U.S. Department of State
Dispatch Volume 7, Number 9, February 26, 1996
Bureau of Public Affairs
Articles in this Issue:
1. Secretary Christopher Presents Awards for Valor to Special Agents --
Secretary Christopher
2. The United States and Japan: Mutual Interests and Cooperation in
Latin America -- Alexander F. Watson
3. Continuing Developments in Bosnia -- President Clinton
4. Focus on the United Nations -- Humanitarian Assistance: Making a
World of Difference
5. Civil-Military Relations in the Americas: Promoting Human Rights,
Democracy, and Accountability -- Gare A. Smith
6. Fact Sheet: Independent States and Dependencies as of March 8, 1996
ARTICLE 1:
Secretary Christopher Presents Awards for Valor to Special Agents
Secretary Christopher
Remarks at an awards ceremony, U.S. Department of State, Washington, DC,
February 15, 1996
This morning we mark a rare occasion--rare because Diplomatic Security
does such a competent and reliable job that life-threatening situations
seldom arise. This is the first time in my tenure as Secretary of State
that I have been called upon to present awards for valor to Special
Agents. That reflects in many ways the success of your operations over
the last three years. We are glad that you keep your valor in reserve --
for when it is really needed.
Every day I benefit not just from the protection of my own security
detail but from all those in the bureau who work to keep our operations
functioning safely. Every State Department employee, especially when
abroad, and every one of our families and friends owe you thanks for a
job well done. You are a proud example of what it means to be public
servants at a time when the term does not always command the respect it
deserves. I remain committed to working to make sure that you have the
resources you need to maintain your standard of excellence.
Every day, the men and women in Diplomatic Security risk their lives in
Washington, elsewhere in the United States, and at our 258 posts around
the world. American foreign policy could not function without you. Your
work shares one of the greatest frustrations of diplomacy: At its most
successful, it prevents threats from ever materializing and for that
reason, often goes unrecognized. I recognize all of you for the work you
do daily, as I recognize these three agents today for their stellar
performance in the line of duty.
Our first honoree, Special Agent Chris Reilly, was the regional security
officer at the American Embassy in Bujumbura, Burundi. The almost
permanent civil strife in Burundi has made travel under heavy guard part
of the day's work for official Americans. Indeed, a tour of duty in
Embassy Bujumbura is a mark of valor in itself. Chris and Larry Salmon,
on temporary assignment from Embassy Windhoek, set out by car with
Ambassador Robert Krueger and the Foreign Minister of Burundi on June
14, 1995.
On a winding mountain road, the convoy was ambushed. Amid automatic
weapons fire, the ambassador's car was stuck behind another vehicle. As
he had been trained, Chris reached across the terrified driver, put the
car in reverse, and backed it out from behind the stopped vehicle ahead.
He then helped the driver maneuver between stopped cars and a precipice
to safety.
I am very pleased to present the Award for Valor to Chris Reilly, for
valor during an attack on an official motorcade in Cibitoke Province,
Burundi, on June 14, 1995.
[Text of citation] While the Ambassador's vehicle came under heavy
automatic weapons fire, your rapid and effective response contributed
directly to saving the lives of the Ambassador and the Foreign Minister
of Burundi. Your actions reflect the highest credit upon you and the
Diplomatic Security Service.
Larry Salmon was driving the vehicle behind the Ambassador's car that
day in Burundi. Responding instantly to the attack, Larry pushed his
passenger to the floor for safety and fired six rounds at the
assailants. He was the only member of the party to return fire, and he
did so while driving his vehicle to safety behind Chris. Larry was hit
in the shoulder by one of the 10 or so bullets that hit his vehicle,
but, as you can see, he has fully recovered.
I am very pleased to present the Award for Valor to Larry Salmon, for
valor during an attack on an official motorcade in Cibitoke Province,
Burundi, on June 14, 1995.
[Text of citation] While the Ambassador's vehicle came under heavy
automatic weapons fire, your rapid and effective response contributed
directly to saving the lives of the Ambassador and the Foreign Minister
of Burundi. Your actions reflect the highest credit upon you and the
Diplomatic Security Service.
Only two months later, Peter Hargraves, then the Regional Security
Officer for Sarajevo, was making the trip from Belgrade to Sarajevo for
a meeting of President Clinton's peace team with the Bosnian Government.
As a member of the team that staffed Embassy Sarajevo under wartime
conditions, Pete knew the dangers of the road well.
Tragically, the edge of the road gave way beneath the armored personnel
carrier in which Peter, Ambassador Robert Frasure, Dr. Joseph Kruzel,
and Col. Nelson Drew were traveling, along with Lt. Col. Daniel Gerstein
and a French soldier. The vehicle came to rest 1,000 feet below the
roadway, in flames. Despite his own severe injuries, Pete extricated
himself from the vehicle. He returned not once, but repeatedly, to pull
Joe Kruzel from the wreckage and attempted to locate the other
passengers, stopping only when the vehicle exploded. Already recognized
for rescuing a colleague from a firefight in Somalia, Pete's heroism
that day was nothing short of inspirational.
I am especially glad to have Katherine Frasure here with us today as we
honor Pete. Two weeks ago, I planted a tree at our embassy in Sarajevo
in honor of Bob Frasure and the other men who died on that August day. I
wish they could have been with us to see the peace they helped bring to
that tragic country. For many, many reasons, I wish they were with us
today.
I am very pleased to present the Department's Award for Valor to Peter
S. Hargraves.
[Text of citation] For exceptional bravery and heroic devotion to your
colleagues, in support of efforts to bring peace to the people of
Bosnia.
(###)
ARTICLE 2:
The United States and Japan: Mutual Interests and Cooperation in Latin
America
Alexander F. Watson, Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs
Address to the Latin American Association of Japan, Tokyo, Japan,
February 21, 1996
Thank you, Ambassador Maeda. I am delighted and honored to be here, and
I look forward to exchanging views with you about the situation in Latin
America and the Caribbean today and about our respective policies in
that region.
Since Assistant Secretary Aronson spoke to this very group in 1991,
there have been enormous changes in Latin America -- changes which are
of great benefit to Latin America, to the U.S., and, I would venture to
say, to Japan as well.
The State of the Region Today
The principal dynamics of Latin America's societies today are
strengthening democracy and market-based economic reform.
Today, every government in Latin America and the Caribbean -- with the
single exception of Cuba, of course -- came into office through free and
fair elections. Despite some problems, respect for basic human rights,
as well as the demands of the people for the rule of law, have never
been stronger.
The remarkable success of democracy is graphically demonstrated in
Haiti, arguably the country in the hemisphere with the least democratic
tradition. Enormous problems remain there, but I believe the Haitian
people -- and our hemisphere as a whole -- can take great pride in the
events of February 7 -- the date of the first transfer of power from one
elected president to another president in the whole tragic history of
that nation. International support has been crucial to this achievement
and must continue to extend and consolidate the progress to date. The
$72 million in bilateral aid that Japan contributed to Haiti from 1990
to 1994 and its $12-million contribution to finance the United Nations
Mission in Haiti have done a lot of good in that desperately poor
country.
We also have seen enormous progress in making the hemisphere an area of
peace and placing the region's militaries firmly under civilian control.
Security thinking is gradually shifting from traditional political-
military doctrines of national security toward cooperative efforts to
combat the transnational threats of narcotics trafficking, organized
crime, and terrorism. And a number of Latin American countries have
contributed significantly to UN and other peacekeeping forces.
We witnessed a setback to our vision of a peaceful hemisphere when the
Ecuador-Peru border dispute erupted into open fighting early last year.
But the successful resolution of that issue demonstrated the new,
collaborative approach to addressing hemispheric problems. Argentina,
Brazil, Chile, and the U.S. -- the four countries named as "guarantors"
in the treaty which originally delineated the border 50 years ago --
worked closely together to quickly separate the forces, establish a
military observers mission, set in place a demilitarized zone, and set
in motion wide-ranging efforts to develop a permanent settlement of the
underlying issues. And in fact, tomorrow and the next day, there will be
a very important meeting in Quito between the guarantors.
In connection with efforts to maintain peace in the Western Hemisphere-
sphere, I want to express my appreciation for Japan's role in helping
the transition of El Salvador from a nation caught in a fratricidal war
to a nation committed to political reconciliation and economic
modernization. Japan contributed a total of more than $65 million to El
Salvador's recovery between 1990 and 1995. Its contribution has paid
enormous dividends. Progress on the economic front has been as great as
on the political front.
Through continuing market-based reform, the region's economies are being
transformed from stagnant, inward-looking, and statist to growing,
export-oriented, and market-driven. Last year proved to be a very
difficult test of this process -- a test which the region clearly
passed. Indeed, 1995 could be described as the year in which Latin
America demonstrated that its commitment to market reforms is
irreversible.
The Mexican peso crisis of December 1994 raised considerable concern in
the financial and economic communities that the region would turn its
back on market reforms and suffer though yet another "lost decade." The
"lost decade" refers, of course, to the 1980s in Latin America. Instead,
Mexico and Argentina, the two countries most deeply affected by the
crisis, not only maintained their reform programs but deepened them,
enacting stabilization programs -- which one prominent economist, the
President of the Inter- American Development Bank, Enrique Iglesias of
Uruguay, called the most rigorous he has ever seen -- and privatizing
state enterprises even in sectors previously considered sacred. It is
important to note that the international financial institutions and --
particularly in the case of Mexico -- the United States, with the strong
support of Japan, provided essential support for these countries' bold
recovery efforts.
The result has been a gradual return of confidence by the investment and
financial communities. For instance, Mexico was able to return to the
capital markets within only seven months rather than the seven years it
needed after the 1982 crisis.
The year 1995 also confirmed the strength of the region's economic
fundamentals. The region experienced its lowest rate of inflation in a
quarter-century. The regional average -- 25% -- however, obscures some
remarkable individual successes: Argentina, for example, achieved an
annual rate of inflation of 2%; not too long ago, a monthly inflation
rate of 2% was considered a positive achievement. Brazil's inflation
last year was 22% -- its lowest in 30 years and the first time Brazil
enjoyed an inflation rate under three digits in many years.
The year 1995 also confirmed that the region remains on the path to
self-sustaining growth. Despite the recessions in Mexico and Argentina
which followed the peso crisis, the region's cumulative growth for the
five years 1991-95 -- 15% -- exceeded its growth through the whole
decade of the 1980s -- 13%. Once again, regional averages obscure the
remarkable success of individual countries. Peru, Chile, and El Salvador
are now being described as growing at "East Asian" rates, with annual
average growth exceeding 6% for the 1991-95 period and with every
expectation that this kind of growth will continue.
Perhaps nothing better illustrates the economic turn-around of the
region than Peru. When I served as the U.S. ambassador to Peru from 1986
to 1989, I had the pleasure of working with my ambassadorial colleague
from Japan, Masaki Seo, with whom I just had lunch, to try to convince
the Peruvian Government to change its destructive populist economic
policies. Unfortunately, we met with little success. The disaster of
these policies is illustrated by one statistic -- the decline of per
capita income by 29% from 1981 to 1990 -- with enormous attendant human
misery, particularly for poorer groups. Peru's remarkable economic
reforms and growth in recent years under President Fujimori's leadership
are finally beginning to redress the horrible economic and social
inequities.
Let me use this opportunity to express my appreciation to Japan for its
help in supporting this turn-around with its $100-million contribution
to the 1993 international debt package and its bilateral assistance
which totaled more than $1 billion from 1990 to 1994.
U.S. Policy Objectives
After this description of changes which have taken place, I'd like now
to describe U.S. policy objectives in Latin America and the Caribbean. I
want to emphasize above all that our policy toward Latin America is
based on the idea of partnership -- a partnership derived from common
values and which is aiming for wide-ranging cooperation to achieve
common goals -- goals which I believe also are shared by Japan. More
than at any time in our hemisphere's history, our interaction is
characterized by collaboration and dialogue.
The Summit of the Americas held in Miami in December 1994 was a dramatic
expression of this new era of cooperation. The 34 democratic leaders of
the hemisphere agreed wholeheartedly on the overall goals of:
-- Strengthening democracy and respect for human rights;
-- Opening markets and moving toward free trade;
-- Preserving the environment; and
-- Ensuring that the benefits of growth are shared by all segments of
the population.
The consensus on the specific initiatives of the summit's action plan
may be even more impressive than consensus on overall philosophical
goals. The action plan's 23 initiatives and more than 100 specific
action items mobilize national governments, international financial
institutions, and non-governmental organizations. They involve work in
areas which were in many countries considered too sensitive domestically
-- such as human rights and problems of corruption -- to even discuss
multilaterally, much less act on multilaterally.
The commitment to negotiate a Free Trade Area of the Americas, which we
call FTAA, by the year 2005 is the best-known and perhaps the most
dramatic of the summit initiatives. But I want to emphasize that the
FTAA forms part of a much broader, comprehensive, and mutually
reinforcing plan. The FTAA commitment is complemented by other economic
initiatives to strengthen capital markets, improve infrastructure, and
cooperate more closely in energy, science, and tourism.
These economic initiatives, in turn, are complemented by parallel
actions to strengthen government institutions, fight corruption and
narcotics trafficking, combat terrorism, improve education and health,
ease poverty, and reverse environmental degradation.
Progress toward the summit commitments has been really impressive across
the board. Here are a few areas by way of example:
Corruption. In the fight against corruption -- which is so important to
ensure fair competition among business companies, whether foreign or
domestic -- governments are putting teeth into their legislation and
enforcement, the U.S. is working within the Organization of American
States on an Inter-American covenant against corruption, and, in
December, we reached a comprehensive agreement on so-called "laundering"
of money acquired from the drug trade and other criminal activities. It
is particularly impressive that the initiative on corruption is coming
largely from Latin American countries: The issue was first placed on
the agenda of the summit by Ecuador, and it was Venezuela which proposed
the drafting of a convention against corruption.
Poverty. In the fight against poverty, a host of initiatives are
underway to increase job opportunities for the poor and to improve
health and education -- the most powerful weapons against poverty in the
long run. The Inter-American Development Bank, for example, has
earmarked $500 million for loans and grants to bolster micro-enterprises
and small businesses. First Lady Hillary Rodham Clinton recently
launched a Partnership for Education Revitalization in the Americas,
focused particularly on improving basic education throughout the
hemisphere. The Pan-American Health Organization last April initiated a
program to eliminate measles from the hemisphere.
Finance. Another example is the Committee on Hemispheric Financial
Issues we have established. Extensive data on capital flows and capital
regulations in the hemisphere are being drawn together for the first
time. A ministerial meeting is planned for mid-1996 to develop concrete
plans to strengthen, liberalize, and integrate the region's capital
markets.
Free Trade. With regard to the FTAA, the hemisphere's trade ministers
met last June in Denver and launched the preparatory phase of the
negotiations. Seven working groups were established in such specific
areas as market access, investment, standards, and customs, with each
working group charged with developing a comprehensive data base and
analyzing the laws and practices of countries and regional integration
groupings. I should mention here that the OAS has pulled together
information on all the laws and practices in the different countries for
the first time, and we owe a debt to the OAS for their work.
We are now preparing for a second ministerial meeting to be held in
Cartagena, Colombia next month. This meeting will establish four
additional working groups, instruct all the working groups to develop
recommendations for negotiating procedures, and look for trade-
facilitating measures that could be implemented in the near term, even
before we start the full negotiating process. As in the case of the
Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum, the ministers will have input
from their business communities through a business forum, which will
meet just before the ministerial meeting in Cartagena.
I want to take this opportunity also to address the concerns expressed
by many outside of the Western Hemisphere about this effort. As
Ambassador Kantor, the U.S. Trade Representative, has noted repeatedly,
the FTAA and other U.S. regional trade initiatives form part of an
overall strategy aimed at liberalizing and building a more open trading
system globally. The FTAA will not raise barriers to non-members and
will be fully consistent with the spirit and rules of the WTO.
The stimulus to growth provided by the FTAA will benefit not only its
participants but all countries which have economic interaction with this
region. Further, the FTAA is seen by many of the leaders of Latin
America as an instrument to consolidate the dramatic trade
liberalization which they undertook unilaterally over the past decade.
The North American Free Trade Agreement -- NAFTA -- is another example
of our view of free trade agreements as policy instruments not only to
provide a stable market for American goods and services but also to
consolidate economic reforms. In my view, NAFTA's greatest achievement
to date has been the support that it gave to Mexico's reformers to
maintain their commitment to market-based policies as they struggled
with the peso crisis of December 1994. This commitment to market reforms
has been critical in establishing the conditions for a rapid return to
growth by Mexico, which will be, of course, of primary benefit to the
Mexican people but which also will benefit all of Mexico's trading
partners.
Cooperation Between the U.S. and Japan in Latin America and the
Caribbean
I would like to turn for a moment to cooperation between the U.S. and
Japan in Latin America and the Caribbean. The U.S. and Japan have a long
history of cooperation in the region, and I strongly believe that there
is every reason for this cooperation to continue and to strengthen. My
feelings were confirmed by meetings yesterday and today with Director
General Sato of your Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Each year, the U.S.
and Japan participate in consultations -- these are the 19th
consultations on Latin America and the Caribbean -- with the goal of
cooperating more fully. Japan obviously has its own national interests
to pursue. Those interests will not always coincide with those of the
U.S. But overall, both Japan and the U.S. gain by supporting the current
trends in Latin America.
Well-functioning democratic governments have an inherent legitimacy
which makes it more likely for them to achieve domestic consensus to
sustain far-reaching economic reforms. Judicial systems which are
efficient and fair are important not only to a country's citizens but
also to foreign businesses which must work within that country's legal
framework. Economic growth shared broadly throughout a society produces
more customers for everyone.
We believe that Japan, as a world leader, has an important role to play
in Latin America, both as a partner in trade and investment and as a
participant in efforts to tackle the broader regional issues I've
discussed today.
I have noted already how Japan's assistance has helped solidify peace,
democracy, and economic reform in such diverse countries as Haiti, El
Salvador, and Peru. We welcome and appreciate Japan's continued support
for development of the region through both bilateral assistance and
support for multilateral institutions. Japan's decision during the
Eighth Capital Replenishment of the IDB in 1994 to increase its share of
IDB capital to 5% was a most welcome development. Equally appreciated
was Japan's pledge of a $500-million contribution to the IDB's
Multilateral Investment Fund.
One way in which our two countries have formalized their joint efforts
in the hemisphere is through the U.S.-Japan "Common Agenda," which began
as part of the Framework for the New Economic Partnership in July 1993.
While our Common Agenda efforts have centered largely and naturally on
Asia, we deeply appreciate Japanese cooperation in projects in Latin
America. Their scope is wide, as it should be to meet the region's needs
-- for instance, improving education for women in Guatemala, preserving
rain forests and other wilderness areas through the "Parks in Peril"
program, developing projects to give Latin America's farmers viable
alternatives to growing drug crops, and many others. We see the Common
Agenda as an opportunity for the world's two largest economies to work
together to promote the common goal of the region's development.
To sum up, I believe that the evolution of Latin America into a region
of peace, democracy, and widely shared prosperity offers great
opportunities for all of us -- for the people of Latin America, for the
U.S., and for Japan. Working together, the U.S. and Japan already have
accomplished much by supporting these positive trends. I am convinced
that we can accomplish more together by leveraging resources and finding
synergies than we can accomplish by working separately.
Sannin yoreba monjunochie. When Japan, the United States, and Latin
America work together, we can make two plus two equal five.
(###)
ARTICLE 3:
Continuing Developments in Bosnia
Statement by President Clinton released by the White House, Office of
the Press Secretary, Washington, DC, February 20, 1996.
This afternoon, I met with my senior national security team to review
the situation in Bosnia. I received a report on this weekend's meeting
in Rome with the presidents of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, and Serbia.
I am pleased that, in Rome, the Balkan leaders recommitted themselves to
keeping peace on track. The parties pledged to resume contacts with the
NATO-led implementation force, to reunify Sarajevo on schedule, to
release all remaining war prisoners, to remove any remaining foreign
forces, to cooperate in the investigation and prosecution of war crimes,
and to strengthen the Bosnia-Croat Federation and reunify Mostar.
I have instructed my foreign policy team to continue efforts to convince
all the parties that their Rome commitments must be implemented
faithfully and without delay. The road to peace is a hard road, but it
is the right road. We are proud to be part of the NATO force, and I am
pleased to be meeting with NATO Secretary General Solana today.
While serious problems remain, it is important to keep the situation in
Bosnia in perspective. After nearly four years of war, peace will not
take hold overnight. We should not lose sight of the remarkable progress
that has been made since Dayton. The cease-fire is holding. The zones of
separation are in place. And in Sarajevo, once a dying city haunted by
snipers and shells, the markets are filled. People are back on the
streets. Builders are repairing shops and small businesses in the center
of town. Sarajevo has come back to life, with a future for all of its
people.
These are the kinds of tangible benefits that will help give all the
people of Bosnia a greater stake in peace than in war. Tomorrow, I am
sending to Capitol Hill a supplemental appropriations request for $820
million to support IFOR and its mission. This includes $200 million to
assist the essential process of civilian implementation -- specifically,
economic reconstruction and reform, deployment of international police
monitors, and demining. I will work with Congress to secure these funds
as quickly as possible. The sooner the Bosnian people recover the
blessings of a normal life, the surer the chances for a peace that
endures.
I would also like to take this opportunity to acknowledge the enormous
dedication of Assistant Secretary Holbrooke, who has spearheaded the
peace effort for us since last August. As Ambassador Holbrooke steps
down, I want to thank him for his service to our nation. The people of
Bosnia and the American people owe him a tremendous debt of gratitude.
(###)
ARTICLE 4:
Focus on the United Nations -- Humanitarian Assistance: Making a World
of Difference
UN humanitarian aid agencies play a critical role in alleviating
suffering and helping to rebuild communities struck or threatened by
natural and man-made disasters. In recent years, the UN system has
served tens of millions of men, women, and children caught up in
tragedies too large to be dealt with by any one nation. Recent UN
operations in Southern Africa, Central Europe, Southeast Asia, and the
Americas are illustrative of the UN's humanitarian contributions to the
global community.
Giving Peace a Chance in Mozambique
The Mozambican Government and RENAMO rebels, after ending a 15-year
civil war in 1992, turned to UN agencies to facilitate the peace and
rebuilding process. The UN's Office for Humanitarian Assistance
Coordination in Mozambique has played a central role in the repatriation
of millions of civilians displaced by war. Major UN humanitarian
agencies, including the World Food Program (WFP), the UN High
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the United Nations Children's Fund
(UNICEF), and the UN Development Program (UNDP) have provided food and
shelter, reopened schools and clinics, and restored water supply
systems. The UN also works to clear landmines, enabling the resumption
of normal settlement, production, transportation, and trading patterns
throughout much of the country. Finally, the UN aids the civil
reintegration of former soldiers through a combination of cash payments,
vocational training, and small-business assistance.
Managing Relief Supplies in the Americas
In the past, the tremendous volume of donations sent by the
international community in response to natural disasters often
overwhelmed the capability of the recipient country to manage intake and
distribution. This problem frequently was compounded by well-meaning
donors sending quantities of items and material not requested by the
affected country. Thanks to a simple, computerized relief-supply
management system called SUMA, recipients of such aid now can overcome
the logistical problems at ports of entry and regional distribution
centers caused by the sheer volume and nature of donations. Developed by
the Pan American Health Organization -- the regional office for the
Americas of the World Health Organization -- this low-tech computer
system is easy to learn and operate and enables users to quickly sort
and distribute critical aid. Because the program is so flexible, SUMA is
becoming a world standard for relief-supply management.
After use and refinement in hurricane, earthquake, and flood relief
across the Western Hemisphere in the early 1990s, SUMA was put to the
test in Haiti after international sanctions were lifted in October 1994.
Facing an impending flood of donated supplies and equipment from all
over the world, the Haitian Government turned to PAHO for help. A team
of volunteers from the Caribbean and Latin America got the SUMA system
up and running quickly, averting chaos at port facilities in Port-au-
Prince.
Heading Off Famine in South Africa
Severe drought in mid-1992 threatened 20 million people in South Africa,
Mozambique, Botswana, Namibia, Zimbabwe, and Zambia with starvation.
Regional and national warning systems raised the alarm early on, and UN
humanitarian agencies quickly responded. A joint mission of the Food and
Agriculture Organization (FAO) and the WFP, with the support of UNICEF
and other UN agencies, conducted a detailed needs assessment and raised
a special alert for the international community. The WFP coordinated the
flow of all relief foods into the region for nearly a year; the 11.6
million tons of relief commodities represented a six-fold increase in
the normal flow of basic food imports. The UN was also key to the
delivery of fertilizers and seeds which enabled Southern African farmers
to quickly rebound from the drought when normal rains resumed in mid-
1993.
Averting Mass Starvation in the Balkans
The onset of an unusually harsh winter in 1992 threatened to put at risk
of starvation a large portion of the 3 million homeless and displaced
civilians in the former Yugoslavia. The WFP and the UN High Commissioner
for Refugees, in conjunction with UNICEF and WHO, distributed food and
other survival supplies that averted mass starvation. UN aid workers
became targets for some of the combatants; relief convoys were regularly
attacked and drivers killed. The aid agencies persevered for several
months until peacekeeping troops arrived to protect the UN supply
routes, winter shelters, and zones of safety that ultimately saved
hundreds of thousands of lives.
Allaying Chaos in Chechnya
UN agencies are at the center of efforts to support more than 200,000
Chechen civilians whose lives have been severely disrupted by fighting
between the Russian army and Chechen rebels since late 1994. Camps for
the displaced, communication links between separated families, and
rehabilitation programs are in place thanks to the UN system. UNHCR and
UNICEF stepped in immediately after war broke out to deliver hundreds of
tons of relief supplies to Chechnya and neighboring republics affected
by the war. WFP and UNHCR continue to support shelter, water, food, and
sanitation programs. The UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs office in
Moscow monitors relief operations in Chechnya and serves to coordinate
the aid efforts of UN agencies and non-governmental organizations
helping the victims of the Chechnya conflict.
Rebuilding Cambodia
UN programs have channeled $880 million in international aid to Cambodia
since a 20-year civil war ended in 1991. The devastated country was
littered with landmines, the infrastructure was destroyed, and crime and
disease were rampant. More than 700,000 Cambodians were in refugee camps
in neighbor- countries. UNDP, UNHCR, and UNICEF collaborated to rebuild
villages, dig wells, and construct public buildings, houses, bridges,
and roads. Other UN projects include the removal of landmines and the
establishment of literacy, entrepreneurship, and industrial training
programs. The UN also oversaw the holding of free and fair democratic
elections in mid-1993. Still, Cambodia is just starting on the road to
full-fledged democracy; the legacy of two decades of violent conflict
and chaos endures in some parts of the country. But thanks in part to
the work of the UN, for the first time ever, a majority of Cambodians
elected the government under which they live, and most Cambodians are
able to strive in peace for a better life.
(###)
ARTICLE 5:
Civil Military Relations in the Americas: Promoting Human Rights,
Democracy, and Accountability
Gare A. Smith, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Democracy, Human Rights
and Labor
Address at the United States Army Southern Command, Miami, Florida,
February 6, 1996
Thanks very much for that warm introduction. It's an honor and a great
pleasure to join you all here this evening. I bring the regards of John
Shattuck, the Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights
and Labor, who regrets that he could not be here, too. As you know, John
is deeply involved in the Bosnian peace process and was for that reason
unable to join us.
I'd like to begin our discussion tonight with a few general remarks
about the importance we in the State Department attach to respect for
human rights and the kinds of human rights challenges we face in the
world today. I'll then discuss how we go about addressing these
challenges.
There are many reasons why we promote respect for human rights in our
foreign policy. I would mention three in particular.
First, as Vice President Gore recently put it, the United States of
America stands for something. People all around the world look to us as
a model of freedom, of respect for human dignity and justice under law.
I think that that is one of our proudest legacies as Americans and that
the American people want us to try to put those ideals into practice.
Second, our dedication to universal values is a vital source of
America's authority and credibility. We cannot lead -- and we cannot be
a world leader -- without it.
Our interests are most secure in a world where accountable government
strengthens stability and where the rule of law protects both political
rights and free market economies. Open borders, transparent legal
systems, and respect for freedom of speech are fundamental values to
individuals, multinationals, and democratic governments alike.
Third, even in 1996, after the end of the Cold War, there are millions
of people who are still forced to live under repressive regimes and
authoritarian governments. It is their suffering, courage, and hope that
is the moral basis of our efforts. This is an area of our foreign policy
where everyone in this audience has a special contribution to make.
During the Cold War, threats to human rights were seen as coming
primarily from centralized authorities -- from strong governments as in
the Soviet Union that ruled with an iron hand. In response, the human
rights community developed the forms of advocacy with which we are now
familiar -- monitoring, reporting, and publicizing cases and advocacy on
behalf of individual victims of human rights abuse and advocacy of
sanctions against abusive governments.
Today, in the post-Cold War world, much has changed. Human rights abuses
are still committed by strong central governments, but we have become
increasingly familiar with abuses in countries with weak or unresponsive
governments and with abuses committed by ethnic, religious, and
separatist extremists who fan group differences into hatred and
sometimes genocide. These conflicts present us with a devastating array
of new human rights problems.
At the same time, the post-Cold War environment offers opportunities for
structural change both within countries and throughout the world
community that could give internationally recognized human rights
greater force than ever before. This is due in large part to the fall of
Soviet communism. But it is also due to a powerful global movement for
human rights and democratic participation.
This movement has been gathering force for two decades. The past few
years have been especially dramatic, changing the political face of many
parts of the world, from the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe to
South Africa, Zambia, Cambodia, El Salvador, Chile, and Mongolia.
The movement for human rights and democracy is beginning to show
strength in many new regions and among people who previously had no
voice. As the 1993 UN World Conference on Human Rights dramatically
demonstrated, this global movement is among the strongest grass-roots
forces in the world today. Increasingly assertive and effective
indigenous forces are pressing worldwide for government transparency and
accountability, for basic democratic freedoms, and for internationally
recognized human rights.
All this is taking place at a time when states are engaging each other
in a growing range of challenges that transcend national borders. Trade,
the environment, security, population, and migration issues create both
powerful forces of integration and increasing conflict.
New technologies of communication and transportation, such as satellite
TV and the Internet, are bringing people of different countries and
cultures much closer together and reinforcing fundamental freedoms.
National economies are becoming increasingly intertwined, as witnessed
by the NAFTA agreement with Canada and Mexico. At the same time, ethnic,
religious, economic, and other forms of group conflict are arising --
sometimes in response to these very forces of integration.
We in the State Department believe that universal human rights play a
critical role in stabilizing this complex global playing field. As Nobel
Peace Prize winner Aung San Suu Kyi recently wrote, it is precisely
because countries are coming into increasing contact that it is
important for us to adhere to basic standards of human rights in our
dealings with other countries and in our own internal systems of
government.
In this new, multipolar world, the traditional human rights "sticks" of
sanctions and other punitive measures directed against abusive regimes
still have an important role to play. But sanctions need to be
complemented by broader means of promoting human rights in countries
that are in the midst of change and internal conflict.
In short, with the passing of the Cold War, we find ourselves in a new
international strategic environment. The human rights abuses of
governments are accompanied by ethnic tension, a breakdown of authority,
and environmental destruction. As a result, human rights promotion must
synthesize familiar forms of pressure and advocacy with long-term
structural reform and the support of grass-roots movements for change.
Indeed, today we see a growing emphasis on multilateral action to
support these movements, first, through negotiated settlements of
conflict, which often include provisions for internationally supported
democratic elections; second, through institutions of accountability for
human rights abuses such as war crimes tribunals, truth commissions, and
judicial assistance programs; and third, through peacekeeping operations
and humanitarian assistance programs.
The efforts currently underway in Bosnia aptly illustrate this new
direction of human rights promotion. The conflict in Bosnia has
generated some of the worst atrocities the European continent has seen
since World War II. The U.S. Government has displayed great leadership
in seeking to stop the bloodshed, hold accountable those responsible for
war crimes, and ensure that the rule of law -- not the rule of genocide
-- prevails.
The Dayton accords have succeeded for now in ending the hostilities and
separating the warring factions. We in the U.S. Government take a great
deal of pride in the impressive efforts being made by U.S. armed forces
to bring peace to Bosnia and its people. I know that a number of our
soldiers in Bosnia -- including NATO commander Adm. Leighton Smith --
are from the Jacksonville area.
Less heralded, but of equal significance, are the Dayton accords'
civilian provisions. This aspect of the accords focuses on
reconstructing Bosnian society on the foundations of civil society,
justice, and respect for human rights and the rule of law. Jacksonville,
of course, boasts its own civilian program -- the Bosnian refugee
program, which is doing much to improve the lives of Bosnians who were
forced to flee their homeland.
One vital institution is the UN War Crimes Tribunal in The Hague. We
have vigorously supported this tribunal politically, financially, and
logistically since its inception. Assistant Secretary Shattuck has
traveled to Bosnia at least 10 times since July to promote the Tribunal
and to ensure that it remains an integral part of the peace process.
Under the leadership of its chief prosecutor, Judge Richard Goldstone --
a man who demonstrated great personal courage during South Africa's
apartheid years -- the Tribunal has indicted 52 people suspected of war
crimes and crimes against humanity. Just this past week, the parties
agreed to new "rules of the road" that will help the Tribunal gather
information and proceed only on the basis of solid evidence.
Sometimes we are asked why we are supporting the Tribunal. There are
many good answers to that question, but the simplest is that sustainable
peace requires justice.
The genocide in Bosnia, like the genocide in Rwanda, did not arise
spontaneously. They were fomented by individuals who sought to gain
political ends through violent and hideous means. Unless these
individuals are called to account for their actions -- for genocide, war
crimes, and crimes against humanity -- justice will not be served, and
reconciliation and reconstruction will be impossible.
The Tribunals are also necessary to lift the burden of collective guilt
that settles on societies whose leaders have directed such terrible
violence. The assignment of responsibility enables the international
community to differentiate between victims and aggressors. It also helps
expunge the illusion that conflicts with an ethnic dimension are
hopelessly complex and therefore insoluble.
Moreover, the Tribunals are essential if future crimes are to be
deterred. If basic human rights can be massively violated with impunity
in Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia, the world is fair game for every
conceivable form of terror.
In addition to the War Crimes Tribunals, a spectrum of other
institutions of accountability have contributed to reconciliation in
other countries. The Truth Commissions of Nicaragua, El Salvador, and
Haiti; the UN Verification Mission in Guatemala; and the National Human
Rights Commissions established in India and Mexico represent new and
diverse ways of providing accountability for human rights abuses.
Accountability also is being furthered in a number of countries by
assistance programs designed to help develop the administration of
justice and the rule of law.
It should go without saying that the kinds of actions we normally
associate with human rights promotion -- such as protests and letter-
writing campaigns -- are all still very important and, unfortunately,
still very necessary. As the world weaves stronger ties through trade
and cultural exchanges, it is vitally important that we foster a global
commitment to human rights as part of the fabric of the world community.
One of the most hopeful and innovative developments I have seen is the
growing interest on the part of members of the business community in
promoting human rights through their work. The example U.S. businesses
set abroad and the codes of conduct adopted by an increasing number of
multinationals effectively promote America's values abroad.
What I think these different trends point to is, in effect, "wholesale"
human rights work -- undertakings that move beyond individual cases to
bring about structural reform, changes in institutions that bring
massive human rights improvements in their wake.
One terrific example of this is in the Middle East, where Israel's
courageous agreement with the PLO has transformed the human rights
situation in the occupied territories and allowed the Palestinians the
opportunity for democratic expression. Ironically, many Palestinians now
credit their first-hand experience with Israeli democracy with their own
appreciation for democratic values.
The Middle East peace process aims to create greater openness throughout
the region as a whole. This is one of the reasons why Secretary
Christopher is making such a great effort to help Israel and Syria
achieve a peace agreement of their own.
To be sure, no single treaty or agreement will end all human rights
problems, but in today's world we have genuine opportunities for
meaningful structural changes that can improve respect for human rights
around the world.
In conclusion, I'd like to borrow from some comments Secretary
Christopher recently made regarding U.S. leadership in the next century.
As businesspeople who understand the importance of our global
relationships, I think you'll find it insightful.
The nations of the world look to America as a source of principled and
reliable leadership. They see American soldiers bridging rivers and
moving mountains to help peace take hold in Bosnia. They see us working
for peace in the Middle East. They see us negotiating trade agreements
so that every nation can find rewards in emerging markets.
They see the most powerful nation on earth standing up for persecuted
peoples everywhere because we believe it is right and because those who
struggle for human rights represent the future. And, ultimately, the
other nations of the world follow us because they understand that
America's fight for peace and freedom is the world's fight.
(###)
ARTICLE 6:
Fact Sheet: Independent States and Dependencies as of March 8, 1996
Independent States(1)
Short-form name Long-form name Code(2) Capital
001. Afghanistan * Islamic State
of Afghanistan AF Kabul
002. Albania *+ Republic of Albania AL Tirana
003. Algeria *+ Democratic and Popular
Republic of Algeria AG Algiers
004. Andorra *+ Principality of Andorra AN Andorra la Vella
005. Angola *+ Republic of Angola AO Luanda
006. Antigua and
Barbuda *+ (no long-form name) AC Saint John's
007. Argentina *+ Argentine Republic AR Buenos Aires
008. Armenia *+ Republic of Armenia AM Yerevan
009. Australia *+ Commonwealth of Australia AS Canberra
010. Austria *+ Republic of Austria AU Vienna
011. Azerbaijan *+ Azerbaijani Republic AJ Baku
012. Bahamas, The *+ Commonwealth of
The Bahamas BF Nassau
013. Bahrain *+ State of Bahrain BA Manama
014. Bangladesh *+ People's Republic
of Bangladesh BG Dhaka
015. Barbados *+ (no long-form name) BB Bridgetown
016. Belarus *+ Republic of Belarus BO Minsk
017. Belgium *+ Kingdom of Belgium BE Brussels
018. Belize *+ (no long-form name) BH Belmopan
019. Benin *+ Republic of Benin BN Porto-Novo
020. Bhutan + Kingdom of Bhutan BT Thimphu
021. Bolivia *+ Republic of Bolivia BL La Paz
(administrative)
Sucre
(legislative/
judiciary)
022. Bosnia and Republic of Bosnia and
Herzegovina *+ Herzegovina BK Sarajevo
023. Botswana *+ Republic of Botswana BC Gaborone
024. Brazil *+ Federative Republic
of Brazil BR Brasilia
025. Brunei *+ Negara Brunei Darussalam BX Bandar Seri
Bagawan
026. Bulgaria *+ Republic of Bulgaria BU Sofia
027. Burkina Faso*+ Burkina Faso UV Ouagadougou
028. Burma *+ Union of Burma BM Rangoon
029. Burundi *+ Republic of Burundi BY Bujumbura
030. Cambodia *+ Kingdom of Cambodia CB Phnom Penh
031. Cameroon *+ Republic of Cameroon CM Yaounde
032. Canada *+ (no long-form name) CA Ottawa
033. Cape Verde *+ Republic of Cape Verde CV Praia
034. Central African
Republic *+ Central African Republic CT Bangui
035. Chad *+ Republic of Chad CD N'Djamena
036. Chile *+ Republic of Chile CI Santiago
037. China *+ ( 3) People's Republic
of China CH Beijing
038. Colombia *+ Republic of Colombia CO Bogota
039. Comoros *+ Federal Islamic Republic
of the Comoros CN Moroni
040. Congo *+ Republic of the Congo CF Brazzaville
041. Costa Rica *+ Republic of Costa Rica CS San Jose
042. Cote d'Ivoire
(Ivory Coast)*+ Republic of Cote d'IvoireIV Yamoussoukro
043. Croatia *+ Republic of Croatia HR Zagreb
044. Cuba + Republic of Cuba CU Havana
045. Cyprus *+ Republic of Cyprus CY Nicosia
046. Czech Republic*+ Czech Republic EZ Prague
047. Denmark *+ Kingdom of Denmark DA Copenhagen
048. Djibouti *+ Republic of Djibouti DJ Djibouti
049. Dominica *+ Commonwealth of Dominica DO Roseau
050. Dominican
Republic *+ Dominican Republic DR Santo Domingo
051. Ecuador*+ Republic of Ecuador EC Quito
052. Egypt*+ Arab Republic of Egypt EG Cairo
053. El Salvador*+ Republic of El Salvador ES San Salvador
054. Equatorial Guinea*+ Republic of
Equatorial Guinea EK Malab
055. Eritrea *+ State of Eritrea ER Asmar
056. Estonia *+ Republic of Estonia EN Tallinn
057. Ethiopia *+ (no long-form name) ET Addis Ababa
058. Fiji *+ Republic of Fiji FJ Suva
059. Finland *+ Republic of Finland FI Helsinki
060. France *+ French Republic FR Paris
061. Gabon *+ Gabonese Republic GB Libreville
062. Gambia, The *+ Republic of The Gambia GA Banjul
063. Georgia *+ Republic of Georgia GG T'bilisi
064. Germany *+ Federal Republic
of Germany GM Berlin
065. Ghana *+ Republic of Ghana GH Accra
066. Greece *+ Hellenic Republic GR Athens
067. Grenada *+ (no long-form name) GJ Saint George's
068. Guatemala *+ Republic of Guatemala GT Guatemala
069. Guinea *+ Republic of Guinea GV Conakry
070. Guinea-Bissau *+ Republic of Guinea-BissauPU Bissau
071. Guyana *+ Co-operative Republic
of Guyana GY Georgetown
072. Haiti *+ Republic of Haiti HA Port-au-
Prince
073. Holy See* Holy See VT Vatican City
074. Honduras *+ Republic of Honduras HO Tegucigalpa
075. Hungary *+ Republic of Hungary HU Budapest
076. Iceland *+ Republic of Iceland IC Reykjavik
077. India *+ Republic of India IN New Delhi
078. Indonesia *+ Republic of Indonesia ID Jakarta
079. Iran + Islamic Republic of Iran IR Tehran
080. Iraq + Republic of Iraq IZ Baghdad
081. Ireland *+ (no long-form name) EI Dublin
082. Israel *+ State of Israel IS (see note 4)
083. Italy *+ Italian Republic IT Rome
084. Jamaica *+ (no long-form name) JM Kingston
085. Japan *+ (no long-form name) JA Tokyo
086. Jordan *+ Hashemite Kingdom
of Jordan JO Amman
087. Kazakstan *+ Republic of Kazakstan KZ Almaty
088. Kenya *+ Republic of Kenya KE Nairobi
089. Kiribati* Republic of Kiribati KR Tarawa
090. Korea, North + Democratic People's
Republic of Korea KN P'yongyang
091. Korea, South *+ Republic of Korea KS Seoul
092. Kuwait *+ State of Kuwait KU Kuwait
093. Kyrgyzstan *+ Kyrgyz Republic KG Bishkek
094. Laos *+ Lao People's Democratic
Republic LA Vientiane
095. Latvia *+ Republic of Latvia LG Riga
096. Lebanon *+ Republic of Lebanon LE Beirut
097. Lesotho *+ Kingdom of Lesotho LT Maseru
098. Liberia *+ Republic of Liberia LI Monrovia
099. Libya *+ Socialist People's Libyan
Arab Jamahiriya LY Tripoli
100. Liechtenstein *+ Principality of
Liechtenstein LS Vaduz
101. Lithuania *+ Republic of Lithuania LH Vilnius
102. Luxembourg *+ Grand Duchy of LuxembourgLU Luxembourg
103. Macedonia, The The Former Yugoslav
Former Yugoslav of Macedonia
Republic of *+ MK Skopje
104. Madagascar *+ Republic of Madagascar MA Antananarivo
105. Malawi *+ Republic of Malawi MI Lilongwe
106. Malaysia *+ (no long-form name) MY Kuala Lumpur
107. Maldives *+ Republic of Maldives MV Male
108. Mali *+ Republic of Mali ML Bamako
109. Malta *+ (no long-form name) MT Valletta
110. Marshall Islands*+ Republic of the
Marshall Islands RM Majuro
111. Mauritania *+ Islamic Republic
of Mauritania MR Nouakchott
112. Mauritius *+ Republic of Mauritius MP Port Louis
113. Mexico *+ United Mexican States MX Mexico
114. Micronesia,Federated Federated States of
States of Micronesia FM Palikir
115. Moldova *+ Republic of Moldova MD Chisinau
116. Monaco *+ Principality of Monaco MN Monaco
117. Mongolia *+ (no long-form name) MG Ulaanbaatar
118. Morocco *+ Kingdom of Morocco MO Rabat
119. Mozambique *+ Republic of Mozambique MZ Maputo
120. Namibia *+ Republic of Namibia WA Windhoek
121. Nauru* Republic of Nauru NR Yaren District
(no capital city)
122. Nepal *+ Kingdom of Nepal NP Kathmandu
123. Netherlands *+ Kingdom of
the Netherlands NL Amsterdam
The Hague(seat
of govt.)
124. New Zealand *+ (no long-form name) NZ Wellington
125. Nicaragua *+ Republic of Nicaragua NU Managua
126. Niger *+ Republic of Niger NG Niamey
127. Nigeria *+ Federal Republic
of Nigeria NI Abuja
128. Norway *+ Kingdom of Norway NO Oslo
129. Oman *+ Sultanate of Oman MU Muscat
130. Pakistan *+ Islamic Republic
of Pakistan PK Islamabad
131. Palau *+ Republic of Palau PS Koror
132. Panama *+ Republic of Panama PM Panama
133. Papua New Guinea *+ Independent State
of Papua New Guinea PP Port Moresby
134. Paraguay *+ Republic of Paraguay PA Asuncion
135. Peru *+ Republic of Peru PE Lima
136. Philippines *+ Republic of
the Philippines RP Manila
137. Poland *+ Republic of Poland PL Warsaw
138. Portugal *+ Portuguese Republic PO Lisbon
139. Qatar *+ State of Qatar QA Doha
140. Romania *+ (no long-form name) RO Bucharest
141. Russia *+ Russian Federation RS Moscow
142. Rwanda *+ Republic of Rwanda RW Kigali
143. Saint Kitts Federation of Saint Kitts
and Nevis *+ and Nevis SC Basseterre
144. Saint Lucia *+ (no long-form name) ST Castries
145. Saint Vincent and the
Grenadines *+ (no long-form name) VC Kingstown
146. San Marino *+ Republic of San Marino SM San Marino
147. Sao Tome and Democratic Republic
Principe *+ of Sao Tome and PrincipeTP Sao Tome
148. Saudi Arabia *+ Kingdom of Saudi Arabia SA Riyadh
149. Senegal *+ Republic of Senegal SG Dakar
150. Seychelles *+ Republic of Seychelles SE Victoria
151. Sierra Leone *+ Republic of Sierra Leone SL Freetown
152. Singapore *+ Republic of Singapore SN Singapore
153. Slovakia *+ Slovak Republic LO Bratislava
154. Slovenia *+ Republic of Slovenia SI Ljubljana
155. Solomon Islands *+ (no long-form name) BP Honiara
156. Somalia *+ (no long-form name) SO Mogadishu
157. South Africa *+ Republic of South Africa SF Pretoria
(administrative)
Cape Town
(legislative)
Bloemfontein
(judiciary)
158. Spain *+ Kingdom of Spain SP Madrid
159. Sri Lanka *+ Democratic Socialist
Republic of Sri Lanka CE Colombo
160. Sudan *+ Republic of the Sudan SU Khartoum
161. Suriname *+ Republic of Suriname NS Paramaribo
162. Swaziland *+ Kingdom of Swaziland WZ Mbabane
(administrative)
Lobamba
(legislative)
163. Sweden *+ Kingdom of Sweden SW Stockholm
164. Switzerland * Swiss Confederation SZ Bern
165. Syria *+ Syrian Arab Republic SY Damascus
166. Tajikistan *+ Republic of Tajikistan TI Dushanbe
167. Tanzania *+ United Republic
of Tanzania TZ Dar es Salaam
168. Thailand *+ Kingdom of Thailand TH Bangkok
169. Togo *+ Republic of Togo TO Lome
170. Tonga* Kingdom of Tonga TN Nuku'alofa
171. Trinidad and Republic of
Tobago*+ Trinidad and Tobago TD Port-of-Spain
172. Tunisia *+ Republic of Tunisia TS Tunis
173. Turkey *+ Republic of Turkey TU Ankara
174. Turkmenistan *+ (no long-form name) TX Ashgabat
175. Tuvalu* (no long-form name) TV Funafuti
176. Uganda *+ Republic of Uganda UG Kampala
177. Ukraine *+ (no long-form name) UP Kiev
178. United Arab United Arab Emirates
Emirates *+ United Arab Emirates TC Abu Dhabi
179. United Kingdom *+ United Kingdom of Great
Britain and Northern
Ireland UK London
180. United States + United States of America US Washington, DC
181. Uruguay *+ Oriental Republic
of Uruguay UY Montevideo
182. Uzbekistan *+ Republic of Uzbekistan UZ Tashkent
183. Vanuatu *+ Republic of Vanuatu NH Port-Vila
184. Venezuela *+ Republic of Venezuela VE Caracas
185. Vietnam *+ Socialist Republic
of Vietnam VM Hanoi
186. Western Samoa *+ Independent State
of Western Samoa WS Apia
187. Yemen *+ (5) Republic of Yemen YM Sanaa
188. Zaire *+ Republic of Zaire CG Kinshasa
189. Zambia *+ Republic of Zambia ZA Lusaka
190. Zimbabwe Republic of Zimbabwe ZI Harare
Other
001. Taiwan (6) (no long-form name) TW Taipei
1 In this listing, the term "independent state" refers to a people
politically organized into a sovereign state with a definite territory
recognized as independent by the U.S.
2 Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS) 10-4 codes.
3 With the establishment of diplomatic relations with China on January
1, 1979, the U.S. Government recognized the People's Republic of China
as the sole legal government of China and acknowledged the Chinese
position that there is only one China and that Taiwan is part of China.
4 In 1950, the Israeli parliament proclaimed Jerusalem as the capital.
The U.S., like most other countries that have embassies in Israel,
maintains its embassy in Tel Aviv.
5 The U.S. view is that the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
has dissolved and no successor state represents its continuation. Serbia
and Montenegro have asserted the formation of a joint independent state,
but this entity has not been formally recognized as a state by the U.S.
6 Claimed by both the Government of the People's Republic of China and
the authorities on Taiwan. Administered by the authorities on Taiwan.
(see note 3)
Dependencies and Areas of Special Sovereignty
Short-form name Long-form name Sovereignty Code(1) Capital
01. American Samoa Territory of
American Samoa United States AQ Pago Pago
02. Anguilla (no long-form name) United Kingdom AV The Valley
03. Antarctica (no long-form name) None(2) AY None
04. Aruba (no long-form name) Netherlands AA Oranjestad
05. Ashmore and Territory of Ashmore
Cartier Islands Cartier Islands Australia AT Admin. from
Canberra
06. Baker Island (no long-form name) United States FQ Admin. from
Wash. DC
07. Bermuda (no long-form name) United Kingdom BD Hamilton
08. Bouvet Islan (no long-form name) Norway BV Admin. from
Oslo
09. British British Indian Ocean
Indian Ocean Territory
Territory (3) United Kingdom IO None
10. Cayman Islands (no long-form name) United Kingdom CJ George Town
11. Christmas Island Territory of
Christmas Island Australia KT The
Settlement
(Flying Fish
Cove)
12. Clipperton Island(no long-form name) France IP Admin. from
Fr. Polynesia
13. Cocos (Keeling) Territory of Cocos
Islands (Keeling) Islands Australia CK West Island
14. Cook Islands (no long-form name) New Zealand CW Avarua
15. Coral Sea Coral Sea Islands
Islands Territory Australia CR Admin. from
Canberra
16. Corsica Territorial France VP Ajaccio
Collectivity of
Corsica
17. Falkland Islands Colony of the United Kingdom(4)FK Stanley
(Islas Malvinas) Falkland Islands
18. Faroe Islands (no long-form name) Denmark FO Torshavn
19. French Guiana Department of Guiana France FG Cayenne
20. French Polynesia Territory of
French Polynesia France FP Papeete
21. French Southern Territory of the France FS Admin.from
and Antarctic French Southern Paris
Lands(5) and Antarctic Lands
22. Gibraltar (no long-form name) United Kingdom GI Gibraltar
23. Greenland (no long-form name) Denmark GL Nuuk
(Godthab)
24. Guadeloupe(6) Department of France GP Basse-Terre
Guadeloupe
25. Guam Territory of Guam United States GQ Agana
26. Guernsey Bailiwick of GuernseyBritish Crown GK Saint Peter
Dept. Port
27. Heard Island Territory of Heard Australia HM Admin.from
and McDonald Island and McDonald Canberra
Islands Islands Australia
28. Hong Kong (no long-form name) United Kingdom(7)HK Victoria
29. Howland Island (no long-form name) United States HQ Admin.from
Wash. DC
30. Jan Mayen (no long-form name) Norway JN Admin.from
Oslo (8)
31. Jarvis Island (no long-form name) United States DQ Admin.from
Wash. DC
32. Jersey Bailiwick of Jersey British Crown JE Saint
Dep. Helier
33. Johnston Atoll (no long-form name) United States JQ Admin.from
Wash.DC
34. Kingman Reef (no long-form name) United States KQ Admin.from
Wash.DC
35. Macau (no long-form name) Portugal (9) MC Macau
36. Man, Isle of (no long-form name) British Crown IM Douglas
Dep.
37. Martinique Department of France MB Fort-de
Martinique France
38. Mayotte Territorial France MF Mamoutzou
Collectivity of Mayotte
39. Midway Islands (no long-form name) United States MQ Admin.from
Wash. DC
40. Montserrat (no long-form name) United Kingdom MH Plymouth
41. Navassa Island (no long-form name) United States BQ Admin.from
Wash. DC
42. Netherlands (no long-form name) Netherlands NT Willemstad
Antilles(10)
43. New Caledonia Territory of New France NC Noumea
Caledonia and
Dependencies
44. Niue (no long-form name) New Zealand NE Alofi
45. Norfolk Island Territory of Norfolk Australia NF Kingston
Island
46. Northern Commonwealth of the United States CQ Saipan
Mariana Islands Northern Mariana
Islands
47. Palmyra Atoll (no long-form name) United States LQ Admin.from
Wash. DC
48. Paracel Islands (no long-form name) undetermined(11)PF None
49. Pitcairn Islands Pitcairn, Henderson, United Kingdom PC Adamstown
Ducie, and Oeno
Islands
50. Puerto Rico Commonwealth of United States RQ San Juan
Puerto
51. Reunion(12) Department of Reunion France RE Saint-
Denis
52. Saint Helena(13) (no long-form name) United Kingdom SH Jamestown
53. Saint Pierre Territorial France SB Saint-
and Miquelon Collectivity of Pierre
Saint Pierre and Miquelon
54. South Georgia South Georgia and United Kingdom(4)SX None
and the South and the South
Sandwich Islands Sandwich Islands
55. Spratly Islands (no long-form name) undetermined(14) PG None
56. Svalbard (no long-form name) Norway SV
Longyearbyen
57. Tokelau (no long-form name) New Zealand TL None
58. Turks and
Caicos Islands (no long-form name) United Kingdom TK Grand Turk
59. Virgin Islands Virgin Islands United States VQ Charlotte
of the United States Amalie
60. Virgin Islands, (no long-form name) United Kingdom VI Road Town
61. Wake Island (no long-form name) United States WQ Admin.from
Wash. DC
62. Wallis and Futuna Territory of the France WF Mata'utu
Wallis and Futuna
Islands
63. Western Sahara (no long-form name) undetermined WI None
1 Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS) 10-4 codes.
2 Antarctica consists of the territory south of 60 degrees south
latitude. This area includes claims by Argentina, Australia, Chile,
France, New Zealand, Norway, and the United Kingdom, the legal status of
which remains in suspense under the terms of the Antarctic Treaty of
1959. The United States recognizes no claims to Antarctica.
3 Chagos Archipelago (including Diego Garcia).
4 Also claimed by Argentina.
5 "French Southern and Antarctic Lands" includes Ile Amsterdam, Ile
Saint-Paul, Iles Crozet, and Iles Kerguelen in the southern Indian
Ocean, along with the French-claimed sector of Antarctica, "Terre
Adelie." The United States does not recognize the French claim to
"Terre Adelie" (see note 2).
6 The Department of Guadeloupe includes the nearby islands of Marie-
Galante and la Desirade and Iles des Saintes, as well as Saint
Barthelemy and the northern three-fifths of Saint Martin (the rest of
which belongs to Netherlands Antilles).
7 Under a Sino-British declaration of September 1984, Hong Kong will
revert to China on July 1, 1997, the expiration of the U.K.'s 99-year
lease on the New Territories.
8 Administered from Oslo, Norway, through a governor resident in
Longyearbyen, Svalbard.
9 Under a Sino-Portuguese declaration of April 1987, Macau will revert
to China on December 20, 1999.
10 Netherlands Antilles comprises two groupings of islands: Curacao
and Bonaire are located off the coast of Venezuela; Saba, Sint
Eustatius, and Sint Maarten (the Dutch two-fifths of the island of Saint
Martin) lie 800 km to the north.
11 South China Sea islands occupied by China but claimed by Vietnam.
12 Bassas da India (BS), Europa Island (EU), Glorioso Islands (GO),
Juan de Nova Island (JU), and Tromelin Island (TE) are controlled by
France and are administered from Reunion. (These islands are claimed by
Madagascar; Tromelin Island also is claimed by Mauritius and
Seychelles).
13 The territory of Saint Helena includes the Island group of Tristan
da Cunha; Saint Helena also administers Ascension Island.
14 South China Sea islands claimed in entirety by China and Vietnam and
in part by the Philippines and Malaysia; each of these states occupies
some part of the islands.
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[END OF DISPATCH VOL 7, NO 9]
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