U.S. Department of State Dispatch 
Volume 7, Number 14, April 1, 1996 
Bureau of Public Affairs 
Articles in this Issue: 
1.  Meeting Our Nation's Needs: Providing Security, Growth, and 
Leadership For the Next Century--Secretary Christopher   
2.  Statement on the Death of Edmund Muskie--Secretary Christopher   
3.  Working To Ensure a Secure and Comprehensive Peace in the Middle 
East--Secretary Christopher 
4.  The U.S. and South Korea: Working To Ensure Peace on the Peninsula--
Secretary Christopher, Korean Foreign Minister Gong 
5.  The U.S. and Canada Renew the NORAD Agreement -- Secretary 
Christopher, Canadian Foreign Minister Axworthy  
6.  U.S. Policy Toward the Korean Peninsula--Winston Lord  
7.  Support for Democracy and the Rule of Law in Haiti--Alexander F. 
8.  U.S.-Nicaragua Relations: National Elections; U.S. Citizen Property 
Claims--John R. Hamilton  
Article 1: 
Meeting Our Nation's Needs: Providing Security, Growth, and Leadership 
For the Next Century 
Secretary Christopher 
Statement before the Subcommittee on Foreign Operations of the House 
International Relations Committee, Washington, DC, March 27, 1996 
Mr. Chairman and members of the committee: I am glad to appear again 
before this House Foreign Operations Subcommittee. This is a new budget 
cycle, and I look forward to consulting with you. 
The budget that is being considered today is about much more than 
dollars and cents. It poses a fundamental choice to this Congress and 
the American people: Will we advance the interests of the American 
people and maintain American leadership in the world? Or will we 
undermine the progress we have made and miss the opportunities that are 
before us?   

Will we continue to work for peace and security in regions of vital 
importance, or will we ignore threats until they reach our shores and we 
have to act? Will we sustain the alliances and institutions we created 
after the Second World War, or will we walk away from our commitments 
and leave ourselves no option but to face future crises alone? Will we 
confront new threats that respect no borders, or will we leave our 
children a world beset by nuclear proliferation, terrorism, and 
environmental crisis? These are only a few of the fundamental questions 
posed in this budget.   

Our Administration has made its choice. We have understood the central 
lesson of this century: that America must lead. That is also the lesson 
of the last three years. I would like to reflect on what our leadership 
has accomplished. 

We ended the deadly war in Bosnia and eliminated the threat it posed to 
security and stability in the heart of Europe. We stopped the flight of 
Haitian refugees to our shores and gave that nation a chance to build 
democracy and prosperity. We achieved the indefinite and unconditional 
extension of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and committed over 100 
countries never to build nuclear weapons. Nuclear missiles in the former 
Soviet Union no longer target American cities. The North Korean nuclear 
program is frozen and on its way to the scrap heap. And our economic 
diplomacy has fueled an export boom, creating more than a million high-
paying American jobs. 

America has stood with those who take risks for peace. A strong 
bipartisan effort has helped Israel and its Arab neighbors make historic 
strides toward a comprehensive peace. We have helped the people of 
Northern Ireland move toward a just and lasting settlement. And in the 
wake of cowardly terrorist attacks in recent weeks, we have stood with 
the peacemakers.  

The foreign policy achievements of this Administration have been 
possible because we have not hesitated to lead. Our investments are 
paying off for the American people. Our nation is safer. Our economy is 
stronger. And our values are ascendant.  

The kind of leadership that produced these achievements cannot be 
sustained on the cheap, unless we want to shortchange the American 
people. Nor can we rely on military strength alone to project our 
leadership, unless we want to use our military all the time. That would 
be costly in dollars and lives that we simply cannot afford to waste. 

The total International Affairs budget has fallen 51% in real terms 
since 1984. Our $19.2 billion request for 1997, including $12.8 billion 
from this subcommittee, is lower than last year's. It strikes the best 
possible balance between our two overarching objectives--pursuing our 
national interests and achieving a balanced budget within seven years. 
It is the bare minimum we need to conduct a foreign policy that protects 
the United States and maintains American leadership.  

Let me address in detail how our budget will help us meet three sets of 
challenges for this year and beyond:  
--  Pursuing peace and stability in regions of vital interest;  
--  Confronting transnational security threats; and  
--  Promoting open markets and prosperity.  
Pursuing Peace and Stability In Regions of Vital Interest 
First, Mr. Chairman, let me discuss key regions where we are pursuing 
peace. In each instance, our assistance not only builds security but 
also leverages support from our friends and allies around the globe for 
our common goals. 

Two weeks ago, President Clinton reaffirmed America's leading role for 
peace in the Middle East in his visits to Egypt and Israel. The Summit 
of Peacemakers in Sharm el-Sheikh brought together 29 world leaders. It 
demonstrated more dramatically than ever before that Israel now has 
partners in the region who stand with it against terrorism. If this had 
happened three years ago, Israel would have been largely alone at such a 
conference. And the President's visit to Israel demonstrated once again 
to its people that the United States is committed to giving them the 
moral and material support they need to achieve peace with security.  

Now we must act together. Tomorrow and Friday, experts will meet in 
Washington to prepare recommendations, which they will present to 
ministers, for implementing the summit's decisions quickly and 

We are determined to use every tool at our disposal to fight terror and 
defeat the enemies of peace. The Government of Israel worked with us to 
identify critical anti-terrorism needs totaling $100 million. I urge you 
to act immediately on the President's request for an additional $50 
million this year, to be offset by inflation savings from the Department 
of Defense accounts. These funds will meet Israel's urgent needs, 
including bomb-sniffing devices and x-ray equipment. Let me emphasize 
that U.S. support for the peace process has been in our national 
interest and produced progress over the last three years, including 
greater stability in the Middle East and an end to Israel's isolation. 
The Middle East has been transformed. The amount we have spent would be 
dwarfed by the amount we would have to spend if war broke out. 

This supplemental is well-justified. It is hard for us here to 
understand the devastating impact the bombings have had on the people of 
Israel. Their continued determination is testimony to their strength. We 
are duty-bound to respond to that determination. In fact, we and the 
Israelis had been in negotiations over anti-terrorism assistance before 
these attacks, and the Israelis came to us with their list of needs. I 
have discussed this with Secretary Perry and General Shalikashvili. They 
are supportive of funding this assistance from the 050 Account. 

This is not the time for us to change our allocations. Someday, peace 
and stability will enable us to modify our support. But I believe this 
is the wrong time to pull back from supporting those who are taking 
risks for peace. We will also expand training and technical cooperation 
with Israel to combat terrorism. 

With the same determination that we used to forge the widest consensus 
ever against terrorism at the recent summit, we will continue to help 
the parties find a lasting and comprehensive peace. Our new budget 
allocates $5.25 billion to sustain our efforts at this crucial moment 
for the peace process. It includes our continued investment in the 
security and economic development of Israel and Egypt--the anchors of 
peace and stability in the region. Our assistance to Jordan will help 
address its key security and economic needs as it takes risks for peace. 
The $75 million we request for the West Bank and Gaza will assist the 
Palestinian authorities in managing areas under their control, 
demonstrate the concrete benefits of peace to the Palestinian people, 
and help mobilize additional support from the international community. 

Mr. Chairman, last week we marked the 90th day of the NATO mission in 
Bosnia. Our troops have met their first critical challenge--overseeing 
the withdrawal of the warring parties from the lines over which they 
fought and died for four years. Every American can be proud of the role 
our armed forces and our diplomats played in making this success 
possible. I appreciate very much the members who have visited Bosnia. 
You know what a superb job our people are doing in very difficult 

We have now entered a new and delicate phase of the operation. The 
killing has ended in Bosnia, but peace in the fullest sense has not yet 
arrived. Our challenge now is to help the people of Bosnia begin the 
process of reconstruction. It is to fully deploy the civilian police 
force. It is to give life to the political institutions the Dayton 
Agreement created. It is to seek justice in the War Crimes Tribunal for 
the atrocities that were committed. 

I attended meetings on all these issues last week in Geneva and Moscow 
where we made progress. The parties agreed to cooperate with IFOR to 
deal with threats and violence in areas being transferred under the 
agreement. Serbia and Croatia agreed to turn over three indicted war 
crimes suspects to the War Crimes Tribunal. The parties in Bosnia agreed 
to release the remaining prisoners of war and to accept ground rules 
making it possible to hold free and fair elections later this year--the 
next critical milestone on the road to peace. The fundamental 
responsibility for these tasks lies with the parties. But without 
international assistance, civilian efforts cannot succeed and peace will 
not endure. 

The assistance we announced last December has already helped Bosnians 
rebuild their homes, provided fuel and clothing for the winter, and 
created short-term employment. The non-military assistance we are 
requesting for this year and for 1997 will train new and reliable police 
officers, help to de-mine Bosnia's roads and fields, and use small 
business loans to help demobilized soldiers make the transition to 
peace. Our request will also help establish a permanent election 
commission to ensure free elections after IFOR's departure. 

This is work that the United States cannot and should not try to do 
alone. Our request for a $200 million supplemental this year will 
leverage many times that amount from Europe, the Middle East, and Asia, 
as well as from the World Bank and IMF. But if our supplemental request 
is not approved by the April 12 pledging conference, our partners may 
not do their share and the peace process will be put in jeopardy. 
Therefore, Mr. Chairman, I earnestly request that you do everything you 
can to have Congress act on this request before the spring recess. 

Mr. Chairman, this assistance is a small investment to prevent a return 
of war to Bosnia. Having come this far and invested so much, we must not 
endanger our gains by failing to provide these funds.  

The participation in IFOR of so many central and east European countries 
is proving the value of the Partnership for Peace, through which they 
trained and planned with NATO forces for two years. Without their 
involvement and the logistical support that countries such as Hungary 
have provided U.S. troops, the international coalition to restore peace 
to Bosnia could not exist. Cooperation in IFOR and through the 
Partnership is also preparing the way for interested nations to join 
NATO. The $60 million we are requesting from this subcommittee for the 
Partnership for Peace is crucial to sustain this successful new element 
of European security. 

Our work for peace in Bosnia and the Middle East has also been advanced 
by our cooperation with Russia. We are continuing our cooperation in 
other areas critical to our security as well. We have already achieved 
massive reductions in nuclear arsenals and made nuclear materials more 
secure. Last week in Moscow, we made important progress on our common 
efforts to achieve a comprehensive test ban treaty this year. We also 
prepared the agenda for the President's April trip to Moscow to attend 
the P-8 nuclear summit and meet with President Yeltsin. 

Of course, we continue to have important differences such as the war in 
Chechnya, NATO enlargement, and Russia's nuclear cooperation with Iran. 
The challenge we face is cooperating where our interests coincide and 
managing our differences candidly and constructively. 

While multi-party elections and free-market principles are increasingly 
facts of life in Russia, reform is under strain. The people of Russia 
face an important choice in the June Presidential election--a contest in 
which the United States is and should be neutral. Our responsibility is 
to support the process of free and fair elections and continued 
political and economic reform. The bottom line is clear: Our assistance 
is helping to strengthen Russia's democratic institutions and the 
underpinnings of a market economy in which three-quarters of Russian 
enterprises are now in some form of private ownership. Most of our 
assistance now goes to private organizations and local governments and 
focuses on concrete objectives such as reactor safety, development of a 
clear tax code, and support for free media. 

In light of the progress made so far, new reform efforts in the other 
New Independent States and our budget realities, U.S. assistance to 
Russia has declined sharply since 1994. Russia will receive only $173 
million out of the $640 million we have requested for the NIS. Where we 
see opportunities to lock in important progress, funding has risen. 
International Affairs funding for Ukraine exceeds funding for Russia 
this year. Ukraine is now our fourth-largest recipient of assistance, 
reflecting that country's progress on economic and political reform and 
our commitment to its security and prosperity. I was in Ukraine last 
week, and the progress that is being made there is very encouraging. 

Our SEED request also sounds a note of optimism for the region: The 
Czech Republic, Estonia, and Latvia have "graduated" from its programs. 
With the Czech Republic now in the OECD and others to follow soon, this 
assistance has achieved its goals and is no longer needed. 

In Haiti, President Clinton's policy of firm, patient engagement allowed 
American troops to come in peace and leave on time. The last American 
troops will depart April 15, and Canada has agreed to lead a UN follow-
up operation. Over the last 18 months, security and human rights 
conditions have improved dramatically. President Preval's inauguration 
last month was Haiti's first-ever peaceful transfer of power from one 
elected government to another.  

During his visit last week, we discussed the formidable challenges 
poverty, violence, and under-development still pose to the Haitian 
people, and we emphasized the need for Haiti to keep basic economic 
reforms and privatization on course. The costs of helping the Haitian 
people institute judicial reform, train police, and improve health care 
and education are quite modest compared with the costs of dealing with 
the consequences of dictatorship and disintegration in Haiti. Our 
assistance will help consolidate recent progress and make sure that we 
realize our goal of a stable Haiti that can give its citizens decent 
lives at home.  

In Northern Ireland, the people have made their choice--as President 
Clinton has said, "for dialogue over division, and for hope over fear."  
The United States must continue to stand with them. President Clinton's 
personal leadership and the bipartisan support of this Congress have 
helped bring all-party talks within reach and encouraged private-sector 
investment to bring jobs and hope to the people of Northern Ireland. Our 
diplomacy and economic support are more crucial than ever to point the 
way forward toward a just and lasting settlement. 

East Asia is another region in which we have a vital interest in 
maintaining peace and stability. Through our military and diplomatic 
presence, we made it clear to Beijing that grave consequences would flow 
from the use of force to resolve the Taiwan issue. We acted to reduce 
the risk of miscalculation and to make clear our abiding interest in the 
peaceful resolution of issues between China and Taiwan--a key 
underpinning of our long-standing one-China policy. We congratulate the 
people of Taiwan on their historic democratic transformation. We welcome 
the public statements this week by both Beijing and Taipei which 
emphasized their willingness to address their differences peacefully and 
directly through the resumption of their dialogue. 

As everyone knows, we have other serious differences with China and are 
firmly pressing American interests in non-proliferation, trade, and 
human rights. Because we have seen a lack of progress on human right, 
for example, we are working with the European Union on this issue at the 
UN Human Rights Commission.  

We also have a number of issues where it is essential that we work with 
China. Indeed, we have successfully cooperated with China in banning 
ballistic missile exports, stopping the North Korean nuclear program, 
building peace in Cambodia, repatriating illegal aliens, and combating 
drug trafficking. The best way for us to pursue our interests is through 
a consistent policy of engagement. In that spirit, I will meet with Vice 
Premier and Foreign Minister Qian Qichen on April 19 in Netherlands both 
to address our concerns and to move our cooperation forward. 
Confronting Transnational Security Threats 
As I said earlier, we also face the challenge of defending Americans 
from transnational security threats. President Clinton's United Nations 
speech last October emphasized that proliferation, terrorism, 
international crime, drugs, and environmental damage threaten all 
nations in this interdependent world. 

We must continue working to stop the spread of weapons of mass 
destruction, the gravest potential threat to the United States and our 
allies. President Clinton will push hard at next month's Moscow nuclear 
summit for additional steps to stem proliferation, increase nuclear 
safety, and halt environmental damage. 

Building on our success in gaining the indefinite and unconditional 
extension of the Non-Proliferation Treaty last year, another landmark is 
within reach: a comprehensive test ban treaty. Last week I met with the 
key negotiators in Geneva, and I am glad to report that real progress is 
being made toward completing a treaty that President Kennedy first 
endorsed 35 years ago. Our objective is to complete a comprehensive test 
ban in time to sign it this year. 

One of the major achievements of this Administration has been the 
freezing of North Korea's nuclear program in its tracks. Since the U.S.-
D.P.R.K. Framework was signed in October 1994, North Korea's nuclear 
facilities have been frozen under effective monitoring by the 
International Atomic Energy Agency--IAEA. The Korean Peninsula Energy 
Development Organization--KEDO--that we helped establish to implement 
the Framework has made significant progress. Last December, KEDO and the 
D.P.R.K. signed a far-reaching agreement to provide the D.P.R.K. with 
proliferation-resistant light-water reactors and enable the IAEA to 
resume inspections of nuclear facilities not subject to the freeze. This 
budget requests funding for KEDO--a necessary investment to secure our 
gains as well as to ensure the cooperation and the contributions of 
South Korea and Japan, which, I must say, dwarf our own. 

Pariah states like Iraq, Iran, and Libya must also be stopped in their 
efforts to acquire weapons of mass destruction. The information that UN 
inspectors have uncovered on Iraq's biological program is chilling. It 
is now clear that Saddam Hussein possessed biological weapons and was on 
the verge of using them against civilians in the Gulf war. Last week, 
the UN's chief Iraq weapons inspector voiced concern that even five 
years after its defeat in the Gulf war, Iraq may still be hiding more 
than a dozen missiles with biological warheads. This is yet another 
reminder that Saddam has not disavowed his pursuit of weapons of terror 
and that sanctions must be maintained--and that we must maintain our 
support for the IAEA's important work in Iraq and around the world. And 
it is also a reminder of why we must ratify the Chemical Weapons 
Convention this year. 

We have also put new emphasis on the fight against international 
criminals, terrorists, and drug traffickers. The President's appointment 
of Gen. Barry McCaffrey to spearhead our counter-narcotics campaign will 
intensify our efforts at home and abroad, including interdiction of drug 
supplies. My trip to Latin America and the Caribbean last month marked 
significant development in our anti-narcotics cooperation with Caribbean 
nations. In Trinidad, we signed the first of a series of agreements 
providing for broader cooperation with American anti-narcotics 
operations. We are absolutely determined to stop the flow of drugs at 
the source, in transit, and on entry to the United States. 

This year, we are requesting a substantial increase over last year's 
appropriation for law enforcement training programs in Latin America, 
Central Europe, and the NIS and a modest increase in our global anti-
terrorism assistance programs. We will step up our crop substitution 
programs and our aerial support in the Andes. And we will enhance our 
anti-heroin efforts in South and Southeast Asia. 

This Administration is putting a new focus on the international 
dimensions of protecting our environment this year. We have increased 
environmental cooperation with our global partners and encouraged them 
to take more steps to preserve resources. Our common agendas with Japan, 
Brazil, and India are good examples of how we use our diplomacy to 
advance a range of our interests as basic as the health of our citizens 
and as complex as the survival of whole ecosystems. Last month, I 
visited a research institute run jointly by the Smithsonian Institution 
and the Brazilian Government on the Amazon River, where research is 
aimed at protecting biodiversity and discovering products of great 
commercial value.  

In 1996, the State Department is fully integrating environmental goals 
into our daily diplomacy for the first time. We are making greater use 
of environmental initiatives to promote our larger strategic and 
economic goals. For example, we are encouraging joint water projects in 
the Middle East and helping environmental industries here in the United 
States capture a larger share of a $400-billion global market. And 
through our $100 million contribution to the Global Environment 
Facility, we support efforts to protect the ozone layer, shield 
Americans from skin cancer, and preserve endangered species. 

Our population and sustainable development programs can make a decisive 
difference in easing threats to our prosperity and global stability.  
Our request for $3.8 billion includes USAID programs and voluntary 
contributions to international organizations that promote economic 

Where these important issues are concerned, polls suggest that many 
Americans see their country as a generous donor--as generous as we were 
in the days of the Marshall Plan when as much as 16% of our budget was 
spent on foreign aid. But the United States now ranks last among the 
industrialized countries, with one-tenth of 1% of our gross domestic 
product devoted to foreign assistance. This should hardly be a source of 
pride at a time when so many countries that received our aid in the past 
have become some of our largest trading partners. For example, the value 
of our exports to Latin America in 1994 alone was double the amount of 
aid we provided in the previous 44 years. 

Our assistance to Africa must be maintained, especially at a time when 
many countries are making quiet progress in stabilizing their economies 
and moving toward democracy. Our $704-million budget request for Africa 
will support critical efforts in areas ranging from democratic 
governance  to population stabilization. Our assistance directed to 
countries in Africa and elsewhere is also designed to strengthen 
accountable governments that respect human rights. Growing out of our 
conviction that democracy and development go hand-in-hand, our efforts 
through USAID and other programs improve the prospects for open 
societies and open markets that offer stability and prosperity to their 

Our humanitarian aid benefits not only the 3 million children a year we 
vaccinate and the thousands of disaster victims we help house, clothe, 
and feed, it is also in America's interest to treat and research 
infectious diseases like Ebola and malaria; it is in our interest to 
help refugees return as soon as they can. 

This year we have requested an increase to restore funding to the 
multilateral development banks. As you know, our contributions to the 
banks are essential to leverage the balance of the banks' funding from 
other nations. Moreover, the United States is leading the efforts of the 
G-7 to reform the multilateral banks in order to make them more 
efficient and effective. It is worth recalling that American companies 
win more contracts from the multilateral development banks than firms 
from any other country. We cannot reap the benefits of those reforms for 
American interests if we do not shoulder our responsibilities. 
Promoting Open Markets And Prosperity 
Finally, this Administration has placed the highest priority on creating 
jobs for Americans at home by opening markets abroad. We are removing 
barriers to trade and investment across the Pacific through APEC, across 
the Atlantic with the European Union, and throughout the Americas 
through the Miami Summit process. Our bilateral negotiations are also 
producing very important results, including the 20 market-opening 
agreements we have reached with Japan. Our exports to Japan are now 
rising five times as fast as imports. This year our watchword is 
implementation--making sure that these trade commitments and agreements 
open up new opportunities for American companies and workers to compete. 

Supporting American business abroad requires constant and meticulous 
attention from our diplomats in Washington and on the spot from 
Singapore to Santiago. It requires funding for posts and personnel as 
well as programs and promotions. It cannot be done with part-time 
officials in a world of 24-hour markets and full-time export promotion 
by our competitors.  

This year, we are requesting $639 million to promote trade and 
investment opportunities for American business through the Export-Import 
Bank, the Overseas Private Investment Corporation, and the Trade and 
Development Agency. Their programs finance exports of American goods and 
services, provide credit services in higher-risk markets like those of 
the NIS, and facilitate infrastructure projects for U.S. firms in the 
big emerging markets of Europe, Asia and Latin America. And they support 
$15-$20 billion in American exports and up to 300,000 American jobs. 
A Sensible Bargain the American People Can Support 
Mr. Chairman, I have mentioned several times in this testimony the 
absolutely vital importance of our posts around the world and the people 
who work in them. I have often said that our diplomats are our first 
line of defense. Over recent weeks I have presented awards to employees 
who opened an embassy in a war zone; who drove an ambassador safely out 
of an ambush; and, sadly, to the family of a man who died in the effort 
to bring peace to Bosnia. Their service represents America at its best. 
Just as in the private sector, however, our people need resources to do 
their jobs. 

Without the platforms that our embassies provide to other federal 
agencies as well as the State Department, we could not track down 
terrorists. We could not follow the situation of religious minorities in 
Eastern Europe or Americans held captive anywhere in the world. We could 
not help stop tropical diseases where they start. We could not help make 
new opportunities for American business.  

Those who would retreat from our commitments and abandon our leadership 
betray a lack of appreciation for what America has accomplished in the 
last 50 years and a lack of confidence that our great nation can shape 
the future. Yet exactly that retreat would be brought about by further 
cuts to our funding. 

With the eight-tenths of 1% of our national budget that we are 
requesting from this subcommittee, we carry out the foreign policy of 
this great nation to meet our nation's needs and provide security, 
growth, and leadership for the next American century. The amount we are 
asking for  is a sensible bargain that I believe the American people 
will want to support.  

Thank you very much.  
[Boxed item] 
Statement on the Death of Edmund Muskie 
Statement by Secretary Christopher released by the Office of the 
Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs and Spokesman, Washington, DC, 
March 26, 1996. 
I learned with great sadness this morning of the death of former 
Secretary of State Edmund Muskie. In serving as his Deputy Secretary of 
State in 1980, I was privileged to work with one of the most 
distinguished American public servants of the past half-century. 

Secretary Muskie's life was a great American story. He was the son of a 
tailor who immigrated to our country from Poland. He became Governor of 
Maine, a United States Senator for three decades, and his party's 
nominee for Vice President. 

As Secretary of State, he was a tireless proponent of American values 
and a champion of freedom in the lands of his parents and grandparents. 
While he served in the State Department for less than a year, he faced 
many difficult challenges. He organized economic sanctions against the 
former Soviet Union after its invasion of Afghanistan. He worked day and 
night to secure the release of our hostages in Iran. He devoted immense 
time and effort to implement the Camp David accords between Egypt and 

Over time, all these patient efforts paid off in a stronger America and 
a safer, freer world. The State Department will remember his many 
contributions, and I will miss his friendship and counsel.  
Working To Ensure a Secure And Comprehensive Peace In the Middle East 
Secretary Christopher 
Remarks to Sharm el-Sheikh Follow-on Meeting, Washington, DC, March 28, 
Distinguished guests, ladies and gentlemen: Welcome to the State 
Department. Two weeks ago, our leaders gathered at Sharm el-Sheikh to 
defend the cause of peace against those who would destroy it through 
terror. It was an unprecedented meeting that produced an unprecedented 
result: For the first time, Arabs and Israelis, Americans, Europeans, 
and Asians united to combat the common threat of terrorism and preserve 
the hope for peace.  

You are here today to build on that accomplishment--to turn the vision 
of Sharm el-Sheikh into a concrete set of actions that will both 
strengthen security and enhance the peace process. 

The challenge we face is clear: We must restore an environment in which 
negotiations can again move forward and agreement can be reached. We 
must seek to sustain the continuity of the peace process, which has led 
to historic agreements. To succeed, our strategy must have two parts.  

First, we must act now to defeat the merchants of terror. We must answer 
their brutality with a common approach and a unified message: that we 
are united against you; we will root you out; we will not let you kill 
the peace.  

Second, as we strengthen our capacity to combat terror, we must also 
reinforce our search for a comprehensive settlement of the Arab-Israeli 
conflict. In particular, we must find ways to support the Palestinian 
people as they too suffer the consequences of the Hamas bombings.  

I am pleased to announce that I have just spoken with Prime Minister 
Peres, PLO Chairman Arafat, and the Prime Minister of Norway, as 
chairperson of the Ad Hoc Liaison Committee on Palestinian Assistance, 
and we have agreed on the development of an emergency plan designed to 
improve the economic situation in Gaza and the West Bank. All sides are 
continuing to work intensively to develop the economic and security 
arrangements necessary to implement the plan. 

The plan has been developed by UN Special Coordinator Larsen in close 
coordination with the two parties and key donors. It will be based on 
the following elements: 
First, facilitating the entry of construction materials to the Gaza 
Strip, putting Gazans who work in construction and related activities 
back to work; 

Second, in cooperation with key donors, establishing an emergency jobs 
program in both the West Bank and Gaza; 

Third, facilitating entry of the necessary materials for the jobs 

Fourth, establishing measures to increase the volume of trade in both 
directions at the crossing points so as to relieve shortages of raw 
materials and increase exports; 

Fifth, increasing the number of convoys, including, for Gaza, citrus 
exports, to transport goods to and from Israeli ports as well as Jordan 
crossing points; 

Finally, increasing imports from Egypt by raising the number of trucks 
allowed to bring goods to and from crossing points. 

This effort to support the Palestinians underscores what our leaders 
recognized at Sharm el-Sheikh--that peace and security are indivisible. 
One cannot exist for long without the other. Both must be pursued with 

Our leaders also understood that last month's murderous attacks on the 
peace process threaten us all. Terrorism knows no borders. Its assault 
on civilized norms has been felt from Oklahoma City to the Tokyo subway. 
It has destroyed innocent lives in France and Algeria, in Egypt and 
Saudi Arabia, in Britain and Turkey, and in many other nations 
represented here. Muslims, Jews, and Christians have all been its 
victims. That is why we all have an interest in joining together now, to 
pool our collective strength in a concerted effort to confront the 
scourge of terrorism in all its forms. 

Sharm el-Sheikh was an important beginning. Here in Washington, you are 
charged with taking the next steps. You must translate the summit's 
decisions into a set of practical recommendations that can be presented 
for decision to foreign ministers in April.  

Our leaders have directed us to improve bilateral, regional, and 
international coordination to stop acts of terror and to ensure that 
their instigators are brought to justice. We need measures that will 
deny terrorists safehaven and prevent them from engaging in recruitment, 
fund raising, and training. We must take steps to identify and choke off 
their sources of financing and arms. We must provide training and 
equipment to help those, such as the Palestinian Authority, who are now 
taking strong action against terrorist organizations. And we must 
consider appropriate steps against states, such as Iran, that support 
the enemies of peace.  

Tomorrow, in the portion of your meeting that addresses terrorism, we 
will convene several sub-groups to consider practical issues of 
cooperation. The sub-groups will focus on different areas, such as 
improving information sharing, enhancing law enforcement cooperation, 
preventing terrorist funding and arms smuggling, and building counter-
terrorism capabilities.  

This is a unique gathering. For the first time, counter-terrorism 
experts from across the Middle East and the world have come together to 
address the common threat they face. I urge you to use this opportunity 
to share your professional experiences with your colleagues and, in 
turn, to learn from them. 

The United States is prepared to work with you in this endeavor. We are 
already engaged in a comprehensive national effort against terrorism. 
Unilaterally, we are working to cut off its financing sources in the 
United States and have imposed harsh economic sanctions against its 
foremost state sponsor. We have developed cooperative programs with 
friends and allies around the world. We are committed to exploring every 
possible means to further advance our efforts. We urge each of your 
countries to do the same. 

The famous political philosopher, Edmund Burke, said, "When bad men 
combine, the good must associate."  With the Sharm el-Sheikh summit and 
with this gathering in Washington, we have answered Burke's call. Now, 
we must act--quickly and effectively--to combat terror, to restore 
security, and to ensure that our goal of a secure and comprehensive 
peace is achieved. 

Thank you.   

The U.S. and South Korea: Working To Ensure Peace on the Peninsula 
Secretary Christopher, Korean Foreign Minister Gong 
Remarks prior to their luncheon, Washington, DC, March 26, 1996 
Secretary Christopher. As always, it is a pleasure to welcome Foreign 
Minister Gong back to Washington. Our talks today, I am sure, will 
deepen the close cooperation which has been the hallmark of our 
relationship with Korea for four decades. 

America's commitment to the security of the Korean Peninsula remains 
unshakeable. I will be discussing with the Foreign Minister how we can 
strengthen our security ties and ensure peace on the peninsula. I look 
forward to hearing from him about  his trip to China. He told me that he 
traveled here directly from China.  

We will review, as we always do, the progress made on the Korean 
Peninsula Energy Development Organization--KEDO--and how we are working 
together to implement   the U.S.-North Korean Agreed Framework that has 
frozen North Korea's nuclear program.  

Our two countries agree that for the Framework ultimately to succeed, 
there must be a dialogue between the two Koreas, and we urge that it 
resume at an early time. The United States has repeatedly urged North 
Korea to keep its commitments under the Framework agreement, which is so 
vital to stability on the peninsula. 

As members of the UN Security Council, we have had an opportunity to 
work closely with South Korea since it became a member late last year. 
Today, we will be discussing some of the critical issues facing the 
Council, especially the importance of maintaining the sanctions on Iraq 
and Libya until they fully comply with the resolutions. 

I expect also to review with the Foreign Minister the extensive 
commercial ties that we have with South Korea, which is now our sixth-
largest export market and one that supports tens of thousands of 
American jobs. Last year, the value of the two-way trade between our 
nations reached   $50 billion--a 30% increase during the last two years. 
We have some differences in the commercial areas, I think, which is only 
natural, considering the very broad relationship we have. Of course, we 
will be discussing those. 

I think our meeting today testifies to how far our relationship has come 
in the last five decades. It will bolster our ties and reflect the fact 
that the true strength of our partnership rests on the thousands of 
encounters that are taking place every day between business 
representatives of the two countries; between our students, who are 
studying in each other's countries; and, perhaps above all, between our 
soldiers and our government officials, who are working together to bring 
our countries closer together and to try     to provide security on the 
Korean Peninsula. 

We welcome you, Mr. Minister. We are delighted to have you here. 

Foreign Minister Gong. Last year, Mr. Christopher and I met four times, 
and this enabled us to establish very close working relations, which I 
believe greatly contributed to the promotion and strengthening of 
relations between our two countries.  

With regard to the North Korea nuclear issue, which the Secretary just 
referred to, I am pleased that the Agreed Framework is being implemented 
smoothly, for the most part, with the conclusion of the light-water 
reactors supply agreement between KEDO and North Korea last year. 

However, the resumption of inter-Korean dialogue, also an integral part 
of the agreement, remains at a standstill due to the North's refusal to 
hold a dialogue with South Korea. This is one of the major causes 
breeding constant concern in the Korean Peninsula.  

The area in which Korea and the United States cooperated closely last 
year is not only limited to the North Korean matter. With Korea having 
become a non-permanent member of the Security Council this year, a new 
era of Korea-U.S. cooperation in the UN has unfolded. 

Korea-U.S. cooperation in the international arena has evolved in both 
depth and scope through such fora as ARF--the ASEAN Regional Forum, the 
foreign ministerial meeting in Brunei held last August, and the Osaka 
APEC summit last November.  

Secretary Christopher and I will exchange broad views on both bilateral 
and multilateral issues in today's meeting. I am sure that we will be 
able to produce a very constructive and fulfilling outcome based upon 
the excellent working relationship we have maintained. Thank you.   
The U.S. and Canada Renew The NORAD Agreement 
Secretary Christopher, Canadian Foreign Minister Axworthy 
Remarks following signing of extension to the North American Aerospace 
Defense Command (NORAD) Agreement, Washington, DC, March 28, 1996 
Secretary Christopher. Good morning. In just a minute I will tell you 
what we've done here, but first let me say that I am delighted to 
welcome Lloyd Axworthy, the new Canadian Foreign Minister, on his first 
visit to Washington. 

The United States and Canada have built a very strong partnership based 
upon the many interests and values that we share. I know the Foreign 
Minister and I will have a comparably useful and effective partnership. 
We have begun to get acquainted, and there is no doubt that we are going 
to have a very fine relationship. 

As I think is well-known, our commitment to a common defense has long 
been the heart of our cooperation. The mechanism has been the North 
American Aerospace Defense Command--we have called that "NORAD" for such 
a long time that we have forgotten what the real words are. First 
established in 1958, NORAD remains an integral part of our defenses, as 
well as a symbol of our trust and confidence on which our whole 
relationship is based. 

We have just now signed a renewal of the NORAD agreement, so we are back 
in business. I am very glad to have two senior military officials here 
today: the Deputy Commander-in-Chief of NORAD, Lieutenant General 
Cuppens--General, we are very pleased to have you here with us today; 
and the commander of Canada's First Air Force, Maj. Gen. Philip Killey, 
also joins us. I think we ought to perhaps give the generals a hand and 
give NORAD a hand. 

The strong relationship that we have has been the foundation for 
prosperity and peace across our entire hemisphere. From our own trade 
agreements to NAFTA to the Summit of the Americas, U.S.-Canadian 
cooperation has led the way in opening markets and building a 
hemispheric economy in which all can prosper. 

There are so many areas where we work together that it would probably be 
unfair to single out any one, but our cooperation right now in Haiti has 
been so critical to the restoration of democracy there. Canada's 
contribution of peacekeepers and resources has been just extraordinary. 
Now Canada's assuming leadership of the UN military mission in Haiti--an 
absolutely indispensable role to safeguard the gains of the past 18 
months and to help to ensure that the people of Haiti will have an 
opportunity for decent and productive lives. 

This is only one example of Canada's commitment to international 
peacekeeping and its contributions to global security and global peace. 
Canada really has been an example for the world in that regard. Other 
illustrations are the Middle East and the Balkans, where Canada has also 
made and is making a major contribution. We are also going to be working 
together in making progress toward a comprehensive test ban treaty. 

At our meeting today, we will be reviewing our cooperation both here in 
the hemisphere and abroad. We are going to be working together in the 
next few months at important meetings of NATO, the G-7, and the United 

So, I am very glad to have this opportunity to get better acquainted 
with Lloyd Axworthy and to begin the process of working with him to 
maintain the very strong partnership that exists between our two 
countries. Welcome, Lloyd, and thank you. 

Foreign Minister Axworthy. Thank you. I would like to thank the 
Secretary for his courtesy in welcoming me and our delegation here over 
the past two days. We have already had some good conversations and look 
forward to a longer session this afternoon, as the Secretary said, to 
examine the incredible range of opportunities and initiatives and 
relationships that Canada and the United States have established over 
the years, both historically and in our contemporary sense.  

It is important to recognize, I think, as each day goes by, about $1 
billion of trade passes across our borders. We are each other's largest 
trading partner. We have thousands of transactions in the commercial 
field and millions of connections in the personal, human field, and it 
is a good opportunity for me in my first visit to be here and to enjoy 
the opportunity of examining those issues.  

[In French, through interpreter] In recent years, the United States has 
been a very good friend of Canada, and it has very generously taken into 
consideration our interests. We are very happy to be here today to sign 
this very important treaty for Canada and the United States. [End of 

One comment I would like to make, because I think the signing of the 
NORAD accord has significance beyond just its importance as a security 
and surveillance early warning system: It is a good model about how we 
can and should work out joint relationships. It is based upon 
collaboration, a sharing of information, a process, a set of rules; it 
has stood the test of time and, perhaps, particularly, it has been able 
to be renovated and renewed and redesigned to meet new conditions.  

The NORAD agreement itself will provide us with the opportunity to 
jointly work on new technologies for aerospace warning, to ensure that 
some of the new concerns that we have about rogue states and their 
nuclear capacity can be clearly identified, and to deal with questions 
of drug interdiction. So it does demonstrate the ability to constantly 
upgrade and improve those institutions that we have established over the 
years to serve our joint interests. 

As the Secretary said, we will be looking forward to the opportunity to 
discuss a number of issues where we are collaborating. The importance of 
Haiti to us, as a country in our hemisphere that is working with great 
courage to reestablish a democratic system with the help of its 
partners, is one that we jointly support. I have been encouraged in our 
discussions so far on how we can continue to work in a cooperative 

We also are looking very closely at collaborating on things like the 
Arctic Council, where we see an opportunity to share again joint--a new 
institution to help us deal with the environment in our northern 
hemisphere. Of course, there are other issues as well on the trade front 
and the cultural front that we want to discuss. The Secretary and I have 
already had some discussions about issues concerning Cuba; about soft-
wood lumber, about related issues that we want to be able to have a 
good, frank, open discussion--and there is certainly a willingness to do 

Finally, just to say that I welcome the opportunity to learn from the 
Secretary--as a new minister--with his vast experience in Middle East 
matters. He has taken a very strong role in the whole work on terrorism. 
There is a major meeting taking place in Washington today of our 
officials to talk about how we can respond to the peace process in the 
Middle East and develop a counter-terrorism approach; the interests that 
we have jointly in the evolution of NATO and eastern Europe, and our 
concerns about working closely together on Nigeria and dealing with the 
human rights situation in that country.  

So we have a full agenda. We will be looking forward to these 
opportunities, and I thank the Secretary and his staff for the welcome 
they have given us.   
U.S. Policy Toward The Korean Peninsula 
Winston Lord, Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs 
Statement before the Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific of the House 
International Relations Committee, Washington, DC, March 19, 1996 
Mr. Chairman, I appreciate your kind invitation to appear today. It is a 
pleasure to testify at this joint hearing on U.S. policy toward North 
Korea. North Korea poses major challenges to U.S. foreign policy, and 
the importance of Korean issues is well known to you, not least from 
your travels to South Korea at the end of last August. As you requested, 
I will focus on U.S.-North Korean relations. But before I begin, I want 
to make clear that our approach to all Korean issues is founded on our 
rock-solid relationship with the R.O.K., an ally of long standing, a 
vibrant democracy, and a major trading partner. 
U.S.-D.P.R.K. Agreed Framework--A Major Achievement 
Nearly a year-and-a-half after the U.S.-D.P.R.K. Agreed Framework was 
signed, the Administration's policy of gradual engagement with North 
Korea is a major success. When the Clinton Administration first entered 
office in January 1993, it was immediately confronted with the problem 
of North Korea's nuclear program. Just 18 months ago, North Korea, bent 
on development of a large nuclear weapons program, had one operational 
nuclear reactor and two larger reactors under construction, all of a 
type designed to maximize production of weapons-grade plutonium. Left 
unchecked, this program would have been capable of producing enough 
plutonium for at least several nuclear weapons annually. Most 
immediately, North Korea was threatening to reprocess the spent fuel 
from its operational reactor to produce several weapons worth of 
plutonium and then reload the reactor and produce additional plutonium. 
Such a nuclear stockpile in the hands of the North Korean regime would 
have been a grave threat to U.S. allies in the region and U.S. interests 
around the world. 

The Agreed Framework has frozen the North's nuclear program in its 
tracks. It has put us on a path to attain all our strategic objectives, 
supporting the international non-proliferation regime, and enhancing 
security and stability in Northeast Asia. North Korea's operational 
reactor and its reprocessing facility are sealed; construction has 
stopped on the two new reactors; very soon, U.S. experts will begin, 
with North Korean cooperation, to place the plutonium-laden spent fuel 
in safe storage pending its eventual removal from North Korea. As you 
emphasized in your Resolution Relating to the Agreed Framework, Mr. 
Chairman, the eventual removal of this fuel from the D.P.R.K. is of 
major significance. The freeze is being effectively monitored by the 
International Atomic Energy Agency--IAEA, which has recently agreed with 
North Korea on procedures for the resumption of ad hoc and routine 
inspections of nuclear facilities not subject to the freeze. 

The Agreed Framework will produce a full accounting of the history of 
the D.P.R.K. nuclear program before the D.P.R.K. receives key nuclear 
components for the light-water reactors we are committed to provide. 
When fully implemented, the Framework will result in the dismantlement 
of North Korea's dangerous gas-graphite reactors and related facilities, 
including the D.P.R.K.'s reprocessing plant. These steps go far beyond 
what the D.P.R.K. would have been required to do under the nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty--NPT, which allows member states to reprocess spent 
fuel under IAEA safeguards. Ensuring that the Agreed Framework is 
successfully implemented is, therefore, a major goal--one we are 
pursuing with full knowledge that we may face serious challenges in the 

The Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization--KEDO--was founded 
1 year ago by the U.S., Japan, and the R.O.K. to implement portions of 
the Agreed Framework, including the light-water reactor project and the 
provision to the D.P.R.K. of interim energy supplies in the form of 
heavy fuel oil. KEDO, under the leadership of Executive Director Stephen 
Bosworth, is moving ahead purposefully to accomplish these tasks. After 
Ambassador Bob Gallucci was appointed the President's Special Adviser on 
Bosnia, Ambassador Paul Cleveland was appointed to serve as the U.S. 
representative on the KEDO Executive Board. The appointment of such a 
senior diplomat is another sign of the importance the Administration 
places on smoothly implementing the Agreed Framework. 

On December 15, 1995, KEDO and the D.P.R.K. concluded an agreement for 
the supply of proliferation-resistant light-water nuclear reactors to 
North Korea. The supply agreement follows up on the joint statement 
negotiated with the North Koreans by my deputy, Tom Hubbard, last summer 
in Kuala Lumpur, which makes clear that North Korea will receive South 
Korean standard model reactors and that South Korea will play a central 
role in all aspects of the light-water reactor project. It was this 
December agreement that triggered the North Korean commitment under the 
terms of the Agreed Framework to allow the IAEA to resume inspections on 
declared nuclear sites not subject to the freeze. 

KEDO is now preparing for negotiations with the Korean Electric Power 
company--KEPCO, the South Korean firm with which it plans to conclude 
the prime contract for the light-water reactor project. In the meantime, 
KEDO has already conducted four site survey visits to the proposed site 
in North Korea where the reactors will be built. A fifth KEDO team will 
travel to the D.P.R.K. in the near future to complete the evaluation, 
leading to a formal designation by KEDO within the next few months of 
the construction site. South Korean nationals have been included in each 
of the KEDO delegations, marking a modest step forward in North-South 
contacts. Contrary to rumors that were circulating in Seoul at the time 
of your visit last fall, Mr. Chairman, South Korean members of the KEDO 
site survey teams have received the same treatment as the members from 
the U.S. and Japan. 

KEDO will soon begin negotiations with the D.P.R.K. on a series of 
implementing protocols to supplement December's light-water reactor 
supply agreement. KEDO is also supplying the D.P.R.K. with 500,000 tons 
per year of heavy fuel oil, as stipulated in the Agreed Framework. These 
shipments replace the electric power potential the D.P.R.K. lost by 
freezing its nuclear program and will continue until the first light-
water reactor goes on line. The D.P.R.K. has accepted our proposed 
method for verifying that this heavy oil is not diverted for uses other 
than those stipulated in the Agreed Framework. 

Financing our commitments under the Agreed Framework is an important 
priority and a major focus of our work. The Administration has requested 
a very modest sum considering the importance to U.S. security interests 
of implementing the Agreed Framework. The President will soon convey to 
the Congress a 614 waiver and congressional certification package, as 
required by law so that we may use the money appropriated by Congress 
for KEDO projects in FY 1996. I hope the Congress will conclude its 
review of this matter as quickly as possible so that KEDO will continue 
to be able to meet its commitment to provide heavy oil to the D.P.R.K. 
Japan has recently agreed to provide $19 million to help KEDO finance 
the purchase of heavy oil. Japan did this in anticipation that the U.S. 
would soon be in a position to play its own necessary role in financing 
this part of the project. 

We are also working with our South Korean and Japanese allies to secure 
new members and new contributions for KEDO. KEDO is gaining increasing 
international support, with 10 countries having joined or indicated 
their intention to join. Some 20 countries have contributed financially 
or plan to contribute. Most recently, the European Union has decided to 
make an initial contribution of $6.3 million for KEDO, while France and 
Germany will also make national contributions of $2 million and $1 
million, respectively. 
U.S. Policy 
It may be helpful to recall briefly the evolution of U.S. policy through 
three administrations over the last eight years. Our approach toward the 
D.P.R.K. began to evolve in 1988, when the Reagan Administration 
undertook the so-called "modest initiative" to open the window for 
limited contact. This initiative marked the first break in the 
comprehensive U.S. economic embargo on North Korea by allowing trade in 
humanitarian goods. It also included official U.S. support for non-
governmental, cultural, and academic contacts between Americans and 
North Koreans, including the issuance of visas for such contacts. The 
next step came in January 1992, during a period of hopeful dialogue 
between North and South Korea, when the Bush Administration agreed to 
host the first-ever high-level meeting between U.S. and D.P.R.K. 
officials. While useful, this did not lead to further high-level 
official contacts, and the U.S.-D.P.R.K. dialogue quickly slipped back 
to working-level exchanges between our embassies in Beijing. Then, in 
March 1993, the D.P.R.K. announced it would withdraw from the non-
proliferation treaty. Following up the UN Security Council's call for 
member states to do whatever they could to help resolve the crisis, this 
Administration decided to engage the D.P.R.K. once again at the 
political level in a process  that eventually resulted in conclusion of 
the Agreed Framework. 

In addition to achieving a durable peace on the Korean Peninsula, the 
U.S. seeks to facilitate progress by the Korean people toward achieving 
national reunification. We look forward to the day when all Koreans will 
enjoy peace, prosperity, and freedom as well as constructive relations 
with their neighbors. Since conclusion of the Agreed Framework, the 
Administration has not rested on its laurels. Recognizing the importance 
of stability in Northeast Asia to U.S. interests, we are maintaining a 
strong deterrent posture and pursuing relations with North Korea in 
close consultation with our allies in South Korea and Japan. 

In dealing with North Korea, the Administration is moving simultaneously 
on three tracks: 

-- We are implementing the U.S.-D.P.R.K. Agreed Framework, as I have 
already described; 

-- We are seeking means of reducing tensions on the Korean Peninsula,  
most importantly through substantive North- South dialogue; and 

-- We are increasing contacts with North Korea in order to promote 
security and stability in the region. 
Reducing Tensions 
While the Agreed Framework has been successful, we are well aware that 
North Korea continues to pose serious challenges for American foreign 
policy. The D.P.R.K. remains a closed society isolated from the outside 
world with massive, forward-deployed conventional military forces and 
dangerous missile, chemical, and biological weapons programs. As you 
pointed out in the report on your visit to Seoul last fall, Mr. 
Chairman, the Korean Peninsula is rightly considered perhaps the most 
serious risk for full-scale conflict involving U.S. troops. 
Consequently, a key objective of U.S. policy must continue to be the 
preservation of security and peace on the Korean Peninsula. The 
cornerstone of our efforts is our alliance with the Republic of Korea. 
Forged in the crucible of war, our alliance with the R.O.K. has been 
nurtured by long-established patterns of close consultation and 
cooperation, as demonstrated throughout our negotiation with the 
D.P.R.K. over the last three years. The 37,000 U.S. forces in Korea 
supporting this alliance are part of the overall 100,000 troops the U.S. 
maintains in the Asia-Pacific area. Our alliance is committed both to 
continued vigilance and to exploring ways to reduce tensions on the 

With the North Korean nuclear program in check, we must continue to 
address the conventional military threat and the threat posed by the 
North's other weapons of mass destruction. North Korea fields an army of 
more than 1 million men, most of it deployed in the immediate vicinity 
of the demilitarized zone. In spite of severe economic problems, the 
D.P.R.K. continues to devote a huge percentage of its national wealth to 
maintaining and modernizing this military machine. The North also 
deploys long-range missiles and chemical and biological arsenals that 
are a threat to the peninsula and beyond, as exemplified by the North's 
missile sales to the Middle East. 

The Military Armistice Agreement of 1953 has helped to maintain the 
peace for more than 40 years now. Over the last few years, the D.P.R.K. 
has engaged in a systematic campaign to undermine the armistice. This 
threatens peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula. As it pledged in 
the 1991 North-South Basic Agreement, the D.P.R.K. should abide by the 
terms of the Military Armistice Agreement until it is replaced by a 
permanent peace. 

It is important that military communications channels be in place in 
Panmunjom so that we can ensure that the armistice is maintained. After 
close consultations in Seoul, the UN Command has proposed talks at 
Panmunjom between general officers representing the Commander of UN 
Forces in Korea and the North Korean People's Army. Under this proposal, 
the U.S., R.O.K., and D.P.R.K. would all participate fully. We continue 
to urge the D.P.R.K. to consider this proposal positively. 

For its part, the D.P.R.K. has repeatedly sought to open direct, 
bilateral talks with us to discuss issues related to peace and security 
on the Korean Peninsula. Most recently, the D.P.R.K. last month proposed 
that the U.S. and D.P.R.K. conclude an interim agreement to maintain 
peace on the peninsula until the U.S. and D.P.R.K. can conclude a peace 
treaty. This approach is absolutely unacceptable to the U.S., as are all 
North Korean attempts to deal with issues of peace and security on a 
bilateral basis. It is the firm position of the United States that it is 
up to Koreans--both North and South--to create a stable peace in Korea. 
The United States will support fully any joint efforts by the North and 
South to create a new peace mechanism and is willing to play whatever 
role the Koreans wish us to play. But the U.S. will not engage the 
D.P.R.K. bilaterally, over the head of our South Korean allies. The 
R.O.K. must fully participate in any military-to-military contacts. 

All of this illustrates the fundamental importance of improved North- 
South relations. The North-South Basic Agreement of December 1991 
stipulates that it is up to Koreans--both North and South--to create a 
stable peace on the Korean Peninsula. In the Agreed Framework, the 
D.P.R.K. made a commitment to engage in North-South dialogue. This 
commitment was so central that the U.S. would not have concluded the 
Framework without it. North-South dialogue is an essential aspect of the 
Agreed Framework and a prerequisite for its full implementation. We have 
repeatedly urged Pyongyang to meet its commitment and begin direct 
governmental dialogue with the R.O.K.--and will continue to do so at 
every opportunity. As we have in the past, we also stand ready to 
support constructive new South Korean initiatives. 
Expanding Contacts 
Expanding contacts with North Korea is an important means of reducing 
tensions and building a broader basis for peace and security on the 
peninsula. In close concert with our South Korean allies, we seek to 
engage the D.P.R.K. bilaterally on a number of issues in order to 
accomplish one of the basic goals of the Agreed Framework: to build a 
North Korean stake in responsible behavior. Toward this end, we also 
continue to work closely with Japan, China, Russia, and others. 

We encourage the D.P.R.K. to continue down the road of greater openness 
to the outside world. We seek to demonstrate to Pyongyang the benefits 
of acting in accordance with international norms in areas such as 
missile proliferation and terrorism. We are ready to cooperate with the 
D.P.R.K. on humanitarian issues such as relief for North Korean victims 
of last year's flooding and the return of the remains of U.S. soldiers. 

The U.S. has provided three tranches of assistance totaling $2,225,000 
to international organizations to aid the victims of flooding in North 
Korea. The decision to provide this indirect assistance was made after 
responsible international organizations determined that a demonstrable 
humanitarian need exists in those parts of North Korea most severely 
affected by the flooding. 

The first two tranches of assistance worth $225,000 were provided to 
UNICEF for a vaccination program and a program to provide nutritional 
supports to young children and nursing mothers. The most recent U.S. 
decision to provide $2 million to the World Food Program for its efforts 
to assist flood victims in the North is a good example of our policy of 
maintaining close consultations and collaboration with our South Korean 
and Japanese allies. Before deciding to extend the $2 million of 
humanitarian assistance, we conducted talks bilaterally with the R.O.K. 
and  trilaterally in Honolulu with the R.O.K. and Japan. We explained 
that this aid would respond to a real humanitarian need, keep the World 
Food Program engaged in North Korea, and demonstrate to North Korea the 
benefits of permitting international organizations to operate there. 
Consequently, the R.O.K. announced that it had no objection to our 
provision of emergency disaster relief assistance through the World Food 
Program. Japan also expressed support. 

We favor the opening of private channels of communication with the 
D.P.R.K. and encourage cultural, academic, and other people-to-people 
exchanges. We welcome indications from American firms of their interest 
in exploring discussions with North Korea, within the context of U.S. 

Under the terms of the Agreed Framework, we will open a liaison office 
in Pyongyang, and the D.P.R.K. will open one in Washington when 
necessary consular and technical issues are resolved. This would be the 
first small step in a diplomatic relationship and would provide us with 
regular, dependable channels of communication. Since the conclusion of 
the Agreed Framework, we have held several rounds of talks with North 
Korea on the opening of liaison offices and succeeded in resolving most, 
but not all, of the outstanding issues. Last fall, we put forward a 
proposal to resolve the final outstanding issues and are still waiting 
for the North Korean reply. We stand ready to open liaison offices as 
soon as these issues can be resolved. We will be happy to brief your 
committee or staff on our plans as we move forward. 

We are also willing to move over time toward more normal relations with 
North Korea but only as North Korea addresses issues of concern to us, 
including North-South relations. Without an improvement in North-South 
relations, it is clear that the development of U.S. relations with North 
Korea will be inhibited. We are well aware of your concerns in this 
area, Mr. Chairman, as expressed in the House Resolution on the Agreed 

During last summer's dedication of the Korean War Veterans' Memorial, 
President Clinton pledged that we would not forget the American soldiers 
who perished in North Korea during the Korean war and whose remains have 
not yet been recovered and returned to the U.S. In January, a U.S. 
delegation, led by Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense James Wold, 
addressed this issue in talks with a North Korean delegation, and we 
hope to continue these negotiations in the near future. We continue to 
press North Korea for talks on the issue of missile proliferation, 
particularly North Korean missile sales to the volatile Middle East. And 
we have also addressed with the D.P.R.K. steps we would like to see 
taken so that we would be able to consider removing North Korea from the 
list of state sponsors of terrorism. The D.P.R.K. has taken a modest 
step forward, issuing an official statement denouncing terrorism. We 
welcome this statement and look forward to seeing concrete evidence that 
North Korea is taking steps to support international action against 

We also believe it will be beneficial to all parties for the D.P.R.K. to 
expand its economic ties with the outside world so that its people can 
share in the East Asian economic miracle. We welcome the modest 
expansion of trade with South Korea, which has made Seoul Pyongyang's 
third-largest trading partner. We took initial steps a year ago to ease 
U.S. economic sanctions on the D.P.R.K. These steps, while modest, have 
led to a small but still significant increase in commercial contacts 
between the U.S. and the D.P.R.K. For example, direct telecommunications 
services have been established, U.S. companies have signed contracts to 
import magnesite from the D.P.R.K., and American non-governmental 
organizations have contributed humanitarian goods to the D.P.R.K. 

We are committed gradually to normalize economic as well as political 
relations with the D.P.R.K. as progress is made on the Agreed Framework 
and other issues of concern to the U.S. There have been recent steps 
forward--particularly the signing of the light-water reactor supply 
agreement and progress on spent-fuel canning. The timing and extent of 
further sanctions reduction measures will in large part depend on 
D.P.R.K. willingness to engage constructively on the issues we care 
about, including missile proliferation, the return of war remains, the 
reduction of tensions, and, most importantly, North-South dialogue. We 
will, of course, consult fully with the Congress as our policy on 
sanctions evolves. 
In conclusion, I want to stress that on all issues concerning the Korean 
Peninsula, the U.S. will continue to coordinate closely with the R.O.K. 
as well as Japan. Our pattern of consultations is intense and constant. 
President Clinton has visited Seoul. President Kim has made two visits 
to Washington. National Security Adviser Lake was in Seoul last month. 
Deputy Secretary Talbott met with his counterpart in December. Secretary 
Christopher, R.O.K. Foreign Minister Gong, and former Japanese Foreign 
Minister Kono decided last November to institute a series of high-level 
trilateral consultations to coordinate policy toward North Korea. I 
chaired the first such meeting in January and look forward to further 

The Agreed Framework has been a great success in dealing with the North 
Korean nuclear threat. It serves regional stability and global non-
proliferation efforts. We will continue to do everything necessary to 
ensure the Framework's smoothest possible implementation. The key 
achievement of the Framework is that it freezes and, when fully 
implemented, will lead to the total dismantlement of the North Korean 
nuclear program. But the Framework encompasses more than just the 
nuclear issue. We are using it to promote a broader approach toward our 
long-term goals:  a durable peace on the Korean Peninsula and the 
eventual reunification that the Korean people seek. These are issues on 
which Koreans will play the leading role. As a friend and ally, the 
United States stands ready to help.  
Support for Democracy And the Rule of Law in Haiti 
Alexander F. Watson, Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs 
Statement before the House Appropriations Committee, Washington, DC, 
March 21, 1996 
Mr. Chairman: Thank you forthe opportunity to appear before this 
committee to discuss U.S. expenditures in support of the restoration of 
democracy in Haiti. A full, detailed discussion of this subject could 
take hours to present. Instead, I would like to briefly evaluate our 
policy, and then my colleagues and I will be glad to respond to specific 

A little later this morning, President Preval will be meeting with the 
President. As the first democratically elected president to succeed an 
elected incumbent in Haiti, his visit marks a turning point in Haitian 
history and in U.S.-Haitian relations. President Preval also will be 
talking to Members of Congress about the need for economic reform in 
Haiti, as well as his vision for the development of the rule of law and 
democratic institutions in Haiti and the importance of continued U.S. 
support in these areas. 

As Assistant Secretary, I focus broadly on the entire region in which we 
live. Haiti is part of the hemispheric community, and its problems 
affect the entire region. When you have worked in and traveled through 
the hemisphere as long as I have, you quickly realize that Haiti's 
problems are not unique. While these problems may be worse in Haiti than 
elsewhere, political instability, health and environmental problems, and 
economic and social restructuring are problems which many of our 
neighbors are struggling to deal with. And these are problems which, 
with our help, many of our neighbors in the hemisphere are overcoming. 

During Secretary Christopher's recent trip through the region, we 
discussed Haiti with a number of the countries, such as Argentina and 
Trinidad and Tobago, that took leading roles in the UN Mission in Haiti-
-UNMIH--and its predecessor, the Multinational Force--MNF--which 
restored democracy to Haiti. These countries and others in the 
hemisphere initially worked with us through the OAS in calling for a 
trade embargo of Haiti, launching an intense diplomatic initiative in 
the hope of solving Haiti's political crisis peacefully, and sending the 
International Civilian Mission--MICIVIH--and the Inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights to bear witness to Haiti's appalling human 
rights situation during the coup period. 

They and we took these unprecedented measures in Haiti because it was in 
the self-interest of every democratically elected government in the 
region to do so. The message was for the hemisphere at large: The days 
of dictators and coups are over. Anyone contemplating the overthrow of a 
democratically elected government anywhere in the region can expect a 
strong, united hemispheric response. Coups will not be permitted to 

Thus, our success in reversing the coup in Haiti is a success for the 
policy of supporting democracy in our region--a policy which has been 
pursued vigorously under both Republican and Democratic administrations. 

Let me turn to where Haiti is today and how far we have come in less 
than 18 months. On February 7, Rene Preval was inaugurated as President 
of Haiti in the first peaceful and constitutional transfer of power from 
one freely elected president to another in that country. Through this 
unprecedented event, the political leaders of Haiti demonstrated their 
commitment to the permanent establishment of democratic processes in 
accordance with the Haitian constitution. 

Former President Aristide remains a very charismatic figure who 
symbolizes the hopes of the Haitian poor for a better life free from 
violent repression. There are many in Haiti who believed and still 
believe that he should have been allowed to serve an additional three 
years to make up for his time in exile. Still others would have liked to 
have seen him be president for as long as he liked. 

However, President Aristide himself set in motion the presidential 
election process that led to his peaceful handing over of power in 
accordance with the provisions of the constitution after the expiration 
of his five-year term. President Aristide stressed the importance of 
establishing the constitutional precedent of a legitimate transfer of 
power for the future of Haitian democracy over his personal beliefs or 
that of his most ardent supporters. He noted that "the second 
[Presidential] election is more important than the first in a 

We believe that President Aristide's demonstrated commitment to 
constitutional rule will be a fundamental principle of future political 
life in Haiti. This stands in stark contrast to Haiti's long history of 
military governments and dictators who cared little for democracy or the 
welfare of the Haitian people. 

In today's Haiti, there is a new sense of personal security due in large 
part to our efforts to rebuild and strengthen the rule of law. We have 
made major progress. Only 18 months ago--prior to the U.S.-led 
intervention --the system of law enforcement and justice was in an 
appalling state. There was no police force, and the Haitian army was 
widely viewed as an enemy of the people. Judicial institutions were 
virtually moribund. The de facto regime which overthrew President 
Aristide was sustained by repression and brutality. 

We have seen some real improvements. The army has been disbanded. The 
new, civilian Haitian National Police has deployed 5,300 new officers, 
selected in an open, apolitical, rigorous, and competitive national 
process. The repressive system of "section chiefs," or rural strongmen, 
has been abolished. Local government around Haiti is now in the hands of 
more than 2,000 elected officials. 

Two hundred years of rampant corruption and governmental neglect have 
left deep marks on Haiti's justice system, but halting progress is being 
made. The government has acknowledged that judicial reform is critical 
and has worked with the international community to address some of the 
problems plaguing the system, including understaffing, untrained and 
incompetent staff, and inadequate compensation. Last July, the Ministry 
of Justice, with assistance from the U.S. Agency for International 
Development and the U.S. Department of Justice, opened a school for 
magistrates as mandated by the Haitian constitution. During its first 
three months, the school put more than 100 judges and prosecutors 
through intensive two-week training courses and will continue to focus 
on short- and long-term training for justices of the peace and trial 
judges. The international community also has provided training for 
prison staffs and assisted in the physical rehabilitation of courts and 

Modest progress has been made on the economic front as well. Haiti's 
gross domestic product grew 2.7% in 1995 after declining about 30% in 
the previous three years. Inflation fell from 52% in 1994 to 25% in 
1995. Exports expanded sharply, to $100 million in 1995 from $52 million 
in 1994, although they still achieved only half the levels of the late 
1980s. The private sector has not responded to the end of the embargo as 
quickly as initially hoped, as potential investors have taken a wait-
and-see attitude. As a result, unemployment is still estimated at about 

Serious problems remain to be resolved. However, the recent extension of 
the mandate of the UN Mission in Haiti will provide additional breathing 
space to foster the strengthening of Haiti's democratic rebirth in an 
atmosphere conducive to economic and social development. International 
peacekeeping troops and civilian police will continue to support the 
efforts of the Haitian National Police to provide the secure conditions 
under which the Haitian Government and people will take responsibility 
for the future development and advancement of their country. Guarding 
the country's political stability and internal security are essential 
preconditions to addressing the range of serious economic, political, 
and social problems Haiti still confronts. The U.S. and other 
governments are committed to assisting in this effort, but only the 
Haitians' own resolve and ability to make difficult decisions will 
determine success or failure in the end. 

One of the most troubling developments since the introduction of the 
Multinational Force has been the approximately two dozen execution-style 
killings which have occurred. The Administration and Congress have 
worked closely together to make clear to the Government of Haiti that we 
cannot support security organizations which retain in their ranks 
individuals who we have credible reason to believe are implicated in 
such offenses. I am pleased to be able to report today that none of the 
individuals of the Aristide Government security forces who were 
implicated in these murders remain in the Haitian security forces or the 
political structure which supervises them. 

The removal of such individuals from the security forces is a 
significant and crucial first step. Bringing those guilty to justice is 
the other half of the equation. Ending the climate of impunity for 
government officers who commit crimes is a major step forward in the 
development of the rule of law. 

The Administration has made clear to the Government of Haiti at all 
levels that a thorough investigation of these offenses is crucial both 
to establish the rule of law and to maintain international support. 
Congress has sent a similar message in the form of Section 583 of Public 
Law 104-107, the Dole Amendment, which prohibits the provision of 
assistance--other than humanitarian and electoral assistance--to the 
Government of Haiti unless the President reports to Congress that the 
Government of Haiti is conducting thorough investigations of political 
and extrajudicial killings and is cooperating with American authorities 
in this respect. The President has delegated his functions under that 
provision to the Secretary of State. 

The Administration's intentions with respect to the implementation of 
that provision of law have been clearly stated to Congress and 
consistently followed in practice, but I believe it useful to reiterate 
our position clearly. When Section 583 became law on January 26, 1996, 
the Administration again examined the progress of the Haitian 
authorities' investigations into execution-style murders. We concluded 
that while progress had been made in terms of establishing a Special 
Investigative Unit, appointing an Investigative Magistrate and 
Prosecutor, and seeking international assistance, we could not document 
sufficient progress to permit us to make the report to Congress called 
for in the statute. 

Since any delay in completing the basic training and deployment of the 
police would have called into question the timely withdrawal of U.S. 
forces from Haiti--after consulting with congressional staff--including 
staff of this committee, the Acting Secretary of State on February 6, 
1996, signed a waiver determination, pursuant to Section 583(c) of the 
statute, that continuing assistance was "necessary to assure the safe 
and timely withdrawal of U.S. forces from Haiti." 

I wish to confirm that the only assistance within the scope of Section 
583(a) that the Administration intends to provide during the period in 
which U.S. peacekeeping forces are withdrawing is assistance to the 
Special Investigative Unit formed to investigate the political and 
extrajudicial killings and assistance to the Haitian National Police. 
Should it prove necessary--and after consultation with Congress--it is 
also possible that we may find it necessary to obligate additional 
assistance to the Haitian Parliament, the justice system, and local 
governments during this period. We do not envision obligating funds to 
provide any other assistance to the Government of Haiti during this 
period and would consult fully with the Congress should an unforeseen 
requirement arise. 

When the Administration concludes that the Government of Haiti is 
conducting investigations as called for in Section 583, we will so 
report to the Congress. In that event, the restrictions on assistance 
based on Section 583 would no longer apply. If the Administration cannot 
report that the Government of Haiti is conducting the required thorough 
investigations by the time U.S. forces have substantially completed 
their withdrawal, we would review, in consultation with the Congress, 
whether and to what extent to continue assistance to the Government of 
Haiti within the scope of Section 583. 

We are hopeful that the criteria of the Dole Amendment will be met. The 
new government has moved to reinvigorate the Special Investigative Unit 
formed last October to investigate a number of high-profile murders 
committed both during the coup period and following President Aristide's 
return. The investigative police trained by ICITAP have returned to 
their duties after the previous government drew them off to other cases. 
The Government of Haiti has agreed to provide them office space 
conducive to the professional conduct of these investigations. The UN 
Civilian Police have provided advisers, and the Department of State has 
contracted two experienced investigators to work with them. These 
individuals have been working with the Special Investigative Unit and 
have helped them develop an investigative strategy for certain of the 
high-profile cases. The FBI has briefed the investigators on its own 
investigation of the Bertin case and has answered follow-up questions 
and offered assistance in forensic laboratory work. We are convinced 
that if the Government of Haiti names a strong leader to the team and 
otherwise demonstrates its strong backing for the conduct of the 
investigation, the ingredients are there to produce the thorough, 
professional investigation we all seek. 

Mr. Chairman, we strongly believe that we must use our influence and 
condition our assistance in such a way as to strengthen those in Haiti 
who support democracy and the rule of law. Our ability to do so depends 
in no small measure on our ability to keep our word and deliver promised 
assistance when our conditions have been met. 

After completing training of the last class of basic recruits, our 
police training program has been effectively closed down for a month due 
to the conditions that the Administration and Congress established 
concerning the presence of suspected killers in the security forces. Now 
that these conditions have been met, we are working with the Congress to 
secure release of a hold on training funds so that the police can 
receive much-needed specialized training. One program that has been 
interrupted is the training of a unit to deal with urban disturbances. 
This capability is clearly needed in today's Haiti. Similarly, programs 
of remedial training on when and when not to use firearms, as well as 
supervisory and investigative training, all depend on reopening the 
Police Academy as soon as possible. 

The recent events in the Cite Soleil neighborhood of Port au Prince 
point up the urgent necessity for getting on with this crucial 
specialized training. On March 6, in response to an attack on police in 
that area possibly perpetrated by the "Red Army" gang, the police and 
the Ministerial Security Guards--who are supposed to be watchmen in 
government buildings--took action that resulted in the killing of seven 
civilians. Though he assumed office only on the morning of the incident, 
Police Director General Denize reacted promptly, ordering an 
investigation by the highly respected Inspector General of the National 
Police and promising severe disciplinary measures. We are hoping to see 
the Inspector General's preliminary report in approximately two weeks. 
Preliminary reports from international human rights observers and UN 
civilian police indicate that the abuses appear to have been committed 
by the Ministerial Security guards. 

While pointing to the need to get on with our training program, the 
events in Cite Soleil also highlight what is perhaps the most serious 
security problem faced by the Haitian authorities--the lack of qualified 
mid-level supervisory personnel throughout the security forces. The 
best-trained young basic recruits cannot perform effectively if they do 
not have capable leaders. Equipment and supplies cannot be utilized 
effectively without supervisors. And discipline essential to a 
professional police force cannot be maintained without accountable 

President Preval and the Haitian Senate have made a good start in their 
selection of the senior leadership of the police and in instituting a 
system of promotion from within of the most meritorious young police 
officers to first line supervisor positions. We are encouraging the 
Government of Haiti to adopt a system for recruiting and training on an 
apolitical basis from all walks of life qualified individuals to fill 
the positions in between. 

While it remains for the Haitian Government, Parliament, and people to 
address the serious problems which remain, there is abundant evidence of 
an improvement in the overall human rights situation for the vast 
majority of the Haitian people, and this in itself indicates bright 
prospects for strengthening the rule of law taking hold. The 
authorities' respect for individual liberties and political freedom, 
while far from perfect, is genuine. There is a seriousness reflected in 
the deliberations of the newly elected Haitian Parliament and its 
relationship with the executive which has breathed new life into Haiti's 

Without question, the most profound issue facing Haiti and its poverty-
stricken people is the development of economic opportunity and 
improvement in the living conditions of Haiti's people. Although the new 
economic team is now in place, the government of Prime Minister Smarth 
has not yet had time to tackle the difficult economic issues it 
inherited from its predecessor. Nevertheless, even before his 
inauguration, President Preval reached out to reassure the local 
business community of his commitment to private sector development. He 
recognized the crucial role of the private sector in creating jobs and 
promised to pursue policies conducive to private investment. 

President Preval has consulted with various political groups in Haiti as 
well, to build consensus on economic reform. Acknowledging the reality 
of Haiti's short-term dependence on external budgetary support, he has 
indicated his intention to reopen negotiations on agreements with the 
international financial institutions by April 15, 1996. 

In this connection, it is sometimes asked whether restoring democracy in 
Haiti has been worth the cost. Our efforts in Haiti in FY 1994--the year 
before President Aristide's return--cost nearly $560 million. Much of 
this was spent in the last quarter of the year in preparing for 
President Aristide's return, but almost $300 million of this went to pay 
for migration and safe haven operations, sanctions enforcement, and 
humanitarian assistance. In the first half of FY 1995-- that is, up to 
March 31, 1995, when the U.S.-led Multinational Force completed its 
task--the U.S. spent $600 million on Haiti-related operations and 
assistance for an 18-month total of about $1.2 billion. 

Since then, U.S. Government expenses in Haiti have dropped dramatically. 
U.S. operations and assistance to Haiti in the second half of FY 1995 
dropped 50% from the first half to $300 million. This year--FY 1996--
U.S. assistance to Haiti is expected to be approximately $120 million, 
and a similar amount is anticipated for FY 1997. This compares to our FY 
1991--pre-coup--assistance of $80 million. It should also be noted that 
during the first two years of the de facto regime, that is, FY 1992 and 
FY 1993, U.S. humanitarian assistance to Haiti totaled $107 million. 

Our humanitarian assistance to Haiti has traditionally been designed to 
meet important health, education, and development needs. In this regard, 
$6.7 million in assistance to three health, education, and training 
programs which are not within the scope of the Dole Amendment has been 
on hold by the Senate since January. We believe that it is not 
appropriate to hold this needed assistance, which is largely a 
continuation of programs conducted in Haiti for years under both 
Republican and Democratic administrations and Congresses. We have been 
working with the Senate to have this hold lifted. 

Eighteen months ago, the U.S. was left to deal largely unaided with the 
humanitarian and refugee crisis in Haiti. Today, other countries and 
multilateral institutions are contributing most of the costs of the 
peacekeeping presence and the bulk of the economic assistance. With the 
replacement of the Multinational Force by UNMIH on April 1, 1995, the 
United Nations assumed most of the peacekeeping costs. At the donors' 
meeting on Haiti in Paris in January 1995, the multilateral institutions 
and other bilateral donors pledged more than $1 billion in humanitarian 
and developmental assistance to Haiti for FY 1995-96. 

Supporting democracy has thus already proven more cost-effective than 
dealing with the consequences of tyranny. It is unquestionably a better 
investment, one which will prepare the basis for increased private 
sector investment in Haiti, a prerequisite for sustainable economic 

Haiti's democracy remains fragile, its new security structures 
inexperienced and untested, and economic renewal is at best tentative. A 
year-and-a-half after the American-led intervention, the economy has 
stabilized, and the political and security situation in Haiti has 
dramatically improved. These improvements have advanced to a point which 
permits a more modest onward international presence in Haiti, one to 
ensure a smooth and sure transfer of key functions enabling Haitians to 
assume responsibility for their own future. 

The path to a better future or a return to the Haiti of old is now in 
the hands of the new government. It must act quickly and decisively to 
maintain the gains made with the restoration of democracy in 1994 and to 
regain the momentum of that moment. But it will continue to need our 
help and that of the rest of the donor community. The people of Haiti 
still must make enormous sacrifices to bring their country into the 21st 
century with the rest of the hemisphere, and we will help them along 
that path as we have helped many of its neighbors in the past.  
U.S.-Nicaragua Relations: National  Elections; U.S. Citizen Property 
Jon R. Hamilton, Acting Deputy Assistant  ter-American Affairs 
Statement before the Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere of the House 
International Relations Committee, Washington, DC, March 21, 1996 
Mr. Chairman, members of the committee: Thank you for inviting me here 
today to discuss the situation in Nicaragua. My testimony will focus on 
the period since Deputy Assistant Secretary Anne Patterson last 
testified before this committee in November and, in particular, on the 
process leading up to Nicaragua's national elections in October. It will 
also address the important question of U.S. citizen- confiscated 
property cases. 
Nicaragua Today 
As we enter 1996, the last full year of the Chamorro government, the 
Administration remains committed to a policy that seeks to strengthen 
the institutional bases of a free and fair democratic process in 
Nicaragua. Our policy similarly seeks to promote free-market policies 
that stimulate equitable economic growth and development. It is a policy 
that, while offering Nicaragua assistance and support, places the onus 
for progress in these areas on the Nicaraguans themselves. We have done 
this through the activism of a superb ambassador and embassy staff who 
have nurtured the strengthening of democratic institutions by 
encouraging a frank, open dialogue among all political, economic, and 
civil actors.  

It is worth taking a moment to note some of the progress the Nicaraguans 
have made toward the consolidation of their democracy and the 
institutionalization of a free market economy.  

-- As recently as 2 1/2 years ago, the Nicaraguan National Assembly was 
paralyzed by party polarization. Today, the Assembly is a vibrant center 
of national political debate and decision-making. 

-- In 1995, the Assembly adopted reforms to Nicaragua's constitution 
that created a more balanced distribution of power between the 
legislative and executive branches. 

-- Following free and fair regional elections in 1994, the National 
Assembly named a new Supreme Electoral Council--CSE--and approved an 
electoral law for the 1996 national elections.  

-- The 500-member, 380 Northern Front--the Recontra force, which in 
April 1994 handed over its arms to reintegrate into civilian life--is 
now a successful agricultural cooperative in Northern Nicaragua. 

-- The army has been reduced from 90,000 to 14,500 members since 1990.  
In accordance with the military code adopted in 1994, long-time head of 
the armed forces Gen. Humberto Ortega retired in February 1995, and Gen. 
Joaquin Cuadra was appointed by the President as his replacement. The 
army changed its name from the old, politically charged Sandinista 
Popular Army to the Army of Nicaragua. 

-- Despite woefully inadequate resources and training, the national 
police is becoming an increasingly professional law enforcement body 
that enjoys broad public support.  

-- The economy has entered its third year of positive growth, while 
inflation has been held in the low double digits. In 1995, Nicaragua 
reduced its foreign debt by $1.9 billion. My colleague from USAID will 
describe the economy in further detail. 

At the same time, the problems Nicaragua still faces are formidable.  

-- Nicaragua's transition to a politically reconciled, fully democratic, 
free market society is still in process. Our policy must not take 
progress to date for granted.  

-- Democratic institutions have yet to win the public's full confidence, 
including a weak judiciary, where poorly paid judges are vulnerable to 
improper influence. 

-- Improvement is also needed in human rights. Although abuses have 
diminished, impunity for past abuses has not been adequately addressed. 
The recommendations of the Tripartite Commission--consisting of the OAS, 
the Nicaraguan Government, and the Church--have not been satisfactorily 
implemented, and the Jean Paul Genie, Arges Sequeira, Enrique Bermudez, 
and the La Marinosa murders cry out for resolution. 

-- Unemployment and under-employment together run about 50%. Nicaraguans 
cite jobs as their primary concern. 

-- The poverty of Nicaragua is appalling. Fifty percent of Nicaraguans 
are poor, and nearly 75% of those in extreme poverty live in the 
countryside. Still struggling to achieve the economic levels it had in 
the 1960s, Nicaragua ranks 14th in the world on a list of the most food-
insecure countries. 

While the U.S. and other sympathetic donors can help, no foreign friends 
can resolve these problems. Only the Nicaraguans can do that--through 
the political will that only they can and must supply. But let me turn 
now to Nicaragua's elections this year.  
U.S. Interest in the Nicaraguan Elections 
Our top objective this year is to help Nicaragua hold elections that 
everyone--Nicaraguans and foreign observers alike--will regard as free, 
fair, and peaceful. The interest of the Nicaraguans themselves in these 
elections is enormous. No fewer than 34 political parties have already 
been duly registered by the Supreme Electoral Council. Nicaragua will 
also be electing deputies to its 92-member Assembly, and, for the first 
time, Nicaraguans will elect mayors directly. This innovation will 
strengthen local representation and accountability. The challenge for 
Nicaragua's political leadership will be to maintain a non-polarized, 
violence-free campaign and to foster mutual respect among the contending 
parties and candidates. The attack on the motorcade of Presidential 
candidate Arnoldo Aleman last December demonstrates the immediacy of the 

Mr. Chairman, Nicaraguans often ask or look for signals indicating which 
candidate or party the U.S. supports. We feel increasingly confident, 
however, that they have come to understand and internalize our reply: We 
take no position on any specific candidate in any specific race. But we 
do take a strong position on the need for a peaceful, transparent 
democratic process that assures free and fair elections for all parties 
and sectors of society and a peaceful transition of power to a successor 
democratic government. And we are prepared to have a productive 
relationship with whatever government that takes office in 1997, as long 
as it is elected in free and fair elections and then exercises power 
Mechanics of the Electoral Registration Process 
So let me address the question of process. The Nicaraguan electoral law 
enacted in January 1996 provides for a dual-track system of voter 
registration. There are some 2.2 million voters to be registered. Some 
80%-85% of those potential voters--those living in 117 municipalities--
will be registered when they apply for a so-called cedula.  The cedula 
is a new multi-purpose citizen identification card that will also serve 
as a voter identification card. The cedula will be valid for 10 years 
and thus for future elections. The cedula system is increasingly being 
used elsewhere in the hemisphere.  

The cedula registration is obviously a slow, deliberate process, 
however. Among other safeguards against fraud, it requires that the 
applicant's name be cross-checked against the national civil registry. 
Even a common spelling error in an applicant's name can hold up issuance 
while manual cross-checks clear up discrepancies. All cedulas are 
approved by a multi-party committee, one of several steps in the 
cedulation process where the political parties will be allowed to vet 
voter registration lists.  

As of March 8, the CSE had received nearly 1.8 million cedula 
applications. As of the same date, it had issued 176,356 cedulas. The 
CSE is currently producing the laminated cards at the rate of just over 
3,000 per day and expects to increase production substantially within 60 
days, as will be necessary to reach the pre-election target of 1.1 
million cedulas issued. There is a safeguard against inefficiencies in 
the cedula system, however. Those cedula applicants who have not 
received their cedulas by September 20 will be issued a temporary voting 
card, or documento supletorio.  In order to increase cedula production, 
USAID is providing the CSE with additional lamination equipment. 

Cedula registration will eventually be extended to the other 26 
municipalities. We favor such action and will argue forcefully that it 
be implemented as soon as possible. For the estimated 15%-20% of voters 
who live in these communities, however, the so-called "ad hoc" 
registration system will be used. This is the traditional voter 
registration system used in all previous Nicaraguan elections, including 
the 1990 nationwide and 1994 regional Atlantic Coast elections. Voters 
in these communities will register in person during the first two 
weekends in June. 

The ad hoc system is a simpler, faster, but less-secure way of 
registering voters than the cedula system. Ad hoc system applicants do 
not have to be cross-checked against the national civil registry. And if 
personal identification documents are unavailable, two witnesses suffice 
to establish voter identity. CSE officials have said that ad hoc voters 
will receive their voter cards the same day they register. 

The establishment of a two-track system, however, invites critical 
examination and careful monitoring. The National Assembly, after 
consulting with the CSE, adopted this approach for a variety of reasons. 
The northern and north-central regions that will use ad hoc registration 
are mountainous. The widely dispersed population has poor access to 
telephones, decent roads, communications, and government services. Very 
few of the inhabitants have any of the ID documents required by law and 
would first have to be entered into the civil registry, a slow first 
step in the cedulation process. There is also the problem that civil 
registries in these area were often destroyed during the conflict of the 

With army and police forces spread thin through these regions, armed 
criminal bands, many composed of ex-army and/or ex-resistance members, 
carry out indiscriminate acts of robbery, extortion, kidnapping, and 
murder without fear of capture or prosecution. In September 1995, an 
armed band kidnapped four CSE officials in a remote northern area, and 
on January 25 the same band attacked Presidential candidate Arnoldo 
Aleman's motorcade. In addition to security, resources are also a 
consideration. CSE personnel are limited, and the council still has a 
budget shortfall. CSE magistrates told the legislature that deploying 
personnel for two weekends, as opposed to four Sundays, was in part a 
budget decision.  

Most observers have concluded that the ad hoc system is for these 
reasons more appropriate for these communities. Non-governmental 
organizations and USAID are working now with the CSE and civil society 
to see how the ad hoc system can be improved so that it works to its 
The Supreme Electoral Council Is Doing its Job 
I would like to turn now to the objectivity and the fairness of the CSE, 
clearly a key institution if the election is to be adequate. Public 
opinion surveys show that the CSE enjoys the greatest credibility of any 
governmental institution. Its members were chosen through a process of 
consensus between the executive and the National Assembly and were 
confirmed by the Assembly. Its membership is politically diverse, and it 
makes decisions by unanimous consent.  Moreover, the CSE has a proven 
professional track record in its conduct of democratic elections in 1990 
and 1994. Those were won by the UNO coalition and the Liberal Party, 
respectively. The 1990 election was observed by a wide variety of U.S. 
and international observer groups, including the international 
institutes of both the Democratic and Republican Parties. 
Representatives of the Organization of American States--OAS, the United 
Nations, the Carter Center, and the International Republican Institute 
observed the 1994 election and rated it positively.  

Finally, however, in order to protect against possible partisan 
political bias at lower levels of the CSE, the new electoral law 
provides that no political party may have more than one member on any 
three-member department or  local electoral council and at each 
electoral table. During his presentation, my colleague from USAID, Mark 
Schnieder, will describe U.S. assistance to this electoral process. 
Continued Need for OAS/CIAV Human Rights Monitoring 
As part of our policy to strengthen the institutional bases of 
democracy, one of our highest priorities has been to strengthen 
Nicaragua's human rights network. We meet with and provide support to 
important Nicaraguan human rights organizations such as Cardinal Obando 
y Bravo's Verification Commission, the Nicaraguan Association for Human 
Rights, the Permanent Commission for Human Rights, and the OAS 
International Commission for Support and Verification--OAS/CIAV. 

The work of OAS/CIAV deserves special mention. Since 1990, CIAV has 
resettled 120,000 ex-resistance members and their families. Much of 
CIAV's work in the conflictive zones is complemented now by USAID 
programs that help re-integrate former members of the resistance. These 
include health, education, and housing projects in the north. In 
addition, a $1.1 million USAID reforestation and job creation project in 
the area around Quilali is benefiting over 3,000 former resistance 
members and their families. 

Although CIAV was originally created to work with the ex-resistance, its 
mandate was expanded at the June 1993 OAS General Assembly to include 
support to all those directly affected by the civil war--up to an 
estimated 500,000 persons. CIAV monitors the human rights situation in 
the conflictive zones, conducts human rights training, and investigates 
human rights abuses involving all Nicaraguans directly affected by the 

Increasingly, the Government of Nicaragua has called upon CIAV and its 
particular expertise and credibility in the north to negotiate peaceful 
solutions to potentially dangerous situations in northern Nicaragua; for 
example, the February 1995 kidnapping by an armed criminal band of an 
American citizen and the September 1995 kidnapping of three electoral 
workers near Wiwili. CIAV's support has been critical to the work of the 
Tripartite Commission on which it sits. We believe its presence in 
Nicaragua is still vital.  

The 1995 constitutional reforms--and legislation subsequently passed by 
the National Assembly--established the framework for an independent 
human rights ombudsman's office with sufficient nationwide presence to 
carry on the human rights monitoring in a post-CIAV period. It is 
unlikely, however, that this alternate system can be up and running 
effectively before the 1996 elections. It is the firm conviction of the 
Administration that the extension of CIAV's mandate through the 
electoral period and transition to new government provides an additional 
element of confidence that the elections will meet everyone's standards 
of freedom and fairness. 
Human Rights 
Political will is also needed in the area of human rights. Our policy in 
this area remains constant: The recommendations of the Tripartite 
Commission must be implemented. The 19 Tripartite Commission cases 
involving members of the military and police are now in the hands of the 
Nicaraguan Supreme Court for review. We expect the court to determine 
whether the military courts did their job by trying the accused 
according to the law.  

Other prominent outstanding human rights cases--including the murders of 
Jean Paul Genie, Arges Sequeira, and Enrique Bermudez--must be resolved. 
All of these cases languish in the hands of the judiciary--except the 
Bermudez case, which will require investigation from scratch. These are 
cases where justice has been delayed; therefore, justice has been 
Economic Policy And Property Issues 
Sandinista-era property disputes still figure prominently in our 
bilateral policy concerns. The size of the problem is staggering however 
one measures it. The land confiscated constitutes about 12% of the land 
mass of Nicaragua. Over 5,200 former owners filed claims for some 16,000 
pieces of property that were received by about 112,000 beneficiaries. 
The government has authorized $650 million to indemnify former owners. 
That is an amount equal to two years of exports or about 35% of 
Nicaragua's gross domestic product--GDP. An equivalent proportion of our 
GNP would be about $2 trillion. Moreover, the problem is not going away. 
The number of pending U.S. citizen claims is actually increasing as new 
claims are filed during the 90-day grace period under the property law, 
and as newly naturalized American citizens bring long-standing claims to 
the embassy. Since last November, 34 U.S. citizens filed an additional 
128 new claims. 

The Chamorro administration established an extensive administrative 
process to sort out these claims. Within this framework, we have been 
pushing hard to ensure that the property claims of U.S. citizens are 
resolved fairly and equitably. Since Deputy Assistant Secretary of State 
Patterson's appearance before this subcommittee last November, the 
American embassy has confirmed that the Nicaraguan Government resolved 
an additional 95 property claims. That brings the total to 732 
settlements through the end of January 1996. (Three hundred sixty-one 
cases were resolved in 1995; another 199 in 1994; only 151 in prior 
years.) A total of 127 U.S. citizens, many holding multiple claims, have 
had all their property claims resolved. Another 104 have had some, but 
not all, of their claims resolved. Another 391 U.S. citizens still have 
not had any of their claims resolved. We believe that the Nicaraguan 
Government needs to intensify its efforts to resolve the claims of U.S. 
citizens, and we have made that point unambiguously in regular meetings 
both in Managua and in Washington. 

After two years of work, the Nicaraguan National Assembly passed a law 
authorizing the privatization of the state-owned telecommunications 
company, TELCOR--now called ENITEL. Privatization of this state-owned 
utility should not only have a positive economic effect, but, 
importantly, the proceeds of the sale are earmarked to support the 
property compensation mechanism. Prequalification of interested firms 
has already taken place, with several U.S. companies--AT&T, Sprint 
International, USACell-Bell Atlantic--participating. Although the 
Government of Nicaragua hoped that the announcement of the privatization 
plan would have an immediate positive impact on the value of property 
compensation bonds--they currently trade at about 22% of face value--
there may not be a significant effect on bond values until the sale 
takes place in early June. Until the value of the bonds goes up, many 
U.S. citizen claimants may remain hesitant to accept bonds as 

The Nicaraguan legislature also passed a new property law last November. 
The law is designed to provide secure titles to the legitimate 
beneficiaries of the rural and urban land reforms of the 1980s, while 
mandating prosecution for abusers who appropriated properties 
fraudulently. It also reiterates that claimants whose properties were 
taken are entitled either to restitution or to compensation. We are 
continuing to monitor closely the implementation of this law to 
determine what effect it will have on our efforts to obtain the rapid 
and equitable resolution of U.S. citizen property claims. To date, the 
law, which is highly complex and only beginning to be implemented,  has 
had little visible impact. Additionally, the law's constitutionality is 
being questioned. Much will depend on how the law is interpreted and 
applied--particularly by the Nicaraguan judiciary. Our overriding 
objective remains, as always, the just resolution of U.S. citizen 
property claims. 

We have been concerned by the slowing pace of case resolutions since 
November and have intensified our efforts to encourage the Nicaraguans 
to resolve the pending U.S. citizen claims. Our ambassador in Managua 
regularly raises the property issue with the full range of Government of 
Nicaragua officials. Other embassy personnel continue to meet daily with 
Nicaraguan interlocutors and U.S. citizen claimants. In February, 
Assistant Secretary of State Tarullo discussed the situation with 
Nicaraguan Ambassador Mayorga, and last week I led a property team to 
Managua to push for faster progress. In my discussions, Nicaraguan 
officials recognized that the rate of settlements was not as high as 
they hoped it would be. Finance Minister Pereira outlined efforts 
underway to resolve some 400 claims belonging to 70 claimants over the 
next few months and to submit some claims to international arbitration. 

Our message--and that of Commerce Secretary Brown who will be 
participating in the Central American- U.S. Trade and Investment Forum 
tomorrow--is that the Government of Nicaragua must resolve all U.S. 
citizen claims fairly and equitably. This is important not only for the 
U.S. citizen claimants, but also so that Nicaragua can convince its 
citizens and potential investors that credible rule of law with respect 
to property exists in Nicaragua and that Nicaragua is a good place in 
which to invest. No issue on our bilateral agenda has a higher priority 
than the resolution of U.S. citizen property claims. 
Confidence Grows As Democracy Takes Hold 
There are many reasons to feel confident about the electoral process 
this year. Most Nicaraguans generally want and are willing to work to 
achieve free and fair elections in the fall of 1996 that will produce 
the first succession of democratically elected governments in the 
country's recent history. Civic education groups are engaged and 
mobilized. For the first time in Nicaraguan history, the legislative 
branch is not a tool of a predominant executive. Freedom of speech 
flourishes--the concern as Nicaraguans enter the electoral period is not 
what can be said but whether one can afford television and radio time. 
The voter registration system, despite its initial difficulties in 
getting a system with major changes from past practice off the ground, 
is up and running, with greater safeguards and transparency than before. 

Another reason for increased confidence is that, despite myriad problems 
facing Nicaragua, institutional strengthening is a reality in 1996. One 
prominent example is the Nicaraguan national police. The police are 
evolving into a more professional law enforcement institution which is 
shedding its former Sandinista ideological roots. Whereas 2 1/2 years 
ago, the police hesitated to confront former brothers-in-arms, including 
militant Sandinista labor or student protestors and squatter groups, 
today the police act with greater responsibility, firmness, and even-
handedness to uphold law and order under civilian direction. The police 
have been put to the test to maintain public order on multiple occasions 
in the past year and have repeatedly demonstrated an apolitical 
commitment to justice and professionalism even though they are 
consistently hampered in their efforts by severe resource, equipment, 
and training shortcomings. 

Police cooperation with the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration--DEA--
in the interdiction of illegal narcotics transshipped across Nicaraguan 
territories has also been promising. The temporary stationing, from 
August through November 1995, of a DEA agent in Managua at the 
Government of Nicaragua's invitation promoted effective counter-
narcotics cooperation, especially with the police, and increased 
Nicaraguan awareness of the scope and danger of international drug 
trafficking. In fact, the Nicaraguans have requested a permanent DEA 

Greater professionalism has produced unexpected endorsements for the 
police from many sectors in the past year, including the editorial pages 
of conservative local newspapers, the Catholic Church, coffee producers 
needing the police to help protect their lucrative harvest from bandits, 
and the Nicaraguan-American Chamber of Commerce, which established a 
fund to support police technical training and other projects. Most 
recently, Cardinal Miguel Obando y Bravo gave the national police a 
plaque of appreciation for their work in protecting Pope John Paul II 
during his February 7 visit to Managua. This is the first time the 
Church has ever bestowed such an honor on any security force in 
Nicaragua. U.S. officials are frequently approached by civic leaders who 
encourage us to provide police training as one of the best ways to help 
this young democracy develop the rule of law. 
Staying the Course 
Peace, democracy, and broad-based prosperity in the hemisphere serve our 
interests because they build cooperation on issues which directly affect 
our own citizens--whether on narcotics trafficking; orderly migration 
flows; economic integration, which creates jobs and wealth for 
Americans; or preservation of regional stability. 

In Nicaragua, the challenge to the United States is to stay the course--
along with other donors--to ensure a peaceful transition to a second, 
democratically elected government, to keep working on strengthening 
democratic institutions, and to help the economy grow. I appreciate the 
committee's interest in discussion of Nicaraguan issues, and we look 
forward to working with you to help Nicaraguans reach their goals of 
democracy and prosperity.  

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