U.S. Department of State
Dispatch Volume 7, Number 41, October 7, 1996
Bureau of Public Affairs



ARTICLES IN THIS ISSUE:

1. Working for Peace in Northern Ireland--Anthony Lake 

2. A Tour Through the New Atlantic Community--John C. Kornblum   

3. U.S. Policy in the Asia-Pacific--John S. Wolf  

4. What's in Print: Foreign Relations of the U.S.  



ARTICLE 1

Working for Peace in Northern Ireland
Anthony Lake, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Address at the Institute for the Study of Diplomacy, Georgetown 
University, Washington, DC, October 8, 1996

I am pleased to have the honor of delivering this year's Oscar Iden 
Lecture. Together, this Institute and Georgetown's School of Foreign 
Service have helped shape the minds of countless American policymakers  
and leaders, including President Clinton. I welcome this opportunity to 
talk with a roomful of those who have chosen to enter the foreign policy 
racket. So before I begin my remarks on peace in Northern Ireland, let 
me offer some thoughts on the key foreign policy challenges that our 
nation faces.

Key Foreign Policy Challenges

Even in the throes of a presidential election, we must remember that 
America's interests do not change every four years. Our responsibility 
is to look beyond the election cycle and focus on the challenges ahead--
no matter who is president come January. The good news is that we live 
at a time of great opportunity. Our nation is at peace. Our economy is 
strong. Our most deeply held ideals are ascendant, as more countries and 
peoples than ever before enjoy the benefits of open societies and open 
markets. These positive developments didn't happen overnight or during 
one administration. They represent the hard-won victory of decades of 
American leadership and engagement around the world.

Yet this new era is not without peril. We face a host of threats--from 
rogue states, from terrorism and organized crime, from the spread of 
weapons of mass destruction--that have grown more deadly in a world 
grown closer.

In this new world of possibility--but also of risk--the need for 
America's global leadership is undiminished. Indeed, if the last 
century--let alone the last four years--teaches us anything, it is that 
only by leading abroad can we hope to stay prosperous and secure at 
home. To lead, our nation must do two things at once.

First, whether it is an outbreak of violence in the Middle East or a 
global 911 such as a hurricane, earthquake, or famine, we must 
effectively manage crises as they arise. This is fast-paced, high-
profile work, its impact readily visible and frequently found in the 
headlines.

These challenges defy easy solutions and neat four-year cycles. Every 
administration inherits its share of problems; ours was no different. 
Are they resolved? No, they're not. Foreign policy issues are very 
seldom finally resolved. Hard work remains to be done in almost every 
case. Some are not likely to be settled in our lifetimes, much less in 
the next four years. But we've made much progress. Judge for yourself--
not from argument, but from facts--simple facts:

In 1993 in Haiti there was a repressive dictatorship and refugees were 
coming to our shores. Now, there is democracy and the flow of refugees 
has ceased.

Then: war in Bosnia; now: peace and peaceful elections.

Then: a dangerous nuclear program in North Korea; now: it's frozen, 
under international supervision.

Then: Russia's missiles were targeted at American cities and citizens; 
now: their detargeting has eliminated the risk to us of an accidental 
launch.

Then: 3,400 nuclear warheads were in Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakstan; 
now: all but 20 of those warheads have been removed, and those should be 
out by the end of the year.

Then: Israel was in a state of war with Jordan; now: they have signed a 
peace agreement and Israel is working--with difficulty--to implement an 
agreement with the Palestinians.

But even as we make progress on these issues we can't let the immediate-
-no matter how important--dictate our agenda at the expense of the 
fundamental. Adrenaline can carry you only so far in foreign policy. 
Even as we respond to today's crises, we must work to avert tomorrow's 
by focusing on long-term strategic goals.

That brings me to the second crucial aspect of leadership: making the 
investments that will pay greater benefits--or prevent greater costs--in 
the future. We must use our strength to secure the foundations and build 
the frameworks that will make a real difference not just in our lives 
but in those of our children.

I believe that we have come a long way in laying the basis for a post-
Cold War world where our interests are protected and our people prosper. 
Over the next four years, whoever leads this country will have a chance 
and a responsibility to build on a number of "construction projects" for 
the future. 

For each project, over the past few years we have constructed the 
foundation and in some cases much of the framework. For example:

A revitalized NATO is keeping the peace in Bosnia. Now NATO is moving 
forward with the processes of enlargement and adaptation while forging a 
new relationship with Russia. We can create the free, prosperous, and 
undivided Europe that the President has been working to build.

We have made the world safer by cutting its nuclear arsenals, securing 
the indefinite extension of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and winning 
approval of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. Now we must bring the 
CTBT into force as soon as possible, win Senate ratification of the 
Chemical Weapons Convention, and work with Russia to ratify START II. We 
can reduce the danger of weapons of mass destruction even further. We 
are taking the fight to terrorists and criminals abroad and at home with 
greater international cooperation and tougher laws. Now we must secure a 
global commitment to zero tolerance for terrorism and lawless behavior. 
While we cannot end terrorism, we can defeat terrorists. 

We have concluded more than 200 trade agreements--from NAFTA and the 
Uruguay Round of GATT to APEC and a Free Trade Area of the Americas. 
These efforts have opened more markets than ever before to our products, 
thus creating more than 1 million new jobs in America and making the 
United States the world's number-one exporter again. Now, we must extend 
the reach of free and fair trade even further, throughout this 
hemisphere and beyond. We can create a global, open trading system for 
the 21st century.

We have promoted democracy everywhere from the former Soviet Union to 
the Americas, where every country but Cuba is a democracy. Now we must 
continue to lead the global move away from repression and toward 
freedom. We can further enlarge the community of democratic nations.

We have stood with those taking risks for peace--from the Middle East to 
Bosnia to Northern Ireland. Now we must stand up to those who would 
reverse these gains. We can--and we must--continue to lead the way in 
bringing seemingly intractable conflicts to resolution because, often, 
peace is a prerequisite to long-term progress.

Northern Ireland

Today, I want to talk to you about   one of those areas where we are 
advancing our interests and ideals by helping those who want to heal 
themselves. Northern Ireland, especially   in the wake of yesterday's 
despicable attack, is once again at a decisive    moment.

Just outside of Belfast, on a lush 300-acre estate of green slopes and 
classical buildings, talks on Northern Ireland's future are now under 
way. There, on the grounds of Stormont Castle, representatives from nine 
political parties have been sitting down around a table with the British 
and Irish governments to work out a sustainable settlement to Europe's 
most enduring civil strife. The opening of the Stormont talks on June 10 
was in itself a significant achievement. Now they face a tough agenda. 
Led by former Senator George Mitchell and his two co-chairmen from 
Canada and Finland, they must agree on how to end a violent conflict--
including how to handle the weapons that have helped fuel it. And they 
must devise a workable government for Northern Ireland as well as 
develop relations both between North and South and between the United 
Kingdom and Northern Ireland.

The hand of history weighs heavily on their efforts. Since the partition 
of Ireland in 1921, the unionist and mainly Protestant majority and the 
large nationalist and mainly Catholic minority have been unable to reach 
a political consensus on how they should be governed and by whom. From 
the beginning of "the Troubles" more than 25 years ago, both sides have 
lived under the shadow of violence and terror. Only when the cease-fires 
were reached two years ago did the people of Northern Ireland begin to 
enjoy a more normal life--one without bomb alerts, package searches, and 
armed patrols on their streets.

Despite a historical climate of fear and mistrust and despite 
yesterday's outrageous act of terrorism, I believe that there are signs 
of hope and progress. Start with Stormont Castle--the seat of Northern 
Ireland's government before 1972. Once the embodiment of a sadly divided 
society, Stormont today is becoming the symbol of a new commitment to 
dialogue and reconciliation. At Stormont, the British and Irish 
governments are working together on issues that have divided them for 
decades. They and the political parties made important decisions on 
rules and procedures during the first session of the talks, which lasted 
until late July. After a difficult summer, these parties demonstrated 
their commitment to the talks by returning to the table on September 9.

But the greatest proof and hope that Northern Ireland's future can be 
different from its past comes from the people themselves. Put simply, 
they want peace. I had the privilege of accompanying President Clinton      
on his historic trip to Belfast and Londonderry almost one year ago--the 
first time a sitting U.S. president has ever visited Northern Ireland. 
While the hundreds of thousands of men, women, and children who filled 
the streets and squares were cheering the President of the United 
States, they were also cheering their dream of lasting peace. They were 
giving voice to their hope for a day of real reconciliation--a day when 
they will all live in neighborhoods without walls, a day when the two 
vibrant traditions of Northern Ireland will flourish together.

That hope found its fullest expression in the 17-month cease-fire that 
President Clinton played a key role in achieving--the longest in the 
history of "the Troubles." Hundreds of lives were spared. We don't know 
who they are. They don't know who they are. We will never know their 
names or neighborhoods, much less their   political loyalties or 
religious affiliations. But for all that, they are alive today. And so 
is the hope for a lasting peace. Even with the breach of the cease-fire 
by the IRA last February and the renewed sectarian strife over the 
summer, there has been no return to full-scale violence in the streets 
of Belfast and Derry--and there must not be.

None of this is to argue away the tremendous difficulties that lie 
ahead. The President and the American people remain deeply outraged by   
the IRA's breach of the cease-fire, its vicious bomb attacks in London 
and Manchester, and its continuing attempts to maim and kill innocent 
civilians. We were dismayed by the bitterness of this summer's marching 
season, by the rekindling of old hatreds and old fears on both sides. 
And yesterday's bombing of British Army barracks in Lisburn, claimed by 
a splinter republican group calling itself the Continuity Army Council, 
deserves the strongest possible condemnation by civilized men and women 
everywhere. Those responsible must be brought to justice.

But make no mistake: The vast majority of the people of Northern Ireland 
want peace. Now it falls to their leaders to heed the call of their 
people and tip the balance between history and hope. The road to lasting 
peace is never short or straight. But the way ahead is clear; it leads 
through Stormont Castle.

All the parties who join the talks have a right to expect them to be 
meaningful and comprehensive. The people have a right to expect their 
representatives to negotiate with tenacity and good faith--both 
essential to reaching an agreement as soon as possible that will benefit 
the whole community. And they have a right to expect that the pursuit of 
peace will make a concrete difference in their lives, building 
confidence and improving their social and economic fortunes. We will do 
what we can to help the talks reach that goal. That   includes 
encouraging American businesses to pursue the opportunities that a 
Northern Ireland at peace has to offer--an effort that continues today 
at a conference in Pittsburgh for American, British, and Irish business 
executives.

The talks are up and running as I speak. And now they must succeed. Of 
course, they will succeed most fully if all the parties--including Sinn 
Fein--are sitting at the same table. That is the firm belief of the 
British and Irish governments. It is also the firm belief of the United 
States.

It can only happen after the IRA restores its cease-fire. Those who 
would reimpose the hard days of the past can have no legitimate role in 
deciding Northern Ireland's future.

We all admire the brave resolve of the loyalist leaders in maintaining 
the loyalist cease-fire in the face of provocations. We join all who 
care about Northern Ireland's future in calling on the loyalists not to 
be provoked into a futile and deadly spiral of violence by yesterday's 
attack. It is inspiring that the loyalists and their leaders, who once 
shunned the political process, now have proved so courageous and steady 
in pursuing peace. If they can uphold a cease-fire and remain open to 
dialogue, surely the IRA can do no less. And surely the mainstream 
parties can find broader inspiration in their example. The only true 
solution to the conflict lies in painstaking negotiation, in breaking 
down barriers and building up ties, and in working together to create a 
better life that all the citizens of Northern Ireland can share.

The British and Irish governments deserve great credit for all they have 
done to bring these talks about; so does Senator Mitchell for the way he 
has conducted them; so do the party leaders who support them, including 
John Hume who has fought so hard for peace over the years. We must hope 
and pray that the incidents last summer and--yes--the outrage of 
yesterday will provide the shock of recognition that the ways of the 
past provide no way forward. They must be rejected. If Stormont fails, 
the absence of a peace process could fundamentally alter the psychology 
of the moment, add weight to the dead hand of history, and give violence 
its victory.

President Clinton remains firmly committed to helping Northern Ireland 
claim its future rather than return to its past. Let me make clear that 
our aim is to help the people reach a just and lasting peace of their 
own choosing, not to impose our own solution. We are neither in favor of 
a united Ireland nor opposed to the idea. But we are determined to 
continue supporting the people of Northern Ireland and the British and 
Irish governments as they take risks for the peace that they themselves 
must build.

While the months and years ahead will be filled with tough choices and 
hard bargains, I believe--we must all believe--that the dream of peace 
in Northern Ireland can be made real. In Belfast, I saw that dream in 
the faces of the crowd gathered for the Christmas-tree lighting. I heard 
it in the words of the policeman who told me, in simple but moving 
terms, of his joy at being able to mix with his fellow citizens without 
fear at the end of his day's work. And I felt it in the silent longing 
of those gathered on the floor of Mackie's Plant, as two children of two 
different traditions spoke with one voice about their shared hopes.

The United States will continue to do what it can to help make that 
dream come true. But the weight of that responsibility rests most 
heavily on those men and women assembled at Stormont Castle. If guided 
by what President Lincoln once called "the better angels of our nature," 
these leaders can meet the challenge of peace posed to them by their 
people. History will judge them harshly if they fail. For only by 
meeting that challenge of peace can they ensure that the future of 
Northern Ireland shines brighter than its past--as brightly as the faces 
that I saw that day around the Christmas tree in Belfast. 

(###)



ARTICLE 2

A Tour Through the New Atlantic Community
John C. Kornblum, Assistant Secretary For European and Canadian Affairs 
Address to the Atlantic Council, Washington, DC, October 8, 1996

We are living through a period of dramatic transformation in Europe. At 
the mid-way point of the process, it is useful to consider what is 
happening and where we want it to go.

Important first steps have been taken. Confrontation has been replaced 
by efforts at joint action based on a consensus of values. 
Democratization has been accepted for the first time in European history 
as the uniform guiding principle of this transformation.

But rapid change also has unleashed the forces of conflict and violence 
at a level not seen in half a century. Long-held assumptions about the 
shape of Europe and the relations among nations and people are likely to 
be questioned even more in years to come. 

It is not possible to predict exactly where this historic process will 
take us. But there are certain constants which can serve as guideposts. 
There also are a number of important assumptions about the new paths 
before us. The United States has sought during the last three years to 
chart a direction which builds on the successes of the past five decades 
while staying ahead of the changes taking place.

In the best tradition of American leadership, President Clinton and 
Secretary of State Christopher have provided strong direction as we 
travel this exciting but sometimes challenging road. 

First, in Brussels in January 1994 and most recently, on September 6 in 
Stuttgart, the United States set forth a bold and creative concept of 
how we can build a new Atlantic partnership on the basis of the 
institutions and relationships which have served us so well. 

Our strategic approach aims at both   integration and cooperation to 
bring together different institutions and processes to accomplish its 
goals. Secretary Christopher has described this as a "New Atlantic 
Community."

Supported by productive bilateral relationships with European countries, 
our efforts enable us to give North America a deeper partnership with a 
new Europe without artificial dividing lines. They allow us to work 
together to contain ethnic conflict and, in the case of Bosnia, to 
restore peace. They help us maintain stability in the Aegean and work 
together for a comprehensive settlement on Cyprus. And they allow a 
concerted effort to influence countries when the progress of reform hits 
a snag.

The New Atlantic Community reflects the ideal envisioned by George 
Marshall nearly 50 years ago of a truly integrated Europe from the 
Atlantic to the Urals. In June of 1947, he eloquently stated our best 
and most noble aspirations for inclusivity, for mutual  aid and support, 
and for a Europe that was secure not by military might but by the 
confidence of its societies. Today    his assessment is as relevant as 
ever: America's successful interaction with   Europe must be based on 
the momentum created by leadership, partnership, and concrete action.

In taking inspiration from Secretary Marshall's vision of active 
cooperation in the Euro-Atlantic region, I do not mean to suggest that 
we should look backward as we face today's problems, for it is clear 
that the New Atlantic Community we create cannot be based on past 
models. The relationship between joint responsibility to resolve 
specific issues as they arise and the need to apportion authority 
between Europe and the United States is still evolving. We cannot build 
a New Atlantic Community on the assumption that it will ultimately 
mirror the West as we have known it. Just as a unified Germany is a 
melding of east and west  rather than simply a larger West Germany, our 
new community must take the contributions of all societies to form a 
true synthesis.

We must capitalize on Europe's diversity--the source of its strength as 
well as its challenge. The new Europe must transcend divisions while 
recognizing the reality that societies increasingly want to retain their 
identity and individualism. In NATO expansion, in the enhancement of the 
OSCE, in our many joint efforts with the EU under the New Transatlantic 
Agenda, there is no need for any state to feel that it is simply signing 
on to existing structures. What is being created is something entirely 
new, which draws from the strength of each contributor.

The second vital point is that despite the wealth, talent, and success 
of much of Europe, the American role is still essential for building 
stability in the New Atlantic Community. Among actively engaged 
Europeans and Americans, of course, this is accepted as a truism. Yet 
there has been a spirited debate in the post-Cold War era about the 
nature and use of U.S. power in the Transatlantic context. A recent 
survey showed that 35% of Americans believe that the United States 
should refrain from engaging at all internationally. America, they say, 
should look to its own interests and in this way preserve, not 
dissipate, its power. Others beg the United States to be a constant and 
highly visible presence--a power-broker as well as a power.

These views are not consistent, however. There are those who straddle 
the issue, worrying that the United States is disengaged and panicking 
that we will become overly dominant when we are direct and decisive. We 
have seen a recent swing in these moods in the last year, with early 
cries that we were becoming too absorbed in Asian affairs or had 
forgotten Europe, followed by criticism of our bold role in achieving 
peace in Bosnia. But throughout this cycle, we should never question the 
overall need for our steadfast presence in Europe.

The United States may be the most powerful country ever. But its power 
has evolved in untraditional ways. There is no question that we are a 
military and economic power of nearly unprecedented rank. Yet our real 
strength lies in our ability to generate ideas and actions and to 
resolve problems in unforeseen ways. Moreover, we have absorbed people 
from every nation, so that we are an amalgam of the enormous range of 
available energy and creative thinking. By remaining the world's 
greatest laboratory for social change and the personification of its 
diversity, we inspire people to identify with us. We are, in a sense, 
the connecting tissue in a time of divisive trends among many societies 
in Europe.

When someone many thousands of miles away drinks a Coke or logs on to 
the Internet, they are not becoming an American; they are becoming part 
of the international community. They are recognizing a way of living 
that is outside of themselves and their narrowly defined traditions.

In the same way, European businesses that use management techniques 
successfully developed and implemented in the United States and then 
marketed in Europe are not veering dangerously onto the road of American 
cultural      imperialism; they are simply taking      advantage of one 
of America's best exports: solutions to problems. The United States 
projects authority not because it is strong but, increasingly, because 
it offers ideas, services, and products that are adaptive and appealing 
in their universality.

The uniqueness of American power lies in its circumspection. It would be 
folly to suggest that the U.S. never uses raw power to further its 
national interests. But Americans themselves today have an ambivalence 
about their might. On the one hand, they unquestionably want to retain 
it and the status that comes with it. No politician today could succeed 
on a platform of promoting a weaker and humbler United States. Yet we as 
a nation are unusually soul-searching in the exercise of military power. 
Where we are unhesitating is in the power to make things happen, to 
shape the world to what we see as a better end. Sometimes through 
military strength, but more often through technological invention, the 
promotion of culture and entertainment, or the conversion of ideas into 
action, we wield influence that makes the world follow our lead.

So U.S. influence is vital. But our role is generally one of direction 
and shared responsibility for common objectives, not single-minded power 
politics. This is particularly true in light of the increased need for 
joint efforts with our European partners. Together over the past several 
years, we have developed an ingenious array of tools to address 
burgeoning crises or persistent problems.

The complementary network of institutions we have designed is an 
impressive resource. Our "toolbox" is so well-equipped now that we can 
choose alternatives ranging from the low-intensity, value-based actions 
of the OSCE to direct military force in appropriate situations through 
our formal military ties in NATO and bilateral security relationships 
throughout the region. 

NATO does remain of prime importance as the foundation for American 
security engagement in Europe. Yet while we retain the core function of 
the alliance--embodying a solemn commitment to defend our allies and 
preserve their freedom--we are, indeed, building a new NATO. It is 
adapted to meet today's security challenges, bolstered by a more active 
and visible European role, acting in partnership with Russia and 
Ukraine, and committed to extending its reach of security and stability 
to countries which were denied that benefit by the Cold War.

By taking new democracies formally into the Alliance, NATO can serve the  
interests of all countries in Europe, including those of Russia. NATO 
membership will remove once and for all the rivalries and temptations of 
a region whose past is riddled with war and conflict. Rather than 
threatening anyone, the expansion of NATO will ensure permanent 
partnership throughout the region. 

In a sense, NATO already has expanded through the highly successful 
Partnership for Peace. The Partnership has brought more than a score of 
non-member nations into close cooperation with NATO, helping to prepare 
some for membership, helping to prepare all to work side by side to 
build a secure Europe and improve their stability. 

The success story of IFOR in Bosnia is an expression of that new 
relationship. Drawing on the success of PfP, we intend to further 
involve Partners in forming an Atlantic Partnership Council in order to 
engage them in the planning as well as the execution of NATO missions.

Enhanced relations with Russia as well as with Ukraine are key tasks for 
the new NATO. In the case of Russia, we are working to embody that 
relationship in a formal charter. No one understands better than we that 
close cooperation and consultation with the Russian Federation is 
essential to building the New Atlantic Community.

The United States hopes that when NATO leaders gather in the spring or 
early summer of next year they will approve a broad package of measures 
of truly historic impact. The summit should complete the internal 
adaptation of the Alliance; it should signal the opening of negotiations 
for new members; it should upgrade PfP and create a new Atlantic 
Partnership Council; and it should    complete a charter with the 
Russian   Federation. These steps will rank with the accomplishments of 
the early post-war period in providing a firm foundation for the future.

NATO's work will be supported increasingly by the Organization for 
Security and Cooperation in Europe. The OSCE is the only framework which 
brings all members of the Community into a single organization. The OSCE 
represents a broad concept of security which focuses on promoting 
democracy at the roots of society. Emphasis on values, human rights, and 
a definition of stability based on the democratization  of societies are 
the guiding principles of the OSCE. As its name suggests, it is the 
basis for the new sort of security cooperation which is developing in 
Europe.

OSCE leaders will meet in Lisbon in early December to define a model for  
security in the 21st century. This model should put into practice the 
principles of cooperation agreed by OSCE countries during the past 25 
years. It should go  beyond words and set forth a sense of empowerment 
for all states, large or small, to define their own interests within the 
framework of the principles of the OSCE. The realization of this 
democratic security space will be an important step toward replacing the 
power politics of the past. 

The European Union is another unique and invaluable partner both in 
terms of deepening integration and sustaining Transatlantic 
collaboration. An economic powerhouse by any standard, the EU and its 
single market have underwritten the economic success of Western Europe 
and constitute a principal mechanism for extending prosperity to Central 
and Eastern Europe.

Recognizing the EU's role and importance, we have taken dramatic steps 
to raise our cooperation to an even higher level with the New 
Transatlantic Agenda, signed by President Clinton and his EU 
counterparts in December 1995. This agenda has turned U.S.-EU relations 
on their axis--we no longer issue heartfelt promises; we now work on 
concrete agendas. Second, the scope now encompasses all of Europe. Our 
goal is to extend the methods which made our Western interaction so 
successful to all of Europe.

Another of our important goals is to build a Euro-Atlantic marketplace. 
The NTA gives new direction and focus to our transatlantic ties and 
seeks to involve our European allies more fully in sharing the burden of 
responding to post-Cold War concerns in Europe and globally. However, 
the pace of accomplishment has been uneven. We call on our European 
partners to work with us, redoubling efforts to show progress on trade 
and drug trafficking in advance of the next U.S.-EU Summit.

Our economic dialogue also has been significantly enhanced through the 
mechanisms offered by the OECD and G-7. The European role in all of 
these arrangements has grown with the full support of the United States. 
This, too, is essential if we are truly to work together as a community 
to tackle the problems we face at the end of this century.

The web of institutions and relationships which we are developing have 
already proven very effective. Two excellent examples come to mind. In 
Bosnia, after differences and disagreement, we have made much progress 
in bringing about a secure peace. Key European countries and Russia 
joined with the United States in the Contact Group to achieve a true 
synthesis of interests and approaches to the problem.

To make concrete progress, direct American military and diplomatic 
leadership was essential and will continue to be essential, but it could 
not be achieved by the United States working in isolation. American 
power alone was not sufficient to address all of the historic, 
political, and ethnic problems of the Balkan region. A new consensus 
among NATO, the EU, and neighboring states was needed.

So far we also have met with success. IFOR and the institutions geared 
to promoting civilian reconstruction have personified the spirit of 
common action that we seek in building the New Atlantic Community. IFOR 
has given a strong projection of the underlying cohesion of NATO, and it 
has shown the world how effective we can be in a cooperative effort with 
former adversaries.

All European institutions are working in concert to achieve our goals in 
Bosnia, pledging the best we all have to offer to find lasting 
solutions. In working together to bring Bosnia back into the Euro-
Atlantic family of nations, we are combining our fundamental belief in a 
value-based set of policies with a recognition that only the 
establishment of confident and freedom-loving societies can bring about 
true stability.

The work undertaken on military confidence-building measures and the CFE 
Treaty over the last few years has also underscored our conviction that 
a mutual web of relationships is critical to achieving real security. 
Conceived in   the depths of the Cold War, negotiated during a time of 
revolutionary change, these new security agreements have ultimately 
altered our entire way of thinking and acting militarily.

Whereas military affairs throughout Europe were once conducted in 
secrecy and suspicion, transparency is now the rule. Nations consult 
about virtually    every aspect of defense, from troop movements to arms 
shipments. Their weapons and military budgets are subject to intrusive 
inspection by neighbors and former foes. Military security is now 
envisioned as more dependent on openness and cooperation than on 
surprise  or the stockpiling of arms.

In the coming months, we will be working to use our ongoing consultative 
opportunities through the CFE Treaty to talk about all aspects of our 
military relationships and how best to keep them effective in altered 
circumstances. 

We will be able to make a focused examination of military situations 
across the continent and retain the momentum that has seen the greatest 
number of conventional weapons destroyed in history. This, again, is the 
welcome product of our new integrated approach to ensuring that each 
nation's interests are protected in order to protect the interests of 
all. Through collective action everyone wins.

What we are developing is a new understanding of how the United States 
and Europe work together. The understanding is based on a respect for 
the differences in European and American sources of strength.

As we find new ways to use the varied tools that we have developed, we 
will continue to build our mutual relationship. American power will be 
critical to this, but it will be a different kind of power than is 
traditionally understood. The rest of the world has evolved and the 
American role has changed. We cannot reinvent the past; we have no 
intention of using, as Josef Joffe has pointed out, either Britain or 
Bismarck as our model. Nor will the use of American power mirror that of 
the early part of this century, World War II, or the Cold War.

In creating a New Atlantic Community, we are not making a clone of the 
West  as we have known it. Rather, we are    engaged in the exciting 
process of inventing our community--one that is steeped in shared 
standards and goals and uses the full richness of its diversity to meet 
its ends.

The year ahead is going to be filled with historic events. Over the past 
three years, we have put in place an action strategy which will allow us 
to shape these events more than ever before. In doing so, we will use 
the great resources of our traditional relationships. The role of the 
U.S. will be central. Our approach also will gain strength from the 
addition of our dynamic new partnership with central and eastern Europe. 
And our new interaction with the Russian Federation will add an even 
wider dimension. But to make it work, we must focus our collective will 
on this new concept. Above all, we must reaffirm our trust in the 
community of values and interests which has already grown up across the 
Atlantic.  

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ARTICLE 3

U.S. Policy in the Asia-Pacific
John S. Wolf, U.S. Coordinator for APEC 
Address to the Pacific Leaders Forum, Bell Harbor International 
Conference Center, Seattle, Washington, October 1, 1996

Good morning. I am delighted to be here to talk about our policy in the 
Asia-Pacific--the region of the world that has become the most robust 
and important in the past two decades and the region that is vital to 
our economic future. You know, it strikes me every time I'm here in 
Seattle--the bridge to the Pacific Rim--how important relationships are 
in fostering business development and business growth. And I see the 
parallel in APEC; we build and nurture relationships within the 
organization and with business in order to eliminate barricades to our 
goods and services. This helps our business community and our economy. 
Before I get into that, let me start by briefly outlining our general 
approach to the region. Then I will focus on the economic aspects of our 
strategy and explain how APEC fits  into the big picture.

The Administration's Asia Policy

President Clinton outlined our policy toward the region during his trip 
to Japan and Korea in July 1993. He set forth a vision of a "New Pacific 
Community built on shared strength, shared prosperity, and shared 
commitment to democratic values."  These three elements are mutually 
reinforcing. To realize the vision of a Pacific community--small c--we 
have been pursuing a variety of initiatives in our bilateral and 
multilateral policies, of which APEC is key.

Preserving Security

Let me just highlight several aspects of our Asia strategy before I get 
to APEC. The Asia-Pacific is the region where four of the world's major 
powers intersect and where the United States has large, abiding, and 
continuing interests in preserving stability. We are maintaining our 
forward military presence in the western Pacific. We are upholding our 
five core alliances with Japan, Korea, Australia, Thailand, and the 
Philippines. And in Southeast Asia, where the Secretary had his meeting 
with his counterparts back in July, we have actively engaged in the 
ASEAN Regional Forum--a new, valuable opportunity where we discuss the 
full range of pressing Asian security issues and a place to engage in 
confidence building.

The cornerstone of our engagement in the region, of course, remains our 
relationship with Japan. The President's very successful summit meeting 
with Prime Minister Hashimoto last April reaffirmed that we can promote 
America's economic interests while at the same time strengthening our 
vital security ties. 

We have worked closely with Japan, for instance, on issues related to 
the Korean Peninsula, where we have led international efforts to 
implement the Agreed Framework. We also have an important and broad-
ranging program, called the Common Agenda, in which we work together on 
environmental matters, on coral reef protection, and on health matters, 
such as AIDS, that involve well over $10 billion. And during the April 
summit, we added narcotics and anti-terrorism efforts to the Common 
Agenda.

Economically, our relationship has matured and is becoming more 
balanced. The financial services sector is opening up, with public and 
private sector pension funds increasingly open to foreign investment 
advisers. We have agreements on cellular phones, and civil aviation, and 
we are seeing more opportunities for American auto and auto repair 
industries. The deficit for the first seven months of 1996 is almost 30% 
lower than for the same period in 1995.

The progress on this front is due to a variety of factors, including 
your persistence in gaining a foothold in the Japanese market and this 
Administration's determination to increase access in different sectors. 
There is much that Japan must do to improve its many regulations and 
practices. We will press for further deregulation of the Japanese market 
and ensure that existing agreements are adhered to.

With Vietnam, we have been able to pursue relations in trade and 
investment building on a foundation of cooperation on POW/MIA accounting 
and on Vietnamese asylum seekers in Southeast Asia. Vietnam has 
expressed an interest to National Security Adviser Lake during his visit 
last June in a comprehensive bilateral trade agreement, which is the 
prerequisite for MFN status. We believe that a comprehensive bilateral 
trade agreement with Vietnam is an important means of ensuring fair and 
equitable market access for U.S. firms. A team of U.S. trade negotiators 
conducted the first round of negotiations last week.

Of course, no speech on the region can neglect China, the emerging power 
that is playing an ever larger role in shaping the future of Asia. It is 
vital to our interests to have a stable, open, and prosperous China, and 
we are engaged in various initiatives, APEC for example, to move China 
in that direction. There is no doubt that there remain important areas 
of difference with China. In order to manage these differences, we are 
seeking much more frequent high-level engagement. A half-dozen cabinet-
level meetings are taking place this fall, and the President will have 
an opportunity to meet President Jiang in November at the APEC Leaders 
Meeting. 

The extension of MFN status has been the foundation of our trade and a 
key element of our political relationship. MFN is, as you know, a 
misnomer; it means ordinary tariff treatment and not privileged status. 
Extension of MFN makes our economy stronger and more efficient. It 
protects over 100,000 American jobs, and it is essential to American 
exports having access to China's rapidly expanding, enormous market.

It is estimated that China will spend $50 billion on the transportation 
sector between now and 2010; on energy, $65 billion over the next few 
years; and on telecommunications equipment and technology, from $10-35 
billion. And that is just a synopsis of the major sectors. Of course, 
without open markets, fair competition, and protection of our 
intellectual property rights, all this would mean nothing. We have 
signed a number of agreements with China that have contributed to our 
export growth--in 1995, exports to China increased by more than 25%. We 
concluded an agreement on IPR protection in 1995, and the Chinese have 
made efforts to implement their commitments. We also have agreements 
covering aviation, maritime, commercial space launch services, and 
textiles. We will work actively with the Chinese to ensure these all 
meet their objectives.

There are many political issues where we need greater Chinese 
cooperation, but I won't get into that this morning. Given the full 
range of our common interest and the importance of China to our future 
security and economic well-being, I cannot overstate the importance of 
regular bilateral and multilateral dialogues between our two countries. 

Promoting Democracy

Another pillar of our strategy is our steadfast support for democracy 
and human rights. This is our most complex challenge and perhaps the one 
for which we receive the least international support. We only need to 
compare Japan and Burma to see that accountable government and the rule 
of law are the foundation of stability and prosperity. Just as open 
markets and open sea lanes promote prosperity and security in the 
Pacific, so do open societies. This, too, is the subject for a separate 
speech. But, I would say here that a foreign policy that did not include 
Americans' principles as a key principle of U.S. foreign policy could 
not long keep the support of the American people. Four years ago when I 
was sworn in as Ambassador to Malaysia, I noted that one cannot 
understand America or Americans if one does not understand the 
fundamental strain of idealism that is part of Americans' shared 
experience.

Accelerating Economic Change

Accelerating the pace of liberalization and market opening is the core 
element of our economic policies in Asia, and, as you may have guessed, 
also my chief interest. Our engagement in the Asia- Pacific Economic 
Cooperation forum ensures that the United States contributes to and 
benefits from the dynamic economic growth of the region. You are here 
today because you know the immense opportunities that are out there. 

Let me, nevertheless, mention some figures to you: Our trade with APEC 
economies in 1995 was $884 billion or about 66% of our total trade with 
the world; with Europe, it was $259 billion or less than 20% of our 
total trade. Growth rates in the Asian economies are three to four times 
higher than the rest of the world, with total output doubling every 8 to 
10 years. I cannot think of a single sector in our own economy which 
cannot benefit from this dynamism.

For example, if you are in any way connected to the infrastructure 
industry, the World Bank forecasts that over the next decade South Korea 
will spend $269 billion on telecommunications, roads, bridges, ports, 
and electric power generation. Collectively, Indonesia, Malaysia, 
Thailand, and the Philippines will spend $404 billion; China, $744 
billion. These numbers wouldn't mean anything to you if trade barriers 
and anti-competitive practices prevent you from competing with other 
international firms fairly.

APEC

Before we get into the prospects for APEC, let me tell you briefly its 
short but significant history. The Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation 
forum was started in 1989 with 12 members. President Clinton elevated 
the level of the organization in 1993 when he invited APEC leaders to 
Blake Island, Seattle--not too far from where we are--for the first ever 
APEC Leaders Meeting, and shaped an economic vision statement for the 
Pacific.

The following year, Indonesia's President Suharto hosted a second APEC 
Leaders Meeting in Bogor, where APEC leaders made a commitment to 
achieve free and open trade in the region by 2010 for developed 
economies and 2020 for developing economies. 

Last November in Osaka, APEC leaders set out a detailed action agenda 
covering the full range of trade issues. The general areas of 
consideration cover the main concerns of international business: tariffs 
and non-tariff measures, services, investment, standards, customs 
procedures, intellectual property, government procurement, competition 
policy, deregulation, rules of origin, and dispute mediation. Members 
are now putting the finishing touches on their individual actions plans 
for getting to free trade and investment by 2010 or 2020.

Let me underscore one point, however. APEC is not an end in itself: It 
serves a series of goals. For us, it is a tool we use to further 
specific U.S. foreign policy objectives. It should not be a surprise if 
every other APEC economy has developed its own-- hopefully, overlapping-
-matrix of interests. Let me name six key ones 
for us.

-- It helps anchor the U.S. as Pacific leader. By playing a central role 
in deepening economic integration, we contribute to the region's 
stability. Our engagement in the region through APEC proves to our 
friends our long-term commitment to the region.

-- Our participation in APEC complements our bilateral efforts to open 
markets. APEC covers such important issues as transparency, intellectual 
property rights protection, and business facilitation.

-- APEC provides a forum for engagement with Asian countries--or 
economies. Not only does APEC include ASEAN as a core element, but it is 
the only organization in the world where the P.R.C., Taiwan--or Chinese 
Taipei, as it is identified in APEC--and Hong Kong each has an equal 
voice.

-- APEC is doing important work to develop safe, effective capital 
markets. We have as a primary economic goal to promote a global 
financial system that can absorb the sort of shock we saw last year in 
Mexico, minimize risks to our economy or the global economy, and at the 
same time help mobilize the enormous pool of private capital that will 
be necessary to sustain the region's growth.

-- As a multilateral forum, APEC gives us broad scope to advance our 
positions on global issues. Though APEC focuses much on trade and 
investment, we began last year a concerted effort to increase the 
attention to environmental aspects of growth. Over time, APEC economies 
may address issues like governance, narcotics, and illegal immigration.

-- Last, but certainly not least, we create new opportunities for U.S. 
business. As I said before, building relationships between governments 
and business is vital in the Asia-Pacific. In addition to carrying out 
projects that effect U.S. business, APEC also creates new opportunities 
to develop effective regional partnerships and new opportunities to get 
U.S. private sector advice on regional issues into agendas of senior 
officials.

This year, APEC economies are taking a concrete step in realizing the 
goal of trade and investment liberalization by 2010/2020 set at Bogor in 
1994 by developing individual action plans, or IAPs. One of my goals for 
1996 is to ensure that every economy presents a transparent, forward-
leaning action plan for trade and investment liberalization. APEC 
economies are now in the final stages of preparing their IAPs for the 
November meetings. When this process is completed, APEC will be the only 
group in the world to have developed a transparent mechanism for 
comparing the progress made by diverse economies. 

For those of you who are familiar with the Uruguay Round negotiations, 
what I have described parallels and reinforces the work of the World 
Trade Organization. And that is intentional. As you know, the WTO will 
hold its ministerial meeting in Singapore just a few weeks after our 
APEC meetings in Manila. We plan to take advantage of the timing and 
accomplish another goal for this year: Spur further progress in the WTO 
by providing a powerful incentive for other trading nations to join in 
the continuing process of liberalization that APEC has provoked. 

We are working on an agreement to eliminate tariffs on information 
technology products before the WTO ministerial meeting in Singapore in 
December. This information technology agreement, or ITA, will reduce 
tariffs to zero on a wide range of high-tech goods and will offer APEC 
economies a special chance to join together in a sector where they lead 
the world in manufacturing.

That is the overall trade policy context of APEC. But a lot of the 
forum's real output is concrete and tangible. We have gotten a lot of 
positive results from our involvement in it. The 10 working groups have 
undertaken projects that directly support the expansion of trade and 
investment in the region. But some benefits are harder to quantify. For 
instance, APEC has put a spotlight on the region and is bringing it 
greater attention from U.S. business.

Other benefits that are hard to quantify are the relationships among 
public and private participants that APEC has fostered. APEC has a 
business advisory council consisting of three CEOs from each member 
economy to advise the leaders. The APEC Business Advisory Council, or 
ABAC, brings to governments the business point of view, channeling 
advice beyond the box and ensuring that our deliverables really are what 
is needed to heighten the pace of greater economic efficiency. 

Our three ABAC members, I am sure, are no strangers to many of you: 
Robert Denham, CEO of Solomon Brothers; Susan Corrales-Diaz, CEO of 
Systems Integrated, a small firm in California; and Frank Shrontz, CEO 
of Boeing. In November, ABAC will meet with President Clinton and APEC 
leaders.

Most of APEC's working groups and committees already gather input from 
the private sector on their work programs. They have accomplished much 
that directly affects the business community, such as:

-- Putting all APEC tariffs in a common data base on the Internet; 
-- Agreeing on common customs procedures that will greatly simplify the 
number of different regimes business must accommodate; or
-- Developing a model mutual recognition agreement in the 
telecommunications area. 

These kinds of measures will reduce your transaction costs, cut your 
cycle time, and increase the efficiency of business all across APEC. 
Giving greater focus to this cooperation between the public and private 
sectors is my third goal for APEC this year.

We are also looking into ways to focus the work of APEC in areas we 
describe as economic cooperation. Through economic cooperation, we can 
break down structural impediments and provide new opportunities to 
benefit from the trade and investment liberalization efforts. That 
means, for instance, linking the region together by providing the 
telecommunications and transportation infrastructure needed to sustain 
growth. And it means promoting environmentally sound growth to avoid 
permanent damage to the environment by promoting the use of clean 
production techniques and new technologies. 

Now that I have given you some idea of what APEC has done and plans to 
do, let me say clearly one thing APEC is not doing. APEC is not creating 
barriers between the Pacific Basin and the rest of the world. There are 
views floating out there that the earth is being divided into three 
blocks: APEC, the Free Trade Area of the Americas, and the EU. This 
zero-sum line of thinking does not parallel with the goals that we have 
set for APEC. What's more, this approach would undermine the liberal 
world trading regime that we have worked toward for years.

APEC is the premier forum for addressing many issues central to U.S. 
policy and central to U.S. national interests in the Asia-Pacific. APEC 
is the premier forum for building personal relationships at the highest 
levels of both the public and private sectors. And with your active 
support, APEC can play a central role in helping to realize the vision 
of a Pacific community of security, stability, and prosperity. 

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ARTICLE 4

What's in Print: Foreign Relations Of the United States

The Department has recently released the following volumes: Foreign 
Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, Volume XVII, Eastern Europe 
and Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963, Volume VI, 
Kennedy-Khrushchev Exchanges. 

1964-1968, Volume XVII, Eastern Europe

U.S. responses to the events surrounding the Soviet invasion of 
Czechoslovakia and the efforts of President Lyndon Johnson to "build 
bridges" to Eastern Europe are the major themes of this volume. For the 
first time, secretly taped records of White House meetings during the 
Johnson presidency are made available.

Since the Eisenhower Administration, the U.S. had used cultural exchange 
and economic assistance programs to encourage greater independence among 
the states of the region from control of the Soviet Union. The Johnson 
Administration also used  trade policy to promote liberalizing trends in 
the Soviet Union.

The "bridge building" program launched by the President in a May 1964 
speech was hampered by a  lack of public and congressional support, as 
well as bureaucratic disagreements, a series of public relations 
missteps, and serious obstacles abroad. As a result, the policy was only 
partially successful.

Full diplomatic relations with Hungary were restored but not without 
many outstanding problems. Relations with Poland also presented a series 
of complications. 

Romania appeared to offer the best prospects for the successful use of 
U.S. economic aid to promote a loosening of ties with the Soviet Union. 
After Romanian leaders actively sought U.S. economic  and technical 
assistance and carried out reforms that met U.S. requirements, the 
relationship between Washington and Bucharest warmed considerably.

This volume is one of 34 volumes documenting the foreign policy of the 
Johnson Administration. 


1961-1963, Volume VI, Kennedy-Khrushchev Exchanges

This volume presents for the first time the complete correspondence 
between President John F. Kennedy and Soviet Chairman Nikita S. 
Khrushchev. It provides a comprehensive overview of major Cold War 
problems and possibilities for detente. Included are personal and 
confidential exchanges as well as official correspondence.

Their correspondence was unique in that it gave rise to the first 
informal written exchange between Cold War leaders. It was a key early 
contributor to the learning process that, over several decades, allowed 
leaders of the two nations to communicate with each other with growing 
mutual understanding and eventually with trust. The correspondence 
presented the clear differences in the personalities and leadership 
styles of both men, as well as the larger political cultures in which 
they worked.

Exchanges between Kennedy and Khrushchev were gathered from the files of 
the State Department and the John F. Kennedy Presidential Library. The 
volume concludes with a letter from Mrs. Kennedy to Chairman Khrushchev 
following the President's death.

This volume is one of 25 volumes documenting the foreign policy of the 
Kennedy Administration.

For further information on each of these volumes, contact David 
Patterson, General Editor of the Foreign Relations series, at (202) 663-
1127; fax (202) 663-1289.

Copies of 1964-1968, Volume XVII, Eastern Europe (GPO Stock No. 044-000-
02433-1) may be purchased for $29 each postpaid ($36.25 for foreign 
orders). Copies of 1961-1963, Volume VI, Kennedy-Khrushchev Exchanges 
(GPO Stock No. 044-000-02387-3) may be purchased for $19 each  postpaid 
($23.75 for foreign orders). VISA, MasterCard, and personal checks are 
accepted. Order from:

U.S. Government Printing Office
Superintendent of Documents
P.O. Box 371954
Pittsburgh, PA 15250-7954

To order by phone, call (202) 512-1800; to fax your order, dial (202) 
512-2250. 

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[END DISPATCH VOL. 7, NO. 41]

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