U.S. Department of  State 
Dispatch, Volume 7, Number 35, August 26, 1996 
Bureau of Public Affairs 
 
 
 
ARTICLES IN THIS ISSUE: 
 
1. U.S. Policy Toward the Middle East: Steering a Steady Course--Robert 
H. Pelletreau 
 
2. Fact Sheet: Independent States and Dependencies 
 
3. Treaty Actions 
 
 
 
ARTICLE 1 
 
U.S. Policy Toward the Middle East: Steering a Steady Course 
Robert H. Pelletreau, Assistant Secretary For Near Eastern Affairs 
Address before the Chautauqua Institution, Chautauqua, New York, August 
21, 1996 
 
Ladies and gentleman: Thank you for that warm welcome. When I arrived at 
this wonderful place last night, I noticed that my lecture was listed on 
this week's schedule between presentations by Professor Moshe Maoz of 
Hebrew University and my friend Abdullah Toukan, who is the personal 
adviser to King Hussein of Jordan. I think it is wholly appropriate for 
a lecture on U.S. policy toward the Middle East to be positioned between 
presentations by an Israeli and a Jordanian. American diplomacy over the 
years has worked hard to bridge the Arab-Israeli divide, at no time 
harder and more successfully than during the Clinton Administration. 
Today, at least part of that divide has been bridged: Israel and Jordan 
are at peace, as Israel and Egypt before them. The Palestinians and 
Israel have concluded several agreements on the way to working out the 
terms of their co-existence, and Syria and Israel have expressed 
interest in finding a common basis for negotiations. It is fair to say 
that the core of the Arab-Israeli agenda has moved on from how to make 
and avoid war to how to make peace and how to make peace bring economic 
and other benefits for those who have courageously reached agreements 
across the negotiating table. 
 
Engaging U.S. Interests
 
Everyone in this audience is aware that we live in a time of rapid and 
fundamental change in world politics. The end of the Cold War has 
challenged analysts, policymakers, and the American public to make sense 
of a fluid international situation. Halfway between the end of the Cold 
War and a new century, Americans are debating such basic questions as 
how to engage internationally to advance national goals, when to use 
force to protect our national interests, and how we can best support 
international institutions like the United Nations and the World Bank. 
 
Finding our bearings in a complex world was not always as difficult as 
it  is today. For more than 40 years, our foreign policy was governed by 
a single, overriding goal--to contain the Soviet Union's expansionist 
tendencies. It was never an easy task to contain a massive empire armed 
with nuclear weapons and the capacity to threaten our interests around 
the world. During the Cold War, flare-ups in tension regularly occurred, 
but at least our goals were clear to everyone. Building new security 
alliances and institutions, forging close ties with other nations, and 
providing foreign assistance all contributed to this clear purpose. 
 
Today, most current and foreseeable threats to our interests from other 
nations do not jeopardize the actual survival of the United States. 
Other nations do not even jeopardize our prosperity except through 
improvements in their own international economic competitiveness. We 
have even embarked on a cloudy and still-incomplete program of 
cooperation with our erstwhile Russian opponents. Yet, we as a nation 
are not comfortable with the current state of affairs, and we cannot 
afford to be complacent. Terrorism disrupts our tranquility both at home 
and abroad, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction has not 
been adequately checked. Ethnic conflicts rage on several continents. 
Global problems of daunting dimensions such as population growth, 
desertification, disappearance of the rain forests, and global warming 
are all growing.  
 
When Americans look out over the world, they can take pride in the fact 
that more people live free and at peace than ever before. But is that 
enough?  Can we be certain that positive trends will continue and 
negative ones will wither without our active leadership, engagement, and 
financial underpinning? 
 
These are questions which are driving the restless search for a 
convincing new paradigm for U.S. foreign policy in this decade. At the 
beginning of the decade, we heard there was a "new world order" and that 
America had a free hand to lead the international community in turning 
back such lawless acts as Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait. We were 
also told that the "end of history" was at hand, with democracy and the 
free market triumphing over communism and all other possible forms of 
human organization. 
 
But then the paradigms took a pessimistic turn. There were lurid 
predictions of "coming anarchy" in a world where nation-states would 
collapse under the weight of overcrowded, ungovernable cities and roving 
bands of lawless thugs. Finally, we heard that we were teetering toward 
a "clash of civilizations," where traditional fault lines between 
peoples and cultures would widen and tear apart the fragile political 
and economic ties that bind the world's nations. 
 
Each of these paradigms is by necessity oversimplified, and each 
contains important insights into the central question: What are our 
interests and how do we pursue them?  But none so far has provided a 
convincing answer. 
 
In the Middle East, I would argue, our interests are broadly engaged, no 
matter what paradigms we apply. Standing threats like aggression by 
rogue states such as Iraq against our allies and oil supplies loom large 
as ever. New threats represented by the terrorists who bombed U.S. 
troops in Saudi Arabia underline the need to maintain a strong and 
vigilant stance in the region. 
 
Let me be more specific about our interests in the Middle East. They 
include, first and foremost, achieving a just, comprehensive, secure, 
and durable Arab-Israeli peace; helping maintain the security and well-
being of Israel; preventing regional conflicts and supporting friendly 
nations; ensuring the free flow of oil from the Gulf upon which we and 
the other industrial nations depend for our economic security; enhancing 
business opportunities for our companies and jobs for our citizens; 
suppressing terrorism and the spread of weapons of mass destruction; 
containing rogue regimes in Iran, Iraq, and Libya; advancing respect for 
human rights, the rule of law and open, and participatory societies; and 
preserving the deep cultural ties we have to the origins of Western 
civilization and the birthplace of the great monotheistic religions--
Judaism, Christianity, and Islam. All of these give our nation a 
concrete and lasting stake in the Middle East. 
 
Many of these interests and objectives overlap, and sometimes they cross 
cut. The peace process, for example, profoundly influences the stability 
of the entire region. The work of every U.S. ambassador in the region is 
made easier if there is an active peace process with strong U.S. 
involvement. Progress in the peace process strengthens governments in 
Egypt, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia and others which are friendly to the 
U.S.; it helps isolate Iran and Iraq whose leaders are hostile; and it 
helps secure our access to Persian Gulf oil. The absence of progress in 
the peace process, on the other hand, increases tensions and spurs 
rearmament and violence, endangering our access to oil and undercutting 
Israeli security. These are only a few examples of the 
interconnectedness of developments in the Middle East. In general, a 
successful peace process enhances regional stability, removes a rallying 
point for fanaticism, and enhances prospects for political and economic 
development. With so many complex interests at stake, the United States 
cannot step back from this turbulent and difficult sector of the globe, 
however tempting it might be at times. 
 
Let me now sketch what the United States has been doing to promote Arab-
Israeli peace and bring a more peaceful and secure life to the people of 
Israel and the Palestinians, Syrians, Lebanese, Jordanians, and 
Egyptians who are their neighbors. 
 
The Long Quest for Peace
 
The goal of peace between Israel and the Arab world has been a 
cornerstone of our Middle East policy since the Truman Administration. 
The Israel-Egypt peace brokered at Camp David by President Carter was a 
significant breakthrough. But after that, until the 1990s, progress 
toward this goal was limited. The climate for peacemaking was poor. 
Israel and the Arabs shared  a profound animosity, suspicion, and sense 
of vulnerability. Both sides saw themselves as victims; neither side 
could contemplate compromise on the scale necessary for peace. 
 
For decades, the Middle East was a tinderbox, threatening to embroil us 
in its deadly wars. This volatility was aggravated by Soviet efforts to 
gain influence through fueling radicalism and conflict. The Arab-Israeli 
conflict emboldened radicals, intimidated moderates, and left Israel--
except for its friendship with the United States--in a lonely state of 
siege. 
 
Throughout the long struggle, only one Arab state--Egypt, under the 
extraordinary leadership of Anwar Sadat--bravely bridged the Arab-
Israeli divide to make peace with Israel. For 17-1/2 years, that heroic 
achievement has held strong. Egypt stood nearly alone until 1993, when 
Israel and the Palestinians signed the Declaration of Principles on the 
White House lawn and the Arab world began to see that Egypt, its largest 
and most powerful member, was in reality a pathfinder rather than a 
pariah. 
 
It was not until the Cold War began to wane that new opportunities arose 
to promote peace. The Gulf War was a watershed. With the United States 
and its coalition partners working together, Saddam Hussein's invasion 
of Kuwait and bid to become the dominant power in the Gulf were 
decisively turned back. Our overwhelming display of power, principle, 
and leadership during the Gulf War provided us with enhanced influence 
in the Middle East. It also tilted the regional balance of power toward 
moderate forces committed to peace and stability. We moved rigorously to 
seize the historic opportunity for peace in 1990 and 1991 because we 
know that, in the Middle East, such opportunities do not last very long. 
 
The current peace process was launched in October 1991 in what we 
generally refer to as the Madrid Middle East peace conference, co-
sponsored by the United States and the Soviet Union. As our ambassador 
to Egypt, I was a member of our delegation. It was a moving experience 
to see, for the first time in my professional career, Israel, the 
Palestinians, Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, Egypt, the Europeans, Russia, and 
the United States together around one table, each saying in his own way, 
"Let's try to reach a peaceful settlement." The Madrid conference 
launched a series of bilateral and multilateral talks that proved useful 
in shattering taboos on political dialogue and helping each side to 
focus on the practical concerns of the other side. This architecture of 
mutually reinforcing bilateral and multilateral levels of negotiation 
has proven both resilient and productive, enabling us to overcome 
serious obstacles and make some remarkable progress. 
 
Breakthrough in 1993
 
The first real breakthrough after the Madrid conference was the dramatic 
moment on the White House lawn in September 1993 when Chairman Arafat 
and Prime Minister Rabin reached out and shook hands following the 
signing of the Israel-PLO Declaration of Principles. With mutual 
recognition and a mechanism for resolving differences through 
negotiation and compromise, the Declaration marked a true turning point 
in the history of the Israeli and Palestinian communities. 
 
In the nearly three years since the signing of the Declaration, Israel 
and the Palestinians have been engaged in almost continuous 
negotiations. These talks have resulted in three landmark agreements, 
including the comprehensive Interim Agreement signed in Washington last 
September. As a result of these agreements, Palestinians now govern 
themselves throughout Gaza and most cities of the West Bank. Israeli 
soldiers no longer face the burden of patroling those streets. Where 
once there was an intifada, Israeli and Palestinian security forces now 
cooperate to root out the terrorist infrastructure of Hamas and the 
Palestinian Islamic Jihad. 
 
We have emphasized to the Palestinians that the success of this process 
will depend on the confidence they engender in their Israeli partners. 
In response to Hamas suicide bombings in Israel last February and March, 
Chairman Arafat, with strong U.S. encouragement, has taken serious and 
effective steps against the Hamas infrastructure and has made important 
progress toward eliminating its terrorist capabilities. Cooperation 
between Palestinian and Israeli security services has improved. The 
United States has stressed to Arafat and other Palestinian leaders the 
need to keep up a comprehensive, sustained, and systematic approach to 
combating terrorism within the rule of law. 
 
We have also stressed the importance of continuing to make progress on 
democracy and human rights. We were pleased to see that the Palestinians 
defied the Hamas call to boycott elections last January and gave 
Chairman Arafat and the Palestinian leadership a strong mandate to 
pursue peace. The Palestinian National Council subsequently voted by an 
overwhelming margin to cancel the anti-Israeli portions of the PLO 
charter. 
 
These are no small achievements. They are tangible steps toward Arab-
Israeli reconciliation and reflect the fundamental desire of the people 
of the region to secure what President Clinton has characterized as the 
"quiet miracle" of normal life. 
 
For Israel, these agreements with the Palestinians have begun to lift 
the heavy moral and political burden of ruling a hostile foreign 
population. Israel's elder statesman, Abba Eban, has pointed out other 
benefits. They include a bustling economy with Pacific Rim potential, a 
GNP rating that would delight any major industrial power, and a wider 
breach than Israel has ever known in the Great Wall of Arab and Moslem 
hostility. There is also a series of commercial commitments that may 
still carry the area to an unexpected renewal of its vitality.  
  
With the psychological barrier between Israel and the Palestinians 
breached, there is a new basis for expanding interaction between Arabs 
and Israelis. In the past three years, Jordan has joined Egypt in 
signing a peace treaty with Israel. Over 100,000 Israelis have traveled 
to Jordan, and a large number of Jordanians have visited Israel. In many 
ways it has become a model peace, a warm peace with numerous sub-
agreements being signed and joint exploration of areas of mutual benefit 
such as civil aviation and transport, trade and tourism, and development 
of water resources. Beyond Jordan, as many as eight Arab League members 
have made official visits to Israel, all but three Arab states have 
participated in some aspect of the peace process, and Israel has 
exchanged diplomatic offices with Morocco and Tunisia and opened 
commercial offices in Qatar and Oman. 
 
The peace process has also acquired an increasingly important economic 
dimension called the economic summit process. It began in Casablanca in 
1994 and moved forward in Amman last year, mobilizing private business 
to take advantage of new opportunities opened up by the peace process 
and encouraging business activities to cross newly opened borders and 
help consolidate peace agreements. At this year's economic summit in 
Cairo, we expect to see major new commercial developments. Overall, the 
economic summit process brings together the public and private sectors 
of the Arab world and Israel, and representatives of large and small 
businesses from all over the world, in ways you would never have seen 
three years ago, but which now are beginning to seem almost routine.  
 
The U.S. is working with the newly elected Netanyahu government to keep 
up the momentum of Israeli-Arab cooperation across a broad range of 
issues. Sustaining our momentum requires a viable peace process which 
offers Arab partners incentives for progress. We are, therefore, 
encouraged that the new Israeli Government has agreed to honor and abide 
by the agreements reached by its predecessors and has expressed its 
desire to continue the peace process and build on those agreements. It 
has recognized that important changes have taken place in the Middle 
East since the Likud was last in power--new agreements, the beginnings 
of new relationships with the Arab states, and a new prosperity for 
Israel which has resulted at least in part from these political 
developments. Prime Minister Netanyahu has shown in his visits to Cairo 
and Amman, his contacts with other Arab leaders, and the beginnings of 
renewed high-level and working-level contacts with the Palestinian 
Authority and first steps to ease the closure on the West Bank and Gaza 
that he understands this reality and does not want to see the 
dismantling of what has been accomplished. We have stressed to the new 
government the key importance of intensifying channels of communication 
with the Palestinians, and we have cautioned about the harmful effect 
that major new settlement activity could have on the negotiating 
process. We have also impressed on Palestinian leaders the need for 
maximum effort and vigilance to root out and prevent acts of terrorism 
and respond to Israel's deep-seated security concerns which played such 
a large role in the recent elections. This would accelerate the current 
gradual relaxation of the tight closure imposed on Gaza and the West 
Bank and put renewed focus on promoting Palestinian economic development 
which the United States strongly supports. 
 
The Extremist Challenge
 
Progress on the peace process has not, of course, been free of 
controversy or pain. With each step forward, there has been a determined 
challenge from the enemies of peace. The Princeton historian Bernard 
Lewis, who has viewed regional developments against a 2,000-year 
continuum of rivalry and conflict, has remarked that: The real threat to 
peace. . .comes from those who see any peace as a betrayal and a 
surrender. They will continue to use every means to prevent a peaceful 
end to their various holy wars. The test of all the seekers of peace 
will be their ability to cope with these forces. 
 
One of the messages we received from Prime Minister Netanyahu when he 
visited Washington last month was that he is going to take a very 
determined approach to terrorism while Israel pursues peace with its 
neighbors. 
 
That approach is certainly an approach we can support, and it is 
consistent with our own long-standing efforts to rally an international 
consensus against terrorism, turn off foreign sources of funding for 
terrorists, and track down and punish the perpetrators of terror, 
including state sponsors. We recognize that peace and security are 
indivisible. Waging peace and fighting terrorism are opposite sides of 
the same coin: You can't pursue peace in isolation, just as you can't 
deal with terrorism in isolation. You have to do both at the same time. 
 
That is how we approached the suicide bombings in Israel in February and 
March, as well as the crisis involving Israel and Lebanon in April. Both 
represented not only human tragedies but serious challenges to security 
and the peace process. 
 
In both cases, the United States took the initiative to deal with the 
immediate human crisis, safeguard the peace process, and refocus 
attention on negotiations. Following the suicide bombings in Israel, 
President Clinton initiated the Sharm el-Sheikh summit, which brought 
together leaders from around the world to send a clear message that 
terrorism from any source must be confronted and beaten. 
 
In the Lebanon crisis last spring, the understanding brokered by 
Secretary Christopher allowed people to return to their homes and will 
protect civilians on both sides of the Israel-Lebanon border.  
 
The Secretary spent more than a week in the Middle East shuttling seven 
times between Damascus and Jerusalem to resolve the crisis. It was a 
grueling exercise. At one point, we had to trade in our Air Force 707 
for a C-141 owing to crew rest requirements. At another, we had to enter 
Lebanon via land convoy across the Bekaa Valley when the air route was 
judged too dangerous. 
 
Secretary Christopher's work in bringing the parties to closure was one 
of the finest diplomatic performances I have witnessed. The set of 
understandings he negotiated to help defuse the conflict between Israel 
and Hezbollah guerrilla forces improved in several ways upon the U.S.-
brokered understandings of 1993. First, the understandings are now 
written to ensure the clarity and consistency of commitments. Second, 
the understandings called for a five-party monitoring group to review 
complaints about implementation of the understandings. The modalities 
governing the monitoring group were completed in a five-sided 
negotiation during Prime Minister Netanyahu's visit in July, and just 
last week, the group successfully dealt with its first complaint. The 
April understandings will help protect both Israeli and Lebanese 
civilians but are not meant to be a substitute for lasting peace 
agreements between Israel and Lebanon and Israel and Syria. 
 
Israel, Syria, and Lebanon
 
When Prime Minister Netanyahu was here, he stated that he had been 
elected to pursue peace with security and not to promote a stalemate. 
And he emphasized to us he was prepared to work with the U.S. to try to 
achieve those goals. He and his Foreign Minister have since stated 
repeatedly that they are prepared to negotiate peace with Syria. The 
Syrian Government has told us privately and publicly that it, too, is 
interested in negotiations. The Lebanese Government has been somewhat 
more reserved in public, but we are convinced that Lebanon also seeks 
peace. Just how these two tracks, which are separate but clearly linked, 
can be engaged productively is still being worked out. 
 
We are encouraged by the recent public statements from Jerusalem and 
Damascus, but we are not under any illusion that achieving peace between 
Israel and Syria and Israel and Lebanon will be quick or easy. Their 
conflict has evolved over many years, and the resolution must evolve 
over time as well. We have long felt that peace between Israel and Syria 
is essential for closing the circle of peace and producing a 
comprehensive settlement. We are committed to working toward this goal. 
The effort must not be put on the shelf just because it is difficult. 
 
Neither Israel nor the United States sees the current Israeli posture in 
southern Lebanon as a desirable or even acceptable long-term alternative  
to peace. Israel claims no land from Lebanon. Again, it is a question of 
security. We, for our part, support Lebanon's sovereignty, independence, 
and territorial integrity and look forward, as the Lebanese people do,   
to the day when Lebanon is free of all foreign forces and in charge of 
its own destiny. The United States stands ready, yes even determined, to 
facilitate dialogue and act as an honest broker whenever an opportunity 
for further peace negotiations arises. Let me close by saying that 
neither U.S. policy nor the U.S. posture has changed. We are actively 
working with the parties in the region to achieve our long-sought goal 
of a truly comprehensive and durable Middle East peace.  (###) 
 
 
 
ARTICLE 2 
 
Fact Sheet: Independent States and Dependencies as of August 20, 1996 
 
Independent States1 
 
[Note: Each Independent State is listed with its short-form name, Long-
form name, Code (see footnote 2), and Capital separated by --] 
 
* Diplomatic relations with the United States 
+ Member of United Nations 
 
001. Afghanistan *+ --Islamic State of Afghanistan--AF--Kabul 
002. Albania *+ --Republic of Albania--AL--Tirana 
003. Algeria *+ --Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria--AG--
Algiers 
004. Andorra *+ --Principality of Andorra--AN--Andorra la Vella 
005. Angola *+ --Republic of Angola--AO--Luanda 
006. Antigua and Barbuda *+ --(no long-form name)--AC--Saint John's  
007. Argentina *+ --Argentine Republic--AR--Buenos Aires 
008. Armenia *+ --Republic of Armenia--AM--Yerevan 
009. Australia *+--Commonwealth of Australia--AS--Canberra 
010. Austria *+ --Republic of Austria--AU--Vienna 
011. Azerbaijan *+ --Azerbaijani Republic--AJ--Baku 
 
012. Bahamas, The *+ --Commonwealth of The Bahamas--BF--Nassau 
013. Bahrain *+ --State of Bahrain--BA--Manama 
014. Bangladesh *+ --People's Republic of Bangladesh--BG--Dhaka 
015. Barbados *+ --(no long-form name)--BB--Bridgetown 
016. Belarus *+ --Republic of Belarus--BO--Minsk 
017. Belgium *+ --Kingdom of Belgium--BE--Brussels 
018. Belize *+ --(no long-form name)--BH--Belmopan 
019. Benin *+ --Republic of Benin--BN--Porto-Novo  
020. Bhutan + --Kingdom of Bhutan--BT--Thimphu 
021. Bolivia *+--Republic of Bolivia--BL--La Paz (administrative)--Sucre 
(legislative/judiciary) 
022. Bosnia and Herzegovina *+ --Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina--BK-
-Sarajevo 
023. Botswana *+ --Republic of Botswana--BC--Gaborone 
024. Brazil *+ --Federative Republic of Brazil--BR--Brasilia 
025. Brunei *+ --Negara Brunei Darussalam--BX--Bandar Seri Begawan 
026. Bulgaria *+ --Republic of Bulgaria--BU--Sofia 
027. Burkina Faso*+ --Burkina Faso--UV--Ouagadougou 
028. Burma *+ --Union of Burma--BM--Rangoon 
029. Burundi *+ --Republic of Burundi--BY--Bujumbura 
 
030. Cambodia *+ --Kingdom of Cambodia--CB--Phnom Penh 
031. Cameroon *+ --Republic of Cameroon--CM--Yaounde 
032. Canada *+ --(no long-form name)--CA--Ottawa 
033. Cape Verde *+ --Republic of Cape Verde--CV--Praia 
034. Central African Republic *+ --Central African Republic--CT--Bangui 
035. Chad *+ --Republic of Chad--CD--N'Djamena 
036. Chile *+ --Republic of Chile--CI--Santiago 
037. China *+ (see note3)--People's Republic of China--CH--Beijing 
038. Colombia *+ --Republic of Colombia--CO--Bogota 
039. Comoros *+ --Federal Islamic Republic of the Comoros--CN--Moroni 
040. Congo *+ --Republic of the Congo--CF--Brazzaville 
041. Costa Rica *+ --Republic of Costa Rica--CS--San Jose 
042. Cote d'Ivoire (Ivory Coast) *+ --Republic of Cote d'Ivoire--IV--
Yamoussoukro  
043. Croatia *+ --Republic of Croatia--HR--Zagreb 
044. Cuba + --Republic of Cuba--CU--Havana 
045. Cyprus *+ --Republic of Cyprus--CY--Nicosia 
046. Czech Republic *+ --Czech Republic--EZ--Prague 
 
047. Denmark *+ --Kingdom of Denmark--DA--Copenhagen 
048. Djibouti *+ --Republic of Djibouti--DJ--Djibouti 
049. Dominica *+ --Commonwealth of Dominica--DO--Roseau 
050. Dominican Republic *+ --Dominican Republic--DR--Santo Domingo 
 
051. Ecuador *+ --Republic of Ecuador--EC--Quito 
052. Egypt *+ --Arab Republic of Egypt--EG--Cairo 
053. El Salvador *+ --Republic of El Salvador--ES--San Salvador 
054. Equatorial Guinea *+ --Republic of Equatorial Guinea--EK--Malab 
055. Eritrea *+ --State of Eritrea--ER--Asmar 
056. Estonia *+ --Republic of Estonia--EN--Tallinn 
057. Ethiopia *+ --(no long-form name)--ET--Addis Ababa 
 
058. Fiji *+ --Republic of Fiji--FJ--Suva 
059. Finland *+ --Republic of Finland--FI--Helsinki 
060. France *+ --French Republic--FR--Paris 
 
061. Gabon *+ --Gabonese Republic--GB--Libreville 
062. Gambia, The *+ --Republic of The Gambia--GA--Banjul 
063. Georgia *+ --Republic of Georgia--GG--T'bilisi 
064. Germany *+ --Federal Republic of Germany--GM--Berlin  
065. Ghana *+ --Republic of Ghana--GH--Accra 
066. Greece *+ --Hellenic Republic--GR--Athens 
067. Grenada *+ --(no long-form name)--GJ--Saint George's 
068. Guatemala *+--Republic of Guatemala--GT--Guatemala 
069. Guinea *+ --Republic of Guinea--GV--Conakry 
070. Guinea-Bissau *+ --Republic of Guinea-Bissau--PU--Bissau 
071. Guyana *+ --Co-operative Republic of Guyana--GY--Georgetown 
 
072. Haiti *+ --Republic of Haiti--HA--Port-au-Prince 
073. Holy See * --Holy See--VT--Vatican City 
074. Honduras *+ --Republic of Honduras--HO--Tegucigalpa 
075. Hungary *+ --Republic of Hungary--HU--Budapest 
 
076. Iceland *+ --Republic of Iceland--IC--Reykjavik 
077. India *+ --Republic of India--IN--New Delhi 
078. Indonesia *+ --Republic of Indonesia--ID--Jakarta 
079. Iran + --Islamic Republic of Iran--IR--Tehran 
080. Iraq + --Republic of Iraq --IZ--Baghdad 
081. Ireland *+ --(no long-form name)--EI--Dublin 
082. Israel *+ --State of Israel--IS(see note 4) 
083. Italy *+ --Italian Republic--IT--Rome 
 
084. Jamaica *+ --(no long-form name)--JM--Kingston 
085. Japan *+ --(no long-form name)--JA--Tokyo 
086. Jordan *+ --Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan--JO--Amman 
 
087. Kazakstan *+ --Republic of Kazakstan--KZ--Almaty 
088. Kenya *+ --Republic of Kenya--KE--Nairobi 
089. Kiribati * --Republic of Kiribati--KR--Tarawa 
090. Korea, North + --Democratic People's Republic of Korea-KN--
P'yongyang  
091. Korea, South *+ --Republic of Korea--KS--Seoul 
092. Kuwait *+ --State of Kuwait--KU--Kuwait 
093. Kyrgyzstan *+ --Kyrgyz Republic--KG--Bishkek 
 
094. Laos *+ --Lao People's Democratic Republic--LA--Vientiane 
095. Latvia *+ --Republic of Latvia--LG--Riga 
096. Lebanon *+ --Republic of Lebanon--LE--Beirut 
097. Lesotho *+ --Kingdom of Lesotho--LT--Maseru 
098. Liberia *+ --Republic of Liberia--LI--Monrovia 
099. Libya *+ --Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya--LY--Tripoli 
100. Liechtenstein *+ --Principality of Liechtenstein--LS--Vaduz 
101. Lithuania *+ --Republic of Lithuania--LH--Vilnius 
102. Luxembourg *+ --Grand Duchy of Luxembourg--LU--Luxembourg 
 
103. Macedonia, The Former Republic of *+ --The Former Yugoslav Republic 
of Macedonia--MK--Skopje 
104. Madagascar *+ --Republic of Madagascar--MA--Antananarivo 
105. Malawi *+ --Republic of Malawi--MI--Lilongwe 
106. Malaysia *+ --(no long-form name)--MY--Kuala Lumpur 
107. Maldives *+ --Republic of Maldives--MV--Male 
108. Mali *+ --Republic of Mali--ML--Bamako  
109. Malta *+ --(no long-form name)--MT--Valletta 
110. Marshall Islands *+ --Republic of the Marshall Islands--RM--Majuro 
111. Mauritania *+ --Islamic Republic of Mauritania--MR--Nouakchott 
112. Mauritius *+ --Republic of Mauritius--MP--Port Louis 
113. Mexico *+ --United Mexican States--MX--Mexico 
114. Micronesia, Federated States of *+ --Federated States of 
Micronesia--FM--Palikir 
115. Moldova *+ --Republic of Moldova--MD--Chisinau 
116. Monaco *+ --Principality of Monaco--MN--Monaco 
117. Mongolia *+ --(no long-form name)--MG--Ulaanbaatar 
118. Morocco *+ --Kingdom of Morocco--MO--Rabat 
119. Mozambique *+ --Republic of Mozambique--MZ--Maputo 
 
120. Namibia *+ --Republic of Namibia--WA--Windhoek 
121. Nauru * --Republic of Nauru--NR--Yaren District (no capital city)  
122. Nepal *+--Kingdom of Nepal--NP--Kathmandu 
123. Netherlands *+ --Kingdom of the Netherlands--NL--Amsterdam (The 
Hague (seat of govt.) 
124. New Zealand *+ --(no long-form name)--NZ--Wellington 
125. Nicaragua *+ --Republic of Nicaragua--NU--Managua 
126. Niger *+ --Republic of Niger--NG--Niamey 
127. Nigeria *+ --Federal Republic of Nigeria--NI--Abuja 
128. Norway *+ --Kingdom of Norway--NO--Oslo 
 
129. Oman *+ --Sultanate of Oman--MU--Muscat 
 
130. Pakistan *+ --Islamic Republic of Pakistan--PK--Islamabad 
131. Palau *+ --Republic of Palau--PS--Koror 
132. Panama *+ --Republic of Panama--PM--Panama 
133. Papua New Guinea *+ --Independent State of Papua New Guinea--PP--
Port Moresby 
134. Paraguay *+ --Republic of Paraguay--PA--Asuncion 
135. Peru *+ --Republic of Peru--PE--Lima 
136. Philippines *+ --Republic of the Philippines--RP--Manila 
137. Poland *+ --Republic of Poland--PL--Warsaw 
138. Portugal *+ --Portuguese Republic--PO--Lisbon 
 
139. Qatar *+ --State of Qatar--QA--Doha 
 
140. Romania *+ --(no long-form name)--RO--Bucharest 
141. Russia *+ --Russian Federation--RS--Moscow 
142. Rwanda *+ --Republic of Rwanda--RW--Kigali 
 
143. Saint Kitts and Nevis *+ --Federation of Saint Kitts and Nevis--SC-
-Basseterre 
144. Saint Lucia *+ --(no long-form name)--ST--Castries 
145. Saint Vincent and the Grenadines *+ --(no long-form name)--VC--
Kingstown  
146. San Marino *+ --Republic of San Marino--SM--San Marino 
147. Sao Tome and Principe *+ --Democratic Republic of Sao Tome and 
Principe--TP--Sao Tome 
148. Saudi Arabia *+ --Kingdom of Saudi Arabia--SA--Riyadh 
149. Senegal *+ --Republic of Senegal--SG--Dakar 
150. Seychelles *+ --Republic of Seychelles--SE--Victoria 
151. Sierra Leone *+ --Republic of Sierra Leone--SL--Freetown 
152. Singapore *+ --Republic of Singapore--SN--Singapore 
153. Slovakia *+ --Slovak Republic--LO--Bratislava 
154. Slovenia *+ --Republic of Slovenia--SI--Ljubljana 
155. Solomon Islands *+ --(no long-form name)--BP--Honiara 
156. Somalia *+ --(no long-form name)--SO--Mogadishu 
157. South Africa *+ --Republic of South Africa--SF--Pretoria 
(administrative)Cape Town (legislative)Bloemfontein (judiciary)  
158. Spain *+ --Kingdom of Spain--SP--Madrid 
159. Sri Lanka *+ --Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka--CE--
Colombo 
160. Sudan *+ --Republic of the Sudan--SU--Khartoum 
161. Suriname*+ --Republic of Suriname--NS--Paramaribo 
162. Swaziland *+ --Kingdom of Swaziland--WZ--Mbabane (administrative)  
Lobamba (legislative) 
163. Sweden *+ --Kingdom of Sweden--SW--Stockholm 
164. Switzerland * --Swiss Confederation--SZ--Bern 
165. Syria *+ --Syrian Arab Republic--SY--Damascus 
 
166. Tajikistan *+ --Republic of Tajikistan--TI--Dushanbe 
167. Tanzania *+ --United Republic of Tanzania--TZ--Dar es Salaam--
Dodoma (legislative) 
168. Thailand *+ --Kingdom of Thailand--TH--Bangkok 
169. Togo *+ --Republic of Togo--TO--Lome 
170. Tonga * --Kingdom of Tonga--TN--Nuku'alofa  
171. Trinidad and Tobago *+ --Republic of Trinidad and Tobago--TD--Port-
of-Spain 
172. Tunisia *+ --Republic of Tunisia--TS--Tunis 
173. Turkey *+ --Republic of Turkey--TU--Ankara 
174. Turkmenistan *+--(no long-form name)--TX--Ashgabat 
175. Tuvalu * --(no long-form name)--TV--Funafuti 
 
176. Uganda *+ --Republic of Uganda--UG--Kampala 
177. Ukraine *+ --(no long-form name)--UP--Kiev 
178. United Arab Emirates *+ --United Arab Emirates--TC--Abu Dhabi 
179. United Kingdom *+ --United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern 
Ireland--UK--London 
180. United States + --United States of America--US--Washington, DC 
181. Uruguay *+ --Oriental Republic of Uruguay--UY--Montevideo 
182. Uzbekistan *+ --Republic of Uzbekistan--UZ--Tashkent 
 
183. Vanuatu *+ --Republic of Vanuatu--NH--Port-Vila  
184. Venezuela *+ --Republic of Venezuela--VE--Caracas 
185. Vietnam *+ --Socialist Republic of Vietnam--VM--Hanoi 
 
186. Western Samoa *+ --Independent State of Western Samoa--WS--Apia 
 
187. Yemen *+ (see note 5)--Republic of Yemen--YM--Sanaa 
 
188. Zaire *+ --Republic of Zaire--CG--Kinshasa 
189. Zambia *+ --Republic of Zambia--ZA--Lusaka 
190. Zimbabwe *+ --Republic of Zimbabwe--ZI--Harare 
 
 
Other 
001. Taiwan (see note 6 )--(no long-form name)--TW--Taipei 
 
Notes: 
 
1 In this listing, the term "independent state" refers to a people 
politically organized into a sovereign state with a definite territory 
recognized as independent by the U.S. 
 
2 Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS) 10-4 codes. 
 
3 With the establishment of diplomatic relations with China on January 
1, 1979, the U.S. Government recognized the People's Republic of China 
as the sole legal government of China and acknowledged the Chinese 
position that there is only one China and that Taiwan is part of China.  
 
4 In 1950 the Israel Parliament proclaimed Jerusalem as the capital. The 
U.S., like most other countries that have embassies in Israel, maintains 
its embassy in Tel Aviv. 
 
5 The U.S. view is that the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia has 
dissolved, and no successor state represents its continuation. Serbia 
and Montenegro have asserted the formation of a joint independent state, 
but this entity has not been formally recognized as a state by the U.S. 
 
6 Claimed by both the Government of the People's Republic of China and 
the authorities on Taiwan. Administered by the authorities on Taiwan. 
(see Note 3) 
 
Dependencies and Areas of Special Sovereignty 
 
[Note: Each Dependency and Area of Special Sovereignty is listed with 
its Short-form name, Long-form name, Sovereignty, Code (see note 1) and 
Capital separated by --] 
 
01. American Samoa--Territory of American Samoa--United States--AQ--Pago 
Pago 
02. Anguilla--(no long-form name)United Kingdom--AV--The Valley 
03. Antarctica--(no long-form name)--None 2--AY--None 
04. Aruba--(no long-form name)--Netherlands--AA--Oranjestad 
05. Ashmore and Cartier Islands--Territory of Ashmore and Cartier 
Islands--Australia--AT--Admin. fr. Canberra 
 
06. Baker Island--(no long-form name)--United States--FQ--Admin. fr. 
Wash. DC  
07. Bermuda--(no long-form name)--United Kingdom--BD--Hamilton 
08. Bouvet Island--(no long-form name)--Norway--BV--Admin. fr. Oslo 
09. British Indian Ocean Territory 3--British Indian Ocean Territory--
United Kingdom--IO--None 
 
 
10. Cayman Islands--(no long-form name)--United Kingdom--CJ--George Town 
11. Christmas Island--Territory of Christmas Island--Australia--KT--The 
Settlement(Flying Fish Cove) 
12. Clipperton Island--(no long-form name)--France--IP--Admin. fr. Fr. 
Polynesia 
13. Cocos (Keeling) Islands--Territory of Cocos (Keeling)Islands--
Australia--CK--West Island 
14. Cook Islands--(no long-form name)--New Zealand--CW--Avarua 
15. Coral Sea Islands--Coral Sea Islands Territory--Australia--CR-Admin. 
fr. Canberra 
 
16. Corsica--Territorial Collectivity of Corsica--France--VP--Ajaccio 
17. Falkland Islands (Islas Malvinas)--Colony of the Falkland Islands--
United Kingdom4--FK--Stanley 
 
18. Faroe Islands--(no long-form name)--Denmark--FO--Torshavn 
19. French Guiana--Department of Guiana--France--FG--Cayenne 
20. French Polynesia--Territory of French Polynesia--France--FP--Papeete  
 
21. French Southern and Antarctic Lands 5--Territory of the French 
Southern and Antarctic Lands--France--FS--Admin. fr. Paris 
22. Gibraltar--(no long-form name)--United Kingdom--GI--Gibraltar 
23. Greenland--(no long-form name)--Denmark--GL--Nuuk (Godthab) 
24. Guadeloupe 6--Department of Guadeloupe--France--GP--Basse-Terre 
25. Guam--Territory of Guam--United States--GQ--Agana 
 
26. Guernsey--Bailiwick of Guernsey--British Crown Dep.--GK--Saint Peter 
Port 
27. Heard Island and McDonald Islands--Territory of Heard Island and 
McDonald Islands--Australia--HM--Admin. fr. Canberra 
28. Hong Kong--(no long-form name)--United Kingdom7--HK--Victoria 
29. Howland Island--(no long-form name)--United States--HQ--Admin. fr. 
Wash. DC 
30. Jan Mayen--(no long-form name)--Norway--JN--Admin. fr. Oslo8 
 
31. Jarvis Island--(no long-form name)--United States--DQ-0-Admin. fr. 
Wash. DC 
32. Jersey--Bailiwick of Jersey--British Crown Dep.--JE--Saint Helier 
33. Johnston Atoll--(no long-form name)--United States--JQ--Admin. fr. 
Wash. DC 
34. Kingman Reef--(no long-form name)--United States--KQ--Admin. fr. 
Wash. DC 
35. Macau--(no long-form name)--Portugal9--MC--Macau 
 
36. Man, Isle of--(no long-form name)--British Crown Dep.--IM--Douglas 
37. Martinique--Department of Martinique--France--MB--Fort-de-France 
38. Mayotte--Territorial Collectivity of Mayotte--France--MF--Mamoutzou 
39. Midway Islands--(no long-form name)--United States--MQ--Admin. fr. 
Wash. DC 
40. Montserrat--(no long-form name)--United Kingdom--MH--Plymouth 
 
41. Navassa Island--(no long-form name)--United States--BQ--Admin. fr. 
Wash. DC 
42. Netherlands Antilles10--(no long-form name)--Netherlands--NT--
Willemstad 
43. New Caledonia--Territory of New Caledonia and Dependencies--France--
NC--Noumea  
  
44. Niue--(no long-form name)--New Zealand--NE--Alofi 
45. Norfolk Island--Territory of Norfolk Island--Australia--NF--Kingston 
 
46. Northern Mariana Islands--Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana 
Islands--United States--CQ--Saipan 
47. Palmyra Atoll--(no long-form name)--United States--LQ--Admin. fr. 
Wash. DC 
48. Paracel Islands--(no long-form name)--undetermined 11--PF--None 
49. Pitcairn Islands--Pitcairn, Henderson, Ducie, and Oeno Islands--
United Kingdom--PC--Adamstown 
 
50. Puerto Rico--Commonwealth of Puerto Rico--United States--RQ---San 
Juan 
51. Reunion 12--Department of Reunion--France--RE--Saint-Denis 
52. Saint Helena 13--(no long-form name)--United Kingdom--SH--Jamestown 
53. Saint Pierre and Miquelon--Territorial Collectivity of Saint Pierre 
and Miquelon--France--SB--Saint-Pierre 
54. South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands--South Georgia and the 
South Sandwich Islands--United Kingdom 4--SX--None 
55. Spratly Islands--(no long-form name)--undetermined 14--PG--None 
 
56. Svalbard--(no long-form name)--Norway--SV--Longyearbyen 
57. Tokelau--(no long-form name)--New Zealand--TL--None 
58. Turks and Caicos Islands--(no long-form name)--United Kingdom--TK--
Grand Turk 
59. Virgin Islands--Virgin Islands of the United States--United States--
VQ--Charlotte Amalie 
60. Virgin Islands, British--(no long-form name)--United Kingdom--VI--
Road Town 
 
61. Wake Island--(no long-form name)--United States--WQ--Admin. fr. 
Wash. DC 
62. Wallis and Futuna--Territory of the Wallis and Futuna Islands--
France--WF--Mata'utu 
63. Western Sahara--(no long-form name)--undetermined--WI--None 
 
Footnotes: 
 
1 Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS) 10-4 codes. 
 
2 Antarctica consists of the territory south of 60 degrees south 
latitude. This area includes claims by Argentina, Australia, Chile, 
France, New Zealand, Norway, and the United Kingdom, the legal status of 
which remains in suspense under the terms of the Antarctic Treaty of 
1959. The United States recognizes no claims to Antarctica. 
 
3 Chagos Archipelago (including Diego Garcia). 
 
4 Also claimed by Argentina. 
 
5 "French Southern and Antarctic Lands" includes Ile Amsterdam, Ile 
Saint-Paul, Iles Crozet, and Iles Kerguelen in the southern Indian 
Ocean, along with the French-claimed sector of Antarctica, "Terre 
Adelie."  The United States does not recognize the French claim to 
"Terre Adelie" (see Note2). 
 
6 The Department of Guadeloupe includes the nearby islands of Marie-
Galante and la Desirade and Iles des Saintes, as well as Saint 
Barthelemy and the northern three-fifths of Saint Martin (the rest of 
which belongs to Netherlands Antilles). 
 
7 Under a Sino-British declaration of September 1984, Hong Kong will 
revert to China on July 1, 1997, the expiration of the U.K.'s 99-year 
lease on the New Territories. 
 
8 Administered from Oslo, Norway, through a governor resident in 
Longyearbyen, Svalbard. 
 
9 Under a Sino-Portuguese declaration of April 1987, Macau will revert 
to China on December 20, 1999. 
 
10 Netherlands Antilles comprises two groupings of islands: Curacao and 
Bonaire are located off the coast of Venezuela; Saba, Sint Eustatius, 
and Sint Maarten (the Dutch two-fifths of the island of Saint Martin) 
lie 800 km to the north. 
 
11 South China Sea islands occupied by China but claimed by Vietnam. 
 
12 Bassas da India (BS), Europa Island (EU), Glorioso Islands (GO), Juan 
de Nova Island (JU), and Tromelin Island (TE) are controlled by France 
and are administered from Reunion. (These islands are claimed by 
Madagascar; Tromelin Island also is claimed by Mauritius and 
Seychelles). 
 
13 The territory of Saint Helena includes the Island group of Tristan da 
Cunha; Saint Helena also administers Ascension Island. 
 
14 South China Sea islands claimed in entirety by China and Vietnam and 
in part by the Philippines and Malaysia; each of these states occupies 
some part of the islands. (###) 
 
 
 
ARTICLE 3 
 
Treaty Actions 
Multilateral 
 
Biological Weapons 
Convention on the prohibition of the development, production, and 
stockpiling of bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons and on 
their destruction. Done at Washington, London, and Moscow Apr. 10, 1972. 
Entered into force Mar. 26, 1975. TIAS 8062; 26 UST 583. 
Accession: Georgia, May 22, 1996. 
 
Defense 
Memorandum of understanding among the United States, Canada, France, and 
Norway concerning a feasibility study for a NATO influence minesweeping 
system (NIMS), with annexes. Signed at Haakonsvern, Ottawa, Paris, and 
Washington Dec. 4 and 5, 1995, Mar. 11, and June 3, 1996. Entered into 
force June 3, 1996. 
 
Memorandum of understanding among the United States, France, Italy, 
Norway, and the United Kingdom covering a feasibility study for a NATO 
submarine rescue system (NSRS). Signed at Bristol, Oslo, Washington, 
Rome, and Paris Feb. 21 and 29, Mar. 15 and 22, and June 12, 1996. 
Entered into force June 12, 1996. 
 
Memorandum of understanding among the United States, Canada, France, 
Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom covering 
subphase two of the design and development phase of the NATO improved 
link eleven (NILE) project, with annex and related letter. Signed at 
Quebec, Bristol, Rome, Bonn, The Hague, Washington, and Paris May 24, 
June 5, 6, 11, and July 2 and 8, 1996. Entered into force July 2, 1996. 
 
Narcotics 
United Nations convention against illicit traffic in narcotic drugs and 
psychotropic substances, with annex and final act. Done at Vienna Dec. 
20, 1988. Entered into force Nov. 11, 1990. [Senate] Treaty Doc. 101-4. 
Accession: Belize, July 24, 1996. 
 
North Atlantic Treaty 
Agreement among the states parties to the North Atlantic Treaty and 
other states participating in the Partnership for Peace regarding the 
status of their forces. Done at Brussels June 19, 1995. Entered into 
force Jan. 13, 1996. 
 
Additional protocol to the agreement among the States Parties to the 
North Atlantic Treaty and the other States participating in the 
Partnership for Peace regarding the status of their forces. Done at 
Brussels June 19, 1995. Entered into force June 1, 19961. 
Signatures: Kazakstan, July 31, 1996; Uzbekistan, July 24, 1996. 
Ratification: Estonia, Aug. 7, 1996. 
 
Prisoner Transfers 
Convention on the transfer of sentenced persons. Done at Strasbourg Mar. 
21, 1983. Entered into force July 1, 1985. TIAS 10824. 
Ratification: Lithuania, May 24, 1996. 
 
Bilateral 
 
Albania 
Express mail agreement, with detailed regulations. Signed at Tirana and 
Washington June 26 and July 15, 1996. Enters into force Sept. 15, 1996. 
 
Australia 
Memorandum of understanding for the production of the offboard active 
decoy Nulka, with annexes. Signed at Washington June 25, 1996. Entered 
into force June 25, 1996. 
 
Belarus 
Agreement regarding cooperation to facilitate the provision of 
assistance. Signed at Minsk July 18, 1996. Enters into force July 18, 
1996, provisionally; definitively, when each party has notified the 
other of the completion of required procedures. 
 
Agreement relating to the employment of dependents of official 
government employees. Effected by exchange of notes at Washington June 
14 and July 26, 1996. Entered into force July 26, 1996. 
 
Cameroon 
Agreement regarding the consolidation and rescheduling of certain debts 
owed to, guaranteed by, or insured by the United States Government and 
its agencies, with annexes. Signed at Yaounde May 6, 1996. Entered into 
force July 31, 1996. 
 
Costa Rica 
Basic exchange and cooperative agreement for topographic mapping, 
nautical and aeronautical charting and information, geodesy and 
geophysics, digital data and related mapping, charting, and geodesy 
materials, with glossary. Signed at San Jose and Fairfax June 14 and 
July 2, 1996. Entered into force July 2, 1996. 
 
Gabon 
Agreement regarding the consolidation and rescheduling of certain debts 
owed to, guaranteed by, or insured by the United States Government and 
its agencies, with annexes. Signed at Libreville June 17, 1996. Entered 
into force Aug. 12, 1996. 
 
Guatemala 
Basic exchange and cooperative agreement for topographic mapping, 
nautical and aeronautical charting and information, geodesy and 
geophysics, digital data and related mapping, charting, and geodesy 
materials, with glossary. Signed at Guatemala and Fairfax June 7 and   
July 2, 1996. Entered into force July 2, 1996. 
 
Indonesia 
Protocol amending the convention of July 11, 1988, for the avoidance of 
double taxation and prevention of fiscal evasion with respect to taxes 
on income. Signed at Jakarta July 24, 1996. Enters into force on the 
date of exchange of instruments of ratification. 
 
Israel 
Counterterrorism cooperation accord. Signed at Washington Apr. 30, 1996. 
Entered into force July 29, 1996. 
 
Japan 
Agreement amending the memorandum of understanding  of Oct. 14 and 25, 
1994, for cooperation in the Advanced Earth Observing Satellite (ADEOS) 
Program. Signed at Tokyo and Washington June 4 and 10, 1996. Entered 
into force June 10, 1996. 
 
Kazakstan 
Agreement relating to the employment of dependents of official 
government employees. Effected by exchange of notes at Washington May 23 
and June 3, 1996. Entered into force June 3, 1996. 
 
Latvia 
Agreement relating to the employment of dependents of official 
government employees. Effected by exchange of notes at Riga Apr. 24 and 
July 16, 1996. Entered into force July 16, 1996. 
 
Macau 
Air transport agreement, with annexes. Signed at Macau July 3, 1996. 
Entered into force July 3, 1996. 
 
Norway 
Memorandum of understanding for the composite hull embedded sensor 
system (CHESS), with annex. Signed at Washington and Kjeller June 6 and 
24, 1996. Entered into force June 24, 1996. 
 
Portugal 
Agreement regarding mutual assistance between customs services. Signed 
at Washington Sept. 15, 1994, with memorandum of understanding 
concerning charter air transportation. Signed at Washington July 23, 
1996. Entered into force July 23, 1996. 
 
Sierra Leone 
Agreement regarding the consolidation and rescheduling of certain debts 
owed to, guaranteed by, or insured by the United States Government, with 
annexes. Signed at Freetown Aug. 7, 1996. Enters into force following 
receipt by Sierra Leone of written notice from the United States that 
all necessary domestic legal requirements for entry into force have been 
fulfilled. 
 
South Africa 
Air transport agreement, with annex and memorandum of understanding 
concerning charter air transportation. Signed at Washington July 23, 
1996. Entered into force July 23, 1996. 
 
St. Kitts and Nevis 
Agreement amending the agreement of Apr. 13, 1995, concerning maritime 
counter-drug operations. Effected by exchange of notes at Bridgetown and 
Basseterre June 27, 1996. Entered into force June 27, 1996. 
 
Sweden 
Memorandum of understanding for cooperative sounding rocket activities. 
Signed at Washington and Stockholm May 17 and June 10, 1996. Entered 
into force June 10, 1996. 
 
_______ 
 
1 Not in force for the U.S. (###) 
 
[END DISPATCH VOL 7, NO. 35] 
(###)

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