U.S. Department of State
Dispatch Volume 7, Number 25, June 17, 1996
Bureau of Public Affairs
ARTICLES IN THIS ISSUES:
1. The Critical Line Between Peace and Prosperity in the Middle East -
Secretary Christopher
2. The Russian Elections and U.S. Policy - Deputy Secretary Talbott
3. Entering the 21st Century: Challenges Confronting America's
Military. - Anthony Lake.
4. The MFN Decision and U.S.-China Relations - Winston Lord
5. U.S.-China Relationship - Charlene Barshefsky
6. U.S. Interests in and Policy Toward Afghanistan - Robin L. Raphel
7. What's in Print: Foreign Relations of the U.S.
Article 1:
The Critical Link Between Peace And Prosperity in the Middle East
Secretary Christopher
Remarks to the Council on Foreign Relations Conference on Investing in
the Future: The Middle East and North Africa in the Next Century.
New York City, June 14, 1996
It is a great pleasure to be here for this important conference. Under
Les Gelb's leadership, the Council on Foreign Relations has continued to
do great work--including its enormously constructive role in the Middle
East Economic Summits. Today's gathering marks another milestone in that
process, and I want to express my appreciation to Les, to Henry Siegman,
and to the entire council for their outstanding efforts.
Looking at this audience, I am struck by the fact that an event like
this would have been unthinkable just 31/2 years ago when I became
Secretary of State. You are, indeed, pioneers of peace--entrepreneurs
and executives from the United States, Israel, and across the Arab
world, now preparing for your third economic summit this November in
Cairo. Starting in Casablanca in 1994 and continuing last year in Amman,
the relationships you have developed and the projects you have launched
have shattered taboos that stood for half a century. You have
established an unprecedented web of contacts and cooperation. You are
helping to lay the essential foundation upon which a more prosperous,
stable, and peaceful Middle East can be built.
Today, I want to talk to you about the critical link between peace and
prosperity in the Middle East. Neither can be fully secured without the
other. Both must be pursued if we are to help lift the region beyond its
legacy of conflict.
At the core of all our efforts, of course, has been the historic process
of Arab-Israeli peacemaking. The quest for peace in the region began
more than 20 years ago, and American leadership has been critical to
each of its successes: the disengagement agreements after the 1973 war;
the peace treaty between Egypt and Israel; the 1991 Madrid Peace
Conference; and the remarkable achievements of the past three years.
Our vital national interests and unique leadership role confer upon the
United States a special responsibility to ensure that these tremendous
strides toward peace are preserved. Peace will strengthen the security
of Israel and our key Arab partners. Peace will enhance regional
stability and our access to the Gulf's vital oil supplies. Peace will
also allow us and our friends to focus on the common dangers that
threaten us all--from rogue states like Iraq and Iran to violent
extremism and terror.
At this time of transition in Israel, as we await the formation of a new
government, it is worth taking a few minutes to remind ourselves just
how much the peace process has accomplished since 1993--and how great a
stake we have in continued progress.
First, Israel and the Palestinians have reached a series of landmark
agreements. Palestinians now govern themselves throughout Gaza and most
cities of the West Bank. Israeli soldiers no longer face the burden of
patrolling those streets. Where once there was an intifada, Israeli and
Palestinian security forces now cooperate to root out the terrorist
infrastructure of Hamas and Islamic Jihad. The Palestinian National
Council voted overwhelm- ingly this spring to remove from its charter
those egregious clauses denying Israel's right to exist.
Second, Israel's 1993 agreement with the Palestinians helped make
possible the peace treaty with Jordan one year later. Today, Israel and
Jordan are establishing cooperative relations across the full range of
political, economic, and security issues. Tens of thousands of Israeli
and Jordanian tourists have visited each others' countries. Later this
month, Jordan will host a reunion of 200 Arab and Israeli teenagers--
participants in a program called Seeds of Peace dedicated to building a
warm peace. And I will never forget King Hussein's moving eulogy at
Prime Minister Rabin's funeral. The King's presence and his eloquence on
such a sad day profoundly reflected how much the region has changed.
Third, the progress achieved in the peace process has helped spur
unprecedented movement in Israel's relations with the broader Arab
world. Diplomatic offices have been exchanged with Morocco, Tunisia, and
Mauritania, and trade offices with Qatar and Oman. The secondary
economic boycott has all but withered away. With the exception of Iraq,
Libya, and Sudan, every Arab League member has participated in some
aspect of the peace process--from the multilateral negotiations on
issues like water, refugees, and arms control to the economic summits in
Casablanca and Amman.
Perhaps no single event better captured this extraordinary
transformation than the Summit of Peace- makers held three months ago in
Sharm el-Sheikh. Virtually overnight, President Clinton and President
Mubarak brought together 29 world leaders, including 14 from the Arab
world. They gathered not to celebrate a breakthrough in the peace
process, but to stand shoulder-to-shoulder with Israel to defend the
process against a wave of terrorism.
These are truly historic achievements. They have advanced the vital
interests of Israel, its Arab partners, as well as the United States.
They have come about with the help of a consistent American approach to
the Middle East that has been guided by a set of core principles. Above
all, these include our unshakable commitment to Israel's security and to
a strong U.S.-Israeli partnership--and our determination to work with
Israel and its Arab neighbors to achieve our common goals of peace and
security. We know that there can be no real peace without security, and
there can be no real security without peace.
That is why we will work with Israel and the Palestinians to help them
implement the agreements they have reached and to resolve outstanding
issues. We will help to strengthen Israel's peace treaties with Egypt
and Jordan. We will continue to work toward a comprehensive peace
through a resumption of negotiations between Israel and Syria and
between Israel and Lebanon. And we will strive to help deepen and
broaden relations between Israel and the wider Arab world.
In each of these areas, the United States will work closely with
Israel's new government, led by Prime Minister-elect Netanyahu. The
recent elections once again underscored the vibrance and strength of
Israel's democracy. The United States enjoyed a strong and productive
relationship with the governments of Prime Minis- ters Rabin and Peres--
statesmen of extraordinary vision and courage. Now we hope to build an
equally strong and productive relationship with the new Israeli Prime
Minister and his team.
President Clinton and I have been in close touch with Mr. Netanyahu
since the elections, and we look forward to welcoming him to Washington
soon after he forms his government. We will be consulting closely with
him and with our Arab partners on how best to sustain the peace process.
In this regard, we welcome Prime Minister Netanyahu's commitment to
continue the peace process. We are urging our Arab friends not to
prejudge the new government in Israel. Now, during this period of
transition, it is essential to avoid actions or statements that close
doors and risk polarizing the situation and raising tensions. It is
critical that we remain focused on preserving the achievements of the
past three years and maintaining the momentum necessary to make new
gains.
It is also critical that we maintain our commitment to building the
economic foundations necessary for a lasting peace. Growing opportunity
can ease the conflicts and hatreds that have held back the Middle East
for half a century. Rising prosperity can help the Middle East move
forward into a new millennium of reconciliation, cooperation, and full
integration with the global economy.
This commitment to a prosperous peace is consistent with President
Clinton's strategic judgment that America's economic and political
interests are intertwined around the world. Opening markets and
expanding trade and investment abroad not only creates jobs at home, but
also strengthens our political relationships and advances our strategic
interests at the same time. As a former Secretary of State, Cordell
Hull, said over half a century ago, "When goods move, soldiers don't."
That is precisely the principle behind the Middle East Economic Summit
process.
Our commitment to this process reflects our conviction that while it may
take politicians and diplomats to make peace, it takes workers and
businesses to build peace. Building peace means inaugurating the new bus
service between Israel and Jordan--and regular flights between Ben
Gurion Airport and Amman. Building peace means the regional airport at
Aqaba to bring tourists to the spot where Jordan and Israel meet astride
the mountains and deserts along the Red Sea. Building peace means a new
power plant on the shores of the Mediterranean in Gaza. And building
peace means the Amoco pipeline--the "peace pipeline"--that will supply
Egyptian natural gas to Israel.
These projects embody the vision that first brought many of us together
in Casablanca nearly two years ago. Then, last October in Amman, we
agreed to establish a set of regional institutions to promote the
regions economic development and integration:
The Middle East Development Bank will support key private sector
projects and focus on the region's critical infrastructure needs. We
hope to open the offices of the bank at the Cairo Economic Summit this
fall.
The Middle East-Mediterranean Travel and Tourism Association will open
the region's wonders to the world and spur economic growth. The
Regional Business Council will become a vital forum for exchanging
business information, developing investment opportunities, and building
a world-class business environment.
As you have been discussing at this conference, we will build on these
achievements at the Cairo Summit. The summit will focus government and
business leaders on the essential steps that must be taken in key areas
such as deregulation, privatization, and other economic reforms. And it
will emphasize the role of small and medium enterprises in the region.
Most important, the Cairo Summit will bring together hundreds of
business people from across the region and around the world to generate
business deals and projects. The summit will once again dramatize the
economic benefits of peace--and the immense potential for economic
cooperation across the Middle East.
But to fulfill that potential, governments should remove the economic
obstacles that stand in the way of growth and opportunity. Governments
should take steps to overcome the legacy of excessive government
regulation and inefficient public investment if they want to attract
local and foreign capital back to the region. They should tear down
tariff and non-tariff barriers if they want to encour- age trade,
especially among the countries of the region. And they should reform
capital markets, update tax systems, and ensure fair business practices
if they want to compete in the global economy of the 21st century.
Some encouraging reforms are taking root. Liberalization has spurred
growth and attracted foreign investment to Tunisia and Morocco. Jordan's
new investment code is helping to attract foreign capital--much of which
is being invested in that country's spectacular tourism boom. Now Egypt
is privatizing companies, reforming banking laws, opening up business
loans, and streamlining customs procedures to facilitate trade. We are
working with Egypt to support these and other reforms through the
partnership led by President Mubarak and Vice President Gore.
Israel, too, has a new opportunity to deepen the already far-reaching
economic reforms that it has undertaken in recent years. We welcome
Prime Minister-elect Netanyahu's commitment to intensify essential
reforms, such as privatization and deregulation. This course will help
sustain the remarkable economic growth and inward investment that Israel
has enjoyed since the peace process began to produce results. As the
economies of the region become more open and integrated, economic growth
in Israel can present opportunities to Israel's Arab neighbors--
especially the Palestinians. Israel's new government can seize the
initiative by finding ways to expand trade with Jordan and increase
economic interaction with the West Bank and Gaza. The United States is
prepared to help by providing free trade privileges to the Palestinians
similar to those that Israel enjoys. The Clinton Administration is
working with Congress to secure this authority.
The political and economic futures of the Middle East are inextricably
linked. The success of the peace process over the last three years has
been the essential condition for creating the region's new economic
opportunities. The readiness of business, in turn, to seize these
opportunities has helped to strengthen the process by demonstrating the
potential of peace to lift the lives of both Arabs and Israelis. Today,
the challenge we face is clear: We must ensure that our efforts on both
the diplomatic and economic fronts are sustained--and that our shared
goal of peace and prosperity continues to be advanced.
Ours is an uncommon enterprise with a common purpose. We ask leaders and
peoples to take risks for peace. We ask companies and entrepreneurs to
take risks for profit--in the name of peace. We ask governments to
encourage business to take those risks by reforming and deregulating
their economies. And we ask the whole world to join us. Thank you very
much.
(###)
Article 2:
The Russian Elections and U.S. Policy
Deputy Secretary Talbott
Address to the Council on Foreign Relations, New York City, June 7, 1996
It is good to be back at a council dinner. I have attended a lot of them
over the years--and never, I might add, just for the cuisine. This
institution means a lot to me. For 15 years, the Harold Pratt House was
my home-away-from-home here in New York and a place where I went for
fellowship and education. But the real reason I am here this evening is
because Les Gelb told me to come, and I learned long ago--back in the
early 1970s--that you can't go too far wrong doing what Les tells you
to. After all, that's why you're here, right?
In addition to his being a friend and mentor, I might add that Les has
done great things with the council, notably, including organizing this
conference. Your topic is: "Does the United States still need to be the
world's leader?" The answer, of course, is a resounding, unambiguous
"yes."
But the very fact that the question even arises is significant and a
little unsettling. With the end of the Cold War, the old isolationist
instinct has, once again, begun twitching in the American body politic,
especially in Congress. The best antidote is activism like the
council's, particularly when it reaches out into the country through
events like this.
So, thanks for the chance to join you. I want to talk about Russia. For
much of this century, that country has been a focus of our national
attention and of our national security policy.
For most of our lives, Russia was our global rival. It was a police
state with a monolithic political system and a command economy, an armed
camp, the metropole of an empire, the warden of Stalin's "prison of
nations," the headquarters of an alliance hostile to the West. In those
days, U.S. and Soviet leaders met regularly--but only to discuss a
fairly limited range of issues, particularly arms control.
But since the end of the Cold War in the late 1980s, and since the
collapse of the Soviet Union on Christmas Day 1991, a new Russia has
been emerging. With it has come the opportunity to pursue a much broader
policy of engagement. Over the past five years, the United States has
supported democratic change and free markets, and we have encouraged
Russia's increasingly close and beneficial association with the
community of democratic nations. We have extended economic assistance,
both bilaterally and through the IMF, enabling Russia to beat back the
threat of hyperinflation and to build fundamental market institutions.
We have worked patiently and persistently with the Russian Government to
cooperate where possible and to manage our differences where necessary.
This policy of engagement has already made every American more secure.
The START I Treaty will enable us to cut our nuclear arsenals by 9,000
warheads, and the START II Treaty, which was ratified by the Senate in
January and which President Yeltsin has vowed to get ratified in the
Duma later this year, will cut another 5,000. We have also worked with
the Russians and three of its neighbors-- Ukraine, Belarus, and
Kazakstan--to make sure that the breakup of the U.S.S.R. does not lead
to the proliferation of nuclear-weapons states. Meanwhile, Russia has
withdrawn its soldiers from Germany, the former Warsaw Pact countries of
Central Europe, and the Baltic states. In Bosnia, our soldiers, American
and Russian, now serve side-by-side in support of the Dayton peace
accords.
Let me now turn to the situation inside Russia, which has changed
dramatically over the past decade. Nine days from now--a week from
Sunday--the Russian people will, for the first time in the 1,000-year
history of their state, vote by free ballot for their national leader.
Millions of Russians will line up at 96,000 polling places, from one end
of the the Eurasian landmass to the other--from Kaliningrad on the
Baltic to Vladivostok on the Pacific, 6,000 miles and 11 time zones
away.
There will be 11 names on the ballot. Boris Yeltsin's will be on the
list, of course. So will the name of Gennadi Zyuganov, the Chairman of
the Presidium of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation, and
Vladimir Zhirinovsky, the leader of the ludicrously misnamed Liberal
Democratic Party.
But there will be others as well, such as millionaire eye surgeon
Svyatoslav Fyodorov, retired Gen. Alexander Lebed, and liberal economist
Grigoriy Yavlinskiy, who spoke to the council in 1992. Unless one of
those candidates receives more than 50%, the top two will face each
other in a run-off three or four weeks later.
So we are in for a suspenseful several weeks. Each of these 11
candidates advocates a different path for Russia in the next century.
America has an intense interest in the path the winner chooses.
But the U.S. should not let the importance of what is about to happen
inside Russia obscure the importance of what has already happened. A
watershed has occurred in that country over the past decade. For the
previous 1,000 years, the leadership of Russia was decided through
dynastic succession, palace intrigue, revolution, civil war,
assassination, mass terror, concentration camps, and what Marxist-
Leninists called 'the dictatorship of the proletariat.' Now, whatever
the imperfections of the new system, at least the Russian people have a
chance to choose their leaders at the ballot box.
What's more, Russia has been changing in ways that limit the power of
the top man in the Kremlin, whoever he is and whatever his intentions.
Over the last five years, authority has become more diffuse and
decentralized. Regional leaders have much more say than was the case in
Soviet times, when they or their predecessors were little more than the
Kremlin's provincial proconsuls. This can be good news or bad news for
reform. There are now oases of economic and political liberalization,
and there are also, in other parts of the country, bastions of reaction,
where old-style communist bosses have maintained their fiefdoms as theme
parks of Soviet inefficiency.
My point is, the battle between the old and new is being played out in
numerous ways, on every level, throughout the land. Now, 60% of the
economy is in private hands. The long food lines that were a hallmark of
daily life in Soviet times when I was first there as a journalist are
largely gone. Churches, synagogues, and mosques are open; so are
borders. In short, Russians are more free to vote, own, buy, sell,
travel, and worship than ever before in their history.
But these changes have not come smoothly or easily. They have brought
dislocation, anxiety and, for many, outright hardship. Unemployment--
virtually unknown and certainly unacknowledged in Soviet times--is now a
fact of life. That is a consequence, among other things, of inefficient
factories being closed. For many, prices have risen faster than
salaries, so the buying power of take-home pay is down. People worry
about the holes in the social safety net. They worry about the huge rise
in crime and corruption, which have reached epidemic proportions and
constitute a major threat to public confidence in government. The very
word 'reform,' which is so basic to the vocabulary of our policy
ofsupport for Russia, has, for many Russians, become a synonym for
hardship and insecurity. This is especially true of those over 50--
people who are having trouble making a go of it now that the rules of
the game have changed so drastically from what they knew most of their
lives.
Then there is the grueling, gruesome war in Chechnya, which is still an
open wound. It had already claimed some 30,000 lives before the cease-
fire agreement of two weeks ago. The damage is already vast and deep,
and it reaches far beyond Chechnya itself. The conflict, while it was
raging, exposed to the world, and to the Russian people themselves, the
often indiscriminate and brutal methods of the Russian military.
It is against this backdrop of change and upheaval that Zhirinovsky's
ultranationalists and Zyuganov's communists did so well in the
parliamentary elections of 1993 and 1995. They have benefited from a
combination of nostalgia for the past, pain in the present, and fear of
the future.
Those factors will be very much in play when Russians go to the polls a
week from Sunday. Many of them will be asking themselves a version of
the question Ronald Reagan made famous in our own presidential election
campaign of 1980: "Are we better off today than we were five or even 20
years ago? Are we on the right course for the future? Who should lead us
for the next five years?"
How the Russian people answer those questions is up to them and to no
one else. That is why President Clinton has assiduously avoided getting
into the dubious business of endorsing a candidate or a party. The U.S.
does not have a vote in the Russian election, nor does it have a crystal
ball about its outcome. But it does have an interest in the policies
that the victor will pursue.
It mattered deeply to the United States that, for most of this century,
Russia was a communist dictatorship that repressed and abused its own
citizens, and it was an expansionist empire that behaved aggressively
toward us, our allies, and its neighbors. And it will matter deeply to
the United States in the 21st century what course Russia's leaders take.
As President Clinton put it in Moscow: "All elections involve choices
and have consequences." That notably includes consequences for Russia's
relations with the rest of the world. And this certainly applies to any
Russian leader who would attempt to reconstitute the U.S.S.R.,
renationalize the economy, or abandon the democratic process.
Why, then, given all the uncertainties associated with Russian politics,
are we so adamant--and confident--in our support for democracy and
elections in Russia? Let me try to answer that question by conjuring up
one of my favorite quotations from the Soviet past. Vyacheslav Molotov,
Stalin's poker-faced, iron-pants foreign minister, once famously said
that the trouble with democratic elections is that you never know for
absolute certain who's actually going to win. He offered that
penetrating insight as a reason for never holding genuine elections,
since they are anathema to totalitarianism.
The U.S. attitude, is of course, quite different. We are not afraid of
democracy--in Russia or anywhere else. Americans, of all people, should
have faith in democracy over the long haul. Some argue that it would
better to have no election at all than one where the wrong candidate
wins. We should not fall prey to such short-sighted pessimism. Nor
should we buy another insinuation, which is that some nations are
somehow genetically or historically doomed to make bad choices forever.
The past 10 years have been a decade of democratization, including in
parts of the world long since written off by politicians and political
scientists alike. All around the globe, on every continent, people who
acquired the opportunity to vote did so with courage, with enthusiasm,
and in great numbers--proving the pessimists and the predeterminists
wrong. Now it is Russia's chance and Russia's choice.
We believe that freedom of speech and the enfranchisement of Russian
citizens will, if sustained, help move Russia toward the rule of law and
the consolidation of civil society. We also believe, as President
Clinton has said repeatedly, that democracies are more likely to be
reliable partners in trade and diplomacy--and more likely to pursue
foreign and defense policies that are compatible with American
interests.
If Russia stays on that course, we will continue to offer our support
and our cooperation. If it turns off that path, no matter who is in the
Kremlin, we will take the necessary steps to defend our security. And we
will remain alert if Russia is changing course in ways that require us
to adjust our policy. The job of our government is to be ready for any
outcome. As Secretary Christopher put it in his speech to the North
Atlantic Council just this past Monday:
Whatever Russia's future holds in store, our interests will remain
the same: to keep our people safe and to consolidate the gains for peace
and freedom made possible by the Cold War's end.
The first test of what kind of new Russia is emerging will be the
fairness of Sunday's voting and of the second round if there needs to be
one. Thereafter, we will keep our eyes peeled for other signs such as
whether Russia continues to permit a free, vigorous, and critical press;
whether it honors the sovereignty, independence, and territorial
integrity of its neighbors; whether it continues to meet the terms of
the financial help it is receiving from the International Monetary Fund
and other world bodies; and whether it continues to honor its
international treaties and commitments.
What is required on our part--especially when Russia is undergoing and
generating a good deal of turbulence--is American consistency and
American steadiness. The Russians must know, as clearly as possible,
what we will support, what we will oppose, what we will stand for, and
what we will stand against.
So, to conclude, there is no question that the Russians have a
momentuous choice to make in nine days. But let us be sure to keep the
election, important as it is, in perspective: It is only one choice in a
long succession of tough choices the Russians will face for many years
to come.
At each step along the way in Russia's development, including the one
that will occur a week from Sunday, let us keep in balance three
considerations:
-- An appreciation of how far Russia has come;
-- A realistic appraisal of how far it has to go; and
-- A recognition of how important it is for us to support progress in
the right direction.
If we can do all that, it will improve the chances that future
presidential elections in Russia will be less suspenseful--for them and
for us.
(###)
Article 3:
Entering the 21st Century: Challenges Confronting America's Military
Anthony Lake, Assistant to the President For National Security Affairs
Commencement address at National Defense University, Washington, DC,
June 12, 1996
As future stewards of your nation's security, you understand the
dramatic changes the world has undergone in just the last few years.
Superpower confrontation has passed, but the lid has been lifted on
simmering ethnic and religious conflicts. Before, rogue states could be
restrained by those who armed and supported them. Now, they are freer to
gamble on the use of force to achieve revolutions in communication and
commerce; send information, goods, and dollars around the world in the
blink of an eye. Yet, the openness that brings us closer together also
makes us more vulnerable to problems such as terrorism and international
crime.
I would like to speak today about some of the challenges confronting our
military in this new security environment. I am honored to do so in this
setting with you, a group that combines years of operational experience
with intense intellectual study. On a personal note, let me add that as
National Security Adviser, I have had the privilege of meeting and
working with America's military men and women every day and to admire
their service and their sacrifice. So as I talk with you of challenges
faced by our military, I want to recognize the extraordinary debt that
we as a nation owe to them and to the families who support them.
Over the past three years, as I have worked with the military in facing
the demands of this new era, I have often been struck by three
fundamental questions. I have discussed them many times with Secretary
Perry and General Shalikashvili, and I am sure they have been on your
minds as well: How do we maintain efficiency and effectiveness as we
manage the post-Cold War drawdown of our forces? How do we preserve the
strength and readiness to fight and win our nation's wars as we conduct
increasingly diverse peacekeeping and humanitarian missions? And how do
we attract and retain an all-volunteer force of high standards that is
reflective of rapid social change in America?
Today, we know the answer to the drawdown question. Since 1989, we have
reduced our force by one-third. We have cut our defense budget by some
40% in real terms from its Cold War high. Some 700,000 men and women
have traded in their uniforms and returned to civilian life. But this
time, unlike previous drawdowns, we did it right.
We recall the stories about the drawdown of the 1970s, when sailors on
ships waited months for parts to fix broken equipment; when planes
became 'hangar queens,' pillaged for repairs; when the Chief of Staff of
the Army declared that America had a "hollow army." Many of you were
there. Today, our leaders have learned the lessons of earlier times.
They know that we can't cut size at the expense of strength, personnel
at the expense of morale, or force at the expense of readiness. In 1994,
when Iraq menaced Kuwait, tensions rose in Korea, and trouble in Haiti
boiled over, we showed that our military was up to the task--and more.
In my view, Secretary Perry, General Shalikashvili, their immediate
predecessors, and our whole military leadership have received far too
little credit for one of the greatest management successes in history.
But now that our force posture is right, and our readiness is as high as
ever, we need to focus on how we employ our armed forces. More than any
other institution in the world, when America's military is asked to do
something, it delivers. It is hard to convey how much it means to
policymakers to have an instrument like that at our disposal. It
provides a great sense of security and confidence. But it also carries a
great responsibility. We must not misuse this extraordinary institution.
When we use military force, we must do so unflinchingly. But we must
never ask our military to do things it can't or shouldn't do. The
President has no more solemn responsibility than to decide when to put
our armed forces in harm's way. He knows that, and so do all of us who
are privileged to serve him.
In recent years, our military has responded to an unprecedented number
and range of contingencies--nearly 40 since the Gulf war. Many of these
operations have involved nontraditional tasks--distributing food,
resettling refugees, and providing medical assistance. All Americans are
proud of our men and women in uniform for doing this work so well. But
the fact remains that we depend on them first and foremost to fight and
win America's wars. This highlights the second question I raised: How do
we guard our military's unparalleled fighting ability, when,
increasingly, we call on it for operations other than war?
In addressing this question, let me briefly review how we approach the
decision to commit our armed forces. Our nation uses force for one
purpose alone--to protect and promote American interests. I believe
these interests can be divided into three categories.
The first involves matters of overriding importance to our national
security and survival--such as a direct attack on our soil, our people,
or our allies. We will do whatever it takes to defend these vital
interests, including the use of decisive military force--with others
where we can and alone when we must. From our swift response when Iraq
moved forces toward Kuwait to our 37,000 troops in Korea, we have shown
our unshakable resolve. Vital interests are the raison d'etre of our
military force--and will be so long as nations exist and human nature is
unchanged.
More and more often, however, we face situations that do not threaten
our nation's vital interests--yet do still affect our interests and the
character of the world in which we live. It might be a conflict, such as
Bosnia, that produces terrible suffering and jeopardizes stability in a
region of vital importance to our nation. Or it might be a brutal coup,
like the one in Haiti, that endangers democracy in our hemisphere and
prompts thousands of desperate refugees to seek sanctuary on our shores.
This second kind of case is more difficult to address, because our
interests, though important, are less immediate, and the threats may be
less clear. That is why before we use force, we must make a careful
assessment: Can the use of our military forces advance American
interests? Do they have a reasonable chance of success? Are the
interests at stake commensurate with the costs and risks? Have other
means been tried and failed to achieve our objectives? Before we send
our troops into situations where our interests are less than vital, they
need a clear and achievable mission, the means to prevail, and a
strategy for withdrawal that is based on the military mission's goals.
In both Haiti and Bosnia, we met those standards, and our troops have
performed superbly. Contrast these operations with Vietnam or Lebanon,
where clear and achievable military missions were not defined soon
enough--or ever. In Vietnam, our society blamed our soldiers for a
defeat that was not theirs. Because we neglected to ask the right
questions, the men and women of our armed forces paid a terrible price--
both in Vietnam and when they came home. We must never put them in that
position again--never.
There is also a third category for using not force but the unique
capabilities of our forces. This category involves primarily
humanitarian interests. Generally, the military is not the best tool to
address such concerns. But sometimes a humanitarian crisis--such as
Somalia or Rwanda--may swamp the ability of relief organizations to
respond. Sometimes only our military has the capability to kick-start
longer term disaster response before handing the operation back to the
relief community.
In considering such cases, we should always keep in mind that the force
of our example bolsters our leadership in the world and enhances our
ability to achieve our interests. When millions of human lives are at
risk, the world's most powerful nation cannot simply sit on the
sidelines. The American people would not allow it--and that is to their
credit.
None of this means America should become the world's policeman. We
cannot answer every 911 around the globe. But when we have weighed the
risks and costs against our interests, and when we can make a
difference, we have a responsibility to act.
Over the last three years, I believe our military has risen to these new
challenges with extraordinary professionalism and skill--whether
restoring democracy to Haiti or stopping the slaughter and safeguarding
the peace in Bosnia on one hand, or saving hundreds of thousands of
Somalis from starvation or delivering nearly 15,000 tons of food,
medicine, and supplies to Rwanda's refugees on the other.
But performing peacekeeping and humanitarian missions while preserving
warfighting capabilities is more than a conceptual challenge. It is also
a challenge to mindset and culture. Is it possible to maintain the ethos
of the warrior in servicemen and women who are serving on missions of
peace?
The answer was made clear to me last Christmas, when I visited our
troops in Haiti with General Shalikashvili. I will never forget how I
felt as he addressed those young Americans. He told them they were tough
troops, trained to do tough work. "But today," he said, "is Christmas.
Take a step back. Look at what you've done. You've saved the lives of
thousands of people. Your mothers would be proud." I could see those
soldiers look a little embarrassed at the praise, but they also seemed
very proud as the General's words sunk in. They were every bit the
world's best-trained, best-equipped, best-prepared soldiers that we
count on them to be. And, yet, they were also agents of hope for a
nation in need--in the best tradition of our people. That moment
captured unequivocally for me that, yes, we can do both.
It seems to me there are four basic points to keep in mind.
The first is that power matters, even in operations other than war. Our
military's successes in Haiti and Bosnia came because they established a
secure environment in each through the exercise and example of their
military power and prowess.
The second point is that our goals in operations other than war must be
practical and limited. We cannot deceive ourselves into thinking that
the very presence of our troops will conjure democracy into existence or
flip the switch on to prosperity. At best, we can only give others a
chance to rebuild their lives themselves. By restricting our engagement
to the time and tasks necessary to complete our military mission, we
underscore that the core purpose of our military is to fight wars--not
to build nations.
The third point to bear in mind is that peacekeeping and humanitarian
missions can also provide valuable experience for when the 'big ones'
come along. They catalyze innovation--such as the joint planning among
our services that was at the heart of our success in Haiti, or the
provision of near real-time intelligence to our field commanders in
Bosnia. They can break new ground in our cooperation with other nations-
-such as our historic partnership with Russia in Bosnia--as well as with
UN agencies, non-governmental organizations, and the media. And they can
help our troops to keep their skills sharp--though, of course, not all
warfighting skills are put to use in these operations. That is why we
must continue to devise new ways for our units to keep their edge, such
as rotating troops out of Bosnia for essential training in Hungary.
Finally, I believe our men and women in uniform are rightfully proud of
what they are doing on these missions and that from that pride comes
power. They show the world an America that is strong enough to be
caring, generous, and humane and that reinforces our nation's ability to
lead the global march for peace and freedom. So we are starting to find
ways to balance the equation successfully.
I want to underscore that in peacekeeping and humanitarian operations,
just as in combat, the President retains and will never relinquish
command authority over American forces. But from the Revolutionary War
to Korea to Desert Storm, the occasional, temporary placement of our
forces under the operational control of foreign commanders has been part
of our nation's security structure--and must remain so.
Some have proposed that in order to deal with these greater numbers of
operations other than war, we should dedicate some of our forces to
peacekeeping operations only. There are others who suggest that our
servicemen and women be allowed to decide the extent of their
participation in such missions. My own view on both issues is, no. As I
said earlier, we use force for one reason only: to protect and promote
our nation's interests. In order to maintain a disciplined fighting
force, where morale is high and unity is strong, peacekeeping and
humanitarian operations must be a common responsibility--no less than
deterring conflicts or winning wars. And I'll tell you now, as I thought
on Christmas Day--not only can our troops do both, they are. Anyone who
has any doubts should ask both Saddam Hussein and the Haitian people.
But to keep our troops the best they can be, we must address the final
challenge I posed at the outset: attracting and retaining an all-
volunteer force of high standards and technical skill that is reflective
of American society.
Part of why our military has been so successful is that it seeks to
employ the best talents that America has to offer, regardless of gender
or race. Indeed, I think we can safely say that our military is the most
merit-based major institution in American society. Not only does it
demand high quality at the outset, it encourages its members to become
even better--and provides opportunities to do so. Our armed forces set
an example for American society in giving those who take responsibility
and work hard a chance to make the most of their own lives.
Almost five decades ago, the integration of our armed forces not only
strengthened our combat readiness, it helped spur our nation to fight
racism at home. Today, because the public still sees itself when it
looks to our troops, it expects the military to keep pace with--and even
to be a model for--the standards that govern the rest of society on
issues from equal opportunity to sexual harassment.
Our military continues to work hard to improve opportunities for women
and minorities. Last month, I attended the graduation of nearly 1,000
new sailors at the Great Lakes Naval Training Center, and I was very
proud, as I looked out at them, to see that--in this particular class--
more than one-third were women.
In the 1970s and 1980s, I was a skeptic about an all-volunteer American
military, primarily because of the concern that there could develop a
gap between the military and the rest of our society. Today, after three
years' experience, I can see that, quite simply, I was wrong.
I have discussed some of the challenges our military is meeting for
America, but there is also a challenge America must meet for our
military. Our servicemen and women put their lives on the line for our
country. They must have the resources they need to do their jobs. This
demands constant reassessment, as we have done--increasing the defense
budget when we recognized funding shortfalls, seeking additional
appropriations for unexpected contingencies, and making sure, as we
approach our 4-year strategy review, that our strategy is backed by
sufficient resources.
But important as technology and weaponry are, we must always remember
that the core of our military strength is the faces behind the force.
For me, they are the rangers I met who had just come home after a
terrible--and, too many forget, heroic--firefight in Mogadishu. They
spoke first of their willingness to serve anywhere, at any time. Or the
troops I have visited in Haiti, who took such pride in what they had
done for the people of Haiti. Or the members of Charlie Rock Company at
Outpost Lima in Bosnia, setting up camp on a muddy hill to help preserve
a hard-won peace--a peace won in large part through the strength and
skill of our Air Force pilots and Navy aviators.
We are all proud of these and the other men and women of America's armed
forces. The President and I are grateful that you, the Class of '96,
will be among those who lead them, work with them, and support them as
we enter the 21st century. I believe that with your wisdom, vision, and
leadership, our military and our nation will remain the most powerful,
successful, and admired the world has ever known.
Congratulations on your graduation, and best wishes to you all.
(###)
Article 4:
The MFN Decision and U.S.-China Relations
Winston Lord, Assistant Secretary for East Asian And Pacific Affairs
Statement before the Subcommittee on Trade of the House Ways and Means
Committee, Washington, DC, June 11, 1996
Thank you very much for the opportunity to testify before this committee
on the extension of China's most-favored-nation--MFN--trading status.
This issue is of critical importance to our relationship with a country
that is fast becoming a major regional and global power. It has great
significance for our national interests. I would like to use my time
this morning to put the MFN decision into the broader context of overall
U.S.-China relations.
Since we normalized relations with China in 1979, every U.S
administration--Democratic and Republican--has extended China's MFN
trading status. This Administration supports the continuation of that
well-established policy.
As President Clinton said when he confirmed his commitment to this
policy two weeks ago: "MFN renewal is not a referendum on all China's
policies." It does not constitute an endorsement of any specific action
or behavior. The decisions of President Carter, President Reagan, and
President Bush to extend MFN did not indicate their approval of Chinese
repression or behavior. Their decisions were based on a balanced
assessment of U.S. interests and the best means of pursuing those
interests. The same considerations apply today. Unfortunately, a number
of myths and misunderstandings have muddled our discussions on China's
MFN status.
First of all, the term "most favored nation," in itself, contributes to
the confusion. Contrary to the way it sounds, MFN does not provide any
preferential or special treatment and is clearly not a reward for good
behavior. Rather, it is the normal commercial foundation upon which our
relations with all but a handful of our international trading partners
rest. It is also the basis of multilateral consensus and support for a
free and open global economic system.
As Congressman Bereuter recently noted, we have not withdrawn Nigeria's
MFN status because its current regime has executed poets and other
political dissidents. Products from Syria and the Sudan receive MFN
treatment, despite their governments' support for international
terrorism.
The extension of this status in these cases, of course, does not mean
that we do not consider human rights abuses, support for terrorism, or
IPR piracy to be serious problems. However, MFN withdrawal is clearly
not the best way to deal with such issues. In each case, we have more
appropriate and more effective foreign policy tools at our disposal.
This is also true in our relations with China. Relying on the
instruments already available, we have tailored our responses to China's
behavior for maximum effectiveness. These instruments provide both
positive and negative inducements for Beijing to address our concerns.
-- On Taiwan, our response to Beijing's missile exercises in the Strait
this March was clear. Our deployment of naval forces to the region was
meant to avert any dangerous miscalculations and signaled to all our
friends our intention to maintain our presence in the region. We have
emphasized to both sides of the Strait the importance of avoiding
provocative actions, and we continue to strongly urge both sides to
resume the cross-Strait dialogue.
-- On non-proliferation, we have demonstrated our determination to
enforce U.S. law. In 1994, as a result of the sanctions we had imposed
following China's sales of missile equipment to Pakistan, China agreed
not to export ground-to-ground MTCR-class missiles and reaffirmed its
commitments to abide by the MTCR Guidelines and Annex.
More recently, this firm stance was critical to our ability to obtain
China's commitment that it "will not provide assistance to unsafeguarded
nuclear facilities" in third countries, including Pakistan. This is a
new and significant public commitment by China. It goes beyond earlier
Chinese commitments by accepting responsibility not only to control
nuclear items specifically listed on the international trigger lists,
but also dual-use items, including ring magnets and other forms of
assistance to unsafeguarded nuclear facilities. It is an important step
forward.
-- On IPR enforcement and other trade issues, we have left no doubt
about the serious consequences of failure to remedy chronic problems and
comply with international and bilateral commitments. At the same time,
we have worked hard to provide constructive advice and support for
China's efforts to integrate its economy into the world trading system.
-- With respect to human rights, this Administration has kept faith with
our principles by placing a high priority on human rights issues in the
conduct of our relationship with China. We have engaged China
bilaterally to raise our concerns, we have taken appropriate
multilateral actions, and we have kept the focus on what China needs to
do to adhere to international human rights standards. Our relationship
with China covers a broad array of issues and interests which we must
weigh. But we will ensure that Beijing is aware that its behavior on
human rights is of great concern and will continue to be a priority for
us.
At the same time, Chinese society is opening up, and its increasing
integration into the international community will be a long-term
process. The creation of an increasing network of economic, educational,
cultural, technical, and legal ties between Chinese citizens and the
outside world will help foster a positive climate in China for human
rights. We are pursuing both governmental and non-governmental dialogue
with China on issues related to the rule of law. Over time, this
engagement, too, will have a significant effect.
A second myth that exists in some quarters is that whenever there are
difficulties in our relationship with China, it must be due to U.S.
miscues. Clearly, the U.S. is not responsible for political insecurities
that lead Beijing to imprison dissidents. Clearly, our policy did not
cause Beijing to launch missiles into the Taiwan Strait, to export
dangerous technologies, or to fail to open markets and enforce
intellectual property rights.
The reality is that, no matter how wise and steady our course, we will
continue to encounter problems as well as opportunities in our bilateral
relations with China. Moreover, during this period, we are dealing with
a complex, difficult and prickly partner whose power is growing, whose
leadership is in transition, and whose government is turning
increasingly to a nationalism that is conditioned by thousands of years
of experience as the dominant "Middle Kingdom" and more than a century
of humiliation by foreigners. Against this backdrop, any administration,
any policy would encounter tensions. It is inevitable that two great
nations--with different histories, cultures, and stages of development--
will have differences.
A third myth is that America should respond to our differences with
China by seeking to control or contain it. Such a policy would be
misguided and, in the end, unsuccessful. It would constitute a self-
fulfilling prophesy of turning China into an enemy. It would require a
major shift in our economic, military, and diplomatic resources. We and
the global community would risk much if China were to become weak,
isolated, and unstable. Who could seriously contend that China, in such
circumstances, would be more likely to respond positively to our
concerns in such areas as regional security, arms control, trade, and
human rights? As Secretary Christopher said recently: "A more secure
China is likely to be more open to reform and a better neighbor."
In practical terms, a containment policy would require the support and
cooperation of Europe, Russia, Japan, Korea, and others in the region.
Whatever the degree of their concern about China's growing power, no
country would be willing to join in efforts to contain the P.R.C. And if
we attempted to pursue such a policy alone, we would not only lose our
ability to influence China in ways that promote our interests, we would
also lose the benefits of cooperation on trade and other commercial
issues; on North Korea; non-proliferation; UN Security Council actions
and other international security issues; and on global issues like the
environment, narcotics trafficking, and international crime. We would
also severely strain our relations with our many friends and allies in
Asia and elsewhere and could potentially destabilize the entire region.
A fourth myth, suggested by some of those who advocate containment, is
that the only alternative is appeasement. Consistent with the approach
of five previous administrations of both political parties, this
Administration's policy of pursuing U.S. interests through engagement
with China in no way implies acquiescence in Chinese actions that clash
with U.S. interests or international norms. As I explained earlier,
engagement allows us to tailor our responses to the specific
circumstances in each area where we have differences with China. It
makes it possible for us to apply a wide range of inducements and
pressures on issues where we wish to encourage China to adjust its
course. Engagement means being firm whenever necessary and cooperative
whenever possible.
Where China does not comply with its international commitments or with
internationally recognized standards of behavior, we are prepared to use
all the instruments at our disposal, including those provided for in
existing domestic legislation, that may be required to promote progress.
Our willingness to take a firm stance when necessary is required to
protect our interests, maintain domestic support for engagement, and
engender respect in Beijing. It is an important component of building a
stable, productive, and mutually beneficial long-term relationship.
At the same time, engagement allows us to continue to enjoy the
substantial benefits of a constructive and cooperative bilateral
relationship with China. In the midst of the inevitable frictions and
media attention, let us not lose sight of these positive elements.
The benefits of engagement with China are not limited, as is sometimes
implied, to the economic and commercial sphere. China, in its own self-
interest, has cooperated with us in managing dangerous North Korean
behavior. It has cut off aid to the Khmer Rouge and supported the
elected government in Cambodia. Though sometimes exerting its influence,
China has not vetoed United Nations actions of critical importance to
the international community. It has cooperated with us in such areas as
narcotics trafficking and alien smuggling.
Despite serious continuing problems, China has come a long way in the
last decade on non-proliferation and arms control issues. It has joined
the Non-Proliferation Treaty--NPT--and the Chemical Weapons Convention
and has supported rapid conclusion of the comprehensive test ban treaty.
In 1994, after we had imposed sanctions related to Chinese sales of
missile equipment to Pakistan, China agreed not to export ground-to-
ground MTCR-class missiles. More recently, we have obtained China's
commitment not to assist any unsafeguarded nuclear facilities.
On the economic side, despite some substantial disputes, China has been
our fastest-growing export market in recent years. Last year alone, our
exports increased by more than one-fourth, supporting nearly 170,000
American jobs. Based on sales in the first quarter of this year, we may
do nearly as well this year--creating another 35,000 or more new jobs.
With one of the world's highest economic growth rates, China offers
enormous commercial opportunities for U.S. business. To take just one
example, by the year 2000, China is expected to invest over $150 billion
in electric power production and distribution, transportation,
telecommunications, and other major commercial and infrastructure
projects. If allowed to compete on a level playing field, U.S. companies
can expect to win a significant portion of the related international
contracts. But if our producers are handicapped in this key market,
European, Japanese, and other international competitors are ready and
able to take their place.
Commercial concerns, of course, are only one of our foreign policy
interests. But we must be very sure of the effectiveness of our proposed
actions before we put at risk the livelihoods of so many American
citizens.
Given the stakes involved, the extension of China's MFN status is a
precondition of engagement--both where we seek changes in Chinese
behavior and where our interests and policies coincide. An examination
of the negative consequences of MFN withdrawal for U.S. interests offers
a compelling case for our policy approach.
On the one hand, MFN withdrawal would not accomplish our goals.
-- It would not promote China's adherence to non-proliferation
standards. Rather, it would strengthen hardliners and provide a strong
incentive to compensate for lost revenues from legitimate trade with
exports of dangerous and destabilizing technologies and equipment.
-- It would not open China's markets and foster respect for commercial
laws and trade disciplines. Rather, it would bolster the claims of
nationalists that China cannot rely on its international partners and
must remain separate, self-reliant, and unbound by international norms
and standards of behavior.
-- It would not help to protect the rights and freedoms of Chinese
citizens or ease repression in Tibet. Rather, it would restrict access
to the outside world and reduce the impact of international values on
Chinese society and politics.
-- It would not enhance the security and stability of Taiwan and Hong
Kong. It would deal severe blows to their economic interests and
stability, while raising tensions and diminishing the chances for a
peaceful cross-Strait relationship and a smooth transition to Chinese
sovereignty over Hong Kong.
On the other hand, MFN withdrawal would inflict great damage on a range
of important U.S. interests.
-- It would deny tens of thousands of jobs to American workers--jobs
that would quickly move to the economies of our international
competitors.
-- It would set back the process of openness and reform in China, doing
the greatest harm to those whom we most wish to support and encourage
there.
-- It would strain our relations with our partners in Asia and
elsewhere.
-- It would severely hamper our ability to work constructively with one
of the world's most powerful nations on the broad range of U.S. foreign
policy interests.
This Administration will not downplay or ignore our problems with
China's policies or behavior. We support unconditional MFN extension not
as a favor for China, but because it is good for America. The stakes are
high--for us and for China, for stability and prosperity in Asia and the
world. We must manage our differences with China in a way that promotes
our interests. China, in turn, must make its own efforts on behalf of a
relationship that will be central to both countries' welfare in the 21st
century.
Mr. Chairman, in the last two weeks, President Clinton and Secretary
Christopher have set forth our comprehensive policy toward China. In
this context, they have reaffirmed their strong conviction that U.S.
national interests require the unconditional extension of China's MFN
status. This judgment is consistent with the policies of previous
administrations and with the advice of political leaders and foreign
policy experts of both parties. As President Clinton has noted, a vote
for MFN renewal is a vote for American interests. I look forward to
working with you and with the rest of the Congress to build the
political consensus that is required for us to steer a steady course
during this difficult period in U.S.-China relations.
(###)
Article 5:
U.S.-China Relationship
Charlene Barshefsky, U.S. Trade Representative
Statement before the Subcommittee on Trade of the House Ways And Means
Committee, Washington, DC, June 12, 1996
Mr. Chairman, it is a pleasure to appear before the subcommittee today
to discuss the U.S.-China relationship and the question of intellectual
property rights enforcement.
It is an understatement to say that the U.S.-China relationship is
complex and multifaceted. America has a range of issues with China that
go far beyond trade. We have a deep and abiding interest in human
rights, and we are critical when basic international norms are not met.
We have continuing concerns in areas ranging from non- proliferation to
environmental protection. And increasingly, trade plays a central role
in our relationship. Make no mistake about it: Americans have a
commercial stake in China. At least 160,000 Americans owe their jobs to
U.S. exports to China. Just as we should not make apologies for China,
we should not apologize for our economic interest in China.
China is the world's fastest-growing major economy, with annual growth
rates of more than 10% for each of the past four years, and average
growth rates of greater than 7% for each of the past 14 years. Already
possessing the world's largest population, by early in the next century,
China may have the world's largest economy.
On May 31, the President sent to Congress the formal waiver recommending
extension of unconditional MFN to China for another year. The United
States' interests in China are best promoted if we maintain MFN as the
foundation for our trade relationship.
Mr. Chairman, we will never achieve China's full integration into the
international community by building walls that divide us. The most
repressive periods in modern Chinese history did not occur in times of
open exchange, they occurred in times of isolation. President Clinton
believes we must remain engaged with China. But let me be clear about
what we mean by engagement. President Clinton came to office with the
strong view that engagement with China does not mean ignoring our
differences. It means we actively engage China to resolve our
differences and it means protecting our interests when consultations are
not fruitful.
When the President decided to delink human rights and MFN two years ago,
he said that we were prepared to use a whole array of legislative and
administrative methods to address specific issues with China. With
respect to trade, as the President has repeatedly said, we welcome
foreign products but insist that our products be treated fairly
overseas. When other countries do not live up to their obligations, we
will take action. More than three years ago, the President affirmed that
"We must enforce our trade laws and our trade agreements with all the
tools and energy at our disposal." We have used all of the tools at our
disposal to open China's market. One area of immediate difficulty, of
course, is China's lack of satisfactory implementation of the 1995
Intellectual Property Rights Enforcement Agreement.
Mr. Chairman, as you are well aware, last month the United States
announced the publication of a $3-billion preliminary retaliation list
targeting Chinese exports to the United States. This action set in
motion a 30-day clock before final action occurs. Last week, the
U.S.Trade Representative held public hearings on the retaliation list,
and we appreciated the range of comments from individuals and companies
that we received. Currently, we are preparing a final list with a value
of approximately $2 billion--a figure commensurate with the damage
inflicted on U.S. industries. Barring satisfactory implementation of the
IPR Enforcement Agreement by China, the final list will go into effect
on June 17.
We do not take the move toward retaliation lightly. China has taken
certain actions to improve IPR protection, particularly in the retail
sector. Over the past year, China has carried out more than 4,000 raids
and destroyed approximately 2 million pirated CDs, and hundreds of
thousands of pirated books, audio cassettes, and trademarks. Some IPR
court cases involving foreign rightholders have also been resolved
successfully over the past year.
China has also established a nationwide IPR enforcement structure as
required under the agreement--a system of more than 30 provincial and
municipal level task forces comprised of enforcement agencies and the
police. The system--designed to target piracy, levy stiff fines, and
remand infringers for criminal prosecution--is working in some
localities. In Shanghai, for example, officials have made IPR protection
a priority and have taken effective action to clean up the city's
markets. Clearly, where Chinese officials have demonstrated resolve,
they have shown that piracy can be brought under control.
Despite these measures, China has not enforced key areas of the
agreement, including halting piracy at its source. As a result,
important American industries and broader American and international
interests are getting hurt. Last year, China exported approximately 50
million pirated CDs, CD-ROMs, VCDs, and LDs to the world. Today, in Hong
Kong and elsewhere, $10,000 software packages can be purchased for as
little as $5. Pirate versions of Microsoft's Windows 95 were on sale in
China before it was officially introduced. Motion pictures are often
pirated and available on VCD disks before they are released in the
United States.
The affect of this activity on the U.S. economy is clear. U.S. copyright
industries alone represent more than 5% of the U.S. work force--roughly
equal to the U.S. auto industry--and are growing three times as fast as
the rest of the economy. The copyright industries contribute more than
$350 billion a year to the U.S. economy, accounting for more than 6% of
GDP. The U.S. computer software industry alone maintains a 75% market
share worldwide and created almost 60,000 jobs last year. When China
pirates American products, it denies the ideas, the enterprise, and the
jobs of these American companies and the workers they represent.
China must take four key actions to remedy the current IPR situation and
implement the IPR Agreement.
First, it must take action against the factories involved in the
production of pirate CDs and CD-ROMs. We have an aggressive strategy
with China to ensure--to the best of our ability--that all CD factories
in China are producing legitimate CDs, LDs, CD-ROMs, and Video CDs. The
IPR Agreement that we have in place with China calls for the clean-up of
all factories producing pirated products. We have targeted the worst
offenders and have asked the Chinese to close down these factories
immediately. In addition, we are working with the Chinese Government to
ensure that the remaining factories are cleaned up or closed down. The
point is that we need to see a comprehensive system in place to
crackdown on piracy in China.
Second, it must intensify enforcement in areas of China where piracy
continues to be rampant, such as Guangdong Province. While China has
raided retail establishments extensively, regions such as Guangdong
continue to engage in rampant piracy. Manufacturers and distributors
have remained untouched. Major pirates have not been punished, and
prosecutors remain reluctant to tackle copyright infringement cases.
Penalties are rarely sufficient to deter piracy. For pirates, they are
now simply a part of the cost of doing business.
Third, it must take effective action to protect intellectual property at
China's borders, particularly seizures of bulk cargo shipments. Exports
of pirated products--mainly from Southern China through Hong Kong--
result in huge losses for U.S. companies in third country markets.
China's Customs Service has conducted more than 1,000 seizures--but
mainly against foot traffic at the border. China has yet to target cargo
shipments, the primary export method for pirated CDs.
Finally, permit market access for U.S. computer software, sound
recording, and motion picture products and companies. China has not yet
fulfilled any of the major elements of the market access commitments
that it undertook in the IPR Enforcement Agreement. Although China has
entered into some revenue-sharing arrangements, U.S. filmmakers still
face de facto quotas in China' markets. China has yet to issue
regulations allowing the establishment of joint ventures for production
of audiovisual products, including the signing and promotion of local
artists, as well as other market access steps.
Actions in these areas, all required by last year's agreement, will
establish the foundation for bringing the rampant piracy under control.
China knows exactly what it must do to get back on the compliance track.
The issue now is for China to take concrete and verifiable action to
reduce piracy at its source and at its borders.
Let me make two final points on this issue. First, the United States has
gone the extra mile to help solve this problem. Since the signing of the
agreement last year, we have sent eight delegations to China and its
provinces and conducted more than 30 senior- level meetings. At the
request of the Chinese Government, we have a team in China this week for
consultations. The United Sates has also provided technical assistance
in support of this effort. Key U.S. law enforcement agencies have
provided assistance to the Chinese, including the Department of Justice,
the FBI, the Customs Service, the Patent and Trademark Office, the U.S
Information Agency, and the U.S.Trade Representative. Additionally, the
U.S. private sector has hosted literally dozens of training seminars
throughout China. In fact, our companies have gone so far as to donate
computer equipment and software to the Chinese Customs Service.
Second, the IPR issue has significance beyond bilateral relations
between the United States and China. As the world's fastest-growing
market, whether China enforces its trade obligations matters to
everyone. We are not the only nation for which the protection of
intellectual property rights is important, and this is well known to
China. We have not asked China to do anything more than what other Asian
nations are already doing--indeed, what China has already agreed to do.
The vitality and success of the global trading system depends on
everyone living up to their obligations.
We urge China to take the concrete actions necessary to demonstrate its
firm commitment to the agreement and ensure its implementation. There is
time for this to happen before sanctions go into effect. We are prepared
to work with the Chinese toward that end. But it is decisive action
against piracy that China must now take.
Mr. Chairman, the U.S.-China relationship is as important as any
bilateral relationship in the world. But the opportunities in our
relationship with China must run in both directions. For China, the
potential of the U.S. market is matched by a tangible reality. Roughly
one-third of China's exports go to the United States, including tens of
billions of dollars worth of electronic machinery, textiles, footwear,
and an ever-increasing volume of higher value-added products. In
addition, Chinese companies, as with all foreign companies, are allowed
to establish freely in the United States. No one restricts their right
to do business with American customers.
For the United States, it is certainly true that China offers unmatched
potential. Unfortunately, while progress has been made, for the United
States, the potential of the China market remains unfulfilled in many
respects. While the United States accepts one-third of China's exports,
China accounts for less than 2% of U.S. exports and maintains highly
restrictive import policies. China must further open its markets. The
first step is to ensure compliance with commitments already made.
We have an opportunity to bridge important gaps in our relationship, so
that benefits travel in both directions. To make this potential a
reality, the United States stands ready to do its share. Renewing MFN,
along with a broader engagement strategy, is critical to building a
long-term, stable relationship with China. But China, too, must bear its
share. It must respect international norms, open its markets, and
fulfill the commitments it makes. Mutual prosperity depends on this.
(###)
Article 6:
U.S. Interests in and Policy Toward Afghanistan
Robin L. Raphel, Assistant Secretary for South Asian Affairs
Statement before the Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South Asian
Affairs Of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Washington, DC, June
6, 1996
Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee: I am pleased to have this
opportunity to review U.S. interests in Afghanistan and our policy
toward that beleaguered country. I would also like to discuss the Afghan
peace process, which the United States has actively supported for
several years.
I appreciate your interest and willingness to focus on this troubled
area. I have recently made a visit to the region that included Pakistan,
Afghanistan, Central Asia, and Russia. The focus of my discussions was
Afghanistan.
The interests of the United States in Afghanistan remain largely as they
have been since the fall of the communists in 1992. They are threefold.
First, regional stability. The ongoing conflict among the Afghan
factions is both a source and result of regional rivalries. The civil
strife is particularly tragic, given the role of the Afghan peoples
struggle in ending the Cold War. The conflict in Afghanistan prevents
the new Central Asian states from establishing trade and oil and gas
outlets to the south; it provides another venue for Indo-Pakistani
competition; it feeds Iranian fears of being surrounded by unfriendly
regimes; and, finally, it promotes a dangerous fragmentation of
Afghanistan.
The stability of this region is important to the United States: We wish
to see countries with governments that provide basic services and that
protect the rights of their citizenry; where economies can flourish and
foreign investment and assistance are welcomed and help improve the
standards of living.
Seventeen years of relentless fighting have all but destroyed
Afghanistan--its economy, its infra- structure, its institutions, and
its social systems. The Afghan people are war-weary; they want an end to
the fighting and a return to normalcy. We seek a negotiated peace in
Afghanistan that would end its role as a battleground. We support the
aspirations of the Afghan people for a broadly accepted, inclusive
government that can be held accountable by the people of Afghanistan to
move the country toward a future of hope.
Second, terrorism and narcotics. In the absence of a functioning central
government in Kabul, these problems cannot be addressed effectively. The
proliferation of militant training camps and increased narcotics
production and trafficking can only be reversed by cooperation between
those both inside and outside Afghanistan. Afghanistan has become a
conduit for drugs, crime, and terrorism that can undermine Pakistan and
the neighboring Central Asian states and have an impact beyond to Europe
and Russia. We intend to maintain an international focus on these
problems.
Americans recall the support the United States gave to the Afghan
freedom fighters who sought to liberate their country from Soviet
occupation. Many non-Afghans also took up the struggle and were trained
in camps on Afghan soil. Unfortunately, these camps also came to be used
for terrorist training. Several terrorist incidents in the Middle East
and elsewhere have been linked to individuals trained in Afghan camps.
Ramzi Ahmed Yousef, who has been indicted as a major figure in the World
Trade Center bombing, has such a link to Afghanistan.
Afghanistan is the second-largest producer of opium in the world after
Burma. Afghanistan's opium production has tripled since 1990, with its
share of illicit worldwide production increasing from 13% of the total
in 1990 to 32% in 1995. Opium poppy cultivation is relatively easy and
very lucrative. In Afghanistan's shattered economy, other means must be
found to provide farmers with a decent living. Opium processed into
heroin finds its way into Pakistan, Central Asia, Russia, Europe, and
the U.S.
The United States currently provides a modest amount of funds for drug
control and rural rehabilitation projects, crop substitution, and
counter-narcotics activities, mostly through the United Nations Drug
Control Program--FY 1995, $715,000; FY 1996, minimum of $200,000.
Third, humanitarian concerns. The human suffering in Afghanistan must be
addressed if the country is to rebuild and rejoin the world community.
Currently, Afghanistan ranks 173rd of 175 countries on the United
Nations human development index. When stability is restored, the more
than 2 million Afghan refugees who live outside the country and the more
than a half-million internally displaced persons can return home.
Stability and security will also allow the redevelopment of the Afghan
economy and reconstruction of the country's infrastructure.
Since 1989, the United States has provided $700 million in assistance to
Afghanistan, largely for the care and feeding of refugees and more
recently for repatriation efforts. In 1995, over $40 million went for
refugee care and repatriation. This assistance has been largely funneled
through UN organizations and private voluntary organizations.
Additionally, the United States has responded with urgently needed
emergency assistance for the residents of Kabul for the past two
winters, providing nearly $1.5 million of food, winter clothing,
blankets, medical supplies, and shelter materials. Recently, we provided
$50,000 for emergency relief in the wake of the recent flooding disaster
in the country. These funds went to the International Federation of the
Red Cross which, along with UN agencies, led the effort to help the
Afghan people after the floods.
Another legacy of the 1980s was the placing of over 10 million landmines
in the Afghan countryside and cities, making Afghanistan one of the most
heavily mined countries in the world. Thousands of innocent victims,
including children, continue to be injured and maimed by these hidden
terrors. Com- pounding this tragedy, the warring factions continue to
place mines. The U.S. contribution to the efforts to locate and
eliminate these mines has been modest, but important. In 1995, the
United States provided over $4 million for the training and operation of
demining dog teams, demining equipment, and other UN demining efforts.
While USAID funding for demining has been eliminated, we earnestly hope
more funding will be available from other sources.
The common thread of all our interests in Afghanistan is the need to
restore stability. This has been the overall goal of U.S. policy. For
the past several years, the United States has worked hard to promote a
peace process in Afghanistan that would enable a functioning central
government to emerge, order to be restored, and reconstruction to begin.
We have fully supported the UN Special Mission on Afghanistan, believing
that the United Nations is best placed to broker a negotiated peace.
In February, as President of the UN Security Council, Ambassador
Madeleine Albright called for the international community to pay more
attention to Afghanistan and focused concern on the humanitarian
disaster that has taken place there. Then in April, the UN Security
Council held an open debate on Afghanistan, the first in over six years.
The nations making statements that day clearly placed the responsibility
for halting the violence on the warring Afghan factions themselves.
The United Nations will do all it can to facilitate the peace process,
but, ultimately, it is up to the factions and their outside supporters
to agree to a peace. The world community urged these factions to
consider the welfare of their country and their people and bring an
immediate end to the fighting.
My recent discussions in the region bolstered my view that many
countries want a tangible peace in Afghanistan achieved as soon as
possible. We have been discussing with many nations the effects of
outside interference on Afghanistan and how the continued supply of
arms, materiel, and funds to the warring factions has only perpetuated
the fighting and made the factions more resistant to negotiations. The
United States has repeatedly urged an end to outside interference in
Afghanistan. We believe that countries in the region should recognize
that Afghanistan's stability is in their interest. Instability breeds
concern among all the neighbors.
At the United Nations, there are ongoing discussions on how to promote
an Afghan peace, such as an arms embargo and an international
conference. The United States wishes to explore these ideas further with
other concerned countries.
We remain convinced that the only solution to this impasse is a
negotiated settlement that leads to a representative, broadly supported,
central government. Steps along the way must include a cease-fire, a
neutral security force, demilitarizing Kabul, agreement on an interim
governing arrangement, and planning for a permanent form of government.
Recently, UN Special Envoy Ambassador Mestiri resigned from his post. We
greatly appreciated Ambassador Mestiri's dedication and efforts under
very difficult circumstances during these past two years. The UN is
currently in the process of choosing a successor. We hope that the next
envoy will have Ambassador Mestiri's foreign policy expertise and
international stature. The new envoy should be able to work closely with
the parties to the Afghan civil war and the countries affected by the
instability in Afghanistan.
We support a vigorous UN peace effort aimed at reconciling the factions
and persuading them to agree to a negotiated settlement. We are
concerned, however, that the factional leaders are not putting the
interests of their country or their fellow countrymen above their self
interest. They are often inflexible and seemingly immune to pressure.
These leaders must be made to understand that the Afghan people do not
want a continuous state of war in their country. The United States
supports the aspirations of the Afghan people to establish a
representative government which will be responsive to their needs.
The U.S. does not favor one faction over another nor does it give any
group or individual support. We believe that the Afghan people have the
right to a government of their own choosing, free from outside
interference. For this to be achieved, all must see that there can be no
sustainable settlement based on the notion that there will be a winner -
-and, therefore, losers. Everyone must have a stake in a negotiated
settlement or everyone will continue to lose. We hope that real progress
toward a lasting peace can begin soon.
(###)
Article 7:
What's in Print
Foreign Relations Of the United States
The recently released volumes of the Foreign Relations series continue
the Department of State's expanded coverage of the documentary history
of the Vietnam war.
The volumes--Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, Volume
II, Vietnam, January-June 1965; and Foreign Relations of the United
States, 1964-1968, Volume III, Vietnam, June-December 1965 are extensive
and intensive, each documenting six months of policy deliberation and
decisions. They are the most comprehensive collection of documents
covering the tumultuous events of 1965, surpassing the Pentagon Papers,
which were made public during the war amid much controversy.
Researchers relied heavily on the records of President Lyndon B. Johnson
and his aides. Records from the Departments of State and Defense and the
Central Intelligence Agency, as well as papers of key officials such as
Gen. William Westmoreland, Averell Harriman, Gen. Maxwell Taylor, and
others were examined and selected.
The Office of the Historian has prepared summaries of the volumes. For
further information, contact David S. Patterson, General Editor of the
Foreign Relations Series, at (202) 663-1127; fax (202) 663-1289.
Copies of the volumes (Volume II--GPO Stock No. 044-000-02405-5, and
Volume III--GPO Stock No. 044-000-02406-3) may be purchased for $37 each
postpaid ($46.25 each for foreign orders). VISA, MasterCard, and
personal checks are accepted. Order from:
U.S. Government Printing Office
Superintendent of Documents
P.O. Box 371954
Pittsburgh, PA 15250-7954
To order by phone, call (202) 512-1800; to fax your order, call (202)
512-2250.
(###)
[END DISPATCH VOL 7, NUMBER 25]
(###)
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