U.S. Department of State 
Dispatch Volume 7, Number 19, May 6, 1996 
Bureau of Public Affairs 
 
 
 
ARTICLES IN THIS ISSUE: 
 
1. U.S., Israel Sign Counter-Terrorism Cooperation Accord--President 
Clinton, Israeli Prime Minister Peres, Text of Counter-Terrorism 
Cooperation Accord, Joint Statement 
 
2. Israel Celebrates 48 Years Of Independence--Deputy Secretary Talbott  
 
3. U.S. Global Economic Leadership--Joan E. Spero 
 
4. Proliferation Dangers to U.S. Security in the Post-Cold War World--
Thomas E. McNamara     
 
5. Nigeria: Commonwealth Ministerial Group Recommends New Measures on 
Nigeria 
 
 
 
ARTICLE 1: 
 
U.S., Israel Sign Counter-Terrorism Cooperation Accord 
President Clinton, Israeli Prime Minister Peres, Text of Counter-
Terrorism Cooperation Accord, Joint Statement 
 
Counter-Terrorism Cooperation Accord Signing Ceremony 
Remarks at signing ceremony,Washington, DC, April 30, 1996. 
 
President Clinton. Good afternoon, Mr. Prime Minister and members of  
the Israeli and American delegations, ladies and gentlemen. For the past 
three years, Israel and the United States have worked hand-in-hand to 
advance the peace process in the Middle East. Today, with this U.S.-
Israel Counter-Terrorism Cooperation Accord, we strengthen our 
partnership to stop the enemies of peace.  
 
With every new step along the path to peace, its enemies grow more and 
more desperate. They know a new day is dawning in the Middle East, and 
that the vast majority of its people want to enjoy the blessings of a 
normal life. Their answer--more violence and terror, more bullets and 
bombs--may seem senseless, but it is the product of  cold calculation. 
By murdering innocent people, they aim to kill the growing hope for 
peace itself.  
 
We will not do what the enemies of peace want. We will not let our anger 
turn us away from the pursuit of peace in the Middle East. Maintaining 
our resolve for peace does not mean,  however, turning the other cheek. 
We must do everything in our power to stop the killing and bring the 
terrorists to justice. That is the only way to give those who have 
chosen peace the confidence they need that they have made the right 
choice and the courage to keep moving forward.  
 
This agreement does just that, by deepening the cooperation between our 
two countries in the fight against terrorism. Prime Minister Peres and I 
worked on it during my visit to Israel  last month, in the wake of a 
terrible string of suicide bombings. Now we have agreed upon areas for 
greater cooperation on information sharing; on the search and 
development; on training and technical assistance; on investigation, 
prosecution, and extradition. In each one we will look at very practical 
ways in which we can work  together better.  
 
I am pleased to sign this accord. I am also pleased that the budget  
I signed just last week included the $50 million I requested earlier 
this year for our joint anti-terrorism efforts this year, including 
today's accords. I thank the Congress for their prompt action here and 
for the bipartisan support it received.  
 
To my friend, the Prime Minister, and the people of Israel, let me say  
that the United States stands with Israel through good times and bad, 
because our countries share the same ideals--freedom, tolerance, 
democracy. We know that wherever those ideals are under siege in one 
country, they are threatened everywhere. We have never been more 
determined to achieve and to defend those ideals and to achieve our goal 
of a just and lasting peace for all the people of the Middle East. Mr. 
Prime Minister. 
 
 
Prime Minister Peres. I would like to thank--from the depths of my 
heart, in the name of the people of Israel--the President, his 
delegation, his team, and him, personally, for really showing the 
deepest understanding that one can hope for, the immediate response 
whenever it is necessary, and the friendship that he has offered time 
and again over the last years.  
 
I see the difference between the camp of terror and the free world. The 
camp of terror is operating under orders: it's disciplined; it's 
organized. The camp of freedom keeps its freedom. You cannot lead the 
camp of freedom unless you have a leader of great inspiration and 
outstanding capacity.  
 
In my own judgment, Bill Clinton has this great capacity to inspire the 
whole free world with his ideas; with his determination; with his 
capacity to distinguish what is right and what is wrong, what is 
immediate and what is long-range, what is support and what is response. 
I feel myself very lucky to see a  person like him standing ahead and 
trying to lead the whole world to  peace and to peace for everybody--not 
just for us, the Israelis, but also for our neighbors; not just for the 
Middle East but for Bosnia, Haiti, or other places.  
 
We are leaving this century with a history of bloodshed. And with 
Godspeed, let's hope that we're entering a different world--one of peace 
and understanding.  
 
The President played a major role in bringing peace between us and the 
Jordanians, between us and the Palestinians. He and his Secretary of 
State are now opening a new chapter to bring  peace between us, Syria, 
and Lebanon that may be the last peace which is necessary in order to 
make the peace comprehensive and all-embracing.  
 
Mr. President, I really, with a full heart of thanks, would like to 
express both our admiration and gratefulness to you, to your 
Administration, to the American Congress, and to the American people. 
The world is a better place to live with this sort of policy and this 
sort of leadership. Thank you very much.  


 
Text of Counter-Terrorism Cooperation Accord Between the Government of 
the United States Of America and the Government Of the State of Israel 
Released by the White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Washington, 
DC, April 30, 1996. 
 
The Government of the United States of America and the Government of the 
State of Israel ("the Parties"): 
 
Unequivocally condemning all acts, methods and practices of terrorism as 
criminal and unjustifiable, wherever and by whomever committed and 
whatever the motivation, in particular the recent heinous acts 
perpetrated against civilians in Israel; 
 
Recalling the declaration of the participants in the historic Middle 
East Summit of the Peacemakers on March 13, 1996 that acts of terror are 
"alien to the moral and spiritual values shared by the peoples of the 
region" and urging all governments to join in condemning and opposing 
such acts; 
 
Convinced that the suppression of acts of international terrorism, 
including those in which States are directly or indirectly involved, is 
an essential element for the maintenance of international peace and 
security; 
 
Calling upon all states to renounce terrorism and to deny financial 
support, the use of their territory, the provision of arms and 
equipment, or any other means of support to terrorist organizations; 
 
Convinced that those responsible for acts of international terrorism 
must be brought to justice through prosecution, extradition, or other 
legal mechanisms; 
 
Sharing the view that international cooperation is an essential factor 
in halting the scourge of international terrorism and that states that 
support terrorism should be subject to sanctions; 
 
Recalling their long-standing and fruitful cooperation on this and other 
topics of mutual security concern; 
 
Resolved to strengthen their own cooperation in combatting international 
terrorism and in encouraging and assisting other states to join in this 
effort; 
 
Have agreed as follows: 
 
Article 1
 
Spheres of Cooperation 
 
1. With a view to enhancing their capabilities to deter, prevent, 
respond to and investigate international terrorist acts or threats of 
international terrorist acts against the United States or Israel, and to 
enlist the cooperation of others in combatting international terrorism, 
the Parties agree to share expertise and otherwise assist each other in 
the following spheres, among others: 
 
1) sharing of information and analyses regarding terrorists and 
terrorist organizations; 
2) training; 
3) exchange of experts; 
4) exchange of experience in dealing with terrorist incidents, including 
crisis management; 
5) exchange of information regarding terrorism-related investigations; 
6) exchange of information on transfers of funds to organizations 
involved in international terrorism; 
7) extradition, prosecution and other legal mechanisms; 
8) research and development; 
9) consulting closely on counterterrorism policy, including regional and 
global counterterrorism initiatives; and 
10) enhancing the counterterrorism capabilities of others. 
 
2. This agreement is intended to supplement existing agreements and 
arrangements between the Parties to address international terrorism. 
Nothing in this agreement shall be construed as derogating from the 
provisions of such agreements or arrangements. 
 
Article 2
 
Establishment of Joint Counterterrorism Group 
 
1. In order to strengthen further their cooperation on counterterrorism 
the Parties hereby establish the United States-Israel Joint 
Counterterrorism Group (JCG). The JCG will serve as a forum for regular 
consultations and development and facilitation of programs of 
counterterrorism cooperation in the spheres listed in Article 1 as well 
as on other mutually agreed counter-terrorism topics. 
 
2. The JCG will be composed of representatives from each Party, 
including as appropriate representatives from the various relevant 
agencies and departments of each Party that work on counterterrorism 
issues. The JCG will be co-chaired by senior counterterrorism officials 
of each Party. 
 
3. The JCG will normally meet annually, alternately in the United States 
and Israel. In addition, special meetings of the JCG may be held to deal 
with particular issues or at the request of either Party. At the request 
of the JCG, experts of the Parties may meet and be in direct 
communication at any other time to assist in fulfilling the purposes of 
this agreement. 
 
4. The JCG may from time to time enter into written understandings or 
implementing arrangements setting forth specific activities to be 
conducted under this agreement. 
 
5. Between meetings of the JCG, participants will maintain contacts with 
their counterparts as required to carry out the purposes of this 
agreement. 
 
Article 3
 
Security of Information 
 
To the extent that any items, plans, specifications or information 
furnished in connection with the implementation of this agreement are 
classified by either Party for security purposes, the General Security 
of Information Agreement dated 10 December 1982 between the Parties and 
that Agreement's Industrial Security Annex, dated 3 March 1983, shall 
apply, unless the Parties agree upon alternative arrangements for 
protecting the material from unauthorized disclosures. 
 
Article 4 
 
General Provision 
 
All undertakings of the Parties under this agreement are to be carried 
out in accordance with their national laws, obligations and policies, 
and are subject to the availability of appropriated funds, resources and 
personnel. 
 
Article 5 
 
Interpretation and Amendment 
 
1. All questions or disputes related to the interpretation or 
implementation of this agreement shall be settled exclusively through 
the diplomatic channel to the mutual satisfaction of the Parties. 
 
2. Either Party may, at any time, request revision of this agreement by 
giving the other Party written notice. Each Party should be prepared to 
discuss the proposal within 90 days thereafter. 
 
Article 6
 
Entry into Force and Duration 
 
This agreement will enter into force on the date of the second of the 
diplomatic notes by which the two Parties notify each other of the 
completion of any necessary internal procedures for entry into force of 
the agreement. It will remain in force until 6 months after either Party 
provides written notice to the other through the diplomatic channel of 
its intention to terminate the agreement. 
 
 
DONE at Washington, D.C., in duplicate, in English and Hebrew, both 
texts being equally authentic, this 30th day of April, 1996, 
corresponding to the 11th day of Iyar, 5756. 
 
FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: 
 
FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE STATE OF ISRAEL: 


 
U.S.-Israel Joint Statement 
Released by the White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Washington, 
DC, April 30, 1996. 
 
President Clinton and Prime Minister Peres have concluded two days of 
intensive discussions on a broad range of issues relating to the U.S.-
Israeli relationship. Those discussions reflect the deep, long-standing 
and unique bonds of friendship which have characterized the U.S.-Israeli 
relationship and the legacy of shared values, common interests, and 
mutual respect for democracy that have made this close and special 
relationship endure. 
 
The President and Prime Minister reviewed the extent of the U.S.-Israeli 
relationship in all its dimensions. They agreed that this cooperation in 
security, economic, and diplomatic areas is grounded in institutions 
that are functioning extremely effectively to the benefit of both 
countries. At the same time, they agreed that, in view of continuing 
threats to regional peace and stability, and in particular the dangers 
posed by proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and advanced 
military technologies, U.S.- Israeli strategic cooperation will grow in 
importance. 
 
To this end, the President and the Prime Minister agreed that a steering 
committee headed by the U.S. Secretary of State and the Israeli Minister 
of Foreign Affairs would be established to explore means of enhancing 
and, where appropriate, formalizing, that cooperation. Two working 
groups will report to the steering committee. The first, dealing with 
security and defense matters, will consider all options including the 
possibility of more formal security accords, for how best to meet common 
threats in the years to come. It will also identify ways to maximize the 
effectiveness of U.S. aid to Israel. The second will deal with other 
policy matters relating to U.S.-Israeli strategic cooperation. 
  
The two leaders affirmed that the strategic partnership between the two 
countries will continue to be based on two key principles: first, the 
United States' unshakable commitment to Israel's security and its 
determination to minimize the risks and costs Israel confronts as it 
pursues peace; and second, the U.S.-Israeli mutual commitment to a 
comprehensive peace and their determination to move toward that goal. 
 
With respect to Israel's security, the President specifically reaffirmed 
the United States' commitment to maintain Israel's qualitative edge and 
to preserve and to strengthen Israel's capability to deter and defend 
itself, by itself, against any adversary or likely combination of 
adversaries. 
 
The President and Prime Minister took great pride in signing the U.S.-
Israel Counter-Terrorism Cooperation Accord. This agreement sets out 
practical measures enabling their two countries to make the best 
possible use of expertise, resources, and capabilities in the war 
against terror. A Joint Counter-Terrorism Group has been established to 
monitor and oversee the implementation of the agreement. Israel and the 
United States also agreed to seek to coordinate their efforts with the 
international effort against terror launched at Sharm al-Sheikh on March 
13, 1996. 
 
The President and the Prime Minister also took note of the joint 
statement on theater missile defense cooperation signed by the Prime 
Minister and Secretary of Defense Perry April 28. The United States and 
Israel recognize the defense of Israel will be made more effective by 
undertaking necessary steps to ensure that Israel's theater missile 
defenses are supported by related United States capabilities. The two 
leaders expressed satisfaction with the positive results to date of the 
ongoing bilateral dialogue on issues relating to the transfer of 
equipment and technology to third countries. 
 
With respect to their determination to achieve a comprehensive peace, 
the two leaders agreed on the importance of implementation of agreements 
reached and the need to expand the orbit of Arab-Israeli peacemaking 
with a view toward achieving normal, peaceful relations between Israel 
and all its Arab neighbors. They welcomed the decision by the 
Palestinian National Council to cancel all the provisions of the 
Palestinian National Covenant which deny Israel's right to exist or are 
otherwise inconsistent with the September 1993 exchange of letters 
between Prime Minister Rabin and Chairman Arafat. This action is an 
important demonstration by the Palestinians of their commitment to honor 
the terms of the 1993 Oslo Accords. 
 
The President and Prime Minister also expressed satisfaction with the 
improved understanding reached last week on Southern Lebanon as a result 
of Secretary of State Christopher's negotiating efforts and after 
discussions with the governments of Israel and Lebanon and in 
consultation with Syria. They noted the importance of prompt activation 
of the monitoring committee and consultative group established by the 
understanding. 
 
Finally, the President and the Prime Minister agreed on the need to end 
the Arab boycott and to eliminate discrimination against Israel in all 
international organizations, including the United Nations. 

(###) 
 
 
 
ARTICLE 2: 
 
Israel Celebrates 48 Years Of Independence 
Deputy Secretary Talbott 
Remarks on behalf of Secretary Christopher at Israel Independence Day 
reception, Washington, DC, April 24, 1996 
 
I regret that I am unable to join you for this celebration of the 48th 
anniversary of Israel's independence. As you know, at the President's 
direction, I am engaged in an intensive effort to end the fighting in 
Lebanon. My goal is to achieve an enduring set of understandings that 
will return calm and peace to civilians on both sides of the Israeli-
Lebanese border. Once the crisis is resolved, we are determined to move 
quickly toward a comprehensive settlement--the only real means to 
provide the people of Israel with the peace and security they deserve. 
 
Since Israel's last Independence Day, it has faced challenges as great 
as any in its history. A year ago, none of us could have imagined that 
Prime Minister Rabin would not be with us today. 
 
Americans have experienced the agony of assassination. We appreciate 
what a traumatic loss his murder was--and still is. And we have nothing 
but admiration for the fortitude with which Prime Minister Peres and so 
many others have sustained the march toward peace with security and a 
new Middle East. 
 
The peace process is supported by many people of good will--Arab as well 
as Israeli--throughout the region. Their ranks will steadily grow as the 
fruits of peace become evident. 
 
But peace is not an easy thing to pursue. The more momentum the process 
gains and the closer we come to our goal, the more embittered and 
desperate the enemies of peace have become. That is why the suicide 
bombers of Hamas have brought carnage to Israel's cities. That is why 
Israel has been forced to fight the cynical guerrillas of Hezbollah, who 
have no compunctions about hiding behind civilians to launch their 
cowardly attacks, with tragic results for the people of Israel and 
Lebanon alike. Once again, a celebration of Israel's independence is 
taking place against a backdrop of threats against the security of 
Israel. That is why we have no choice but to press forward for peace 
with security. 
 
I reaffirm to you the unshakable support of the United States for the 
people of Israel in your pursuit of peace. I am also here to reaffirm my 
confidence and faith in the people of Israel. 
 
The courage and strength you have demonstrated through 48 years of 
struggle, sacrifice, and success and your unique commitment to 
democratic values will see you through again. Of that I am certain. For 
four decades, the United States has stood by Israel's side. We will 
remain by your side as a partner and, above all, as a friend. That was 
the message President Clinton carried to Israel last month and the 
message he asked me to convey today. 
 
The roots of our commitment to your security and prosperity run deep. 
Like you, we are a diverse nation comprised of people from every part of 
the world; like you, our nation cherishes freedom; and, like you, we are 
deeply committed to take risks for peace. 
 
It is my sincere hope that when we mark this occasion next year, the 
real peace and security that Israel so richly deserves will at last be 
within its grasp. President Clinton and I will continue to do everything 
in our power to help make it so. 

(###) 
 
 
 
ARTICLE 3: 
 
U.S. Global Economic Leadership 
Joan E. Spero, Under Secretary for Economic,Business, and Agricultural 
Affairs 
Remarks at Town Meeting, Boston, Massachusetts, May 2, 1996 
 
It is a pleasure to be here with you today to talk about U.S. global 
economic leadership. I want to thank the World Affairs Council for its 
excellent work in organizing regional foreign policy conferences such as 
this. Secretary Christopher and all of us at the State Department value 
these opportunities to discuss key foreign affairs issues with the 
American public, to describe our policy objectives, and to hear your 
views. 
 
Our major foreign policy challenge today is to redefine the objectives 
of U.S. foreign policy for the post-Cold War world. We live today in a 
world without a clear common enemy, a world with pressing global 
problems such as terrorism, health, and the environment, and a world 
where national borders are increasingly blurred by economic 
interdependence.  
 
In the realm of foreign economic policy, one of our primary objectives 
is to promote the prosperity of the American people by opening foreign 
markets and supporting American exports and investment. But, our foreign 
economic policy is also an integral part of our broader foreign policy 
vision. 
 
Economic diplomacy plays an important role in supporting the traditional 
foreign policy goals of peace and security. In Bosnia, Haiti, Russia, 
the New Independent States of the former Soviet Union, and the Middle 
East, we have understood that increasing prosperity undergirds lasting 
peace and progress toward democracy. Thus, we use traditional economic 
assistance policies and also promote domestic economic reforms, regional 
economic cooperation, and foreign investment and trade. 
 
A less understood, but equally important, goal of our international 
economic policy is the maintenance of American influence in key regions 
of the world. We have long used political influence to advance our 
commercial goals; we can also employ economic tools to further our 
political goals. The presence abroad of American traders, investors, and 
financiers--and the importance of the American market--can be as 
effective instruments of foreign policy as military power.  
 
Historically, NATO anchored us militarily in Europe and the U.S.-Japan 
security alliance was the pillar of our security presence in Asia. 
Today, economic relationships and the new economic institutions they 
have spawned--for example, the World Trade Organization and NAFTA--
provide equally important anchors for the projection of America's 
political influence around the world. 
 
Thus, economic tools are increasingly important mechanisms for 
projecting American leadership and influence and are an increasingly 
vital component of U.S. foreign policy. The momentous convergence in 
global security and economic relationships over the past few years 
necessitates a new foreign policy--one which successfully integrates our 
national security concerns with our evolving economic interests.  
 
Today, I want to talk with you about how we are working to pursue our 
nation's increasingly interrelated security and economic interests--and 
to highlight the three principal methods we employ to carry out this 
mission. First, as I mentioned, we use economics to support our 
diplomatic goals of peace and democracy; second, we are constructing a 
new economic architecture for the post-Cold War world--at the bilateral, 
regional, and  multilateral levels; and third, we promote U.S. 
competitiveness in the global economy by supporting U.S. business 
overseas.  
 
Support for Peace and Democracy 
 
In recent months, we have seen remarkable progress toward peace in 
regions long wracked by strife. The Dayton peace accords have put an end 
to years of bloody conflict in the Balkans, and opponents in Northern 
Ireland have begun to leave the battleground for the negotiating table. 
Last fall, the Palestinians and the Israelis signed a new round of peace 
accords and in South Africa, the states of the former Soviet Union, and 
Haiti, governments elected by their citizens are laying the foundations 
of stable, democratic rule. 
 
American diplomacy has been vital to these developments. While diplomacy 
is necessary to negotiate peace or to launch democratic rule, economic 
security is critical to sustaining them. That is why the U.S. is 
promoting economic revitalization in trouble spots around the world. 
 
Let me begin with the Middle East, a model of economic support for peace 
and security. I personally have been very much involved in this effort--
and I have the cumulative jet lag to prove it. In recent years as the 
peace process has moved forward, we have attempted to provide a solid 
economic underpinning to buttress diplomatic gains. 
 
Our first major effort in the Middle East was on behalf of the 
Palestinians. It began immediately after the historic signing of the 
Oslo accord at the White House in September 1993. Support for the 
Palestinian economy was, in many ways, a traditional assistance effort--
mobilizing donors from around the globe to promote a viable economy in 
the West Bank and Gaza. 
 
However, even this effort was in many respects unique: When we started, 
there was no Palestinian government to receive and administer the 
assistance. To help them get started, we had to pay the salaries of the 
police to ensure public order and of the tax collectors to generate 
revenue to fund operations. The effort also required an unprecedented 
level of cooperation among former adversaries, the 40-plus donor 
countries, and the international organizations trying to help. 
 
Now, 2-1/2 years later, the Palestinians have held their first general 
elections and inaugurated a Palestinian Council. Despite continuing 
poverty and refugee camps in the West Bank and Gaza, sewers are being 
built, roads are being paved, and there is a building boom financed by 
private capital. 
 
As we have worked to expand the circle of peace, we have developed new 
types of economic diplomacy to support the peace process. One example is 
economic summits, which were held in Casablanca in 1994 and in Amman in 
1995. The next summit will be held in Cairo later this year. These 
summits have brought together political and business leaders from the 
Middle East and around the world. There are two novel aspects to these 
summits: They bring private capital directly into the peace process and 
they foster regional economic cooperation. Let me explain. 
 
Clearly, it is business--not government--which is the real engine of 
economic development. As a frequent traveler to the region, I have found 
a striking change in attitudes in recent years. Two years ago in 
Casablanca, political and business leaders from all corners of the 
region--Arabs and Israelis--mingled freely and talked about doing 
business. Last year in Amman, deals were signed. Israel and Jordan 
reached agreement to develop jointly the Jordan Rift Valley which 
straddles their border. They will construct a joint international 
airport in the Eilat/Aqaba area. American firms are helping this happen. 
Sprint signed an agreement to bring Internet service to Jordan. Israeli 
and Egyptian firms signed preliminary agreements to establish a pipeline 
to bring Egyptian natural gas to Israel and Gaza. 
 
We have high hopes for further progress at the next Middle East Summit 
in Cairo later this year. The focus in Cairo will be on investment 
opportunities in the region and on helping businesses tap into potential 
projects. These include regional water programs, the interconnection of 
electricity grids, regional high-speed fiber optic cables, roads and 
railways, and joint hotel and tourism projects.  
 
An important aspect of our economic diplomacy is the creation of new 
regional institutions to foster regional economic cooperation. Building 
on the summit process, we have helped to establish a Middle East 
Development Bank, a regional business council and the Middle 
East/Mediterranean Travel and Tourism Agency. 
 
The Middle East Bank is the linch-pin of these efforts. The bank was 
initiated by Israel, Egypt, Jordan, and the Palestinians. It has three 
specific objectives: To assist the private sector, to promote regional 
projects, and to advance regional economic dialogue. The bank will focus 
on regional projects, and its relatively small capital base will be used 
to leverage existing resources in the private sector, the World Bank, 
and other institutions. We plan to formally launch the new bank, which 
will be headquartered in Cairo, at the summit there this fall. 
 
Finally, let me say a word about Lebanon. As you know, Secretary 
Christopher negotiated a cease-fire last Friday to end the hostilities 
in southern Lebanon and northern Israel. Part of the agreement is an 
effort to assist in the reconstruction needs of Lebanon. Here again, we 
will use the tools of economic diplomacy to help build the foundation 
for a lasting peace. The Middle East is a model of the Clinton 
Administration's strategy of putting economics at the center of our 
foreign policy to support both our security and economic interests while 
fostering regional security and prosperity. 
 
New Economic Architecture 
 
A second major goal of our foreign economic policy is to build and 
modernize what we call the economic architecture for the post-Cold War 
world. Our objective is to create an international system for the 21st 
century that is more open, more market-oriented, and that is better for 
world prosperity and for world peace. There is also a political 
dimension: the new economic architecture is a way for the U.S. to 
project its power and influence in key regions of the world.  
 
We are working at all levels--global, regional, and bilateral--and in 
many fora to strengthen international economic institutions. At the 
global level we have worked to launch the World Trade Organization and 
to modernize the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the 
United Nations. Our regional efforts to build a new architecture focus 
on the Americas, Europe, and Asia.  
 
Here in the Western Hemisphere, we wanted to support new, and in some 
cases, fragile democracies and to help consolidate the process of 
economic reform already underway across the region. So, in December 
1994, President Clinton hosted 34 democratically elected leaders at the 
Summit of the Americas in Miami. There, we committed to work together in 
new ways to strengthen democracy, eradicate poverty, promote prosperity 
by consolidating economic reforms, and protect the environment. We also 
agreed on a new framework for regional cooperation, including the 
creation of a "Free Trade Area of the Americas" by 2005.  
 
In Europe, we needed to counteract the perception that both the U.S. and 
Europe were turning inward and drifting apart. Despite the strong and 
enduring ties that have long existed between the United States and 
Europe, Europeans worried that the U.S. was turning its attention to the 
dynamic emerging regions of Asia and Latin America. We were concerned 
that Europe was focused on the development of the European Union--
appropriately, I might add--and on its relationships to the east. 
Moreover, strains over Bosnia prior to the Dayton agreements fueled 
concerns that NATO was losing its relevance. 
 
We needed to renew and reshape our partnership with Europe to make it 
more responsive to current times. That is why President Clinton went to 
Madrid last December to launch a New Transatlantic Agenda with the 
European Union leaders. Economic cooperation is at the heart of the New 
Transatlantic Agenda. The Transatlantic Business Dialogue, composed of 
CEOs from more than 200 American and European firms, keeps us focused on 
actions of practical and tangible benefit to business. This is why we 
are working to conclude Mutual Recognition Agreements for standards in 
such sectors as telecommunications, and a multilateral Information 
Technology Agreement--ITA--to eliminate tariffs in this important area. 
In this way, we are building a new transatlantic marketplace,  in which 
trade barriers to bilateral trade and investment will be reduced or 
eliminated. The New Transatlantic Agenda has enabled us to reaffirm the 
central importance of the transatlantic relationship and to deepen our 
economic partnership with the EU, while promoting peace and stability 
around the world.  
 
Finally, let me turn to Asia. The challenge we faced in Asia was to 
strengthen existing security arrangements and to participate fully in 
the region's dynamic economic growth. The Asia-Pacific is the most 
dynamic economic region of the world. It accounts for half of the 
world's output; by the end of this century, one-half of all world trade 
will take place across the Asia-Pacific region. Two-thirds of the United 
States' total trade is with the Pacific countries. In Asia, a strong 
U.S. commitment to the region's security has created an environment 
conducive to economic development, growing markets, and flourishing 
trade. In turn, prosperity is the best foundation for the advancement of 
our strategic interests: democratic values, non-proliferation, 
protection of the environment, and human rights. 
 
We have turned to the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum, or APEC, 
to anchor us in the Asia-Pacific. APEC was established in 1989 as a 
loose consultative organization representing the world's most dynamic 
economies and one-third of the world's people. It reached a turning 
point in 1993 when President Clinton brought the 18 APEC leaders 
together for the first time in Seattle. There, the APEC leaders pledged 
to create a "community of Asia Pacific Economies." Since then, they have 
gradually put that vision into practice. In 1994, the APEC leaders 
reconvened in Indonesia and committed to achieving free and open trade 
and investment in the Asia-Pacific by 2010 and 2020. Last November in 
Osaka, the APEC leaders adopted a concrete action agenda for achieving 
liberalization in trade and investment by those dates, and members 
announced so-called "downpayments" on actual liberalization. This year 
in Manila, the leaders will put forth their national and regional action 
plans for liberalization. 
 
Business is an especially active participant in APEC. Business 
representatives participate directly in APEC's 10 working groups, where 
most of the day-to-day problem-solving for business takes place. Last 
year in Osaka, the leaders established an APEC Business Advisory Council 
to institutionalize the critical role of business in APEC and to ensure 
that business has direct input at the policy-making level. 
 
While APEC is facilitating business activities and promoting 
liberalization in the Asia-Pacific region, it also plays an important 
geopolitical role. It anchors the U.S. in the fastest-growing region in 
the world and complements our military presence in the Pacific. It is a 
vehicle for bringing China into the regional economy and the Asian 
political community. In addition, the fact that China, Hong Kong, and 
Taipei are all members of APEC enables them to come together and find 
common purpose. 
 
The America Desk: Helping U.S. Business Compete 
 
The third key principle of our foreign economic policy is to support 
U.S. competitiveness in the global economy. Promoting an increasingly 
open international trading system is vital to American exports and 
American jobs. We also must ensure that our companies are able to take 
advantage of opportunities created by open market systems. 
 
Secretary Christopher made support for U.S. economic interests a core 
function of the modern State Department. He calls it the "America Desk." 
Our embassies around the world are working harder than ever to help U.S. 
companies identify opportunities, safeguard investments, and make deals. 
We keep the pressure on foreign governments to pass and enforce 
intellectual property legislation; we negotiate bilateral investment 
treaties that provide fair treatment for our businesses; and we help our 
companies resolve investment disputes.  
 
The positive feedback we are getting shows that we are already making a 
difference. Business people who once never thought of going to a U.S. 
embassy for assistance, now tell me it is their first port of call when 
they do business abroad. Our goal now is to bring the same perspective 
to Washington, to bring business closer to the State Department itself, 
and make its concerns central to our policy-making process. If we are 
truly to put economics at the center of our foreign policy, we must 
consult more extensively with businesses as we develop policies that 
affect their interests. 
 
Conclusion 
 
So, America's economic prowess and American global leadership are 
inextricably linked. We live in an era in which the U.S. is uniquely 
positioned to provide that leadership and advance our own political and 
economic interests. The challenge we face is to continue to revitalize 
America's foreign policy for the 21st century. By bringing economics to 
the center of that process and by understanding the ways in which 
economic tools support our diplomatic and political objectives, we have 
taken a big step in the right direction. As we continue this effort, we 
will need the ideas, the advice, and the support of people such as 
yourselves.  

(###) 
 
 
 
ARTICLE 4: 
 
Proliferation Dangers to U.S.Security in the Post-Cold War World 
Thomas E. McNamara, Assistant Secretary For Political-Military Affairs 
Address to the World Affairs Council, Portland, Maine, April 23, 1996 
 
Thank you for the opportunity to speak to you today. In the post-Cold 
War era, the United States faces an array of foreign policy challenges--
from trade barriers to unsustainable population growth, from conflicts 
in Bosnia and the Middle East to the subject of my remarks today: the 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. 
 
While these issues can appear daunting and intractable, never before 
have we had such opportunities to secure American interests. Through 
intensified diplomatic efforts and worldwide cooperation, the U.S. is 
waging tough campaigns against crime, illegal drugs, terrorism, and the 
trafficking of deadly weapons and materials. For example, this year we 
will seek to fulfill the President's 1995 UN call for an effort to 
negotiate and sign an international declaration on citizens' security, 
aimed at protecting our citizens, our borders, and our institutions. 
 
Vigorous American leadership is essential to maintain a world hospitable 
to our national interests. As Secretary Christopher has said, "Retreat 
is not a responsible option for the United States." American engagement 
can be, and often is, decisive in countering threats to, not only our 
security, but to global stability. It is often the case that no other 
nation has the resources, respect, vision, and power to lead the world 
in finding solutions and countering threats to our security. 
 
As we embrace this role, we must remember that the international affairs 
budget is a cornerstone of our national security policy. To again borrow 
the Secretary's words: 
 
The bipartisan consensus on behalf of American engagement in the world 
is a vital source of America's strength. . . . We cannot protect our 
interests if we do not marshal the resources to stand by our 
commitments. We cannot have it both ways. Those who say they want a 
strong America have a duty to help keep America strong. And diplomatic 
readiness is our first line of defense--in large part so that we are not 
compelled to put our men and women in uniform in harm's way. 
 
Yet we spend only about 1% of our federal budget on diplomacy and 
assistance programs. The State Department's operations budget has held 
steady since fiscal 1996 at about $2.5 billion, only slightly more than  
the cost of one B-2 bomber. Additional cuts would close additional 
diplomatic missions, lengthen the wait for passports, reduce our ability 
to help the nearly 2 million Americans who require help each year 
overseas, and lessen help for U.S. business.  
 
How does diplomacy translate into our own national security? To a large 
extent, by creating an international political consensus on acceptable 
norms that govern the behavior of nation states and by building trust 
and confidence in security assurances offered in exchange for such 
responsible behavior. This is particularly true in the arena of 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. A country capable of 
developing such weapons will do so unless it is convinced and trusts 
that it will not be attacked--and if attacked, that its allies will come 
to its aid. NATO is a prime example of such a success, as are other 
treaties and conventions specifically designed to control nuclear, 
chemical, or biological weapons and their means of delivery. 
 
It is worth noting that even before the end of the Cold War, the 
international community began the process of creating arrangements and 
developing standards to control weapons of mass destruction and that the 
U.S. was the instigator of these international norms. U.S. leadership 
was critical in the formation, adoption, and continuing viability of 
many of these regimes and initiatives by assuring the participants of 
U.S. commitment to their national security and territorial integrity. 
The belief by U.S. allies was fundamental to their decisions to forego 
national programs of weapons of mass destruction. And, of course, Soviet 
protection of its allies was critical to their compliance with regimes 
that denied them nuclear weapons development programs. 
 
The Soviet Union, which we considered our enemy, also saw the wisdom of 
some of these international initiatives; for example, the Non-
Proliferation Treaty--NPT--was conceived and signed at the height of the 
Cold War with the active participation of the Soviet Union and its 
satellites. Additional measures, such as the Zangger Committee to 
control technology useful for nuclear weapons, flowed from the NPT. To 
deny proliferant countries the means to deliver weapons of mass 
destruction, the Missile Technology Control Regime--MTCR--was conceived 
in the 1980s--before the dissolution of the Soviet Union and in 
anticipation of the kind of regional conflicts that now present the 
greatest threat to global stability. 
 
In fact, a series of regional initiatives to control weapons of mass 
destruction, specifically nuclear weapons, have their origins during the 
tense years of the Cold War. The Treaty of Tlatelolco, which establishes 
a nuclear weapons-free zone in Latin America, dates back to 1967. 
Negotiations to establish an African nuclear weapons-free zone go back 
as far as the mid-1960s and for a South Pacific nuclear weapons-free 
zone to 1985. Negotiations for the Chemical Weapons Convention date from 
1970 and for the Australia Group to Ban Chemical Weapons and Transport 
of Precursor Chemicals from 1984. 
 
Ironically, the end of the Cold War also ended the bipolar certainty and 
control. States that no longer can rely on superpower patronage--that 
have lost their sense of domestic and international security--have opted 
for their own weapons of mass destruction programs. Regional actors, 
especially those cut off from the international mainstream, have been 
freed from superpower constraints, in particular, those constraints that 
were imposed by the former Soviet Union. 
 
Iraq and the D.P.R.K. are cases in point. Recent revelations of the UN 
Special Commission paint a grim picture. Unknown to any of us, coalition 
forces in the Gulf war faced a series of Iraqi biological and chemical 
weapons deployable on a variety of delivery systems. Worse, we now know 
that Saddam Hussein had plans that would have allowed him to target most 
of the capitals of Europe and the Middle East with missiles tipped with 
nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons by the end of this century. 
North Korea's use of obsolete, but indigenous, technology to create a 
nuclear weapons program also put us on the edge of a major crisis. 
 
This trend even goes beyond states. For the first time, non-state actors 
have become risks in this field. A bizarre Japanese cult not only used 
chemical weapons in a terrorist strike, but also was acquiring the 
technology to build nuclear and biological weapons. Opportunists and 
criminals have managed to get their hands on small quantities of nuclear 
weapons-usable material. Proliferation was always a game played by 
states--and a limited number of them. The existing nonproliferation 
system has not been geared toward coping with the challenge of 
privatized proliferation. 
 
These new challenges--whether from rogue states or rogue individuals--
have called for responses unlike those the non-proliferation and arms 
control practitioners of the Cold War would recognize. The Agreed 
Framework for North Korea, the UN Special Commission for Iraq, the 
creation of multilateral science centers to prevent "brain drain," and 
some of the unique arrangements the United States entered into to remove 
nuclear material from the former Soviet Union all broke long-established 
precedents. 
 
We continue to develop new solutions to these new problems, but the most 
effective strategy is to create conditions under which irresponsible 
behavior in spreading weapons of mass destruction or technology and 
materiel for their manufacture will provoke instant and global 
opprobrium. The non-proliferation regimes create and nurture such 
international norms and standards of behavior. For this reason, they are 
in our national interest. With-out our participation and support, they 
would be hollow; with our leadership, our resources, and our compliance, 
they will succeed. 
 
We already see the results of an accelerating global acceptance of the 
benefits of non-proliferation. Of the new republics formed after the 
dissolution of the Soviet Union, only Russia is a nuclear-weapons state. 
All the others who have joined the non-proliferation treaty did so as 
non-nuclear-weapons states. The indefinite extension of the NPT last May 
and adherence to it by all but the handful of countries with obvious 
political and security motives to hold open a nuclear option was the 
clearest example of this phenomenon. Their support for indefinite 
extension reflected the simple recognition that the treaty is in their 
national interests--that global stability is served by international 
efforts to stem the spread of weapons of mass destruction. The NPT's 
extension can, in turn, help lay the foundation for further nuclear 
reductions by the nuclear weapons states. 
 
There has been a rush by countries to demonstrate their commitment to 
international norms through adherence to the various non-proliferation 
regimes. Former dissenters from the consensus on non-proliferation have 
joined up. Argentina and South Africa joined the NPT and have been 
accompanied by Brazil into the MTCR. Desire for participation in the 
NSG, AG, MTCR, and the Wassenaar Arrangement is high. 
 
The Wassenaar Arrangement, in fact, is an excellent example of post- 
Cold War cooperation among former adversaries. The former COCOM regime 
was designed as an institution of the Cold War to respond to the threat 
posed by the Soviet Union and its allies. The Wassenaar Arrangement is 
based on national controls and is not directed at any state or group of 
states. It will not impede legitimate transactions nor interfere with 
the rights of states to acquire means of self-defense. It is focused on 
dangerous behavior by states. It will promote extreme vigilance 
concerning trade of very sensitive dual-use items and technologies and 
provide the means of defining common approaches to trade with regions of 
potential instability such as the Middle East and South Asia. 
 
The construction and nurturing of a web of norms and standards of non-
proliferation behavior may take time, but it does bear fruit. Even 
China, long an advocate of weapons of mass destruction, has begun the 
arduous process of conforming its policies to the evolving international 
norms. It signed the NPT in 1992. We continue a dialog with them on 
missile and chemical exports. There will be bumps in the road, but the 
greater the acceptance of these international norms by an ever-growing 
number of countries, the more difficult it will be for either a state or 
a non-state player to indulge in threats of mass destruction. 
 
In looking at the creation of behavioral norms, we need to look at the 
role that sanctions can play. The threat of U.S. sanctions can be used 
to back up our diplomacy and has, in fact, been useful in certain cases. 
We have taken hard decisions to impose sanctions, consistent with the 
requirements of law. But imposing or threatening to impose sanctions is 
not always the best way to proceed in advancing non-proliferation goals. 
 
One problem with sanctions is their number and complexity. To convince a 
government to do or not to do something, we need to be able to convey a 
clear and understandable message. Our web of sanctions laws confuses us 
and certainly confuses other countries. Another problem is that many of 
the sanctions are disproportionate to the offense. 
 
We cannot use sanctions effectively as a tool of policy if we cannot 
make the punishment fit the crime. That problem is complicated by the 
laws' inflexibility. If we determine that "x" has happened, we have no 
choice but to impose sanctions. While most of the laws permit waivers, 
the waiver standards vary dramatically, making it extremely difficult to 
tailor the threat of sanctions to make it most persuasive in each 
circumstance. 
 
Since our unilateral sanctions have no basis in international norms--
unlike UN or GATT/WTO sanctions--they are not recognized or accepted by 
foreign governments. Their broad scope smacks of extraterritoriality, 
which makes other governments actively hostile to our sanctions. This, 
in turn, has a negative effect on our non-proliferation policy. 
 
Finally, many of the sanctions hurt us more than they hurt the intended 
victim. For example, cutting off Export-Import Bank financing as certain 
sanctions laws require can cost U.S. companies hundreds of millions of 
dollars in business. In the vast majority of cases, the targeted country 
simply goes to an alternate supplier to purchase the same items. The 
lack of international support also means that the sanctions have less of 
an economic effect on the intended target, have an unfair impact on the 
U.S. economy, and weaken our ability to gain other nations' support. 
 
We do need other nations' support, not only to maintain the non-
proliferation norms but also to devote resources to the solution of non-
proliferation threats. Our arms control successes, coupled with the 
dissolution of the former Soviet Union, have bequeathed a vast and 
growing trove of nuclear materials, knowledge, and technology that no 
longer is circumscribed by totalitarian controls. The breakup of the 
Soviet empire radically changed the proliferation landscape. Thousands 
of nuclear weapons and hundreds of tons of weapons-usable uranium and 
plutonium have been rendered excess by our success in reducing nuclear 
arsenals. 
 
But nuclear weapons and nuclear weapons-usable materials do not 
disappear when they have fulfilled their political purpose. Nor do the 
scientific knowledge and technical skills that produced those weapons. A 
proliferator or a terrorist needs only a few kilograms of plutonium--
roughly an amount the size of a soda can--to destroy a city. It is thus 
imperative that we and other countries assist the heirs of the Soviet 
nuclear complex to protect nuclear materials, control nuclear 
technology, and redirect weapons scientists to peaceful pursuits.
 
This nuclear heritage encompasses not only Russia but also new nation 
states that never before had to shoulder the responsibilities of 
national control of nuclear materials and technology. The enormous task 
of meeting their new international obligations and of bearing the costs 
of arms control treaties has fallen on the New Independent States 
simultaneously with economic and political dislocations. No one country 
alone could provide the assistance needed to upgrade the systems of 
protection for nuclear materials or to ease the economic hardships which 
motivate attempted smuggling of nuclear materials. 
 
It is noteworthy that the United States recognized early the need for 
serious, long-term engagement with Russia, the other New Independent 
States, as well as the Baltic republics and countries of central Europe 
to prevent the diffusion of materials and technology otherwise 
controlled by non-proliferation regimes. The security of nuclear 
materials and technology has been a top-priority foreign policy 
objective of both Congress and the President for two consecutive 
administrations. 
 
The President has involved all levels of the executive branch in this 
endeavor. From the beginning, we have pursued a multifaceted strategy 
that combines diplomatic, arms control, technical, and law enforcement 
initiatives and involves many U.S. agencies. There is a simple core 
logic behind our effort: nuclear weapons, materials, and expertise must 
be properly secured; excess quantities of nuclear material must be 
reduced; the gains we have made in arms control must become 
irreversible; and the skills needed to make weapons of mass destruction 
must not be auctioned to the highest proliferant bidder. Let me outline 
the major elements of our strategy.It is clear that the threat of 
nuclear proliferation does not stem from nuclear materials alone but 
also from the knowledge of how to make them lethal. Soviet weapons 
programs employed thousands of scientists and engineers with expertise 
invaluable to terrorists or rogue states. Science and technology centers 
in Russia and Ukraine fund cooperative projects with Western scientists 
to engage thousands of scientists throughout the former Soviet Union in 
constructive, peaceful projects. 
 
At the government--state--level, we ensured that new nuclear weapons 
states did not emerge from the breakup of the Soviet Union. Ukraine, 
Kazakstan, and Belarus joined the NPT and agreed to remove all nuclear 
weapons from their territory. Removal is completed in Kazakstan and is 
progressing well in Ukraine and Belarus. And through the cooperative 
threat reduction program, funded by the Nunn-Lugar legislation, we 
ensure that these and Russian strategic systems are dismantled in a 
timely and safe manner. 
 
Dismantling nuclear weapons eliminates one problem but creates another--
large stockpiles of nuclear materials. To secure the materials 
themselves, we are assisting dozens of former Soviet nuclear facilities 
with effective systems of nuclear materials protection, accounting, and 
control. To assure that these systems remain in use, we are assisting 
with the development of independent regulatory authorities in countries 
that have never needed such infrastructure. 
 
Should these protective measures be breached, we must be able to inter-
dict thefts so that nuclear materials  are not handed over to terrorists 
or governments seeking nuclear weapons. We are assisting these new 
countries to create effective customs and export control systems. We are 
helping them write new laws, establish new agencies, and develop the 
technical capabilities to implement effective controls. We have also 
initiated international cooperation to combat nuclear smuggling. 
 
The international community sees the threat of nuclear proliferation and 
is taking the steps necessary to meet it. We have no evidence that a 
successful transaction involving weapons-usable material has occurred or 
that an extensive nuclear black market has developed. To our knowledge, 
nuclear smuggling almost always results in the arrest of the 
traffickers. Indeed, most cases involve flim-flam artists peddling 
bogus, though sometimes dangerous, material. But the danger from even 
one successful case of diversion, whether it involves a nuclear weapon, 
weapons- usable nuclear material, or technical expertise, is most 
serious. 
 
We are attacking this problem at every level and are using the full 
range of tools available to us. We will have to combat this problem for 
the remainder of this century--and beyond. Re-sources must be applied 
not only to the high-profile activities that dominate popular fiction on 
this topic but also to the more mundane--but more effective efforts to 
secure nuclear material at its source and to reduce the supply of 
weapons-usable material. This is going to be a very long-distance run, 
and we are in it for the long haul. 
 
Here again we see a global convergence of views regarding the importance 
of this issue. Our concern is mirrored by that of the Government of 
Russia. The most dramatic evidence of this convergence of views is 
President Yeltsin's initiative in convoking the Moscow Nuclear Summit, 
which took place Friday and Saturday. This initiative, warmly and 
immediately accepted by President Clinton and the other P-8 leaders, has 
affirmed international commitment to nuclear security and safety. 
 
However, I repeat: The end of the Cold War has, in fact, increased, not 
decreased, the threat of proliferation. This continued threat requires 
that, in the absence of a bipolar balance of  power, the U.S. continue 
its function as the fulcrum of efforts to frustrate the spread of 
weapons of mass destruction. 

(###) 
 
 
 
ARTICLE 5: 
 
Nigeria: Commonwealth Ministerial Group Recommends New Measures On 
Nigeria 
Statement by Acting Department Spokesman Glyn Davies, Washington, DC, 
April 25, 1996. 
 
The United States welcomes the April 23 recommendation by the 
Commonwealth Ministerial Action Group--CMAG--that Commonwealth nations 
implement new measures to register their continuing disapproval of 
developments in Nigeria. Several of these recommendations are consistent 
with measures already adopted by the European Union and the United 
States.  
 
These measures include visa restrictions on members of the Nigerian 
regime and their families, withdrawal of military attaches, termination 
of military training, and an embargo on arms exports. The recommended 
downgrading of cultural and educational links and the banning of 
sporting contacts, with the exception of the Olympics, also complement 
avenues the United States is pursuing. 
 
By adopting the Ministerial Group's recommendations, the Commonwealth 
and its member countries will be joining an increasing number of 
international voices calling for real progress on a rapid, transparent 
transition to democratic rule and respect for human rights and the rule 
of law in Nigeria. The Ministerial Group's recommendations and the UN 
Human Rights Commission's April 22 unanimous adoption of a resolution on 
the human rights situation in Nigeria demonstrate that the international 
community will not permit governments such as Nigeria's to impede 
democratic progress and ignore standards for human rights with impunity. 
 
We share the Commonwealth's view that the general human rights situation 
in Nigeria continues to deteriorate. Notwithstanding the holding of non-
party local government elections in March 1996, new restrictive decrees 
issued by the Government of Nigeria cast doubt on its commitment to the 
democratic process. New measures such as those proposed by the CMAG, 
implemented collectively, offer the best possibility of impressing upon 
the Nigerian leadership the urgency of taking credible, positive steps 
toward establishing an elected, civilian government in Nigeria. We hope 
for the early adoption of the Ministerial Group's recommendations by 
Commonwealth member countries and look forward to the opportunity to 
consult with them on possible new multilateral economic measures. 

(###) 
 
[END DISPATCH VOL 7 NO 19]

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