U.S Department of State 
Dispatch Volume 7, Number 15, April 8, 1996 
Bureau of Public Affairs 
 
ARTICLES IN THIS ISSUE: 
 
1. Defeating the Forces of Destruction  A National Security Priority--
President Clinton 
 
2. Ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention: A Top Priority--
Secretary Christopher 
 
3.  Statement on the Death of Secretary  Of Commerce Ron Brown--
Secretary Christopher 
 
4.  The Challenge of Change in Russia--Anthony Lake 
 
5.  National and International Efforts To Control Nuclear Weapons--
Thomas E. McNamara 
 
6.  United States, France, and The United Kingdom To Sign Protocols Of 
the South Pacific Nuclear-Free Zone Treaty 
 
7.  Fact Sheet: Implementation of the LIBERTAD Act 
 
 
ARTICLE 1: 
 
Defeating the Forces of Destruction: A National Security Priority 
President Clinton 
Remarks to the University of Central Oklahoma community, Oklahoma City, 
Oklahoma, April 5, 1996 
 
Former Governor George Nigh, Rep. Ernest Istook, Mayor Bob Rudkin, House 
Speaker Glen Johnson; HUD Regional Representative Steve Weatherford, 
members of the University of Central Oklahoma community: I have just 
come from a memorial service for the victims of the Oklahoma City 
tragedy. So let me begin by sharing with you what I said to their 
families and friends. 
 
The loss this community suffered one year ago can never be made whole. 
Nothing we say or do can bring back the children, the mothers and 
fathers, the sons and daughters, the husbands and wives who were stolen 
from you before their time. But while your spirit has been terribly 
tested, it has not been defeated. Ever since the very first alarm 
sounded, Oklahoma City, with the help of thousands of Americans all 
across our land, came together. 
 
From an extraordinary rescue effort to the scholarship funds for 
surviving children, to the current outpouring of support that will allow 
families to travel to Denver for the trial, you have reminded us that 
when America pulls together, we are never defeated. And you have shown 
children all over our country that in the wake of evil, goodness will 
prevail. 
 
I wanted to end this day of remembrance here--in a place of learning and 
reason that is focused on the future. You share with me a special 
responsibility to make sense of this senseless act of violence and to do 
everything we can to stop it from happening again. 
 
To succeed, we have to put Oklahoma City in a larger context: The 
challenge that all democracies now face in protecting the safety of 
their citizens. 
 
Think about this moment we are living. For more people than ever before, 
it is a moment of remarkable possibility. Our country is at peace. Our 
economy is strong. The Cold War is over. Democracy and free markets are 
taking root on every continent. Former political prisoners--from Havel 
to Mandela--are now presidents. And around the world, conflicts that 
once seemed beyond solution are closer than ever to resolution. 
 
What we're seeing is the blocs, barriers, and borders that defined the 
world for previous generations give way with the help of a new 
generation of extraordinary technology. The laptops, modems, CD-ROMs, 
and satellites you use every day send ideas, products, and money across 
our planet in seconds. They bring with them extraordinary opportunities-
to build a safer and more prosperous future, to make our own people 
healthier and wiser through advances in medicine and education, to 
protect our planet from decay through sustainable development, to create 
good new jobs by opening markets around the world. 
 
But the promise of this moment is matched by peril. The false prophets 
that dominated so much of our century--fascism and communism--are dead 
or discredited. But the forces of intolerance live on. And just as 
surely as fascism and communism, they would spread hatred over hope, 
chaos over community. These forces can be seen in sudden explosions of 
ethnic and religious rivalries that my friend Ron Brown, his Commerce 
Department colleagues, some of our finest business leaders, and their 
military crew were working so hard to stop from happening again when 
their plane went down in the Balkans. 
 
They can be seen in the reckless aggression of rogue states. And they 
can be seen especially in a growing web of threats that include 
terrorism, international organized crime, drug trafficking, and the 
spread of weapons of mass destruction. 
 
Now, groups that once operated only in one country or region or engaged 
in only one kind of criminal activity have become global and 
diversified: drug traffickers barter machine guns, terrorists sell 
counterfeit bills, organized criminals smuggle nuclear materials. 
 
They find strength in the very openness, freedom, and progress we 
cherish. They are equal opportunity destroyers with no respect for 
borders. 
 
No one is immune--not the people of Japan, where a gas attack in the 
Tokyo subway poisoned thousands of commuters; not the people of England, 
where brutal bombings took innocent lives and threatened the growing 
prospects for peace in Northern Ireland; not the people of Israel, where 
suicide bombers killed scores of innocent people in their desperate 
attempt to kill the peace process; not the people of Latin America or 
Southeast Asia, where heavily armed drug traffickers have murdered 
judges, journalists, police officers, and passers-by; not the people of 
the new democracies in Eastern Europe, where organized criminals prey on 
decent men and women trying to build a better life; and not the people 
of our own country, where home-grown terrorists blew up your federal 
building, where foreign hate-mongers tried to topple the World Trade 
Center in New York, where drugs and the violence that is their by-
product destroy so many lives. 
 
That is why my Administration has-made the fight against these forces of 
destruction a national priority--and a national security priority. To 
stem the flow of narcotics and stop the spread of organized crime, we 
are cooperating as never before with countries around the world--sharing 
information, providing military support, initiating anti-corruption 
efforts, taking on money-laundering, shutting down drug syndicate front 
companies, and opening an FBI office in Russia and a training center in 
Hungary. We are getting results--busting up drug cartels; bringing crime 
kingpins to justice; and giving our new "drug czar," General McCaffrey, 
the tools he needs to slow the flow of drugs to our children. 
 
To reduce the nuclear threat and prevent weapons of mass destruction 
from falling into the wrong hands, we have engaged in the most far-
reaching arms control and nuclear security effort in history. I am very 
proud of the results. 
 
Today, there are no Russian missiles pointed at our cities or citizens. 
Through the START treaties, our two countries are cutting their nuclear 
arsenals by two-thirds from their Cold War levels. We convinced Ukraine, 
Belarus, and Kazakstan to give up the nuclear weapons left on their land 
when the Soviet Union collapsed. We got North Korea to freeze its 
dangerous nuclear weapons program.  
 
We helped win the indefinite extension of the nuclear Non-Proliferation 
Treaty. We are working with countries around the world to safeguard 
nuclear materials and convert them to peaceful use, which will be at the 
top of the agenda when I'm in Moscow for the nuclear summit two weeks 
from now. And I am determined to secure a comprehensive test ban treaty 
and to get our Congress to approve the Chemical Weapons  Convention this 
year. 
 
We are waging the battle against terrorism here at home and around the 
world. Working through the United Nations and on our own, we maintain 
strong sanctions against states that sponsor terrorism--such as Iran, 
Iraq,  Sudan, and Libya. We are cooperating closely with countries 
around the world to stop terrorists before they act, to capture them 
when they do, and to bring them to justice. We have increased funding, 
personnel, and training for our law enforcement agencies. We have 
developed new technologies--such as briefcase-sized x-ray machines and 
bomb-squad robots--to detect and disable bombs. 
 
After the terrible suicide bombings in the Middle East, we pledged $100 
million for counterterrorism equipment and training for Israel. We led 
the Summit of Peacemakers where 29 leaders from the Middle East and 
around the world came together to stand down terror and stand up for 
peace. Our policy is clear: Terrorism will not pay; terrorists will pay. 
 
These efforts are getting results. We foiled terrorist attacks on New 
York City and on our airliners abroad. We have arrested and extradited 
more terrorists than all previous administrations combined. We have 
brought to justice and won convictions against most of the terrorists 
responsible for the World Trade Center bombing. We have strengthened our 
ability to deal with terrorist attacks involving chemical or biological 
weapons. 
 
These achievements are real. They have saved lives. But terrorists never 
give up, so we must never give in. We have to remain vigilant, reduce 
our vulnerabilities, and constantly renew our efforts to defeat 
terrorism. 
 
That's why I have been so frustrated by Congress' failure to pass the 
tough anti-terrorism legislation I proposed after Oklahoma City. The 
legislation I sent to Congress would strengthen our ability to 
investigate, prosecute, and punish terrorist activity. Congressional 
leaders promised to send the bill back to me for signature by last 
Memorial Day--six weeks after Oklahoma City. Now, almost an entire year 
has passed, and that bill has yet to cross my desk. 
 
While Congress is dragging its feet, you can bet that terrorists won't 
be dragging theirs. Terrorists do not go slow. Their only agenda is 
death and destruction on their own timetable. We need this legislation, 
and we need it now. 
 
But we also need the right kind of legislation. It should include a 
provision to chemically mark the explosive materials terrorists use to 
build their bombs. It should grant us explicit authority to prevent 
terrorist groups such as Hamas from raising money in America. It should 
allow us to quickly deport foreigners who support terrorist activities 
from our shores. And it should give our law enforcement officials the 
ability to use high-tech surveillance to keep up with stealthy, fast-
moving terrorists. 
 
The forces of destruction prey on all that divides us. They forget that, 
for all our differences, so much more unites us. Here in America's 
heartland and all over the world, most people want the same things: to 
live in peace, to be treated with dignity, to provide for themselves and 
their families, and to build a life better than their parents had and 
pass on an even better one to their children. 
 
The lesson of Oklahoma City is that even the most horrible acts of 
terror are no match for those simple dreams and for the human spirit. If 
we follow your example--if we come together and work together as a team 
in our communities, in Washington, all across America, and around the 
world--we can and we will defeat them. 
 
Thank you. God bless you. And God bless America.   

(###) 
 
 
ARTICLE 2: 
 
Ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention:  A Top Priority  
Secretary Christopher 
Statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Washington, DC, 
March 28, 1996 
 
Mr. Chairman, members of the committee: I am pleased to testify before 
you for the first time this year. With my colleagues Secretary Perry and 
General Clark, I am here today to explain why prompt ratification of the 
Chemical Weapons Convention this year is in the overriding interest of 
the United States.     
 
President Clinton has put stopping the spread of weapons of mass 
destruction at the top of our efforts to protect and enhance the 
security of every American. Working with this committee and the 
Congress, we have achieved a number of important non-proliferation and 
arms control victories. We secured the indefinite and unconditional 
extension of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. We shut down North 
Korea's dangerous nuclear program and sent it on its way to the scrap 
heap. Thanks to the efforts of this committee, the Senate ratified the 
START II Treaty which deepens cuts in our Cold War nuclear arsenals. And 
the United States joined with 28 nations in the so-called Wassenaar 
Arrangement to control transfers of dangerous conventional arms and 
sensitive dual-use goods and technologies.  
 
These achievements would not have been possible without strong American 
leadership. Indeed, only the United States has the power and influence 
to forge a strong global consensus against the proliferation of weapons 
that threaten the security and prosperity of the world. That fact was 
brought home to me again during my recent trip--to South America, where 
Argentina and Brazil have become our partners against proliferation and 
have--renounced the nuclear option. 
 
Now the United States has the opportunity and responsibility to lead the 
world toward another landmark achievement. The ratification and entry 
into force of the Chemical Weapons Convention will reinforce the 
security of each and every American. President Clinton again underscored 
the urgency of Senate approval in his State of the Union speech and has 
made the convention's ratification this year a top priority. 
 
Ratification of this convention not only represents a remarkable 
opportunity to strengthen our own security, it denies us no option that 
we would ever wish to exercise. With the dramatic changes of the past 
decade, the threat of a massive chemical attack from the nations of the 
former Soviet Union has been drastically reduced. Under American law, 
the United States is already required to destroy the vast majority of 
our chemical weapons stockpile by 2004. By imposing an international 
legal obligation to destroy chemical weapons, the Chemical Weapons 
Convention puts all other states that are capable of deploying chemical 
weapons, including Russia, on the same footing as us.  
 
President Yeltsin and other senior officials have publicly and privately 
reaffirmed Russia's commitment to destroy its chemical weapons arsenal. 
Russia must still take additional concrete steps to follow through on 
these commitments and rectify remaining problems. By ratifying the 
convention, we will add the force and weight of the entire international 
community to our efforts to assure the destruction of Russian chemical 
stocks. Our action will also spur other nations, such as China, to 
ratify and join the regime. 
 
Today, Mr. Chairman, the main danger we face is the possible use of 
chemical weapons against U.S. forces deployed overseas, and against our 
allies. The case of Iraq underscores the danger posed by a brutal 
dictator possessing unconventional weapons. We now know that Saddam's 
factories were capable of producing thousands of tons of deadly 
chemicals per year, including mustard gas and the nerve agents sarin and 
tabun. After overcoming repeated Iraqi deception efforts, the United 
Nations has only recently confirmed that Saddam also produced large 
quantities of the highly toxic nerve agent VX. The UN suspects that Iraq 
may still be hiding stocks of weaponized VX, which confirms the threat 
that Saddam continues to pose. 
 
If we had had the convention two decades ago, we might have been able to 
prevent or at least severely hamper Iraq's chemical weapons activities. 
We must act now. Iran is engaged in a major effort to develop its 
chemical arsenal, and we believe that some 20 countries already have, or 
may be developing, chemical weapons. 
 
The best protection against these weapons is to make it more difficult 
for hostile nations and groups to obtain and use them. By blocking the 
supply and demand for chemical weapons, the Chemical Weapons Convention 
does just that. 
 
First, all states that are parties to the convention will be required to 
give up their chemical weapons. The convention requires the destruction 
of existing stockpiles and bans virtually every aspect of a chemical 
weapons program, from development to stockpiling. It puts in place a 
comprehensive inspection regime that includes intrusive challenge 
inspections and commits parties to enact legislation to punish 
violators, who also risk international sanctions. No treaty is 100% 
verifiable, but the convention is carefully structured so that parties 
tempted to cheat will never be sure they can evade detection and 
sanctions.  The sooner the convention enters into force, the sooner 
those countries possessing or seeking chemical weapons will have to make 
a choice: abide by its provisions or suffer the weight of penalties and 
sanctions imposed by the international community.  
 
Second, the convention prohibits parties from helping any country to try 
to circumvent its provisions. By specifically banning trade in certain 
chemicals with countries that are not members, the convention will make 
it much harder for non-parties to acquire the key ingredients they need 
to produce chemical weapons.    
 
The convention also will help us combat chemical terrorism. The 
legislation it requires will strengthen the legal authority of countries 
to prosecute anyone who tries to acquire chemical weapons. The 
destruction of chemical stockpiles will reduce the threat of stolen 
weapons. And international transfers of many of the key chemicals that 
can be used to make these weapons will be controlled. Indeed, it is no 
surprise that the Japanese Government moved to ratify the convention 
immediately after the attack in Tokyo. 
 
American leadership was vital to complete the convention. Now it is 
required again if the treaty is to enter into force successfully and we 
are to begin a transparent and orderly process to eliminate stockpiles, 
stop production, and erect stronger barriers against proliferation. 
 
So far, 160 countries have signed the Chemical Weapons Convention, and 
49 have deposited instruments of ratification. When 65 countries have 
ratified, a 180-day countdown toward entry into force begins. We are now 
only 16 ratifications away from that countdown, which could come within 
just a few months.  
 
If the United States is among the first 65 parties to ratify the 
convention, we will retain our critical leadership role in the global 
fight against chemical weapons. If we are not, we will lose the chance 
to ensure that our views are fully reflected in the final preparations 
for entry into force. We will not be able to participate immediately in 
the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, which monitors 
compliance. We will not be able to join immediately in international 
inspections. 
 
Failure to ratify the convention promptly will jeopardize not only our 
security and international standing but our prosperity. Because the 
treaty restricts trade with non-parties in certain chemicals, failure to 
ratify could cut off U.S. companies from their traditional trading 
partners. Uncertainty about U.S. participation in this regime could lose 
business for American companies and lose jobs for American workers. Let 
me note that the U.S. chemical industry enthusiastically supports the 
treaty, having worked closely with our negotiators to help ensure that 
it will safeguard proprietary information. 
 
Eliminating chemical weapons has long been a bipartisan goal. By law 
adopted during the Reagan Administration, our chemical weapons stock- 
piles are headed for destruction. The convention itself is the product 
of years of bipartisan effort. President Bush took a strong personal 
interest in the treaty, which the United States signed during his 
administration. Reagan and Bush administration officials, including 
Lawrence Eagleburger, Brent Scowcroft, and Ronald Lehman, have recently 
reaffirmed their support for the treaty. 
 
Mr. Chairman, the Clinton Administration supports this treaty because it 
is especially suited to the post-Cold War security environment, where 
the threat posed by chemical weapons is not limited to one state or 
group of states. The convention will simultaneously remove chemical 
weapons from the world's stockpiles and build up the barricades against 
their future acquisition. It will make it more difficult for others to 
threaten or use chemical weapons against the United States, our 
soldiers, our allies, and friends.  
 
We signed the convention in January 1993. Since November 1993, the 
Senate has considered it thoroughly, holding 10 hearings and submitting 
hundreds of questions for the record. It is now time to bring the 
convention to a vote. 
 
We must not let pass this opportunity to strengthen our own security and 
affirm our leadership in non-proliferation. On behalf of the President, 
I urge the Senate to give its advice and consent to the ratification of 
this vital treaty now. 
 
Before ending my remarks, Mr. Chairman, I would like to say a brief word 
about the Nuclear Safety Convention that is also before you. Parties to 
this convention are obligated not only to operate their nuclear 
facilities safely, but to report to other parties on the steps that they 
have taken to do so. The convention will enhance our security and our 
safety. It has been adopted by all of the other G-7 participants at the 
Nuclear Summit, which will be held next month in Moscow, where it will 
be high on the agenda. I urge this committee to give the convention 
prompt consideration. Thank you very much..    

(###) 
 
 
ARTICLE 3:  
 
Statement on the Death of Secretary of Commerce Ron Brown  
Statement by Secretary Christopher, released by the Office of the 
Department Spokesman, Washington, DC, April 4, 1996. 
 
It was with terrible shock and sadness that I learned of the loss of 
Secretary of Commerce Ron Brown and his party off the coast of Croatia 
yesterday. The American business leaders and government officials were 
accompanying the Secretary on a mission of peace to help the people of 
the former Yugoslavia rebuild their economies and their lives after four 
years of war. This is an immeasurable loss for America, for the United 
States Government, and for the families of those on board the aircraft. 
 
I am honored to have served in President Clinton's Cabinet with Ron 
Brown, a man for whom I have had great respect and affection. My 
thoughts and prayers are with his family and those of the others lost in 
yesterday's tragedy.   

(### 
 
 
ARTICLE 4: 
The Challenge of Change in Russia 
Anthony Lake, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs 
Address to the U.S.-Russia Business Council, Washington, DC, April 1, 
1996
 
(introductory remarks deleted) 
 
I wanted to join you today--asked to join you today--because few issues 
on America's foreign policy agenda are as critical or as challenging as 
our relations with Russia. And few groups understand as clearly as you 
do what is at stake here. With President Clinton going to Moscow in just 
a few weeks and with the Russian people going to the polls in June, this 
is an important time to remember why staying engaged with Russia is in 
America's national interest. 
 
Consider first the world that we live in today: Halfway between the end 
of the Cold War and the dawn of a new century, our nation is at peace. 
Our economy is strong. The tide of market democracy is rising around the 
world, bringing freedom and the hope of prosperity to more people than 
ever before in human history. All of this provides new opportunities for 
us. 
 
But this promising new era is not by any means risk-free. Old threats, 
such as aggression by rogue states, have taken on new and dangerous 
forms. And a host of modern threats, from nuclear proliferation to 
terrorism, to the growth of international crime, ignore national borders 
and undermine our national security. So, in this new age of possibility 
but also of peril, American leadership is more important than ever 
before. The world may have radically changed, but our basic mission in 
the world has not. 
 
In many regions, the roots of democratic society--pluralism, tolerance, 
liberty--are not yet firm. Now, as--before, our special role in the 
world is to safeguard and strengthen the community of democracies and of 
open markets, and nowhere is that mission more vital than in Russia. 
 
After more than four decades of nuclear peril, of communist repression 
that trampled the rights and shackled the potential of people throughout 
the Soviet empire, of superpower rivalry from Angola to Vietnam, the 
state that was once our fiercest opponent is now moving toward market 
democracy.  
 
Helping Russia succeed in this is deeply, profoundly in our national 
interest. A stable, democratic, market-oriented Russia would be far less 
likely to threaten America's security and far more likely to work with 
us to solve global problems. It can be an important partner in 
prosperity, with 150 million new consumers for American products. It can 
be a strong ally against the forces of destruction, whether they take 
the form of rogue nations or ethnic hatreds or terrorists trafficking in 
nuclear materials. And it could be a force for stability on a continent 
long wracked by division. 
 
The situation in Russia today does pose some very real concerns: Senior 
officials who stood for reform have been fired. Protectionist pressures 
have jolted our trade. We continue to differ with Russia over its 
nuclear cooperation with Iran. And just last month, the Communist-
dominated Duma voted for reconstituting the Soviet Union. 
 
Let me emphasize here: We support the millions of former Soviet citizens 
in all those nations who broke the chains of tyranny in 1991. They have 
chosen freedom, and their will must be respected. President Yeltsin 
believes that and so do the vast majority of the Russian people. 
 
There is also the tragedy of Chechnya--a tragedy for the Chechens, for 
the Russians, and for all friends of Russian democracy. We support the 
territorial integrity of Russia, and we oppose attempts to change 
international borders through the use of force. 
 
We oppose terrorism in all its forms. But we also oppose strongly the 
means the Russians have been using. Widespread and indiscriminate use of 
force has spilled far too much innocent blood and eroded support for 
Russia. The cycle of violence must end. 
 
We welcome President Yeltsin's decision, announced yesterday, to begin 
withdrawing army units and to intensify the search for a settlement 
there. We call on the Chechens to respond in a similar spirit. 
 
Just before I came over here, I got a report of a new attack on a 
Russian army column, and heavy losses resulted. We hope very much that 
this was the last shot in the last phase, rather than the opening shot 
in a new round of fighting. 
 
So, we must not let our vision of Russia's future blur our view of its 
current problems. It doesn't serve us or the Russian people to pretend 
that real challenges don't exist or don't matter, but neither should we 
yield to the prophets of pessimism who insist that Russia is doomed to 
repeat its past. If we shrug our shoulders, if we turn our backs, we 
risk creating a self-fulfilling prophecy, and we will miss a unique 
opportunity before us. 
 
We always expected Russia's journey to reform to be uneven and 
difficult. We do not know, and, indeed, we cannot know, what the outcome 
of that search will be. That is precisely why our strategy is designed 
for the long haul. Only by staying engaged--steadily, patiently, 
intensively--can we help Russia seize the promise of a democratic future 
instead of reverting to its past. Only by keeping our eyes on the 
horizon, steering by the stars of our interests and our ideals, can we 
move toward the goal that will benefit our people: a stable, democratic, 
market-oriented Russia, secure within its borders and at peace with 
itself and with its neighbors. 
 
Since taking office, President Clinton has worked closely with the 
Congress and our friends around the world to strengthen support for 
Russia's progress. And these efforts have paid real dividends for 
America, for Russia, and for the whole world. 
 
So let's step back for a moment from the immediate problems that we can 
see all-too clearly and try to understand the historic nature of the 
gains that have been made in the past few years. Over the last three 
years, our assistance has helped Russia lay democracy's foundations--
political parties, free elections, and an increasingly independent 
media. The Russian people now have a voice in governing their country. 
And the whole world will hear them express their views when they go to 
the polls in mid-June. 
 
We also have seen major changes in Russia's economy. It wasn't long ago 
that the state's heavy hand gripped every enterprise and guided every 
decision. This was not the "invisible hand." Resources were wasted while 
basic needs went unmet. Long lines of shoppers stood in the cold for 
products that never arrived in the stores. Private property was an alien 
concept. The state managed everything and managed it badly. 
 
The legacy of that period is still visible. But today, with America's 
strong support, more than 20,000 large enterprises and 100,000 small 
ones have been transferred to private hands. Now the private sector 
produces more than 60% of Russia's GDP. Inflation, as Gene Lawson said, 
has dropped from about 18% a month one year ago to around 3% today. 
Average monthly wages have grown. 
 
All of this is good, of course, for the Russian people, because behind 
those statistics are the lives of the Russian people who are benefiting 
from reform. But it's also good, as you well know, for America as well. 
You know better than anyone that an open, stable, prosperous Russia will 
expand the frontiers of American business, creating jobs and 
opportunities back home here. 
 
I'm sure many of you are wondering what impact the June elections will 
have on Russia's commitment to continue its reforms. I won't speculate 
on the outcome of the elections, but there is one central fact: Any 
Russian government will face the same opportunity. And that opportunity 
is that Russia is pointed toward economic recovery if it stays the 
course of reform. Attempting to halt or reverse the process would impose 
a huge cost not just in resulting capital flight, inflation, and 
shortages but in the public support and confidence on which elected 
leaders depend. Sooner or later and in democracies it's usually sooner--
political leaders act on interest. And it is deeply in the interest of 
Russia and its leaders to stick with economic reform. 
 
Most nations also act on interest in their foreign affairs. And, today, 
I believe that most Russians know that the best way to build security 
and prosperity at home is to press for integration with the rest of the 
world and not to isolate themselves behind walls of their own making. 
 
With our backing, Russia has deepened its engagement with regional and 
global institutions. It has stepped up its responsibilities on the 
international stage--from cosponsoring the Middle East peace process to 
helping to form the Contact Group on Bosnia. The Russian Government has 
acted to improve relations with Russia's closest neighbors--from 
withdrawing Russian troops in the Baltics to resolving key differences 
with Ukraine. It's got a way to go, but it has been making progress. 
 
Russia also has begun to build bridges of security across the Cold War 
dividing lines of Europe. This is in Russia's interest--profoundly so---
and in ours as well. Twice in this century, instability in Central 
Europe led to violent, global conflict that cost American and Russian 
lives--millions and millions of them. The best way to prevent that from 
ever happening again is to build an undivided Europe and to build it 
together. 
 
For our part, we are working closely with our allies to create an 
integrated, secure Europe where Russia can play an important role. Our 
strategy is paying off. Russia is now a full member of the Partnership 
for Peace. The NATO-Russia relationship is expanding. And, after 50 
years of hostile confrontation, today Russian and American troops are 
exercising together on land and at sea, working together at NATO 
headquarters, and standing together to safeguard the peace in Bosnia. 
 
The process of NATO enlargement is moving forward, and it will happen as 
new members are ready to add to NATO's strength and as the allies reach 
consensus. It will keep to its open, inclusive course and hold to its 
steady pace. Getting off-track in either direction would damage our 
long-term goal of enlargement. Delaying enlargement would destroy the 
momentum that we have built and the spirit that has led the new 
democracies to work so--hard to reform in preparation for membership. 
Calls to move more quickly would only challenge the consensus that we've 
developed in NATO and risk setting back rather than accelerating the 
process that the United States has done so much to create. 
 
As we have stressed to our Russian colleagues, NATO enlargement is not 
directed at anyone. And the process will neither determine nor depend on 
events in Russia. NATO can do for Europe's east what it did 50 years ago 
for Europe's west: prevent a return to local rivalries, strengthen 
democracy against future threats, and provide the conditions in which 
fragile market economies can flourish. And, as enlargement proceeds, we 
hope the NATO-Russia relationship will become a full-fledged 
partnership--an alliance with the alliance to tackle common problems 
together. 
 
Nowhere will America's partnership with Russia do more to strengthen our 
mutual security and nowhere has it been more effective than in reducing 
the nuclear threat. 
 
Today, because of our steady engagement, America's cities and America's 
families are no longer targeted by Russian missiles. Kazakstan has given 
up the nuclear weapons left on its soil, and Ukraine and Belarus are 
removing theirs as well. Together, START I and START II, which we hope 
the Duma will soon ratify, will slash by two-thirds the nuclear arsenals 
that we and the former Soviet Union held at the height of the Cold War. 
 
We want to build on this record of progress by enhancing the security of 
nuclear materials and by improving our ability to fight nuclear 
smuggling. These are among the issues that will top the agenda when 
President Clinton goes to Moscow later this month to help lead the 
Summit on Nuclear Safety and Security. 
 
So the distance that Russia has traveled toward deepening democratic and 
market reform, conducting a measured foreign policy, and reducing the 
nuclear threat makes Russia's reversing course extremely difficult at 
best. It's not impossible, perhaps, but it would be hard for them to do 
and not at all in their interest. 
 
That said, everyone here knows that the current economic and political 
situation in Russia is far from perfect. Trying to do business in Russia 
can be very trying indeed. The Red Army may be gone, but the red tape 
lingers on. Commercial success still depends too much on who you know 
and what favors you can get. 
 
I want all of you to know that the hardship you confront in doing 
business in Russia is our concern in the government as well, because 
ultimately it is the private sector that will lead Russia into the 
global economy and promote prosperity for both our peoples. 
 
You, here, were among the first on the ground--pioneers for American 
enterprise and ambassadors for American know-how. You make the 
investments and forge the relationships that will pay off down the line. 
You recognize, as do we in government, that it makes good sense to hang 
in there today, because what millions of Russians are so determined to 
build will yield enormous dividends tomorrow. 
 
We know that, for Russia's economy to work and for you to have the 
confidence you need to invest, the business climate has to be 
predictable and open. Contracts must be honored. The banking system must 
be strengthened. Taxes and their enforcement must be fair. Laws and 
regulations must be observed throughout the land, and corruption must be 
rooted out. 
 
Only the people of Russia can overcome these enormous challenges. Our 
interest--the American interest--is to help them succeed. It would be 
easy to resort to knee-jerk reactions whenever we disagree with Russia's 
politics or its policies. It would be easy to walk away. But we have 
worked too hard and accomplished too much, and it would be foolish and 
irresponsible to back out now. We have a responsibility to future 
generations to lock in our gains and to build on them. 
 
First, we must and will stand firm behind Russia's new democratic 
institutions--an independent judiciary, free media, accountable 
government. Strengthening democracy is also crucial for Russia's 
marketplace, for the rule of law that protects human rights also will 
help guarantee that contracts are respected, just as the searchlight of 
a free press can help expose corruption. 
 
Second, we must continue our support for reform through international 
financial institutions such as the IMF. The new extended fund facility 
will help Russia keep its economy on track. It sets tough performance 
requirements, monitors them monthly, and if performance falters, the 
money stops. The agreement is based on good policy and performance, not 
parties or personalities. 
 
Third, we will continue to work with Russia on structural reforms and 
good business practices. This is a top priority with the Gore-
Chernomyrdin Commission. And, as long as the Russians work 
constructively with us, we will help them establish a tax code that is 
fair, a capital market that functions, and the legal framework that 
business needs to do business. 
 
Together, these steps will help Russia create the economic security that 
its people so deeply desire. And finally, we will continue our efforts 
to reduce the nuclear threat and to advance common foreign policy 
interests. Our partnership with Russia can help shape the world we seek, 
where our interests are more likely to be protected and where our ideals 
of democracy and open markets can flourish. 
 
I don't need to tell all of you in this room that the next few months 
will be vitally important ones for Russia. The eyes of the world will be 
watching as the Russian election campaign gathers steam. The United 
States does not support any one candidate or party. We are, however, 
unequivocal in our support for reform and reformers. And all friends of 
Russian democracy want to see that the elections are free, fair, and 
regular. 
 
The Russian people face a critical choice now about the destiny of their 
nation--whether they will go into the new future that the reformers have 
laid out or revert to the terrible past of Soviet communism. The greater 
Russia's commitment to political and market reform, the more effective 
America's support and that of the world will be. 
 
We have worked hard to open the door to a stronger partnership with the 
West, to global markets, to international institutions, and to a more 
peaceful and stable world. But only Russia can--make the decision to 
cross that threshold for good. Only Russia can take responsibility for 
not closing that door on itself. 
 
The Russian people want the same basic things that we do: security, 
prosperity, and the chance to pass on to their children bolder 
opportunities; brighter hopes; and a safer, better world. They have it 
within their power to make those dreams come true, and, in the end, it 
is up to the Russians. We expect Russia to stay on the road of reform. 
As it does, America will keep its commitment to be with them every step 
of the way. 
 
Thank you very much.  

(###) 
 
 
 
ARTICLE 5: 
 
National and International Efforts to Control Nuclear Weapons 
Thomas E. McNamara, Assistant Secretary for Politico-Military Affairs 
Statement before the Subcommittee on Investigations of the Senate Armed 
Services Committee, Washington, DC, March 22, 1996 
 
I am very pleased to address the subcommittee on an international 
security problem unique to the post-Cold War period. For nearly 50 
years, the danger of a nuclear conflagration centered primarily on the 
U.S.-Soviet confrontation. The main risk to humanity and to U.S. 
security was the possibility of a massive U.S.-Soviet nuclear exchange 
generated either through fundamental conflict or accident. Historic 
shifts have dramatically reduced the risk of a nuclear exchange between 
the superpowers. Washington and Moscow have taken unprecedented arms 
control steps to reduce their nuclear stockpiles and to stabilize the 
nuclear balance between the U.S. and Russia. Today, neither side targets 
its weapons at the other, both the U.S. and Russia are dismantling 
nuclear weapons ahead of arms control schedules, and the U.S. has 
ratified and hopes that Russia soon will ratify START II, the most 
ambitious nuclear arms control agreement in history, which will result 
in cuts in the nuclear stockpiles of the two countries by two-thirds. 
 
However, nuclear weapons and nuclear weapons-usable materials do not 
disappear when they have fulfilled their political purpose. They do not 
lose their destructive potential with the stroke of a pen at a 
diplomatic conference, nor does the scientific knowledge and technical 
skill possessed by former nuclear weapons designers. 
 
We have rendered excess thousands of nuclear weapons and hundreds of 
tons of weapons-usable uranium and plutonium. A small quantity of 
plutonium--roughly only an amount the size of a softball--is sufficient 
to destroy a city. And the plutonium and uranium we have freed from 
nuclear weapons will last for thousands of years. It is thus imperative 
that we continue our efforts, in cooperation with Russia and other 
countries, to secure nuclear materials, protect nuclear technology, and 
redirect weapons skills to peaceful pursuits. 
 
The breakup of the Soviet empire radically changed the proliferation 
landscape. Three additional states emerged with nuclear weapons on their 
territories. The Soviet system for protecting and controlling nuclear 
materials, designed to work within a totalitarian police state, went the 
way of the former Soviet Union. As the nations of the FSU face the 
transition to more democratic forms of government, they are confronted 
with the much more complex task of protecting nuclear materials within 
free societies. Finally, the combination of extreme economic dislocation 
and the emergence of organized crime that has afflicted the states of 
the former Soviet Union has increased both the temptation and the 
potential means to divert nuclear material. 
 
The U.S. recognized from the start that this problem could not be 
attacked on only one front. We decided to attack this problem on several 
fronts and to devise a layered defense against the threat. Thus, we have 
sought to control the sources of supply of nuclear materials as well as 
technology and items used in the production or use of special nuclear 
materials, to reduce demand, to ease the economic dislocations that 
followed the break-up of the Soviet Union, and to strengthen the law 
enforcement and intelligence capabilities that would be needed if the 
security of the materials is breached. 
 
President Clinton and the Secretary of State have made nuclear materials 
and technology security one of our highest priorities. The President's 
first decision directive on non-proliferation focused on this critical 
subject. This high-profile concern was reflected again in the September 
1995 Presidential Decision Directive addressing nuclear materials 
security in the former Soviet Union. In his October 1995 speech to the 
UN General Assembly, the President reflected that a soda can-size lump 
of plutonium is enough to make a bomb and pledged that ăbuilding on 
efforts already underway with the states of the former Soviet Union and 
with our G-7 partners, we will seek to better account for, store, and 
safeguard materials with massive destructive power." 
 
The President's personal involvement will continue with his attendance 
in April at the Moscow nuclear summit hosted by President Yeltsin. 
 
From the beginning, therefore, we have concentrated our efforts on 
securing nuclear weapons, nuclear materials, and the requisite skills to 
design such weapons at their source. We have taken a number of concrete 
steps to reduce this uniquely post-Cold War danger, including the 
following. 
 
-- We succeeded in bringing Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakstan into the 
Non-Proliferation Treaty as non-nuclear-weapons states. Nuclear weapons 
have been removed from Kazakstan, and Ukraine and Belarus are on 
schedule to denuclearize by the end of 1996. 
 
-- The U.S. is assisting these new nations in transporting their Soviet-
era weapons to Russia and also is assisting Russia in its dismantlement 
effort and the secure storage of the resulting fissile material. 
 
-- We continue our assistance to Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and 
Kazakstan; to other countries of the former Soviet Union; and to 
countries in Central Europe to improve their systems to control, 
protect, and account for nuclear materials; 
 
-- The U.S. is working with Russia, Ukraine, the European Union, Japan, 
and other nations to help prevent economic dislocation from causing the 
flight of Soviet nuclear weapons scientists to cash-rich rogue states by 
creating science and technology centers in Moscow and Kiev. These 
centers provide useful employment in peaceful scientific projects to 
weapons scientists from the former Soviet Union. 
 
-- The U.S. has worked with other concerned governments to remove 
weapons-grade material from possible diversion. In November 1994, 
Project Sapphire transferred multiple bombs' worth of highly enriched 
uranium from Kazakstan. 
 
-- In January 1994, the U.S. and Russia concluded an agreement under 
which 500 tons of highly enriched uranium derived from dismantled 
nuclear weapons will be blended down into safer and more proliferation-
resistant low-enriched uranium and sold to the U.S. for use as fuel in 
civilian nuclear power reactors. This agreement is being implemented: 
Shipments of uranium are arriving from Russia, and commercial payments 
for these deliveries are being made. 
 
-- Through the Nunn-Lugar assistance program, we have helped Russia 
increase the security of nuclear weapons being returned from forward 
deployment for dismantlement and are cooperating to build a safe, secure 
storage facility for fissile material from dismantled weapons. 
 
-- As part of our worldwide effort to reduce and eventually to eliminate 
the use of weapons-usable highly enriched uranium in civilian nuclear 
programs, the U.S. has begun a bilateral program with Russia to develop 
low-enriched uranium fuels for use in Soviet-style research reactors. 
 
-- The U.S. is reviewing with Russia ways in which we can bring to an 
end the production of weapons-grade plutonium in the three plutonium 
production reactors that still remain in operation. 
 
-- The U.S. is actively working with Russia to identify options to 
convert excess plutonium into a form at least as proliferation-resistant 
as spent nuclear fuel. 
 
-- The U.S. has assisted directly and through the International Atomic 
Energy Agency--IAEA--the efforts of successor states to the U.S.S.R. in 
securing nuclear material and placing it under international inspection. 
 
-- We have engaged in diplomacy  at the highest levels to permit the 
U.S. to cooperate with Russia and other affected countries in combating 
smuggling.  
 
-- And, to confirm these efforts, the President, in September 1995, 
issued a new Presidential Decision Directive to organize even more 
comprehensive U.S. efforts to secure nuclear material. 
 
We must face the fact, however, that these initiatives will take time to 
mature and become fully effective. As long as any nuclear material is at 
risk and the possible temptation to sell it remains, we must continue to 
refine our tools for fighting the threat of illicit trafficking. 
 
The most visible symptom of this risk--of illicit transfers of nuclear 
material--are the reported cases of smuggling by individuals or small 
groups whose chief goal is monetary gain. The Administration and the 
Congress recognized early on that nuclear smuggling constitutes a direct 
threat to efforts to halt the spread of nuclear weapons. Illicit 
trafficking in nuclear material bypasses the international regime to 
halt nuclear proliferation. The regime operates on the assumption that 
states can and will control sensitive materials. Illicit nuclear 
trafficking, on the other hand, is largely the act of unauthorized 
individuals outside national control  who have found some gap in the 
nuclear material security systems of states. 
 
National and international mechanisms to control proliferation are based 
on the assumption that the single-most important technical step in 
developing nuclear weapons is to acquire nuclear weapons-usable 
material. Manufacture of this material requires the investment of 
hundreds of millions of dollars and years of sophisticated engineering. 
Smuggling of such material bypasses the time and the cost and short 
circuits the principal technical barrier to nuclear proliferation. 
 
We have no evidence that a nuclear-weapons trafficking transaction of 
this kind has yet occurred. Indeed, in the area of the security of 
nuclear weapons, we are confident that such a breakdown in security is 
less likely, but the U.S. is continuing its support for safe and secure 
transport and storage of nuclear weapons.  
 
However, we cannot afford to be complacent. We know nuclear weapons-
grade material is at risk. We know that there are covert networks to 
acquire sensitive technology for weapons of mass destruction. And we 
know that criminals have obtained at least small quantities of nuclear 
material in the past few years. The international community clearly sees 
this threat   and is taking the steps necessary to forestall it. 
 
Nuclear smuggling is not like other kinds of illegal trafficking. We 
cannot afford to have even a single case of successful smuggling of 
enough nuclear material for a weapon. We cannot realistically expect any 
strategy based only on law enforcement and interdiction to be 100% 
effective. Thus, anti- smuggling initiatives are necessarily only a part 
of the response to the changing world situation. 
 
Most of the early reported cases were transparent scams involving inert 
substances or radioactive materials without weapons applications. 
Nonetheless, despite the sensationalism surrounding these cases, we 
recognized the nature of the problem and the need to combat it on many 
fronts. Accordingly, we already have undertaken a number of steps to 
combat nuclear smuggling. These include: 
 
-- Organizing the executive branch so that the U.S. can respond quickly 
and in a coordinated fashion to any nuclear trafficking incident; 
 
-- Providing export control and customs enforcement assistance to 
affected states in Europe and Central Asia; 
 
-- Providing assistance to states and the IAEA in analyzing seized 
material and in developing accurate sources of information on smuggling 
cases; 
 
-- Establishing additional law enforcement cooperation with key states 
in Europe affected by smuggling, spearheaded by FBI Director Freeh's 
efforts in Moscow; 
 
-- Supplying equipment, technology, and training to states in Central 
Europe to enable them to detect nuclear trafficking on their 
territories, including a large-scale training effort in Budapest in 
March 1995; 
 
-- Upgrading the ability of key countries to exchange law enforcement, 
intelligence, and technical information; 
 
-- Hosting events such as the FBI-organized April 1995 meeting in 
Quantico, Virginia, of international law enforcement officials from more 
than 20 countries, which focused on nuclear smuggling; 
 
-- Participating in a September 1995 meeting in Germany of customs 
officials from some 30 countries who shared their experience and methods 
in combating nuclear smuggling. 
 
-- Bringing international scientific and law enforcement experts 
together at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory in November 1995 to 
develop forensic methods for investigating incidents where nuclear 
materials were diverted; and 
 
-- Finally, at a November 1995 conference in Turkey, reinforcing U.S. 
export control assistance to countries of the Caucasus and Central Asia  
 
We have not forgotten about the demand side of the equation. There 
always will be a risk of nuclear smuggling as long as proliferators are 
prepared to offer cash for illegal nuclear goods. The U.S. has energized 
our significant intelligence capabilities to track the covert 
procurement efforts of rogue states. We share information with the 
states affected by these procurement networks to frustrate them. We 
provide assistance to the UN Special Commission and the IAEA in their 
efforts to tear out Iraq's covert weapons of mass destruction--WMD--
programs at the root. We are providing financial and technical 
assistance to the new IAEA effort to develop safeguard methods to detect 
clandestine nuclear activities. At the same time, we are continuing our 
diplomatic efforts to persuade countries about which we have 
proliferation concerns to halt their WMD development programs. 
 
Export controls are the initial barrier between suppliers and 
unauthorized recipients and, thus, in effect, inhibit demand. The export 
control system inherited by Russia and the other New Independent States-
NIS-was not designed to cope with the current freedom of or volume of 
trade. Since sensitive materials were never allowed to be exported 
without the expressed consent of the Soviet Government, the problem of 
inspection and proper identification of products that bypassed the 
centralized system was not a problem with which the Soviet export 
control system had to deal. The development of an export control system 
which enables informed decision-making about license applications as 
well as identification of commodities in transit for interdiction 
purposes has been, therefore, a focus for U.S.-Russian and U.S.-NIS 
cooperation. The export control system emerging from this cooperation 
will be much more adept at preventing misuse of technology and 
commodities useful in nuclear weapons, the development of nuclear 
weapons, and unsafeguarded fuel-cycle activities. 
 
The security of nuclear materials and technology worldwide has been a 
primary foreign policy objective of the Congress and the President for 
two consecutive administrations. The wisdom and foresight of the 
Congress, led by Senators Nunn and Lugar, resulted in the establishment 
of the Cooperative Threat Reduction-CTR-program for the former Soviet 
Union. The $1.5 billion appropriated for this program has been essential 
to pursuing the goals of denuclearizing Ukraine, Kazakstan, and Belarus 
and in working to augment nuclear security in Russia. Similarly, the 
decision of Congress to establish and fund the non-proliferation and 
disarmament fund has complemented our efforts to secure nuclear 
materials and prevent nuclear smuggling. The FY 1996 appropriation for 
the Department of Energy to upgrade the security of nuclear materials 
reflects our joint recognition that the security of all weapons-usable 
materials-military or civilian in nature--s an important policy concern. 
These programs represent money well spent, but continuing progress is 
dependent on continued congressional interest and continued funding to 
address this long-term problem. The countries that harbor the remnants 
of the Soviet nuclear infrastructure have transitional economies and are 
hampered in their ability to devote resources--and in some cases 
expertise--to the protection of nuclear material. It is clearly in our 
national interest to expand the effort and to provide the necessary 
funds to assure that this material is protected at its source. 
 
We have made a start, but much more needs to be done to keep nuclear 
weapons-usable material out of the wrong hands. We need to energize 
other states and the international community to take a number of steps 
to further reduce the danger of nuclear-material trafficking. 
 
We continue to work with our partners to foster international 
cooperation to ensure the security of nuclear materials and to combat 
nuclear smuggling. The G-7 plus Russia --the P-8--agreed at the 1994 
Naples summit to cooperate in preventing nuclear smuggling. Since that 
time, we have continued our diplomatic contacts. We will continue these 
diplomatic initiatives at the Moscow nuclear summit which the President 
will attend in four weeks. There, we hope to adopt a P-8 program with 
specific, concerted initiatives to combat nuclear smuggling as well as 
to reinforce cooperation with Russia and others to increase security of 
nuclear materials and address the problem of fissile material 
disposition. 
 
At the same time, a number of countries are moving ahead with practical 
steps. For example, the U.S. has designated points of contact for 
nuclear smuggling incidents and  significant developments in the P-8, as 
well as for law enforcement. We have taken steps to broaden 
coordination, cooperation, and information sharing among our law 
enforcement and intelligence agencies. 
 
At the summit, the U.S. also will seek to broaden the scope of our 
activities to include non-P-8 countries that are a potential source or 
transit point for nuclear-material trafficking. The results of the 
summit can serve as a model for collective and individual use in 
structuring relationships with those countries to assure the security of 
nuclear materials. 
 
Although our focus today is largely on nuclear issues, I would like to 
underscore the threat posed by terrorist access to chemical or 
biological weapons. Many of the initiatives that I discussed today are 
applicable to the chemical and biological weapons threat. I would like 
to take a moment, however, to mention one additional measure that will 
improve our ability to fight attempts by rogue states or terrorists to 
acquire, transfer, and use chemical weapons. That measure is the 
chemical weapons convention-CWC. 
 
Although the CWC was not designed to prevent chemical weapons terrorism, 
certain aspects of the convention, including its non-proliferation 
provisions and law enforcement requirements, will strengthen existing 
efforts to deal with this threat. For example, the CWC's non-
proliferation provisions will deny terrorist access to chemical weapons 
by requiring parties to eliminate their national stockpiles and by 
controlling transfers of certain chemicals that can be used to make 
chemical weapons. In addition, implementing legislation, required by the 
convention, will enhance the authority to investigate and prosecute 
chemical weapons-related activities, before chemical weapons are used. 
It also will make chemical suppliers and the public more aware of the 
chemical weapons threat and of the fact that even attempting to develop 
or possess such weapons is illegal. For these and other reasons, we seek 
prompt ratification and entry into force of the CWC as central to our 
efforts to deal with this threat. 
 
I want to conclude by repeating that so far, we have no information that 
a nuclear black market has successfully developed. Every case involving 
trafficking of nuclear weapons-usable material has-to our knowledge-
resulted in the arrest of the traffickers. Indeed, most cases of nuclear 
smuggling involve unscrupulous flim-flam artists who are preying on 
international concerns and public fears to try to turn a quick profit by 
pedaling phony material. 
 
However, the phenomenon we are dealing with is new and the danger from 
even one successful case of smuggling is so great that we have acted 
quickly and, I believe, prudently to close off the risk of a nuclear 
black market. We will have to attack this problem for the remainder of 
this century and beyond. This difficult challenge calls for sustained 
attention and diligent application of people and resources. Those 
resources must be applied not only to the high-profile activities that 
dominate popular fiction on this topic but also to the more mundane--but 
critically important--efforts to secure nuclear material at its source 
and to reduce the supply of weapons-usable material. Without such steps, 
all the high-tech wizardry and law enforcement cooperation we can muster 
will eventually fail.  

(###) 
 
 
 
ARTICLE 6: 
 
 
United States, France, and the United Kingdom To Sign Protocols of the 
South Pacific Nuclear-Free Zone Treaty 
Statement by White House Press Secretary, Mike McCurry, Washington, DC 
March 22, 1996. 
 
The Governments of France, the United Kingdom, and the United States 
will sign three Protocols of the South Pacific Nuclear-Free Zone Treaty 
in Suva, Fiji on March 25.  This treaty, which is also known as the 
Treaty of Rarotonga, creates a nuclear-free zone in the South Pacific by 
prohibiting the testing, manufacture, acquisition, and stationing of 
nuclear explosive devices in the territory of  parties to the treaty and 
also prohibiting the dumping of radioactive wastes at seas. 
 
The treaty has three Protocols. 
 
--Under Protocol 1, the United States pledges not to manufacture, 
station, or test nuclear explosive devices in American territories 
within the zone created by the treaty, i.e., American Samoa and Jarvis 
Island. 
 
--Under Protocol 2, the United States pledges not to use or threaten to 
use any nuclear explosive device against any party to the Treaty of 
Rarotonga or against any territory of a Protocol party within the zone. 
 
--Under Protocol 3, the United States pledges not to test any nuclear 
explosive device anywhere within the zone. 
 
The signing of these Protocols reflects a number of positive 
developments that have occurred over the past 10 years.  The end of the 
Cold War, the collapse of the Soviet Union, sharp reductions in the 
number of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems, indefinite 
extension of and near universal adherence to the Treaty on the Non-
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons--NPT--and progress on a comprehensive 
test ban treaty have all led to a more stable strategic environment in 
which further progress can be made on arms control and non-proliferation 
measures. 
 
Signing the Protocols for the United States will be the Honorable Don 
Gevirtz, Ambassador of the United States of America to Fiji, Nauru, 
Tonga, and Tuvalu.  In his remarks, Ambassador Gevirtz will stress the 
important role that the nations of the South Pacific and the South 
Pacific Forum play in the international arena on arms control and non-
proliferation measures and will cite specifically their strong support 
for indefinite extension of the NPT.  

(###) 
 
 
 
ARTICLE 7: 
 
 
Fact Sheet: Implementation Of the LIBERTAD Act 
Fact sheet released by the Department of State, Office of the Spokesman, 
March 29, 1996.  
 
On March 12, 1996, the President signed into law the Cuban Liberty and 
Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act, better known as the Helms-Burton 
Act. This action was taken as a strong response to the recent downing of 
two unarmed U.S. civilian aircraft by the Cuban Government. 
 
The legislation is complex and contains a variety of provisions 
including: 
 
-- Codification of all embargo restrictions that were in effect on March 
1; 
 
-- Creation of a private right of action in U.S. courts that will allow 
U.S. nationals whose property was confiscated by the Cuban Government to 
sue Cuban governmental entities or foreign investors who use or profit 
in any way from those properties. This provision may be suspended by the 
President if he determines that to do so would be in the national 
interest and would expedite the transition to democracy in Cuba; and 
 
-- The denial of visas and entry into the U.S. of individuals who 
traffic in U.S.-claimed properties in Cuba after March 12, 1996, and 
their immediate family members, as well as corporate officers and 
controlling shareholders of entities which traffic in such properties. 
 
The Administration will diligently implement the legislation and will 
work to resolve the numerous legal and procedural questions related to 
the implementation of the act. Because of the act's complexity, however, 
the U.S. is not yet in a position to provide details on how the 
provisions will be enforced. 
 
With regard to the Title IV exclusion of "traffickers," the U.S. hopes 
to implement the legislation in a way that would increase economic 
pressure on the Cuban Government while minimizing the disruption of 
relations with U.S. allies and trading partners. 
 
Title IV is prospective, meaning that it applies only to trafficking 
that begins on or after March 12, 1996, including improvements in or 
additions to existing investments. 
 
Additional information on implementation of the act will be provided 
once procedures are in place.
 
(###)   
 
[END DISPATCH VOL. 7. NO. 15] 
(###)

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