U.S. Department of State
Dispatch, Volume 7, Number 43, October 21, 1996
Bureau of Public Affairs
ARTICLES IN THIS ISSUE
1. The Legacy of America's Leadership as We Enter the 21st Century--
President Clinton
2. Ukraine at Five: A Progress Report on U.S. Policy--Acting Secretary
Talbott
3. The Pursuit and Implementation of Durable Solutions--Phyllis E.
Oakley
4. Russia's Journey From Totalitarianism Toward Democracy--Ambassador
Thomas Pickering
5. Treaty Actions
ARTICLE 1:
The Legacy of America's Leadership As We Enter the 21st Century
President Clinton
Address to the people of Detroit, Detroit, Michigan, October 22, 1996
(introductory remarks deleted)
I am delighted to be here in Detroit to discuss the challenges we face
as we enter the 21st century; to make sure that we remain the world's
strongest force for peace and freedom, and for security and prosperity.
Detroit is a city meeting the challenges of the future, and is the
perfect place for me to have this opportunity to visit with you.
Yesterday, I couldn't help thinking that in the empowerment zone that
the mayor and others have worked to make so much of, which has generated
$2 billion in private capital to develop the resources of the people of
Detroit here, and in the ground we broke yesterday for a $1.6-billion
new airport to give you the capacity to reach out to the rest of the
world, Detroit is doing what all of America must do. We must develop
ourselves and reach out to the rest of the world. Congratulations,
Mayor, and to all the other local officials here.
From its very founding, our nation has stood for the idea that people
have the right to control their own lives, to pursue their own dreams.
In this century, we have done far more than just stand for these
principles--Americans have acted upon them and sacrificed for them;
fought two world wars so that freedom could triumph over tyranny; then
made commitments that kept the peace that helped to spread democracy,
that brought great prosperity to ourselves, and helped to win the Cold
War.
Now the idea as we struggle for democracy and freedom--freedom of
religion, freedom of speech, freedom of assembly, open markets, respect
for diversity--these ideas are more and more the ideals of humanity.
When we adopted democracy as our form of government in 1776, and then
when we ratified our Constitution a few years later, it was an unusual
choice that we made. Democracy had largely vanished from the Earth for
nearly 2,000 years--since Ancient Greece.
In this century, amid all the wars and bloodshed, we have struggled to
advance the cause of democracy and to support those who are seeking it.
And, now, for the first time in history, 61% of the world's nations, and
for the very first time in the last couple of years, over half the
people on the face of the globe live in democratically elected--under
democratically elected leaders in free countries. That is a remarkable
thing. This never happened before.
Four years ago, when I sought the presidency, I said that to build a
strong community based on opportunity and responsibility here at home,
to be both prosperous and secure, we would have to continue to lead
abroad in this new era. The burden of American leadership and the
importance of it, indeed, the essential character of American leadership
is one of the great lessons of the 20th century. It will be an even more
powerful reality in the 21st century--a century in which the blocks and
barriers that defined the world for previous generations will continue
to give way to greater freedom, faster change, greater communications
and commerce across national borders, and more profound innovation than
ever before; a century in which more people than ever will have the
chance to share in humanity's genius of progress.
As walls come down around the world, so must the walls in our minds
between our domestic policy and our foreign policy. Think about it. Our
prosperity as individuals, communities, and a nation depends upon our
economic policies at home and abroad--on Detroit's empowerment zone and
your commitment to an airport facility that will more efficiently
connect you to the rest of the world. Our well-being as individuals,
communities, and a nation depends upon our environmental policies at
home and abroad. Our security as individuals, communities, and a nation
depends upon our policies to fight terrorism, crime, and drugs at home
and abroad. We reduce the threats to people here in America by reducing
the threats beyond our borders. We advance our interests at home by
advancing the common good around the world.
Let me just give you one example, that I will return to in a moment. In
the last four years, the American people--working together--have created
10.5 million new jobs. Now, that is good news. But perhaps even more
important, more than half those jobs are in high-wage categories. That
is one reason that real wages for the typical working family have
started to rise again for the first time in a decade.
Now, that has to be seen in terms of what is happening to the American
economy becoming connected to the rest of the world. We have had an all-
time high in exports--an increase in exports of about 35%, and we know
that export-related jobs, on average, pay considerably higher than jobs
which are totally confined in their economic impact to the domestic
community.
We have made 200-plus agreements in trade, including more than 20 with
Japan. We have seen an increase of 85% in the export of American
products to Japan. I visited, as many of you know, an American auto
dealership in Tokyo. Just yesterday, we learned that our exports of
American cars to Japan increased 40% in just one year last year. I say
that simply to make the point that our economic policies at home and
abroad affect the well-being of America's families.
In a world that is increasingly interconnected, we have to just sort of
take down that artificial wall in our mind that this is completely a
foreign policy issue and this is completely a domestic issue, because
increasingly they impact one on the other. That is why I think, among
other things, we have to resist those who believe that now that the Cold
War is over, the United States can completely return to focusing on
problems within our borders and basically ignore those beyond our
borders.
That escapism is not available to us because at the end of the Cold War,
America truly is the world's indispensable nation. There are times when
only America can make the difference between war and peace, between
freedom and repression, between hope and fear. We cannot and should not
try to be the world's policeman. But where our interests and values are
clearly at stake, and where we can make a difference, we must act and
lead.
We must lead in two ways: First, by meeting the immediate challenges to
our interests from rogue regimes; from sudden explosions of ethnic and
religious and tribal hatreds; from short-term crises; and, second, by
making long-term investments in security, prosperity, peace, and freedom
that can prevent these problems from arising in the first place, and
that will help all of us to fully seize the opportunities of the 21st
century.
We have approached the immediate challenges with strength and
flexibility, working with others when we can, alone when we must, using
diplomacy where possible and force where necessary.
When I took office, the bloodiest war in Europe since World War II was
raging in Bosnia. Thanks to U.S.-led NATO air strikes, American
diplomacy, and IFOR's peacekeeping efforts, the war is over and
elections have been held. The Bosnian people are now getting on with the
very hard work of rebuilding their lives, their land, their economy, and
their capacity to deal with each other in an atmosphere of respect. None
of it will be easy, but America acted, our partners and allies acted.
And think of what would have happened if we had walked away.
When I took office, dictators terrorized Haiti. They forced tens of
thousands of refugees to flee. Because we backed American diplomacy with
military force and the power of an international coalition, the
dictators are gone, Haiti's democracy is back, the flight from fear has
ended. Difficulties remain, but think what it would be like if America
had not acted.
As Senator Levin said, when I took office, North Korea was moving
forward with a dangerous nuclear program it had been working on for more
than a decade. Thanks to our diplomacy, and with the help of Japan,
South Korea, and China, North Korea has frozen that program under
international monitoring. I wish that more progress were being made in
North Korea toward openness, but think how much worse it would be if we
had not acted.
Two years ago, the collapse of the Mexican peso jeopardized our own
economy and the sanctity of our borders. Because we stepped in
immediately and rallied others to join us, Mexico has rebounded. Three-
quarters of our loans have been repaid ahead of schedule. We are earning
interest on the deal. I believe we have made about $.05 billion so far.
I know that was one of the more unpopular decisions of my presidency,
but think what would have happened if we had allowed our neighbor to the
south to collapse economically without a supporting hand from the United
States for their efforts to reform their political and economic systems
and, therefore, to be able to work with us in a supportive way.
In each of these cases we were able to succeed because, first, we
accepted the responsibility to lead. But it is not enough just to handle
these immediate crises. We also must set our sights on a more distant
horizon. Through our size, our strength, our relative wealth, and also
through the power of our example, America has a unique ability to shape
a world of greater security and prosperity, peace and freedom. These are
long-term efforts and often they take place behind the headlines. But
only by pursuing them can we give our children the best possible
opportunity to realize their own God-given potential. That is why we
have worked patiently and pragmatically to reduce the threat of weapons
of mass destruction, to take on the challenge of terrorism, to build an
open trading system for the 21st century, to help secure the gains that
peace and freedom are making around the world. We are making the future
more secure by lifting the danger of weapons of mass destruction.
It has taken hard negotiations and persistent diplomacy. But consider
the results. Today, not a single Russian missile targets America. We are
cutting our nuclear arsenals by two-thirds. We are working to keep the
remaining weapons safe and secure. We helped to convince Ukraine,
Kazakhstan, and Belarus to give up the warheads left on their lands
after the Soviet Union dissolved. We won the indefinite extension of the
Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, our most powerful tool in keeping
nuclear weapons from spreading. And just a few weeks ago, after
literally decades of discussion that began under Presidents Eisenhower
and Kennedy, I was proud to be the first head of state to sign the
Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. Once enforced, it will end
nuclear testing for all times.
There is, to be sure, more hard work ahead of us. We must secure the
ratification in the U.S. Senate of the Chemical Weapons Convention, to
make it more difficult for rogue states and terrorists to acquire poison
gas. We must strengthen the Biological Weapons Convention to help
prevent the use of disease as a weapon of war. And we must succeed in
negotiating a worldwide ban on anti-personnel landmines, which murder
and maim more than 25,000 people a year.
As we keep our focus on these goals, we must also keep the heat on
terrorists who would darken the dawn of the new century. Piece by piece,
we have put in place a strategy to fight terrorism on three fronts:
toughening our laws at home, tightening security in our airports and
airplanes, and pressing our allies to adopt with us a strict policy of
zero--zero--tolerance for terrorism.
In the congressional session just concluded, two important pieces of
legislation were passed to help give us the tools to fight terrorists at
home. And nearly all the Vice President's recommendations for increased
security at our airports and on our airplanes were adopted in a $1-
billion bill designed to help us move immediately and aggressively to
improve airport and airline security. I am encouraged by that.
When I met last summer with the leaders of the G-7 nations in France,
they agreed to work with us to try to get a zero tolerance for terrorism
policy around the world. While we can defeat terrorists--and we have
been successful in thwarting attempted terrorist attacks in the United
States, attempted attacks on our planes flying out of the West Coast;
recently there was a conviction in a U.S. court of a person we
extradited back to the United States who was charged and then convicted
of conspiring to blow up a number of airplanes flying from our West
Coast over the Pacific--it will be a long time before we defeat
terrorism. But we have to remain determined and strong. If we do, we
know we can prevail. It took a while for the Cold War to be resolved in
a way that was favorable to humanity and freedom, but we stayed the
course, and we must stay the course against this. And our allies must
help us. We simply cannot be doing business by day with people who are
supporting terrorists who will kill us by night. That is wrong and we
must work to develop a common policy on that.
We are building prosperity at home by opening markets abroad, as I said
earlier. I believe that decades from now people will look back on this
period and see the most far-reaching changes in the world trading system
in generations. The more than 200 trade agreements we have negotiated
have led to more than a million new jobs. They have helped to make
America the number-one exporter again. You know that here in Detroit.
You led the nation here with the fastest recent growth in export trade.
And today, for the first time since the 1970s, the United States is
again the number-one producer of automobiles in the world.
It is not easy to both expand trade and keep the rules fair. It has to
be done issue by issue, agreement by agreement. It is hard work, day-in
and day-out, month-in and month-out, year-in and year-out. But we must
continue to do it. Next month I will travel again to Asia--to the
Philippines, for the fourth annual summit of the Asia-Pacific Economic
Cooperation forum, because a lot of America's future is tied to Asia's
future. As a Pacific power, we have a responsibility to work for
stability and security in Asia, and an opportunity to benefit from that
region's extraordinary economic growth.
We also are working to advance the cause of peace and freedom around the
world. This also is a mission rooted in both our ideals and our
interests. After all, when people live free and they are at peace, they
are much less likely to make war or abuse the rights of their own
citizens, and are much more likely to be good trading partners and
partners in the struggle against terrorism, international crime, and
drug trafficking, working with us to prevent global environmental decay.
From the Middle East to Northern Ireland, from Cuba to Burma, from
Burundi to South Africa, those taking risks for peace and freedom know
that the United States will stand at their side.
Nowhere are our interests more engaged than in Europe. When Europe is
at peace, our security is strengthened. When Europe prospers, so does
America. We have a special bond because our nation was formed from the
hopes and dreams of those who came to our shores from across the
Atlantic seeking religious freedom, fleeing persecution, looking for a
better life. From the Pilgrims of 1620 to the Hungarian freedom fighters
of 1956, whose struggle we commemorate tomorrow, they gave America the
strength of diversity and the passion for freedom. Remarkable
generations of Americans invested in Europe's peace and freedom with
their own sacrifice. They fought two world wars. They had the vision to
create NATO and the Marshall Plan. The vigor of those institutions, the
force of democracy, the determination of people to be free--all these
helped to produce victory in the Cold War. But now that freedom has been
won, it is this generation's responsibility to ensure that it will not
be lost again, not ever.
President Reagan gave strength to those working to bring down the Iron
Curtain. President Bush helped to reunify Germany. And now, for the very
first time since nation-states first appeared in Europe, we have an
opportunity to build a peaceful, undivided, and democratic continent. It
has never happened before; it can be done now. A continent where
democracy and free markets know no boundaries, but where nations can be
assured that their borders will always be secure and their sovereignty
and independence will always be respected.
In January 1994, during my first trip to Europe as President, I laid out
a strategy for European integration--political integration around
democracies, economic integration around free markets, security
integration around military cooperation. I urged our enduring allies and
new friends to build the bonds among our nations that are necessary for
this time--through the European Union, NATO, and the other institutions
of a new Europe. I challenged all our people to summon the will and the
resources to make this vision real. The United States and Europe are
answering that challenge. With our help, the forces of reform in
Europe's newly free nations have laid the foundations of democracy. They
have political parties and free elections, an independent media, and
civilian control of the military. We have helped them to develop
successful market economies, and now moving from aid to trade and
investment.
Look at what has been achieved by our common efforts. In the seven years
since the fall of the Berlin Wall, two-thirds of Russia's economy has
moved from the heavy grip of the state into private hands. Poland now
has one of the West's highest rates of growth. You are as likely to read
about Poland on the business page as the front page today. The private
sector produces half the national income of an independent Ukraine. From
the Czech Republic to Hungary to Estonia, the same forces of freedom and
free markets are creating bustling prosperity and hope for the future.
The bedrock of our common security remains NATO. When President Truman
signed the North Atlantic Treaty 47 years ago, he expressed the goal of
its founders plainly, but powerfully: to preserve their present peaceful
situation and to protect it in the future. All of us here today--every
single one of us--are the beneficiaries of NATO's extraordinary success
in doing just that.
NATO defended the West by deterring aggression. Even more, through NATO,
Western Europe became a source of stability instead of hostility. France
and Germany moved from conflict to cooperation. Democracy took permanent
root in countries where fascism once ruled.
I came to office convinced that NATO can do for Europe's East what it
did for Europe's West--prevent a return to local rivalries, strengthen
democracy against future threats, and create the conditions for
prosperity to flourish. That is why the United States has taken the lead
in a three-part effort to build a new NATO for a new era.
First, by adapting NATO with new capabilities for new missions;
Second, by opening its doors to Europe's emerging democracies; and
Third, by building a strong and cooperative relationship between NATO
and Russia.
To adapt NATO, we have taken on missions beyond the territory of its
members for the first time, and done so in cooperation with non-member
states, shifting our emphasis to smaller and more flexible forces
prepared to provide for our defense, but also trained and equipped for
peacekeeping. We are setting up mobile headquarters to run these new
missions more effectively and efficiently. We are giving our European
allies a larger role within the Alliance, while preserving NATO's vital
core which is an integrated command military structure.
The United States will continue to take the lead in NATO, especially in
the southern region where the most immediate threats to peace exist. But
we welcome our allies' willingness to shoulder a greater share of the
burden and to assume greater leadership.
Bosnia has been the first major test of the new NATO. At first, NATO
could act jointly only with the United Nations. But once NATO took
charge, once its lead, its air power, together with its diplomatic
leadership, was available fully, it pushed the Bosnian Serbs from the
battlefield to the bargaining table. The NATO-led Implementation Force
has restored security to Bosnia. It has given the Bosnian people a
chance--not a guarantee, but a chance to build a lasting peace.
But for NATO to fulfill its real promise of peace and democracy in
Europe it will not be enough simply to take on new missions as the need
arises. NATO must also take in new members, including those from among
its former adversaries. It must reach out to all the new democracies in
Central Europe, the Baltics, and the New Independent States of the
former Soviet Union.
At the first NATO summit I attended in January 1994, I proposed that
NATO should enlarge--steadily, deliberately, openly. Our allies agreed.
First, together, we created the Partnership for Peace as a path to full
NATO membership for some and a strong and lasting link to the alliance
for all. I think it would be fair to say that the Partnership for Peace
has exceeded what even its most optimistic supporters predicted for it
in the beginning. There are more than two dozen members now.
The more than two dozen members and the astonishing amount of
cooperation and joint training and partnership that has developed as
results of this Partnership for Peace has made it something of
significance--I believe enduring significance--beyond what we ever
imagined when we started it. And the strategy is paying off. The
prospect of membership in or partnership with NATO has given Europe's
new democracies a strong incentive to continue to reform and to improve
relations with their neighbors.
Through the Partnership for Peace, prospective new members are actually
gaining the practical experience they need to join NATO. Thirteen
partner nations are serving alongside NATO troops and helping to secure
the peace in Bosnia. There are Polish and Czech combat battalions,
Hungarian and Romanian engineering troops, soldiers from Ukraine and the
Baltic states, forces from Sweden and Finland, and a full Russian
brigade.
Just seven years ago, these soldiers served on opposite sides of the
Iron Curtain. Today, their teamwork with our troops and other European
NATO allies is erasing the lines that once divided Europe while bringing
an end to the bloodiest conflict in Europe since World War II.
We have kept NATO enlargement on track. Now it is time to take the next
historic step forward. Last month, I called for a summit in the spring
or early summer of next year to name the first group of future NATO
members and to invite them to begin accession talks. Today, I want to
state America's goal: By 1999--NATO's 50th anniversary and 10 years
after the fall of the Berlin Wall--the first group of countries we
invite to join should be full-fledged members of NATO. I also pledged
for my part, and I believe for NATO's part as well, that NATO's doors
will not close behind its first new members. NATO should remain open to
all of Europe's emerging democracies who are ready to shoulder the
responsibilities of membership. No nation will be automatically
excluded. No country outside NATO will have a veto. We will work to
deepen our cooperation, meanwhile, with all the nations in the
Partnership for Peace. A gray zone of insecurity must not reemerge in
Europe.
Now, I want to say that as we go forward, the American people should be
aware that this plan is not free of costs. Peace and security are not
available on the cheap. Enlargement will mean extending the most solemn
security guarantee to our new allies. To be a NATO member means that all
the other members make a commitment to treat an attack on one as an
attack on all. But mark my words, if we fail to seize this historic
opportunity to build a new NATO in a new Europe, if we allow the Iron
Curtain to be replaced by a veil of indifference, we will pay a much
higher price later on down the road. America will be stronger and safer
if the democratic family continues to grow, if we bring to our ranks
partners willing to share the risks and responsibilities of freedom.
This past summer, by overwhelming majorities, both Houses of Congress
passed a NATO Enlargement Facilitation Act. I greatly appreciate this
bipartisan support for our efforts to forge a broader alliance of
prosperity, of security and, as the First Lady said in Prague on the
last 4th of July, an alliance of values with Europe. I look forward to
working with Congress to ratify the accession of new members, to provide
the resources we need to meet this commitment, to secure the support of
the American people. NATO enlargement is not directed against anyone. It
will advance the security of everyone--NATO's old members, new members,
and non-members alike.
I know that some in Russia still look at NATO through a Cold War prism
and, therefore, look at our proposals to expand it in a negative light.
But I ask them to look again. We are building a new NATO, just as we
support the Russian people in building a new Russia. By reducing rivalry
and fear, by strengthening peace and cooperation, NATO will promote
greater stability in Europe, and Russia will be among the beneficiaries.
Indeed, Russia has the best chance in history to help to build that
peaceful and undivided Europe, and to be an equal and respected and
successful partner in that sort of future.
The great opportunity the Russian people have is to define themselves in
terms of the future, not the past; to forge a new relationship with NATO
as enlargement moves forward. The United States has suggested that
Russia and NATO work out a formal agreement on cooperation.
We should set up a regular mechanism for NATO-Russia meetings at all
levels. We should consult on European security issues so that whenever
possible NATO and Russia can act jointly to meet the challenges of the
new era, just as we have acted jointly in Bosnia.
Just think about it. In Bosnia, Russia and NATO are already partners for
peace. We should set our sights on becoming full partners and bringing
all of Europe together. Together, we can help to turn the main
battleground for the bloodiest century in history into a continent whose
people remain secure and prosperous, free and at peace.
During these past four years, it has been one of the greatest privileges
of my life to represent America around the world--from the halls of
Kremlin to the hillsides of Port-au-Prince; from the deserts of Jordan
to the Tokyo Harbor; from the Charles Bridge in Prague and Riga's
Freedom Square to the DMZ in Korea. I have heard the voices and shaken
the hands of presidents and prime ministers, and just as important,
citizens on the streets of distant lands. Wherever I go, whomever I talk
with, the message to me is the same: We believe in America. We trust
America. We want America to lead. And America must lead.
I wish every American could see our country as much of the world sees
us. Our friends rely upon our engagement. Our adversaries respect our
strength. When our family went to open the Olympics in Atlanta, I was so
moved by the statements of young people from around the world about the
efforts the United States had made to foster peace in Bosnia, peace in
Northern Ireland, peace in the Middle East--things these young athletes
felt personally because it was their lives, their future, and the
children they still hope to have on the line.
As we enter the 21st century, we must make a commitment to remain true
to the legacy of America's leadership--to make sure America remains the
indispensable nation, not only for ourselves, but for what we believe in
and for all the people of the world. That is our burden. That is our
opportunity. And it must be our future. Thank you and God bless you all.
(###)
ARTICLE 2:
Ukraine at Five: A Progress: Report on U.S. Policy
Acting Secretary Talbott
Remarks before The Washington Group 1996 Leadership Conference,
Washington, DC, October 11, 1996
Thank you Jaroslav [Voiko], and thanks to The Washington Group for
including me in your celebration.
To those of you who arrived today from other parts of the country for
this weekend's conference, welcome to Washington. During the Cold War,
this city used to be called the "capitol of the free world." Well,
Washington still qualifies as exactly that. In fact, with the collapse
of Soviet communism, with the disappearance of the U.S.S.R., and with
the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, the free world is a much bigger
place than it was just a few years ago--and today the free world
includes an independent, democratic Ukraine.
Over the past 3 1/2 years, I've had six opportunities to visit that
brave young democracy. It's good to be back on sovereign Ukrainian
territory this evening. I'm grateful to the embassy for opening its
doors to me and my colleagues from the Administration--John Deutch, the
Director of Central Intelligence; Carlos Pasqual of the National
Security Council; Melanne Verveer of the Office of the First Lady; Teras
Bazyluk of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency; and Bill Taylor and
Bruce Connuck of the State Department.
The President and the Secretary of State have asked me to convey two
messages to all of you: First, they have asked me to extend their
greetings and their thanks for all that everyone here has done both for
Ukraine and for U.S.-Ukrainian relations; and second, they have asked me
to review briefly, from the vantage point of the Clinton Administration,
the past five years.
Everyone here tonight knows very well how far Ukraine has come in that
short time. This room is filled with witnesses of Ukraine's
transformation. Some of you were a part of the "Chain of Unity" that
stretched from Kiev to Lviv on January 22, 1990. Some of you were in the
Verkhovna Rada on August 24, 1991, the day when an honor guard brought
in a giant blue and yellow flag and Ukraine declared its independence.
Others here were in Kiev or Lviv or Kharkiv during the landmark
presidential election in 1994, when Ukraine became the first New
Independent State of the former Soviet Union to transfer power from one
democratically elected government to another. Or you've been back for
subsequent regional elections that have produced victories around the
country for a new generation of leaders who have made the cities and
towns they lead into hubs of reform and sources of new ideas. Or maybe
you were there this past June, when Ukraine adopted a new constitution
that has codified the country's commitment to democracy and equal rights
for all its citizens.
Many of you--I'd guess most of you--have seen with your own eyes the
industry and entrepreneurship of the Ukrainian people, which have
spawned thousands of small businesses throughout the country. They now
account for more than half of Ukraine's national income. You've seen the
hospitals where there are now MRIs and other modern diagnostic
equipment, and you've seen the maternity wards where there are now
incubators for premature babies. You've seen the churches and synagogues
that are once again filled with worshippers.
In fact, many of you have been more than just witnesses of all this--
you've been benefactors and participants, and your contribution goes
back a lot longer than five years. For more than seven decades of Soviet
domination, the Ukrainian-American community kept alive the dream of an
independent and democratic homeland. Your faith nurtured the spirit and
the substance of independence until the dream finally came true in 1991.
Since then, you have labored on behalf of Ukrainian democracy, Ukrainian
rule of law, Ukrainian freedom of the press, Ukrainian medicine and
science, the Ukrainian environment, and Ukrainian prosperity.
Many of you have worked hard to put the Ukrainian economy on the right
track. It has been a monumental effort, and there were some scary
moments along the way. Not too long ago, Ukraine was looking over the
abyss of hyperinflation. Last month, inflation was running at only 2%--a
huge and hopeful improvement. Also in September, Ukraine successfully
launched its new currency, the hryvnia, which is already stronger than
the kharbovanets, the provisional currency it replaced.
If Ukraine is to continue this progress--if it is to fulfill its
tremendous economic potential--there is much hard work still to be done.
That means cutting taxes and bureaucracy, promoting land reform, and
building the legal foundation for a market economy.
But Ukraine does not face the challenge alone. The American people as a
whole have followed the example of the Ukrainian-American community.
We've all joined together in the great task of supporting a free
Ukraine. President Clinton has led the way by calling on the
international community to secure $1.9 billion in cash commitments for
Ukraine in 1996. He has gone beyond the mandates of Congress to provide
Ukraine with $330 million in bilateral grants and $860 million in trade
and investment credits.
We're in Ukraine not just with our dollars, but with our know-how, our
expertise, our own can-do bent for licking the toughest problems. We're
on the ground making a difference for the better, working with real
people. Americans are in Ukraine today training the next generation of
entrepreneurs. And by the way, our exchange programs work both ways.
Through the U.S. Information Agency and the Agency for International
Development, nearly 8,000 Ukrainians have come to our country to share
our ideas, to learn first-hand about our way of life and work.
By early next year, we will have helped Ukraine privatize virtually its
entire small business sector and a significant share of its larger
enterprises. We have already helped Ukraine build democracy by
sponsoring town hall meetings, sending legal advisors and constitutional
experts, and assisting Ukraine's growing independent media.
Let me also make special mention of America's effort--both public and
private--to help Ukraine deal with one of the defining disasters of our
time. Ten years ago, an obscure town on the Prypiat River became world-
famous overnight. When Reactor Number Four at the Chernobyl nuclear
power plant blew its top, it was more than an isolated accident; it
marked the beginning of the meltdown of the Soviet Union. But Chernobyl
also left Ukraine with a health crisis that will last a generation--and
it left the world with an obligation to ensure that such a tragedy never
happens again. Through the work of numerous volunteer groups--many of
whom are represented in this audience--there has been an outpouring of
support for the victims, especially the children of Chernobyl.
A number of you were present at the White House when Vice President Gore
and the First Lady commemorated the anniversary of the disaster--not
just by looking backward at the horror, but by looking forward with hope
and resolve. In this spirit, the United States has delivered over 100
tons of medical supplies to hospitals in Ukraine and Belarus. We have
also used our leadership position in the Group of Seven major
industrialized democracies to make available $3 billion to support
Ukraine's decision to close Chernobyl by the year 2000.
Let me assert a key point: Everything we've done for Ukraine--and
everything we will do in the future--we do not just because we Americans
are a generous people, although that is certainly the case. We've done
it and we'll keep on doing it also because it is in our own nation's
interest to see an independent, secure, democratic Ukraine survive,
succeed, and prosper.
Let me explain why that is by echoing our President. I was with him--as
was Marta--on a lovely spring day in May 1995, when he spoke to an
audience of enthusiastic, welcoming students in front of the main
building at Shevchenko University in Kiev. President Clinton told that
young audience that support for Ukraine's young democracy reflects our
most deeply held American values and advances our most fundamental
interests. He said a Ukraine that fulfills the hopes of its 52 million
citizens will also, as he put it, "provide an essential anchor of
stability and freedom in a part of the world still reeling from rapid
change."
We've said over and over--and we mean it every time we say it--that
Ukraine is a key European country. It is a bellwether for a vast region
that matters deeply and enduringly to the United States. If Ukraine
stays on course toward a better future for its own people, that will be
good for all of Europe and for the larger transatlantic community of
which we are a part. If, however, Ukraine goes off course, that will be
bad for all of us. The rationale for a steadfast policy of American
support for Ukraine is just that simple.
The fact is, while Ukraine still faces numerous challenges, it has
already emerged as a force for stability and integration in Europe. It
has done so through its courageous decision in 1994 to join the Non-
Proliferation Treaty as a non-nuclear-weapons state. In exchange for
assurances worked out with the help of the United States, Ukraine
enhanced its own security, and it set a valuable example for the rest of
the world. As a result of that landmark of Ukrainian wisdom, the whole
world is safer today, and it will be safer still in the next century.
Ukraine has shown similar statesmanship and strategic foresight by
forging strong new ties with the west while maintaining constructive
relations with its neighbors to the east and to the north. Ukraine was
the first New Independent State to join the Partnership for Peace
program in February 1994. This past summer, American, Ukrainian,
Russian, and Polish troops trained together for peacekeeping operations
on Ukrainian soil.
That training is already paying off. Today, American and Ukrainian
soldiers are together in Bosnia, working side by side to deal with the
first major threat to the peace in Europe since the end of the Cold War.
And a Ukrainian-Polish peacekeeping battalion is taking shape.
Ukraine has also managed its complex relationship with Russia with
prudence and balance, working hard to defuse problems before they become
crises. From time to time, when both parties have asked us to do so, the
United States has helped, and it stands ready to do so again in the
future.
We in the U.S. Government fully understand the difficulty that often
attends the right decisions. Therefore, we will use every occasion,
including this one, to reaffirm our determination to ensure that there
is a proud and prominent place for Ukraine in the growing community of
market democracies--and in the institutions that undergird our common
values, our common interests, and our common aspirations.
My boss, Secretary Christopher, recently delivered a major speech on
European security in Stuttgart. He laid out the President's strategic
vision for a Europe that is increasingly stable, secure, prosperous, and
democratic--a Europe that will be undivided for the first time in
history. Let me quote just one part of what Secretary Christopher had to
say about Ukraine in that speech. "A critical goal of the New Atlantic
Community," he said, "is to achieve Ukraine's integration with Europe."
That statement will serve as a guiding principle for the United States
in the months and years ahead. It means that we will support Ukraine's
active participation in the Council of Europe and in the Organization on
Security and Cooperation in Europe, the OSCE. It means that we will
continue to assist Ukraine in its effort to join the World Trade
Organization, and that we endorse Ukraine's interest in the Central
European Free Trade Area, the European Union, and the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development, which is the international forum
for monitoring economic trends in free market democracies.
That same guiding principle--that same commitment to Ukraine's
integration into the community of nations--will also dictate our
leadership of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. NATO is, and will
remain, essential to the evolution of a new, post-Cold War Europe.
A solid, cooperative relationship between NATO and Ukraine is vital to
European security. As you all know, NATO is preparing to take in new
members. There will be concrete steps in that direction next year. We
are determined that the process of NATO enlargement serve the larger
cause of peace, security, prosperity, democratization, and integration
on the continent of Europe.
This is more than just a matter of asserting a negative: it is more than
being determined that NATO enlargement not create new dividing lines or
harm the legitimate security interests of any of the new democracies
emerging from the old Soviet empire. It is also a matter of asserting a
positive proposition--that NATO must respect and enhance the security of
the region as a whole and the security of all European states that
deserve and aspire to integration. That emphatically includes Ukraine.
As a vigorous, pathbreaking participant in the Partnership for Peace,
Ukraine is already cooperating closely with NATO. We've laid the basis
for a steadily developing relationship of cooperation and consultation.
There is nothing to limit how that enhanced relationship might develop
over time.
Let me underscore here two simple statements of fact--and of principle:
First, Ukraine and only Ukraine will decide what associations or
memberships it aspires to in the future; and second, NATO and only NATO
will decide whom to admit to its ranks.
The watchwords of NATO enlargement bear repeating here: the process will
continue to be deliberate; it will be transparent; it will be open; it
will be inclusive; it will be respectful. "Inclusive" means that none of
the emerging democracies is to be excluded. None means none. It means
there will be no special categories for inclusion into NATO, and none
for exclusion from NATO. "Respectful" means that the rights and
interests of all those states will be taken fully and properly into
account in the way that enlargement occurs. Both those principles apply
to Ukraine.
How we apply those principles is one of the most important items on the
ever-growing agenda of U.S.-Ukrainian cooperation and consultation. No
subject has occupied more attention than European security in the
dealings that Secretary Christopher and I have had with our friend
Foreign Minister Hennadiy Udovenko, or in the talks that Tony Lake and I
recently had with Volodymyr Horbulyn, the very able Secretary of the
National Security and Defense Council. By the way, Foreign Minister
Udovenko will be here again in just over a week for meetings with
Secretary Christopher, Secretary Perry, and National Security Advisor
Tony Lake.
The subject of Ukraine's important role in the building of a new Europe
will also figure, along with a wide array of other topics, in a new
channel that is opening between Washington and Kiev: the U.S.-Ukraine
Binational Commission, to be headed by President Kuchma and Vice
President Gore.
I do not want to impose on your kind attention much longer. Nor do I
want to delay the next stage of the embassy's hospitality. I just want
to make one final point.
All of us in the Clinton Administration--starting with the President and
Vice President themselves--are optimistic about Ukraine's future, and I
sense you are too. One reason for our optimism is that Ukraine has come
so far in such a short period of time.
The United States' own historical experience should make us Americans
patient, persistent, and admiring when we look at Ukraine. After all,
our own democracy has been a work in progress for 220 years. We must
remember how long it has taken us to get it right. In fact, we're still
working at it. The United States became a "new independent state" in
1776. When we celebrated the fifth anniversary of our own independence
in 1781, we still had a very long way to go. It would take us another
six years to draft a constitution. Independent, democratic Ukraine
accomplished that task before it turned five. In our own evolution as a
civil society and a multiethnic democracy, it took us 89 years to
abolish slavery, 144 to give women the vote, and 188 to extend full
constitutional protections to all citizens.
All of which is to say that, even by the accelerated, fast-forward
standards of the modern world, Ukraine at the tender age of five has
much of which to be proud, much to make it confident about the future,
and much that we Americans can be proud to support, to applaud, and to
join in celebrating--for Ukraine's sake, and for our own. So happy
birthday, Ukraine. Mnohaya Lita, Ukraino.
(###)
ARTICLE 3:
The Pursuit and Implementation Of Durable Solutions
Phyllis E. Oakley, Assistant Secretary for Population, Refugees, and
Migration
Statement before the 47th Executive Committee of the UN High
Commissioner for Refugees, Washington, DC, October 7, 1996
Mr. Chairman, Madame High Commissioner, distinguished colleagues:
Congratulations to Ambassador Mchumo of the Republic of Tanzania on his
election as chairman of the Executive Committee. I would like to express
our special thanks to Ambassador Esper-Larsen for steering us
successfully through the first year of the new EXCOM format and,
particularly, for taking time from his new assignment to participate in
the inter-sessional standing committee meetings. Although this week will
be a test of the new EXCOM, I am confident that the new procedures will
result in a more focused and thorough discussion of issues. I would also
like to congratulate the Government of Ireland on its recent election to
the Executive Committee.
Mr. Chairman, Mrs. Ogata, delegates may I turn now to our theme--"the
pursuit and implementation of durable solutions."
Solutions are not born in isolation. Solutions are the result of
intensive efforts to build peace--peace between nations, peace between
neighbors, and peace among people. Mrs. Ogata has said that we have to
be more imaginative and daring in pursuing solutions. Permanent
solutions require comprehensive approaches--approaches which integrate
political, human rights, security, and humanitarian concerns. UNHCR,
under Mrs. Ogata's outstanding leadership, has developed innovative,
comprehensive approaches to address the complex problems of population
movements. Let me discuss some of those approaches.
The United States joined the call in 1993 for UNHCR to take the lead--
together with the International Organization for Migration (IOM) and the
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)--to address
refugees and other migrant movements in the countries of the
Commonwealth of Independent States through a regional conference held
last May. The Program of Action adopted includes specific actions for
the countries of the CIS, which are grounded in internationally accepted
principles of human rights, refugee, and humanitarian law. The
prevention of unnecessary future displacements of people is a key goal
of the Program of Action. Implementation will also go a long way to
protect and assist those displaced and--more germane to our topic--to
identify permanent solutions. My government just contributed $1.5
million to the first appeal for CIS Conference follow-up issued jointly
by UNHCR and IOM. We encourage other governments to support efforts to
implement this unique approach.
June 30th marked the end of the Comprehensive Plan of Action for
Indochinese Refugees. The CPA was a truly multilateral seven-year
effort. It broke new ground in cooperation among countries of origin,
countries of first asylum, and donor and resettlement countries, where
all participants helped bear the burden of a regional problem.
Mr. Chairman, we all know that voluntary repatriation is the preferred
solution. There is nothing better than for people to be able to return
to their homes. UNHCR just marked the end of one of the most successful
repatriation operations in history--the return of over 1.5 million
Mozambicans from neighboring countries in southern Africa. However,
repatriation is not a permanent solution unless there are opportunities
for refugees and displaced persons to reintegrate into their home areas.
We should think of repatriation in expansive terms. It is not only
movement, but a package of actions--sustainable development, a
community-based approach, and a focus on returnee communities.
We believe that humanitarian organizations like UNHCR can contribute to
refugee reintegration. However, success depends on the political will of
the countries involved and sustainable development actions. In this
regard, I salute the revitalization efforts of the Horn of Africa's
Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD). The upcoming November
IGAD Partner Meeting offers one opportunity for collective discussion
and renewed commitment to solve refugee issues in the Horn of Africa.
The need for a comprehensive approach is amplified when we look at the
complexity of population movements today. Individuals leave their homes,
communities, and countries for many reasons--some flee armed conflict or
human rights abuse, some seek economic opportunities, and others seek to
escape drought. It is becoming difficult to differentiate between those
who cross an international border to escape persecution and those who
flee persecution within their nation's border. The High Commissioner is
called upon more and more frequently to use her good offices and provide
assistance and protection for those who need it, whether refugees or
internally displaced. But let us remember she is the High Commissioner
for Refugees, and refugees should continue to be her primary concern.
UNHCR's senior management is undertaking an ambitious task in reviewing
"measures to ensure a constant focus on durable solutions and
disengagement." We applaud this foresight. UNHCR is currently caring for
26 million individuals of concern. In an environment of increasing needs
and diminishing resources, UNHCR is obligated to think through ways to
conclude operations through solutions--such as local integration or
third country resettlement, in addition to repatriation.
UNHCR's review of the Mozambique operation demonstrated that through
advance planning and early discussions among key actors, the
humanitarian community can succeed in assuring a smooth disengagement.
Just as it is important for UNHCR to devise comprehensive strategies, it
is also essential to close out UNHCR's role at a planned time. We
encourage UNHCR to extend the cooperation with UNDP to design general
frameworks for collaboration or memoranda of understanding in order to
routinize the success of operations like Mozambique.
As UNHCR senior management leads the international community toward
durable solutions for the millions of refugees in the world today, we
are reminded that the framers of the international refugee conventions
had the foresight--and the optimism--to provide for an official
recognition that a refugee situation had been solved--the cessation
clause. Thankfully, there are situations where refugees no longer have a
well-founded fear of persecution. We believe that it is time to consider
invoking the cessation clause in areas that are on their way to
resolution. As UNHCR focuses on permanent solutions and disengagement,
this is a tool that should be used more effectively, but without
sacrificing the right of those who continue to fear return to have
individual claims considered.
Mr. Chairman, the Great Lakes region of Africa is an example of a region
that presents UNHCR and the international community with sharply drawn
challenges. The existing Rwandan camps are unacceptably militarized;
first, asylum is under threat, and turmoil and killing are on the rise
throughout the region. The longer the refugees remain in the camps, the
greater their risk of being pulled into the widening turmoil.
We need to break an intolerable and unsustainable status quo. The
international community has to take some risks, to design a coordinated
strategy, and to urgently pursue durable solutions. While the
international community will continue to help, the countries of refugee
origin and asylum in the region must take greater responsibility as
well. Resources are limited and diminishing. Prompt, voluntary, and
orderly repatriation of Rwandan refugees is needed despite the risks
that always come with large movements of people. We must continue and
augment traditional efforts to encourage voluntary repatriation.
Together with other concerned governments, we are also suggesting a
series of measures in the Great Lakes region, including camp
consolidation, targeted application of the cessation and exclusion
clauses, and phasing out assistance to existing camps that are too close
to borders, while providing viable alternatives for those who continue
to fear return. These are issues to be discussed urgently with regional
governments, donor governments, and organizations--all those who strive
to bring peace and justice to this troubled area.
In another part of the world, UNHCR is nearing completion of durable
solutions for Guatemalan refugees. We welcome Guatemala's commitment to
reintegration and Mexico's generous offer of permanent resettlement. We
are confident that the challenges of sustainable integration will be met
in both countries.
A solution which deserves special note is third country resettlement.
Resettlement is an important tool of protection. Granted, the numbers
resettled each year are dwarfed by those in countries of first asylum.
Resettlement is sometimes the only option to ensure an individual's
protection; furthermore, it provides the opportunity for a person or
family to begin to build a future. We are particularly encouraged by
UNHCR's efforts over the past year to increase attention to resettlement
programs, including the practice of regular consultations with
interested governments and NGOs. For our part, we will continue to work
actively to resettle UNHCR-referred cases, and to maintain our generous
levels of worldwide resettlement of refugees.
Coordination and cooperation among governments, international
organizations, and non-governmental organizations are key elements in
the search for solutions. The United States enthusiastically supports
efforts undertaken in the last year to examine the coordination of
emergency humanitarian assistance through ECOSOC resolution 1995/56. We
view the Interagency Standing Committee (IASC) as the best existing
mechanism to facilitate quick, effective response to complex
emergencies. However, for the IASC to work, participating agencies must
"own" the process. We hope that UNHCR will be flexible and creative in
considering new approaches to revitalize the IASC and improve
coordination. In this regard, we will continue to look for mechanisms by
which governments can be better informed concerning the work of the
IASC.
Protection is fundamental to any comprehensive approach. Providing
protection for persons who have a well-founded fear of persecution is
the responsibility of every government here today. It is the legal duty
of all parties to the Convention and/or Protocol relating to the Status
of Refugees. The High Commissioner is mandated to keep a close watch on
the state of protection of refugees in the world. Disturbingly, Mrs.
Ogata has reported severe threats to refugee protection, including cases
where some countries are forcibly returning people to countries where
they have been persecuted or tortured. There are confirmations of
substantial loss of life owing to such flagrant abuse of the right of a
refugee to seek and enjoy protection. We must seek to maintain and to
strengthen the humanitarian principle that refugees must not be returned
to persecution or torture, either from within the territory of a
receiving state or from its border. Similarly, we should seek to
encourage these protections for those in flight from armed conflict.
We must ensure that our policies--and more importantly, our practices--
meet both our legal and our moral responsibilities to protect people in
danger.
Over the coming year, we will engage in discussions on how to extend
additional, more effective protection to others who need it--though they
may not be refugees in the technical sense. The United States suggests
that we examine protection of unaccompanied children who have crossed
international borders in the context of these UNHCR discussions, as well
as other fora where unaccompanied children are on the agenda. Although
the term comprehensive approach has been used in geographic terms,
appropriate responses to the needs of children requires its own
comprehensive approach, to include protection of children as set forth
in many international conventions.
Mr. Chairman, we have often talked about getting away from the rhetoric
on refugee children and translating policy and talk into action. EXCOM
has endorsed the policy and guidelines for refugee children as sound
bases for programming. The United States contributed generously in 1994
and 1995 to create a Regional Support Unit for refugee children. The
unit was designed with maximum flexibility for UNHCR to choose a
location in any region of the world where the needs of refugee children
are greatest. The Great Lakes region was chosen as the first region for
the RSU. The time is right to evaluate its use as a starting point in an
assessment of progress in implementation of the guidelines on refugee
children.
UNHCR has recognized that women are an integral part of any solution. We
are particularly impressed with the active leadership the Deputy High
Commissioner has provided this year to chair the internal Reference
Group on Refugee Women. From all accounts, this mechanism is turning
rhetoric into action. Now is the time to turn to UNHCR's operational
partners, in particular NGOs. In order to ensure that UNHCR's NGO
partners are implementing UNHCR policy and guidelines on the ground--and
with the expressed interest of several NGOs--the United States
Government has funded a position at the Women's Commission for Refugee
Women and Children to assist NGOs to incorporate UNHCR's guidelines in
their programs
Last year, we urged UNHCR to establish an Initiative Fund for Refugee
Women in order to allow the organization to explore new, innovative ways
to involve refugee women in the planning and implementation of UNHCR
programs. I am pleased to report that my government has contributed
$200,000 to this fund and we hope to see results of its use over the
next few months. Only through the active involvement of women in every
stage of UNHCR activities can solutions truly be permanent.
President Clinton announced at the Lyon summit that the United States
would contribute $5 million to create the Bosnia Women's Initiative
(BWI) under the auspices of UNHCR to provide opportunities for women in
Bosnia-Herzegovina to become full participants in the economic recovery
of their country. BWI aims to empower women through innovative
programming, and will be implemented by NGOs from the region led by
women to benefit women. UNHCR plans to appeal to governments to
contribute to BWI; we strongly second UNHCR's call for contributions as
tangible support for permanent solutions in Bosnia-Herzegovina. I plan
to travel to Bosnia and Croatia at the end of this week to lend support
to the Women's Initiative and to meet with major donors, the World Bank,
and others to urge that they also give high priority to programs that
benefit women.
While I am on the subject of contributions, I am happy to report that
with the conclusion of our financial year, U.S. contributions to UNHCR
in 1996 have surpassed 1995 by nearly $30 million. We provided almost
$254 million to UNHCR this year for general and special programs. Our
contributions to UNHCR's general program total over $98 million and our
contributions to UNHCR's operations in the Great Lakes and the former
Yugoslavia predictably top the list for special program contributions
with $60 million for the Great Lakes, and $57 million for the former
Yugoslavia. The U.S. Agency for International Development contributed
more than $10 million to UNHCR programs.
Finally, I would like to take a moment to recognize the ambitious
changes currently underway in UNHCR. My government is tremendously
impressed with UNHCR's proactive efforts to "change management" and
reform the organization to respond more efficiently and effectively. We
welcome the involvement that UNHCR staff members at all levels have had
in "Project Delphi." The Deputy High Commissioner and his colleagues on
the Change Management Group who have worked feverishly over the past few
months to construct Project Delphi's action plan deserve special
acknowledgment. This plan is now resulting in concrete changes in the
way that UNHCR does its business. We encourage UNHCR to continue its
dialogue with governments as the action plan is implemented.
As part of that dialogue, the United States has recognized the High
Commissioner's efforts to bring more women into the organization through
preferential recruitment procedures. That said, we could not help but
notice that, aside from the High Commissioner herself, there is only one
other woman among the 18 proposed senior managers. We hope this is only
a temporary distortion of the High Commissioner's recruitment strategy.
I would like to close my remarks by paying my own personal tribute--and
that of my government--to the thousands of UNHCR staff members who work
everyday to find solutions for the plight of the world's refugees. Our
thanks to them and to you, Mrs. Ogata. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
(###)
ARTICLE 4:
Russia's Journey From Totalitarianism Toward Democracy
Ambassador Thomas Pickering
Remarks before the Association of American Publishers, Frankfurt,
Germany, October 3, 1996
It is a pleasure to be with you to talk about Russia, a country that has
absorbed my attention and energy for the past 3 1/2 years. To state the
obvious, it has been an eventful time. When I arrived in Moscow in the
spring of 1993, President Yeltsin and his rivals in the parliament were
locked in a bitter power struggle. It ended only when Yeltsin, in
response to his opponents' use of force, resorted to force to disband
the parliament. Three months later--in December 1993--the Russian people
approved the current constitution by a slim margin in a referendum, but
gave nearly a quarter of the vote to Zhirinovksiy's ultranationalist
protest party in parliamentary elections.
The past 12 months have witnessed Duma elections in which the Communist
Party finished a strong first, President Yeltsin's remarkable comeback
victory in the presidential elections, and now questions about his
ability to lead in light of his serious health problems. This period has
also seen Russia and the IMF sign a three-year, $10-billion
stabilization loan and continued progress in Russia's financial
stabilization effort that has brought monthly inflation down below 1%.
Given this record, it is hardly surprising that, for Russians and
Western observers alike, the past 3 1/2 years have been an emotional
roller coaster of great expectations and disappointments. It has been
hard not to succumb to the emotion of the moment. But those that did,
lost sight of the more fundamental change taking place that will
ultimately shape Russia's future. The change has been, on balance,
positive for both Russia and Western interests. I would be the last to
play down the formidable challenges still facing Russia and the
inevitable crises that lie ahead. I, nevertheless, remain an optimist
about Russia's possibilities and our relations with it.
With that by way of background, I would like to share with you some
reflections on Russia--on its politics, economy, and foreign policy--as
my tour of duty comes to an end there.
Unfortunately, you cannot talk about Russia today without talking about
President Yeltsin's health. That issue has loomed over all political
discussion in Moscow for the past several weeks. Of course, we, like the
Russian people, wish President Yeltsin a speedy and full recovery from
his illness and a quick return to his Kremlin office.
Still, we cannot avoid the issue of succession, even if we hope it comes
at the end of the four-year term to which President Yeltsin was elected.
For the ability to transfer power smoothly and peaceably, with a minimum
of disruption, is critical to the stability and viability of any
democratic government, especially one such as Russia's that is in the
early stages of formation. In this regard, the developments of the past
year have been encouraging. The very fact that presidential elections
occurred on schedule, despite widespread calls for postponing or
canceling them or negotiating their results in advance, and that they
were by and large free and fair, despite numerous predictions to the
contrary, bolsters our confidence that any succession will occur
according to constitutional norms.
Moreover, as Moscow comes to grips with the implications of Yeltsin's
health problems, the prevailing assumption has been that if Yeltsin
steps down before the end of his term, elections will decide his
successor. Indeed, there is already much pre-election maneuvering in
Moscow. However unseemly that might be given our human sympathy for
Yeltsin, it is a further indication that any new president is likely to
enjoy the democratic legitimacy President Yeltsin now does.
A succession according to constitutional norms, whenever it occurs,
would further undergird stability in Russia. Indeed, the country is
already more stable than many observers, both in Russia and in the West,
imagine. The factors promoting stability are many. Let me focus on just
three.
First, there has been a vast devolution of power--both political and
economic--over the past decade to regional authorities and autonomous
commercial and industrial structures. This devolution will receive a
further boost during the regional elections this fall. Governors once
appointed by the President will now be popularly elected. As a result,
although the President may be the most powerful figure in the country
today, his power pales in comparison to that wielded by the Communist
Party bosses of the Soviet period or the tsars before them. Indeed, what
happens in Moscow matters less for overall developments in Russia today
than it perhaps has at any other time this century.
For most of Russia--Chechnya is the obvious exception--devolution means
just that. It is not just motivated by separatism. Chechnya,
fortunately, is an exception, and an example that few other regional
elites are tempted to follow. My extensive travels over Russia--I have
visited two-thirds of the Russian Federation's 89 federal units--have
unearthed no strong separatist urges. Rather, the regional leaders I
have met all stress one point: The need to develop a durable federal
system based on an equitable division of responsibility between central
and regional authorities. This will be an uneven process, and
disagreements between Moscow and the regions will inevitably arise. But,
overall, it provides the best avenue for fostering stability and
guaranteeing the country's territorial integrity.
Second, Russian society has witnessed an unprecedented opening up over
the past decade. This process has been particularly important for young
people, who are best positioned to cope with--and, most important, to
take advantage of--the vast changes now underway. As a result, much
energy that would have been erupted into political rebellion in a more
closed system has been channeled into entrepreneurship. It is not
unusual, indeed it is the norm, for leading bankers and businessmen to
be in their 20s and 30s.
Of course, some of this energy has found an outlet in crime, manifested
in the rapid growth of organized crime. This is a disturbing
development. But we must not exaggerate the problem. Crime very often
accompanies reform in its early phases, because old social norms are
broken down before they can be replaced by new ones. Crime also
intervenes to take over roles the government should perform, but cannot
in its temporarily weakened condition, for example, the protection of
private property and the enforcement of contacts. Some crime was
inherited from the Soviet Union. As a result, some of the crime problem
will die away naturally as reform consolidates its position in Russian
society. At the same time, we are already working closely with the
Russian Government on ways to fight organized crime here and now.
Third, Soviet communism is dead. That was one key verdict of this year's
Presidential elections. For the moment, there is no all-encompassing
alternative to the path toward democracy and a market economy on which
Russia has embarked, and there is none looming on the horizon. Of
course, there will continue to be sharp debate over the pace and scope
of reform, but no real debate over the fundamentals. Private property
and political pluralism are here to stay in Russia. To undo them would
require great resources and a willingness to shed vast amounts of blood.
No current opposition force appears up to the task.
Stability in Russia has been both a cause and a consequence of the
economic progress Russia has made over the past few years. The progress
has been impressive, especially given the many predictions of imminent
disaster that have been bandied about in both Russia and the West. Prime
Minister Chernomyrdin's first government, for example, did a remarkable
job in bringing financial stabilization to Russia. Only three years ago,
the country was on the brink of hyper-inflation. For the past two
months, inflation has been below 1%. At the end of August, the IMF
announced that the country was back on track--after some excessive
election-related spending--in its three-year, $10-billion stabilization
program.
For his second government, Chernomyrdin has assembled a strong team to
press ahead with needed economic change. The new First Deputy Prime
Minister in charge of macroeconomic reform, Vladimir Potanin, is a
leading commercial banker familiar with Western business practices. The
new Finance Minister, Aleksandr Livshits, formerly an economic advisor
to President Yeltsin, has ably articulated economic policy to the
public. The Economics Minister, Yevgeniy Yasin, is a strong proponent of
creating a fair and predictable environment for business activity, for
Russian and foreign investors alike. And Anatoliy Chubays, one of the
original members of the Gaydar reform team, has taken the key job of
head of the Presidential Administration. He and Chernomyrdin have had
good working relations in the past. All of this augurs well for the
president and the government pulling in the same direction in support of
economic policy.
The major task facing the second Chernomyrdin Government will be to
build on its achievement of financial stabilization to accomplish a
thorough restructuring of the Russian economy. Prime Minister
Chernomyrdin recognized this as his main challenge in his address to
parliament in August.
What is at issue here is much more than the "pump priming" we sometimes
associate with boosting economic production in the West. It amounts to
nothing less than the wholesale reconstruction of the economy on the
industrial rubble of 75 years of communism. That will require
significant domestic and foreign investment, and it will require time
and hard work and further sacrifice by the Russian people. There is no
magic wand.
The Chernomyrdin Government, however, has a good base to work from. The
Russian economy, for example, has experienced a necessary downsizing in
industry, particularly in areas like defense production. Although the
shift of resources to new production and economic activity is only just
beginning, we already see evidence of growth in the service sector. Much
of this is not fully captured in the official statistics, but is evident
in the construction and new retail trade outlets that are visible not
just in Moscow and St. Petersburg, but out in the provinces.
The number of commercial banks has grown rapidly, perhaps too rapidly.
Some banks, particularly the so-called "pocket banks" which have been
established by enterprises, face solvency problems. There has been and
will continue to be consolidation in the banking sector. I think the
press speculation about a banking crisis in Russia this fall is
exaggerated. The Russian Central Bank knows well the weak points in its
banking system and is actively working to head off crises.
Foreign trade remains a bright spot in the economy. Russian trade has
expanded sharply. Russia has registered a trade surplus for the third
year in a row, reaching $28 billion in 1995. Energy, minerals, and raw
materials lead in these exports, but the Russians continue to seek
markets for their high technology industries. Russia sees its future in
free trade and deeper integration in a global economy. The United States
has fully supported Russia's efforts to accede to the World Trade
Organization--WTO--on appropriate commercial terms and has welcomed the
liberalization that has taken place in Russia's foreign trade regime.
Although the situation is slowly improving both politically and
economically, Russia remains mired in a prolonged period of strategic
weakness. How Russia comes to terms with its reduced capabilities at a
time when Russian elites continue to yearn for great power status will
also be a key issue to watch in the coming years. For Western leaders,
the challenge will be to help consolidate freedom and independence in
Central Europe without pushing Russia into an aggressive posture.
Although Russia continues to oppose NATO enlargement, I believe its
leaders increasingly realize that their ability to prevent it is
minimal. Indeed, early on, in mid-1993, Boris Yeltsin made clear that
Russia had no right to tell the Poles to which international
organization they could belong. Our aim is, however, broader than
enlarging NATO. We want to see a peaceful, secure, and stable Europe
that includes both a revitalized and enlarged NATO and a peaceful and
democratic Russia that plays a major constructive role in Euro-Atlantic
affairs. One of the keys to this outcome will be a strong NATO-Russia
relationship.
In this regard, NATO-Russian cooperation in Bosnia has proven an
excellent example of how the U.S. can work closely and cooperatively
with our former adversary. Likewise, I see greater room for cooperation
along Russia's periphery, where American and Russian interests often
coincide on regional conflict resolution, combating narcotics, and
blunting terrorist and rogue state influence. By building closer working
relationships with Russia, we will also be working together against
those in Russia who seek to establish in that part of the world an
exclusive Russian sphere of influence. Indeed, we welcome closer
relations among the former states of the Soviet Union which are
developed on a voluntary basis, where mutual advantage prevails, and
where the region remains equally open to outside trade and investment.
As this quick review of politics, the economy, and foreign policy
suggests, Russia has come a long way in just five years, but major
challenges remain.
First, Russia must find a way of defining itself as a nation that is
consistent with democratic development. As numerous scholars have
pointed out, Russia became an empire long before Russians became a
nation. As a result, Russian national consciousness, for many Russians,
is infused with imperialist elements. Acting on those imperial impulses,
especially in relation to the other former Soviet republics, will,
however, sap the resources needed for the revival and flourishing of the
Russian nation. The smaller Russia which emerged in 1991 will be a
greater Russia than a bigger Russia. And that smaller Russia will still
be the world's largest nation in terms of area by a long shot.
Second, Russia's democrats must come to terms with Russian nationalism,
which they have tended to see as reactionary, xenophobic, and
aggressive. History, however, has demonstrated that nationalism provides
the key legitimizing principle of all societies exiting communism. To
succeed, Russian democrats must endeavor to present their vision of
Russia as an organic outgrowth of what is best in Russia and not as
radical break with 1,000 years of Russian history, as they did
immediately after the Soviet breakup. If they do not make this effort,
they will concede the field to extremists and doom Russia's democratic
experiment. Indeed, precisely because they realize this point, the so-
called honeymoon in our relationship has been short-lived and now is
replaced by a partnership in which Russian interests play a key, and not
unhealthy role.
Third, Russians must close the historically wide gap between society and
the state. The presidential and parliamentary elections of the past 12
months and the ongoing regional elections are critical steps in making
the government accountable to the people. But more than elections are
needed. In particular, Russian society needs to develop that dense
network of horizontal and vertical ties--the professional associations
and civic and religious organizations, for example--that allow society
to act on government policy between elections. These ties are only
beginning to emerge in Russia.
Fourth, Russian society must be infused with a democratic spirit. The
democratic virtues of tolerance and compromise, as well as the
democratic separation of the public and private spheres, have shallow
roots in Russia. Advancing democracy will require a thorough overhaul of
the educational system, including new history and civics texts to
replace the old--and now discarded--communist tracts. So far, however,
the government has devoted few resources to educational reform and
allowed the entire system to stagnate and begin to decay.
Fifth, Russia must build a genuine federal structure. The country is
simply too vast and too diverse to be run efficiently from a single
center. The devolution of power away from Moscow over the past several
years has created the conditions for the emergence of a new federal
system. But the new power arrangements still have to be codified in a
stable legal framework.
If nothing else, what the past decade of Russian history has
demonstrated is that Russia has embarked irreversibly on a journey away
from its totalitarian and communist past. There can be no going back--no
going back because Soviet communism revealed itself as a historical
dead-end, no going back because neither the people nor their leaders
will sanction it. Where it is headed is an open question. It would be a
grave mistake to believe there is anything inevitable about a transition
to democratic polity based on a market economy at peace with itself and
the rest of the world. History will assuredly continue to surprise.
For the moment, however, we can say that, despite the uncertainties,
Russia is moving in a direction that is compatible with the West's long-
term interests in global peace and security and an integrated and
prosperous global economy. The overwhelming share of the credit goes to
the Russian people and their leaders. We in the West have naturally
played a lesser, but not insignificant, role by remaining engaged in
Russia through the ups and downs of the past decade. It is an approach
we must continue, for history has offered us an opportunity we are
unlikely to see again: The opportunity to turn an implacable foe into a
partner. We have used this opportunity wisely so far. We must continue
to do so.
(###)
ARTICLE 5:
Treaty Actions
Multilateral
Chemical Weapons
Convention on the prohibition of the development, production,
stockpiling, and use of chemical weapons and on their destruction, with
annexes. Done at Paris Jan. 13, 19931. [Senate] Treaty Doc. 103-21.
Ratifications: India, Sept. 3, 1996; Portugal, Sept. 10, 1996.
Children
Convention on the rights of the child. Done at New York Nov. 20, 1989.
Entered into force Sept. 2, 19902.
Ratification: Andorra, Jan. 2, 1996.
Genocide
Convention on the prevention and punishment of the crime of genocide.
Adopted by the UN General Assembly at Paris Dec. 9, 1948. Entered into
force Jan. 12, 1951; for the U.S. Feb. 23, 1989.
Accession: Azerbaijan, Aug. 16, 1996.
Human Rights
International covenant on civil and political rights. Adopted by the UN
General Assembly Dec. 16, 1966. Entered into force Mar. 23, 1976; for
the U.S. Sept. 8, 1992.
Optional protocol to the international covenant on civil and political
rights. Adopted by the UN General Assembly Dec. 16, 1966. Entered into
force Mar. 23, 19762.
International covenant on economic, social, and cultural rights. Adopted
by the UN General Assembly Dec. 16, 1966. Entered into force Jan. 3,
19762.
Accession: Sierra Leone, Aug. 23, 1996.
Judicial Procedure
Convention abolishing the requirement of legalization for foreign public
documents, with annex. Done at The Hague Oct. 5, 1961. Entered into
force Jan. 24, 1965; for the U.S. Oct. 15, 1981. TIAS 10072; 33 UST 883.
Accession: Andorra, Apr. 15, 1996.
Convention on the civil aspects of international child abduction. Done
at The Hague Oct. 25, 1980. Entered into force Dec. 1, 1983; for the
U.S. July 1, 1988. TIAS 11670.
Accession: Iceland, Aug. 14, 1996.
Convention on the taking of evidence abroad in civil or commercial
matters. Done at The Hague Mar. 18, 1970. Entered into force Oct. 7,
1972. TIAS 7444; 23 UST 2555.
Accession: Poland, Feb. 13, 1996.
North Atlantic Treaty
Agreement among the states parties to the North Atlantic Treaty and
other states participating in the Partnership for Peace regarding the
status of their forces. Done at Brussels June 19, 1995. Entered into
force Jan. 13, 1996.
Additional protocol to the agreement among the states parties to the
North Atlantic Treaty and the other states participating in the
Partnership for Peace regarding the status of their forces. Done at
Brussels June 19, 1995. Entered into force June 1, 19962.
Signature: Moldova, Sept. 6, 1996.
Approval: Slovak Republic, Sept. 18, 1996.
Ratification: Norway, Oct. 4, 1996.
Bilateral
Canada
Administrative arrangement for cooperation and the exchange of
information in nuclear regulatory matters, with appendices. Signed at
Ottawa Aug. 15, 1996. Entered into force Aug. 15, 1996.
Memorandum of understanding for technology research and development
projects, with annex. Signed at Washington and Ottawa July 18 and Aug.
29, 1996. Entered into force Aug. 29, 1996.
Fiji
Agreement amending the air transport agreement of Oct. 1, 1979, as
amended. Effected by exchange of notes at Suva July 10 and Aug. 19,
1996. Entered into force Aug. 19, 1996.
Germany
Agreement amending the memorandum of understanding of Apr. 27, 1983, as
amended, for the dual production and sale of the stinger weapon system.
Signed at Washington and Bonn July 10 and Aug. 22, 1996. Entered into
force Aug. 22, 1996.
Honduras
Memorandum of agreement concerning assistance in developing and
modernizing Honduras' civil aviation infrastructure. Signed at
Washington and Tegucigalpa July 24 and Aug. 23, 1996. Entered into force
Aug. 23, 1996.
Japan
Agreement confirming provision on matters relating to the civil air
transport agreement of Aug. 11, 1952, as amended, contained in the
memorandum of understanding of Apr. 16, 1996, and modifying the schedule
to the agreement. Effected by exchange of notes at Washington Aug. 21,
1996. Entered into force Aug. 21, 1996.
Russia
Agreement concerning the procedure for the customs documentation and
duty-free entry of goods transported within the framework of U.S.-
Russian cooperation in the exploration and use of space for peaceful
purposes. Signed at Moscow Dec. 16, 1994. Entered into force Aug. 26,
1996.
Turkey
Agreement relating to the employment of dependents of official
government employees. Effected by exchange of notes at Ankara Aug. 28
and 29, 1996. Entered into force Aug. 29, 1996.
1 Not in force.
2 Not in force for the U.S.
(###)
[END OF DISPATCH, VOLUME 7, NUMBER 43]
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