will also be 
devoted to addressing other global problems, such as AIDS, international 
crime, terrorism, and narcotics production and trafficking.

Humanitarian Assistance

Alleviating human suffering remains a high priority in our FY 1994 
budget.  During FY 1993, we provided worldwide relief to refugees and 
victims of poverty and of natural disasters and crises such as war, 
famine, and drought.  Significant amounts of aid are being directed to 
the vast human tragedies in Somalia and the former Yugoslavia.  The 
Clinton Administration is committed to continuing the funding levels 
Congress provided for these activities in FY 1993, and we're also 
proposing a $20-million increase in refugee assistance in 1994.

To conclude the broad topic of assistance, Mr. Chairman, if we succeed 
with our plans for redirecting and revitalizing our assistance efforts, 
Americans will benefit and the world will benefit.

State Department Reform

Now, a few words about State Department reform.  Given the budget 
constraints, flexibility and wise management of funds for all our 
programs and institutions become ever more important.

In this regard, I'd particularly like to commend Representative Berman 
and Representative Snowe for their subcommittee's efforts to provide me 
with increased flexibility and decreased micromanagement.  I know you're 
marking up the State Department bill next week, and I appreciate very 
much your help as the Department tries to accomplish more with fewer 
budgetary resources.

Our broad-based reform of the State Department's organization and 
operations is designed to achieve quicker, more open, more cost-
effective policy-making and performance.  We must achieve clearer 
financial accountability.  We must invest in better training for our 
personnel, both Foreign and Civil Service.  And we must ensure that the 
face of the Department, which is shown to the world, is a diverse face.

The committee's cooperation and support remains vital to the success of 
our overall reform efforts.  I want you to know, Mr. Chairman and all 
members of the committee, that our Administration is more open to your 
views than ever as we face together the challenge of forging a new 
foreign policy, better channeling our resources, and adapting our 
institutions to a world that is fundamentally changed.


And now, Mr. Chairman, before I close, I want to add a few words on the 
ongoing crisis in the former Yugoslavia, a matter that I know is of deep 
interest to the committee.

The Bosnian Serb so-called referendum this past weekend has 
overwhelmingly rejected the Vance-Owen peace plan.  At the same time, 
the Bosnian Serbs and others in that sad country continue to engage in 
aggression.  As you know, I never gave much weight to the so-called 
referendum, and I indicated from the moment the Bosnian Serbs called for 
it that it would in no way advance the cause of peace; and I believe it 
has not done so.

My attitude was similar toward the signature by the Bosnian Serb leader 
Karadzic on the Vance-Owen plan in Athens a couple of weeks ago.  
Subsequent events have made a mockery of that signature.  What we have 
looked at, and looked for, from the beginning were not signatures or 
words or referenda but rather actions on the ground, demonstrating a 
serious interest in ending the violence and coming to a peaceful 
settlement.  We have seen no real indication of such actions by the 
Bosnian Serbs.

This is a historically tragic and difficult problem.  It involves a 
struggle among three groups--the Serbs, the Croats, and the Muslims--all 
residing in Bosnia and each possessing deep distrust and ancient hatreds 
of each other.  The war that began 2 years ago has evolved into a war of 
all against all.  Indeed, some of the most violent recent battles have 
taken place in the western half of Bosnia between Croat and Muslim 
fighters, particularly around the town of Mostar.  There are atrocities 
on all sides in this terrible situation.

Obviously, any intervention in such a morass must be carefully 
considered and carefully weighed with a clear view to what the United 
States' interests are.  In addressing this problem, President Clinton 
has set forth several principles that guide our consideration of further 
steps to respond to the violence, to produce a political settlement, and 
to contain the conflict.

The first principle is that we will not act alone in taking actions in 
the former Yugoslavia.  This is a multilateral problem, and it must have 
a multilateral response.  There are a number of countries already 
involved on the ground, and a number of countries have moral, political, 
and strategic interests at stake here.  Furthermore, at heart this is a 
European problem.  We will do  what we can, in concert with our allies 
and friends, to respond to the violence and contain the conflict; but we 
will not act unilaterally.  

Second, the United States will not send ground troops into Bosnia to 
engage in military action.  As I've said, we are prepared to commit our 
military forces to implement a peace settlement entered into 
consensually and in good faith by the parties, but we will not use our 
military forces to impose a settlement in the Balkans.

The President's position is that the best way to increase the pressure 
on the Bosnian Serbs and, ultimately, contain the conflict is to lift 
the present arms embargo, coupled with a standby authority for air power 
in the event that the Bosnian Serbs try to take advantage of the 
situation while the Bosnian Government is preparing to defend itself.  
This approach is, in the President's judgment, the right course; but 
it's an approach that, obviously, can be carried out only with the 
cooperation of our allies and friends.  It will require the repeal of a 
United Nations Security Council resolution which was supported by the 
prior Administration and by the governments in Europe.

As you know, our allies and friends in Europe are not prepared to follow 
this course at the present time.  However, we're continuing to consult 
with them on these proposals and other steps.  Along these lines, I'll 
be engaging in a new round of consultations on the problem in the next 
several days.  I'll be meeting with Foreign Minister Kozyrev from Russia 
on Thursday and Foreign Minister Juppe of France here in Washington on 

Although, Mr. Chairman, this is a difficult situation--a problem I once 
described as a "problem from hell"--our involvement and our actions have 
made a difference.  American leadership has resulted in concerted 
pressure that has produced some tangible results.  We've become engaged 
diplomatically, and we were able to get two of the three parties to sign 
on to the Vance-Owen agreement.  We were able to get enforcement of a 
"no-fly" zone.  We've engaged in a large-scale humanitarian effort that 
has saved thousands of lives.

Our pressures have directly resulted in Milosevic's recent shift to 
pushing for a peace agreement and agreeing to increasingly isolate the 
Bosnian Serbs, and we have increased the sanctions against Serbia very 
considerably in the last few days.  These actions have been consistent 
with our interests.

In situations like this, Mr. Chairman, we must be tough, but we also 
must try to be wise.  And being wise means acting in ways that are 
consistent with our national interests.  This the President has done and 
will continue to do. 


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