U.S. Department of  State
Dispatch, Volume 7, Number 45, November 4, 1996
Bureau of Public Affairs


1. The Enduring Importance of American Engagement in the Asia-Pacific 
Region--Anthony Lake

2. Inauguration of the Central Asia Institute--James F. Collins

3. Transatlantic Relations and the Future of European Security--William 
J. Crowe, Jr.

Article 1:

The Enduring Importance of American Engagement in the Asia-Pacific 
Anthony Lake, Assistant to the President For National Security Affairs
Remarks to the Japan-America Society, Washington, DC, October 23, 1996

Tonight, I want to speak with you about the enduring importance of 
American engagement in the Asia-Pacific region. The United States has 
been a Pacific power since the first China Clippers and the U.S. Navy's 
Pacific Squadron set sail from our shores almost two centuries ago. By 
the time of the Second World War, countless Americans had traveled 
across an ocean that Herman Melville called the tide-beating of the 
earth--many to make fortunes, some to save souls, but all to swell a 
two-way flow of commerce and culture that helped to strengthen and 
enrich our country. After the war, our leaders understood that America's 
future would not be secure if Asia's was imperiled. Our military 
presence provided the stability that gave Asian nations the chance to 
build thriving economies. In turn, America benefited from strong 
security ties with our allies and partners, growing economic links and 
the talent and drive of millions of Asian immigrants.

President Clinton came into office determined to renew and reinforce our 
commitment to remain a Pacific power. Today, we are a Pacific power. We 
have maintained about 100,000 troops across the Pacific--just as we 
maintain about 100,000 troops in Europe. We have revitalized our 
alliance with Japan--the cornerstone of our engagement--for the 
challenges of a new century. We have acted decisively to preserve 
stability, sending our carriers to calm the seas off Taiwan and our 
Apache helicopters and Patriot missiles to keep the peace on the Korean 
Peninsula. We have opened a new chapter in our relations with Vietnam, 
while working  for the fullest possible accounting of the Americans 
missing there. And we have advanced an ambitious diplomatic agenda 
across Asia--strengthening democracy, spurring economic integration, 
launching regional security talks, helping American businesses, and 
protecting the health and welfare of American citizens.

We will continue to be a Pacific power--not because we are sentimental 
moralists, but because we have cold, hard interests in a region that 
accounts for half the world's people, much of its resources, a quarter 
of its goods and services, and most of its biggest militaries. Our 
security and prosperity depend on our engagement where the interests of 
so many powers converge--and where we fought three wars in the last 
half-century. An American withdrawal would create an unhealthy vacuum. 
It could kindle arms races from Northeast Asia to the South China Sea. 
It could make us more vulnerable to new threats like the spread of 
weapons of mass destruction, terrorists who plot to blow up American 
airliners, and criminal gangs that export illegal aliens and import 
stolen cars. It could slow the proud march of Asia's newest democracies 
to a crawl. And it could shut us out of the world's most vibrant 
markets, harming 40% of our trade and over 2 million of our jobs, and 
hurting our chances to benefit from more than $1 trillion in Asian 
infrastructure projects alone over the next decade. In short, just as 
America's strength at home continues to depend on our engagement in 
Europe, we also must be either a Pacific power or no power at all. 

But power is not an end in itself. We must answer the fundamental 
question about the purpose of our power--the power of our military and 
our diplomacy, the power of our ideals and example, the power of our 

Let me tell you what I told the Asian leaders with whom I met on my 
recent trip in the region. With the end of the Cold War, the purpose of 
our power in the Pacific is stability. Our victory in what President 
Kennedy called our long, twilight struggle has left us with no single, 
overarching foe to contain, and we are in no hurry to create a new one. 

We must and will always be prepared to defend our interests, whether in 
the Asia-Pacific region, Europe, or elsewhere around the globe. But as 
we defend those interests or respond to crises, diplomatically or 
militarily, we must also pursue our strategic vision of how to build a 
world where our people can prosper in peace.

Today, Asia faces a choice between two global visions for the 21st 
century. The first is a return to the zero-sum politics of the 19th 
century--a world where great powers are permanent rivals, acting as 
though what was good for one power was, by definition, detrimental to 
another. The second is a world where great powers act to increase 
cooperation, avert chaos, and strengthen economic growth, while 
preserving the balances of power that preserve the peace.

As the world's most powerful nation, the United States will survive and 
prosper under either vision. But in a world grown closer, both the costs 
of conflict and the rewards of cooperation have risen. That is why we 
are convinced that the second vision holds greater benefits for the 
American people. This vision is driven by interests, not altruism. It 
serves our national interest if great powers can work together to 
establish global norms in areas such as trade, non-proliferation, and 
the environment, and join in combating common threats such as terrorism 
and international crime. Establishing these rules of the road will help 
promote the stability that benefits us all. And we want to work with 
Asia's leaders as those rules are developed.

President Clinton laid out his vision of an Asia-Pacific community built 
on shared efforts, shared benefits, and shared destiny when he traveled 
to Japan and Korea in July 1993--his first trip overseas as President. 
By working together over the last four years to strengthen the region's 
unprecedented stability, we are laying the groundwork for a true 
regional community.

Our efforts to promote greater stability have taken three forms: 
strengthening our alliances, deepening our engagement with China, and 
enlarging the region's community of democracies.

First, we have revitalized our alliances and maintained our forward-
deployed forces because we share the view of almost every country in 
Asia that a strong, American security presence remains the bedrock for 
regional stability.

To strengthen the U.S.-Japan alliance, President Clinton and Prime 
Minister Hashimoto signed a new charter last April that will benefit all 
the nations of Asia. Since 1952, our security ties have been essential 
to creating the stable environment that has enabled countries in the 
region to focus more on their economies than their arsenals. Japan's 
continued support for our military presence and closer links between our 
armed forces will maintain those conditions and enable us to deepen our 
cooperation on behalf of peace and stability. We have also worked 
together to ease the burden of our bases in Okinawa without weakening 
our forces.

Our alliance with a democratic and prosperous Japan is one of the great 
success stories of the last half-century. Together, we are supporting 
peace in the Middle East and Bosnia, reform in Russia, and the 
consolidation of democracy in Haiti. And through our Common Agenda, we 
are global partners in the fight to preserve the environment and halt 
scourges such as AIDS. We look forward to working with Japan's new 
government to ensure that our alliance's next five decades are as 
successful as its last.

With our ally, South Korea, we are working to reduce the tensions on the 
Korean Peninsula that threaten all of Northeast Asia. Working with South 
Korea, Japan, and China, our determined diplomacy has stopped North 
Korea's dangerous nuclear program in its tracks and put it on the path 
to eventual dismantlement. As I speak, its facilities remain frozen 
under the supervision of the International Atomic Energy Agency, whose 
technicians are on the ground canning spent fuel for shipment out of the 
country. President Clinton and President Kim Young Sam have proposed 
four-party talks that have the potential to close one of the Cold War's 
last open chapters and lead to a permanent peace on the peninsula.

We have also reinforced our alliances with Australia, the Philippines, 
and Thailand--and President Clinton looks forward to deepening those 
ties when he visits each of these countries next month. We have 
magnified the power of our forward-deployed forces by expanding our 
access to military facilities with ASEAN nations such as Singapore. And 
we have begun building a new architecture for regional security 
cooperation. While we have not tried to create carbon copies of European 
institutions such as NATO and the OSCE, we have worked with our allies 
and partners in Asia to open security dialogues that will strengthen our 
ability to confront common challenges. These initiatives are already 
helping to defuse tensions in the South China Sea and to dispel distrust 
across the region.

A second key element of regional stability is our engagement with China. 
With its emergence as a great power, China will play a central role in 
deciding whether the next century is one of cooperation or zero-sum 
rivalry and conflict. As President Clinton has said, a secure, stable, 
open, and prosperous China--in other words, a strong China--is in our 
interest. We welcome China to the great powers table. But great powers 
also have great responsibilities. 

Our cooperation is essential to security in the Asia-Pacific region and 
around the world. We worked closely with China to secure passage of the 
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty last month and the indefinite extension of 
the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty last year. We have cooperated to 
consolidate peace in Cambodia and ensure stability on the Korean 

As you know, this spring presented real challenges to all of us who 
believe in the importance of constructive U.S.-China relations--chief 
among them China's military exercises in the Taiwan Strait. By sending 
two carrier groups to the area, we made clear that any use of force 
against Taiwan would have grave consequences. We also reiterated our 
commitment to our one-China policy and encouraged both sides to resume 
the dialogue that is essential to a peaceful resolution of their 

Our clear understanding of each other's position on Taiwan, together 
with strong progress in other areas, has restored the positive momentum 
to our relationship. When I traveled to Beijing this July, I found 
China's leadership clearly eager to expand our strategic dialogue. Since 
then, we have held important high-level talks on non-proliferation and 
trade. Of course, the United States and China will continue to have 
important differences, especially in areas such as human rights, where 
China's recent conduct has been of particular concern. But we agree that 
the best way to manage those differences is through engagement, not 
pervasive confrontation--building agreement where our interests converge 
and dealing frankly where they do not. We will have the opportunity to 
make further headway next month, when Secretary Christopher will travel 
to Beijing and President Clinton will meet with President Jiang Zemin at 
the APEC Leaders' Meeting in Manila.

The third key element of regional stability is democracy and human 
rights. Put simply, open societies make for better neighbors. Whether in 
the Asia-Pacific region or around the world, history shows that 
governments that abuse their citizens at home are also more likely to 
provoke conflicts or cause problems beyond their borders, whether by 
spawning refugees, sheltering narcotics traffickers, or damaging the 
global environment.

Of course, we promote the rule of law and human rights not just because 
it advances our interest in stability, but because doing so is true to 
our ideals as Americans. Democracy comes in many forms. We do not seek 
to impose our own vision on others. Indeed, the democratic odyssey of 
countries from Mongolia to Thailand demonstrates that the desire for 
political freedom is a home-grown commodity, not an American export. 
Across Asia and around the world, we will continue to speak out on 
behalf of those who defend universally recognized rights. We will 
continue to push repressive regimes in places like Burma to pursue 
national reconciliation and genuine political dialogue. And we will 
continue to assist new democracies like Cambodia by encouraging the 
development of political parties and political institutions.
By using our power to promote stability, we accomplish two goals.

-- First, we help hundreds of millions of people to live what President 
Clinton has called the quiet miracle of a normal life. Thanks to 
America's efforts, the Pacific has finally begun to live up to its name. 
In Cambodia, farmers can till fields that once yielded only death and 
destruction. In South Korea, schoolchildren can worry more about their 
exams than about war. And in Thailand, one of the biggest threats that a 
thriving democratic middle class now faces are traffic jams. 

-- Second, in promoting stability, we spur the economic progress that 
benefits all our businesses and workers. Freed from the threat of war 
and inspired by a greater stake in their futures, the peoples of an 
Asia-Pacific region at peace have propelled their nations into the front 
ranks of economic growth. 

Now, our economic strategy is enlarging the shared stake that we have in 
sustaining that growth. The United States is working to encourage the 
free flow of trade and investment that is creating jobs and 
opportunities for Americans, fueling Asia's high-octane economies, and 
uniting nations across the Pacific in the common pursuit of prosperity.

President Clinton came into office determined to create an open global 
trading system for the 21st century--a goal that we will advance this 
December at the first meeting of the new World Trade Organization in 
Singapore. Decades from now, people will look back on this period as a 
time of revolutionary change in the world trading system. The more than 
200 trade agreements that we have negotiated have helped to create more 
than   1 million new American jobs and to restore our status as the 
world's biggest exporter.

Nowhere has our strategy been more important--or more successful--than 
in Asia, home to the world's most dynamic economies and some of our most 
important trading partners. As the world's two largest economies, the 
United States and Japan have a special responsibility to uphold the goal 
of open trade. And we are. Our 22 trade agreements with Japan--covering 
everything from medical parts and auto parts to rice--have raised our 
exports in those areas by 85%. They have also helped to reduce our 
overall trade deficit by 10% last year--the first decline since 1990. 
And the deficit for the first seven months of the year is nearly 30% 
lower than for the same period in 1995. Now we are working to ensure 
full implementation of those agreements, as well as to resolve our 
differences in other important areas.

It is also in our strategic interest to ensure the smooth integration of 
China--now our fastest-growing export market and soon to be the world's 
largest economy--into the global trading system. Our economic engagement 
is bringing down barriers to our products and protecting our 
intellectual property. Now we are working to bring China into the World 
Trade Organization on commercially viable terms. That is the best way to 
ensure that China lives by the economic rules of the road and has the 
opportunity to help set those rules. Because China will have an enormous 
impact on the future of the global economic system, it is especially 
important that it lives up to the standards of openness and transparency 
that the WTO requires of all its members.

We also have a strong interest in supporting open trade with the ASEAN 
nations--now our third-largest export market. Our two-way trade has 
expanded nearly 50% over the last two years, reaching more than $100 
billion in 1995.

But increasingly, it is the ambitious regional efforts that we have 
launched--from NAFTA and the Free Trade Area of the Americas to APEC--
that are spearheading the drive toward a world where the flow of trade 
and investment is limited only by our imaginations. Three years ago, 
President Clinton set out a bold vision of regional economic integration 
at the first historic APEC Leaders' Meeting in Seattle--a vision given 
life by the landmark commitment the leaders made one year later to 
achieve free trade and investment in the region by the year 2020. Next 
month in Manila, we will set out plans to achieve that goal, as well as 
work to strengthen regional financial institutions and 
preserve our shared environment.

At this year's APEC Leaders' Meeting and on each stop along his trip, 
President Clinton will also deliver a simple message--loud and clear: 
The United States will remain a Pacific power. The interests that compel 
our engagement have grown. And our determination to create a community 
of shared efforts, shared benefits, and shared destiny is stronger than 
it has ever been. 

The advances that we have already made attest to the remarkable fast-
forwarding of history in the Asia-Pacific region over the last half-
century. Some of its nations have risen from the ruins of war and 
tyranny to the heights of peace and democracy. Many have transformed 
themselves from colonialism's oldest outposts to capitalism's newest 
frontiers. And almost all have succeeded in offering their people a 
future much brighter than their past. This dramatic progress was 
profoundly in America's interest, and we were there to support and 
encourage it every step of the way. 

Now, on the edge of a new era and the brink of a new millennium, 
American leadership in the Asia-Pacific region is essential to security, 
prosperity, and freedom not just across an ocean but around the world. 
As we strive to advance our global interests, how well we respond to the 
challenges of what some call the Pacific century will determine whether 
it will be an American century as well.  


Article 2:

Inauguration of the Central Asia Institute
James F. Collins, Special Adviser to the Secretary For the New 
Independent States 
Remarks before foreign policy/Central Asia experts, Johns Hopkins School 
of Advanced International Studies, Washington, DC, October 21, 1996

I want to thank Paul Wolfowitz and Fred Starr for including me on the 
occasion of the opening of the Central Asia Institute. Deputy Secretary 
Strobe Talbott very much regrets he could not join you and asked me to 
convey his very best wishes to all of you as you open the new Institute, 
which he and we believe will be doing very important work

My first message today is that all of us in the government's foreign 
policy community unreservedly and enthusiastically welcome the founding 
of this Institute. It will bring needed new emphasis and focus in the 
scholarly and policy community to issues of a region in which the United 
States has important and growing interests.

The five states of Central Asia present special challenges and 
paradoxes. While possessing great natural resources, they ranked among 
the poorest and least-developed of the former Soviet republics at the 
time of independence. Despite its Silk Road heritage and position at an 
historic crossroad of European and Asian civilizations, the region was 
the most isolated in the U.S.S.R. at the time that empire broke apart. 
Proud founders of great Islamic centers of faith and scholarship whose 
ranks included the great physician and philosopher Avicenna and the 
astronomer Ulu  Beg, the Central Asians are today challenged to define 
anew the relationship between religion and the state after more than 70 
years of enforced atheism.

In engaging these new nations, America's challenge has been to promote 
modern, tolerant states and societies which can work productively with 
us in support of shared interests. We have defined the following U.S. 
objectives in the New Independent States (NIS) which we have tailored to 
meet the specific needs of the rich and complex region of Central Asia:

-- Support for the independence, sovereignty, and security of each of 
the Central Asian states.
-- Assistance in the establishment of free-market economies and 
democratic governments committed to equal opportunity and human rights 
for their citizens.
-- Integration of these states into the world community of political and 
financial institutions, as well as their participation in the Euro-
Atlantic security dialogue and cooperative programs.
-- Encouragement of these states to pursue peaceful relations among 
themselves and with their neighbors to seek new avenues for regional 
cooperation, and to resolve local conflicts with international 
-- Prevention of any trafficking in weapons of mass destruction or their 
elements across this region or its borders. The departure of the last 
nuclear warhead from Kazakstan in 1995 was a significant achievement in 
support of non-proliferation. We all owe a debt of gratitude to the 
Government of Kazakstan for their removal. Similarly, we will cooperate 
on other transnational threats of terrorism, narcotics, and 
environmental degradation.
-- Enhancement of U.S. commercial interests and the expansion and 
diversification of global energy supplies.

This agenda is complex and demanding, but my second message is that we 
are making progress throughout Central Asia in advancing it.

It is worth recalling that, at independence, there were many who doubted 
whether these new states would survive. Skeptics pointed to the lack of 
a national tradition in Central Asia and noted the absence of defined 
national independence movements in this area. Yet, I think today we are 
struck by the progress that has been made in just five years.

Integration Into International Organizations

One of our earliest goals was to assist with the introduction of these 
states into the international community. We were among the first to 
recognize them, to establish embassies in each  of the Central Asian 
nations, and to engage their governments as sovereign members of the 
international community. Today, there has been significant progress 
across the area.  All except Tajikistan are active participants in 
NATO's Partnership for Peace. All are members of the OSCE, which has 
opened a regional office in Tashkent. All are exploring membership in 
the World Trade Organization, and several are well on their way to 
completing the process. They all welcome foreign trade and investment. 
They are responsible and moderate players in the international arena.

Regional Cooperation

There are encouraging signs of increasing regional cooperation. 
Kazakstan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan for example, in addition to 
developing a regular trilateral dialogue and some common financial 
institutions, have formed a joint peacekeeping battalion which 
participated together for the first time in August in a U.S. Partnership 
for Peace exercise. Regional cooperation will also be essential in 
tackling the enormous environmental problems in the area--especially the 
management of water resources--whose past misuse led to the Aral Sea 
catastrophe. The U.S. was the first foreign donor to provide assistance 
in this area with our Aral Sea Initiative. We continue to encourage 
regional cooperation on the environment. In line with Secretary 
Christopher's determination to enhance our diplomatic focus on 
environmental issues, we plan to establish a new State Department 
regional environmental office at our embassy in Tashkent that will serve 
the area. We have also taken a regional approach to economic 

The Central Asian American Enterprise Fund got off to the fastest start 
of any of the comparable investment funds and has a significant 
contribution as an effective instrument in promoting economic change. We 
feel strongly that regional cooperation on topics of common concern, 
such as the environment, can foster ties which will extend to other 
areas as well. Such cooperation can help lessen tensions in the region 
and will help to reduce the potential for conflict.

Regional Conflict

Much of the progress that Central Asians have achieved reflects the fact 
that most of their societies are at peace. Tragically, the Tajiks have 
been the exception and their situation underscores the need to resolve 
local conflicts without violence and through political means. Denied 
that benefit, the Tajiks grapple with a continuing conflict and a 
fragile ceasefire that  has hindered political and economic reform. 
Unresolved, this conflict will place the very future of the Tajik nation 
at risk. We continue to support the efforts of the UN to find an 
equitable, negotiated settlement ensuring a broad-based government 
essential to a lasting solution. We also support the efforts of 
institutions such as the OSCE to work within Tajikistan to promote 
national reconciliation. This process has been tough and painfully slow. 
While the Tajik parties themselves must find the means to reach the 
necessary compromises, we also hope that the regional states will 
redouble their efforts to contribute to a solution.

Democratic and Economic Reform

There are still many obstacles in the quest to create democratic 
societies in Central Asia. Some positive steps have been taken; the 
open, multi-candidate presidential election in Kyrgyzstan is one 
example. But progress here has been much slower than we would have 
liked. Institutions and attitudes inherited from the past are still too 
entrenched in many places.

Some in the region believe that too swift a transformation will simply 
lead to instability or "Islamic extremism." One continuing point we make 
is that there is no contradiction between democracy and stability. On 
the contrary, pluralist, open, and tolerant societies are essential for 
stability and prosperity.

We continue to assist in the area of building democracy. Our assistance 
programs have emphasized the importance of democratic reform and 
promoted the growth of non-governmental organizations. Thousands of 
Central Asian citizens have participated in U.S. exchange programs-- 
educators, parliamentarians, lawyers and judges, journalists, and other 
future leaders.

We have welcomed democratic achievements in the area, such as 
Kyrgyzstan's election, and we are actively encouraging further steps 
throughout Central Asia, such as the registration of local NGO's, 
increased media freedom, and protection of human rights. Central Asian 
governments are increasingly receptive to dialogue with us and other 
states, the OSCE, and international human rights organizations. We need 
to stay fully engaged with our Central Asian  friends on this front.

Economic Reform

On the economic reform side, Central Asian states have made impressive 
gains. The states have introduced their own currencies and all have 
central banks and are poised for growth. Tajikistan--plagued by 
continuing civil conflict--is the obvious exception, but even here the 
government qualified for its first IMF program and a $50 million World 
Bank loan this year. We have focused much of our technical assistance on 
helping these countries develop sound commercial, legal, and regulatory 
systems, but we need to do more to encourage the creation of an 
investor-friendly climate. This will benefit U.S. business and it will 
significantly help these countries attract the investment and the 
capital they need. Central Asia's population base of more than 50 
million--combined with proper development of its significant resources--
will make it an important business market for the future.

The independence and economic prospects of Central Asia's states are 
clearly linked with their ability to expand and develop new markets (as 
well as other new trade and communications routes west to Europe, east 
to Asia, and south to the Subcontinent). The United States will be an 
active participant in developing Central Asian markets and promoting the 
region's economic development.


We have both a strategic and commercial interest in increasing and 
diversifying world energy supplies. With the vast resources of the 
Caspian Basin, Central Asia will be a significant energy producer in the 
next century. We support rapid Caspian energy development through 
private investment. Western private investment will be crucial and its 
importance is increasingly recognized. Western private investment in the 
development of the Caspian energy resources will require a legal regime 
that offers a clear delineation of seabed resources by the littoral 
states and minimal involvement by Iran. The current transport systems 
are inadequate for moving the growing volume of Caspian Basin oil and 
gas exports to world markets. We support the development of additional 
and multiple export routes, including a route through Turkey. We are 
encouraging regional cooperation on oil transport and development, which 
will benefit all states in the region. And we are emphasizing that 
commercial viability and meeting international standards are central to 
successful projects.


So, my final message is that America today has new and growing interests 
at stake in Central Asia. As this region opens itself to the outside 
world, it is vital that Americans develop the tools, find the resources, 
and use the talent needed to promote our goals of an independent, open, 
stable, secure, and economically developed Central Asia. The group 
associated with this Institute is a distinguished one which has shown 
leadership in awakening the United States to the importance of Central 
Asia. Dr. Brzezinski and Dean Wolfowitz were just in Turkmenistan, and 
Institute Chairman Starr's article on Uzbekistan in Foreign Affairs 
focused on the importance of the area.

We have been working to develop productive relations with the leaders 
and societies of this region since its states became independent five 
years ago. Vice President Gore heads the list of administration 
officials who have visited the area since independence. This month 
alone, all five foreign ministers from Central Asia visited Washington. 
President Clinton received Uzbekistan President Karimov in June, and 
Tajikistan Prime Minister Azimov was here in September. Aside from such 
exchanges, we have developed a network of bilateral ties and programs in 
the political, economic, and security areas.

So, as we meet this evening, I again wish to salute the Institute and 
its founders. Your commitment to scholarship and to free, public debate 
in launching the Central Asia Institute adds an important new voice in 
support of America's relations with Central Asia. In a larger sense, we 
also salute the states of Central Asia for their commitment to sovereign 
equality with all other states in the great Eurasian space. We know from 
our own experience that a new birth of freedom requires courage and 
steadfast commitment to the great task ahead. As the citizens of 
Kazakstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan build 
their new nations, the United States will continue to be fully engaged 
with these five states. Our cooperation on a government-to-government 
basis and through excellent independent initiatives such as the Central 
Asia Institute will continue to deepen across the whole range of 
interests. I am confident that our partnership with each, and our 
regional cooperation with all five, will be vital to their development 
as resilient, prosperous, sovereign, and democratic states. 


Article 3:

Transatlantic Relations and the Future of European Security
William J. Crowe, Jr., U.S. Ambassador to the United Kingdom
Remarks at the Royal Institute of International Affairs, London, U.K., 
October 25, 1996

I would like to thank the Ret. Hon. David Howell for that very gracious 
introduction. I am privileged to be here today. I want to congratulate 
the Royal Institute on its handsome new quarters.

The make-over of the auditorium is indicative of the continued vitality 
of the Royal Institute. I was privileged to host a function at Winfield 
House last fall to mark the 75th anniversary of this venerable 
establishment. Chatham House has, throughout its history, enjoyed an 
enviable reputation as a commentator on international affairs and a 
catalyst for imaginative foreign policy research.

This tradition continues with the release today of a Chatham House Paper 
on Transatlantic Relations by Beatrice Heuser. This paper is a welcome 
addition to the discussion, and comes at a time when we are all 
interested in how the Atlantic Community will adapt to the new realities 
of the 21st century.

I intend to speak on that subject today. But first, a report from the 
home front. I have recently returned from the U.S., where, as you no 
doubt have noticed, there is a presidential election campaign underway.

I have seen some anxiety expressed by pundits because so little 
attention is given to foreign policy during the American elections. In 
turn, I am often asked whether this heralds a resurgent isolationism in 

In one sense they are right. Historically, foreign policy plays a minor
role in U.S. voter calculations, which turn much more on domestic 

It is true that Americans, in general, would like to see Europe do more 
in solving European problems and to rely less on U.S. involvement. As 
you might suspect, they similarly wish to cut down on the monies that go 
to overseas concerns. 

But to conclude that such attitudes signal a retreat from global 
engagement on the part of Washington would be very wide of the mark. In 
fact, when polled in detail, the great bulk of the public wants their 
government to remain engaged overseas and to exercise a prominent role 
in free world councils.

The two main presidential candidates are both internationalists who 
believe that American leadership is vital to the continued growth of 
trade and prosperity around the globe, as well as to our own national 
security. Admittedly, you will hear occasional echoes from our 
isolationist past--particularly in extremely conservative quarters--but 
these voices are in no sense harbingers of the future.

These views are well founded. As  the world's remaining superpower,  the 
U.S. is irrevocably entwined with the international community. Indeed,
globalization has advanced to the point that direct foreign investment 
is now one of the leading forms of international commerce.

Nearly one-fifth of American workers owe their jobs in whole or in part 
to foreign trade and investment. Exports now account for almost one-
third of real U.S. growth, and are expected to climb more sharply than 
the overall economy for the remainder of this decade. Studies show that 
American companies which export their goods tend to be more profitable, 
and their workers better paid.

These are facts. If politicians tried to ignore them, I can assure you 
that American business would quickly show them the error of their ways.

Last Tuesday, the President reminded Americans of these realities. In 
the interconnected world of today, our domestic security and prosperity 
are intimately linked with foreign policy, leaving no choice but global 

To bring the matter closer to home, the President further stressed that, 
. . . nowhere are our interests more engaged than in Europe. When Europe 
is at peace, our security is strengthened. When Europe prospers, so does 

At the same time, our history has made us somewhat circumspect about 
asserting our power. We are not eager to be the world's policeman. But 
please do not make the mistake of assuming occasional reticence signals 
a major retreat; it does not. The central lesson of the Cold War is 
still with us: U.S. engagement is a key element of global stability and 
a necessary condition for the advance of free markets and pluralism. My 
entire working life has been devoted to this proposition, and the 
President reiterated on Tuesday that he personally subscribes to this 

I can think of no better way of illustrating this commitment than 
reviewing with you the progress we are making--with Britain and our 
other allies--on building a durable structure for security and 
prosperity in Europe.

There is no question that we are living through a period of traumatic 
change and restructuring in Europe. With the demise of the Warsaw Pact, 
the benchmarks that informed the free world's political and strategic 
policies for over 40 years disappeared. In turn, an unprecedented level 
of ethnic conflict and violence has been unleashed, which presents us 
with a whole new set of perplexing challenges.

Already, some encouraging adjustments have been made to the imperatives 
of what, for a time, was called the New World Order. Among those states 
interested in order, joint action is replacing confrontation. Today, the
West is more and more operating on a consensus of values. For example,
democratization and pluralism have been accepted as the cornerstone of 
the transformation.

While the horizon is still unclear, the U.S., along with its allies, has 
laid out an impressive game plan for moving forward in this uncertain 
era. This approach aims at both cooperation and restructuring to bring 
together a variety of institutions and processes  to achieve our goals. 
Secretary Christopher has described this enterprise as constructing a 
"New Atlantic Community." Let's look briefly at the current state of 

First and foremost, together we are facing the most important challenge 
for the West today--the task of integrating the former Warsaw Pact 
nations, including a democratic Russia, into a stable European security 
framework. The aim is to capitalize on Europe's diversity and strengths, 
but, at the same time, to overcome its historical divisions.

This is a formidable task, requiring a multi-faceted effort. A conscious
decision has been made that the best way to do this is by building on
existing tools of cooperation, such as NATO, the OSCE, and the EU.

Collective security, anchored on both sides of the Atlantic, is the base 
on which this new community must rest. That is why NATO is at the heart 
of the endeavor 

In the five years since the end of the Cold War, we have made 
considerable progress on adapting the alliance's organization to the new 
imperatives. Internal reforms are giving substance to a European defense 
identity within NATO's overall apparatus. This approach is generating a 
new flexibility to respond to purely European crises with the necessary 
forces taken from NATO assets--commonly known as the Combined Joint Task 
Force concept.

Moreover, the Alliance's "Partnership for Peace," or PfP, has matured 
into a credible mechanism for security cooperation and dialogue with 
non-NATO nations. It promises to remain a dynamic vehicle for expanding 
this kind of contact. It serves to acquaint the militaries of emerging 
democracies with the challenges of civilian control, new governments 
with the political and military character of NATO, and aspiring members 
with both the merits and burdens of full participation in the coalition.

Similarly, the OSCE provides a values-based forum for all of Europe that 
contributes to the growth of a common security vision. The OSCE is the 
only framework which combines all European states into a single 
grouping. An emphasis on promoting stability and democratization is at 
the heart of the OSCE. It is being tested at this moment, overseeing 
Bosnian elections--at both the national and municipal levels. Although 
it operates at a broader and more grassroots level, it will, hopefully, 
dovetail well with the overall security structure.

The principal challenge, however, remains--to extend NATO's security 
assurances to those eastern and central European nations who wish to 
join the alliance, and who qualify for membership. President Clinton has 
proposed a NATO summit in the spring or early summer of next year. An 
immediate objective will be to take the next logical step by inviting 
potential new members to begin accession negotiations with the alliance.

The President has set 1999 as the American goal for accepting the first 
new members into the fold. I understand the British Government has 
proposed a similar date. In this way we can commemorate the 50th 
anniversary of the signing of the Washington Treaty by setting NATO on 
track for another half-century.

This will continue to be a transparent, deliberate, thoughtful process. 
Ultimately, final decisions will be submitted to the involved 
parliaments for approval. The first members to join will not shut the 
door behind them. It will remain open for further accessions of 
democratic governments ready and willing to shoulder the 
responsibilities of participation. Please understand, no state outside 
NATO will exercise a veto on the final decisions.

At the same time, deepening the links between Russia and NATO will be 
high on the summit agenda. Secretary Christopher has proposed that a 
central element of this project be a formal NATO-Russia charter. But the 
modalities of this effort are, frankly, still in flux.

The target is to agree upon formal arrangements for joint action between
the alliance and the Kremlin, and to create a permanent mechanism for
taking on serious problems such as weapons proliferation, nuclear 
smuggling, and conflict prevention. Hopefully, these initiatives can 
build on our heartening experience in Bosnia, where Russian troops are 
participating in the IFOR mission. In sum, it is a promising and 
farseeing strategy.

I am not so naive as to suggest that this will be simple or easy. Most 
Russians have a built-in foreboding about NATO, and overcoming their 
suspicions will require exceptional patience, statesmanship, and 
imagination on the part of all the allies. Nevertheless, we must 
persevere. Successfully crafting solutions that permit Russia to be a 
participating partner for peace and stability in the mainstream of 
Europe is a matter of the highest priority.

We do not often have the luxury of choosing where we meet the future. I 
don't think anyone would have selected the Balkans as a test case for 
NATO reform and adaptation, just as in the aftermath of World War II, 
Berlin was the last place the allies wished to engage in a test of 
strength with Stalin. However, you play the hand you are dealt, and, as 
my British friends like to say, "Get on with it."

NATO has passed the first hurdle  by successfully leading the IFOR 
deployment, while at the same time laying some of the groundwork for 
reorienting the alliance's basic perspectives. Not a bad record for an 
organization many thought destined to become a museum piece in the wake 
of the Cold War.

In Bosnia itself, last month's elections were an important milestone on 
the long road to recovery. As we move toward the end of the IFOR 
mission, the options for a possible security presence after 1996 
currently are the focus of intense study at NATO. Once the need for and 
the specific shape of any potential mission is clear, we can then 
proceed to the question of whether and how the U.S. and others can 
respond and contribute to it.

We must retain a long-term perspective as we evaluate where to go from
here. While Washington has striven to follow the Dayton schedule, it is 
not dogmatic on the subject. We respect this week's decision by the OSCE 
to postpone the municipal elections scheduled for next month in Bosnia. 
The first priority must be to ensure the election process is fair and 

One should also keep in mind the wide spectrum of civil tasks to be 
completed--governance, law enforcement, infrastructure, etc. Above all, 
long-term economic support will be critical if the people of Bosnia are 
to move toward a genuine pluralism. Of course our ability to supply this 
support hinges on the basic commitment of the Bosnians to political 
progress. In that regard, the U.S. was encouraged by the first meeting 
of the three-person Bosnian presidency this week. They agreed to a 
regular schedule of joint presidency meetings, which is a significant 

While it is always easy to be pessimistic in such endeavors, we should 
not overlook that a great deal has been achieved in Bosnia in the last 
18 months, certainly more than anyone could have predicted. There have 
been a series of encouraging accomplishments which should inspire 
further effort.

I want to stress, as I have in the past, the importance of success in 
Bosnia. Like it or not, the future character of NATO, Russian reform, 
the EU, the UN, bilateral alliances--all have a heavy stake in the 
Bosnian outcome. In my judgment, it will be a landmark event in the 
history of the next 50 years.

With the end of the Cold War, we increasingly find economic and security 
developments intersecting and melding. As Europe progressively 
integrates its economies, stability should grow. For this very reason, 
it is our hope that NATO and the EU enlargement will generally move 
forward together.

But we have also sought to move beyond economic cooperation in our 
relationship with the EU. This is the rationale behind the Transatlantic 
Agenda signed by President Clinton  in Madrid last December.

The document, of course, has a strong trade and investment component, 
but it also seeks to engender cooperative political, humanitarian, and 
development activities. This effort reflects the broad range of issues 
that now require international attention, as well as the American desire 
that our European allies share more fully the burden of responding to 
post-Cold War concerns.

Whether it be studying ways to reduce trade barriers, putting in place a 
global early warning system for infectious diseases, or coordinating
environmental assistance to central Europe, the emphasis of the agenda 
is on practical, near-term steps the U.S. and the EU can take together. 
By taking a series of modest and attainable steps, we hope to lay the 
foundation for more visionary goals as confidence grows and 
circumstances permit.

In the area of commerce, the U.S. is particularly keen to move ahead on 
further reducing tariffs in the information technology area. Also, in 
response to the strong messages we are receiving from the transatlantic 
business community, we are now working on a series of "Mutual 
Recognition Agreements" that will harmonize standardization procedures 
in business sectors representing over $40 billion in mutual trade.

Progress in this area has been somewhat uneven but we hope to harvest as 
many of these "MRA" accords as possible before the next  EU-U.S. summit. 
Success on this front would graphically signal that a new era of 
cooperation is truly underway.

This new initiative with the EU builds on our existing bilateral 
relations with our allies. It is a natural complement to the movement of 
the EU--with U.S. support--toward greater economic collaboration.

Washington remains an interested observer as EU-member states discuss 
greater foreign policy and/or security cooperation. These decisions, of 
course, are for the European players to sort out. But the U.S. has a 
strong interest in preserving the foreign policy flexibility and 
responsiveness which we currently enjoy in the bilateral relationships 
with our allies.

In the security discussions, we are pleased to see a growing European
security identity planted within NATO. In the final analysis, we would 
like to see the EU evolve in a way consistent with the goals of building 
a stable and prosperous Europe, while at the same time, taking into 
account the democratic and cultural roots of its members.

I think it is worthwhile to step back for a moment to comment on the 
overall impact of these steps I have discussed. Taken as a whole, as I 
have outlined, we have developed an impressive array of tools to address 
Europe's emerging problems. They offer alternatives ranging across the 
entire spectrum of political and economic initiatives to direct military 
force when it becomes appropriate.

Supported by positive bilateral relations with allies, these efforts 
should enable America to develop a deeper partnership with Europe--
irrespective of national boundaries. The U.S. is genuinely committed to 
a presence in Europe. While we are unquestionably strong--both 
economically and militarily--the heart of the American approach lies in 
a political willingness to search for creative, non-violent actions 
geared to the new realities, and which permit us to resolve problems in 
innovative ways.

Make no mistake. Americans prefer to use power sparingly and to work 
hand-in-hand with other free nations in meeting today's challenges.

Washington's leadership is still a vital part of this endeavor, but the 
U.S. cannot work in isolation. American influence and power alone is not 
sufficient. A new consensus among NATO, the EU, and adjacent countries 
is essential and, I believe, we are well on our way to achieving that 

The legacy of cooperation and trust the U.S. has built up with the 
United Kingdom is of crucial importance as we construct these new 
understandings and processes.

The most important result of our common legacy is that the United 
Kingdom shares with the U.S. a willingness to shoulder the risks and 
responsibilities of international action. Without it, our ability to 
deal with the recent sea changes that have transformed the globe would 
be severely diminished.

That is why I reject those who claim our unique bilateral heritage is 
becoming a historical relic that will fade away, replaced by a new 
globalism. On the contrary, as President Clinton asserted during his 
visit last year, U.S.-U.K. cooperation stands "above the rest--a model 
for the ties that should bind all democracies."

As the American baseball manager Casey Stengel was fond of saying, 
"Predictions are difficult, especially about the future." My naval 
experience taught me early on the futility of trying to look too far 
over the horizon.

But I do know this. The Anglo-American bond is alive and well. It will 
continue to be an important and steady beacon to steer by. Indeed, one 
of the more pleasant aspects of my job is that every day I witness yet 
another example of how strong these ties remain.

I firmly believe the Anglo-American bond will continue to flourish and 
to amplify the strength of both people. It is a principal reason why I 
am confident that we will find our way in this new terrain. In a time of 
trial, I can think of no better asset to fall back on than the legacy of 
Anglo-American cooperation. Thank you. 



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