U.S. Department of State 93/01/13 Statement at Senate Confirmation Hearing Office of the Spokesman Statement at Senate Confirmation Hearing Secretary-Designate Christopher Senate Foreign Relations Committee Washington, DC, January 13, 1993 Mr. Chairman: It is a great honor to appear before you as President- elect Clinton's nominee for Secretary of State. This hearing room is a long way from Scranton, North Dakota, population 300, where I was born and raised, and I am deeply moved by being here in these circumstances. You and the members of this committee have contributed much leadership and wisdom to our nation's foreign policy over the past decade. Let me say at the outset that I look forward to a close and cooperative relationship with you. I also look forward to your questions and will try to answer them with the ruthless candor for which diplomats are famous. In the 3 weeks since President-elect Clinton asked me to serve as his Secretary of State, I have received about as much commiseration as congratulation. Friends point to this new world's raw conflicts and stress our own limited resources. They tell me I have drawn an important but unpleasant assignment. I appreciate their concern. But I dispute their assessment. I believe we have arrived at a uniquely promising moment. The signature of this era is change, and I believe many of the changes work in our favor. The Cold War is over. Forty years of sustained effort on behalf of collective security and human dignity have been rewarded. Millions who lived under the stultifying yoke of communism are free. The tide of democratic aspirations is rising from Tibet to Central America. Freer markets are expanding the reach of prosperity. The nuclear nightmare is receding, and I want to congratulate President Bush and [Russian] President Yeltsin on their successful negotiation of the START II Treaty [Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty]. We now have the opportunity to create a new strategy that directs America's resources at something other than superpower confrontation. Perils of the New Era Neither President-elect Clinton nor I have any illusions about the perils that lurk in many of this era's changes. The end of the Cold War has lifted the lid on many cauldrons of long-simmering conflict. The bloody results are evident in the former Yugoslavia and elsewhere. Nor will this era lack for ruthless and expansionist despots; [Iraqi President] Saddam Hussein confirmed that fact. Yet it is also true that we are now relatively more powerful and physically more secure. So while we are alert to this era's dangers, we nonetheless approach it with an underlying sense of optimism. Not since the late 1940s has our nation faced the challenge of shaping an entirely new foreign policy for a world that has fundamentally changed. Like our counterparts then, we need to design a new strategy for protecting American interests by laying the foundations for a more just and stable world. That strategy must reflect the fundamental changes that characterize this era: -- The surfacing of long-suppressed ethnic, religious, and sectional conflicts, especially in the former Soviet bloc; -- The globalization of commerce and capital; -- A worldwide democratic revolution, fueled by new information technologies that amplify the power of ideas; -- New and old human rights challenges, including protecting ethnic minorities as well as political dissidents; -- The rise of new security threats, especially terrorism and the spread of advanced weaponry and weapons of mass destruction; and -- Global challenges including overpopulation, famine, drought, refugees, AIDS [acquired immuno-deficiency syndrome], drug-trafficking, and threats to the earth's environment. To adapt our foreign policy goals and institutions to these changes, President-elect Clinton has stressed that our effort must rest on three pillars: First, we must elevate America's economic security as a primary goal of our foreign policy. Second, we must preserve our military strength as we adapt our forces to new security challenges. Third, we must organize our foreign policy around the goal of promoting the spread of democracy and markets abroad. As we adapt to new conditions, it is worth underscoring the essential continuity in American foreign policy. Despite a change in administrations, our policy in many specific instances will remain constant and will seek to build upon the accomplishments of our predecessors. Examples include the Middle East peace process, firm enforcement of the UN sanctions against Iraq, ratification and implementation of the START II Treaty, and the continuing need for US power to play a role in promoting stability in Europe and the Pacific. Nevertheless, our Administration inherits the task of defining a strategy for US leadership after the Cold War. We cannot afford to careen from crisis to crisis. We must have a new diplomacy that seeks to anticipate and prevent crises, like those in Iraq, Bosnia, and Somalia, rather than simply to manage them. Our support for democratic institutions and human rights can help defuse political conflicts. And our support for sustainable development and global environmental protection can help prevent human suffering on a scale that demands our intervention. We cannot foresee every crisis. But preventive diplomacy can free us to devote more time and effort to problems facing us at home. It is not enough to articulate a new strategy; we must also justify it to the American people. Today, foreign policy makers cannot afford to ignore the public, for there is a real danger that the public will ignore foreign policy. The unitary goal of containing Soviet power will have to be replaced by more complex justifications to fit the new era. We need to show that, in this era, foreign policy is no longer foreign. Practitioners of statecraft sometimes forget [that] their ultimate purpose is to improve the daily lives of the American people. They assume foreign policy is too complex for the public to be involved in its formation. That is a costly conceit. From Vietnam to Iran-contra, we have too often witnessed the disastrous effects of foreign policies hatched by the experts without proper candor or consultation with the public and their representatives in Congress. More than ever before, the State Department cannot afford to have "clientitis," a malady characterized by undue deference to the potential reactions of other countries. I have long thought the State Department needs an "America Desk." This Administration will have one--and I'll be sitting behind it. Guiding Principles For Foreign Policy I will not attempt today to fit the foreign policy of the next 4 years into the straightjacket of some neatly tailored doctrine. Yet, America's actions in the world must be guided by consistent principles. As I have noted, I believe there are three that should guide foreign policy in this new era. First, we must advance America's economic security with the same energy and resourcefulness we devoted to waging the Cold War. The new Administration will shortly propose an economic program to empower American firms and workers to win in world markets, reduce our reliance on foreign borrowing, and increase our ability to sustain foreign commitments. Despite our economic woes, we remain the world's greatest trading nation, its largest market, and its leading exporter. That is why we must utilize all the tools at our disposal, including a new GATT [General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade] agreement and a North American Free Trade Agreement that serves the interests of American firms, workers, and communities. In an era in which economic competition is eclipsing ideological rivalry, it is time for diplomacy that seeks to assure access for US businesses to expanding global markets. This does not mean that our commercial goals will trump other important concerns, such as non- proliferation, human rights, and sustainable development in the Third World. But for too long, we have made economics the poor cousin of our foreign policy. For example, in nearly all the countries of the former Eastern bloc--nations whose economies and markets are on the threshold of growth--we have for years assigned only one Foreign Service officer to assist US companies. In the case of Russia, that means one commercial officer for a nation of 150 million people. Other economic powers, such as Germany and Japan, devote far more personnel to promoting their firms, industries, and economic concerns. The Clinton Administration intends to harness our diplomacy to the needs and opportunities of American industries and workers. We will not be bashful about linking our high diplomacy with our economic goals. We will ask our foreign missions to do more to gather crucial information about market opportunities and barriers and actively assist American companies seeking to do business abroad. Second, we must maintain a strong defense as we adapt our forces to new and enduring security challenges. As a result of efforts begun in the late 1970s by President Carter and continued under Presidents Reagan and Bush, our Administration inherits the best fighting force in the world. But the world has changed. We face a paradox. The collapse of the Soviet Union enables us to reduce our Cold War military forces. But it also leaves American power as the main ballast for an unstable world. Our ability to manage the transition to a more stable system of international relations will depend on tenacious diplomacy backed by credible strength. The President-elect and Secretary [of Defense]-designate Aspin have described how we must adapt our armed forces to new missions. And I agree with President-elect Clinton's statement that we will resolve constantly to deter, sometimes to fight, and always to win. I have spent a good portion of my life practicing various forms of diplomacy, negotiation, and problem solving--from the effort to secure the release of the American hostages in Iran, to responses to urban unrest and police brutality, to the practice of law over 4 decades. I have argued and still believe that diplomacy is a neglected imperative. I believe we must apply new dispute resolution techniques and forms of international arbitration to the conflicts that plague the world. I also know from experience that nations do not negotiate on the basis of goodwill alone; they negotiate on the basis of interests and, therefore, on calculations of power. As I reflect on our experience in the Cold War, it is clear that our success flowed from our ability to harness diplomacy and power together--both the modernization of our forces and negotiations for arms control; both advocacy for human rights and covert and overt opposition to Soviet expansionism. In the years to come, Americans will be confronted with vexing questions about the use of force--decisions about whether to intervene in border disputes, civil wars, outright invasions, and in cases of possible genocide; about whether to intervene for purposes that are quite different from the traditional missions of our armed forces--purposes such as peace-keeping, peace-making, humanitarian assistance, evacuation of Americans abroad, and efforts to combat drug smuggling and terrorism. While there is no magic formula to guide such decisions, I do believe that the discreet and careful use of force in certain circumstances--and its credible threat in general--will be essential to the success of our diplomacy and foreign policy. Although there will always be differences at the margin, I believe we can--and must--craft a bipartisan consensus in which these questions concerning the use of force will no longer divide our nation as they once did. However, we cannot respond to every alarm. I want to assure the American people that we will not turn their blood and treasure into an open account for use by the rest of the world. We cannot let every crisis become a choice between inaction or American intervention. It will be this Administration's policy to encourage other nations and the institutions of collective security, especially the United Nations, to do more of the world's work to deter aggression, relieve suffering, and keep the peace. In that regard, we will work with [UN] Secretary General Boutros-Ghali and the members of the Security Council to ensure [that] the United Nations has the means to carry out such tasks. The United Nations has recently shown great promise in mediating disputes and fulfilling its promise of collective security--in Namibia, Cambodia, El Salvador, and elsewhere. But the United Nations cannot be an effective instrument for sharing our global burdens unless we share the burden of supporting it. I will work to ensure that we pay our outstanding obligations. Ultimately, when our vital interests are at stake, we will always reserve our option to act alone. As the President-elect has said, our motto in this era should be: Together where we can; on our own where we must. One of the main security problems of this era will be the proliferation of very deadly weapons--nuclear, chemical, biological, and enhanced conventional weapons--as well as their delivery systems. The [Persian] Gulf war highlighted the problem of a fanatical aggressor developing or using weapons of mass destruction. We must work assiduously with other nations to discourage proliferation through improved intelligence, export controls, incentives, sanctions, and even force when necessary. Overall, this Administration will give high priority to the prevention of proliferation as we enter a new and exceedingly dangerous period. Third, our new diplomacy will encourage the global revolution for democracy that is transforming our world. Promoting democracy does not imply a crusade to remake the world in our image. Rather, support for democracy and human rights abroad can and should be a central strategic tenet in improving our own security. Democratic movements and governments are not only more likely to protect human and minority rights, they are also more likely to resolve ethnic, religious, and territorial disputes in a peaceful manner and to be reliable partners in diplomacy, trade, arms accords, and global environmental protection. A strategic approach to promoting democracy requires that we coordinate all of our leverage, including trade, economic and security assistance, and debt relief. By enlisting international and regional institutions in the work of promoting democracy, the United States can leverage our own limited resources and avoid the appearance of trying to dominate others. In the information age, public diplomacy takes on special importance--and that is why we will support the creation of a Radio Free Asia to ensure that the people of all Asian nations have access to uncensored information about their societies and about the world. Democracy cannot be imposed from the top down but must be built from the bottom up. Our policy should encourage patient, sustained efforts to help others build the institutions that make democracy possible: political parties, free media, laws that protect property and individual rights, an impartial judiciary, labor unions, and voluntary associations that stand between the individual and the state. American private and civic groups are particularly well suited to help. In this regard, we will move swiftly to establish the Democracy Corps, to put experienced Americans in contact with foreign grassroots democratic leaders, and to strengthen the bipartisan National Endowment for Democracy. We must also improve our institutional capacity to provide timely and effective aid to people struggling to establish democracy and free markets. To that end, we need to overhaul the US Agency for International Development [USAID]. The agency needs to take on fewer missions, narrow the scope of its operations, and make itself less bureaucratic. As a matter of enlightened self-interest as well as compassion, we need to extract lessons from USAID's past successes and failures to make its future efforts stronger. In all this work, we must ensure that the people who carry out our nation's foreign policy have the resources they need to do the job. I want to work with you to ensure they have adequate facilities, training, information systems, and security. We also need to take a new look at the way our State Department is organized and our policy is formulated. In the coming weeks, I intend to streamline the Department of State to enhance our capabilities to deal with issues that transcend national boundaries and to improve the international competitiveness of American business. The Clinton Administration will put America back in the forefront of global efforts to achieve sustainable development and, in the process, leave our children a better world. We believe that sound environmental policies are a precondition of economic growth, not a brake on it. These three pillars for our foreign policy--economic growth, military strength, and support for democracy--are mutually re-enforcing. A vibrant economy will strengthen America's hand abroad, while permitting us to maintain a strong military without sacrificing domestic needs. And by helping others to forge democracy out of the ruins of dictatorship, we can pacify old threats, prevent new ones, and create new markets for US trade and investment. Principal Challenges To US Security Let me take a few moments to consider how this strategic approach applies to the principal security challenges that America faces in the 1990s. None is more important than helping Russia demilitarize, privatize, invigorate its economy, and develop representative political institutions. President Yeltsin's courageous economic and political reforms stand as our best hope for reducing the still-formidable arsenal of nuclear and conventional arms in Russia and other states of the former Soviet Union, and this, in turn, permits reductions in our own defense spending. A collapse of the Russian economy, which contracted by 20% last year, could fatally discredit democracy, not only in the eyes of the Russians but in the eyes of their neighbors as well. Our Administration will join with our G-7 [Group of Seven leading industrialized nations] partners to increase support for Russia's economic reforms. That aid must be conditioned on the willingness of Russia to continue the difficult but essential steps necessary to move from a command economy to a more market-oriented one. We shall also place high priority on direct and technical assistance for Russia's efforts to dismantle its weapons and properly dispose of its nuclear materials, to provide civilian employment for defense technicians, and to house its demobilized forces. We must say to the democratic reformers in Russia that the democratic nations stand with them and that the world's experience in coping with similar problems is available to them. We should also orchestrate similar international action to help Ukraine, the other Commonwealth [of Independent] States, the Baltics, and the nations of Eastern and Central Europe. In Europe, we remain committed to NATO, history's most successful military and political alliance, even as we support the evolution of new security arrangements that incorporate the emerging democracies to the east. Our Administration will support efforts by the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe to promote human rights, democracy, free elections, and the historic re-integration of the nations of Eastern and Western Europe. I can also assure you that this Administration will vigorously pursue concerted action with our European allies and international bodies to end the slaughter in Bosnia--a slaughter that has claimed tens of thousands of lives and that threatens to spread throughout the Balkans. Europe and the world community in general must bring real pressures, economic and military, to bear on the Serbian leadership to halt its savage policy of ethnic cleansing. In Asia, we confront many challenges and opportunities. In particular, as President-elect Clinton stressed during the campaign, a complex blend of new and old forces requires us to rethink our policy toward China. On the one hand, there is a booming economy based increasingly on free market principles, which is giving hundreds of millions of Chinese citizens an unprecedented degree of prosperity and a thirst for economic as well as political reform. On the other hand, we cannot ignore continuing reports of Chinese exports of sensitive military technology to troubled areas, widespread violations of human rights, or abusive practices that have contributed to a $17-billion trade imbalance between our two nations. Our policy will seek to facilitate a peaceful evolution of China from communism to democracy by encouraging the forces of economic and political liberalization in that great country. Elsewhere in Asia, the countries of the Pacific Rim are becoming a global center of economic dynamism. In 1991, our trans-Pacific trade exceeded $316 billion, dwarfing our $221-billion trade with Western Europe. We must devote particular attention to Japan. Japan has recently taken important steps to meet more of its international security responsibilities, such as assisting in peace-keeping efforts from Cambodia to Somalia. Now it must do more to meet its economic responsibilities as well--to lower trade barriers more quickly and to open its economy to competition. Together, Japan and the United States account for a third or more of the global economy. That obligates us both to steer clear of the reefs of recrimination and the rise of regional trading blocs that could sink prospects for global growth. But we also have an obligation to America's firms and workers to ensure [that] they are able to benefit from the growth of Japan's economy, just as the strength and openness of the US economy has helped fuel Japan's prosperity over many decades. In South Korea, we will continue to maintain our military presence as long as North Korea poses a threat to that nation. And on Asia's subcontinent, our interests include combating nuclear proliferation; restoring peace to Afghanistan; seeing an end to communal strife that threatens India's democracy; and promoting human rights and free elections in Burma, Pakistan, and elsewhere. In the Middle East, we must maintain the momentum behind the current negotiations over peace and regional issues. President Bush and [former] Secretary of State Baker deserve great credit for bringing Arabs and Israelis to the bargaining table, and the Clinton Administration is committed to building on that historic breakthrough. Our democracy-centered policy underscores our special relationship with Israel, the region's only democracy, with whom we are committed to maintaining a strong and vibrant strategic relationship. We also believe that America's unswerving commitment to Israel's right to exist behind secure borders is essential to a just and lasting peace. We will continue our efforts with both Israel and our Arab friends to address the full range of that region's challenges. Throughout the Middle East and the Persian Gulf, we will work toward new arms control agreements, particularly concerning weapons of mass destruction. We will assume a vigilant stance toward both Iraq and Iran, which seem determined to sow violence and disorder throughout the region and even beyond. In this region, as well, we will champion economic reform, more accountable governance, and increased respect for human rights. And following a decade during which over 1,000 Americans were killed, injured, or kidnaped by perpetrators of international terrorism, we will give no quarter to terrorists or the states that sponsor their crimes against humanity. Nowhere has the march against dictators and toward democracy been more dramatic than in our own hemisphere. It is in our self-interest to help Latin America consolidate a decade of hard-won progress. In the past several years, as democracy has spread in the region and market economies have been liberalized, our exports to Latin America have doubled. In close partnership with our hemispheric partners, Canada and Mexico, we should explore ways to extend free trade agreements to Latin American nations that are opening their economies and political systems. At the same time, we expect to complete understandings regarding the North American Free Trade Agreement as outlined by President-elect Clinton. We also need to make the Organization of American States [OAS] a more effective forum for addressing our region's problems. In Haiti, we strongly support the international effort by the UN and the OAS to restore democracy. In Cuba, we will maintain the embargo to keep pressure on the Castro regime. We will strongly support national reconciliation and the full implementation of peace accords in El Salvador and Nicaragua. And in the Andean countries, the power of the drug lords must be broken to free their people and ours from the corrupting influence of the narcotics trade. In Africa, as well, a new generation is demanding the opportunities that flow from multi-party democracy and open economies. They deserve our understanding and support. We need to assist their efforts to build institutions that can empower Africa's people to husband and benefit from the continent's vast resources; deal with its economic, social, and environmental problems; and address its underlying causes of political instability. We will be equally committed to working with Congress to redirect our foreign assistance programs to promote sustainable development and private enterprise in Africa. In South Africa, we shall work actively to support those, black and white, who are striving to dismantle the hateful machinery of apartheid and working with determination to build a multi-racial democracy. The Triumph of Freedom As I said on the day President-elect Clinton nominated me to be Secretary of State, back when I was in law school, two of my heroes were [former Secretaries of State] Gen. George Marshall and Dean Acheson. And I am enormously honored by the opportunity to occupy the post held by them and by many of the most revered names in our nation's history. Marshall and Acheson were visionaries who recognized at the dawn of the Cold War that America could not remain safe by standing aloof from the world. And the triumph of freedom in that great struggle is the legacy of the activist foreign policy they shaped to project our values and protect our interests. Now, as in their day, we face a new era and the challenge of developing a new foreign policy. Its activism must be grounded in America's enduring interests. It must be informed by a realistic estimate of the dangers we face. It must be shaped by the democratic convictions we share. And, to command respect abroad, it must rest on a sturdy, bipartisan consensus here at home. The ultimate test of the security strategy I have outlined today will be in the benefits it delivers to the American people. Its worth will be measured not by its theoretical elegance but by its results. If it makes our people more prosperous and increases their safety abroad; if it helps expand the stabilizing and ennobling reach of democratic institutions and freer markets; if it helps protect the global environment for our children--if it achieves these kinds of benefits, then we will have discharged our responsibilities to our generation as Marshall, Acheson, and the other architects of the post-war world discharged theirs. They have given us a high standard to emulate as we define anew the requirements of US global leadership. I look forward to working with both parties in Congress to construct a new framework for that leadership, a frame-work within which healthy debate will occur but within which we can also build a strong consensus that will help us cooperatively pursue the national interest at home and abroad. (###)