U.S. Department of State
Dispatch Volume 7, Number 23, June 3, 1996
Bureau of Public Affairs
ARTICLES IN THIS ISSUE:
1. Fighting Terrorism: Challenges For Peacemakers--Secretary
Christopher
2. The U.S. Faces Key Foreign Policy Challenges--Anthony Lake
3. The New Transatlantic Agenda: Setting the Course for U.S.
Cooperation with Europe--Joan E. Spero
4. American Objectives in the Middle East--Robert H. Pelletreau
5. U.S. Policy Toward Burma--Kent Wiedemann
ARTICLE l:
Fighting Terrorism: Challenges For Peacemakers
Secretary Christopher
Address to the Washington Institute for Near East Policy annual Soref
Symposium, Washington, DC, May 21, 1996
(introductory remarks deleted)
Thank you very much. I last spoke at the Institute in October 1993, soon
after Prime Minister Rabin and Chairman Arafat shook hands on the White
House lawn and forever changed the course of Middle East history. Since
then, much has happened. Israel and Jordan are at peace. Palestinians
defied the Hamas call to boycott elections and in doing so gave their
clear mandate for peace. Today, they govern themselves in Gaza and most
cities in the West Bank. The Palestinian National Council voted over-
whelmingly to make good on its commitment to cancel the egregious
provisions of its charter. Economic summits have been held in Casablanca
and Amman. Eight members of the Arab League have made official visits to
Israel, and--with the exception of Libya, Iraq, and Sudan--every Arab
League member has participated in some aspect of the peace process.
Had I predicted these events in 1993, you probably would have said that
I needed a long rest. The scope and pace of change has truly been
breathtaking. It has come so fast that what was previously unthinkable
is now routine. In the face of difficult challenges, it is easy to
forget how dramatically the peace process has already transformed the
landscape of the Middle East. As we move forward, we must remember the
enormous progress we have made.
None of the challenges we now face is more pressing than the fight
against terrorism. Terrorism destroys innocent lives. It undermines a
society's sense of security--and with it the very foundation upon which
a lasting peace must be built. As such, terrorism is a threat to our
national interests--not simply in the Middle East but around the world.
President Clinton has rightly identified terrorism as one of the most
important security challenges we face in the wake of the Cold War. As he
said in his address to the United Nations last October, terrorism today
is a worldwide phenomenon. No one is immune--certainly not Israel but
also not Egypt or Japan or France, Britain or Germany or Turkey, Saudi
Arabia, Argentina, or Algeria, and, unfortunately, not America, where
terrorists have struck from lower Manhattan to Oklahoma City.
As if the threat is not already severe enough, we now face an even more
alarming danger: the terrorist armed with weapons of mass destruction.
Last year's nerve gas attack on the Tokyo subway system was a grim omen.
It was also a wake-up call for the world. The threat is real. We must
act now to meet it.
The United States is leading the way. Last month, the President signed
into law landmark anti-terrorism legislation. This bill provides law
enforcement with new tools to stop terrorists before they strike and to
bring them to justice when they do. It strengthens our ability to
prevent international terrorists from raising funds in the United
States. And while ensuring legal safeguards, it allows us quickly to
expel foreigners who provide support for terrorist activities.
The United States also has spearheaded efforts to combat terrorism on
the global level. We have imposed strong sanctions against states that
sponsor or harbor terrorists. We have intensified our counterterrorism
cooperation with other countries, allowing us to apprehend key figures
in attacks such as the World Trade Center bombing. Last December, with
our partners in the G-7 and Russia, we convened a ministerial meeting in
Ottawa to develop common strategies for fighting terror. In April,
President Clinton joined President Yeltsin and other leaders in Moscow,
where they agreed on new steps to prevent nuclear materials from falling
into the wrong hands.
Nowhere in the world has America's leadership in the fight against
terror been more evident than in the Middle East. We have maintained UN
sanctions against Libya for its role in the bombing of Pan Am flight
103. And we are working to increase pressure on Sudan for its support of
last June's assassination attempt against Egypt's President Mubarak.
America's most critical role, however--and the one I want to focus on
today--is defending the Middle East peace process and peacemakers
against the vicious attacks of their enemies. Terrorists and their
supporters are now engaged in a systematic assault on Israel and the
peace process. Their goal is clear: They seek to kill the very
possibility of peace by destroying every Israeli's sense of personal
security.
The enemies of peace are escalating their attacks for a very clear
reason: The peace process is succeeding. With every step toward peace
that Israel and its neighbors take, the enemies of peace grow more
desperate and more determined to lash out. They must promote fear
because they know that hope is their undoing.
The United States is determined to ensure that the enemies of peace do
not succeed. We will never give in to their terror. We refuse to allow
terrorists to undermine our resolve or divert us from our goal of a
real, secure, and lasting peace for Israel and for all the people of the
Middle East.
When Israel was terrorized by a wave of suicide bombings in February and
March, President Clinton responded by organizing the Sharm el-Sheikh
summit. Literally overnight, leaders from around the world answered his
call to join Israel--not to celebrate another breakthrough in the peace
process but to defend the peace process at a moment of crisis. It was an
unprecedented event that sent an unmistakable message: The enemies of
peace are doomed. Their terror will only strengthen our resolve to
complete the circle of peace and put them out of business for good.
Sharm el-Sheikh launched a process to expand joint efforts against
terrorism throughout the region. Most recently, President Clinton and
Prime Minister Peres signed a new anti-terrorism accord that will
strengthen cooperation between our two governments. In addition, the
United States is providing Israel with more than $100 million in anti-
terrorism equipment and training.
We also have begun to bolster the counterterrorism capabilities of the
Palestinian Authority. With our support, Israeli and Palestinian
security services are now cooperating in a joint campaign to root out
the terrorist infrastructure in the West Bank and Gaza. Palestinian
forces have intercepted many suicide bombers. They have uncovered
explosives and arms caches. They have arrested, tried, and imprisoned
perpetrators of terrorist acts, and they continue to hunt down others.
Chairman Arafat today clearly understands that he must give a 100%
effort in the war on terror--and not just because his agreements with
Israel require it. He is doing it because he knows that the bombs of
Hamas and Islamic Jihad are trying to destroy Palestinian aspirations
as much as they are Israeli lives. The United States will continue to
insist that this increased Palestinian effort be sustained.
As with Hamas before it, Hezbollah's purpose in last month's attacks in
Lebanon also was to kill the peace process. As hostilities escalated,
America's responsibility and interests were clear: to use our influence
to stop the suffering of innocent civilians, to end the crisis, and to
create a new framework to limit the chances of it happening again.
The agreement that resulted from my shuttle mission achieved those
objectives. Hundreds of thousands of Israelis and Lebanese have been
able to return to their homes. New, written understandings have been
reached to contain the dangers of any hostilities. An international
effort will be mounted to assist in Lebanon's reconstruction. We are
organizing a monitoring group in which Israel, Lebanon, and Syria are
being brought together for the first time to help prevent another
crisis.
This recent campaign of violence has again shined the spotlight on a
disturbing reality: When it comes to terrorism against the peace
process, Iran is playing a leading role. Iran's leaders regularly use
rhetoric that incites terrorism. President Rafsanjani called Prime
Minister Rabin's assassination "divine vengeance." And just prior to the
Hamas bombing spree, Iran's Supreme Leader, Khameini, preached that "The
power of Islam will ultimately bring about the end of the rootless
Zionist regime . . . which must be destroyed."
Iran has not stopped at rhetoric. It frequently meets with all the major
terrorist groups--including Hezbollah, Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad,
and the PFL-PGC. It actively encourages these groups to use terror to
destroy the peace process. It provides them with money--up to several
million dollars a year in the case of Hamas, Islamic Jihad, and others
and up to $100 million a year for Hezbollah. Iran also supplies them
with arms and material support, training, and--in some cases--
operational guidance.
The evidence has grown in recent months. In advance of Israel's
elections, Iranian-trained terrorists have been sent to infiltrate
Israel and the Palestinian territories. Some have been intercepted.
Others narrowly failed in carrying out their deadly activities. Still
others have succeeded in their murderous missions. We believe that an
Iranian-backed group was responsible for last week's drive-by shooting
of an Israeli-American yeshiva student in the West Bank. In another
case, Belgium intercepted a shipment containing a mortar, which came
from Iran and was probably intended for an attack on a Jewish target in
Europe.
There should no longer be any debate about Iran's involvement in
terrorism against the peace process. German Foreign Minister Kinkel left
no doubt about that in remarks he made here in Washington just two weeks
ago. He said that Germany is "fully aware of the evil things that Iran
has been doing and is still doing." He went on to say that
"The Americans and the Germans agree as to the general assessment of
what Iran means by way of terrorism . . . support of Hezbollah, Hamas,
and Jihad."
While we and our allies now share a similar analysis of the facts, we
differ when it comes to how best to deal with Iran. The United States
believes that Iran will change its behavior only when the world makes it
pay a sufficiently high political and economic price. We must deny
Iran's leaders the resources to finance their dangerous policies. That
is why the President decided, last year, to impose a comprehensive
embargo on U.S. trade with Iran. And that is why we have been working
with Congress on legislation to further tighten economic restrictions on
Iran.
In contrast, some European nations continue to engage Iran in what they
call a critical dialogue while maintaining normal trade. The Europeans
themselves acknowledge that their policy has produced no significant
change in Iranian behavior. We remain convinced that no amount of
dialogue will alter Iran's policies unless it is coupled with real
economic pressure.
Let me stress one point: We do not oppose the EU policy because we
oppose the principle of speaking with Iran. The United States has long
said that we are ready to conduct an open dialogue with authoritative
representatives of the Iranian Government, in which we could fully air
our two major concerns: First, Iran's support for terrorism, especially
against the peace process and, second, its efforts to acquire weapons of
mass destruction. Iran, however, has never taken up this offer.
Our determination to contain Iran and to defeat the enemies of peace is
clear. But so is our commitment to press ahead with negotiations on a
comprehensive Arab-Israeli peace. Anything less would hand the
terrorists the very victory they seek.
To close the circle of peace, agreements between Israel and Syria and
between Israel and Lebanon are essential. Syria presents us with a
unique challenge. On the one hand, we continue to have serious problems
in our bilateral relationship with Syria. Syria remains on our narcotics
list as well as on our terrorism list.
Both President Clinton and I have consistently pressed our concerns with
President Asad and other senior Syrian officials. We will continue to do
so and to make clear that these concerns must be met before the United
States can build a mutually beneficial relationship with Syria.
Yet we recognize that Syria is different from Iran. Iran rejects the
very notion of peace and has dedicated itself to Israel's destruction.
By contrast, Syria has been negotiating directly with Israel to end
their conflict. I have no illusions: Translating that willingness to
negotiate into a peace agreement will be difficult. But the talks thus
far have provided a solid foundation for progress when negotiations
resume.
As long as we remain convinced that peace is possible, we must continue
to work with the parties to achieve a breakthrough that would have far-
reaching strategic consequences--not just for the Middle East but for
America's vital interests. A comprehensive peace will dramatically
reduce the risk of another Arab-Israeli war. It will remove the final
constraints on Israel's having normal relations with the entire Arab and
Muslim world.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, ending the Arab-Israeli conflict
will allow us and our friends to harness our resources to meet the
common set of strategic challenges that threaten us all--especially the
rise of extremist movements that use terrorism and violence and rogue
states, such as Iran and Iraq, that possess weapons of mass destruction.
These are the real dangers that we and our friends will have to address
in the coming years. In pursuit of our national interests, we are
determined to do so. A critical part of our strategy must be a continued
effort to seize the historic opportunity that now exists to achieve a
secure and comprehensive peace. Thank you.
(###)
ARTICLE 2:
The U.S. Faces Key Foreign Policy Challenges
Anthony Lake, Assistant to the President for National Security
Address to the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, Chicago, Illinois,
May 24, 1996
I am glad to be back in Chicago and to see some old friends again. I am
something of a baseball fan, and being in the Windy City reminds me of
one of the game's many good quotations. After a game in rough weather--
probably at Comiskey--Yankee out-fielder Mickey Rivers is reported to
have said that it was so bad out there, "it was blowing 360 degrees."
I can sympathize. In Washington--and in foreign affairs--it frequently
feels like it's blowing 360 degrees. But our nation's interests are not
seasonal. We have to look much farther down the road and consider how
to ready ourselves for the long haul and prepare for the storms ahead.
So, as we near the end of the Clinton Administration's first term, I
want to talk about the key foreign policy challenges America will face
in the coming years. Political leaders may change with elections, but
America's interests do not. The way these challenges are met--or
ignored--will affect the lives of each and every American and our
prospects for the century ahead.
Halfway between the end of the Cold War and the dawn of a new century,
our nation is at peace. Our economy is strong. The tide of market
democracy is rising around the world, bringing freedom and prosperity to
more people than ever before and new opportunities for us.
Yet this promising new era is not risk-free. Old threats, such as
aggression by rogue states, have taken on new and dangerous dimensions.
A host of modern threats--from terrorism to drug trafficking to man-made
environmental disasters--ignore national borders and undermine our
security.
In this new world of possibility--but also peril--America's global
leadership is more important than ever. That great scholar of
diplomacy, Woody Allen, once remarked that 80% of life is just showing
up. For better or worse, simply "showing up" is not enough in foreign
policy. To lead effectively, our nation must do two things at once.
First is the business of managing crises as they arise. Whether dealing
with an outbreak of violence in Liberia, trying to secure a Middle East
cease-fire, or responding to a global 911 such as the Kobe earthquake,
managing crises is fast-paced, high-profile work. Its rewards--or its
failures--are readily visible and frequently found in the headlines.
This audience knows that such foreign policy challenges do not arise in
neat four-year cycles. Every administration inherits problems it must
manage; ours was no different. Three of the most urgent were repression
in Haiti, the war in Bosnia, and the containment of Iraq.
--Because we backed diplomacy with force, the dictators are gone from
Haiti, the desperate flow of refugees has ended, and the first-ever
democratic transfer of power took place this year. The last of the U.S.
peacekeepers came home on time, as promised.
--Because we deployed our troops rapidly and decisively to the Persian
Gulf in 1994, Iraq withdrew the troops it massed on Kuwait's border--and
we preserved peace and stability in the region.
--Because we stood up for peace in Bosnia, the slaughter has ended.
American troops and their IFOR partners are helping to give the Bosnian
people the breathing room they need to build the peace they have chosen.
I am proud that our Administration led the world's response to these
problems. But it was also important that while managing these
emergencies, we also pressed forward with the projects that stretch
beyond the crisis of the day and are essential for building the future
that we want.
This is the second aspect of leadership: anticipating the problems of
the future, making the investments that will pay greater benefits--or
prevent greater costs in the future--and laying the groundwork for the
peace and prosperity of tomorrow. Even as we handle day-to-day events,
we must devote ourselves to the acts of construction on the core
security issues that affect the daily lives of American citizens.
I believe we are laying the foundation for a post-Cold War world in
which our interests are protected and our people prosper. Over the next
four years, whoever leads this country will have a chance and a
responsibility to build on that foundation.
What are these "construction projects?" One is to strengthen and
broaden our core alliances as we lay the groundwork for peace in the
21st century. On the President's trip to Asia last month, we signed a
new security charter with Japan. We joined with South Korea in launching
a major initiative that we hope will lead to a permanent peace between
North and South and eventually erase the Cold War's last remaining
frontier. Those achievements, along with our efforts to engage China in
a productive dialogue, aim at fulfilling the President's vision of a
peaceful Asia-Pacific community built on shared efforts and shared
benefits.
Since our policy on Asia is seizing today's headlines, I would like to
focus on three other "construction projects" for the next four years:
building an undivided, democratic Europe; preparing for the military
threats of the future; and building a new global trading system.
Building an Undivided Europe
History has taught us that when Europe is in turmoil, America suffers,
and when Europe is peaceful and prosperous, America can thrive as well.
Today, with the Cold War over, a peaceful, democratic, undivided Europe
is within reach.
We have worked hard to turn that vision into reality by supporting the
process of Europe's integration. We have helped the nations of central
Europe and the former Soviet Union to develop the essentials of
democracy--fair elections, a free media, and an independent judiciary.
We have helped them to rebuild their shattered economies.
These efforts are paying off. Many central European nations are moving
from aid to trade. Some--such as Poland and the Czech Republic--are
among Europe's fastest-growing economies. Today, America is Russia's
largest private investor, and our total trade with Russia has grown 65%
in the last three years. More trade with and investment in Europe's new
democracies with their millions of new consumers means more jobs and
higher wages at home.
We are also deepening security cooperation with all who share our values
and our vision of peace. A key part of this process is NATO's
enlargement. NATO can do for Europe's east what it did 50 years ago for
Europe's west--prevent a return to local rivalries, strengthen democracy
against future threats, and provide the conditions for fragile market
economies to flourish.
Two years ago, the United States laid a cornerstone of the new Europe by
initiating the Partnership for Peace. From the Black Sea waters of
Romania to the bayous of Louisiana, Partners and allies are building
bridges of cooperation. For some countries, the Partnership will be the
path to NATO membership. For others, it will be an active link to the
alliance. For all, it is a powerful incentive to deepen democracy,
establish civilian control of the military, and be responsible members
of the global community.
Already, we are seeing results. Right now in Bosnia, soldiers from at
least 13 Partner states are standing shoulder-to-shoulder with NATO
troops. One of those Partners, Hungary, is the major staging ground for
America's contribution to the NATO force.
Over the next four years, we must lock in these gains for the 21st
century. This means moving NATO enlargement forward on the same steady,
transparent track we have followed since the start. That means resisting
calls to move too rapidly, which could undermine our goal by
compromising NATO's consensus on bringing in new members. But it also
means that those nations that are ready to add to the strength of the
alliance must not be kept in limbo. Delaying enlargement would destroy
the momentum we have built and dispirit new democracies that have worked
so hard to reform. We will not allow such delays.
As enlargement moves forward, we must also work to make the NATO-Russia
relationship a full-fledged partnership. Our teamwork in the Contact
Group and between our troops in Bosnia has shown that such a partnership
is both possible and productive. It is a harbinger of the undivided
Europe that lies before us if we all have the vision and determination
to achieve it.
Preparing for the Military Threats of the Future
Our second act of construction lies in preparing for the real military
threats of the post-Cold War era. Superpower confrontation has passed.
But the lid has been lifted on numerous simmering ethnic and religious
conflicts. Before, rogue states could be restrained by those who armed
and supported them. Now, they are more likely to gamble on the use of
force to achieve their ends.
The United States has taken these developments to heart, and we are
strengthening our defenses for a world that remains dangerous. Indeed,
we may be doing a better job of preparing for the threats of a new era
than did previous post-war generations. Remember, five years after World
War II, America's military drawdown had gone so far that we were nearly
pushed off the Korean Peninsula. Five years after Vietnam, the Army
Chief of Staff declared that we had a "hollow army."
Now, five years after the post-Cold War drawdown began, America's
military has completed an extraordinary transformation. Our military
leadership has received far too little credit for one of the greatest
management successes in history--a large- scale personnel reduction with
no loss in morale or needed capacity. I visited the Great Lakes Naval
Training Center this morning and was very impressed with the morale of
the Navy recruits now becoming sailors.
Following our Bottom-Up Review--an analysis of unprecedented scope--our
forces have been reshaped for the challenges we face today and those
that may confront us tomorrow. America's military readiness has never
been higher, and our forces are prepared and equipped to meet potential
crises around the world. Our strategy calls for our forces to deter and,
if necessary, fight two major, regional conflicts nearly simultaneously.
In 1994, when Iraq menaced Kuwait, tensions rose in Korea, and trouble
in Haiti boiled over, we showed that our military was equal to the task-
-and more. Our troops' rapid, professional deployments deterred possible
aggression in the Mideast and Asia and brought the people of Haiti a
chance for a brighter future. They are also performing the kind of new
missions for peace and freedom that our era demands--as we have seen in
Haiti, Rwanda, and Bosnia.
To maintain our forces' superiority, the Clinton Administration has made
an unwavering commitment to give our troops the resources they need.
Because of that pledge, when circumstances change, we adjust and provide
what is required. Over the last two years, we added nearly $4 billion to
the military budget to cover the costs of unexpected missions. Based on
a clear look at what we needed for readiness and modernization,
President Clinton decided in December 1994 to increase funding for our
long-term defense plan by $25 billion over six years. As he has said so
often, the President is determined that America's military be the best-
trained, best-equipped, and best-prepared fighting force on earth--and
we will provide the means to keep it that way.
Just as the Administration is committed to preserving our edge in
conventional forces, we also are determined to reduce the threat to the
American people posed by weapons of mass destruction. When the Iron
Curtain fell, a window of opportunity opened for building a world that
is safer from chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons. So we have set
the most ambitious arms control and non-proliferation agenda in history-
-and we are meeting it.
Because of our steady engagement with Russia and the New Independent
States, no Russian missiles are targeted at America's cities and
citizens. START I and START II, which we hope the Russian Duma will soon
approve, will slash by two-thirds the nuclear arsenals that we and the
Soviet Union held at the height of the Cold War. We also are working to
strengthen the Biological Weapons Convention and are pressing for
ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention. We are urging the
Senate to approve this vital treaty without delay.
We have secured the indefinite and unconditional extension of the Non-
Proliferation Treaty. We hope to sign a comprehensive test ban treaty
this year--and thereby constrain the next generation of nuclear weapons.
And we are working so that all nations abide by the provisions of the
Missile Technology Control Regime.
Not too long ago, debate raged over the value of arms control treaties.
In the post-Cold War world, the answer is clear: These gains--the
result of determined diplomacy by both Democratic and Republican
administrations --are real and have made the American people safer.
But we will not be truly secure through diplomacy alone. Maintaining our
deterrent force--conventional and nuclear--remains the best way to keep
any state from challenging us with weapons of mass destruction. Any
potential enemy must know that our response to an attack using these
weapons will be absolutely overwhelming and devastating. This is how we
kept the peace for 50 years, and it is our best guarantee for the next
50 and beyond.
Nonetheless, we must prepare for the unlikely event that our military
might, arms control agreements, and nuclear deterrent fail to prevent
some rogue nation from launching a missile attack against the United
States or our armed forces. Our Administration is spending $3 billion a
year to develop and deploy missile defenses. Our approach, as the
President said this week at the Coast Guard Academy, "is based on real
threats and pragmatic responses." It is based on the common-sense notion
that before we build a missile defense, we need to know what the threat
is.
Today--and for years to come--the greatest threat we face is from short-
and medium-range missile attacks against our troops or our allies. The
regions of greatest peril are the Middle East and Asia. That is why we
have made theater missile defense our top priority. We have deployed
upgraded Patriot missiles to South Korea. We are working with Japan to
upgrade their defenses. And we recently reached an agreement with Taiwan
to provide them with an anti-missile capability. We are cooperating with
Israel on theater defenses. We are pressing ahead with a range of
advanced short-and medium-range missile defenses, such as Patriot PAC-3,
Navy Lower Tier, and Army THAAD--which will be ready for use by 1998--
and the more capable Navy Upper Tier, which can be fielded a few years
later.
Putting theater missile defenses first makes sense. It addresses the
threats that exist now. But we also have to look ahead to prepare
ourselves for threats down the road. While our intelligence community
does not believe that a rogue state is likely to acquire a long-range
missile capability within the next 15 years, we are committed to
developing a national missile defense system by 2000 that can, if
needed, be deployed by 2003.
This is a rational response to a possibility that is remote but whose
consequences would be horrifying. The alternative to our plan, the bill
launched by the Senate and House leadership last March, would require
that we choose a missile defense system today for certain deployment by
2003.
This is the wrong way to defend America. It would lock us into today's
technology and deny us the benefit of tomorrow's advances. If some
future dictator gets reckless, we don't want to get caught with a
Betamax when we could have the latest technology on our side.
Their bill would also violate arms control agreements that are making us
safer. It could resurrect many of the technologies of the failed "Star
Wars" scheme, including space-based missiles and lasers, as well as sea-
based and multiple-site anti-ballistic missile defenses. All of these
systems would violate the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. The ABM treaty
remains a cornerstone of our arms control achievements, and throwing it
into question would imperil the ongoing cuts in Russia's nuclear
arsenal. Giving up the reduction of thousands of warheads for protection
against a threat that does not yet exist is a bad trade-off. It simply
does not make sense. We can preserve the treaty while fielding the
defenses we need.
Their approach would not only be bad strategy, it is bad budgeting. Last
week, the Congressional Budget Office estimated that the bill's program
would cost somewhere between $31 billion and $60 billion by 2010. At
that price, our nation would have a hard time sustaining the
modernization our conventional forces must have. It is not surprising
that when the bill's sponsors heard that estimate, they pulled it from
the floor of the House--though its supporters in the Senate appear
determined to press on.
There is a right way and a wrong way to defend America and its citizens
from a missile attack. I hope we can come together in a bipartisan
fashion behind the right way, the practical way, the prudent way. As
Secretary Perry said in an interview yesterday, we should find common
ground on this issue, for example along the lines envisioned in the
substitute amendment on National Missile Defense policy that Congressman
John Spratt of South Carolina intends to offer when the House takes up
the Defend America bill. That way, our nation will have the missile
defense it needs against the threats that may develop, and our forces
will have the best equipment and training for all the missions they will
inevitably face--conventional and nuclear.
Trade
The two "construction projects" I have discussed so far--building an
undivided Europe and building the right defense against military threats
we actually face--have an obvious impact on the security of the American
people. But we define "national security" in terms of people's daily
lives and that means not just the military security of our nation but
our citizens' economic well-being as well--as a basis for their personal
security. In an era where goods and ideas are traded all over the world
and where millions of dollars can flash across the planet at the stroke
of a computer key, it is clear that our economic welfare is tied to the
rest of the world.
That is why we have worked so hard to build a new global trading system.
Through painstaking negotiation and hard-headed persuasion, we are
opening markets to American goods and services and creating new
opportunities for American companies and workers. Now, with regional
efforts such as NAFTA, APEC, and the Summit of the Americas; global
accords such as the Uruguay Round; and tough bilateral negotiations such
as the U.S.-Japan auto agreements, barriers are coming down and our
exports are going up, creating more than 1 million good, high-paying
jobs in just the last three years alone.
You can see the results of our strategy in the progress we have made in
Japan. There is more hard work ahead, but in the last three years, our
two nations have signed 21 separate trade agreements, covering
everything from medical supplies to computers. Our exports in those
sectors are up about 85%, meaning more jobs and better pay for American
workers, and lower prices and greater choice for Japanese consumers.
We also created America's first National Export Strategy, helping our
firms walk through the doors we opened with trade agreements. With our
support, American firms have won more than $57 billion in foreign
business contracts since November 1993.
To sustain this performance and strengthen prosperity into the 21st
century, our nation must enforce existing trade agreements, including
the more than 180 agreements concluded by the Clinton Administration. We
must transform our vision for free trade in the Americas into concrete
results, including by expanding NAFTA to Chile. We must build on our
blueprint for free trade in the Asia-Pacific region, the fastest-growing
market in the world.
Conclusion
Even as we lay the foundation for the new century--dealing with today's
crises and building tomorrow's framework for stability, security, and
prosperity--the tools we rely on are the same as ever: diplomacy where
we can, force where we must; working with others where we can and alone
when we have to; keeping our military strong while adapting our
alliances to new demands; maintaining constructive relations with the
world's great powers--those nations that have the greatest ability to
help or hinder us in our efforts. We must have the resources needed to
conduct effective diplomacy, use our aid programs to head off future
crises, and support our military.
Just as we rely on time-proven tools, so we are fulfilling a timeless
mission. In many regions, the roots of the democratic society--
pluralism, tolerance, and liberty--are not yet firm. Now, as before, our
special role in the world is to safeguard and strengthen the community
of democracies and open markets.
Enlargement of democracy is central to all of the challenges I have
mentioned today. A democratic Europe is more likely to remain at peace
and to be a strong partner in diplomacy, security, and trade. Democratic
nations are less likely to go to war against one another and more likely
to join us in promoting arms control, fighting proliferation, and
combating the forces of destruction. Democracy undergirds the open
markets that promote prosperity because the rule of law helps guarantee
that contracts are respected, just as the searchlight of free media
helps expose corruption.
Over the next four years, we have a chance to pave the way to a bright
new century in which central Europe, where two world wars began, becomes
an anchor of stability in an undivided, democratic Europe; in which we
work with our allies and friends in the Asia-Pacific region to sustain
our security and build a future of growing prosperity; in which the dark
cloud of nuclear destruction gives way to the sunshine of peace; in
which open societies flourish, linked and invigorated by open markets;
in which our children and children everywhere can therefore make the
most of their talents to pursue their dreams.
That is America's challenge on the eve of the millennium. America can--
and must--meet it. I think we will.
(###)
ARTICLE 3:
The New Transatlantic Agenda: Setting the Course for U.S Cooperation
With Europe
Joan E. Spero, Under Secretary for Economic, Business, and Agricultural
Affairs
Address to the American Council on Germany, New York City, May 13, 1996
As a former board member and--long ago--a participant in the Young
Leaders Program, it is a special pleasure to be with you here today. I
value opportunities to discuss foreign affairs issues with groups such
as the American Council on Germany to describe our policy objectives and
to hear your views.
President Clinton's foreign policy has a powerfully simple objective: to
enhance the security and prosperity of the American people. We live in a
world without a clear common enemy; a world with pressing global
problems such as terrorism, health, and the environment; a world where
national borders are increasingly blurred by economic interdependence.
Our foreign policy challenge today is thus to adapt this enduring
objective to the post-Cold War world.
In this new world, U.S. foreign economic policy plays a central role.
The Clinton Administration recognizes that our strengths at home and
abroad are inseparable and that our ability to create jobs and growth
here depends on our ability to open markets and support American exports
and investment overseas. But our foreign economic policy is also an
integral part of our broader foreign policy vision--one which integrates
our national security concerns with our evolving diplomatic and economic
interests.
We employ economic diplomacy to support the traditional foreign policy
goals of peace and security. In Bosnia, for example, reconstruction and
the creation of market institutions go hand-in-hand with the military,
security, and political aspects of the Dayton Agreement. Ron Brown and a
bold group of American business people were doing just this work when we
lost them so tragically on a mountainside in Croatia.
Building an Economic Architecture For the Post-Cold War World
One of the major goals of our foreign economic policy is to build and
modernize what we call the economic architecture for the post-Cold War
world. We are working at all levels--global, regional, and bilateral--
and in many for a to strengthen international economic institutions.
At the global level, we have worked to launch the World Trade
Organization and to modernize the International Monetary Fund and the
World Bank. We are also building new economic relationships through
regional efforts in the Americas, in Asia, and in Europe. Thus, economic
tools are increasingly important mechanisms not only for advancing our
economic interests but also for projecting American leadership and
influence. This approach is not unlike the policies pursued by Jack
McCloy and his colleagues when they built the IMF, World Bank, and the
UN after World War II.
Around the world, we have joined efforts with our partners to create new
institutions, new structures, and new processes to advance our mutual
economic and security interests.
We have brought together the economies of the Pacific Rim in the Asia-
Pacific Economic Cooperation forum--APEC--and have advanced that
region's commitment to achieving free trade by the years 2010 and 2020.
In the Middle East, we have used economics to support our diplomatic
efforts to bring peace. Last November, at the Middle East/North Africa
Economic Summit in Amman, the parties created new regional institutions
designed to foster public-private partnerships to improve the climate
for peace and to improve the climate for doing business. Among these was
an innovative Middle East Development Bank.
In our own hemisphere, we brought together the 34 democracies for the
Summit of the Americas in December 1994 to consolidate political and
economic reform, open markets, and spread the benefits of prosperity to
the poorest. We are now working with our hemispheric partners on the
nuts and bolts of implementing a Free Trade Area of the Americas by the
year 2005.
In Europe, we are working with our partners to renew and revitalize our
strong ties. Tonight, I would like to tell you how we are pursuing our
security, political, and economic interests in Europe through the New
Transatlantic Agenda--NTA--launched by President Clinton and the
European Union leadership last December.
The New Transatlantic Agenda
Along with NATO, the NTA is a centerpiece of our foreign policy in
Europe. It is designed to broaden, deepen, and modernize the U.S.-
European relationship. The New Transatlantic Agenda affirms that our
ties with Europe are as important today as they have been for the past
50 years. It lays out a road map for future years of the steps we must
take to promote our global partnership and the free flow of goods and
services in the transatlantic marketplace.
The NTA responds to the perception that both the U.S. and Europe were
turning inward and drifting apart. Despite the strong and enduring ties
between the United States and Europe, Europeans worried that the U.S.
was turning its attention to the dynamic emerging regions of Asia and
Latin America. We in turn noted that Europe was focused on the
development of the European Union-- appropriately, I might add--and on
its relationships to the east. Moreover, strains over Bosnia prior to
the Dayton Agreement fueled concerns that NATO was losing its relevance.
We needed to renew and reshape our partnership with Europe to make it
more responsive to the challenges and opportunities of the next century.
This concern was reflected in calls by prominent European leaders,
including British Foreign Secretary Malcolm Rifkind and German Foreign
Minister Klaus Kinkel, for a Transatlantic Free Trade Area between the
U.S. and the European Union.
The concept of the New Transatlantic Agenda was proposed in a speech
given by Secretary Christopher just one year ago in Madrid. He expressed
U.S. concern about the perceived drift in our relationship with Europe
and laid out a broad vision for reaffirming the transatlantic
relationship. Secretary Christopher envisioned a comprehensive
"transatlantic agenda for the 21st century" that would deepen our
political and economic partnership with the EU while promoting peace and
security around the world. The Secretary's call was taken up and
formally launched by Presidents Clinton and Santer and Prime Minister
Gonzalez at their summit in Madrid last December. A senior-level group
of officials was charged with implementing the agenda. My colleague,
Peter Tarnoff, and I are the U.S. representatives. We and our European
counter- parts entered this process with three goals in mind:
First, we wanted an agenda that was action-oriented. A previous effort,
the 1990 Transatlantic Declaration of the U.S. and the EU leadership,
had articulated the broad values and objectives that informed our
relationship. It also created a mechanism for greater consultation. But
quite frankly, there was a sense that the declaration was all process
and too little substance. So we wanted the NTA to have a concrete plan
of action. We needed to produce results that would be understood by our
publics as well as by our bureaucrats. That is why we linked the NTA to
the semi-annual summits with the European Union. The leaders identify
priorities for joint action and the senior-level group prods our
respective bureaucracies into producing them.
Second, we wanted an agenda that was broad-based--that would encompass
the broad range of our common political, economic, trade, business,
social, educational, and other interests. This is one of the reasons we
resisted equating a free trade arrangement with the NTA. We were looking
for a more comprehensive framework. A second reason, however, is that a
free trade area between the U.S. and the EU is simply not feasible at
this time. Under WTO rules, a free trade agreement must cover
substantially all trade. On that score, we and the EU would have trouble
getting from A to B--from agriculture and audiovisual to bananas. And we
were concerned that the effort would divide, not unite us. Furthermore,
while some barriers obviously remain, it is worth remembering that the
U.S. and the EU had come together as partners in the Uruguay Round to
conclude the most far-reaching liberalization of world trade in history.
But equally important in developing a broad agenda was our desire to
harness the dynamism and strength of our economies and peoples to the
task of supporting our political, diplomatic, and security goals in
Europe and the world. If the U.S. and Europe were to meet the challenges
of the new age, we needed to find ways of working better together in the
many areas where our cooperation is essential to progress.
Third, we wanted practical business involvement. From the beginning, we
asked business and industry to tell us what steps we and our European
partners could take to help them. That is why we created the
Transatlantic Business Dialogue, or TABD, which brings together CEOs
from more than 200 American and European companies to advise our
officials. The TABD recommendations are, for the most part, being
incorporated in the agenda.
NTA Goals and Accomplishments
The NTA, then, is an ambitious work, but it is a work in progress. Let
me tell you about our accomplishments thus far and describe the four
broad areas for cooperative action we agreed to pursue together.
Promoting peace, stability, democracy, and development: First is our
common goal of promoting peace, stability, democracy, and development.
We are doing this by working together to make the peace work in Bosnia,
by supporting emerging democracies and civil society in central and
eastern Europe, and in Russia and the New Independent States. Our
cooperation includes our joint support for the peace process in the
Middle East and our common stand against proliferation on the Korean
Peninsula.
Bosnia has been a key test of the NTA. At the U.S.-EU Summit in December
last year, we reiterated our joint commitment to implement the Dayton
Peace Agreement. We have a long way to go, but today the people of
Bosnia are not at war and are searching for reconciliation and working
toward reconstruction. The road from war to peace in Bosnia is the most
dramatic evidence that the transatlantic partnership remains essential.
One clear example of this partnership is the April Bosnia conference
which the EU coordinated and which raised $1.2 billion for
reconstruction.
The U.S. and the EU also are working together in Albania to support the
May 26 elections and are examining ways to strengthen civil society in
Poland through our respective assistance programs. We are working to
coordinate on the ground with our European partners to structure our
assistance so as to enhance economic and political reform in Romania,
Bulgaria, and Lithuania.
In a time of scarce and declining resources, it is especially important
that we do everything possible to maximize the effectiveness of our aid
policies around the world. Under the NTA, we are taking steps to
coordinate our emergency and humanitarian aid. For example, we have
agreed to consolidate U.S.-EU efforts on immunization programs in West
Africa and will soon identify two African countries for similar
coordinated approaches for investment in health sector programs.
Responding to new global challenges: A second objective of the NTA is
to strengthen our partnership in responding to new global challenges:
international crime and narcotics trafficking, refugee flows,
environmental degradation, and the spread of new diseases, such as AIDS,
that respect no borders.
One of our toughest problems is law enforcement. The inclusion of this
area under the NTA, however, has helped raise its political profile and
is, in fact, yielding results. We are close to an agreement with the EU
to control the flow of what are called "precursor chemicals" for illicit
drug production. This will be an important achievement in the global
fight against narcotics trafficking and is typical of the practical
emphasis of the NTA. We are also hopeful that the EU will participate in
the International Law Enforcement Academy in Budapest, a unique
institution which is building the institutions of civil society by
training police officials from central and eastern Europe.
American and European leadership are key to international efforts to
safeguard our environment. The legacy of environmental degradation in
the New Independent States endangers human health and hampers
sustainable economic development. The U.S. and the EU have agreed to
begin work to establish a national environmental center in Ukraine and
are developing plans to set up national centers in Russia, Moldova, and
other countries in the region.
The outbreaks of highly infectious and deadly diseases such as Ebola, as
well as the continuing worldwide scourge of AIDS, have highlighted the
value of prevention and rapid response. Here is an area where an
initiative under the NTA literally will have an impact on the lives of
people around the world. We are taking steps to build an early warning
and response network for infectious diseases, linking U.S. agencies such
as the Centers for Disease Control to a European health information
network. Also, we will work together with the World Health Organization
and other multinational organizations to make it a truly global network.
Expanding trade and strengthening economic relations: A third major NTA
goal is to cooperate in strengthening the multilateral trading system
and in eliminating barriers to trade so as to build a transatlantic
marketplace. Our commitment is to reduce or eliminate tariff and non-
tariff barriers to the flow of goods, services, and capital. Our
approach is what we call "building blocks." We are tackling those
barriers that are the most significant impediments to trade, such as
conflicting standards, duplicative testing and certification procedures,
and other regulatory inconsistencies that are so burdensome to trade. It
is no coincidence that this is where business is telling us to
concentrate our efforts.
We have begun work on an Information Technology Agreement to facilitate
trade in this crucial sector by eliminating tariffs. We are also working
to allow mutual recognition by U.S. and EU authorities of each others'
product testing, certification, and inspection systems in key areas such
as telecommunications equipment and pharmaceuticals. Mutual recognition
involves difficult issues because it addresses our very different
regulatory and legal traditions. For this reason, progress in these
areas is mixed, but there is a commitment on both sides to succeed.
Another example of the close involvement of business in the NTA is a
joint effort between government and business experts to address
differences in the way that the U.S. and the EU regulate auto safety and
emissions.
Finally, in order to eliminate barriers, you have to first identify
them. It is true that, with some exceptions, trade between the U.S. and
the EU is remarkably free. However, under the NTA, we have begun a joint
study to identify those barriers which remain and to examine ways to
address them.
Strengthening common bonds: A final objective of the NTA is to deepen
and expand the transatlantic community by strengthening the bonds
between our peoples. Both sides recognize that the old habits of
cooperation need revitalization. We need to demonstrate how closer
collaboration across the Atlantic can help in dealing more effectively
with common domestic challenges such as unemployment, the aging society,
education, and health care.
Labor Secretary Reich and his counterpart, Commissioner Flynn, have just
launched a U.S.-EU working group on labor and employment issues. The
group will develop creative approaches to the use of unemployment
compensation and seek ways to promote labor market flexibility.
Last December, we signed an Agreement on Higher Education and Vocational
Training. We have selected eight projects to promote faculty and student
exchanges in non-traditional areas such as environmental science,
physics, and engineering.
Science is a final area of concentration under this objective. We are
aiming to complete a comprehensive science and technology agreement
during 1997, and we are looking at possible collaborative projects
between our Department of Transportation and its EU counterpart on
developing intelligent highway systems.
Conclusion
So we are very busy. But we have just begun on our road to deepening,
broadening, and modernizing the transatlantic relationship. In each of
the four areas--promoting peace, stability, democracy, and development;
responding to global challenges; expanding world trade and closer
economic relations; and building ties among our peoples--we have already
seen practical, if not earth-shaking results.
Most of what we are doing under the NTA will not show up on the front
page of the New York Times. But I believe we have launched what could
become a new and even more vital era of U.S.-European relations, one
adapted to the new post-Cold War world. And it is especially fitting
that I come to the American Council on Germany to outline our progress.
The NTA is rooted in the ideas that informed the life and work of Jack
McCloy and of this organization--that the U.S. and Europe are bound by
strong and enduring historical and cultural ties and that we must act
together in Europe and around the globe to promote peace, stability, and
prosperity for all people.
I would like to think that, in a modest way, we are following in Jack
McCloy's footsteps. Whether as High Commissioner for Germany, president
of the World Bank, or founder and godfather of the American Council on
Germany, he understood that practical, on-the-ground work built the
fundamental bridges between the U.S. and Europe.
Whether tackling old problems such as in the Balkans or the Middle East,
or pursuing new challenges such as the environment and crime, we are
following his example, strengthening the bonds among all our peoples. It
is an effort that would make him proud. Thank you.
(###)
ARTICLE 4
American Objective In the Middle East
Robert H. Pelletreau, Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern Affairs
Address at the CENTCOM annual Southwest Asia Symposium, Tampa, Florida,
May 14, 1996
It is a particular pleasure to speak at CENTCOM's annual Southwest Asia
Symposium. Today, I would like to present an overview of U.S. policies
toward the Middle East, taking into account recent developments.
Some in the region diagnose Saddam Hussein's Takriti regime as "dead and
still flying," and it is true that the Iraqi armed forces are less
imposing today than they were in 1990. But we who bear the
responsibility for ensuring security and stability in the Gulf cannot
afford to be complacent. Saddam has shown on too many occasions his
ruthless unpredictability.
I have taken a special interest in the Central Command and its
predecessor, the Rapid Deployment Force, since their creation after the
traumatic events of 1979: The fall of the Shah and taking of American
hostages in Iran, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and President
Carter's declaration of the Gulf as an area of vital U.S. interest.
Returning from Bahrain to my first tour in OSD, I participated in our
early access negotiations with Oman, Egypt, Somalia, and Kenya. We have
come a long way since those early days. Your superb performance in
Desert Storm and closely coordinated political-military action since
have consistently strengthened our security framework in the Gulf. We
are better able to meet the challenge today than at any time in the
past. But we are still well below the comfort level.
Enduring U.S. Interests
Close political-military coordination is uniquely important in the
Middle East, where security issues have a high profile. There are few if
any areas of the world that combine such strategic importance to the
United States with such chronic instability. While remarkable progress
has been made toward achieving Arab-Israeli peace, serious obstacles
remain to be overcome. We must contend with proliferation threats;
border disputes; the problems of domestic instability and economic
underdevelopment; human rights problems; to say nothing of the
challenges of dealing with terrorism, extremism, and fanaticism.
Instability in the Middle East carries profound dangers. It can threaten
the security of close friends and partners such as Israel and Egypt and
the GCC states. It can threaten our NATO partners in Europe. It can
threaten our ability to protect vital oil supplies from the Gulf. It can
bring new outbreaks of terrorism to our shores. And it can fuel a race
to acquire weapons of mass destruction.
With so many of our interests at stake, the United States cannot remain
indifferent to this turbulent sector of the globe. Tempting as it is, we
do not have the option of picking up our marbles and going home. We have
a major interest not just in preventing the outbreak of conflict and
promoting the peaceful resolution of disputes but also in changing the
conduct and limiting the means of potential war-makers and in isolating
extremists who foment destabilization and conflict. This can be achieved
only through active and sustained political engagement backed by
American military power and through support from our friends and allies.
Securing a just, lasting, and comprehensive peace between Israel and its
neighbors remains a cornerstone of our overall foreign policy. A
successful peace process will enhance regional stability, remove a
rallying point for fanaticism, and enhance prospects for political and
economic development. The United States is engaged on several fronts to
advance peace negotiations--an engagement which in turn helps achieve
our other objectives in the Middle East. These include preserving
Israel's security and well- being, maintaining security arrangements to
preserve stability in the Persian Gulf and commercial access to its
resources, combating terrorism and weapons proliferation, assisting U.S.
business, and promoting political and economic reform.
Let me focus particularly on our two biggest areas of initiative: the
peace process and Gulf security.
The Peace Process
Today, more than at any time in recent history, Israel and the Arabs
have a historic opportunity to resolve one of the most complicated and
intractable conflicts of the 20th century. Over the past 2 1/2 years,
the United States has lent its full support to Israel and Arab partners
for peace as they take courageous measures to chart a new course for the
Middle East.
Our support has been essential--because the forces of extremism and
terror in the Middle East have worked hard to discredit the peacemakers
and undermine their achievements. Particularly in the past few months,
the peace process has been subject to very serious challenges--first the
suicide bombings in Israel, then the confrontation in southern Lebanon
and northern Israel.
Improving the 1993 Understandings: In both cases, the United States took
the initiative to overcome the immediate crisis and refocus attention on
peace negotiations. In the case of south Lebanon, Secretary Christopher
spent more than a week in the Middle East in April, shuttling seven
times between Damascus and Jerusalem to broker a cease-fire. At one
point, we had to trade in our Air Force 707 for a C-141 owing to crew
rest requirements. At another, we had to enter Lebanon via land convoy
across the Bekaa Valley when the air bridge was judged too dangerous.
Secretary Christopher's work in bringing the parties to closure was one
of the finest diplomatic performances I have witnessed. The set of
understandings he negotiated improves in several ways upon the U.S.-
brokered understandings of 1993. First, the under- standings are now
written to ensure the clarity and consistency of commitments undertaken.
Second, the under- standings call for a five-party monitoring group,
which is now taking shape and will review complaints about
implementation of the understandings.
These understandings will help protect civilians on both sides but are
not meant to substitute for lasting peace agreements. However, the
parties did renew their pledge in these understandings to continue that
broader search for peace. We believe that our successful efforts to
control the fragile situation in south Lebanon and limit the potential
for escalation have established a basis for resumption of Syrian-Israeli
negotiations after a new Israeli government is formed.
Permanent-Status Talks: Two weeks ago, Prime Minister Peres and
Chairman Arafat were in Washington for separate meetings with President
Clinton and Administration officials. In their discussions at the White
House and with Secretary Christopher, both parties reaffirmed their
determination to start the permanent-status negotiations on time
according to the calendar set forth in the 1993 Declaration of
Principles.
Despite high decibel levels at the UN and in the regional press, they
did just that, as in similar fashion the Palestinians did not allow the
fighting in south Lebanon to divert them from convening the Palestine
National Council in Gaza and taking action to revoke the old charter
provisions calling for Israel's destruction. The initial round began in
Taba, Egypt, on May 5. We did not participate in this opening session,
but we were in close touch with both sides. We will undoubtedly play a
facilitative role as those talks unfold over the months and, most
likely, several years ahead.
Meanwhile, we will continue to look for other ways to support the
peacemakers as they take risks for peace. During Prime Minister Peres'
visit to the United States, we signed a counter-terrorism agreement and
an agreement to expand cooperation on theater missile defense. We also
continue to play a leading role in the international effort to help the
Palestinians build a more peaceful and prosperous future.
Jordan's Bold Move: Promoting comprehensive peace requires the United
States to stand beside Arab states as well as Israel as they take risks
for peace. President Clinton committed the United States to support
Jordan when King Hussein defied the predictions of many observers and
took bold steps toward peace without waiting for others in the region.
We worked quietly with Israel and Jordan for more than a year leading up
to the signing of their peace treaty in 1994 to identify potential areas
of economic cooperation, many of which are now being pursued. With the
support of Congress, we have relieved Jordan of its bilateral debt to
the U.S. and undertaken to help Jordan meet its legitimate defense
requirements through the provision of a squadron of F-16s.
Already we see evidence of the goodwill and cooperation engendered by
Jordan's decision for peace. Jordan and Israel are moving toward a warm
peace on many levels. Israeli and Jordanian military officers have
hosted one another. They have flown a joint humanitarian aid mission to
Bosnia and have worked together to defuse landmines along their common
border. For our part, we applaud King Hussein's clear moves away from
the dictatorial regime in Baghdad and to rebuild Jordan's traditional
relations with the GCC, Jordan's vigorous enforcement of UN sanctions,
and its decision to host the temporary deployment of the Airpower
Expeditionary Force. This force is providing additional land-based air
forces to augment regional deterrence while affording Jordan and the
U.S. Air Force increased joint training.
Egypt's Stabilizing Role: U.S. strategic cooperation with Jordan is
strengthening regional stability and expanding on the solid foundation
of the Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty and close U.S.-Egyptian military
ties, which have held firm for more than 17 years. Egypt plays an
important stabilizing role in the region, supporting our peace process
objectives and providing essential support for the U.S. military
presence. A decade of U.S.-backed military modernization, coupled with
strong Egyptian leadership, has helped build a modern force in Egypt
capable of working effectively with U.S. forces in coalition warfare.
Egypt galvanized the Arab coalition during the Gulf war and constituted
the second-largest foreign force to our own in the campaign to liberate
Kuwait. When Iraq threatened Kuwait again in October 1994, Egypt's
expeditious approval for deployment of a carrier battle group through
the Suez Canal sent a critical signal to the Baghdad regime.
We continue to rely on Egypt for quick transit of military assets to and
from the Gulf region. The U.S. routinely conducts 500 military
overflights each month. Our military assistance also facilitates Egypt's
contributions to international peacekeeping operations. At last count,
Egypt was involved in five different peacekeeping operations. The
foreign minister of a Gulf country said to me recently, "You must
continue to assist Egypt. For us, Egypt is the High Dam."
The Multilateral Track: The multilateral track of the peace process
plays an indispensable role in the overall structure of negotiations:
reinforcing progress on other tracks, buffering shocks and periods of
impasse, and laying the foundations for longer term regional cooperation
and development. Last week, for example, even as the level of tension in
the region remained high over clashes along the Israel-Lebanon border,
Israeli, Arab, U.S., and other outside experts held a productive meeting
in Amman on plans for regional economic development. The Multilateral
Working Groups bring together representatives from Israel and 13 Arab
countries and more than 30 parties from outside the region to address
broad issues facing the region as a whole, such as water, the
environment, refugees, and arms control and security. Fred Axelgard, our
point man for the ACRS working group, will speak tomorrow on the
important efforts to develop regional confidence- building measures and
other initiatives.
We see the economic underpinnings of peace agreements as vital to their
success. In addition to our bilateral efforts, we have put a lot of
energy into the economic summit process, which will convene for the
third time this coming fall in Cairo. The two previous regional economic
summits in Casablanca and Amman were instrumental in galvanizing
regional economic cooperation and showcasing new commercial
opportunities opened up by the peace process. They have stimulated a new
level of intra-regional economic activity and contact, as well as a
progressive dismantling of the barriers to trade on the Arab-Israeli
level, the Arab-Arab level, and also the global level.
Gulf Security
Let me turn to our policy toward the Gulf region. A key national
security concern is to protect our friends and vital interests in the
Gulf against the twin dangers of hegemony and regional conflict. The
chief threats today come from Iraq and Iran. Powerful in regional terms,
the dictatorship in Iraq and the theocracy in Iran openly declare their
enmity toward the United States, blatantly disregard international norms
of behavior, and pose a direct threat to their neighbors. The U.S.
commitment to protect the Gulf from domination by a hostile power is not
new. A series of presidents from both parties have expressed this
commitment in private discussions with leaders of the area and in public
declarations.
he Administration has led two tough-minded international efforts to
contain the threats posed by Iraq and Iran and to compel changes in
their conduct. While we can claim considerable success in limiting and
countering the military capabilities of these rogue regimes, their
ambitions to acquire weapons of mass destruction and to dominate the
Gulf continue, as does their support for terrorism as an instrument of
policy.
Iraq: .Five years after the Gulf war, Iraq remains a threat to
international peace and stability. Iraq's invasion was a noxious act of
20th-century piracy: the unprovoked occupation of a small, peaceful
neighbor and a fellow member of the Arab League and United Nations. Had
the U.S. not organized and led the international coalition to roll back
this aggression, Saddam Hussein might well have gotten away with his
gamble and become a regional superpower with dark and far-reaching
consequences for us all. Thousands of American soldiers were involved in
halting and reversing this aggression.
Twice since then, we have been obliged to conduct rapid deployment
exercises to strengthen our deterrent in the region. When Iraq moved
military forces to its border with Kuwait in October 1994 in an effort
to intimidate the UN Security Council, the swift and decisive response
by U.S. forces in Operation Vigilant Warrior convinced Iraq to pull
back. Last August, there were once again ominous signs of an Iraqi
military threat following the defection of Saddam's brother-in-law,
Hussein Kamel. And, once again, following coordinated visits to regional
capitals by General Peay and my delegation, we increased our military
capabilities and staved off the threat.
Throughout this period, the efforts of the Multinational Interception
Force have been critical to enforcing the sanctions. In the past 18
months, CENTCOM naval forces of the U.S. Fifth Fleet have interdicted
and diverted to Gulf ports almost 70 tankers and cargo vessels
attempting to skirt the sanctions. Regional states have joined in
accepting these vessels into their ports and disposing of the sanctions-
violating cargos.
Our policy on Iraq remains firm: Iraq must fulfill all obligations
established under UN Security Council resolutions passed after the
invasion. No relaxation of the sanctions will be possible until Iraq
complies fully. There is solid, allied support for this position: The
Security Council last week unanimously agreed for the 31st time to
maintain sanctions without modification. As the most recent report
submitted by UNSCOM Chairman Ekeus lays out, Iraq continues to hide
evidence of past weapons programs and is continuing clandestine efforts
to develop missiles and other frightening weapons. It has not yet
returned stolen Kuwaiti military equipment or complied with one of the
most universally accepted rules of warfare--a good faith effort to
account for prisoners and MIAs when the fighting is over.
We are also disturbed by Saddam's callous indifference to the welfare of
his own people. Over a year ago, the Security Council unanimously
approved Resolution 986, crafted by the U.S. with Omani help, to permit
limited and controlled sale of Iraqi oil for the purchase of
humanitarian goods. Ongoing discussions at the UN suggest that the
Iraqis are ambivalent. Are they genuinely interested in taking this
opportunity to alleviate the suffering of their people or are they
viewing the 986 negotiations as a way to achieve some gain for the
regime? We have made clear that Resolution 986 must be implemented as
written, without amendment, and we are working with the UN to make sure
that any agreement on the details of implementation clearly reflects
this stance. If Iraq is playing straight, reaching agreement on the text
as it has been tightened should not be difficult. And we will be pleased
to see the people's hardship relieved and the compensation and UNSCOM
funds replenished within the framework of the resolutions and the
sanctions which will continue to remain fully in effect.
Iran represents a different--and in some ways more complex-- challenge.
There are no UN sanctions on Iran, and there are significant differences
between the United States and its allies over how to deal with Iran. We
have deep objections to several of Iran's policies, including its
support for terrorism, pursuit of weapons of mass destruction, support
for Hamas and other violent groups seeking to derail the peace process,
subversion of other governments, and a human rights record which is
deservedly condemned by the international community. None of these
policies is required by Islamic teachings. President Clinton's decision
one year ago to impose a trade and investment embargo against Iran
affirmed both the depth of U.S. feeling about Iran's conduct and our
willingness to assume leadership of a stronger international effort to
confront the Iranian challenge.
We have called on all major industrial states to join the United States
in denying Iran sophisticated armaments, nuclear technology, and
preferential economic treatment. Although European governments have not
as yet seen fit to join us in a full embargo of Iran, no government or
international financial institution is providing Iran with any official
aid. Our allies have substantially reduced the pace and scope of new
loans and investment guarantees. Most major oil companies have concluded
that investing in Iran is not worth the cost in terms of U.S. pressure
and potential retaliation.
Our diplomacy has consolidated a consensus among Russia and 29 other
governments participating in the Wassenaar Arrangement to deny Iran and
other pariah states arms and sensitive dual-use items that can have
military purposes. Our high-level dialogue with Russia and China has
limited their nuclear cooperation with Iran, especially the sort of
assistance that would be most helpful in the development of nuclear
weapons, and we hope through persistence and improved intelligence to
convince them to end all forms of nuclear cooperation with Iran.
On balance, however, our efforts to impose a severe economic cost on
Iran for pursuing objectionable policies have, so far, elicited a
disappointing and lukewarm response from our allies, despite our urging
and ongoing discussions with them. Some of our closest allies, in the
hope of commercial reward, have been tolerant of Iran's outlaw behavior.
We are, therefore, working with Congress to devise more thorough-going
and effective measures to step up international pressure on Iran. We are
not insisting that our allies give up their policy of "critical
dialogue," but we believe dialogue without associated economic pressure
and real costs to Tehran will continue to be ineffective.
At the same time, we see no viable opposition movement in Iran. We
therefore remain willing to enter an authorized and above-board dialogue
with Iran's leadership, and we will welcome better relations with Iran
once it abandons its unacceptable policies and begins to act as a
peaceful, not aggressive, neighbor in the region and as a responsible
member of the international community.
GCC Security: U.S. efforts to enhance the military strength of the six
states of the GCC are an important complement to our political efforts
to contain the threat from Iran and Iraq. Under CENTCOM's determined
leadership, the United States has made steady progress in improving
security cooperation with these states since Desert Storm. We have a
three-tier approach. First, we help each Gulf state strengthen its
individual defense forces through our defense sales and training
programs. Second, we encourage regional defense cooperation among the
Gulf states through the GCC's collective security arrangements. The
GCC'srecent exercises in Kuwait and in the seas off Oman mark an
important step forward, although there is quite along way to go in this
area. The recent resolution of the Saudi-Qatari border dispute should
improve the atmosphere.
A lot of hard diplomatic and military work has gone into the third tier-
- our bilateral security cooperation with individual states. We have
made dramatic strides since 1991, increasing U.S. forward presence in
the region in a careful, non-permanent way; pre-positioning equipment in
Kuwait and Qatar; and carrying out an expanded program of land, sea, and
air training exercises with the GCC states. This cooperation has been
critical to defusing crises, as in October 1994, and in maintaining
stability. We are steadily increasing our regional consultation and
intelligence exchanges and working in a cooperative spirit to resolve
the inevitable problems and frictions that arise.
I believe there is a general understanding that the U.S. cannot and does
not aim to impose a "pax Americana" on the Gulf. Our own anti-
imperialist tradition prevents it, as does the strong anti-colonial
sentiment of the area's citizens. We may be the dominant outside power,
but we must operate within a unique--and complicated--political
framework. While our friendship and strength are welcome, area
governments resist permanent bases, iron-clad treaty arrangements, and
grand blueprints for NATO-like structures. The frustrating costs in
efficiency and capability of this still-too- ad-hoc security structure
mean that we and Gulf governments must continue the process of
consultation and adjustment in order to construct and maintain a
credible deterrent against evolving threats.
A Regional Concern: Internal Reform
Most of the foreign policy issues I have outlined have their roots in
the domestic conditions in the states of the region. Although
circumstances vary from country to country, populations are troubled by
a lack of political and economic opportunities along with intimations of
corruption and injustice. This situation fuels extremism, whether of a
secular or Islamist variety, which works against U.S. interests as well
as the broader interests of the Middle East states.
While the ability of an outside power to affect domestic circumstances
is limited, the measures we take to preserve security and order must be
complemented by an awareness of internal conditions which fuel
extremism. When we operate on the territories of friendly governments,
we must do so with sensitivity to their culture and its norms of
behavior. The same is true when we ask for favors or burden- sharing.
Our requests must fall within the circle of agreed common interest and
be pursued through consultation, not diktat. At the same time, we should
not hide our own values. We support free-market economic reforms in the
region and are encouraged by progress in countries such as Morocco,
Tunisia, and Israel. Egypt and Algeria have launched important market-
oriented initiatives. We also encourage movement toward more
participatory government and respect for human rights and the rule of
law. We encourage practical measures to foster greater political freedom
and openness. We do this not because we are trying to impose Western
models of society and government on the Middle East, but because
experience has taught us that governments must be seen as responding to
the aspirations of their people and acting for the benefit of their
people in order to ensure long-term allegiance and stability.
Conclusion
As you know, because you are a part of it, the United States has a large
agenda and faces daunting challenges in the Middle East. With the end of
the Cold War and the superpower rivalry, the United States has a unique
capacity to influence events and promote our interests. We are right to
be turning our energies increasingly to supporting steps toward more
peaceful and cooperative relations in the region.
At the same time, security remains the foundation of all progress. It
requires vigilance and sound preparation to meet contingencies, foreseen
and unforeseen. Iran and Iraq continue to defy international norms and
must be met with more than ringing rhetoric. Their behavior serves as a
reminder that the forces of extremism and fanaticism continue to agitate
the wider Middle East, especially now that we are making progress toward
resolving the larger Arab-Israeli struggle.
The United States' ability to meet these challenges depends in large
measure on how well our warriors and diplomats work together. When we
cooperate, we are a powerful force for stability and peace. If we do
not, we are all the losers. Cooperating together, we can ensure that
America will continue to wear the mantle of leadership, not just in
combating enemies, but in building a world that reflects our ideals and
promotes our interests.
(###)
ARTICLE 5
U.S. Policy Toward Burma
Kent Wiedemann, Deputy Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific
Affairs
Statement to the Senate Banking Committee, Washington, DC, May 22, 1996
Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity to appear before the Banking
Committee on behalf of the Department of State. I am pleased to review
with you today our common concerns about the situation in Burma and to
describe U.S. policy toward the country.
Conditions in Burma: Political Stalemate and Continuing Human Rights
Violations
To begin, I would like to briefly review the situation in Burma today.
Burma is in a sad state. There has been no improvement in the political
and human rights situation, and we continue to have the same concerns
that were detailed in Assistant Secretary Lord's testimony last July and
in my testimony last September. The State Law and Order Restoration
Council-- SLORC--retains its iron grip on the country and rules by fear.
Moreover, events of the last few days suggest an ominous potential
escalation in the SLORC's oppression of the democratic opposition. Press
reports indicate that some 91 democracy activists have been detained in
Burma by the SLORC, including U Win Htein, personal secretary to Aung
San Suu Kyi and one of her closest advisers. The group includes members
of the National League for Democracy--NLD--who were elected to
parliament in 1990 but not allowed by the SLORC to take their seats, as
well as family members of several representatives. The representatives
had planned to attend a conference of elected parliamentarians at the
home of Aung San Suu Kyi from May 26-29. This meeting, which we
understand Aung San Suu Kyi still plans to hold, is to coincide with the
sixth anniversary of the 1990 elections.
The Administration condemns in the strongest terms efforts by the SLORC
to prevent the citizens of Burma from exercising their basic political
rights. Our embassy is reporting on the changing situation on the
ground. Within the past month, we have made strong statements to the
Burmese authorities in Rangoon and Washington raising our concerns.
Yesterday I protested to the Burmese ambassador regarding the reports of
the arrests and warned that a continued crackdown would lead to further
deterioration in our already seriously strained relations.
These disturbing actions come against a backdrop of the SLORC's menacing
actions against the democratic opposition. The SLORC has been unwilling
to begin a dialogue with Aung San Suu Kyi and leaders of the ethnic
minorities about the political future of the country. The regime
maintains a constant barrage of press attacks, some particularly
virulent and personal, against Aung San Suu Kyi and the NLD. Just
yesterday, in a speech reported in state-run newspapers, military
intelligence chief Khin Nyunt bluntly threatened Aung San Suu Kyi and
her supporters as "traitors" who are endangering the stability of the
state. Simultaneously, the SLORC has put forward as its "political
reform" alternative a national constitutional convention that will
provide the means to perpetuate authoritarian military rule.
In response to SLORC intransigence and unwillingness to engage in
dialogue, the NLD has escalated its challenge to the regime. In recent
public statements, the NLD called on the SLORC to immediately implement
the results of the 1990 elections and accused the junta of acting
lawlessly.
In response, the SLORC lashed out at Aung San Suu Kyi in newspaper
articles and accused her of engaging in reckless and provocative
actions. The SLORC last month issued a pointed public warning against
any "misuse" of the Buddhist New Year festivities for political purposes
and then blocked off the road to Aung San Suu Kyi's house April 16,
which prevented some of her supporters from visiting her for the New
Year celebrations. More recently, NLD Chairman Aung Shwe wrote to the
SLORC chairman taking the SLORC to task for expelling the NLD from the
National Convention last November.
For their part, Aung San Suu Kyi and her associates remain confident in
the ultimate triumph of their democratic cause. But the SLORC believes
it is dealing from a position of strength, and it appears unlikely to
move toward political reconciliation, at least in the short-term. Thus,
the domestic political dynamic for dialogue is at a stalemate.
Throughout the country, egregious human rights violations continue. The
SLORC arrests and sentences political opponents for the slightest
infraction; in one case, an Aung San Suu Kyi supporter was sentenced to
five years for a minor traffic violation. Hundreds of political
prisoners remain jailed, including some 20 elected members of
parliament, who won their seats in the democratic elections of 1990. The
regime has imposed particularly long, harsh prison sentences on a number
of NLD activists and on Leo Nichols, an Anglo-Burman who served as
honorary consul for several Nordic countries and is one of Aung San Suu
Kyi's closest friends.
Burmese citizens are routinely rounded up and forced to carry military
equipment, weapons, and ammunition for the Burmese Army. In addition to
receiving inadequate food and water, these press-ganged porters often
have been forced to work, at great risk, in areas of armed conflict. The
SLORC also compels its citizens to carry out forced labor on roads,
railroads, and other infrastructure projects. Despite a reported
internal decree by the SLORC to suspend forced labor by the army, we
have not seen any diminution of this practice.
On the narcotics front, Burma remains the world's main source of heroin.
Some 60% of the heroin on America's streets comes from the poppy fields
of Burma. The SLORC has not made drug control a priority issue. The
Burmese Army reached an agreement with drug trafficker Khun Sa and his
Mong Tai army in January, bringing Burma's Shan State under a greater
measure of Rangoon control. Although there are signs that narcotics
production and trafficking in the Shan State have been temporarily
disrupted, this may be largely the result of adjusting to the new
situation. The regime also has announced it will not try Khun Sa for
decades of heroin trafficking activity.
U.S. Committed to Pressing for Progress on Democracy, Human Rights, and
Counternarcotics
We are not impartial observers of this dispute. We support the
aspirations of the NLD and the people of Burma, who desire what so many
others around the world now take for granted--the chance to freely
express their views and to be represented by leaders of their choosing.
We support a range of tough measures designed to bring pressure to bear
on the regime in Rangoon. Our goal is simple and straightforward: to
make it clear to the regime that Burma cannot fully rejoin the
international community and gain the assistance it needs until
fundamental changes are made. Since 1988, we have suspended our own
economic aid program and have urged other potential donors such as Japan
to limit strictly any development assistance to Burma.
We do not provide GSP trade preferences. We have decertified Burma as a
narcotics cooperating country, which requires us by law to vote against
assistance to Burma by the multilateral development banks. This and our
influence with other countries have in practice prevented most
assistance to Burma from the IMF, the World Bank, and the Asian
Development Bank. We do not promote U.S. commercial investment in or
trade with Burma. Neither Eximbank nor OPIC provides loans or insurance
for American companies selling to or investing in Burma.
On the international level, we have strongly supported efforts in the UN
General Assembly and the International Labor Organization to condemn
human and worker rights violations in Burma. At the UN Human Rights
Commission last month, we led the effort against attempts to water down
the Burma resolution. We have urged the UN to play an active role in
promoting democratic reform through a political dialogue with Aung San
Suu Kyi. We refrain from selling arms to Burma and have an informal
agreement with our G-7 friends and allies to do the same.
Our principled stand has had an impact. While our policy has not
resulted in a democratic government in Burma, our unrelenting pressure
since 1988 may have helped to bring about Aung San Suu Kyi's release,
has given heart to the democratic opposition, and continues to serve
notice to the junta that the international community is watching and
that it cannot act with impunity. Our continued vigilance also has
influenced some other countries from interacting as fully with Burma as
they otherwise might do. Moreover, we do not believe the kind of
"constructive engagement" the ASEAN countries are practicing will result
in meaningful change in Burma. Since 1988, Burma's ASEAN neighbors have
increased their trade and investment with Burma, yet there has been no
progress in human rights or democratization. If the U.S. let up its
pressure on Burma, the SLORC would be led to believe that no one in the
international community would take them to task for their continuing
oppression of the Burmese people.
For this reason, we intend to maintain the U.S. measures already in
place in Burma. In the absence of genuine political reforms and progress
in narcotics control in Burma, we do not believe it is appropriate to
resume development assistance, restore GSP benefits, or resume Eximbank
and OPIC programs. Of greatest impact, we also will continue to oppose
lending from the international financial institutions and seek, with
other friendly governments, to maintain our informal arms embargo. The
United States also will continue to raise directly with the SLORC our
strong concerns about democracy, human rights, and counter-narcotics. We
will likewise urge other governments to do the same.
Proposals for Further Sanctions
The Administration is committed to maintaining in place our current
tough measures. Concerning S-1511, the sanctions bill introduced by
Senator McConnell, we support the intent of the bill and share its
goals, including a prompt transition to democracy and the release of all
prisoners of conscience. We are proud of our efforts on these issues and
of our role as the foremost international proponent of human rights,
democracy, and narcotics control in Burma.
This legislation would require that we immediately impose a range of
additional sanctions on Burma, including visa restrictions and a
prohibition on investment. Additional sanctions are an option available
to us in response to ongoing and future developments in Burma. However,
instead of being locked into a set of legislatively prescribed mandatory
measures, we need to maintain our flexibility to respond to events in
Burma and to consult with Congress on appropriate responses to ongoing
and future developments. We thus oppose measures such as the mandatory
provisions of S-1511 that restrict rather than maintain or enhance the
Administration's freedom of action. At the same time, we would be
willing to explore legislative measures for discretionary sanctions that
would augment our options and maintain our freedom of action. We are
prepared to continue to consult with Members and their staff on this
issue. As I have indicated, we are deeply concerned about the recent
arrests of NLD members, have communicated that concern both publicly and
privately to the SLORC, and have warned them that there would be serious
consequences if the crackdown continues.
Two additional factors need to be taken into account in considering
sanctions: multilateral support and the limitations of unilateral
action. To be sure, the calibrated use of multilateral sanctions can be
an effective tool in an overall strategy using incentives and
disincentives. However, we have discussed multilateral sanctions with
interested countries, and there is little international support for such
sanctions--especially among Burma's key trading partners.
In reviewing the option of additional unilateral sanctions, we must
weigh the value of such a political statement against its economic
impact on the regime. In this respect, we note that unilateral sanctions
would have limited economic impact on the regime. Burma has forged
strong links to its regional neighbors. While these neighbors share some
of our concerns, they see dialogue and engagement on the world scene
through economic interaction as the best way to bring about changes in
the SLORC's behavior.
Conclusion
Mr. Chairman, there is no doubt that Congress and the Administration
share the same goals in Burma. We all want to see a dialogue of national
reconciliation that will help lead to a new democratic future for Burma.
We all want an end to human rights abuses and the installation of a
democratically elected government in Rangoon. Very importantly to the
United States, we all want an end to heroin production and trafficking.
Our hope is that Aung San Suu Kyi is justified in her dauntless optimism
that eventually democracy will come to Burma. Thoughtful, reasoned
measures by the U.S. Government can help make this hope a reality.
I look forward to continuing to work with the committee and other
Members of Congress on this and other issues. Thank you.
(###)
[END OF DISPATCH VOL 7, NO. 23]
To the top of this page
Index of Dispatch Magazine Archives 1996 Issues||
Index of Dispatch Magazine Archives||
Index of "Briefings and Statements"
Index of Electronic Research Collections
ERC Reference Desk ||
Alphabetic Index ||
Sitemap ||
ERC Homepage
Last modified: Jun. 8, 1999