U.S. Department of State 
Dispatch, Volume 7, Number 28, July 8, 1996 
Bureau of Public Affairs 
 
 
 
ARTICLES IN THIS ISSUE: 
 
1. The G-7 Summit: International Issues--Secretary Christopher, Treasury 
Secretary Rubin  
2. Russian Elections
3. U.S. and Business: Partners in Addressing Global Environmental 
Issues--Eileen B. Claussen 
4. What's in Print: Foreign Relations of the U.S. 
5. Treaty Actions 
 
 
ARTICLE 1: 
 
The G-7 Summit: International Issues 
Secretary Christopher, Treasury Secretary Rubin 
Remarks prior to press briefing, Lyon, France, June 28, 1996 
 
Secretary Christopher. Good afternoon. Since taking office, President 
Clinton has focused the summits on developing concrete strategies to 
address the most pressing concerns of both the American people and the 
international community at large. 
 
At Tokyo, as you will recall, the President galvanized support for the 
completion of the Uruguay Round, and he mobilized a major western 
economic package for Russia. At Naples, the leaders adopted the 
President's proposal for a far-ranging review and reform of the 
principal international institutions in order to try to ready them to 
meet the challenges of the next century. At Halifax last year, following 
the President's now-successful efforts to end the Mexican financial 
crisis, the summit took important steps to improve the international 
community's ability to respond to that kind of crisis in the future. 
Very important steps have been taken along that line. 
 
Coming to the summit here in Lyon this year, the President identified 
two priority areas that he wanted to focus attention on: First, securing 
the peace in Bosnia, and second, combating international crime and 
terrorism. We expect the leaders to adopt concrete plans of action in 
both of these areas. 
 
In Bosnia, we have already made considerable strides in implementing the 
Dayton Agreement. I want to commend the efforts of IFOR and the High 
Representative, Carl Bildt, in this regard. The guns have fallen silent 
in Bosnia. The opposing military forces have been separated and they are 
now demobilizing. The parties have agreed, only a few days ago, to far-
reaching conventional arms reductions. Virtually all the prisoners-of-
war have been released after a major effort on our part. And foreign 
forces have now departed from Bosnia. 
 
Work has begun on the Gorazde Road, which is so important symbolically 
and substantively. The long-term project of reconstruction is under way. 
Freedom of movement, far from perfect, nevertheless has been 
substantially improved with thousands of people crossing the inter-
boundary lines every day. 
 
We all recognize, of course, that this is a multi-year commitment on the 
civilian side and much more needs to be done. Here at Lyon, we expect 
the leaders will adopt a concrete plan of action to strengthen 
implementation in several areas, particularly relating to elections and 
economic reconstruction. 
 
On elections, as you know, the head of the OSCE has now officially 
confirmed elections will take place as scheduled under the Dayton 
Agreement on September 14. Elections are vital to put in place the key 
political institutions called for in Dayton, including a national 
presidency, a national legislature, and national courts. These 
institutions are essential if we are going to achieve the Dayton goal of 
a multi-ethnic society and if we are to continue the work on 
reconstruction, which is so essential. Our action plan will lay out 
specific steps that the international community will take to make the 
elections a success. 
 
On economic reconstruction, the leaders will lay out an agenda to make 
sure that peace produces real benefits in the lives of ordinary 
civilians--ordinary citizens of Bosnia. This will include new steps to 
ensure adequate funding and the construction of priority reconstruction 
projects. 
 
The leaders will also review various aspects of Dayton compliance. One 
of the most important of these, of course, is compliance with the orders 
of the War Crimes Tribunal. I want to stress that the Dayton Agreement 
now flatly prohibits indicted war criminals from participating in the 
elections. The President will be working with his fellow leaders here to 
make clear that indicted war criminals such as Mr. Karadzic must be 
removed from power, removed from influence, be out of the country, and 
in the hands of the War Crimes Tribunal. 
 
Terrorism, international crime--to move to the second subject--are also  
priority issues for President Clinton, President Chirac, and the other 
leaders. Last night, at the urging of both President Clinton and 
President Chirac, the leaders adopted a statement declaring the fight 
against terrorism to be an absolute priority for all of them. The 
program that the leaders will adopt during the next two days represents 
a very important  series of steps in addressing what is obviously one of 
the most important problems facing the world today. 
	 
Since the beginning of our Administration, President Clinton has put 
these concerns about terrorism and international crime at the very top 
of his agenda. Last year at the 50th UN General Assembly, the President 
called on all nations to adopt effective, coordinated strategies to 
fight these transnational issues such as terrorism, crime, narcotics, 
arms trafficking, and nuclear smuggling--issues that have a very close 
interactive relation to each other--I am sorry to say. 
	 
In Ottawa last December, the P-8 agreed to a declaration against 
terrorism, calling on all nations to ratify the 11 international 
antiterrorism agreements, and to do so by the year 2000. Experts from 
the P-8 have developed a package of 40 recommendations on international 
crime and terrorism that the leaders will review and will endorse later 
today or later at the summit. 
	 
These recommendations, of course, are not the end of the effort. As you 
know, last night, the leaders asked the ministers to meet within the 
next month to consider further actions. 
	 
This is the message that will go forth from Lyon: The international 
community is united and determined to prevail in the fight against 
terrorism. We must not rest until this fight against this most serious 
threat to our security and well-being has been won. 
	 
The significance of our decision is strengthened here by the presence of 
Russia in our discussions both of global and regional security issues. 
The elections held two weeks ago in Russia represent a milestone on the 
continued path of political and economic reform in that country. 
Russia's participation here--with the arrival this afternoon of Prime 
Minister Chernomyrdin and Foreign Minister Primakov--are further signs 
that Russia is integrating itself into the international community and 
contributing to international stability and security. 
	 
We look forward to a similarly successful second round of elections in 
Russia. We will continue to urge the leaders of Russia and the people of 
Russia to strengthen and consolidate reforms as they move into their 
future. Thank you very much. 
	 
Secretary Rubin. Thank you. Let me, if I may, add a few words with 
respect to the economic agenda of this summit and where we may be going-
-going forward. 
	 
The President came to the summit committed to advancing the 
international economic agenda that he began advancing, as Secretary 
Christopher said, at the Tokyo Summit--the first summit of his 
Administration--focusing on promoting sustainable growth and financial 
stability in the world economy, strengthening our capacity to deal with 
new challenges to the international financial system, supporting 
development and reform in the developing and transitional world, opening 
markets, building multilateral trading systems, and supporting the 
transition in Russia and the former Soviet Union. 
	 
We have reached agreement in Lyon on quite a number of measures that 
continue to advance this process that began with the President in Tokyo 
and then led to Naples and Halifax. 
 
First, the leaders reaffirmed their commitment to macroeconomic policies 
and structural reforms to promote sustainable growth and job creation. 
And in this context let me say--because I suspect you will probably ask 
me anyway--that the leaders welcomed the broad movements in exchange 
rates in the major currencies since April of 1995 and instructed their 
finance ministers to continue to cooperate on economic and foreign 
exchange matters. 
	 
Second, the leaders welcomed the progress achieved in implementing the 
Halifax initiatives, which were designed to strengthen the financial 
system, including the establishment earlier of a strong early warning 
system through the disclosure requirements promulgated by the IMF, and 
the agreement on a new, $50-billion supplementary facility for the IMF 
done around the concept of the general agreements to borrow. 
	 
One of the key outcomes, in my view at least, of our discussions in Lyon 
was to continue our emphasis on remaining at the frontier of 
globalization and innovation in the financial markets. Toward this end, 
the communique outlined new priorities with respect to enhancing 
regulatory cooperation to safeguard the financial system, including 
stronger risk management and transparency in innovative markets in the 
major financial centers; making operative with specific steps the 
agreement previously reached to cooperate in regulating the 
international financial organizations that operate across global 
borders; and establishing standards for financial institutions in 
emerging markets--a very important issue going forward. 
	 
They also called for review of the implications of electronic money--
Internet and the like--and the identification of ways to make sure that 
the benefits of these developments are realized, and at the same time, 
ways to avoid the  problems that are implicit in these developments. 
	 
Third, the leaders reaffirmed a results-oriented partnership for 
development which emphasizes the importance of sound economic policies 
and good governance in the developing world, more effective assistance 
by the multilateral development institutions, focused particularly on 
poverty alleviation and in putting into place the underpinnings for 
private sector development and continued support from the developed 
countries. 
	 
The finance ministers, who have had a number of meetings during this 
two-day period, will be talking about this development agenda over 
dinner this evening with the managing director of the IMF, the president 
of the World Bank, and the director general of the WTO. The leaders will 
meet with those three plus the secretary general of the United Nations 
tomorrow to discuss those and other subjects. 
	 
Fourth, the most important thing--with respect to the development 
agenda, the leaders agreed on a comprehensive approach for alleviating 
the debt burden of the poorest nations, so those nations, if they agree 
to sound reform policies, will be able to manage their debt burden and 
succeed economically. This approach includes a substantial commitment 
from the World Bank, which we expect will total the order of $2 billion 
from their own resources for debt alleviation, and contribution by the 
IMF through a continuing, enhanced structural adjustment facility, 
referred to as the ESAF, financed primarily by its own resources. 
	 
This approach also calls for increased debt reduction by the creditors 
of the Paris Club. We believe that debt reduction, debt relief for the 
poorest countries is the most efficient way of making a contribution to 
their reform and development. 
	 
All of these measures are vital achievements in the ongoing process of 
dealing with the global economy and the global financial markets. There 
is an enormous amount of work to do, but, if you look back over the past 
31/2 years, I believe without question that there have been tremendous 
achievements that will greatly contribute to all of our economies and 
our national security in the years ahead, including very much to those 
of the United States. 
	 
Let me conclude by complimenting our French hosts, my colleague, Jean 
Arthuis, in particular, for their effective leadership in various 
meetings at this summit. 
	 
We would now be delighted to respond to questions.  

(###) 
 
[Box item] 
 
Other documents from the G-7 Summit will be printed in Dispatch 
Supplement, Volume 7, No. 2. The documents also are available via 
internet at: 
     www.state.gov/ 
 
[Box end] 
 
 
 
ARTICLE 2: 
 
Russian Elections 
Statement by Secretary Christopher,released by the Office of the 
Spokesman, Washington, DC, July 4, 1996. 
 
I want to join President Clinton in congratulating President Yeltsin on 
his victory in Russia's presidential election and for his sustained 
commitment to the democratic process. Let me also congratulate the 
Russian people, who have shown the world again that they are determined 
to exercise their right to shape their future. The election sets an 
important precedent for a future in which choices are always made 
peacefully and openly at the ballot box.  
	 
The United States will continue to stand with the Russian people in 
their pursuit of democratic change and free market reform. Together, we 
now have the opportunity to advance the considerable progress we have 
already made with President Yeltsin's government, including on arms 
control and non-proliferation, the fight against international crime and 
terrorism, our common efforts in Bosnia and the Middle East, and 
Russia's integration into the global economy. 
	 
Of course, the road ahead will have many difficult challenges. But the 
election is an important milestone. The progress of democracy in Russia 
and our engagement with that country has made America safer and opened 
vast opportunities for our nation, for Russia, and the world. President 
Clinton's consistent approach has advanced America's fundamental 
security interests, and promoted freedom and security in Europe. It 
deserves bipartisan support in the months ahead.  

(###) 
 
 
 
ARTICLE 3 
 
U.S. and Business: Partners in Addressing Global Environmental Issues 
Eileen B. Claussen, Assistant Secretary for Oceans and International 
Environmental and Scientific Affairs 
Remarks before the Chatham House Workshop on Multinational Corporations 
and Global Environmental Change, London, U.K., June 27, 1996 
 
It is a great pleasure to be with you this evening. I look forward to 
sharing ideas with you informally over dinner and in the meantime will 
try to offer some useful food for thought. And since that's the only 
kind of food you're likely to get until I'm through, I'll try to keep my 
remarks brief. 
	 
By calling attention to the role of multinational corporations in 
addressing global environmental issues, Chatham House has identified a 
critical audience and provided a unique forum. Make no mistake: You and 
the companies you represent have the potential to affect in significant 
and positive ways the global environmental problems we all face. It is 
this potential that I would like to explore tonight.  
	 
Any such exploration will be pointless, however, unless we can agree on 
a basic premise: namely, that global environmental problems--from 
climate change to the proliferation of toxic chemicals to the loss of 
biodiversity--are real and serious threats for which we must find 
solutions. Those who continue to believe either that these issues are 
not real, or that they will disappear if resisted hard enough, will not 
find this a relevant discussion. 
	 
Let me assure you that governments now acknowledge the importance of 
global environmental concerns at the highest levels. They are raised in 
meetings of heads of state, foreign ministers, environment ministers, 
energy ministers, finance ministers, and ministers of business and 
industry. In the United States, there is no better evidence of this 
heightened focus than Secretary of State Warren Christopher's new 
initiative to place international environmental issues squarely in the 
mainstream of American foreign policy. 
	 
What does this initiative mean?  It means that the United States will 
elevate the importance of negotiations on key international 
environmental agreements to the highest levels of government. It means 
that we will make environmental issues an increasingly significant 
component of our bilateral relationships. It means that we will improve 
the capacity of our embassies around the world to address environmental 
concerns. It means that we will confront the problem of weak compliance 
with international environmental agreements. In a broader sense, it 
means that we will continue to make strong links between protection of 
the environment and continued economic strength, public health, and 
national security. 
	 
Encouraging even more high-level government attention to the global 
environment is obviously important and will remain a critical element in 
our efforts to address these difficult issues. But let us not deceive 
ourselves. The days of believing that government has all the answers--or 
can implement those it has--are over. Solving global environmental 
problems will require a concerted and integrated long-term effort from 
both the public and the private sector.  
	 
For the rest of my talk, I will use climate change as my chief example. 
It is arguably the most important environmental issue facing the planet 
and also the most complicated. However, the points I am going to make 
could easily apply to many other global environmental concerns. 
	 
Let me begin by saying that governments have not successfully come to 
grips with the three key ingredients of a climate change response: 
policy development and implementation, investment strategy, and the will 
to act. 
	 
On the policy side, governments are in some disarray in their views 
about how to deal with the climate issue. Differences in national 
economic priorities, levels of development, extent of commitment to 
sustainable development, and degrees of public support make 
international consensus very hard to reach. These differences lead some 
countries to favor harmonized policies and measures to address climate 
change; others, targets and timetables, for example capping greenhouse 
gas emissions by fixed levels at fixed dates; others, differentiated 
obligations in which individual countries each have different 
responsibilities; and still others, no action at all. As we near the 
critical phase in the multilateral negotiation of next steps for post-
2000 emissions reductions, no clear policy direction is now apparent. 
Little thought has been given to how these policies, no matter which are 
chosen, will be implemented and enforced. 
	 
Neither the United States nor any of the other major industrialized 
powers, with the possible exception of Japan, are making the needed 
investments to deal with climate change over the long term. In the U.S., 
a combination of the pressure to balance the budget and a Congress 
hostile to environmental concerns has resulted in dramatically slashed 
funding for everything from renewable energy research to Global 
Environment Facility contributions. In Europe, belt-tightening spurred 
by the need to scale back the welfare state has put increased pressure 
on resources. In developing countries, economic growth and the need to 
relieve ubiquitous poverty dominate the agenda. Measures to mitigate 
climate change are often seen as threatening such priorities and rarely 
attract much serious attention or significant investment. 
	 
Finally, there is the issue of political will. While I have argued that 
governments are more aware of global environmental problems than ever 
before, their readiness to tackle one as complicated and far-reaching as 
climate change is uncertain. Dealing with climate change will require 
not only a technological revolution but also a change in the way in 
which governments make policy. This issue cannot be handled by 
environment ministries alone. Any effective response must integrate 
foreign policy, energy policy, financial policy, trade policy, 
industrial policy, and technology policy. In fact, without a combination 
of intra-government integration and the political will to act on what is 
decided, we have only empty environmental rhetoric, something that 
neither inspires confidence nor produces results. Developing an 
integrated response is a task most governments are unable to handle--
particularly on an issue where individual citizens are not as yet ready 
to stand and be counted. And because the response required is so 
substantial, it must have a strong public constituency. 
	 
Building such a constituency brings me to the role of the environmental 
community. Environmental NGOs hold our feet to the fire in never failing 
to remind us of the severity of environmental problems and of the 
ultimate need to solve them--even when the answers to those problems 
seem nearly unattainable. On issue after issue, their work in educating 
the public about environmental threats has generated critical support 
for taking action. But on climate change, they have not yet succeeded in 
mobilizing an educated citizenry in most countries. Furthermore, they 
are not endowed with the money, the technical expertise, or the 
international influence to decide on and implement solutions. 
	 
That responsibility falls largely to business and industry. Yet industry 
is not united on a realistic response to climate change. Some in the 
business community continue to oppose taking any action, citing the 
familiar refrain of "scientific uncertainty"--this despite the 
overwhelming scientific consensus of the Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change reflected in its Second Assessment Report last December. 
Others reluctantly recognize that this issue is not going away and spend 
their energies trying to head off measures that may negatively affect 
them in the short term. Still a few others understand the importance of 
this issue and are willing to take actions to mitigate climate change. 
In the end, though, no single group has emerged as an effective and 
consistent voice in influencing the process, either domestically or 
internationally. 
Which is, I think, where you come in. As multinational corporations, you 
have the ability, and could play a decisive role in, meeting many of the 
challenges I have discussed. You have the capital, the know-how, the 
worldwide operations, and the influence. Further, you have the capacity 
to act strategically for the long term even if it means absorbing some 
costs in the short term. Still, why should you care? I can think of 
three reasons. 
 
First, the impacts of climate change threaten to disrupt the Earth's 
systems in ways that will be bad not only for public health and the 
environment but also for your businesses. Rising sea levels, increased 
frequency of extreme weather events, altered agricultural patterns, and 
increased spread of infectious disease all add up to serious economic 
trouble, particularly in the developing world where many of you are 
expanding your operations. 
	 
Second, tackling climate change offers tremendous economic 
possibilities. If we are going to turn over the technologies of the past 
because they are too energy intensive or too polluting, someone will 
have to develop and market the technologies of the future. The companies 
that are there first--with the products that make environmental and 
economic sense--will be the winners. I know that many of you do not like 
to discuss government policies that create winners and losers, but the 
changes necessary to deal with climate change inevitably will have that 
effect. 
	 
And finally, I think it is clear that stronger international action on 
climate change is coming, one way or another. Despite their differences, 
most governments agree that the science on climate change demands that 
more be done. The steps taken so far--both by developed and developing 
countries--are not enough. You will be the ones that will end up 
implementing what is decided. Now is the time to play a central role in 
making sure that our policies are the correct ones, both for the 
environment and the economy. 
	 
In order to do this, you must develop constructive and sustained 
dialogues with governments around the world. If governments fail to 
understand what is possible and when it is possible, the outcome is not 
likely to be good public policy. On the other hand, if industry fails to 
take the challenge seriously, or refuses to share and communicate the 
results of sound, long-term investment planning, governments will not 
take industry's proposals seriously. And again the outcome will not be 
good public policy. Only if all of you--and there is strength in 
numbers--establish consistent and honest communications with government 
decision-makers all around the world will we achieve meaningful and 
lasting results. 
	 
If you can develop these relationships with governments, you will be 
able to influence where we establish the next milestone in our efforts 
to address climate change. Reaching that milestone, however, will mean 
pushing technological innovation and creative thinking to a new level 
over a sustained period. 
 
Let me make a few key assumptions about your futures:  
  
1. You will still be here in the next generation;  
2. You will still be working in the multinational context; and  
3. In order to maintain your profitability, you will be in some 
businesses different from those that are now your focus.  
 
Making these assumptions requires that you anticipate the future--and 
begin now to take steps to meet it. 
	 
Up until now, modern society has relied almost exclusively on energy 
from fossil fuels to power its progress. That almost total reliance has 
to change, particularly as we see rapid growth in the developing world 
where the central dilemma related to climate change is quite 
straightforward--a world in which developed countries had the per capita 
greenhouse gas emissions of a China would be unthinkable, while a world 
in which China and other developing countries had the per capita 
emissions of the United States would be uninhabitable. 
	 
Some alternatives are beginning to emerge. While still only tiny 
percentages of the total energy market, solar and renewable energy, 
energy efficiency devices, and a rethinking of energy distribution 
systems must be the wave of a more environmentally friendly future. 
While, to date, much of the investment in these areas has come from 
high-risk venture capital firms, it seems likely that a successful 
global effort will require a much more aggressive approach by the 
multinationals.  
	 
Stepping back from climate change, the same point can be made for other 
global environmental concerns including the proliferation of toxic 
chemicals, the unsustainable cutting of the world's forests, and the 
pollution of our oceans. Confronting all of these issues over the long 
term requires new technologies, new attitudes, and new relationships. 
And let me add that I think tomorrow's workshop is an excellent forum 
for thinking about how to develop them. 
	 
Changes of the magnitude I have discussed may seem farfetched, and yet 
they are inevitable. The question is whether we have the courage, the 
innovation, and the foresight to move fast enough to prevent irreparable 
damage to our planet's natural systems. I am convinced that to achieve 
this goal, we need your active participation. To many that is going to 
sound like a strange concept. Multinational corporations as a whole have 
often been viewed--with some justification I may add--as the naysayers 
of international environmental protection efforts. While I can assure 
you that many of my experiences have been otherwise--and I would cite 
collaboration on the Montreal Protocol as a prime example--I feel 
strongly that the time has come for you as a community to do much more 
to make the transition from naysayer to partner. I can certainly speak 
for the United States in saying that such a change would be welcome 
indeed. Thank you. 

(###) 
 
 
 
ARTICLE 4: 
 
What's in Print Foreign Relations of The United States 
 
The Department of State has recently released Foreign Relations of the 
U.S., 1961-1963, Volume XII, American Republics. This volume details the 
Kennedy Administration's efforts to counter the influence of Fidel 
Castro in Cuba and its creation of the Alliance for Progress, which was 
designed to foster peaceful, middle class, social and economic 
revolutions in Latin America. In compilations covering the development 
of the Alliance as well as U.S. bilateral relations with Argentina, 
Brazil, British Guiana (Guyana), Dominican Republic, Haiti, Panama, and 
Peru, the volume documents the conflicts between the lofty goals of the 
Kennedy Administration and the long-standing problems of Latin America, 
including the disparity between rich and poor, single commodity 
economies, military influence in politics and, in some cases, entrenched 
dictatorships. 
	 
Documents presented in this volume reflect the mixed results of the 
policies of the Kennedy Administration. The initial enthusiasm and 
momentum for the Alliance for Progress waned and serious potential 
trouble spots remained. 
	 
For further information on this volume, contact David S. Patterson, 
General Editor of the Foreign Relations series, at (202) 663-1127; fax 
(202) 663-1289. 
	 
Copies of this volume (GPO Stock No. 044-000-02410-1) may be purchased 
for $41 postpaid ($51.25 for foreign orders). VISA, MasterCard, and 
personal checks are accepted. Order from: 
 
	U.S. Government Printing Office 
	Superintendent of Documents 
	P.O. Box 371954 
	Pittsburgh, PA 15250-7954 
 
To order by phone, call (202) 512-1800; to fax your order, call (202) 
512- 2250. 

(###) 
 
 
 
ARTICLE 5: 
 
Treaty Actions 
 
Multilateral: 
 
Chemical Weapons 
Convention on the prohibition of the development, production, 
stockpiling, and use of chemical weapons and on their destruction, with 
annexes. Done at Paris Jan. 13, 1993[footnote 1]. [Senate] Treaty Doc. 
103-21. 	 
Ratification: Ethiopia, May 13, 1996.   
 
Children 
Convention on protection of children and cooperation in respect of 
intercountry adoption. Done at The Hague May 29, 1993. Entered into 
force May 1, 1995 [footnote 2].   
Signature: Norway, May 20, 1996. 
 
Copyrights 
Berne convention for the protection of literary and artistic works of 
Sept. 9, 1886, revised at Paris July 24, 1971 and amended in 1979.  
Entered into force for the U.S. Mar. 1, 1989. [Senate] Treaty Doc. 99-
27. Accession: Korea, May 21, 1996. 
 
Judicial Procedure 
Convention on the service abroad of judicial and extra-judicial 
documents in civil or commercial matters. Done at The Hague Nov. 15, 
1965. Entered into force Feb. 10, 1969. TIAS 6638; 20 UST 361. 
Accession: Poland, Feb. 13, 1996 [footnote 3]. 
 
North Atlantic Treaty 
Agreement among the States Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty and 
other States participating in the Partnership for Peace regarding the 
status of their forces. Done at Brussels June 19, 1995. Entered into 
force Jan. 13, 1996. 
Signatures: Italy, Mar. 14, 1996; Lithuania, Jan. 31, 1996; Macedonia, 
May 30, 1996; Netherlands, Feb. 5, 1996; Sweden, Apr. 4, 1996; Turkey, 
Feb. 5, 1996; Ukraine, May 6, 1996; United Kingdom, Mar. 5, 1996. 
Ratifications: Albania, May 9, 1996; Bulgaria, May 29, 1996; Canada, May 
2, 1996; Czech Republic, Mar. 27, 1996; Hungary, Dec. 14, 1995; Latvia, 
Apr. 19, 1996; Romania, June 5, 1996; Slovakia, Dec. 13, 1995; Slovenia, 
Jan. 18, 1996. 
 
Additional protocol to the agreement among the States Parties to the 
North Atlantic Treaty and the other States participating in the 
Partnership for Peace regarding the status of their forces. Done at 
Brussels June 19, 1995. Entered into force: June 1, 1996 [footnote 2]. 
Signatures: Albania, Oct. 10, 1995; Belgium Oct. 31, 1995; Bulgaria, 
Oct. 16, 1995; Canada, Oct. 13, 1995; Czech Republic, Nov. 2, 1995; 
France, Dec. 1, 1995; Italy, Mar. 14, 1996; Latvia, Dec. 13, 1995; 
Lithuania, Jan. 31, 1996; Macedonia, May 30, 1996; Netherlands, Feb. 5, 
1996; Poland, Nov. 3, 1995; Romania, Nov. 3, 1995; Sweden, Apr. 4, 1996; 
Ukraine, May 6, 1996. 
Ratifications: Albania, May 9, 1996; Bulgaria, May 29, 1996; Canada, May 
2, 1996; Czech Republic, Mar. 27, 1996; Hungary, Dec. 14, 1995; Latvia, 
Apr. 19, 1996; Romania, June 5, 1996; Slovenia, Jan. 18, 1996. 
 
Patents 
Patent cooperation treaty, with regulations. Done at Washington June 19, 
1970; entered into force Jan. 24, 1978. TIAS 8733; 28 UST 7645. 
Accessions: Bosnia-Herzegovina, June 7, 1996; St. Lucia, May 30, 1996. 
Withdrawal of declaration concerning Chapter II: Greece, June 7, 1996. 
 
Prisoner Transfer 
Inter-American convention on serving criminal sentences abroad. Done at 
Managua June  9, 1993. Entered into force Apr. 12, 1996 [footnote 2]. 
Signatures: Canada, July 8, 1994; Costa Rica, June 9, 1993; Ecuador, 
Mar. 14, 1996; Mexico, June 4, 1995; Panama, Dec. 5, 1994; United 
States, Jan. 10, 1995; Venezuela, Apr. 14, 1994.  
Ratifications: Canada, June 3, 19953; Venezuela, Sept. 13, 1995. Entered 
into force: April 12, 1996 [footnote 2]. 
 
Red Cross 
Protocol additional to the Geneva conventions of Aug. 12, 1949, and 
relating to the protection of victims of international armed conflicts 
(Protocol I), with annexes. Done at Geneva June 8, 1977. Entered into 
force Dec. 7, 1978 [footnote 2].  
 
Protocol additional to the Geneva conventions of Aug. 12,1949, and 
relating to the protection of victims of non-international armed 
conflicts (Protocol II).  Done at Geneva June 8, 1977. Entered into 
force Dec. 7, 19782.  
Ratification: Mongolia, Dec. 6, 1995 [footnotes 3, 4]. 
Accessions:  South Africa, Nov. 21, 1995; Swaziland, Nov. 2, 1995. 
 
Refugees 
Protocol relating to the status of refugees. Done at New York Jan. 31, 
1967. Entered into force Oct. 4, 1967; for the U.S. Nov. 1, 1968. TIAS 
6577; 19 UST 6223. Territorial Application: United Kingdom extended to 
Jersey effective Feb. 20, 1996. 
 
Seabed Disarmament 
Treaty on the prohibition of the emplacement of nuclear weapons and 
other weapons of mass destruction on the seabed and the ocean floor and 
in the subsoil thereof. Done at Washington, London, and Moscow Feb. 11, 
1971. Entered into force May 18, 1972. TIAS 7337; 23 UST 701. 
Ratification:  Guatemala, Apr. 1, 1996. 
 
Terrorism 
Convention on the prevention and punishment of crimes against 
internationally protected persons, including diplomatic agents. Adopted 
by the UN General Assembly Dec. 14, 1973. Entered into force Feb. 20, 
1977. TIAS 8532; 28 UST 1975. 
Accession: Kazakstan, Feb. 21, 1996. 
 
International convention against the taking of hostages. Adopted by the 
UN General Assembly Dec. 17, 1979. Entered into force June 3, 1983; for 
the U.S. Jan. 6, 1985. 
Accession: Kazakstan, Feb. 21, 1996. 
 
Convention on the safety of United Nations and associated personnel. 
Done at New York Dec. 9, 1994 [footnote 1]. 
Ratification:  Panama, Apr. 4, 1996. 
Accession: Singapore, Mar. 26, 1996. 
 
Torture 
Convention against torture and other cruel, inhuman, or degrading 
treatment or punishment.  Adopted by the General Assembly of the United 
Nations Dec. 10, 1984. Entered into force June 26, 1987; for the U.S. 
Nov. 20, 1994. [Senate] Treaty Doc. l00-20. 
Accessions: Kuwait, Mar. 8, 1996; Zaire, Mar. 18, 1996; Lithuania, Feb. 
1, 1996. 
 
Weapons, Conventional 
Convention on prohibitions or restrictions on the use of certain 
conventional weapons which may be deemed to be excessively injurious or 
to have indiscriminate effects, with annexed protocols. Adopted at 
Geneva Oct. 10, 1980. Entered into force Dec. 2, 1983; for the U.S. 
Sept. 24, 1995. [Senate] Treaty Doc. 103-25. 
 
Protocol on non-detectable fragments (Protocol I) to the Convention on 
prohibitions or restrictions on the use of certain conventional weapons 
which may be deemed to be excessively injurious or to have 
indiscriminate effects. Adopted at Geneva Oct. 10, 1980. Entered into 
force Dec. 2, 1983; for the U.S. Sept. 24, 1995. [Senate] Treaty Doc. 
103-25. 
 
Protocol on prohibitions or restrictions on the use of mines, booby-
traps, and other devices (Protocol II) to the convention on prohibitions 
or restrictions on the use of certain conventional weapons which may be 
deemed to be excessively injurious or to have indiscriminate effects. 
Adopted at Geneva Oct. 10, 1980. Entered into force Dec. 2, 1983; for 
the U.S. Sept. 24, 1995. [Senate] Treaty Doc. 103-25. 
 
Protocol on prohibitions or restrictions on the use of incendiary 
weapons (Protocol III) to the convention on prohibitions or restrictions 
on the use of certain conventional weapons which may be deemed to be 
excessively injurious or to have indiscriminate effects. Adopted at 
Geneva Oct. 10, 1980. Entered into force Dec. 2, 1983 [footnote 2]. 
Ratification: Luxembourg, May 21, 1996. 
Accessions: Georgia, Apr. 29, 1996; Mauritius, May 6, 1996. 
Acceptance: Togo, Dec. 4, 1995. 
 
Women 
Convention on the elimination of all forms of discrimination against 
women. Adopted by the UN General Assembly Dec. 18, 1979. Entered into 
force Sept. 3, 19812. [Senate] Ex. R, 96th Cong., 2d Sess.   
Accessions: Algeria, May 22, 1996; Pakistan, Mar. 12, 1996. 
 
Bilateral: 
 
Algeria 
Agreement regarding the consolidation and rescheduling of certain debts 
owed to, guaranteed by, or insured by the United States Government and 
its agencies, with annexes. Signed at Algiers Mar. 27, 1996. Enters into 
force following signature and receipt by Algeria of written notice from 
U.S. that all necessary domestic legal requirements for entry into force 
have been fulfilled. 
 
Austria 
Convention for the avoidance of double taxation and the prevention of 
fiscal evasion with respect to taxes on income, with memorandum of 
understanding. Signed at Vienna May 31, 1996. Enters into force on the 
first day of the second month following the exchange of instruments of 
ratification. 
 
Azerbaijan 
Postal money order agreement. Signed at Baku and Washington Apr. 3 and 
May 17, 1996. Entered into force: July 1, 1996. 
 
Bulgaria 
Agreement amending and extending the agreement of Dec. 2 and 23, 1993, 
relating to trade in textiles and textile products. Effected by exchange 
of notes at Sofia Apr. 22 and May 2, 1996. Entered into force May 2, 
1996; effective Jan. 1, 1996. 
 
Cameroon 
Agreement regarding the consolidation and rescheduling of certain debts 
owed to, guaranteed by, or insured by the United States Government and 
its agencies, with annexes. Signed at Yaounde May 6, 1996. Enters into 
force following signature and receipt by Cameroon of written notice from 
the United States that all necessary domestic legal requirements for 
entry into force have been fulfilled. 
 
European Atomic Energy Community 
Agreement for cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Signed 
at Brussels Nov. 7, 1995 and Mar. 29, 1996. Entered into force Apr. 12, 
1996.  
 
French Polynesia 
International express mail agreement, with detailed regulations. Signed 
at Papeete and Washington Nov. 30, 1995 and Apr. 5, 1996. Entered into 
force June 15, 1996. 
 
Germany 
Second supplementary agreement amending the agreement on social security 
of Jan. 7, 1976, as amended (TIAS 9542, 12115; 30 UST 6099), with second 
supplementary administrative agreement amending the administrative 
agreement of June 21, 1978, as amended (TIAS 9542, 12115; 30 UST 6150). 
Signed at Bonn Mar. 6, 1995. Entered into force May 1, 1996. 
 
Iran 
Settlement agreement regarding certain claims before the Iran-U.S. 
Claims Tribunal, with annex. Signed at The Hague Feb. 9, 1996. Entered 
into force Feb. 9, 1996. 
 
Settlement agreement on the case concerning the aerial incident of July 
3, 1988 before the International Court of Justice, with annexes. Signed 
at The Hague Feb. 9, 1996. Entered into force Feb. 9, 1996. 
 
General agreement on the settlement of certain ICJ and Tribunal cases, 
with related statement. Signed at The Hague Feb. 9, 1996. Entered into 
force Feb. 9, 1996. 
 
Japan 
Implementing arrangement in the field of basic science and technology, 
with annex. Signed at Washington May 3, 1996. Entered into force May 3, 
1996. 
 
Lithuania 
Acquisition and cross-servicing agreement, with annexes. Signed at 
Vilnius and Patch Barracks (Germany) Mar. 29 and Apr. 30, 1996. Entered 
into force Apr. 30, 1996. 
 
Mali 
Memorandum of understanding concerning scientific and technical 
cooperation in the earth sciences, with annexes. Signed at Bamako Apr. 
23, 1996.  Entered into force  
Apr. 23, 1996. 
 
Mexico 
Memorandum of understanding concerning scientific and technical 
cooperation in the earth and mapping sciences, with annex. Signed at 
Mexico May 7, 1996. Entered into force May 7, 1996. 
 
Agreement adding Annex 2 to the memorandum of understanding of Aug. 12, 
1992, on scientific and technical cooperation in the mapping and earth 
sciences. Signed at Mexico May 6, 1996. Entered into force May 6, 1996. 
 
Protocol concerning the use of channels in the 932.5-935 MHz and the 
941.5-944 MHz bands for fixed point-to-point services along the common 
border, with appendices. Signed at Morelia Apr. 26, 1996. Entered into 
force Apr. 26, 1996. 
 
Protocol concerning the use of bands allocated to the aeronautical 
radio-navigation and aeronautical communications services along the 
common border, with appendices. Signed at Morelia Apr. 26, 1996.  
Entered into force Apr. 26, 1996. 
 
Agreement amending Annex V to the agreement of Aug. 14, 1983, on 
cooperation for the protection and improvement of the environment in the 
border area (TIAS 11269). Effected by exchange of notes at Mexico May 7, 
1996. Entered into force May 7, 1996. 
 
Agreement for energy cooperation, with annex. Signed at Mexico May 7, 
1996. Entered into force May 7, 1996. 
 
Nepal 
Agreement amending and extending the agreement of May 30 and June 1, 
1986, as amended and extended, relating to trade in cotton textiles. 
Effected by exchange of notes at Kathmandu Apr. 18 and 30, 1996. Entered 
into force Apr. 30, 1996. 
 
Poland 
Agreement for the establishment of the U.S.-Polish Fulbright Commission. 
Signed at Warsaw Oct. 20, 1995. Enters into force on the date on which 
the parties shall have notified each other that their legal requirements 
for entry into force have been fulfilled. 
 
Slovenia 
Agreement on the protection and preservation of certain cultural 
properties. Signed at Washington May 8, 1996. Enters into force upon 
exchange of notes by which parties inform each other about the 
fulfillment of their respective constitutional requirements for entering 
into international agreements. 
 
Sri Lanka 
Agreement between the United States and Sri Lanka amending and extending 
the agreement of May 23 and 24, 1988, as amended and extended, relating 
to trade in textiles and textile products, with annexes. Effected by 
exchange of notes at Colombo Mar. 22 and Sept. 5, 1995 and Apr. 17 and 
23, 1996. Entered into force Apr. 23, 1996. 
 
Thailand 
Air transport agreement with annex and memorandum of understanding. 
Signed at Bangkok May 8, 1996. Entered into force May 8, 1996. 
 
	1  Not in force. 
	2  Not in force for the U.S. 
	3  With declaration(s). 
	4  With reservation(s).  

(###) 
 
[END DISPATCH VOL. 7, NO. 28]

To the top of this page