U.S. Department of State
Dispatch Volume 7, Number 30, July 22, 1996
Bureau of Public Affairs

 
 
ISSUES IN THIS ARTICLE: 
 
1.  U.S. Intervention in the Post-Cold War Era--Nancy E. Soderberg 
2.  Making the International Climate Change Process Work--Timothy E. 
Wirth 
3.  Hong Kong's Progress Toward Reversion: Implications for the U.S.--
Winston Lord 
4.  Treaty Actions 
 
 
 
ARTICLE 1: 
 
U.S. Intervention in the Post Cold-War Era 
Nancy E. Soderberg, Deputy Assistant to the President for National 
Security Affairs 
Remarks to the U.S. Institute of Peace, Washington, DC, July 10, 1996, 
(introductory remarks deleted) 
 
I would like to use my time with you to address American intervention in 
the post-Cold War era--how we decide to get involved in matters beyond 
our borders. 
 
For more than four decades, most American foreign policy was made and 
measured in relation to the Soviet threat. Confronted by a fierce, 
ideological rival--a rival that possessed thousands of nuclear warheads-
-American policymakers rallied around a single mission: containment. 
That banner slogan became the central organizing concept for American 
foreign policy in the Cold War era--from where and when we intervened to 
the creation of security alliances to whether and to whom we gave 
foreign assistance. 
 
Today, with the Cold War over, the security environment has changed. To 
be sure, we still face threats to our national security--threats that 
demand traditional uses of American power and diplomacy. During the last 
three years, we have met these familiar challenges with determination 
and success. But in this new world, we also face a new type of challenge 
that I would like to discuss today: The new opportunities and new 
responsibilities America has to make a difference. No national consensus 
has emerged to date on what we should do in these areas. Resources are 
tight, and once again, some voices are preaching the path of isolation. 
But I believe the Clinton Administration has laid the foundation for 
real progress. We have worked decisively to bolster support for American 
leadership in the world, not only in areas of traditional concern, but 
in meeting the challenges of the 21st century as well. 
 
First, let me address those challenges that reflect the traditional 
focus of our power and diplomacy. The President's primary responsibility 
is always to protect our citizens and our shores. When matters of 
overriding importance to our national security and survival are at 
stake--such as a direct attack on our soil, our people, or our allies--
we will do whatever it takes to defend our interests, including the use 
of decisive military force--with others where we can, and alone when we 
must. 
 
When Saddam Hussein's henchmen made an attempt on President Bush's life, 
President Clinton took direct military action. When Iraq moved forces 
toward the Kuwaiti border in 1994, we sent our troops to the region and 
Saddam backed down. When North Korea began removing spent fuel from its 
nuclear reactor that same year, we broke off our negotiations and began 
working with our allies toward international sanctions and making plans 
to augment our military forces on the Peninsula. Pyongyang came back to 
the table, ready to talk about terminating their dangerous nuclear 
program. 
 
America's armed forces are the core of our nation's power, and we have 
kept our military the best-trained, best-equipped, and best-prepared in 
the world. We have strengthened and modernized our core alliances in 
Europe and Asia--maintaining about 100,000 troops in each region, 
setting the process of NATO enlargement in motion, and forging a new 
security declaration with Japan. While a long-range missile threat to 
our shores is unlikely to arise within the next 15 years, we are 
committed to developing a National Missile Defense system by 2000 that 
can, if needed, be deployed by 2003. 
 
Just as we have strengthened our military ability to secure our 
interests, we have also focused on our diplomatic power. President 
Clinton has seized the opportunity the end of the Cold War presents to 
reduce the nuclear threat by pursuing the most ambitious arms control 
and non-proliferation agenda in history. Today, Ukraine, Belarus, and 
Kazakstan have agreed to give up the nuclear weapons left on their soil. 
START I and START II will slash by two-thirds the nuclear arsenals that 
we and the Soviet Union held at the height of the Cold War. We secured 
indefinite extension of the NPT, are urging the earliest Senate 
ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention, hope to sign a 
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty this year, and have broadened 
international support for the Missile Technology Control Regime. These 
efforts and achievements are in the interest of every American's 
security. 
 
We have also led the fight against an increasingly interconnected array 
of forces of destruction--such as terrorists, drug traffickers, and 
organized criminals. These threats have little regard for national 
borders. No nation is immune, and none can defeat them alone.  
 
Since taking office, President Clinton has marshaled our resources and 
galvanized world efforts against these threats. He has attacked state-
sponsored terrorism with stiff sanctions on rogue nations, enacted tough 
counterterrorism legislation that gives law enforcement the tools they 
need to fight terrorists at home, and mobilized the world community--
from the Summit of Peacemakers in Sharm El-Sheikh to the recent G-7 
summit in Lyon. But the skeletal remains of the Khobar Towers in Dhahran 
are a brutal reminder that our work is far from over. As the President 
has said, America must not and will not be driven from this battle. 
 
We also understand the importance of engagement with the world's other 
great powers--those nations that have the greatest ability to help or 
hinder us in our efforts. We have worked steadily and intensively with 
Russia to help it seize the promise of a democratic future--and last 
week's run-off confirmed that the Russian people want to stay the path 
of reform.  
 
We have fortified our strategic dialogue with China, using the best 
tools available--incentives and disincentives alike--to advance American 
interests. That was the purpose of Tony Lake's trip over the last few 
days to Beijing. When we disagree with China, we defend our interests 
vigorously, and when China expanded its military exercises in the Taiwan 
Strait, we made clear that any use of force against Taiwan would have 
grave consequences. But by engaging China, we have helped achieve 
important benefits--from cooperation toward a Comprehensive Test Ban 
Treaty to freezing North Korea's dangerous nuclear program.  
 
Deterring--and defending our nation if necessary--against attacks on our 
vital interests, reducing the nuclear threat, fighting forces of 
destruction such as terrorism, and staying engaged with other great 
powers, are clearly the most serious foreign policy challenges and also 
the most straightforward. In deciding how and when to meet them, the 
calculus is clear: We must and will marshal whatever resources we need 
to get the job done right. Protecting our most fundamental national 
security interests is always the primary focus and concern of any 
American president. 
 
The second category of challenge is what I would call "new 
responsibilities and opportunities," which demand new responses and new 
thinking.  
 
Let me divide these new responsibilities and opportunities into four 
general areas in which we can use our influence as the sole remaining 
superpower to:  
 
-- promote peace;  
-- strengthen democracy;  
-- prevent conflicts; and  
-- alleviate crises.  
 
Some would argue against our engagement in areas where there is no 
overriding direct threat to our interests. President Clinton sees the 
situation differently. During the Cold War, we resisted actions that 
diverted our resources from the overwhelming struggle at hand. Today, we 
are freed from that constraint. This does not mean we should intervene 
everywhere or respond to every emergency. But as the world's most 
powerful nation--economically, militarily, and through the sheer force 
of our values--we cannot simply turn our backs on tragedy or 
opportunity. 
 
In choosing how and when to get involved, we must ask a number of 
critical questions, including the following:  
 
1. Will our efforts advance American interests and ideals?  
2. Will they be successful?  
3. Are they a good use of our limited resources?  
4. How do our interests compare to the costs and risks?  
 
Once we have answered these questions, we must carefully decide which 
tools we are willing to apply--from the power of our example--persistent 
diplomacy and economic aid, or sanctions to military force.  
 
First, let me address promoting peace. The end of the Cold War has 
lifted the lid on religious and ethnic conflicts such as we saw in 
Bosnia where ethnic hatred spiraled into a war that claimed thousands of 
lives, threatened stability in the heart of Europe, and did violence to 
the values on which America stands. Early in 1993, the President decided 
he would only send ground troops to Bosnia to help implement a peace 
agreement, because the costs of intervening as combatants were too high 
when balanced against our interests.  
 
However, we used every other tool in our arsenal to search for peace, 
prevent the war from spreading, and ease the suffering of the Bosnian 
people. We imposed tough economic sanctions on Serbia, stationed troops 
in The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia to contain the spread of 
the fighting, provided air support for UNPROFOR, conducted the longest 
humanitarian airlift in history, enforced a no-fly zone, and helped to 
make peace between Bosnia's Muslims and Croats.  
 
But last summer, when Bosnia's Serbs stepped up their brutality and 
another winter of disaster loomed, President Clinton launched his own 
diplomatic effort--backed by military force--to bring the warring 
parties to the peace table. The combination of heavy NATO air strikes 
and intensive American diplomacy, together with the renewed 
determination of our European partners and the Croat gains on the 
battlefield, were what made the Dayton peace conference possible.  
 
Today, our troops are serving heroically in Bosnia--not fighting in a 
war, but helping to secure the peace that American leadership helped 
achieve. The success of our military operation in Bosnia has been 
strengthened by the lessons we learned in Somalia--about the importance 
of a clear military mission, firm deadlines, and an exit strategy. 
 
There are other areas in which the investment of American resources has 
gone a long way for peace. The President has worked hard to build on the 
efforts of previous administrations in the Middle East, and we all 
admire the determined diplomacy of Secretary Christopher and his team. 
During the last three years, we have witnessed historic agreements 
between Palestinians and Israelis, and between Israel and Jordan. In 
Northern Ireland, the President's decision to use our leverage as a 
close and trusted partner of both Great Britain and Ireland has spurred 
unprecedented breakthroughs: a 17-month cease-fire that saved hundreds 
of lives and peace talks that began last month in Belfast. There remains 
much to be done, beginning with the restoration of the cease-fire, but 
we can be proud of the difference our engagement has made. In Cyprus, 
our special envoy Richard Beattie is working hard to resolve the 
problem. He is the first person to take on this important role since 
1980, and will be traveling to the region with Ambassador Albright next 
week to try to build momentum toward a comprehensive settlement. 
 
Second, let me address strengthening democracy. The rising tide of 
freedom around the world is helping shape a world in which America can 
thrive, but it is neither inevitable nor irreversible. It needs our 
support and our leadership.  
 
In Haiti, the Administration mobilized the international community to 
isolate the brutal dictatorship that had overthrown the legitimate 
government. We had important interests in shoring up democracy in our 
hemisphere, ending the abuse of human rights, and stemming the tide of 
desperate refugees, and we tried every peaceful avenue to achieve our 
goals. But when it became clear that peaceful means alone would not 
succeed, the President decided to back his diplomacy with force. When 
Haiti's generals learned our planes were in the air, they stepped aside 
in a hurry. Our troops were able to enter Haiti peacefully and help the 
Haitian people reclaim their democracy. By defining our interests 
clearly and using the tools at our disposal effectively, we achieved all 
our goals with a minimum of violence. Today, Haiti has achieved the 
first democratic transfer of power in its history, and its people have a 
chance for a brighter future. 
 
We have worked to promote democracy in other, though less dramatic ways, 
including tightened sanctions against Cuba, marshaling international 
condemnation of near coups in Paraguay and Sao Tome and Principe, and 
working in partnership with Europe to consolidate the gains of Central 
Europe's new democracies. Our assistance programs are making a 
difference in building judicial systems, helping monitor elections, 
teaching political party development, and promoting sustainable 
development. Democrats from Beijing to Bucharest and beyond look first 
to America for inspiration. 
 
We are leading the effort to pressure those still bucking the tide of 
democracy--such as the military rulers in Nigeria and Burma--by 
isolating the leaders while trying to press them to move forward. 
Progress is often painfully slow, but in the end, history is on the side 
of democracy and we can and must push it along. 
 
Third, as Michael Lund so thoughtfully discusses in his book, the United 
States can also use its influence to prevent conflicts before they erupt 
and become a more serious drain on our resources. I doubt many Americans 
are aware that we have troops on the border between Peru and Ecuador to 
help safeguard peace between these two friends of the United States. We 
helped our NATO allies Greece and Turkey avoid a conflict over the 
Aegean island of Imia. And we have launched an intensive diplomatic 
effort to prevent another Rwanda-like genocide in Burundi. In the last 
year alone, Ambassador Albright, Deputy Secretary Talbott, NSA Anthony 
Lake, Assistant Secretary Moose, Deputy Director of Central Intelligence 
Tenet, and now, Special Representative Howard Wolpe have all traveled to 
the region to help promote reconciliation. 
 
Some may argue that we should not put so much effort in a place with so 
little bearing on American interests. I would argue that it is a small 
investment compared to the one we would have to make if Burundi 
exploded. In Rwanda, for example, where the international community 
failed to act quickly enough to prevent the genocide, the United States 
was spurred into action as images of the atrocities captured our 
attention and our conscience. I am proud that the U.S. military was able 
to kick-start the relief effort--delivering nearly 15,000 tons of food, 
medicine, and supplies to Rwanda's refugees, and then handing the 
operation back to the relief community. But the crisis in Rwanda was 
costly--first and foremost in Rwandan lives. And no matter how admirable 
our intervention was, we are trying to avoid the need to repeat it in 
Burundi. 
 
The fourth area of opportunity, alleviating crises--both man-made and 
natural--is a simple calculation of costs and need. In Rwanda, we could 
not stand by as images of the disaster poured out, when we knew we had 
unique abilities to help. Similarly, when complex crises from the 
Balkans to the Caribbean to West Africa threaten the lives of hundreds 
of thousands, or when earthquakes result in devastation in Japan, 
America can and should respond. We continue to be in the forefront of 
international efforts to respond to humanitarian need, contributing some 
$1.5 billion each year for these efforts. Moreover, this level of 
commitment reflects a strong executive-congressional consensus. By 
showing the strength to be generous and humane, we reinforce our 
authority as the leader of the global community. 
 
During the last three years, I believe this Administration has made a 
real difference for our people and others--by knowing how to use the 
right tool at the right time, by marshaling our resources, and 
leveraging our power. Our efforts may lack the simple clarity of the 
past. But that is not necessarily bad. In today's new world of fast-
paced innovation, part of being strong means being able to adapt--to 
fortify old structures to withstand modern challenges, to anticipate new 
problems before they arise, and to make the investments that will bring 
greater payoffs, or prevent greater costs, down the line. 
 
Whenever we are faced with pressures to act, we carefully balance our 
interests against the costs. But there are times when America, and 
America alone, can make the crucial difference between fear and hope. We 
must not shrink from our responsibility to lead, and those in Congress 
who would slash our modest foreign affairs budget are playing dangerous 
politics with America's well-being.   
 
For 50 years, our country has been the world's greatest force for 
freedom and progress, and it has brought us real security and prosperity 
here at home. If we continue to lead, if we continue to meet the peril 
and seize the promise of this new era, that proud history will also be 
our destiny. That is President Clinton's goal--and that is what we who 
work with him are determined to achieve. We don't have magic solutions 
for every challenge we face. But at the end of the day, the bottom line 
is clear: Because of our efforts, our nation is more secure, our people 
are more prosperous, and our values are ascendant all around the world. 
We are laying the foundations for the 21st century to be an American 
century as well. Thank you. 
 
(###) 
 
 
 
ARTICLE 2: 
 
Making the International Climate Change Process Work 
Timothy E. Wirth, Under Secretary for Global Affairs 
Remarks before the Second Conference of the Parties Framework Convention 
on Climate Change, Geneva Switzerland, July 17, 1996 
 
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me begin by congratulating you, Mr. 
Chimutengwende, on your selection as chair of the conference. My 
government appreciates your willingness to assume this important role 
and the leadership you have brought to this task. I also want to take 
this opportunity to congratulate the distinguished representative from 
Germany, Angela Merkle, for the remarkable job that she did in guiding 
the work under this convention over the past several years. The task of 
moving forward more than 150 nations is difficult enough. In this 
instance, however, the challenge has been compounded by the fact that we 
are dealing with what is probably the most complicated scientific, 
environmental, economic, and political challenge in history. The 
international community is in your debt for hosting us and helping us 
reach the mandate agreed upon in Berlin last year. 
 
Since Berlin, our deliberations have benefited from the careful, 
comprehensive, and uncompromised work of the Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change, whose efforts serve as the foundation for international 
concern and whose clear warnings about current trends are the basis for 
the sense of urgency which my government holds in these matters. We are 
not swayed by and strongly object to the recent allegations about the 
integrity of the IPCC's conclusions. These allegations were raised not 
by the scientists involved in the IPCC, not by participating 
governments, but rather by nay-sayers and special interests bent on 
belittling, attacking, and obfuscating climate change science. We want 
to take this false issue off the table and reinforce our belief that the 
IPCC's findings meet the highest standards of scientific integrity. We 
also note with regret that the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and 
Technological Advice--SBSTA, blocked by a very small group of countries, 
did not agree on how to use the IPCC report. Let me make clear the U.S. 
view: The science calls upon us to take urgent action. The IPCC report 
is the best science that we have and we should use it. 
 
In the ongoing scientific effort, Mr. Chairman, I want to note that the 
United States is proud of the more than $1 billion annual investment it 
has been making on global change research in recent years. This is a 
cost we have taken on in order to enhance our own and the world's 
understanding of the earth's atmospheric, oceanic, and biological 
systems and represents not only the seriousness with which we view these 
matters, but also the willingness of President Clinton and the American 
people to help pioneer progress on behalf of the environment. 
 
The United States of America takes very seriously the IPCC's recently 
issued Second Assessment Report, which underscored and amplified the 
panel's initial work--refining estimates and revealing new 
understandings that serve to signal even louder alarm bells. From our 
perspective, the most salient of these findings are as follows: 
 
-- The chemical composition of the atmosphere is being altered by 
anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases. 
--  The continued buildup of these gases will enhance the natural 
greenhouse effect and cause the global climate to change. 
 
Based on these facts and additional underlying science, the second 
assessment reported that "the balance of evidence suggests that there is 
a discernible human influence on global climate." This seemingly 
innocuous comment is, in fact, a remarkable statement. For the first 
time ever, the world's scientists have reached the conclusion that the 
world's changing climatic conditions are more than the natural 
variability of weather. Human beings are altering the earth's natural 
climate system. 
 
In turn, the best scientific evidence indicates that human-induced 
climate change, if allowed to continue unabated, could have profound 
consequences for the economy and the quality of life of future 
generations: 
 
-- Human health is at risk from projected increases in the spread of 
diseases like malaria, yellow fever, and cholera; 
-- Food security is threatened in certain regions of the world; 
-- Water resources are expected to be increasingly stressed, with 
substantial economic, social, and environmental costs in regions that 
are already water-limited, and perhaps even political costs where there 
is already conflict over limited resources; and 
-- Coastal areas--where a large percentage of the global population 
lives--are at risk from sea level rise. 
 
In our opinion, the IPCC has clearly demonstrated that action must be 
taken to address this challenge and that, as agreed in Berlin, more 
needs to be done through the convention. This problem cannot be wished 
away. The science cannot be ignored and is increasingly compelling. The 
obligation of policy-makers is to respond with the same thoughtfulness 
that has characterized the work of the world's scientific community. 
 
Unhappily, Mr. Chairman, while the established international scientific 
process is working well, the international policy process, as 
established under the convention, has not been as successful. The 
shortcomings of the convention--its failure to address the post-2000 
period, for example--were well explored in Berlin and do not bear 
repeating today. The most salient fact is now more apparent than ever: 
the current convention structure has not achieved the results that were 
anticipated and planned for in good faith. Few nations in either the 
developed or developing world have been fully successful in meeting 
their commitments under articles 4.1 and 4.2  of the convention. We have 
to do better.  
 
Over the past year, the United States has been engaged at home and 
internationally in serious analysis of the successes and failures of the 
current convention structure, as well as of the practicality of the 
various proposals for next steps that have been put forward in recent 
discussions. While we still have much work to do, our analysis and 
consideration of this issue to date have led us to certain conclusions 
about the form of an agreement we hope these negotiations will consider 
and pursue. In the months ahead, our ongoing analysis and assessment 
will allow us to more precisely articulate the specific contents that 
the United States could support. 
 
We begin, Mr. Chairman, from the following base set of principles which 
will guide our consideration of proposals and which we believe should 
guide our multilateral negotiations. 
 
First, our negotiations must focus on outcomes that are real and 
achievable. Sound policies pursued in the near- term will allow us to 
avoid the prospect of truly draconian and economically disruptive 
policies in the future. Measured adjustments now and in the years ahead 
will enable all nations to reduce emissions in an economically sensible 
manner. Denial and delay will only make our economies vulnerable in the 
future. 
 
Second, the United States will continue to seek market-based solutions 
that are flexible and cost-effective. We will not accept proposals that 
are offered for competitive, not environmental, reasons. Serious 
proposals in the future must not be thinly veiled attempts to gain 
economic advantage. This is a global problem with global impacts and 
therefore requires solutions that are fair and that will ensure 
prosperity--now and in the future--for all the world's people. 
 
Third, the agreement should lay the foundation for continuing progress 
by all nations in the future. The United States believes that 
international cooperation on this challenge remains critical to any 
effective response and that all nations--developed and developing--must 
contribute to the solution to this challenge. We believe that, while 
this is a long-term challenge, we must start making progress now and 
engage the public and private sectors over the medium-term as well. 
Climate change is a serious problem and will require sustained long-term 
investment and the full creativity of the marketplace. 
 
President Clinton has urged all Americans and all nations to prepare 
their economies for the 21st century. Meeting this challenge requires 
that the genius of the private sector be brought to bear on the 
challenge of developing the technologies that are necessary to ensure 
our long-term environmental and economic prosperity. 
 
Based on these principles--encompassing environmental protection, 
realism and achievability, economic prosperity, flexibility, fairness, 
and comprehensiveness--the United States recommends that future 
negotiations focus on an agreement that sets a realistic, verifiable, 
and binding medium-term emissions target. We believe that the medium-
term target must be met through maximum flexibility in the selection of 
implementation measures, including the use of measures such as reliable 
activities implemented jointly and trading mechanisms around the world. 
In addition, our view is that it will be necessary to continue working 
toward a longer-term concentration goal (e.g. for the next 50 to 100 
years), as set out in the convention's objective, recognizing that 
scientific understanding and technology will improve over time. Working 
toward such a goal would better establish the long-term, global nature 
of the problem. 
 
Having outlined in broad terms the basic components of an agreement we 
could support, I want to underscore the expectation of the United States 
that the agreement be realistic and achievable. Our preliminary analysis 
of the targets that have been tabled for consideration to date suggests 
that these proposals are neither realistic nor achievable--either 
because they would compromise other important principles, such as the 
need for flexibility in time and place of implementation, or because 
they involve timeframes and objectives that are not consistent with 
national and international prosperity. Our job, in the months ahead, is 
to search for agreement on a next step that will produce results that 
are consistent with our environmental and economic aspirations. 
 
Others have suggested that the negotiations move toward consideration of 
some ambitious mandatory, internationally coordinated policies and 
measures. In particular, suggestions are emerging for annexes to the 
agreement outlining specific actions that relevant Parties would be 
required to undertake, such as, for example, agreed fiscal or regulatory 
policies. In our view, the significant differences in national 
circumstances and individual national approaches to these matters 
suggest that few, if any, individual measures are likely to be 
applicable to all countries. Therefore, as a general proposition, the 
United States opposes mandatory harmonized policies and measures. We are 
open to the possibility of exploring consensus on agreed procedural 
measures, for example, those that might be necessary to implement an 
international trading regime or ensure enhanced reporting. 
 
Finally, Mr. Chairman, I want to discuss a difficult component of the 
negotiations, but one that is essential if we are to make progress over 
the long-term. The United States is committed in these negotiations to 
ensuring that all countries--developed and developing--take steps to 
limit emissions, consistent with the mandate agreed upon last year in 
Berlin. We look forward to working together to develop strategies for 
advancing implementation of this convention. While we recognize that 
developed countries have the responsibility to lead, we also believe 
that this effort must be a partnership with all nations. We stand ready 
to continue our efforts to provide technical expertise to work with 
developing countries to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, and to continue 
the partnership which we have begun with many. 
 
In summary, we have come to the conclusion that the current structure of 
the convention is less than ideal. Performance under the current regime-
-or lack thereof--suggests that a new model must be considered. Next 
steps must be structured in a way that will help produce the desired 
results--not just more rhetoric. We believe circumstances warrant the 
adoption of a realistic but binding target, leaving it to individual 
governments to decide the most appropriate measures needed to meet the 
agreed target. We are convinced that the target must be both realistic 
and binding because it is only through the surety of a commitment of 
this nature that governments will take their obligations seriously, and 
the only way we can be assured of progress. 
 
We are also convinced that it is the target that should be binding, not 
the individual measures, thus allowing maximum flexibility in 
implementation. Continued use of non-binding targets that are not met 
makes a mockery of the treaty process. It leaves the impression that 
rhetoric is what counts rather than real emission reductions--an outcome 
that is both unacceptable and counterproductive. 
 
Mr. Chairman, the United States is committed to making the international 
climate change process work. The science is convincing; concern about 
global warming is real and we must continue to take steps to address 
this problem consistent with our long-term economic and environmental 
aspirations. Working together, it is imperative that we marshall the 
creativity and will that is necessary to address this far-reaching 
challenge in an aggressive manner. The United States hopes we can 
negotiate an agreement that is comprehensive, flexible, fair, and 
certain, and which will help prepare our country and the world--
environmentally and economically--for the next century. 
 
(###) 
 
 
 
ARTICLE 3: 
 
Hong Kong's Progress Toward Reversion: Implications for the U.S. 
Winston Lord, Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs 
Statement before the subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs of 
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Washington, DC, July 18, 1996 
 
Mr. Chairman, I am pleased to have the opportunity to appear before this 
subcommittee today to discuss Hong Kong. 
 
In less than one year, Hong Kong will revert to Chinese sovereignty. At 
midnight on June 30, 1997, Hong Kong's 155-year history of British 
colonial rule will cease and it will become a Special Administrative 
Region of the People's Republic of China. This transfer of sovereignty 
is without historic precedent or parallel, and the world will be 
watching. Already, countless prognosticators have opined about what the 
reversion will mean to Hong Kong's future. Thus, it is an opportune time 
to review Hong Kong's progress toward reversion and its implications for 
the United States. 
 
First, a few words about what Hong Kong is today. By almost any 
standard, Hong Kong is one of the world's most successful societies. 
With a land area of only 420 square miles and a population of just 6.3 
million, Hong Kong is the world's eighth-largest trading economy and a 
leading international financial center. Its airport is among the world's 
top five in both passenger and cargo volume, and its container port is 
the world's busiest. It has Asia's second-largest stock market. Over 700 
foreign companies maintain regional headquarters in Hong Kong, including 
85 of the world's top 100 banks.  
 
Over the past two decades, the Hong Kong economy has more than 
quadrupled, and its per capita GDP has tripled to about $24,000--higher 
than that of the United Kingdom, Canada, or Australia. Unemployment is 
only 3.2%, regular budget surpluses have produced a secure fiscal 
environment, and Hong Kong has accumulated over $58 billion in foreign 
exchange reserves. Hong Kong is one of the safest cities in the world 
and is Asia's most popular travel destination, with a record 10.2 
million visitors in 1995. Hong Kong is also a center for 
telecommunications technology and has long been a media hub for Asia, 
with over 700 newspapers and periodicals based there. 
 
But numbers tell only part of the story. The reasons underlying Hong 
Kong's extraordinary success are significant as well. Hong Kong has one 
of the world's most liberal trade and investment regimes. For the second 
year in a row, the Heritage Foundation rated Hong Kong as the freest 
economy in the world. Government regulation is transparent and 
nonburdensome. Taxes are low and the Hong Kong dollar is freely 
convertible. The workforce is educated, highly motivated, and 
industrious, and Hong Kong's pool of enterprising entrepreneurs is 
legendary. 
 
Other factors are more subtle, but they are no less compelling. Hong 
Kong people live and work within a trusted framework of law and justice-
-without economic, social, or political repression. Civil liberties and 
individual political, cultural, and academic freedoms are protected 
assiduously. The rule of law is well-established, and Hong Kong courts 
act as independent arbiters between the government and the governed. 
Freedom of expression is guaranteed, including the freedom to advocate 
changes of policy and practice without fear of government retribution.  
 
This combination of favorable government policies and an open way of 
life has given Hong Kong people the energy, enterprise, and confidence 
to pursue their own interests within the bounds of the law. Their 
instinctive belief in these values--combined with their hard work, 
resourcefulness, and imagination--has transformed Hong Kong into the 
thriving international entrepot it is today. 
 
The Road to Reversion 
 
Hong Kong's status after reversion to Chinese sovereignty is defined in 
two documents: the 1984 Sino-British Joint Declaration and the 1990 
Basic Law promulgated by the People's Republic of China. Together, these 
documents are China's promise that, although sovereignty will change in 
1997, Hong Kong's way of life will not. 
 
The Joint Declaration provides that the post-1997 Hong Kong Special 
Administrative Region will be directly under the authority of the P.R.C. 
central government. Unlike other regions of China, however, Hong Kong 
will retain a high degree of autonomy in all matters except foreign 
affairs and defense. The Joint Declaration established the concept of 
"one country, two systems" for Hong Kong, and guarantees that the social 
and economic systems, lifestyle, and rights and freedoms currently 
enjoyed by the Hong Kong people will remain unchanged for at least 50 
years. The Joint Declaration is an international agreement registered 
with the United Nations; it is the international legal foundation upon 
which Hong Kong's relations with the rest of the world are based. 
 
The Basic Law provides the fundamental governing framework for 
implementing the "one country, two systems" principle in Hong Kong 
consistent with China's commitments in the Joint Declaration. It says 
that the P.R.C. socialist system and policies will not be extended to 
the territory. The Basic Law reiterates the Joint Declaration promise to 
allow Hong Kong to exercise a high degree of autonomy and to exercise 
separate executive, legislative, and judicial power after 1997.  
 
We strongly believe that Hong Kong's best interests are served by 
faithful attention to the letter and spirit of the Joint Declaration. In 
it, China made an extraordinary series of pledges about Hong Kong's 
future. On paper, the Joint Declaration establishes a framework that 
can, if honored and effectively implemented, assure that Hong Kong 
remains the vibrant and attractive place it is today. Among other 
things, the Joint Declaration provides that: 
 
-- Hong Kong will have independent courts, with ultimate judicial 
authority resting in a Court of Final Appeal; 
-- Hong Kong residents, not non-Hong Kong P.R.C. citizens, will occupy 
all important government and civil service positions; 
-- Hong Kong laws, not P.R.C. laws, will apply; 
-- Hong Kong's finances will be independent of China, and no tax 
revenues will be collected for or sent to Beijing;  
-- Hong Kong will continue to maintain its own currency, the Hong Kong 
dollar, which will be freely convertible; 
-- Hong Kong police will maintain public order; 
-- Hong Kong will be empowered to enter into international agreements in 
a wide range of areas; and 
-- Hong Kong people will elect the legislature. 
 
The key question, of course, is whether China will honor this impressive 
set of commitments. The world does not yet know the answer. China has 
repeatedly stated its intention to stand by its pledges and preserve 
Hong Kong's high degree of autonomy. The international community, which 
has a substantial stake in Hong Kong, will be watching and expecting 
this to happen. More important, the people of Hong Kong will make their 
own decisions about the future--primarily by assessing the degree of 
sensitivity to local concerns Beijing brings to the important decisions 
it makes. For this reason, clear, positive signals from Beijing will be 
increasingly important to ensure Hong Kong's stability and prosperity 
under the Joint Declaration principles. 
 
In general, Chinese statements and actions have been reassuring about 
its commitment to Hong Kong's future prosperity and preservation of its 
dynamic capitalist system. As China has become Hong Kong's largest 
investor and set up numerous companies in Hong Kong, it has demonstrated 
respect for the economic system. It has made clear its intention to 
maintain Hong Kong's own currency linked to the U.S. dollar and to 
preserve Hong Kong's substantial foreign exchange reserves. P.R.C. 
companies so far seem interested in gaining a share of the lucrative 
contracts tendered in Hong Kong rather than undermining the process 
itself. Negotiations between the U.K. and China on the new airport, the 
world's largest infrastructure project, were successfully concluded last 
year. Chinese officials have proclaimed an even greater commitment to 
fiscal discipline than the Hong Kong Government, voicing opposition to 
new government spending plans and expressing fear about the impact of 
proposed social welfare programs on Hong Kong's traditional budget 
surpluses. The preservation of Hong Kong's strong economic system 
assumes, of course, that it is not infiltrated by corruption, rigging of 
the tendering process, influence-peddling by the P.R.C. Government and 
institutions, or other factors that will test the vigilance of investors 
or Hong Kong Government officials. 
 
China has also taken a number of encouraging steps outside the economic 
area. Joint P.R.C.-Hong Kong efforts on customs, immigration, and other 
law enforcement matters are successful and bode well for cooperative 
relations after 1997. China has approved Hong Kong's continued 
participation in international organizations and extension of most major 
multilateral agreements currently applied to Hong Kong through the 
United Kingdom. Last year, Britain and China agreed upon, and the Hong 
Kong legislature approved, arrangements for the Court of Final Appeal. 
We believe this was a useful step in promoting confidence in the 
continuity of the rule of law and judicial institutions. Significant 
progress has been made with respect to the production, issuance, and 
control of the future Hong Kong passport. After initial anxiety, 
expanded and productive contacts between Hong Kong civil servants and 
Beijing now appear to promote confidence and mutual trust. China has 
announced that all important Hong Kong Government positions will be 
filled by Hong Kong residents after 1997--allowing most senior civil 
servants to remain in place. 
 
Unfortunately, Beijing has shown less understanding of the need to 
provide Hong Kong with the same high degree of autonomy in the political 
area. Its approach to the Legislative Council-- Legco--has been 
particularly troubling. Democratic elections were late in coming to Hong 
Kong; the first direct elections for any seats in the legislature were 
only permitted by the British in 1991, after China's military assault on 
Tiananmen Square. In 1994, the legislature enacted a reform electoral 
law proposed by Governor Patten and designed to provide a more 
accountable and democratic political system. Since then, China rejected 
the electoral reforms as inconsistent with the Joint Declaration 
assurance that the "laws currently in force" in Hong Kong would remain 
unchanged. China has repeatedly stated that the Legco elected in 1995 
will be dissolved on July 1, 1997, and a provisional legislature will 
take its place until new elections are held under as-yet unspecified 
rules. 
 
Both British and Hong Kong Government officials have criticized China's 
decision as unjustified and unnecessary. They see it as a threat to Hong 
Kong's   future autonomy and its continued democratic development. They 
have challenged Beijing to describe how a provisional legislature is 
consistent with the Joint Declaration requirement of an elected 
legislature in Hong Kong. As yet, however, the modalities by which 
Beijing will select a provisional legislature are  still unclear. For 
its part, China has announced that the provisional legislature it 
proposes will last for no more than a year. It will, in turn, be 
replaced in 1998 by an elected Legco, chosen on the basis of a new 
electoral law likely to be passed by the provisional body. China has 
said that a broad spectrum of candidates and parties will be allowed to 
participate in the 1998 elections. 
 
China's attitude on Legco raises serious concerns. The U.S. has not 
endorsed any particular electoral law or set of proposals. But we have 
strongly supported the development of open, accountable, and democratic 
institutions in Hong Kong, and Governor Patten's reform proposals were a 
worthy step in that direction. Legco's enactment of his proposals in 
1994 gave them added legitimacy, and we, therefore, believe that China 
should permit those elected in the 1995 elections to serve their full 
terms. Dissolving a legislature elected on the basis of an election law 
passed by Legco, and replacing it with a provisional legislature chosen 
by some unknown method, appears to be a large step backward. We will be 
watching closely to see how a provisional body is formed, who become 
members, and what kind of electoral changes it makes. Hong Kong's high 
degree of autonomy will undergo one of its first important tests in this 
process. 
 
In other statements on political matters, Beijing has shown an 
insensitivity to the way in which Hong Kong works and the wishes of its 
residents. Its announcement that portions of Hong Kong's bill of rights 
would be scrapped, and that the P.R.C. would not report to the UN on 
human rights in Hong Kong, was opposed by virtually the entire spectrum 
of political opinion in Hong Kong outside of the P.R.C.-controlled 
media. In choosing the 150-person Preparatory Committee, charged with 
establishing the post-1997 government, Beijing pointedly excluded 
representatives of the Democratic Party--the largest political party in 
Legco with 29 of the 60 total seats. When the Preparatory Committee 
formally voted to establish a provisional legislature upon reversion, 
the only member to vote against the measure was publicly rebuked. He was 
then told he was ineligible to serve in the provisional body or on the 
selection committee for Hong Kong's first chief executive--one of the 
most important decisions Beijing will make  this year. 
 
Freedom of expression and of the media will be another test of China's 
intentions. Recent pronouncements by P.R.C. officials implying that 
journalistic advocacy would not be permitted reflect an imperfect 
understanding of what freedom of speech really means. Beijing's comments 
drew immediate, negative reaction in Hong Kong. While few expect full-
fledged censorship, Beijing's statements raised concern that 
journalists, editors, and publishers may be expected to adopt informal 
limits in areas of particular sensitivity, such as Tibet, Taiwan, or 
criticism of the Communist Party or China's leadership. We hope that 
Hong Kong's free and open press continues and that tolerance for dissent 
and the right of peaceful debate are maintained. 
 
The United States and Hong Kong 
 
Hong Kong is an international city. Its future stability and continued 
prosperity are important--not just to China, but to the entire world 
community, including the United States. 
 
The United States has a major interest in Hong Kong's successful 
transition. U.S. trade, investment, and business with Hong Kong flourish 
in a virtually barrier-free environment. Last year's exports to Hong 
Kong--many of which are reexported to China--totaled nearly $15 billion. 
U.S. companies have $13 billion of investment in Hong Kong. Some 1,000 
resident U.S. firms employ 250,000 Hong Kong workers--nearly 10% of the 
workforce. About 37,000 American citizens live and work in Hong Kong, 
the second-largest foreign presence after Filipinos. The U.S. Navy calls 
in Hong Kong at the rate of 60 to 80 ship visits per year. Cooperation 
between the Hong Kong Government and U.S. law enforcement agencies makes 
a real difference in our efforts to combat drug trafficking, illegal 
alien smuggling, organized crime, and counterfeiting. 
 
We also enjoy strong educational and cultural relations, including a 
very large flow of tourists and students in both directions. Over 14,000 
Hong Kong students are studying in the United States, and Hong Kong 
alumni of American universities number in the tens of thousands. Nearly 
120,000 new business and tourist visas were issued to Hong Kong 
residents in 1995, and over 700,000 U.S. citizens traveled to Hong Kong 
last year. 
 
Thus, we have a very significant stake in promoting economic and 
business relationships, preserving civil liberties and the rule of law, 
maintaining a cooperative law enforcement relationship, and preserving 
access to Hong Kong as a routine and frequent port of call for navy 
ships. The bottom line is that we want to enjoy the same broad range of 
relations with Hong Kong after 1997, an objective made clear in the 
U.S.-Hong Kong Policy Act. 
 
United States policy toward Hong Kong is therefore grounded in a 
determination to help preserve Hong Kong's prosperity and way of life. 
Let me review the basis of that policy. As previous administrations, the 
Clinton Administration strongly supports the Joint Declaration. It 
provides a sound basis for a smooth transfer of sovereignty and a 
comprehensive and rational framework for Hong Kong's continued stability 
and prosperity. But, it is not only our policy that underscores support 
for the Joint Declaration. While recognizing that Hong Kong will become 
a part of China, the U.S.-Hong Kong Policy Act establishes domestic 
legal authority to treat Hong Kong as an entity distinct from the P.R.C. 
after reversion. This reinforces the Joint Declaration concept of "one 
country, two systems." 
 
We believe that United States' interests--and those of Hong Kong itself-
- are best served by faithful implementation of the commitments made in 
the Joint Declaration. We are not direct actors in this drama, as 
specific arrangements for Hong Kong's transition are matters primarily 
between the British, the Chinese, and the Hong Kong people. But we do 
play a strong, supportive role to ensure that our interests are 
protected.  
 
How do we do this? We encourage both Britain and China to deal 
sensitively and flexibly with controversial transition issues. We 
maintain a regular dialogue with leaders in Beijing, London, and Hong 
Kong to provide our perspective of the transition process and to discuss 
areas in which we believe the pitfalls may lie. And we speak clearly 
about our expectations for Hong Kong's future and about the factors that 
will keep Hong Kong the attractive and prosperous center it is today. 
Our public and private statements reiterate the themes key to Hong 
Kong's continued autonomy: Access to free markets and an open investment 
regime, a solid legal system and independent judiciary, 
noninterventionist economic policies, continued protection of civil 
liberties and cultural and academic freedoms, an open and aggressive 
press, and open and accountable democratic institutions. 
 
In pursuing our commercial and law enforcement interests, we promote a 
framework of bilateral and multilateral agreements that ensure separate 
treatment for Hong Kong from China, as called for in the Joint 
Declaration and the U.S.-Hong Kong Policy Act. We have initialed an air 
services agreement, an extradition agreement, and a mutual legal 
assistance agreement with Hong Kong; they await approval by the Sino-
British Joint Liaison Group. Negotiations on a bilateral investment 
agreement are underway, and will begin shortly on a prisoner transfer 
agreement. We are also pledged to support Hong Kong's participation in 
the WTO, APEC, and other international organizations. We expanded our 
law enforcement presence in Hong Kong by adding additional FBI and INS 
representatives and opening an office of the U.S. Secret Service. 
 
In recognition of Hong Kong's special status, we intend to continue to 
grant Hong Kong a separate textile quota. We also plan to maintain a 
separate export control regime with Hong Kong, assuming it preserves the 
same effective controls over sensitive technologies in the future as it 
does now. We are working closely with Hong Kong Government officials to 
help to ensure that Hong Kong's independence in each of these areas 
continues to be preserved. 
 
During the past year, we have also promoted a variety of artistic, 
educational, and cultural exchange programs, including a series of 
activities sponsored by the Hong Kong-America Center. The Immigration 
Act of 1990 established a special "extended validity" option for 
immigrant visas issued to certain Hong Kong residents, allowing them 
until 2002 to enter the United States. This is an important factor 
helping to stabilize Hong Kong's population as the transition 
approaches. 
 
High-level visits in both directions are another avenue to underscore 
the importance of Hong Kong to U.S. interests. Over the past year, 
Administration and Congressional visitors spent over 300 days in Hong 
Kong; these visitors have included several members of this subcommittee, 
four cabinet secretaries, and over a dozen subcabinet officials. We hope 
to continue the steady pace of visits over the next year, and we 
especially encourage regular official visits by members of Congress. 
 
At the same time, we welcome the visits of Hong Kong leaders to the 
United States. In just the past few months, for example, senior 
Administration officials have met with Governor Patten, Chief Secretary 
Anson Chan, Trade and Industry Secretary Denise Yue, Democratic Party 
Chairman Martin Lee, Preparatory Committee Vice Chairman C.H. Tung, 
Political Advisor Robert Pierce, and Police Commissioner Eddie Hui. 
These visits are important to present an accurate and balanced view of 
Hong Kong's progress toward a smooth transition and to articulate the 
fundamentals important to Hong Kong's success. 
 
Above all, Hong Kong is a place people go to do business, and the United 
States Government is far from the only important player that can 
influence Hong Kong's future stability and prosperity. The decisions and 
behavior of thousands of private companies and individuals from the 
United States and elsewhere  will be at least as important in 
determining the Hong Kong of the future. For this reason, we encourage 
them to speak frankly and directly to Beijing.  
 
In this context, strong U.S.-China relations will enhance the prospects 
for protecting U.S. interests in Hong Kong and positively influencing 
its future. Indeed, Beijing's flexibility and tolerance on Hong Kong 
issues can themselves help to build a stronger relationship of trust 
between China and the United States. A successful transition will carry 
positive messages about China's interaction with the world. Conversely, 
a difficult transition, in which the principal problems stem from 
Beijing's actions, will affect international perceptions of China 
generally. The potential impact of an unsuccessful transition should not 
be underestimated. Hong Kong itself is sensitive to the effect of U.S.-
China relations on its own stability. When missiles are lobbed over the 
Taiwan Strait, when U.S. sanctions are threatened against China, and 
whenever the recurring MFN debate approaches, the fragility of Hong 
Kong's confidence in its own future becomes immediately apparent. Simply 
put, when U.S.-China relations are troubled, Hong Kong becomes nervous. 
 
A Transition in Progress 
 
And what of the future? In the runup to reversion, a plethora of views 
on Hong Kong's future abound. Some contend that Hong Kong will be 
contaminated by a repressive system intolerant of dissent and any form 
of democratic government, thereby violating the letter and spirit of the 
Joint Declaration. Others claim that nothing will change, and that Hong 
Kong will continue as an economic dynamo, a major center for business 
and finance, and an entrepot and incentive for continued economic and 
political liberalization in China. 
 
The reality is that Hong Kong's transition is still a work in progress 
that will play out over many years. One year from July 1, 1997, the most 
accurate view of its progress is neither doom-laden nor blindly 
optimistic, but is a realistic balance of the promise and the problems 
that have appeared to date. On the one hand, the transition is 
progressing better than most observers forecasted when the Joint 
Declaration was signed in 1984, or after the military assault on 
Tiananmen Square in 1989. On both occasions, many predicted that, by 
1996, massive emigration and capital flight would have already occurred. 
Neither has. On the other hand, Beijing has often made moves or 
statements that suggest at the least an insensitivity to what makes Hong 
Kong stable and prosperous. 
 
Hong Kong's economy remains healthy and strong. Most Hong Kong business 
representatives view the future positively and are less concerned with 
the uncertainties over political arrangements. Recent surveys by the 
American Chamber of Commerce, the Hong Kong Government, and the Japanese 
Chamber of Commerce show that over 90% of international investors remain 
optimistic about Hong Kong's prospects after 1997. A stable law-and-
order situation enhances this position; Hong Kong is not a city gripped 
by violence, panic, or corruption. And emigration from Hong Kong has 
actually decreased over the past two years. In its place, many Hong 
Kongers have acquired foreign passports and have returned to Hong Kong.  
 
In the end, the answers lie primarily in Beijing and Hong Kong. It is 
critical that Beijing adhere to its commitment to preserve Hong Kong's 
high degree of autonomy. The signals it sends to Hong Kong and the world 
during the next year will be watched closely for indications that China 
will handle controversial transition issues with sensitivity and in 
accordance with the Joint Declaration. 
 
Beijing has ample reasons to live up to its commitments; no country has 
benefited more from Hong Kong's success than China itself. Hong Kong is 
China's largest trading partner and much of China's two-way trade uses 
Hong Kong as a transshipment point. Sixty-five percent of foreign direct 
investment in China now comes from or through Hong Kong. Over 50,000 
enterprises in Guangdong Province alone use Hong Kong investment and 
employ over 4 million P.R.C. workers. 
 
Indeed, China has relied on Hong Kong's easy access to investment 
capital; sophisticated financial, technical, and legal expertise; and 
entrepreneurial skills to fuel its own economic growth over the last two 
decades. Beijing knows that Hong Kong's vibrant service economy could 
quickly dissipate through steady or mass emigration if its signals or 
actions erode confidence. Many in Hong Kong carry a second passport to 
Canada, Australia, or the United States as insurance against future 
uncertainty. Beijing wants to send a positive message to Taiwan that a 
promising future follows the reunification Beijing seeks. Thus, Beijing 
has a real interest in making its stewardship of Hong Kong a success; 
the issue is whether it understands what is needed to do so. 
 
For its part, Hong Kong brings considerable strength to the transition--
above all is the vision, vigor, and resilience of its people. There are 
those who would discount the ability or the will of the Hong Kong people 
to remain an autonomous voice in Hong Kong. I disagree. Hong Kong has 
already established political and economic success and is reaping the 
benefits of both. Its creative and entrepreneurial population has 
weathered crises of confidence in the past, and has come out ahead each 
time. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Hong Kong is simply too important to the world to give up prematurely 
and to retreat to pessimism when there is still much to be resolved in 
the transition. But given the mixed signals and difficulties, there is 
hardly room for complacency about its future. Continued close 
cooperation between Hong Kong and Beijing up to and beyond the reversion 
is essential to convert the principle of autonomy into practice and 
reality. The United States will support efforts to preserve Hong Kong's 
way of life through the change in sovereignty.  After all, it is in the 
best interests of the United States, China, and Hong Kong alike that 
Hong Kong remain an open, prosperous, and vibrant society after 1997.  
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 
 
(###) 
 
 
 
ARTICLE 4: 
 
Treaty Actions 
 
Multilateral 
 
Chemical Weapons 
Convention on the prohibition of the development, production, 
stockpiling, and use of chemical weapons and on their destruction, with 
annexes. Done at Paris Jan. 13, 19931. [Senate] Treaty Doc. 103-21. 
Ratifications: Belarus, July 11, 1996; Chile, July 10, 1996; Ireland, 
June 24, 1996; Latvia, July 23, 1996; Moldova, July 8, 1996; New 
Zealand, July 15, 1996; Uzbekistan, July 23, 1996. 
 
Children 
Convention on the protection of children and cooperation in respect of 
intercountry adoption. Done at The Hague May 29, 1993. Entered into 
force May 1, 19952. Signature: June 19, 1996. Ratification: Philippines, 
July 2, 1996. 
 
Consular Relations 
Convention on consular relations. Done at Vienna Apr. 24, 1963. Entered 
into force Mar. 19, 1967; for the U.S. Dec. 24, 1969. TIAS 6820; 21 UST 
77. Accession: Andorra, July 3, 1996. 
 
Defense 
Memorandum of understanding among the United States, Germany, and Italy 
concerning cooperation on project definition and validation of a medium 
extended air defense system, with annex. Signed at Washington, Rome, and 
Bonn May 17, 24, and 28, 1996. Entered into force May 28, 1996. 
 
Diplomatic Relations 
Vienna convention on diplomatic relations. Done at Vienna Apr. 18, 1961. 
Entered into force Apr. 24, 1964; for the U.S. Dec. 13, 1972. TIAS 7502; 
23 UST 3227. Accession: Andorra, July 3, 1996. 
 
Human Rights 
International covenant on civil and political rights. Adopted by the UN 
General Assembly Dec. 16, 1966. Entered into force Mar. 23, 1976; for 
the U.S. Sept. 8, 1992. Accessions: Belize, June 10, 1996; Kuwait, May 
21, 1996. 
 
Optional protocol to the international covenant on civil and political 
rights. Adopted by the UN General Assembly Dec. 16, 1966. Entered into 
force Mar. 23, 19762. Accession: Malawi, June 11, 1996. 
 
International covenant on economic, social, and cultural rights. Adopted 
by the UN General Assembly Dec. 16, 1966. Entered into force Jan. 3, 
19762. Accession: Kuwait, May 21, 1996. 
 
Judicial 
Convention on laundering, search, seizure, and confiscation of the 
proceeds from crime. Done at Strasbourg Nov. 8, 1990. Entered into force 
Sept. 1, 19932. Ratification: Sweden, July 15, 1996. 
 
Narcotics 
Single convention on narcotic drugs, 1961. Done at New York Mar. 30, 
1961. Entered into force Dec. 13, 1964; for the U.S. June 24, 1967. TIAS 
6298; 18 UST 1407. 
 
Protocol amending the single convention on narcotic drugs, 1961. Done at 
Geneva Mar. 25, 1972. Entered into force Aug. 8, 1975. TIAS 8118; 26 UST 
1439. 
 
Convention on psychotropic substances. Done at Vienna Feb. 21, 1971. 
Entered into force Aug. 16, 1976; for the U.S. July 15, 1980. TIAS 9725; 
32 UST 543. Accession: Estonia, July 5, 1996. 
 
United Nations convention against illicit traffic in narcotic drugs and 
psychotropic substances, with annex and final act. Done at Vienna Dec. 
20, 1988. Entered into force Nov. 11, 1990. [Senate] Treaty Doc. 101-4. 
Ratifications: Cuba, June 12, 1996; Philippines, June 7, 1996. 
 
Patents 
Strasbourg agreement concerning the international patent classification. 
Done at Strasbourg Mar. 24, 1971. Entered into force Oct. 7, 1975. TIAS 
8140; 26 UST 1793. Accession: China, June 17, 19663. 
 
Budapest treaty on the international recognition of the deposit of 
microorganisms for the purposes of patent procedure, with regulations. 
Done at Budapest Apr. 28, 1977 and amended on Sept. 26, 1980. Entered 
into force Aug. 19, 1980. TIAS 9768; 32 UST 1241. Accessions: Estonia, 
June 14, 1996; Canada, June 21, 1996.  
 
Property 
Convention of Paris for the protection of industrial property of Mar. 
20, 1883, as revised. Done at Stockholm July 14, 1967. Entered into 
force Apr. 26, 1970; for the U.S. Sept. 5, 1970; except for Arts. 1-12 
which entered into force May 19, 1970; for the U.S. Aug. 25, 1973. TIAS 
6923, 7727; 21 UST 1583, 24 UST 2140. Accession: United Arab Emirates, 
June 19, 1996. 
 
 
Bilateral 
 
Algeria 
Agreement regarding the consolidation and rescheduling of certain debts 
owed to, guaranteed by, or insured by the United States Government and 
its agencies, with annexes. Signed at Algiers Mar. 27, 1996. Entered 
into force June 24, 1996. 
 
Antigua and Barbuda 
Agreement amending the agreement of Apr. 19, 1995, concerning maritime 
counter-drug operations. Effected by exchange of notes at Bridgetown and 
St. John's June 3, 1996. Entered into force June 3, 1996. 
 
Bosnia-Herzegovina 
Investment incentive agreement. Signed at Sarajevo July 12, 1996. Enters 
into force on date on which Bosnia-Herzegovina notifies the U.S. that 
all legal requirements for entry into force have been fulfilled. 
 
Canada 
Agreement concerning the training of mission specialists for space 
shuttle flights, with implementing agreement. Effected by exchange of 
notes at Ottawa Aug. 31, 1995 and May 17, 1996. Entered into force May 
17, 1996. 
 
Ecuador 
Agreement for cooperation in the Global Learning and Observations to 
Benefit the Environment (GLOBE) program, with appendices. Signed at 
Quito Apr. 22, 1996. Entered into force Apr. 22, 1996. 
 
El Salvador 
Basic exchange and cooperative agreement for topographic mapping, 
nautical, and aeronautical charting and information, geodesy and 
geophysics, digital data and related mapping, charting and geodesy 
materials, with glossary. Signed at Delgado (San Salvador) and Fairfax 
May 10 and 22, 1996. Entered into force May 22, 1996. 
 
Gabon 
Agreement regarding the consolidation and rescheduling of certain debts 
owed to, guaranteed by, or insured by the United States Government and 
its agencies, with annexes. Signed at Libreville June 17, 1996. Enters 
into force following signature and receipt by Gabon of written notice 
from the U.S. that all necessary domestic legal requirements for entry 
into force have been fulfilled. 
 
Germany 
Agreement amending the memorandum of understanding of Apr. 27, 1983, as 
amended, for the dual production and sale of the Stinger Weapon System. 
Signed at Bonn and Washington Apr. 24 and May 14, 1996. Entered into 
force May 14, 1996. 
 
Indonesia 
Memorandum of agreement concerning assistance in the development of 
Indonesia's civil aeronautics and air commerce, with annex. Signed at 
Washington and Jakarta Apr. 3 and May 3, 1996. Entered into force May 3, 
1996. 
 
Kazakstan 
Agreement relating to the employment of dependents of official 
government employees. Effected by exchange of notes at Washington May 23 
and June 3, 1996. Entered into force June 3, 1996. 
 
Korea 
Memorandum of understanding concerning technology research and 
development projects, with annex. Signed at Washington and Seoul May 29, 
1996. Entered into force May 29, 1996. 
 
Macedonia  
Agreement to treat as binding the agreement of June 19, 1995, among the 
states parties to the North Atlantic Treaty and the other states 
participating in the Partnership for Peace regarding the status of their 
forces. Effected by exchange of notes at Skopje June 3, 1996. Entered 
into force June 3, 1996. 
 
Malaysia 
Agreement for the promotion of aviation safety. Signed at Kuala Lumpur 
May 28, 1996. Entered into force May 28, 1996. 
 
Mongolia 
Express mail agreement, with detailed regulations. Signed at Ulaanbaatar 
and Washington June 5 and July 1, 1996. Enters into force Sept. 1, 1996. 
 
Organization of American States 
Agreement amending Annex A of the agreement of May 14, 1992, regarding 
the headquarters of the Organization of American States. Effected by 
exchange of notes at Washington May 24 and 29, 1996. Entered into force 
May 29, 1996. 
 
Poland 
Agreement extending the agreement of Aug. 1, 1985, as amended and 
extended, concerning fisheries off the coasts of the United States (TIAS 
12003, 11816). Effected by exchange of notes at Warsaw Dec. 15 and 20, 
1995. Entered into force June 19, 1996. 
 
Russian Federation 
Agreement extending the agreement of June 1, 1990, as amended, regarding 
certain maritime matters. Effected by exchange of notes at Washington 
Dec. 1, 1995 and May 28, 1996. Entered into force May 28, 1996; 
effective Oct. 1, 1996. 
 
Memorandum of understanding for scientific and technical cooperation in 
the physical, chemical, and engineering sciences. Signed at Moscow July 
16, 1996. Entered into force July 16, 1996. 
 
Slovakia 
Agreement on the procedures to terminate the Treaty on Naturalization 
between Czechoslovakia and the United States of July 16, 1928. Effected 
by exchange of notes at Bratislava May 30, 1996. Entered into force May 
30, 1996. 
 
St. Lucia 
Agreement amending the agreement of Apr. 2, 1995, concerning maritime 
counter-drug operations. Effected by exchange of notes at Bridgetown and 
Castries June 5, 1996. Entered into force June 5, 1996. 
 
 
1 Not in force. 
2 Not in force for the U.S. 
3 With declaration. 
 
(###)
[END OF DISPATCH VOL 7, NO. 30]

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