U.S. Department of State
Dispatch Volume 7, Number 38, September 16, 1996
Bureau of Public Affairs


ARTICLES IN THIS ISSUE:

1.  The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty: Strengthening Security for the 
U.S. and the World--Secretary Christopher, White House Fact Sheets

2.  Promoting American Business Abroad--Secretary Christopher

3.  U.S. Relations With Indonesia--Winston Lord



ARTICLE 1:

The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty: Strengthening Security for the U.S. 
and the World
Secretary Christopher, White House Fact Sheets

Secretary Christopher
Statement released by the Office of the Department Spokesman, 
Washington, DC, September 11, 1996.

The UN General Assembly's vote yesterday to adopt the Comprehensive 
Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) was a landmark decision that will 
strengthen the security of the United States and that of every nation in 
the world. It moves us toward the fulfillment of a decades-old dream 
that there will be no nuclear explosions anywhere. This dream has been 
shared by world leaders beginning with Presidents Eisenhower and 
Kennedy.

The CTBT will prohibit any nuclear explosion, whether for military or 
peaceful purposes. It will effectively constrain the development and 
improvement of nuclear weapons and contribute to the prevention of 
nuclear proliferation and our ultimate goal of nuclear disarmament.

President Clinton's personal leadership played a key role in the success 
of the CTBT negotiations. The President's decision in July 1993 to 
extend the moratorium on U.S. nuclear testing laid the groundwork for 
the negotiations, and his announcement in August 1995 that the United 
States would support a zero-yield CTBT paved the way for resolution of 
one of the treaty's central issues. 

Of course, this success would not have been possible without the strong 
and unstinting efforts of so many of our allies and friends around the 
world. I want especially to acknowledge the role played by the 
Government of Australia, which led the effort to bring the CTBT to the 
UN. 

This treaty demonstrates the power of the international community to 
unite around a great goal and to act together to improve the security of 
all its members. The United States calls upon all nations, especially 
those with a historic commitment to the CTBT, to sign and ratify it 
without delay. 

We have another landmark arms control opportunity before us this week as 
the Senate is considering the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). This 
convention is of critical importance to the security of the United 
States. The threat of chemical weapons, whether in the hands of 
governments or terrorists, is one of the most pressing security 
challenges we face in the post-Cold War era. The CWC is a crucial tool 
in our global fight against chemical weapons proliferation. It 
establishes an international legal basis to seek out and isolate anyone 
who seeks to develop, produce, or stockpile chemical weapons.

The CWC has bipartisan backing. It was negotiated during the Reagan and 
Bush Administrations and has the full support of President Clinton. We 
urge prompt ratification of the CWC to demonstrate to the world our 
determination to defeat the rogue states or terrorists who would use 
such weapons of mass destruction.



Fact Sheet: Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty--Chronology During the Clinton 
Administration
Released by the White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Saint Louis, 
Missouri, September 10, 1996.

March 3, 1993. Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs 
Lake orders completion of an interagency Presidential review of U.S. 
policy on nuclear testing and a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.

April 4, 1993. Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin agree at the Vancouver 
summit that negotiations on a multilateral nuclear test ban should 
commence at an early date, and that the two governments would consult 
with each other accordingly.

April 23, 1993. President Clinton releases a White House statement on 
advancing U.S. relations with Russia and the other New Independent 
States, stating his intention to begin consultations with Russia, our 
allies, and other states on the specific issues related to a CTBT 
negotiation within the next two months.

July 3, 1993. President Clinton announces in his Saturday radio address 
to the nation the conclusion of the Presidential review on nuclear 
testing and a CTBT, and states his intention to extend the U.S. testing 
moratorium and seek to negotiate a CTBT.

August 10, 1993. The Geneva Conference on Disarmament (CD) decides to 
give its Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban a mandate to begin 
negotiations on a CTBT in January 1994. The Chairman of the AHC is 
authorized to proceed with intersessional consultations on the specifics 
of the CTBT mandate and other issues.

October 5, 1993. China conducts first nuclear test since President 
Clinton's appeal for a global moratorium. White House issues statement 
regretting China's decision to resume nuclear testing.

December 16, 1993. United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) passes 
resolution 48/70 by consensus supporting the multilateral negotiation of 
a CTBT. This is the first time that a consensus resolution in support of 
a CTBT has been adopted by the UNGA.

January 25, 1994. The CD reconvenes in Geneva and directs the Ad Hoc 
Committee to negotiate intensively on a universal and multilaterally and 
effectively verifiable comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty, which 
would contribute effectively to the prevention of the proliferation of 
nuclear weapons in all its aspects, to the process of nuclear 
disarmament and, therefore, to the enhancement of international peace 
and security. Negotiations begin in the Ad Hoc Committee. 

December 15, 1994. UNGA passes resolution 49/70 by consensus reaffirming 
its support for multilateral negotia- tions on a CTBT.

January 30, 1995. Assistant to the President for National Security 
Affairs Lake announces that the President has decided to extend the 
moratorium on U.S. nuclear testing until a CTBT enters into force 
(assuming signature before September 30, 1996). Lake also announces that 
the U.S. will withdraw its proposal for a special "right to withdraw" 
from the CTBT 10 years after it enters into force, noting that the 
President considers the maintenance of a safe and reliable nuclear 
stockpile to   be a supreme national interest of the United States. 

May 11, 1995. The NPT Review and Extension Conference agrees to extend 
the NPT indefinitely and without condition. The conference adopts 
"Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and 
Disarmament," calling for the conclusion of negotiations on a CTBT in 
1996. 

June 13, 1995. President Chirac announces he will resume nuclear testing 
in September, conduct eight tests to be completed by May, and be ready 
to sign a CTBT in the fall of 1996. White House issues statement 
regretting France's decision to resume nuclear testing.

August 11, 1995. President Clinton announces that the United States will 
support a true zero-yield CTBT banning any nuclear weapon test explosion 
or any other nuclear explosion.

September 5, 1995. France resumes nuclear testing in the South Pacific. 
White House issues a statement regretting this action. 

September 14, 1995. The United Kingdom announces its support for a zero-
yield CTBT.

October 20, 1995. The United States, France, and the United Kingdom 
release a joint statement at the United Nations and in capitals stating 
their intent to sign the Protocols to the South Pacific Nuclear Free 
Zone (SPNFZ) Treaty "during the first half of 1996."

October 23, 1995. Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin agree at Hyde Park to 
work together to succeed in getting a zero- yield CTBT in 1996.

December 12, 1995. United Nations General Assembly passes resolution 
50/65 by consensus calling on the CD to conclude the CTBT so as to 
enable its signature by the outset of the 51st session of the General 
Assembly.

January 29, 1996. President Chirac announces the end of French nuclear 
testing in the South Pacific.

February 29, 1996. Australia submits a 102-page draft CTBT text to the 
CD and calls on negotiators to reach an agreement by late June.

March 19, 1996. UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali appeals to 
the CD to complete a global treaty banning all nuclear explosions by 
June 30.

March 25, 1996. U.S., France, and the U.K. sign three Protocols to the 
South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty in Suva, Fiji.

April 11, 1996. U.S. signs Protocols I and II to the African Nuclear 
Weapon Free Zone Treaty in Cairo, Egypt.

April 20, 1996. Moscow nuclear summit issues statement on CTBT calling 
for concluding and signing the CTBT by September 1996.

May 28, 1996. Nuclear Test Ban Ad Hoc Committee Chairman Jaap Ramaker of 
the Netherlands tables a draft "chairman's text" stating he had 
concluded that the best way to meet the internationally agreed deadline 
was to "present a complete draft to show the way forward."

June 28, 1996. Chairman Ramaker tables compromise draft text at the 
conclusion of the second part of the 1996 CD session. White House 
releases statement by the President from Lyon, France, applauding the 
compromise draft and calling on members of the CD to return to Geneva in 
late July prepared to agree to forward a CTBT to the United Nations so 
that the treaty can be approved and opened for signature in the United 
States in September. 

July 29, 1996. China conducts a nuclear test and declares it will start 
a moratorium on nuclear testing effective from July 30, 1996. 

August 9, 1996. After consultations in the Ad Hoc Committee, Chairman 
Ramaker announces that he has confirmed that continuing negotiations on 
the draft treaty as a whole would not likely yield further results. He 
also announces one modification in the draft treaty relating to the 
number of states required to approve an on-site inspection. 

August 16, 1996. Nuclear Test Ban Ad Hoc Committee meets and agrees to a 
report to the CD stating that "no consensus" could be reached either on 
adopting the text of the CTBT or on  formally passing it to the CD, due 
to Indian objections.

August 23, 1996. Australian Foreign Minister Alexander Downer announces 
Australia will sponsor a resolution seeking the endorsement from the 
UNGA of the CTBT and its opening for signature at the earliest possible 
date.
  
September 10, 1996. UNGA reconvenes and votes to adopt the Comprehensive 
Test Ban Treaty and open it for signature at the earliest possible date.



Fact Sheet: The Purpose of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
Released by the White House, Office of the Press Secretary, St. Louis, 
Missouri, September 10, 1996.

By banning all nuclear explosions, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty 
(CTBT) will:

-- Constrain the development and qualitative improvement of nuclear 
weapons;

-- End the development of advanced new types of nuclear weapons; 

-- Contribute to the prevention of nuclear proliferation and the process 
of nuclear disarmament; and 

-- Strengthen international peace and security. 

The CTBT thus marks a historic milestone in our efforts to reduce the 
nuclear threat and build a safer world. 


The CTBT Parties

The CTBT was negotiated in the Geneva Conference on Disarmament (CD), 
recently expanded to include 61 member states, between January 1994 and 
August 1996. The treaty shall be open to all states for signature before 
its entry into force, and any state can accede to the treaty after that 
date. Thus, its participation can be universal. 


CTBT's Central Features

Structure. The treaty itself includes a Protocol in three parts:  Part I 
detailing the International Monitoring System (IMS); Part II on On-Site 
Inspections (OSI); and Part III on Confidence-Building Measures. There 
are also two annexes to the Protocol Annex 1 detailing the location of 
various treaty monitoring assets associated with the IMS; and Annex 2 
detailing the parameters for screening events.

Basic obligations. The CTBT will ban any nuclear weapon test explosion 
or any other nuclear explosion, consistent with President Clinton's 
August 11, 1995, decision to negotiate a true zero-yield CTBT. 
Organization. The treaty establishes an organization to ensure the 
implementation of its provisions, including those for international 
verification measures. The organization includes a Conference of States 
Parties, an Executive Council, and a Technical Secretariat, which shall 
include the International Data Center.

Verification and inspections. The treaty's verification regime includes 
an international monitoring system composed of seismological, 
radionuclide, hydroacoustic, and infrasound monitoring; consultation and 
clarification; on-site inspections; and confidence-building measures. 
The use of national technical means, vital for the treaty's verification 
regime, is explicitly provided for. Requests for on-site inspections 
must be approved by at least 30 affirmative votes of members  of the 
treaty's 51-member Executive Council. The Executive Council must act 
within 96 hours of receiving a request for an inspection.

Treaty compliance and sanctions. The treaty provides for measures to 
redress a situation and to ensure compliance, including sanctions, and 
for settlement of disputes. If the conference or Executive Council 
determines that a case is of particular gravity, it can bring the issue 
to the attention of the United Nations.

Amendments. Any state party to the treaty may propose an amendment to 
the treaty, the Protocol, or the annexes to the Protocol. Amendments 
shall be considered by an Amendment Conference and shall be adopted by a 
positive vote of a majority of the states parties with no state party 
casting a negative vote.

Entry into force. The treaty will enter into force 180 days after the 
date of deposit of the instruments of ratification by all states listed 
in Annex 2 to this treaty but in no case earlier than two years after 
its opening for signature. Annex 2 includes 44 states members of the 
Conference on Disarmament with nuclear power and/or research reactors. 
If the treaty has not entered into force three years after the date of 
the anniversary of its opening for signature, a conference of the states 
that have already deposited their instruments of ratification may 
convene annually to consider and decide by consensus what measures 
consistent with international law may be undertaken to accelerate the 
ratification process in order to facilitate the early entry into force 
of this treaty.

Review. Ten years after entry into force, a Conference of the States 
Parties will be held to review the operation and effectiveness of this 
treaty.

Duration. The treaty is of unlimited duration. Each state party has the 
right to withdraw from the CTBT if it decides that extraordinary events 
related to its subject matter have jeopardized its supreme national 
interests.

Depository. The Secretary General of the United Nations shall be the 
depository of this treaty and shall receive signatures, instruments of 
ratification, and instruments of accession. 

(###)



ARTICLE 2:

Promoting American Business Abroad
Secretary Christopher
Remarks to the Minority Business Council, Washington, DC, September 11, 
1996

Good morning. I am very glad to welcome you to the State Department's 
Conference on Resources for Minority Businesses in the Global 
Marketplace.

Joining me here today are the other members of the Trade Promotion 
Coordinating Committee--TPCC. That body was established by the Clinton 
Administration to make sure that American businesses--of all sizes and 
from all sectors--benefit as we open markets and expand opportunities 
for trade and investment. You will be hearing from Commerce Secretary 
Mickey Kantor, Energy Secretary Hazel O'Leary, Acting U.S. Trade 
Representative Charlene Barshefsky, and Phil Lader, Administrator of the 
Small Business Administration. You will meet others from the Eximbank, 
OPIC, the Trade and Development Agency, USAID, and the Minority Business 
Development Agency as well. 

For three years, the late Ron Brown led the TPCC as Commerce Secretary. 
He worked tirelessly to reduce barriers to U.S. exports and to introduce 
U.S. entrepreneurs to new markets. Most of all, Ron Brown worked to tear 
down preconceptions. He believed that Americans of all backgrounds and 
races--in family firms or giant corporations--could prosper in the 
global market. It is that legacy on which the TPCC, with Secretary 
Kantor now at its head, continues to build. 

The TPCC is just one part of the Clinton Administration's unprecedented 
support for American business in the international economy. At the 
center of our economic strategy has been our determination to create 
jobs for Americans at home by opening up opportunities for American 
firms abroad. I believe that our success will be one of the lasting 
legacies of this Administration. U.S. exports jumped by an unprecedented 
$82 billion last year, for an increase of more than 30% since 1993.  

Through the persistent efforts of Mickey Kantor, Charlene Barshefsky, 
and others, we have negotiated 21 market-opening agreements with Japan. 
Through APEC, we forged a strong commitment to open trade across the 
Asia-Pacific region. We are building a new Transatlantic Marketplace 
with the European Union. We are moving toward a Free Trade Area of the 
Americas that will encompass a market of 850 million consumers. And, of 
course, we succeeded in ratifying NAFTA and completing the GATT Uruguay 
Round. Now, as we approach the 21st century, the United States is 
positioned better than ever to be the most dynamic hub of the global 
economy. Today, we hope to make sure you are aware of the trade 
promotion resources available to you--and to make sure that you are able 
to take full advantage of our recent successes.

One thing on which all the experts agree is that America's diversity is 
an important part of our success in the global economy. Our roots lie in 
more than 100 different cultures. Yesterday's immigrants are tomorrow's 
exporters, forging new ties with the regions from which they came. 
Yesterday's start-up business may be tomorrow's Microsoft. And more and 
more of yesterday's small and medium-sized businesses are moving into 
foreign markets today.

As Secretary of State, I have made it a priority to expand our support 
for American business and make it more accessible to firms of all sizes. 
When I became Secretary, I told all our officers that there is nothing 
more important than sitting behind what I call the Department's "America 
desk."  That is my shorthand for seeing that the Department does 
everything it can to ensure that our business people can compete and win 
on a level, fair, and open playing field.


". . . the Department's 'America desk' . . . is my shorthand for seeing 
that the Department does everything it can to ensure that our business 
people can compete and win on a level, fair, and open playing field."


We support American business across a broad range of issues--pressing 
for the enforcement of effective intellectual property laws from 
Argentina to China and getting nine bilateral investment treaties 
ratified this summer alone. Our embassies are active in supporting 
American firms in international competition and in helping them resolve 
disputes when they arise. Embassy staff in busy posts like Beijing brief 
hundreds of Americans on economic and political conditions each year.

We have also built up our outreach to American business by appointing a 
Senior Coordinator for Business Affairs. David Ruth and his staff have 
traveled around the United States meeting with hundreds of small and 
medium-sized firms, listening to their concerns and letting them know 
what we can do to assist them. David has expanded our consultation with 
American business on foreign policy issues that affect your operations.
 
After today's meetings, I hope you will agree that the Clinton 
Administration has put together a talented team--your team--to promote 
American business abroad as never before. Consider us your partner as 
you turn America's know-how and America's diversity to America's 
advantage in the world as never before. 

(###)



ARTICLE 3:

U.S. Relations With Indonesia
Winston Lord, Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs
Statement before the Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs of 
the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee, September 18, 1996

Thank you Mr. Chairman. I am pleased to meet with you to discuss U.S. 
relations with Indonesia. A country of rich potential as well as great 
accomplishments, Indonesia often does not receive the kind of attention 
among most Americans that it deserves.

Let us first recall the principal features of our policy toward this 
region. During this Administration, we have pursued President Clinton's 
vision of a new Pacific community based on strength, shared prosperity, 
and a shared commitment to common values.

We are working with the nations of the region toward each of these three 
goals. On the security front, the U.S. is maintaining our force levels 
and alliances, combating the proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction, and helping develop new regional dialogues, such as the 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the ASEAN Regional 
Forum (ARF), to address our common security challenges.

In the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum, which the United 
States has supported since its inception, we are promoting greater 
economic cooperation and trade liberalization in the region.

The third pillar of our Pacific policy is the advocacy of democracy and 
human rights, long a central theme of U.S. foreign policy. Closed 
societies cannot stay closed forever in an era of instantaneous 
communication. Free societies also contribute to economic well-being and 
the peaceful resolution of conflicts.


U.S.-Indonesian Relations

Against this backdrop, let me address more directly our policy toward 
Indonesia. U.S. relations with Indonesia have been largely friendly for 
the last 50 years, ever since the U.S. provided key diplomatic support 
to buttress that country's successful struggle for independence.

The fourth-most populous nation in   the world, Indonesia is a vast 
country of over 200 million people and 17,000 islands. Its location 
gives it particular strategic importance, lying across key  sea lanes 
that bring oil to the United States and our allies and through which 
U.S. naval power moves to defend America's interests. Indonesia and its 
ASEAN partners clearly welcome U.S. engagement in the region and are 
doing what they can to support our presence. Jakarta has opened its 
ports for U.S. Navy ship visits and repairs and made available a bombing 
range for U.S. Air Force planes.

Our economic relations are strong and growing. Indonesia has a free 
market economy that is increasingly driven by the private sector, 
although the government continues to play a significant role through 
ownership of major industries. Under President Soeharto's leadership, 
Indonesia has pursued sound macro-  and microeconomic policies that have 
produced remarkable growth. Its economic growth, which has averaged 6.6% 
over the past 10 years, has clearly benefited average Indonesians. 
Recent UN and World Bank surveys show that the gap between the richest 
20% of the population and the poorest 20% is  among the smallest of all 
developing nations. Given Indonesia's enormous weight in the region, its 
impressive economic strides have anchored ASEAN's own transformation 
from "dominos to dynamos." 

This remarkable growth has decidedly benefited U.S. economic interests 
as well. Bilateral trade grew nearly 60% over the last five years, to 
almost $12.3 billion, and U.S. investment now exceeds $7 billion, not 
counting our massive investment in Indonesia's petroleum and gas 
sectors. Moreover, a prospering Indonesia has fueled wider economic 
growth in Southeast Asia, where we are the major foreign economic player 
in many countries. Indonesia's enthusiastic support for regional tariff 
reductions in keeping with ASEAN Free Trade Area initiatives promises 
further advantages for efficient U.S. exporters.

With aid levels totaling $59 million, the United States is the sixth-
largest international donor to Indonesia. Our assistance is helping to 
stop the spread of AIDS; contributing to the revision of Indonesia's 
commercial code; supporting Indonesia's transition to a more democratic 
and pluralistic political system; protecting Indonesia's biodiversity; 
and working to improve women's literacy, access to basic medical 
services, and credit.

Part of Indonesia's success may lie in its relatively low expenditures 
on defense. Although the military plays a leading governing role, 
Indonesia's defense expenditures as a percentage of GNP total 1.5%, 
ranking it 119th (1994) in the world between Guyana and Guatemala. As 
one senior Indonesian official told us recently: "We would rather spend 
the money on economic development."


Indonesia's International Role

In addition to our major bilateral interests, Indonesia has been a 
positive force for promoting regional and global goals that are in the 
U.S. interest. These include the peaceful settlement of disputes in the 
region, arms control, and free trade. For example:

-- Indonesia was a founding member of ASEAN. Created as a bulwark 
against  the spread of communism, ASEAN has evolved into a political and 
defense-related institution dedicated to regional stability as well as a 
dynamic economic organization promoting regional trade and investment.

-- In 1991, Indonesia served as co-chairman (with France) in the 
negotiations which set up the UN-sponsored Cambodian peace process that 
led to the establishment of an elected government in that country.

-- In 1993, Indonesia helped found the ASEAN Regional Forum that holds 
annual meetings to discuss security issues, thus building patterns of 
cooperation among countries with security interests in the region. ARF 
now consists of 21 members, comprised of the seven ASEAN countries--
Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and 
Vietnam--plus Australia, Cambodia, Canada, China, the European Union, 
India, Japan, Korea, Laos, Myanmar, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, 
Russia, and the United States. 

-- Indonesia has provided key support to the 18-member Asia-Pacific 
Economic Cooperation forum, which promotes greater economic cooperation 
and trade liberalization in the region. Following the example of 
President Clinton who hosted the first APEC leaders meeting, President 
Soeharto invited heads of Asia's leading economies to Bogor in 1994, 
where they set sweeping goals to achieve free trade and investment by 
the years 2010--for developed countries--and 2020--for others. President 
Soeharto's advocacy was crucial in the decision of several APEC members 
to support this goal. Of particular importance to U.S. interests, 
President Soeharto insisted that all trade sectors, including 
agriculture, be included in the liberalization agenda.

-- As chairman of the Nonaligned Movement from 1992 to 1995, Indonesia 
brought constructive leadership to this key international grouping, 
moving it away from its long history of taking positions contrary to 
U.S. interests. 

-- Similarly, Indonesia--under President Soeharto's leadership--has 
pursued constructive policies toward its neighbors in the region. This 
is in contrast to the early 1960s when Jakarta sought "confrontation" 
with Malaysia and opposed any signs of American influence. This approach 
has helped produce the kind of stable environment that made economic 
progress possible. Southeast Asia is    now our third-largest overseas 
trading partner.

-- In 1995, Indonesia supported a consensus decision that extended 
indefinitely the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. 

-- In 1996, Indonesia supported our efforts to complete negotiation of a 
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty no later than 1996.

-- In 1995 and 1996, Indonesia donated heavy fuel oil to the Korean 
Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO), thus helping to reduce 
the threat of nuclear proliferation in North Korea. Indonesia has also 
become the first ASEAN member of KEDO.

-- In 1996, Indonesia brokered a peace agreement between the Government 
of the Philippines and the Moro National Liberation Front that ended a 
decades-long conflict in the southern Philippines.

-- Later this year, Indonesia will assume the leadership of the 
Organization of the Islamic Conference.

-- From 1975 until 1996, Indonesia provided safe haven to thousands of 
Vietnamese fleeing their homeland. In August 1996, Indonesia peacefully 
transferred the last of these refugees to Vietnam and closed the camps.

-- For several years, Indonesia has sponsored workshops to help resolve 
long-standing territorial disputes in the South China Sea.


Thus, Mr. Chairman, Indonesian policies and actions over the last 
several decades have advanced regional cooperation and stability in 
Southeast Asia and the wider Asia-Pacific region. Its role on broader 
international economic and security issues has been similarly 
constructive.


Democracy and Human Rights in Indonesia

Administration officials, including President Clinton, repeatedly have 
made clear that our relationship, as strong as it currently is, cannot 
reach its full potential until Indonesia improves its human rights 
performance. Indonesia's constitution highlights democratic principles. 
The national ideology of Pancasila, upon which the constitution is 
founded, includes a belief in a supreme being while calling for 
religious tolerance, a just and civilized society, national unity, 
democracy, and social justice. The constitution also provides for 
freedom of the press, freedom of peaceful assembly and association, and 
freedom of religion for the five recognized religions. 

To be sure, many of these principles are not yet followed in practice. 
Among other problems, individuals are sometimes detained without formal 
arrest, and accusations of torture have been leveled at the police and 
military personnel. Although elections are held, the Indonesian people 
continue to lack the ability to change their government. Important 
limitations remain on freedoms of expression, association, assembly, and 
the press. 

The human rights situation in East Timor is of special concern. In this 
regard, ongoing problems include the treatment of detainees and 
prisoners and the behavior of the security forces toward the population 
there. As you are aware, the United States accepts the incorporation of 
East Timor without maintaining that a valid act of self-determination 
has taken place. We believe that an internationally accepted 
comprehensive settlement is the best way to achieve lasting improvements 
in the situation in East Timor.

In Irian Jaya, Indonesia's human rights record has also come under 
criticism. Here, the major problems involve the difficult relationships 
between government officials and the military on the one hand and the 
indigenous people on the other. 

In our assessments of the Indonesian human rights situation, we must 
acknowledge, however, that government policies have brought considerable 
economic benefits to average Indonesians and that there have been 
improvements in other areas as well. Indonesia's remarkable economic 
growth, for example, has produced a considerable decline in the portion 
of the population living in absolute poverty. According to the World 
Bank, this number has dropped from 60% 20 years ago to 14% today. Per 
capita income has risen from around $70 in 1965 to over $1,000 today. 
Indonesia's record in promoting religious tolerance is impressive as 
well. While   the press practices self-censorship and certain topics 
remain off limits, the media routinely carry stories that are often 
critical of the government or report foreign criticisms of the 
government's human rights performance.

The military has also taken a number  of steps to correct its own human 
rights shortcomings. Recent abuses by troops have been followed by 
courts martial and prison sentences in some cases. In some instances, 
military honor boards that have handed down sentences have been headed 
by graduates of U.S. International Military Education and Training 
(IMET) programs. These same officers have also attempted to incorporate 
human rights materials in Indonesian military training courses and, in 
the province of Irian Jaya, have been responsible for issuing new rules 
of engagement manuals that include such principles.


Post-July 27 Developments

In examining recent events in Indonesia, it is important to recognize 
that the country appears to be entering a protracted transition to a 
post-Soeharto leadership, a period that may well extend into the next 
century. Elections for parliament are slated for 1997. President 
Soeharto will almost certainly be selected for a seventh five-year term 
in 1998 if he decides to run again at age 77. This said, most 
Indonesians appear to realize that the question of a successor for the 
president will confront the nation in the foreseeable future.

These considerations, among others, appear to have sparked the 
heightened political activity that has marked the Indonesian scene in 
recent months. Moreover, the impending elections seem to have been a key 
factor prompting the government role in the removal of one opposition 
leader, Megawati Sukarnoputri, and its subsequent July 27 violent 
ejection of her supporters from the Indonesian Democratic Party (PDI) 
headquarters, which they were occupying to protest the government's 
moves against their leader. Ensuing riots following the violent takeover 
of the PDI headquarters resulted in a number   of deaths and 
considerable property damage. The government followed up by arresting 
large numbers of people active in the reform movement, including 
individuals such as labor leader Muchtar Pakpahan, who appear to have 
simply stated their views on the need for political changes.


U.S. Response

While the U.S. can help encourage positive developments in Indonesia, it 
is the Indonesian people and government that will shape that nation's 
destiny. As in any large nation, internal considerations will 
predominate. In short, U.S. influence is important but limited. This 
said, we have positioned ourselves on the side of responsible change. As 
Secretary Christopher stated in his testimony before the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee on August 1, 1996:

At the present time, I think there's a strong interest in seeing an 
orderly transition of power there that will recognize the pluralism that 
should exist in a country of that magnitude and importance. So we will 
be encouraging a transition there that expresses the popular will.

In keeping with the Secretary's remarks, we have consistently upheld the 
rule of law in our public statements of recent weeks and protested 
actions that deprive individuals of their fundamental human rights. We 
have also raised with senior Indonesian officials reports of 
mistreatment of detainees, who in turn have pledged to look into the 
allegations. In the meantime, our statements of concern regarding the 
rights of those detained after the July 27 events have been published in 
Jakarta newspapers, ensuring that the U.S. position is widely known and 
appreciated.

We will continue to speak out when actions occur in Indonesia that 
violate human rights, and we will press ahead with our monitoring of and 
support for human rights, as we have done in the past.

By way of review, our actions under this Administration include:

-- Maintaining contact with Indonesians across the political spectrum to 
develop a persuasive dialogue on human rights/democracy issues and to 
encourage the development of modern political institutions that reflect 
popular will;

-- Visiting areas of special interest such as East Timor, Aceh, and 
Irian Jaya as resources permit;

-- Including democracy and human rights themes whenever possible in 
public speaking appearances before civilian and military audiences;

-- Encouraging the Indonesian Armed Forces to nominate qualified 
candidates for our expanded IMET program that stresses human rights and 
civilian rule;

-- Providing the Indonesian military with information on international 
practices and conventions dealing with the handling of POWS, treatment 
of civilian populations, etc.

In this vein, senior U.S. Government officials, from the President on 
down, regularly raise human rights with their Indonesian counterparts. 
On his recent trip to Indonesia for the ASEAN Post-Ministerial 
Conference and the ASEAN Regional Forum, Secretary Christopher made a 
point of meeting with the National Human Rights Commission. Expressing 
his support for the organization's work, the Secretary said:

. . . it is clear that this Commission with its very steady and discreet 
and careful way of proceeding--an honorable way of proceeding--has 
raised the awareness of human rights issues within theIndonesian 
Government and with the people of Indonesia."  

Later this year, Assistant Secretary Shattuck is scheduled to travel to 
Jakarta to make our concerns regarding human rights abuses known to 
senior officials.

And as you know, Mr. Chairman, I visited Jakarta just last week for 
discussions with senior government officials, the National Human Rights 
Commission, religious leaders, and a broad range of non-governmental 
organizations. In all of my exchanges, I highlighted our important human 
rights concerns against the backdrop of maintaining good relations with 
Indonesia in order to pursue our other important interests with that 
nation and in the region. Our message has been clear. Judging by my 
trip, I believe it has been heard. But we will, of course, have to gauge 
the impact by monitoring developments over the coming weeks.


F-16 Transfer

In the U.S. and abroad, there is considerable interest concerning our 
intention to proceed with the transfer of the nine Pakistani F-16 
fighters to Indonesia. As you know, the Administration has replied to 
recent questions on this issue by noting that a number of Members of 
Congress have expressed concern over the timing of this transfer 
following events in Jakarta in late July and by stressing that the 
Administration has also followed these developments closely and has 
voiced its own concern over their human rights implications. We have, 
nonetheless, indicated that we remain convinced that this transfer is in 
the U.S. interest and should proceed and that we intend to notify 
Congress of our intentions in January. 

In this regard, it is important to recall the unique nature of this F-16 
sale. These nine planes are part of a group of 27 aircraft that were 
built under contract to Pakistan but which could not be delivered 
because of the 1990 Pressler Amendment. In 1995, after consultations 
with Congress, President Clinton told Prime Minister Bhutto that the 
U.S. would try to sell these planes to a third country. The United 
States has acted, in effect, as Pakistan's agent in this regard. 

Despite our approaches to numerous nations, only Indonesia has agreed to 
purchase some of the Pakistani planes.

U.S. arms sales policy toward Indonesia, which has been endorsed by the 
Congress, is to make available to Indonesia military equipment that will 
support legitimate external defense needs. Absent improvement in the 
human rights situation, we do not export equipment such as small arms 
that might be used to suppress legitimate dissent. The transfer of the 
Pakistani F-16s is consistent with that policy. Moreover, providing 
these aircraft to Indonesia will respond to the legitimate defense needs 
of that country, which has taken responsible actions over the past 
several decades in support of peace and stability in Southeast Asia, a 
common goal of U.S. policy. The transfer should also reinforce our ties 
with the Indonesian leadership and hence our ability to influence its 
thinking about political liberalization.


Conclusion

In summary, then, Indonesia is a critically important nation in a region 
of vital significance to the U.S. Its policies toward its neighbors and 
the region have been responsible, constructive, and supportive of our 
interests. Prosperity and stability in Southeast Asia and the wider 
region have benefited from Indonesia's contributions. We should do what 
we can to encourage continuation of these policies as that nation enters 
what appears to be an inevitable period of transition. At the same time, 
we believe Indonesia's own best interests will be served by evolution 
toward a political system that is more responsive to the aspirations of 
its people for a larger voice in their future. 

To achieve these twin goals in the coming years, Mr. Chairman, we need 
to continue to demonstrate that we approach Indonesia as a friend--one  
who recognizes Indonesia's contributions and thus can speak frankly 
about areas where further progress will be necessary for  our 
relationship to reach its full potential. Thank you. 

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END OF DISPATCH VOL. 7, NO. 38

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