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U.S. Department of State 93/04/20 Testimony on Assistance to Russia & Foreign Affairs Budget Office of the Spokesman Statement by Secretary of State Warren Christopher before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Washington, DC April 20, 1993 It is a pleasure to appear again before you and this committee. Three months have passed since our first official meeting at my confirmation hearing. Much has transpired in that time. We have conducted an activist, internationalist, democracy-oriented foreign policy. I look forward to exploring the full range of challenges we confront. I will limit my formal remarks to two key issues. First, I want to update you on our single-most important foreign policy priority: the effort to help reform succeed in Russia. Second, I will review the Administration's foreign affairs budget requests and management strategy. Assisting Reform in Russia: From Vancouver to TokyoMr. Chairman, the last few weeks have witnessed important developments in Russia's relations with the United States and the West. The Vancouver summit between Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin marked a milestone. It was the first truly post-Cold War summit, where talk about economic reform and democracy played as central a role as negotiations over nuclear weapons did in the past. At the summit, the presidents agreed on a new package of bilateral programs designed to address Russia's immediate human needs and contribute to the building of a market economy. It targets areas of high priority. This includes a resumption of US food exports; support for privatization and new businesses; help in dismantling nuclear weapons; a housing program for demobilized soldiers to speed Russia's withdrawal from the Baltic countries and parts of the former Soviet empire; funding for programs to enhance nuclear safety; help in resurrecting Russia's energy sector; and an increase in people-to-people exchanges. These programs are designed to deliver quick, tangible benefits to the Russian people. They will support Russia's long-term transformation to the market, and--most importantly-- directly serve US interests by reducing the former Soviet nuclear arsenal and opening new markets for our workers, farmers, and businesses. While America's increased support and leadership will be critical for promoting reform, we cannot do it alone. Our help must be part of a much larger partnership between Russia and the international community. Building that broader cooperative effort was precisely the purpose behind last week's extraordinary meeting in Tokyo between foreign and finance ministers of the G-7 [Group of 7 industrialized] countries and Russia. At that meeting, Russia's Deputy Prime Minister Fyodorov outlined a bold new plan to control Russia's money supply, reduce its budget deficits, and achieve macroeconomic stabilization. In response, we and our G-7 partners--working through the international financial institutions-- announced a major new multilateral initiative to support reform. In addition to the Paris Club's recent rescheduling of $15 billion of Russia's foreign debt, the $28-billion Tokyo package will include helping Russia to stabilize its currency, to finance critical imports, to restructure key sectors of its economy, and to reduce the threat of its deadly nuclear legacy. The vast majority of this new support for Russian reform will come from the international financial institutions. But it is also going to require contributions from G-7 members, as well as other countries in Asia, the Middle East, and Europe that are capable of participating. Here, America must be willing to pay its fair share. As President Clinton stated in Vancouver, our strategy to assist Russia consists of three steps. -- The first is the $1.6 billion package of bilateral programs announced at the US-Russian summit. As you know, the monies for this package have already been appropriated by the Congress. -- The second step is the new multilateral support program announced in Tokyo. One of the most important and innovative parts of that program could be the creation of a G-7 privatization fund. This fund is designed to help Russia cope with the economic and political consequences of privatizing the huge--and hugely wasteful--state-owned enterprises that are bleeding its budget dry and fueling inflation. Our share of this effort would amount to some $500 million, and would take the form of a "challenge grant." That is, it would be contingent on other G-7 members contributing another $1.5 billion. We would then look to the international financial institutions to commit an additional $2 billion in co-financing, bringing the fund's total resources to $4 billion in grants and loans. -- The third step in the President's plan to support Russian reform is to work closely with the Congress to develop further bilateral assistance efforts. A starting point will be the funding requests in our fiscal year (FY) 1994 budget to continue current programs to dismantle nuclear weapons, deliver humanitarian help, and promote democracy and privatization. In recent talks with the Russians, our G-7 partners, and the Congress, we have reached the conclusion, Mr. Chairman, that even more must be done. As I announced last week in Tokyo, the President has decided to seek an expanded package of US bilateral programs, to build upon the ones announced at Vancouver, and in addition to the requests contained in our FY 1994 budget. This package reflects the intensive consultations that we have had. It focuses on what Russia's reformers say they most need, as well as the areas where Members of Congress have suggested our efforts should be aimed. This will build on our assistance efforts in energy, privatization, and housing for demobilized soldiers and also provide support for the environment, medicines, trade and investment, and exchange programs. This expanded package of bilateral steps, together with our $500 million contribution to the prospective G-7 privatization fund, would require an additional appropriation of approximately $1.8 billion. We are now consulting with this committee and others in Congress to determine how best to structure such a request. Mr. Chairman, I realize this is a difficult proposal at a time when so many Americans face hardships here at home. But President Clinton and I are convinced that this investment in Russia's democratic future is an essential investment in America's future. By making this investment, we can help turn our most dangerous enemy into an enduring partner. That, I believe, is a critical--indeed, a noble--mission. The President and I will continue to make the case to the American people that a focused program to assist Russian democracy is in our deepest self-interest. We are counting on the members of this committee to join us in this effort. International Affairs BudgetMr. Chairman, let me now turn briefly to a discussion of our FY 1994 international affairs budget. It is a budget that accurately reflects the times we live in. In its funding requests, it recognizes the tight fiscal constraints confronting our government today. And in its priorities and objectives, it marks a first but important step toward addressing the new challenges of the post-Cold War era. One of our highest priorities will be promoting democracy and human rights. I have already described the especially high stake we have in helping freedom triumph in Russia and the other new states of the former Soviet Union. But our efforts must be worldwide. The lesson of this tragic century is clear: The best check against international aggression is the emergence of governments that encourage tolerance, pluralism, and respect for the individual. Our budget also places a new emphasis on promoting multinational peace- keeping and peace-making. The end of the Cold War has unleashed long- suppressed conflicts in Eastern Europe, the former Soviet Union, and elsewhere. But it has also opened up new possibilities for international cooperation. Our task is to harness that cooperation to contain, and far more importantly, to prevent conflict. The tragedies of the Balkans and Somalia bear grim witness to the price of international delay. International peace-keeping--especially by the UN- -can and must play a critical role. Capabilities must be enhanced to permit prompt, effective, preventive action. We in the United States must be ready to do our part. In this connection, the President and I believe that millions spent now on preventive diplomacy and peace-keeping can save hundreds of millions in defense and international relief later. These priorities, as well as others highlighted in our budget, represent an important effort to reorient our scarce resources to the realities of the post-Cold War era. The budget reflects a commitment to using the taxpayers' dollars wisely and efficiently, in full support of the President's economic and deficit-reduction programs. Reforming the Institutions As important as how much we spend on foreign policy, however, is how we spend it. I'm convinced that the Department of State cannot hope to respond effectively to new challenges unless we improve the way we deal with complex problems that cut across traditional bureaucratic boundaries. A stifling bureaucracy, an obsolete division of labor, or cumbersome decision-making are luxuries we cannot afford. As a first step in remaking the State Department, I announced a broad- based reorganization plan in February. The plan shifts portfolios and creates new positions to mirror post-Cold War missions. It will reduce excessive layering within the Department and streamline the policy process. Our objective is simple: quicker policy-making, more open policy-making, and, most importantly, better policy-making. We also need to refocus our foreign assistance priorities and programs. Specifically, the US Agency for International Development must be overhauled. I have asked Deputy Secretary Wharton to examine the Agency's role in the post-Cold War era and report his recommendations to me by the end of this month. We look forward to working closely with this committee and the full Congress in this effort. Conclusion Before I conclude, Mr. Chairman, I would like to depart from my prepared remarks to say a few words about the worsening tragedy in Bosnia. Upon taking office, our Administration was faced with a condition of advanced deterioration. Frankly, it was a situation that would have been better dealt with by the West more than a year ago. Nonetheless, we now face a worsening environment in eastern Bosnia that has horrified the world. In response to the Serbs' relentless aggression, the United States joined our partners in the Security Council this weekend in passing a resolution that will dramatically tighten existing economic sanctions. The steps are, indeed, severe--and entirely fitting. When implemented, they will significantly increase the pariah status of Belgrade and its Bosnian allies. We intend to press for total isolation so long as they continue their aggression. If Bosnia's Serbs fail to halt their aggression and agree to a peace plan within 6 days from today, Serbia will confront a series of harsh new measures, including the following: -- All ships will be banned from entering Yugoslav territorial waters; -- No country will be allowed to ship goods by land across Serbia; -- Every Yugoslav plane, ship, truck, rail car, and cargo container outside the country will be subject to impoundment; -- Barges will be prohibited from passing through Serbia along the Danube River unless they have special permission and submit to UN monitoring; and -- All bank accounts and other financial assets held by Yugoslav institutions abroad will be frozen. These steps will also apply to Serb-held areas of Bosnia and Croatia. The President remains deeply concerned [about] the situation. The Administration is now urgently reviewing a wide range of options available to the world community to further punish Serbian aggression and bring an end to the violence. As the President has said, this includes options that have previously been unacceptable. We will stay in close touch with members of this committee and the full Congress as our deliberations proceed. (###)