U.S. Department of State 
Dispatch Volume 7, Number 22, May 27, 1996 
Bureau of Public Affairs 
 
ARTICLES IN THIS ISSUE: 
 
1.  U.S.-East Asia Strength and Prosperity  in the 21st Century--
President Clinton 
2.  American Interests and the U.S.-China Relationship--Secretary 
Christopher 
3.  Southeast Asia Regional Security Issues: Opportunities for Peace, 
Stability, and Prosperity--Winston Lord 
4.  Civilian Control of the Military in Democracies--Robert E. Hunter 
 
 
ARTICLE 1: 
 
U.S.-East Asia Strength and Prosperity In the 21st Century 
President Clinton 
Remarks to the Pacific Basin Economic Council, Washington, DC, May 20, 
1996 
 
Thank you very much. Mr. Tooker, Mr. Fenmore, Mr. Lee, members of the 
Administration, my fellow Americans, and our guests from all around the 
world: Welcome to Washington, and welcome to Constitution Hall. 
 
For nearly three decades the Pacific Basin Economic Council--PBEC--has 
stood on the cutting edge of trade and investment and opportunity. 
Today, with 19 member nations from Mexico to Malaysia, you are an 
integral part of this vibrant Asia-Pacific community. I am especially 
grateful for your active support of APEC. 
 
Today, I am pleased to announce the appointment of three talented 
Americans to the new APEC Business Advisory Council--Frank Schrontz, 
Susan Corrales-Diaz, and Robert Denham. I also want to say a very 
special thank you to Les McCraw of the Fluor Corporation for his 
tremendous contribution to APEC's Pacific Business Forum over the last 
two years. 
 
The world has changed a lot since 1967, when PBEC was founded. 
Superpower confrontation has given way to growing cooperation. Freedom 
and democracy are on the march. Modern telecommunications have collapsed 
the distances between us. The new global economy is transforming the way 
we work and live, bringing tremendous opportunities for all our peoples. 
So many of these opportunities and some of our most significant 
challenges lie in the Asia-Pacific region.      
 
Today, half the people on our planet live in Asia. China alone is 
growing by the size of Canada every two years. Asia contains four of the 
seven largest militaries in the world, and two of its most dangerous 
flashpoints--the world's most heavily fortified border between North and 
South Korea and the regional conflict in South Asia, where India and 
Pakistan, two of America's friends--live on the edge of conflict or 
reconciliation. At the same time, the economies of East Asia have become 
the world's fastest-growing, producing fully one-quarter of our planet's 
goods and services.  
 
America has vital strategic and economic interests that affect the lives 
of each and every American citizen. We must remain an Asia-Pacific 
power. Disengagement from Asia, a region where we have fought three wars 
in this century, is simply not an option. It could spark a dangerous and 
destabilizing arms race that would profoundly alter the strategic 
landscape. It would weaken our power to deter states like North Korea 
that still can threaten the peace and to take on problems, including 
global terrorism, organized crime, environmental threats, and drug 
trafficking in a region that produces 62% of the world's heroin. 
 
Our leadership in Asia, therefore, is crucial to the security of our own 
people and to the future of the globe. It is also important to our 
future prosperity. The Asia-Pacific region is the largest consumer 
market in the world, accounting already for more than half of our trade 
and supporting millions of American jobs. By the year 2000, auto sales 
in Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand could equal our car sales to Canada 
and Mexico. Over the next 10 years, Asian nations will invest more than 
$1 trillion in infrastructure projects alone. We can help to shape a 
region's open economic development, but if we sit on the sidelines we 
could watch our own prosperity decline.       
 
When I took office, I had a vision of an Asia-Pacific community built on 
shared efforts, shared benefits, and shared destiny--a genuine 
partnership for greater security, freedom, and prosperity. Given all the 
currents of change in the region, I knew then and I know now the road 
will not be always even and smooth. But the strategy is sound, and we 
have moved forward steadily and surely toward our goal. 
 
With both security and economic interests so deeply at stake, we have 
pursued from the outset an integrated policy, pursuing both fronts 
together, advancing on both fronts together. Though the end of the Cold 
War has lessened great power conflict in Asia and in Europe, in Asia, 
just as in Europe, a host of security challenges persist--from rising 
nationalism to nuclear proliferation, to drug trafficking, organized 
crime, and other problems. To meet these tests in Europe, we are 
adapting and expanding NATO, emphasizing the Partnership for Peace, 
including a new and more constructive relationship with Russia which is, 
of course, both a European and a Pacific nation and, therefore, must be 
a partner in making a stable and prosperous Asia-Pacific future as well. 
 
Asia has not evolved with similar unifying institutions, like NATO, so 
we are working with Asia to build new security structures, flexible 
enough to adapt to new threats, durable enough to defeat them. Each 
arrangement is like an overlapping plate of security armor, working 
individually and together to protect our interests and reinforce peace. 
 
Our security strategy has four fundamental priorities: a continued 
American military commitment to the region; support for stronger 
security cooperation among Asian nations; leadership to combat the most 
serious threats; and support for democracy throughout the region. To 
pursue that strategy, we have updated and strengthened our formal 
alliances with Japan, Korea, the Philippines, Australia, and Thailand. 
We have reaffirmed our commitment to keep 100,000 troops in the region. 
 
Just a few weeks ago, we renewed our security alliance with Japan and 
moved to reduce the tensions related to our presence on Okinawa. Today, 
that security relationship is stronger than ever. We have reached a 
series of security access agreements, magnifying the impact and 
deterrent effect of our forward deployed force. We have supported the 
ASEAN nations in building a new security alliance dialogue in a region 
long fractured by distrust. We have launched new security initiatives 
such as the four-party talks President Kim and I proposed in an effort 
to bring a permanent peace to the Korean Peninsula.  
 
With our South Korean allies, we stopped the North Korean nuclear threat 
that had been brewing since 1985, when North Korea began to build a 
plutonium production reactor. Through firmness and steadiness, we gained 
an agreement that has already halted and eventually will dismantle North 
Korea's nuclear weapons program. Today, a freeze is in place under 
strict international supervision. And last month, we began the canning 
of North Korea's spent fuel. One of the greatest potential threats to 
peace is, therefore, being diffused with American leadership.      
 
We are meeting today's missiles threats to the region by building 
advance ballistic missile defense systems to protect our troops and our 
allies. We have deployed upgraded patriot missiles to South Korea. We 
are upgrading the 21 battalions of patriot systems in Japan and jointly 
examining future requirements with the Japanese Government. We recently 
reached an agreement with Taiwan that will provide them with a theater 
missile defense capability. And we are developing even more advanced 
systems for deployment in the next few years, such as the Navy Lower 
Tier, THAAD, and Navy Upper Tier programs. The latter two address longer 
range missile threats. 
 
When China expanded its military exercises in the Taiwan Strait, we made 
clear that any use of force against Taiwan would have grave 
consequences. The two carrier battle groups we sent to the area helped 
to defuse a dangerous situation and demonstrated to our allies our 
commitment to sta- bility and peace in the region. In the long run, we 
also strengthen security by deepening the roots of democracy in Asia. 
 
Democratic nations, after all, are more likely to seek ways to settle 
conflicts peacefully, to join with us to conquer common threats, to 
respect the rights of their own people. Democracy and human rights are, 
I believe, universal human aspirations. We have only to look at South 
Korea, the Philippines, and Taiwan; the Cambodians who turned from 
bullets to ballots to build a democratic future; Burma's Aung Sang Suu 
Kyi; and other courageous leaders in the area. 
 
We will continue to support our shared ideals in Asia, as elsewhere, 
encouraging reform, shining the spotlight on abuse, speaking out for 
those whose voices are silenced. Reinforcing the security pillar of 
America's relationships in Asia also advances American economic 
interests. Security and stability unleash resources for human progress, 
saving for the future, investing in education and enterprise, expanding 
trade, drawing the region closer together, and making the case for peace 
stronger and stronger. As with our security strategy, our economic 
strategy in Asia employs all the tools available--multilateral, 
regional, and bilateral--to open markets and, thereby, create more 
opportunities and jobs for Americans.  
 
Soon after I became President, as all of you know, I called for the 
first-ever summit meeting of Asia and Pacific leaders. At that historic 
meeting in Washington State, leaders from China to Indonesia to Brunei 
embraced a common vision of an Asia-Pacific community of shared 
strength, prosperity, and peace. One year later in Indonesia, we made a 
landmark commitment to achieve free trade and investment in the region 
by the year 2020. And last year in Japan, APEC adopted an action plan to 
get there. 
 
Next November in Manila, I am confident we will take steps toward 
concrete measures to lower trade and investment barriers. With APEC, 
NAFTA, our efforts in this hemisphere, and the World Trade Organization, 
the United States is working to lead the construction of a new global 
trading system, a world of expanding markets and fairer rules in which 
America can thrive and people all over the world can have a chance to 
live out their destinies and dreams as well. 
 
Country to country, we are restoring health and balance to our economic 
relations--through firm negotiations and tough action where necessary, 
to open markets for our goods and services, today the most competitive 
in the world.      
 
In the past three years, our own exports have boomed. They're up over 
35% to an all-time high, creating a million new jobs that consistently 
pay more than jobs that are not related to exports. I'm proud to say 
that once again our nation is the number one exporting country in the 
world. You can see the results of our strategy in the progress we have 
made in working with our friends in Japan. Today, we are selling more 
goods to Japan than ever before. Our bilateral trade deficit in the 
first quarter was down 25% from last year. Since 1993, our two nations 
have signed 21 trade agreements, focusing on sectors where America's 
competitiveness is strongest. Our exports in those 21 areas are up 85%, 
three times faster than the rest of our export growth in Japan. 
 
In Tokyo today, a consumer can drive to work in a Chrysler Jeep, talk 
with a friend on a Motorola telephone, snack on an apple from Washington 
State, and have American rice for dinner. Of course, a Japanese speaker 
could say the same thing about an American using all Japanese products, 
but it's nice now that both of us can tell that story. Of course, our 
work is not done. We must achieve further progress, but we are making a 
real difference for American exports and jobs. 
 
Finally, let me turn to our relations with China, for they will shape 
all of our futures profoundly. How China defines itself and its 
greatness as a nation in the future and how our relationship with China 
evolves will have as great an impact on the lives of our own people and, 
indeed, on global peace and security as that of any other relationship 
we have. 
 
China is Asia's only declared nuclear weapons state, with the world's 
largest standing army. In less than two decades, it may well be the 
world's largest economy. Its economic growth is bringing broader changes 
as steps toward freer enterprise fuel the hunger for a more free 
society.  
 
But the evolution underway in China is far from clear-cut or complete. 
It is deep and profound, and, today, China stands at a critical 
crossroads. Will it choose the course of openness and integration or 
veer toward isolation and nationalism? Will it be a force for stability 
or a force for disruption in the world? Our interests are directly at 
stake in promoting a secure, stable, open, and prosperous China--a China 
that embraces international non-proliferation and trade rules, cooper- 
ates in regional and global security initiatives, and evolves toward 
greater respect for the basic rights of its own citizens.  
 
Our engagement policy means using the best tools we have--incentives and 
disincentives alike--to advance core American interests. Engagement does 
not mean closing our eyes to the policies in China we oppose. We have 
serious and continuing concerns in areas like human rights, non-
proliferation and trade. When we disagree with China, we will continue 
to defend our interests and to assert our values. But by engaging China, 
we have achieved important benefits for our people and the rest of the 
world.       
 
We worked closely with China to extend the nuclear non-proliferation 
treaty and to freeze North Korea's nuclear weapons program. We welcome 
China's constructive position regarding the proposed four-party talks 
for peace on the Korean Peninsula. We are working with China to conclude 
and to sign a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty by September. And we 
are cooperating to combat threats like drug trafficking, alien 
smuggling, and, increasingly, environmental decay. 
 
Last week we reached an important understanding with China on nuclear 
exports. For the first time China, explicitly and publicly, committed 
not to provide assistance to unsafeguarded nuclear programs in any 
country. China also agreed to hold consultations on export control 
policies and practices.  We continue to have concerns about China's 
nuclear exports. This agreement provides a framework to help deal with 
those concerns.  
 
Our economic engagement with China has also achieved real results. 
China's elimination of more than 1,000 quotas and licensing requirements 
has helped to fuel a rise of more than 200% in United States exports of 
telecommunications equipment since 1992. China has become our fastest-
growing export market, with exports up nearly 30% in 1995 alone. 
 
Much remains to be done. Our bilateral trade deficit with China is too 
high, and China's trade barriers must come down. But the best way to 
address our trade problems is to continue to work to open China's 
booming market by negotiating and enforcing good trade agreements. That 
is why we will use the full weight of our law to ensure that China meets 
its obligations to protect intellectual property. That is why we are 
insisting that China meet the same standard of openness applied to other 
countries seeking to enter the WTO--no more, no less. And that is why I 
have decided to extend unconditional most-favored-nation--MFN--trade 
status to China.  
 
Revoking MFN and, in effect, severing our economic ties to China, would 
drive us back into a period of mutual isolation and recrimination that 
would harm America's interests, not advance them. Rather than 
strengthening China's respect for human rights, it would lessen our 
contact with the Chinese people. Rather than limiting the spread of 
weapons of mass destruction, it would limit the prospect for future 
cooperation in this area. Rather than bringing stability to the region, 
it would increase instability, as the leaders of Hong Kong, Taiwan, and 
all of the nations of the region have stated repeatedly. Rather than 
bolstering our economic interests, it would cede one of the fastest-
growing markets to our competitors.  
 
MFN renewal is not a referendum on all China's policies. It is a vote 
for America's interests. I will work with Congress in the weeks ahead to 
secure MFN renewal and to continue to advance our goal of a secure, 
stable, open, and prosperous China. This is a long-term endeavor, and we 
must be steady and firm. 
 
Where we differ with China--and we will have our differences--we will 
continue to defend our interests. We will keep faith with those who 
stand for greater freedom and pluralism in China, as we did last month 
in cosponsoring a UN resolution condemning China's human rights 
practices. We will actively enforce U.S. laws on unfair trade practices 
and non-proliferation. We will stand firm for a peaceful resolution of 
the Taiwan issue within the context of the one China policy, which has 
benefited the United States, China, and Taiwan for nearly two decades.
 
But we cannot walk backward into the future. We must not seek to isolate 
ourselves from China. We will engage with China, without illusion, to 
advance our interests in a more peaceful and prosperous world. 
 
Asia is in the midst of a historic transformation--one America helped to 
inspire, and one we cannot afford to ignore. I have spoken today about 
challenge and change, but I pledge to you as President of the United 
States that one thing remains unchanging, and that is America's 
commitment to lead with strength, steadiness, and good judgment. 
 
Working together with groups likes yours and others, our nations can 
rise to the challenges of this time, reinforcing our strength and 
prosperity into the 21st century. We can build an Asia-Pacific region 
where fair and vigorous economic competition is a source of opportunity, 
where nations work as partners to protect our common security, where 
emerging economic freedoms are bolstered by greater political freedoms, 
where human rights are protected and diversity is respected. 
 
We can build a Pacific future as great as the ocean that links our 
shores. Let us pray that we have the wisdom, the courage, and the 
firmness to do that.  
 
I thank you for your dedication to that goal. Thank you very much. 

(###) 
 
 
 
ARTICLE 2: 
 
American Interests and the U.S.-China Relationship 
Secretary Christopher 
Address before Council on Foreign Relations, Washington, DC, May 17, 
1996 
 
Thank you for that very kind introduction. It is a great pleasure to see 
Les Gelb and Barber Conable again. I want to thank the Council on 
Foreign Relations, the National Committee on United States-China 
Relations, the Asia Society, and Business Week for hosting me. I am very 
pleased to have the chance to speak with you today about the United 
States and China. 
 
There can be no doubt that the stakes in our relationship with China are 
tremendous. China's future will have a profound impact on the security 
and prosperity of the Asia-Pacific region and the world. As Secretary of 
State, I have an important responsibility to develop our relationship in 
ways that will benefit the United States, as well as China and our 
allies and friends. 
 
To reach this goal, we strongly support China's development as a secure, 
open, and successful nation that is taking its place as a world leader. 
China has an important and constructive role to play in the coming 
century, and we welcome it. The United States and China share many 
interests that can only be served when our two countries deal 
constructively and openly with each other. By deepening China's 
integration into the international system, we can best ensure that 
China's development as a strong and responsible member of the 
international community promotes our interests as well as its own.
 
We do not have any illusions about the difficulty of managing our 
relations during this period of dramatic change and transition in China. 
On some critical issues, we have deep differences. Our focus must be on 
the long term, and we must seek to resolve our differences through 
engagement, not confrontation. We will do our part, but China, too, must 
do its part. Here at home, we must mend the consensus, frayed since 
Tiananmen, that has supported a constructive approach to China for 
almost a quarter-of-a-century--an approach that has profoundly served 
our national interest.   
 
I have had the privilege of witnessing many of the remarkable changes 
that have shaped America's role as a Pacific power. As a young officer 
in the U.S. Navy, I was present in Tokyo Bay at the time of Japan's 
surrender in 1945. As a trade negotiator with Japan during the 1960s in 
the Kennedy Administration, I saw the beginnings of that nation's 
dramatic rise. As Deputy Secretary of State during the 1970s, I helped 
achieve the normalization of our ties with China. And as Secretary of 
State, I joined President Clinton in uniting the leaders of the Asia-
Pacific region behind a bold vision of economic growth and integration. 
The roots of that vision for the Asia-Pacific region reach back almost 
two centuries. From the days of the China Clippers carrying merchants 
and missionaries, to Admiral Nimitz's armadas, the United States has had 
enduring interests across the Pacific. Over the last half-century, our 
military presence--and our generous assistance--have promoted stability 
and given Asian nations the chance to build thriving economies and 
strong democracies. 
 
President Clinton recognizes that Asia is more important to our 
interests now than ever before. During the last three years, we have 
pursued a comprehensive strategy in Asia that has produced concrete 
benefits for each and every American. Today, Americans are more secure 
because we have invigorated our core alliances in Asia and maintained 
100,000 troops in a region where we have fought three wars in the past 
half-century. We are more prosperous because we have opened markets 
among the fastest-growing economies in the world. Our trade with Asia 
has almost doubled since 1990. And we face a brighter future because we 
are cooperating with former enemies to build new ties across the 
Pacific. 
 
China's evolution will play a central role in shaping that future. From 
North Korea to the Spratly Islands, China can tip the balance in Asia 
between stability and conflict. Its booming economy holds a key to 
Asia's continued prosperity and, increasingly, to our own. Its 
cooperation is essential to combating threats ranging from the spread of 
nuclear weapons to alien smuggling and global environmental damage.
 
China's people have made dramatic progress in building a market economy 
and a more vibrant society. In roughly two decades, China has managed to 
quadruple its economic output--a monumental achievement by any measure. 
Millions of Chinese consumers have moved well-beyond the "four musts"--a 
bicycle, a radio, a watch, and a sewing machine--and now often own 
cellular phones and personal computers. The most revolutionary slogan of 
the last decade has been Deng Xiaoping's injunction that "to get rich is 
glorious."  Party propagandists and the People's Daily compete now for 
attention with radio call-in shows, satellite dishes, and the Internet. 
But these changes have also generated what historian Jonathan Spence 
calls "internal pressures that the rest of us can only guess at."  
Rising incomes and an easing of social controls have raised 
expectations. Economic advances have brought improved living standards 
for many but left millions behind. Farmers flock to cities in search of 
better jobs--a restive "floating population" that numbers as many as 100 
million people. Population growth and pollution strain China's natural 
resources.  
 
China's leaders face these complex challenges at a time of political 
transition. Confronted with the worldwide collapse of communism and the 
passing of the Deng Xiaoping era, they are turning to nationalism to 
rally their country and to legitimate their hold on power. This, in 
turn, has prompted fears that an increasingly nationalistic China might 
exert its power and influence in ways that challenge the security and 
prosperity of its Asian neighbors.    
 
These changes have opened important new opportunities for U.S.-China 
cooperation on a broad range of shared interests, including non-
proliferation, peace on the Korean Peninsula, and the fight against 
narcotics trafficking. But the same changes in China have also created 
serious strains in our relationship. In the wake of China's crackdown 
following the Tiananmen Square demonstrations, some Americans see 
China's growing power, and our differences on such issues as trade and 
human rights, as proof that China represents a fundamental threat to our 
interests. Some Chinese contend that despite our public assurances, the 
United States really seeks to contain and weaken China. 
 
Both views are fundamentally flawed. We reject the counsel of those who 
seek to contain or isolate China. That course would harm our national 
interests, not protect them. Demonizing China is as dangerously 
misleading as romanticizing it. American policy toward China has been 
most successful when we have acknowledged that country's great 
complexity, recognized that change requires patience as well as 
persistence, and respected China's sovereignty while standing up for our 
own values and interests. 
 
Since 1972, the foundation for deepening engagement between our nations 
has been the "one China" policy that is embodied in the three joint 
communiques between the United States and the People's Republic of 
China. This policy is good for the United States, the P.R.C., for 
Taiwan, and the entire region. It has helped keep the peace on both 
sides of the Taiwan Strait. And under its umbrella, Taiwan's democracy 
and prosperity have flourished. 
 
The United States strongly believes that a resolution of the issues 
between the P.R.C. and Taiwan must be peaceful. We were gravely 
concerned when China's military exercises two months ago raised tensions 
in the Taiwan Strait. Our naval deployment at that time was meant to 
avert any dangerous miscalculations between either party. We are 
encouraged that both sides have now taken steps to reduce tensions in 
the Taiwan Strait. 
 
On the eve of the inauguration next Monday of Taiwan's first 
democratically elected president, it is timely to reflect on the 
enduring value of our "one China" policy for both the P.R.C. and  
Taiwan--and on our common interest and responsibility to uphold it. I 
want to tell you publicly, today, what we have been saying privately to 
the leaders in Beijing and Taipei in recent weeks.   
 
To the leadership in Beijing, we have reiterated our consistent position 
that the future relationship between Taiwan and the P.R.C. must be 
resolved directly between them. But we have reaffirmed that we have a 
strong interest in the region's continued peace and stability--that our 
"one China" policy is predicated on the P.R.C.'s pursuit of a peaceful 
resolution of issues between Taipei and Beijing. 
 
To the leadership in Taiwan, we have reiterated our commitment to robust 
unofficial relations, including helping Taiwan maintain a sufficient 
self-defense capacity under the terms of the Taiwan Relations Act. We 
have stressed that Taiwan has prospered under the "one China" policy. 
And we have made clear our view that as Taiwan seeks an international 
role, it should pursue that objective in a way that is consistent with a 
"one China" policy. 
 
We have emphasized most strongly to both sides the importance of 
avoiding provocative actions or unilateral measures that would alter the 
status quo or pose a threat to peaceful resolution of outstanding 
issues. And we have strongly urged both sides to resume the cross-Strait 
dialogue that was interrupted last summer.  
 
The United States also has an important interest in ensuring a smooth 
transition in Hong Kong on July 1, 1997. We support the 1984 Sino-
British Joint Declaration and its "one country, two systems" framework. 
Beijing's commitment to maintain Hong Kong's open economy, democratic 
government, distinct legal system, and civil liberties is crucial to 
Hong Kong's future prosperity--and to China's. 
 
Building on our enduring "one China" policy, the Clinton 
Administration's approach to China is guided by three tenets. First, I 
said at the outset, we believe that China's development as a secure, 
open, and successful nation is profoundly in the interest of the United 
States. Second, we will support China's full integration and its active 
participation in the international community. And, third, while we seek 
dialogue and engagement to manage our differences with China, we will 
not hesitate to take the necessary action to protect our interests. Let 
me briefly explain each of these three elements. 
 
First, the wisdom of encouraging a stable and thriving China is best 
shown by considering the dangerous consequences of its opposite. History 
demonstrates that an isolated China can produce harmful, even 
disastrous, results for the Chinese people, the region, and the world. 
The reforms that China has undertaken since the late 1970s have produced 
great benefits. As China meets the needs of its people, it will be more 
secure. And a secure China is likely to be more open to reform and to be 
a better neighbor.  
 
Our participation in China's internal economic development, for example, 
has helped to expand our commercial ties, with U.S. exports to China 
doubling in the first half of this decade. Our exchanges on the rule of 
law with China are contributing to legal reforms in China that 
strengthen accountable government and make it easier for American 
companies to do business.  
 
The second element of our strategy is to support a China that not only 
abides by international rules but plays an active and responsible role 
in setting them. As China gains the benefits of this participation, it 
must assume commensurate obligations. China's full participation in the 
international community is essential to our ability to address the 
critical global and regional challenges of the next century. 
No area better illustrates the benefits of gaining China's deeper 
involvement in the international community than the fight against the 
spread of weapons of mass destruction. A little over a decade ago, China 
stood outside of the world's major non-proliferation regimes. Today, 
China is a member of the International Atomic Energy Agency and a 
signatory to the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and the Chemical 
Weapons Convention--a dramatic turnabout that our engagement helped to 
produce. The United States and China have worked together to achieve 
unconditional extension of the NPT, controls on ballistic missile 
exports, and the shutdown of North Korea's nuclear weapons program. With 
China's help, we hope to complete a comprehensive test ban treaty and 
have it ready for signature at the UN General Assembly this September.  
We still face serious proliferation challenges with China. But we should 
not underestimate the significance of the steps that already have been 
taken. 
 
China's smooth integration into the global trading system is also in our 
interest. That is why the United States strongly supports China's 
accession to the World Trade Organization on commercially acceptable 
terms. We have worked with China to develop a roadmap of concrete steps 
to widen access to its markets and bring its trade practices in line 
with WTO rules. 
 
Both our nations' interests are also served by China's full 
participation in new structures for regional security and economic 
cooperation. China's membership in the ASEAN Regional Forum is an 
important example. That membership encouraged China's statement last 
year that it would abide by international law to settle its claims in 
the Spratly Islands. And as a result of its membership in APEC, China is 
lowering its tariffs as part of its down-payment toward achieving open 
and fair trade in the region by the year 2020.  
 
But the process of integration is incomplete, and there remain important 
areas of difference. To manage these differences, we seek engagement. 
And for engagement to be successful, we must be prepared to take actions 
necessary to protect our interests--the third element of our approach. 
Where we have differences, we will press our views and interests 
candidly and forcefully, with all the appropriate means at our disposal.   
Our willingness to enforce U.S. law, for example, was critical to 
reaching an understanding last week with China on non-proliferation and 
nuclear-related exports. Following intensive discussions that I held 
last month with Vice Premier Qian, China has made a public commitment 
not to provide assistance to unsafeguarded nuclear facilities. And it 
has agreed to important consultations on export control policies and 
related issues. At the same time, we continue to have serious concerns 
about China's nuclear and military cooperation with Iran, and we will 
continue to press this issue with Chinese leaders.   
 
We have also stressed to China the importance of fully implementing the 
agreement to protect intellectual property rights that we reached in 
February 1995. The piracy of compact disks, videos, and software is 
growing, causing billions of dollars in losses to American companies. 
The President has made it clear that if the Chinese authorities do not 
act to curtail sharply this piracy, we will have no choice but to go 
ahead with carefully targeted sanctions that were announced this week. 
We do not want a trade war with China. That would serve no one's 
interests. The sanctions lists issued this week should not be seen as 
the end of the process--but as a step that could lead to a successful 
outcome. That said, like any other nation, China must fulfill its 
agreements and meet its responsibilities as a leading trading nation. No 
one should doubt that we will protect our interests. 
 
Trade and investment are helping to create a more open China. But we 
will not rely solely on the beneficial impact of increasing economic 
development to bring about progress in human rights. Recent economic and 
legal reforms have somewhat diminished the arbitrary power of the 
Chinese Government over the daily lives of its citizens. But grave human 
rights abuses continue, including the arrest of those who peacefully 
voice their opinions, including restrictions on religious freedom, as 
well as repression in Tibet.  
 
The American people have a deep and abiding interest in the promotion of 
human rights in China and around the world. We will continue to speak 
out on behalf of those in China who defend universally recognized 
rights, as we did together with our European Union colleagues at the UN 
Human Rights Commission last month. We will continue to work with China 
to strengthen its judiciary. We know that change in China will take 
time--and that the most repressive periods in recent Chinese history 
have occurred when China was isolated from the world. That is one of the 
strong reasons why we continue to pursue engagement with China.  

Our support for continuing most-favored-nation trading status for China 
should be seen in the context of the three elements of our policy. The 
MFN debate should not be a referendum on China's current political 
system or on whether we approve of the policies of the Chinese 
leadership. The issue at stake is whether renewing MFN unconditionally 
is the best way to advance American interests.  The President and I are 
convinced that the answer is a resounding "yes"--a conclusion reached by 
every American president since 1979.   
 
Revoking or conditioning MFN would not advance human rights in China, 
but it would damage our economy and jeopardize more than 200,000 
American jobs. It would harm Hong Kong, which is why legislative leader 
Martin Lee and Gov. Chris Patten strongly support MFN's unconditional 
renewal--as they emphasized in Washington last week. It would hurt 
Taiwan, whose economy depends heavily on its commercial ties with the 
P.R.C. and U.S.-China trade. It could also undermine our ability to work 
with China on regional security issues, such as North Korea, and on any 
of the other important interests we share--from non-proliferation to the 
global environment. And it would weaken our influence throughout a 
region that still looks to America as a source and a force for stability 
and security. 
 
The issues that I have discussed today only begin to reflect the breadth 
of our relationship with China. We have an extraordinarily diverse and 
demanding agenda with China. 
 
Given the range of our interests and the importance of China to our 
future security and well-being, I believe the time has come to develop a 
more regular dialogue between our two countries. Holding periodic 
cabinet-level consultations in our capitals would facilitate a candid 
exchange of views. It would provide a more effective means for managing 
specific problems, and it would allow us to approach individual issues 
within a broader strategic framework.  
 
I also believe that our nations' two leaders should hold regular summit 
meetings. I intend to discuss these ideas with Vice Premier Qian when we 
meet in Jakarta in July. 
 
In the United States, we also face an immediate priority. If we are to 
sustain the advances that we have made with China since the historic 
opening in 1972, we must rebuild the bipartisan consensus that has 
guided our relations with China since then. Our interests demand it, and 
our allies and friends expect it. We must continue to have the full 
support of the American people to meet the difficult challenges that lie 
ahead.    
 
Thank you very much.  

(###) 
 
 
 
ARTICLE 3: 
 
Southeast Asia Regional Security Issues: Opportunities for Peace, 
Stability, and Prosperity 
Winston Lord, Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs 
Statement before the Asia and Pacific Subcommittee of the House 
International Relations Committee, Washington, DC, May 30, 1996 
 
Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of this committee, I am very 
pleased to come before you today to discuss regional security issues in 
Southeast Asia. I commend you once again for holding a hearing on issues 
that deserve thoughtful exploration and debate. On many previous 
occasions, we have met to address our interests and concerns in other 
parts of Asia: China, Japan, and the Korean Peninsula, for example. At 
many of those sessions the focus of our discussion has been not so much 
on opportunities as on the problems we face and the ways you and we, 
working together, might try to solve them. 
 
Such was the case during the 1960s and 1970s when there were many such 
hearings on the painful challenges posed by the conflict in Southeast 
Asia. Back then, few could imagine, let alone focus on, the great 
promise and potential the region could achieve in just a few decades. 
That we have not had frequent sessions on the situation in Southeast 
Asia during the 1990s is not a sign of neglect, but a tribute to the 
profound, positive changes that have occurred in the region. Indeed, I 
can think of no part of the world that has come so far so fast, not just 
in terms of security, but in terms of economic and political 
development. Where in the past we saw tension and conflict, we now see 
cooperation and a real sense of community. Without returning to the 
debate over the Vietnam war, I think we can find some solace--amidst the 
pain--in our involvement in that war by recalling the shield we provided 
for the nations of Southeast Asia.  
 
Just last month, Foreign Minister Jayakumar of Singapore delivered an 
excellent lecture at Georgetown University on this very topic. In his 
remarks, the Minister argued that America's sacrifice in Indochina 
bought valuable time for the non-communist countries in Southeast Asia 
to put their economic houses in order, providing breathing space which 
laid the foundation for the rapid economic growth we see there today. He 
concluded that America's forward military presence is essential for 
Southeast Asia's continued stability and prosperity. Through continued 
strategic, military, and economic engagement in Southeast Asia our 
people can now benefit from the sacrifice we made in Vietnam decades 
ago. As Foreign Minister Jayakumar said:  
 
. . .the United States remains an indispensable factor of any new 
configuration for peace, security and economic growth in the Asia-
Pacific. Only the United States has the strategic weight, economic 
strength and political clout to hold the ring in the Asia-Pacific. 
 
I have here a copy of Foreign Minister Jayakumar's speech, and I ask 
that it be entered in the record.  
 
Relations with Southeast Asian Countries 
 
The countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations--ASEAN--have 
been at the heart of the remarkable progress of the last several 
decades. Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand 
decided to put aside their differences in 1967 when they issued the 
Bangkok declaration, a truly visionary step designed to promote the 
goals of political and economic cooperation in the tumultuous and 
threatening environment of the Vietnam war. Since then, the countries of 
ASEAN have succeeded splendidly in realizing their goals. Just as the 
creation of the European Union served to dampen the historical enmities 
in Europe and forge fresh cooperation, the growth of ASEAN has had a 
similar effect in the Southeast Asia region. The ASEAN nations have not 
only become the model for regional integration and cooperation, but they 
have helped to pave the way for other visionary initiatives such as the 
Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation--APEC--forum and the ASEAN Free Trade 
Area--AFTA. 
 
ASEAN, formed at a time of conflict in Vietnam, came full circle in 1995 
when it welcomed Vietnam as a member. Both Cambodia and Laos are 
scheduled to join ASEAN during the coming year. Burma could become a 
member by the turn of the century. 
 
The United States and Vietnam also entered a new phase of relations with 
the normalization of diplomatic relations on July 11, 1995. This 
progress in relations with Vietnam has, above all, reflected and 
encouraged its cooperation on our highest priority issue--the fullest 
possible accounting for our MIAs. It also promotes our regional security 
and economic interests. 
 
Security is essential to the creation of a peaceful and prosperous 
Southeast Asian region, and the United States continues to do its part. 
We have special relationships with two of the ASEAN countries--the 
Philippines and Thailand are treaty allies. In recent years, other ASEAN 
nations have also provided access to compensate for the loss of 
Philippine bases and to keep the U.S. engaged in the region. Singapore, 
which receives 80-90 U.S. Navy visits a year and hosts periodic 
stationing of U.S. Air Force contingents, is a key part of USCINCPAC's 
"swing" strategy between Northeast Asia and the Middle East. Similarly, 
since 1992 our naval vessels get periodic repairs in Indonesia. Malaysia 
also makes available commercial repair facilities for U.S. ships and 
aircraft. Brunei and the U.S. conduct periodic joint training under our 
recently concluded memorandum of cooperation. 
 
Through our participation in the ASEAN Regional Forum, we hope to 
promote stable relationships throughout Southeast Asia. The ASEAN 
Regional Forum is a young organization. Its inaugural meeting was held 
only in 1994. But it is clear that the organization can play a key role 
over the years ahead in promoting peace and security through confidence-
building measures, enhancement of transparency, and other forms of 
cooperation. 
 
We believe that a strong U.S. security presence is essential for the 
continued stability and prosperity of the region. Our 100,000 soldiers, 
sailors, airmen, and marines deployed in Asia  underscore our commitment 
to the region. This presence is warmly and widely welcomed by the 
nations of the region as serving stability and signaling U.S. 
engagement. Although the post-Cold War era has left the region largely 
free of conflict, and many age-old rivalries stemming from the colonial 
era and even before have passed into history, there will always be a 
concern that today's peace and prosperity, if not carefully nurtured, 
could slip away. We have all welcomed the dynamic growth of the region, 
but this growth, stimulated by competition, can lead to new tensions. 
Development has put pressure on the environment. Narcotics is a major 
concern. By cooperating with our Southeast Asian friends, we can ensure 
that the peace and development of today is not undermined in the years 
ahead. 
 
I realize the focus of our session today is on security issues, but we 
should not let pass the opportunity to mention the region's economic 
security as well. With the peace of the past 20 years has come 
prosperity. And continued prosperity--as well as the growing economic 
interdependence of the region--contributes to security. 
 
The ASEAN nations form one of the most dynamic regional markets in the 
world. GDP for ASEAN's 400 million people exceeds $500 billion, and the 
GDP has grown by an average 7% annually for the past six years. ASEAN, 
as a whole, is our fourth-largest trading partner. Two-way trade is 
approaching $100 billion. U.S. investment in the region already exceeds 
$20 billion. And both trade and investment are increasing sharply. We 
are committed to working with ASEAN and the other countries of Southeast 
Asia to ensure that this trade is free and fair, and that their markets 
remain open to American business. These growing economic ties promote 
prosperity and economic security, not only in Southeast Asia but here at 
home as well. 
 
Recent events have focused particular attention on two Southeast Asian 
nations which aspire to eventual ASEAN membership. The situation in 
Burma over the past week has significantly altered the country's 
political dynamics. Aung San Suu Kyi, despite intimidation by the State 
Law and Order Restoration Council--SLORC, successfully and defiantly 
hosted a convention by her party, the National League for Democracy, 
addressed a crowd of 10,000 supporters, and called for genuine dialogue 
with the military junta. We were encouraged that Aung San Suu Kyi was 
able to hold her party congress. However, the SLORC continues to detain 
more than 250 NLD supporters, and there are unconfirmed reports that it 
may bring charges against some of those detained. We deplore these 
detentions and call on the SLORC to immediately and unconditionally 
release all of those who have been detained. The United States has made 
the strongest possible representations to the Burmese authorities in 
Rangoon and Washington. 
 
Our objective is to do what we can to inhibit the SLORC from increasing 
the oppression, including a resort to violence, and promote movement 
toward a direct dialogue between the SLORC and the NLD aimed at national 
political reconciliation and democratization. Further, to this end, we 
are consulting closely with other interested nations on steps to take to 
press the regime to release the detainees and enter a dialogue. We will 
continue to make it clear to the military regime that it will not gain 
international legitimacy until it starts talking to the legitimate 
representatives of the Burmese people. 
 
The United States supports efforts in Cambodia to build democratic 
institutions, promote human rights, and foster economic development. We 
are concerned about recent political developments in Cambodia, 
particularly indications that political intolerance may be growing. 
Administration officials have made several visits to Phnom Penh since 
late last year to express our concerns candidly with Cambodian leaders, 
and we continue to follow the situation closely. Most recently, we 
promptly condemned the killing of newspaper editor Thun Bunly on May 18, 
expressed our concern both in Phnom Penh and Washington, and have urged 
Cambodian authorities to find and punish those responsible. 
 
We are also concerned that political disagreement between FUNCINPEC and 
the CPP over powersharing and other issues, if not properly handled, 
could adversely affect Cambodia's stability. We continue to urge all 
sides to make a concerted effort to work out their differences 
peacefully in accordance with the laws and constitution. 
 
Together with our concerns, it is important to remember that Cambodia 
has come a long, long way in the past few years. The country has 
suffered through decades of turmoil, slaughter, and civil war that 
devastated its infrastructure and traumatized its population. The 
Cambodian people have already traveled a great distance from this dark 
past. Politically motivated violence, while not completely eliminated, 
has dropped sharply, Khmer Rouge strength is being steadily reduced, and 
thousands of refugees have returned to their homes. Perhaps most 
important, Cambodians chose their government in a free and fair election 
in 1993. We must maintain a balanced perspective while we work with the 
Cambodians on overcoming the many obstacles ahead. In pursuit of our 
goals, the U.S. Government provided $40 million in assistance for 
Cambodia in 1995, and we anticipate that 1996 levels will be close to 
$30 million. U.S. assistance has had an immediate and visible impact on 
the lives of hundreds of thousands of Cambodians and has been vital in 
advancing U.S. interests in democratization, rehabilitation of the 
country, and preventing the return to power of the Khmer Rouge. 
 
ASEAN Regional Forum--ARF 
 
The ASEAN Regional Forum--ARF, which was first proposed by the 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations in 1993, currently is the only 
region-wide, governmental-level, multilateral security dialogue in the 
Asia-Pacific region. Current membership includes the seven ASEAN 
nations--Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, 
Thailand, and Vietnam--plus the U.S., Australia, Cambodia, Canada, the 
P.R.C., the EU, Japan, South Korea, Laos, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, 
and Russia. India and Burma are expected to join at the ARF Ministerial 
Meeting in Jakarta in July which Secretary Christopher will attend.
 
U.S. engagement in regional security dialogues in the Asia-Pacific, 
including the ARF, has been encouraged by this Administration. 
Previously, the U.S. had been cautious about regional security 
dialogues, because it feared our engagement in them would be construed 
as a mask for our withdrawal from a leadership role in regional 
security. This Administration decided that active U.S. support for such 
dialogues could enhance, not weaken, our security leadership, as long as 
it was coupled with a renewed commitment to our forward military 
presence and strengthening of our bilateral alliances. We see ARF as 
something that complements, not supplants, our bilateral relationships 
in Southeast Asia. We will maintain these bilateral alliances while 
monitoring what we hope will be the continued strengthening of the ARF 
process. We will neither lose sight of ARF's security dialogue 
potential, nor will we prematurely inflate its progress. 
 
The ARF Concept Paper agreed to in 1995 sets forth the purpose and 
potential of the ARF. While no timeliness were established, the paper 
envisages ARF evolving through three stages of security cooperation: 
confidence building, preventive diplomacy, and elaboration of approaches 
to conflicts. Despite caution on the part of some members that the 
organization is evolving too quickly, the ARF has begun to move 
incrementally to ease tensions, reduce suspicions, and cultivate 
consultation habits. Working with others, we will seek to promote these 
habits of consultation and dialogue in a region generally unaccustomed 
to such open exchanges. 
 
Since the first ARF Ministerial Meeting in 1994, ARF's  disparate 
members have become increasingly comfortable discussing relatively 
controversial subjects--such as nuclear testing, the situation in North 
Korea, and conflicting claims in the South China Sea--in plenary 
sessions. There is still a way to go, however, for ARF discussions to 
evolve from set pieces to more genuine give and take. Nonetheless, when 
one looks at the extremely diverse composition of the forum, it has 
already come a substantial distance in only two years. With deliberate 
encouragement and support from its major players, ARF can develop over 
time into a useful forum for preventive diplomacy and conflict 
resolution. 
 
The ARF's potential for defusing regional tensions was shown last year 
when it helped to lower the heightened tensions caused by a series of 
incidents in the South China Sea. ASEAN issued a joint statement in 
March 1995, which called for peaceful resolution of the territorial 
claims in the South China Seas. This was followed in May by the strong--
and warmly welcomed--U.S. statement of official policy on the 
Spratlys/South China Sea. These statements, along with ASEAN's 
determination to ensure discussion of the issue at ARF senior officials' 
and ministerial meetings, resulted in a freeze on activities in the area 
and a fresh emphasis on diplomacy. One positive result was a 
constructive statement by Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen at the 
August 1995 ARF indicating that Beijing would seek to resolve the 
Spratlys/South China Sea dispute peacefully based on principles embodied 
in the Law of the Sea Convention. The ARF discussion of this issue was 
seen by countries of the region as making an important contribution to 
reducing tensions in the South China Sea. 
 
In the past year, ARF has fleshed out its first goal of confidence-
building by sponsoring a series of working groups and meetings on 
confidence-building, peacekeeping operations, and search and rescue. 
Each of these meetings is co-hosted by an ASEAN and a non-ASEAN member; 
the U.S. and Singapore are co-hosts of the ongoing search and rescue 
meeting. The first session took place in March in Honolulu, and there 
will be a second meeting in early 1997 in Singapore. A fourth working 
group on disaster relief coordination will be established in July, 
pending ministerial approval.  
 
I headed the U.S. delegation to the most recent ARF-related meeting--
that of Senior Officials--held in Yogjakarta May 10 and 11 to prepare 
for the July ministerial meeting. The lively and productive May meeting 
presages a productive ministerial. Although we are still shaping our 
positions with respect to the upcoming ministerial, priority topics for 
the U.S. are likely to include support for a  full range of initiatives 
associated with non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and 
transparency of conventional arms transfers, ARF encouragement of Korean 
Peninsula initiatives such as the Four-Party Peace Talks and KEDO, and a 
wide-ranging, mutually productive exchange of views on other regional 
security issues. We will also support the ongoing work in various 
confidence-building areas.  
 
Regional Arms Sales 
 
The U.S. Government arms transfer policy for the ASEAN region follows 
the guidelines established in the U.S. Policy on Conventional Arms 
Transfer--CAT, signed by the President on February 10, 1995. This policy 
serves five goals: 
 
--  Ensuring that our military forces can continue to enjoy 
technological advantage over potential adversaries; 
 
--  Helping allies and friends deter or defend themselves against 
aggression while promoting interoperability with U.S. forces when 
combined operations are required; 
 
--  Preserving regional balances of military forces while preventing the 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; 
 
--  Promoting peaceful conflict resolution and arms control, regional 
stability, human rights, and other foreign policy objectives; and 
 
--  Enhancing the ability of the U.S. defense industrial base to meet 
U.S. defense requirements and maintain long-term military technological 
superiority at lower costs. 
 
The principal factors driving Southeast Asian arms enhancements in 
recent years have been increased financial resources from robust 
economic growth, ongoing requirements to modernize obsolete systems, 
principally aircraft, a partial switch in defense doctrine from counter-
insurgency to conventional military operations, a requirement to protect 
extended economic zones and claims in the Spratly islands, and a desire 
to strengthen defense self-reliance. 
 
ASEAN governments perceive little prospect of inter-ASEAN armed 
conflict. This, in part, explains the absence of a region-wide arms 
race. Within ASEAN, countries' acquisition of advanced weaponry 
typically has involved small numbers of systems, taking into account 
cost, personnel, and infrastructure constraints. The ASEAN countries 
themselves have recognized that their defense procurement generally 
serve to modernize forces and replace outmoded equipment, though in the 
process a number of them are adding significant new force-projection 
capabilities. 
 
Long-standing U.S. policy has been to treat ASEAN members as equal in 
terms of our willingness to supply high-technology weaponry. Approval of 
a weapons system for one ASEAN country has generally meant approval for 
all--subject, of course, to a  recipient's ability to finance, operate, 
and integrate a given system, as well as to our policy against being the 
first to introduce a new technology into a region. Where there have been 
special concerns--for example, over human rights in Indonesia--we have 
adjusted this policy without abandoning it. Since the U.S. has long been 
the region's preferred arms supplier, this policy has helped to ensure a 
regional arms balance. 
 
International Military Educational Training--IMET--has been and 
continues to be a valuable component of U.S. foreign policy and in 
furthering peace, stability, and respect for human rights in the region. 
IMET training emphasizes the importance of civilian control of the 
military, military justice, and respect for international human rights 
standards. IMET supports U.S. objectives of promoting reforms and 
strengthening professionalism in Asian armed forces, making them 
institutions capable of protecting sovereignty while respecting civilian 
authority and citizens' human rights. IMET focuses on training military 
personnel about respecting human rights and implementing accountable 
military justice by exposing them to our own professional military 
personnel and procedures, which function under civilian control. 
 
As ASEAN expands, our arms-transfer policy must obviously reflect that 
Vietnam remains a proscribed country under U.S. arms export control laws 
and therefore is ineligible to purchase U.S. origin-defense equipment. 
In Burma, as long as the current despotic military regime continues, 
that country will be prohibited from purchasing U.S. arms. 
 
A major benefit of our arms transfers to the region has been to sustain 
and expand U.S. military capability in the region through enhanced 
interoperability and joint exercises. In addition, several of the ASEAN 
countries were helpful during the Gulf war in 1990-91 in allowing the 
movement of U.S. forces through the ASEAN region on their way to the 
Middle East. Many of these countries are also making significant 
contributions to international peacekeeping.  
 
The U.S. Government plays a limited role in promoting sales to the ASEAN 
region. ASEAN governments and arms-producing companies typically discuss 
a potential sale first and then approach the U.S. Government for 
approval. Only if a particular requested system meets the criteria for 
transfer and other producing countries enter the competition do the U.S. 
Government and its embassy personnel become involved in advocacy. 
 
South China Sea Territorial Issues 
 
The Spratly Islands and surrounding South China Sea are the object of 
competing territorial claims among Brunei, the P.R.C., Malaysia, the 
Philippines, Taiwan, and Vietnam. As I have already noted, some modest, 
but positive, diplomatic efforts by these countries in 1995 eased 
tensions between China and the Philippines. A unified ASEAN approach on 
the Spratlys in April 1995 meetings with China; discussion of the South 
China Sea situation at the August 1995 ASEAN Regional Forum; and 
separate, more intense, bilaterals among the Philippines, China, and 
Vietnam have all contributed to this modest improvement. Our own May 
1995 public statement on the South China Sea was also welcomed by ASEAN 
as making an important contribution to diplomatic efforts to ease 
tensions. 
 
Maintaining freedom of navigation is a fundamental U.S. interest. 
Unhindered navigation by all ships and aircraft in the South China Sea 
is essential for the peace and prosperity of the entire Asia-Pacific 
region, including the U.S. We appreciate the efforts of all claimants 
that have reiterated their support for the principle of freedom of 
navigation in the South China Sea. 
 
The U.S. is concerned that unilateral actions and reactions in the South 
China Sea might increase tensions in the region. We strongly oppose the 
use or threat of force to resolve competing claims and urge all 
claimants to exercise restraint and to avoid destabilizing actions. Our 
May 1995 statement calls upon all claimants to intensify diplomatic 
efforts to address issues related to competing claims, taking into 
account the interests of all parties. It also expresses our opposition 
to any maritime claim inconsistent with the 1982 UN Law of the Sea 
Convention. We welcome any diplomatic initiatives which support mutual 
restraint by all claimants and ease tensions in the South China Sea. We 
reiterate our willingness to assist in any way the claimants deem 
helpful. I would like to submit the full text of this statement for the 
record. 
 
Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon Free Zone 
 
The U.S. has stated on several occasions that it is prepared to consider 
positively a Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon Free Zone--SEANWFZ--treaty, 
provided it conforms to our long-standing criteria for supporting 
nuclear weapon free zones. The fact that the U.S. has recently signed 
the protocols to the treaties establishing the South Pacific Nuclear 
Free Zone--SPNFZ--and the African Nuclear Weapon Free Zone is proof of 
our willingness to support nuclear weapon free zones when they are 
designed in accordance with our long-standing criteria. 
 
The United States, however, has significant concerns with the current 
text of the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon Free Zone Treaty signed in 
Bangkok, December 15, 1995, and its accompanying protocol. We have made 
these concerns known to the Southeast Asian states on numerous 
occasions. These concerns are also shared by the other four 
internationally recognized nuclear weapon states. 
 
One of the most significant issues preventing us from supporting the 
treaty at this point is the inclusion of Exclusive Economic Zones--EEZs-
-and continental shelves in the zone, which raises questions about the 
consistency of the treaty with high seas freedoms and other principles 
embodied in the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. Furthermore, 
continental shelves and EEZs have never been clearly delimited in the 
South China Sea, which creates uncertainty over the scope of treaty and 
protocol obligations and could be a source of conflict due to competing 
territorial claims in the region. 
 
The U.S. has other concerns with the treaty and protocol, including the 
precise nature of the legally binding negative security assurances from 
protocol parties, ambiguity of language concerning the permissibility of 
port calls by ships which may carry nuclear weapons, and the procedural 
rights of protocol parties to be represented before the various 
executive bodies set up by the treaty to ensure its implementation. 
We have indicated our willingness to continue consultations with ASEAN 
to try to resolve our remaining concerns, and such consultations have 
taken place and are expected to continue. The U.S. will also consult 
with the other nuclear weapons states, that share our legitimate 
security concerns. The Administration cannot predict when or if 
agreement can be reached with the Southeast Asian states on a solution 
that would permit the U.S. to consider signing the SEANWFZ protocol. 
Conclusion 
 
In sum, the U.S. has been working quietly, but effectively, to build 
relationships with the Southeast Asian countries that reflect the new 
opportunities created by a post-Cold War security environment and 
Southeast Asia's own dynamic economic and political growth. 
 
Today, I have described the key elements of those relationships--our 
alliances; our forward military presence; a "places, not bases" strategy 
that provides our military with access arrangements and operational 
cooperation; practical support through IMET and foreign military sales 
that enhances Southeast Asian military cooperation with the U.S. 
consistent with our global conventional arms transfer policy; new and 
expanded multilateral cooperation through the ASEAN and ARF processes 
that complement our bilateral relationships; and U.S. support for the 
efforts of the nations in the region to address potential regional 
trouble spots such as the South China Sea. 
 
Mr. Chairman, we believe that, cumulatively, these policies are 
promoting a more stable and mature relationship with Southeast Asia that 
serves U.S. interests and enhances regional security.   
 
Thank you.  

(###) 
 
 
 
ARTICLE 4: 
 
Civilian Control of the Military in Democracies 
Ambassador Robert E. Hunter, U.S. Permanent Representative on the North 
Atlantic Council 
Address at Jagiellonian University, Krakow, Poland, May 6, 1996 
 
I am honored to be here in Krakow and at Jagiellonian University, this 
ancient center of learning, of hope, and of history--the heart and soul 
of a free people. I am fortunate to share the panel with Janusz 
Onyszkiewicz, who has done so much to secure Poland's freedom and to 
ground its military in democratic principles--both when he was Minister 
of Defense and, now, as a key member of the Sejm's Defense Committee. 
Mr. Chairman, in my comments today, I choose a simple theme. It is about 
people who are 
 
. . . willing to profit from the present circumstances of Europe, and by 
the favorable moment which has restored us to ourselves; free from the 
disgraceful shackles of foreign influence; prizing more than life, and 
any personal consideration, the political existence, external  
independence and internal liberty of the nation. . . 
 
This is Poland today, with its great chance to profit from the end of 
the Cold War, with its new birth of freedom, and with its commitment to 
take its rightful place within the West. 
 
But these words were, in fact, written 205 years ago, at a time when few 
of the world's peoples enjoyed basic human rights and so many were 
unable to decide the fate of their countries. The people of Poland wrote 
those words on May 3, 1791, as the foundation of Europe's first written 
constitution, which inspired so many people in other countries, just as 
our own American Revolution had "fired the shot heard 'round the world."
 
For an American, coming to Krakow to talk about the role of the military 
in civil society and in building democracy is a pilgrimage. Our 
Revolution, devoted to the proposition that "all men are created equal," 
succeeded in part because of the skills and devotion of Polish patriots. 
Tadeusz Andrzej Bonawentura Kosciuszko was colonel of artillery in our 
Continental Army and adjutant to Gen. George Washington. When Kosciuszko 
returned home, he became a great champion of Polish independence and 
integrity, defender of Poland's liberties and its constitution. It is 
fitting that he is enshrined here in the cathedral, the resting place of 
kings. 
 
Kosciuszko's commitment is a mark of today's ambition. A man far ahead 
of his time, he maintained, along with his friend Thomas Jefferson, that 
the republic could be created and protected only on the basis of 
absolute liberty and equality before the law. And for his qualities as a 
military man of action but also as a democrat, he was granted American 
citizenship by the Congress of the United States. This is just one more 
bond of liberty and belief that binds our two countries together. 
 
Mr. Chairman, at last the states of Central Europe have a chance to be 
free and independent, to chart their own course, to provide for their 
future without fear of domination from outside. At NATO, we will do our 
part. We have drawn inspiration from the Marshall Plan of 50 years ago, 
whose benefits were then denied to Poland and its neighbors, but whose 
underlying promise we can together now fulfill. At NATO, we seek to 
build security throughout the continent--enhancing it for all and 
reducing it for none. 
 
To that end, under President Clinton's leadership, NATO, in January 
1994, decided to take in new members. It will do this as a means of 
providing confidence to free people that their efforts to promote the 
well-being of their families and their nations can bear fruit and lay to 
rest the doubts and uncertainties that have so often plagued Central 
Europe and shattered peace throughout the continent. Last year, NATO set 
forth the basic qualities of membership--the "how and the why" of 
enlargement. This year, we are intensifying our talks with each 
interested country about the details of its security efforts. We are 
proceeding toward concrete decisions on the "who and when" of 
membership. We shall enlarge; we shall extend the zone of security 
eastward. 
 
Enlargement is one part of a larger effort to build security throughout 
Europe. At the same time, at NATO we are also vigorously pursuing the 
Partnership for Peace. PFP is, in part, a means for preparing countries 
to join NATO--to show direction and achievement in the reform of 
military forces. But it is also a permanent, close association with NATO 
for every country--ally or partner--so that all can be part of the West 
and of a Europe that is truly secure. As Secretary of State Christopher 
said recently at Prague, "No nation in Europe should ever again be 
consigned to a buffer zone between great powers or relegated to another 
nation's sphere of influence." PFP is visible proof of this pledge.
 
I salute Poland's leading role as an active member of the Partnership. 
You are adapting your forces to NATO standards. You have officers at the 
Brussels headquarters and at NATO's Partnership Coordination Cell at 
SHAPE--at which, last Friday, your national day was celebrated. Your 
forces train with NATO. You held the first-ever Partnership for Peace 
exercise in September 1994, near Poznan, which I was pleased to attend. 
We hope that you will soon ratify your Status of Forces Agreement with 
NATO. And you have sent forces to Bosnia--as part of the Nord-Pol 
Battalion within the American sector. 
 
The NATO-led Implementation Force in Bosnia--IFOR-- is a testing ground 
for allies and partners alike. Its lessons will enlighten what each of 
us does, providing solid experience both for the Partnership and for 
NATO's role in meeting the new challenges of European security. No 
lesson will be more important than what the militaries of these several 
countries can do together based on mutual respect both within and 
between each national contingent.  
 
At NATO, we are also reaching out to Russia. We want it to succeed in 
creating democracy and a market economy. We welcome its membership in 
the Partnership for Peace. We want it to take its legitimate place in 
efforts to build a secure Europe--just as it is doing with IFOR in 
Bosnia, along with all 16 NATO allies and 13 other Partnership for Peace 
countries. 
 
In all these efforts, there are common themes. None is more important 
than the fundamental grounding of security in freedom and democracy. 
What societies are and believe and do is crucial to a secure future. 
Democracy, in fact, is the best guarantee for peace. This insight of 
Immanuel Kant's two centuries ago has been proven in the western half of 
the continent, and now the nations of Central Europe and beyond have 
their chance to follow suit. 
 
NATO and all other institutions of the West are working together to help 
the countries of this region make the difficult but necessary transition 
to democracy. NATO's efforts are directed in particular to the military, 
both symbol and substance of what can and must happen throughout 
society. 
 
The role of the military in civil society--the theme of this panel--is 
thus one key to consolidating democracy in the countries of Central 
Europe, as well as in building a new security order throughout the 
continent. The creation of armed forces fully embedded in the democratic 
process is an indispensable element in the transition of partner 
countries--and it is indispensable for NATO membership. 
 
For an enlarged NATO to remain effective, the alliance must ensure that 
the basic tenets of democratic society have taken root among new members 
and within their military establishments. They must accept all the 
obligations set out in the Washington Treaty and in the Partnership for 
Peace framework document. They must work within themselves--and with us-
-to build those habits of mind and practices of institution that create 
and preserve democracy and our common commitment to free societies. This 
is a key point of the NATO agenda. We are even now completing work on a 
basic set of guidelines on civilian and democratic control of the 
military, as proposed by Secretary Christopher at last year's spring 
ministerial meeting of the North Atlantic Council. 
 
When President Kwasniewski visited NATO in January, he stressed his 
commitment  
 
to make the best possible use of the time left before the enlargement of 
NATO to bring [Poland's] armed forces and political structures in line 
with the standards adhered to by the countries of the Alliance. 
 
We salute the progress that Poland has made during the past six years. 
We are especially pleased to see your commitment to strengthening 
civilian control through constitutional reform and legislation--such as 
the Minister of National Defense Act, which clarifies the chain of 
command between the Ministry of Defense and the President with respect 
to the military. But the task is by no means done, as President 
Kwasniewski himself acknowledged. We support and encourage your further 
efforts. 
 
Yet, while we applaud efforts for military reform in partner countries, 
we are concerned that there be more than lip service paid to the concept 
of the military's role in civil society. Understandably--but 
erroneously--for some there is a lingering sense that civilian control 
somehow equates to the role played by political officers--the 
"commissars"--assigned to military units in the Warsaw Pact. Others 
apparently harbor the misconception that civilian control somehow 
implies the "victory" of one group--the civilians--over another--the 
military. 
 
In fact, in democracies, the idea of civilian control is quite different 
and more fundamental: a people's acceptance that decisions concerning 
the full range of defense policy must be under the scrutiny and ultimate 
authority of democratically elected officials. In the first instance, to 
borrow from your 1791 Constitution, "the army should ever remain under 
the subordination and obedience of the executive power." That does not 
mean that the military has no say in the process, but it ensures that 
those leaders whose mandate is rooted in constitutional authority make 
final decisions and are held accountable for them by the people. 
 
Ensuring the military's proper role in society has many elements. Nine 
have proved to be particularly important: 
 
First, a proper constitutional and legislative structure, with clearly 
defined responsibilities for the executive and legislative branches--
both in peacetime and during crisis or war--with a system of checks and 
balances; 
 
Second, clear primacy of civilians in the Ministry of Defense and the 
military establishment, with the senior military officer subordinate to 
a civilian official; 
 
Third, substantive parliamentary oversight--involving members of 
parliament trained in the techniques and responsibilities of holding 
executive power accountable, including the allocation and use of 
resources; 
 
Fourth, the creation of a permanent professional staff in parliament 
that can build on its expertise over the years and keep members fully 
informed on the key issues; 
 
Fifth, transparency of budgets and defense plans--as a vital act in 
creating trust between civilians and military and in building public 
confidence; 
 
Sixth, development of a cadre of civilians, in and out of government, 
expert in the full range of security issues; 
 
Seventh, training and education throughout the armed forces about the 
role of the military in democratic society; 
 
Eighth, a fair and effective military justice system that enforces on 
all ranks established standards of conduct and discipline; and 
 
Finally, an open and informed national debate, preceding decisions on 
national security and military matters. 
 
Of course, there is no simple, single solution to fostering productive 
civil-military relations in democratic societies. Even in the most well-
developed democratic systems, tensions between civilian and military 
sides are normal; adjustments, based on experience, are constantly 
needed--as happened in the United States after the Vietnam War, when we 
adopted the War Powers Resolution and more recently the Goldwater-
Nichols Act to reorganize and streamline relations between our military 
and its civilian leadership. These adjustments in civilian and military 
roles and powers stemmed from prolonged and sometimes acrimonious 
debate. Yet, without tensions and debate, democracies rarely have the 
chance to make informed choices among alternatives--and to become 
stronger as they do so. 
 
Managing the tensions inherent in civil-military relations requires the 
active involvement of political and military leadership committed to 
democratic ideals. Most important, embedding military forces within 
democratic, civil society must not be seen simply as a requirement of 
joining Western security institutions. It must be done out of a belief 
that it is the best course for the nation. 
 
We cannot expect that everything will be achieved in a short time, that 
all questions will be perfectly answered in advance. But we at NATO 
stand ready--in open, frank discussion--to work together with you and 
with your neighbors to achieve the goal of a secure and democratic 
Europe. We shall all do this, in the words of Poland's 1791 
Constitution: "desirous to deserve the blessing and gratitude, not only 
of our contemporaries, but also for future generations." 

(###) 
 
[END OF DISPATCH VOL 7 NO 22] 

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