U.S. Department of State 
Dispatch Volume 7, Number 6, February 5, 1996 
Bureau of Public Affairs 
 
 
 
ARTICLES IN THIS ISSUE: 
 
 
1.  The United States and France:  Building on a Historic Alliance--
President Clinton, French President Chirac 
2.  Policy and Principles:  The Clinton Administration's Approach--James 
B. Steinberg, Director of Policy Planning 
3.  The United States and the Security of Taiwan--Winston Lord, 
Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs 
 
 
 
ARTICLE 1: 
 
The United States and France:  Building on a Historic Alliance 
President Clinton, French President Chirac 
Opening remarks at a press conference following meeting, Washington, DC, 
February 1, 1996 
 
 
President Clinton. President Chirac and I have just concluded a very 
good discussion. Let me begin by saying how much the United States 
appreciates the President's strong leadership and the vital role France 
is playing all around the world. This is a time for the world's great 
democracies to reach out, not retreat. Many of the problems we face--
including terrorism, international organized crime, and drugs--have no 
respect for borders. And the extraordinary opportunities we enjoy to 
shape a safer and more prosperous future for our people can be realized 
only if we stay engaged and if we work together. 
 
France and the United States are doing just that--building on our 
historic alliance to meet the challenges of this new era. NATO is a 
cornerstone of that alliance. The President and I spent a good deal of 
time discussing its present and its future. In Bosnia, all of us can see 
NATO's critical role in ending a terrible war and in helping peace take 
hold and in restoring stability to the heart of Europe. President Chirac 
and I reviewed the impressive progress our troops are making. We agreed 
that the mission in Bosnia is moving forward steadily, surely, and as 
safely as possible. 
 
The Bosnia operation also demonstrates how well NATO can work with 
Europe's new democracies. Countries that were our Warsaw Pact 
adversaries less than a decade ago now are serving side by side with our 
troops for peace. This is a tribute to the decision that we made to 
reach out to them through the Partnership for Peace and by holding out 
the possibility of opening NATO's doors to new partners. We agreed that 
NATO must and will continue its steady progress toward enlargement and 
will strengthen its relationship with Russia. 
 
Let me say again:  I told President Chirac how pleased we in the United 
States are with France's recent decision to move closer to the military 
side of NATO--a move that will strengthen our alliance and a move that 
is very, very important to the United States. I also welcomed the French 
efforts to build a stronger European defense identity within NATO. This 
will allow our European allies to deal more effectively with future 
security problems and spread the costs and risks of our leadership for 
peace, while preserving the basic structure of NATO. 
 
The Franco-American partnership extends well beyond NATO and, indeed, 
well beyond Europe. We've seen it in Cambodia, where our cooperation was 
vital to the success of democratic elections. We see it in Haiti, where 
French gendarmes are taking part in the international police force and 
playing a critical role. And in Africa, both our countries today are 
working to help people realize their tremendous economic and political 
potential. Today, President Chirac and I agreed to work together on 
preventive diplomacy in Africa to begin to head off conflicts before 
they start. 
 
Finally, we focused on a series of new threats to the safety of our 
citizens that demands a coordinated response:  the spread of weapons of 
mass destruction, terrorism, international organized crime, drug 
trafficking and, of course, the threats to the global environment. 
 
I welcome France's decision to end nuclear testing in the Pacific and 
its strong support for signing a zero-yield comprehensive nuclear test 
ban treaty this year. That is a project we can and we will work on 
together, and I believe we will succeed. As I said in the State of the 
Union address, a comprehensive test ban treaty is one of my highest 
priorities as President. It will dramatically reduce the nuclear threat 
to every American and to people all over the world. Having France as a 
strong partner in this crusade significantly increases the prospects for 
success. 
 
Let me add also that we greatly appreciate France's offer to join and 
contribute to the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization--the 
organization that will provide alternative energy to North Korea as it 
freezes and then dismantles its dangerous nuclear weapons programs. 
 
This past year, terrorists have taken the lives of people in the very 
heart of Paris and in the very heart of America. The President and I 
agreed that our law enforcement agencies can and must work even more 
closely together, sharing their experiences and their expertise until we 
succeed in defeating terrorism. We'll look at new ways to stop the flow 
of drugs to our streets and the spread of organized crime by cracking 
down harder on money laundering and making it easier to extradite 
criminals. 
 
Finally, let me say again to the President: I want to thank you for your 
long and consistent leadership in Bosnia, for the sacrifices made by the 
French there, especially the French soldiers. And I want to tell you how 
much it means to me and to all Americans that today you presented the 
Legion of Honor to the families of the three American diplomats who were 
killed there in the search--ultimately, the successful search--for a 
peace agreement. 
 
This is symbolic of the friendship that the United States has with 
France. You are our oldest ally. I thought it quite appropriate today 
that we had your welcoming ceremony on the lawn of the White House in 
full view of the Jefferson Memorial because Thomas Jefferson was our 
first envoy--the symbol of our friendship, our alliance with France. 
 
Now the United States has another forceful and energetic partner for 
peace and progress in President Chirac. Let me invite him to make a 
statement, welcome him again to the United States, and then we will take 
your questions. 
 
Mr. President. 
 
 
President Chirac.  President Clinton has more or less said everything 
there was to be said--because, anyway, everything that we said, he said 
wonderfully. It was all that. 
 
I just have some brief remarks. First of all, a sentiment of gratitude 
for the way I've been welcomed here. And I deeply appreciated this--to 
be welcomed in the White House and in Congress. And, secondly, there was 
a very fundamental agreement between us on most of the subjects that we 
talked about. I think the most outstanding example is Bosnia, where the 
action undertaken by President Clinton has been decisive for a peace 
agreement that a few months before no one could really have imagined. 
 
France was not absent, naturally, from the effort that led to this. And 
if the country manages to regain equilibrium in peace and come back to 
peace, this will be, to a large extent, due to the President of the 
United States. 
 
I also wanted to mention two problems here which, among others, I'm 
deeply concerned about. First of all is the question of the necessary 
reform of the organization of the Atlantic alliance in order to adapt it 
to the needs of our time. We can, I think, expect the very best in terms 
of peace from that organization as long as the organization has adapted 
to the new circumstances.  
 
My second point is the fact that we really must understand how 
absolutely essential it is that we should not disengage ourselves from 
development aid. Many countries in the world are in the process of being 
excluded precisely as they're making very substantial efforts in order 
to try to move toward democracy and the market economy, so we must help 
them in that effort. Those were the two messages that I wish to express 
today to the Congress. 
 
Now, lastly, I felt very deep emotion in awarding, this morning, to 
three wonderful women--wonderful ladies--the Legion of Honor in the name 
of the people of France and the Republic of France--the widows of three 
great American diplomats who gave their very best efforts to help to 
achieve peace and, alas, lost their lives in that country of Bosnia.  
 
(###) 
 
 
 
ARTICLE 2: 
 
Policy and Principles:  The Clinton Administration's Approach 
James B. Steinberg, Director of Policy Planning 
Address to the Foreign Policy Association, New York City, January 24, 
1996 
 
 
In last night's State of the Union message, President Clinton challenged 
the United States to sustain our role as the leader in the fight for 
freedom and peace. Three years of American leadership by President 
Clinton have already produced great benefits for the American people and 
for the world community. Had America not led, the war in Bosnia would 
continue today with mounting casualties--a war threatening European 
stability, eroding the NATO alliance, and damaging U.S. credibility. Had 
we not led, peace in the Middle East would not be on the horizon, and we 
would face a growing crisis in Haiti. Without U.S. leadership, the 
prospect for new American jobs and economic growth through important 
trade agreements such as the WTO, NAFTA, and successful auto 
negotiations with the Japanese would remain beyond reach. The Mexican 
economy would be in free-fall, threatening our economic security and the 
stability of the world's financial markets. The President's leadership 
assured that nuclear weapons programs were halted in North Korea and 
Iraq and that the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty was indefinitely and 
unconditionally extended. Through determination and the exercise of 
American leadership, we have repeatedly turned challenges into real 
gains for Americans. 
 
In the Office of Policy Planning, we often are torn between helping 
coordinate day-to-day policy and longer term planning. In our fast-
forward world, long-term sometimes means next Monday, and history is 
what happened last Friday. That said, as the director of the office 
responsible for helping frame policy in a larger context, I would like 
to take a step back tonight and talk about the broader principles and 
strategies that lie behind the President's remarkable foreign policy 
accomplishments. 
 
Policy planners contend daily with the legacy of our first director--
George Kennan. Kennan served from 1947 to 1949--at a time when the 
United States was resisting its instinct to turn inward once more and 
was instead helping to build a stable post-war order. He earned his 
place in American history, of course, by arguing that "the main element 
of any United States policy toward the Soviet Union must be that of a 
long-term, patient but firm and vigilant containment of Russian 
expansive tendencies." With that single word--containment--he set the 
direction for more than 40 years of U.S. foreign policy. 
 
"Containment" primarily was a prescription for U.S. policy. Yet 
containment rested on an understanding of the international system 
dominated by the threat of communist aggression. This one word became 
the bumper-sticker of the Cold War. Containing the Soviet Union was used 
to justify almost every foreign policy activity, from regional 
interventions and the building of security alliances to supporting 
economic institutions and foreign assistance. 
 
Since the collapse of the Soviet external and internal empire, many 
analysts have sought to find a new bumper sticker, one that would 
characterize the post-Cold War international system and set the new 
paradigm for U.S. foreign policy. So many theories have surfaced, in 
fact, that they've exhausted the memory of the State Department's 
antiquated computer system. 
 
At first, optimism was the prevailing sentiment. We were told that a 
"new world order" was within reach, where American power would tame 
lawless aggressors. Others claimed that we had reached the "end of 
history," where market democracy had become accepted worldwide as the 
only possible--indeed, historically inevitable--form of government. 
Others told us of a "borderless world," where international commerce 
would wash over governments and erase territorial boundaries and where 
the invisible hand of the marketplace might overcome every ill--from 
authoritarianism in China to famine in Africa to poverty in India. 
 
Pessimists soon made a comeback. They tell us of the "coming anarchy," 
where unchecked environmental damage and rapid population growth will 
make many parts of the world ungovernable and will unleash floods of 
economic and political refugees to our own shores. Others warn that we 
live at the early stages of a "clash of civilizations," where 
antagonistic cultures with irreconcilable values and objectives will 
engage in constant conflict with one another, tearing at the fragile 
economic and political ties that bind the world's peoples. 
 
Each of these grand theories contains within it many important truths. 
But whatever the merit of physics' never-ending search for a "great 
unified theory," the world we face today is far too complicated to 
describe in one theory or fit on a bumper sticker. Our interests are too 
broad; our challenges too diverse. And too often, broad 
oversimplifications either hide or distort reality. 
 
Kennan, to his credit, rejected simplistic understandings of the 
communist threat. He eventually came to oppose our involvement in 
Vietnam, for instance, because he saw Southeast Asia as peripheral to 
our core national interests and the war itself as about nationalism, not 
communism. And while Kennan accurately predicted--nearly 50 years ago--
that the Soviet system would collapse, he did so based on a careful 
analysis of its component parts:  the ideology of its leaders, the 
fundamental weaknesses of the command economic system, and the weariness 
of the Russian people. He came to reject the more extravagant extensions 
of containment policy for ignoring communism's greatest weakness--the 
communist system itself. 
 
Today, Kennan continues to speak out against the danger of seizing too 
quickly on any single policy prescription, but he still counsels us to 
define sound principles--"principles that accord with the nature, the 
needs, the interests, and the limitations of our country." These 
principles should define the real-world demands on a nation's capacity 
to act and the limits of its ability to do so. Leaders have a 
responsibility to articulate principles, to inform the public about 
their perception of the national interest, especially when dangers and 
opportunities are not immediately obvious. 
 
Last week at Harvard University, Secretary Christopher reaffirmed four 
core principles that have come to guide foreign policy in the Clinton 
Administration. These principles are designed to meet today's 
opportunities and dangers. 
 
Our first and most important principle is that America must lead if we 
want to protect our national interests and values. No other nation has 
the power, the resources, the respect, and the authority to lead. 
Leadership means that we will act alone when we must but work with 
others when we can. 
 
Whether bringing peace to troubled regions, strengthening our role in 
the global economy, or fighting transnational threats from nuclear 
proliferation, crime, terrorism, or environmental decay, our leadership 
has often meant the difference between success and failure. 
 
Leadership does not come cheap. Forces in Congress have proposed cuts in 
our foreign affairs budget that would cripple our diplomacy just when we 
are beginning to reap the benefits of the end of the Cold War. Of 
course, we have important responsibilities to attend to at home. But we 
can't create jobs if foreign markets are not open. We can't build a 
secure future if drug trafficking is flourishing or if dangerous nations 
develop nuclear weapons. Think about how short-sighted it is for 
Congress not to find $22 million to implement KEDO and freeze North 
Korea's nuclear program. In fact, for less than one-third of one percent 
of our GDP and just a little more than 1% of all government spending, we 
could fund the entire foreign affairs budget. These are modest outlays 
by the world's standards, but they represent an American commitment to 
the world that will, in turn, catalyze major contributions by our allies 
and friends. 
 
A second principle is the need to strengthen the institutions that 
provide an enduring basis for global peace and prosperity. For half a 
century, institutions such as NATO, the UN, GATT, the IMF, and the World 
Bank have helped us share the burdens of leadership. Some critics argue 
that we should significantly diminish our links with these institutions. 
These critics would leave us with only two choices: do nothing or do it 
by ourselves. 
 
That's the choice we would face in Bosnia without NATO, the UN, the 
OSCE, and the World Bank. That's the choice we would have faced when 
Mexico's economy collapsed, without the International Monetary Fund. And 
that's the choice we would have faced without the UN when nations such 
as Haiti, El Salvador, Cambodia, and Angola needed help to recover from 
civil war and famine.  
 
That's why we're reinvigorating old institutions and building new ones. 
We are adapting and adjusting proven institutions such as NATO and 
extending their benefits to new members. We are creating new 
arrangements with our neighbors and our European allies, such as the 
Summit of the Americas and the Transatlantic Marketplace. And the 
President has taken major steps toward strengthening consultation and 
cooperation in Asia--on economic matters through the annual APEC 
leaders' meetings and on security issues through the ASEAN Regional 
Forum and the Northeast Asian Security dialogue. This is why we are 
taking a hard look at institutions, such as the UN, that must reform to 
meet new challenges. 
 
Cutting funding for the UN means limiting our ability to address vital 
development needs and to negotiate important environmental agreements 
and share needed information on climate change, on ozone depletion, and 
on oceans and fisheries. In an integrated global economy, environmental 
damage in one part of the world can affect economies everywhere. 
Pollution's impact on our nation's health takes an enormous toll on our 
manufacturing, service, and agricultural productivity. Disappearing 
cropland worldwide, coupled with a projected doubling in world 
population, may lead to dramatic rises in world food prices. Whether we 
like it or not, these threats to our well-being are best addressed 
through negotiations at international organizations such as the UN. 
 
Our third principle is that we must support democracy and human rights 
if we want a policy that not only reflects our ideals but also 
reinforces our interests. Promoting democratic values amplifies our 
authority and credibility in the world. Our interests are most secure in 
a world where the rule of law protects both political rights and free 
market economies. From working with courageous reformers in South 
Africa, Mexico, and the new democracies of Central Europe and the former 
Soviet Union, to supporting the War Crimes Tribunal and the elections 
process in the former Yugoslavia, this principle both closely reflects 
our image of ourselves and accepts that there are limits to our ability 
to help others set themselves free. 
 
Our fourth principle is constructive relations with the great powers--
our longstanding allies in Western Europe and Japan, as well as our 
former adversaries in Russia and China. We live in a world where these 
four powers, each in its own way, have the ability to significantly 
affect our security and prosperity. 
 
Some have said that in the absence of an overwhelming common threat, 
America's relationships with its core allies would inevitably drift 
apart. After three years of close cooperation with our friends in Europe 
and Japan, we can fairly claim that the opposite is true. Our common 
action in Bosnia has done more for European cooperation and stability 
than years of sterile theoretical debates over competing "security 
architectures." And the New Transatlantic Agenda that we launched last 
month in Madrid will expand our economic ties and strengthen our 
cooperation with the European Union in confronting global political and 
security challenges. 
 
Our cooperation with Japan also has deepened in response to new 
opportunities and challenges. A year-long review of our alliance has 
revitalized our security ties. Japan has worked with us to end the North 
Korean nuclear program, and we have maintained our security relationship 
in the face of domestic challenges in both countries. While there 
continue to be important trade issues between us, the 20 market-access 
agreements we have reached have contributed to the recent sharp decline 
in our bilateral trade deficit--as you saw in today's New York Times. 
 
Nowhere is the task of the policy planner--or of the policy maker--more 
challenging than in dealing with Russia and China. The unprecedented and 
painful transitions that Russia and China are currently undertaking 
embody the range of challenges and opportunities we confront in the 
world today. 
 
We have recognized that Russia's transition to a more democratic, 
market-oriented society will be long and difficult and the outcome not 
foreordained. But there are vital U.S. interests at stake in our 
relations with Russia, and practical cooperation where possible 
increases both our countries' security and prosperity. In light of a 
half-century of confrontation, it is important to reflect how far we--
and the Russian people themselves--have come.  
 
Of course, it would be easy to enumerate our differences with Russia. 
Its ongoing struggle with the conflict in Chechnya, its crime and 
corruption, and Moscow's nuclear cooperation with Iran indicate that 
this transition will not be easy and may impact American interests and 
Russia's own development. Russia is still struggling to define its 
future at home and abroad. Ultimately, the Russian people alone will 
decide whether they, too, can define a new path for Russia or whether 
they will turn to the forces who prey on their fears. Russians face an 
important choice in the June presidential elections. Our key obligation 
is to engage Russia by promoting democratic values and institutions 
while keeping watch over own national interest at all times. 
 
For those of you who follow our relations with China, it will probably 
sound like an understatement to say that the last year has been 
difficult and in important respects disappointing. China remains an 
authoritarian state, though far from the totalitarian monolith it once 
was. Important differences remain between our two countries on issues 
such as human rights, proliferation, and trade. Having abandoned the 
substance of communism and lacking a credible ideological replacement, 
China's leaders have sought to mobilize support by emphasizing 
nationalistic themes of order in confronting a deep-seated fear of chaos 
and unfurling the banner of sovereignty in response to perceived foreign 
pressure and influence. Its continued insistence on the right to use 
force to protect its claims to sovereignty in Taiwan and the South China 
Sea will not ease regional tensions. 
 
Our Administration does not seek to isolate or contain China. This is 
not because we want to do China a favor, but because engagement serves 
our interests and the interests of our friends and allies in the region. 
We seek to restore positive momentum to the relationship. We remain 
committed to the "one China" policy forged through successive Democratic 
and Republican administrations. We are committed also to finding 
constructive ways to address our differences and to cooperate on common 
concerns. 
 
Secretary Christopher has stated very clearly that the United States 
will do its part. But if we are to build a lasting, productive 
relationship, China has a responsibility to take meaningful steps to 
address areas of our concern and to respect internationally accepted 
principles. 
 
Whatever our problems or disagreements, we need to understand that China 
will be a major--and growing--factor on the Asian regional scene and in 
the world. Whether in terms of maintaining stability in the Taiwan 
Strait, on the Korean Peninsula, or in the South China Sea; whether in 
terms of fostering an economic regime in the Asia-Pacific region that 
promotes our own prosperity as well as that of our trading partners; or 
whether in terms of the effective functioning of the United Nations and 
other institutions of the international system, China will be a key 
player.  
 
As we have successfully confronted this world of opportunity and danger, 
it is ironic that the biggest challenge to securing our interests abroad 
may be a fraying consensus at home. Of course, we must address 
challenges in the United States. There is no disputing that. Those whom 
I call the "new isolationists" do not deny that we have a stake in the 
world. But absent the kind of immediate and overriding threat posed by 
communism, they fail to appreciate how early and effective actions by 
the U.S. to prevent crises, to build and maintain international 
institutions, to support democracy and human rights, and to maintain 
constructive relations with our key allies and other important global 
actors can help us avoid much more costly and dangerous interventions in 
the future. 
 
As the President argued last night, American leadership is crucial to 
advancing our economic interests abroad and to creating a world safe 
from destabilizing conflicts and threats from crime, terrorism, and 
environmental decay. Never has our engagement been more vital. 
Isolationism always will strike a responsive chord with Americans, in 
part because we have long been at peace with the countries on our 
borders, and in part because vast oceans separate us from Europe, Asia, 
and Africa. But the countries on our borders share with us a free trade 
area that continues to create American jobs. And Europe, Asia, and 
Africa are no longer that far away, thanks to rapid communications and 
transportation, and thanks to our increasingly interdependent economies. 
 
We cannot afford to look back nostalgically at the days of containment, 
nor wait for a new overwhelming security threat to emerge. As the 
President said last evening, today's dangers know no borders. The loss 
of nuclear materials from one country is a challenge to the security of 
all countries. We must work with others to confront these transnational 
problems. Though we no longer have a single enemy around which we can 
rally public support, the stakes are too high to withdraw from a world 
that we have helped create and which reflects American interests and 
values more than at any time in our history.  
 
(###) 
 
 
 
ARTICLE 3: 
 
The United States and the Security of Taiwan 
Winston Lord, Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs 
Statement before the Subcommittee on East Asia and the Pacific, Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee, Washington, DC, February 7, 1996 
 
 
Mr. Chairman, members of the committee:  I welcome the opportunity to 
appear before you today to discuss one of the United States' most 
significant policy issues in Asia. It is also one of the most difficult 
ones. I commend you for addressing these questions at this time. I hope 
our exchanges today will serve to dampen recent tensions and promote 
American interests. 
 
Peace in the Taiwan Strait lies at the core of our China policy. For 
decades, we have stressed that we    will support any peaceful solution 
to disagreements between Taiwan and the P.R.C. Such a solution obviously 
must be supported by both sides. 
 
My testimony will discuss the present security situation in the Taiwan 
Strait area. Then, I will explain why the policy of the United States 
serves the interests of all parties concerned in maintaining peace and 
stability. I will describe the dangers to our interests which would 
result from conflict in the area. And I will urge that we--both the 
Administration and Congress--move cautiously and cooperatively to 
maintain the delicate balance that successive Administrations have 
achieved. 
 
Recent Developments 
 
We may recall crises in the Taiwan Strait threatening U.S. involvement 
in the late 1950s. In the decades since, peace and stability have 
prevailed as a result of wise policies on all sides. However, following 
the visit to the U.S. last summer by Taiwan's President, Lee Teng-hui, 
tensions have risen with tough political rhetoric in Beijing and a 
series of military moves by the People's Liberation Army. One Chinese 
military exercise included the firing for the first time of surface-to-
surface missiles into the ocean 100 miles or so north of Taiwan. These 
developments have raised serious questions and concerns on the island, 
in the United States, and in neighboring Asian countries about stability 
in the area. Most recently, there has been speculation in the U.S. and 
foreign press about further military actions by the P.R.C.  
 
We are concerned by any rise in tension in the region. We have conveyed 
this to Beijing, and we are watching developments closely. However, 
having examined all of the available evidence, we cannot conclude that 
there is an imminent military threat to Taiwan. While it is abundantly 
clear that the P.R.C. wishes its military activities to be noticed--to 
influence Taiwan's legislative and presidential elections and to have a 
restraining effect on Taiwan's international activities--they do not, in 
our judgment, reflect an intention to take military action against 
Taiwan. Perhaps more importantly, the Taiwan authorities have reached 
the same judgment. Though the scale of some of these recent exercises is 
substantial, the pattern of such exercises in connection with elections 
in Taiwan is not new; such activities have been observed since 1988. 
P.R.C. authorities have stated publicly, as well as to us in diplomatic 
exchanges, that there is no change in their intention to seek a peaceful 
resolution of the Taiwan question. We, as always, will continue to 
monitor closely the situation in the Taiwan Strait. But all evidence at 
our disposal at this time leads to the conclusion that the P.R.C. has no 
intention to initiate military action.  
 
What then lies behind the recent actions by the Chinese military? As I 
have suggested, these demonstrations of military strength--and there may 
be more--are evidently intended to send a message to the Taiwan 
authorities to curb what the P.R.C. regards as efforts to establish a 
separate, independent identity for Taiwan. Last June's visit to the U.S. 
by President Lee Teng-hui was interpreted by the P.R.C., wrongly in our 
view, as a step toward independence. The Chinese position, of course, is 
that Taiwan is a part of China, and it thus views the issue as vital to 
its interests. Some P.R.C. commentators have charged Lee Teng-hui with 
the intention of abandoning, or postponing indefinitely, the Taiwan 
authorities' longstanding goal of eventual reunification with the 
mainland.  
 
While expressing a desire for recognition of Taiwan as a sovereign 
entity for now, the Taiwan leadership has repeatedly reaffirmed its 
interest in eventual reunification. Meanwhile, President Lee has sought 
to appeal both to the desire of the people on Taiwan for greater respect 
and recognition from the international community. It is also apparent 
that the majority there wish to remain separate from the People's 
Republic of China, at least until political and economic conditions on 
both sides of the Strait make reunification more attractive. 
 
Although neither Taiwan nor the P.R.C. wants a military confrontation, 
there is a danger that Chinese nationalism in the P.R.C. may collide 
with Taiwan's search for international recognition and status. 
Democratic development in Taiwan has permitted the free expression by a 
portion of the Taiwan populace of a desire for a separate Taiwan 
identity, expression of which had been largely suppressed under the 
previous political leadership in Taiwan. Some in Beijing interpret this 
development as challenging the assumption underlying the political 
status quo and source of stability in the Taiwan Strait--the acceptance 
of a single Chinese state by both sides.  
 
Since 1950, Taiwan has been seen in the P.R.C. as a sensitive issue, 
touching on core notions of sovereignty, territorial integrity, and 
feelings of nationalism. With the meeting of these two powerful 
historical forces--growing nationalism on the mainland and increased 
efforts by Taiwan's democratic polity to obtain greater recognition of 
its own identity and improve its international status--tensions between 
Beijing and Taipei have increased. The drawn-out succession to Deng 
Xiaoping on the mainland and electoral politics on Taiwan have further 
complicated this situation. 
 
U.S. Policy 
 
It is vital to keep in mind U.S. interests in the Taiwan issue. We 
insist that the P.R.C. and Taiwan work out their differences peacefully, 
so as not to disturb the security of the region and the people there. At 
the same time, our approach is to strictly avoid interference in the 
process whereby the two sides pursue resolution of differences.  
 
The Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) of 1979 forms the basis of U.S. policy 
regarding the security of Taiwan. Its premise is that an adequate 
defense in Taiwan is conducive to maintaining peace and security while 
differences remain between Taiwan and the P.R.C. Section 2 (b) states: 
 
It is the policy of the United States . . . to consider any effort to 
determine the future of Taiwan by other than peaceful means, including 
by boycotts or embargoes, a threat to the peace and security of the 
Western Pacific area and of grave concern to the United States; to 
provide Taiwan with arms of a defensive character; and to maintain the 
capacity of the United States to resist any resort to force or other 
forms of coercion that would jeopardize the security, or the social or 
economic system, of the people on Taiwan. 
 
Section 3 of the TRA also provides that the  
 
United States will make available to Taiwan such defense articles and 
defense services in such quantity as may be necessary to enable Taiwan 
to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability.   
 
It further stipulates that: 
 
The President is directed to inform the Congress promptly of any threat 
to the security or the social or economic system of the people on Taiwan 
and any danger to the interests of the United States arising therefrom. 
The President and the Congress shall determine, in accordance with 
constitutional processes, appropriate action by the United States in 
response to any such danger. 
 
The key elements of the United States' policy toward the Taiwan question 
are expressed in the three joint communiques with the P.R.C. as follows. 
 
--  The United States recognizes the Government of the P.R.C. as "the 
sole legal Government of China." 
--  The U.S. acknowledges the Chinese position that "there is but one 
China and Taiwan is part of China."  In 1982, the U.S. assured the 
P.R.C. that it has no intention of pursuing a policy of "two Chinas" or 
"one China, one Taiwan." 
--  Within this context, the people of the U.S. will maintain cultural, 
commercial, and other unofficial relations with the people of Taiwan. 
--  The U.S. has consistently held that resolution of the Taiwan issue 
is a matter to be worked out peacefully by the Chinese themselves. Our 
sole and abiding concern is that any resolution be peaceful. 
 
I reiterate the above passages from the TRA and the joint communiques in 
some detail, since they express precisely the governing principles of 
our policy. They serve U.S. interests today just as well as in past 
decades. 
 
Let me now call attention to an aspect of the August 17, 1982, joint 
communique between the United States and the People's Republic of China, 
which is extremely important to Taiwan's security. In this document, the 
P.R.C. stated that its "fundamental policy" is "to strive for a peaceful 
resolution to the Taiwan question."  Based on that P.R.C. assurance, the 
United States Government made reciprocal statements concerning our 
intentions with respect to arms sales to Taiwan--that we did not intend 
to increase the quantity or quality of arms supplied and, in fact, 
intended gradually to reduce these sales. At the time the joint 
communique was signed, we made it clear to all parties concerned that 
our intentions were premised on the P.R.C.'s continued adherence to a 
policy of striving for peaceful reunification with Taiwan. We 
continually review our assessment in light of events, particularly 
during periods of heightened tension. Our judgment is that the P.R.C. 
has not changed this policy, and we have abided by our commitments. 
 
Taken as a whole, our policy has been unequivocally successful in 
obtaining our fundamental objective regarding the security of Taiwan--
peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait. The Taiwan Relations Act and 
the 1982 communique have been complementary elements of this policy. The 
former has provided the means for our continued support for Taiwan's 
self-defense capability, while the latter forms the basis for the 
understanding with the P.R.C. that any resolution of the differences 
between Taiwan and the mainland must be achieved through peaceful means. 
U.S. arms sales to Taiwan have been consistent with both the TRA and the 
1982 joint communique. 
 
Taiwan's weapons systems are not offensive in character but constitute a 
credible deterrent to military action. With the addition of several new 
defensive systems purchased or leased from the U.S. in the past few 
years, Taiwan's self-defense capability will be as strong as at any time 
since 1949. Those systems include various types of military aircraft, 
ships, and air-defense and anti-ship missiles. In addition, the U.S. has 
provided significant technical support for Taiwan's own production of 
the Indigenous Defense Fighter and PERRY-class frigates. 
 
With U.S.-supplied and jointly developed systems, taken together with 
those systems which Taiwan has produced domestically and those it is 
purchasing from other countries--notably 60 MIRAGE fighter aircraft and 
six LAFAYETTE-class frigates from France--Taiwan has a formidable 
capacity to defend itself. Although there may be other defensive systems 
which Taiwan will seek to obtain for its self-defense, the basic 
inventory of equipment which Taiwan has or will have in its possession 
will, in our view, be sufficient to deter any major military action 
against Taiwan. 
 
While our arms sales policy aims to enhance the self-defense capability 
of Taiwan, it also seeks to reinforce stability in the region. We will 
not provide Taiwan with capabilities that might provoke an arms race 
with the P.R.C. or other countries in the region. Moreover, our policy 
must be applied with a long-term perspective. Any transfer of a 
complicated modern weapons system generally requires years of lead time 
before the capability is fully in place. Each new system, moreover, 
demands a U.S. commitment for continuing logistical and technical 
support in order to remain effective. Decisions on the release of arms 
made without proper consideration of the long-term impact both on the 
situation in the Taiwan Strait and on the region as a whole would be 
dangerous and irresponsible. 
 
The Stakes 
 
If armed conflict were actually to break out in the Taiwan Strait, the 
impact on Taiwan, the P.R.C. and, indeed, the region would be extremely 
serious. The peaceful, stable environment that has prevailed in the 
Taiwan Strait since the establishment of our current China policy in 
1979 has promoted progress and prosperity on both sides of the Taiwan 
Strait. The benefits to Taiwan and the P.R.C. have been obvious. The 
shift from the earlier belligerent climate in the Strait to a peaceful 
and stable one has permitted the realization of Taiwan's economic 
miracle and has had a direct impact on Taiwan's positive political 
transformation. Taiwan is now a world-class economic power, and the 
March presidential elections will cap Taiwan's transition to democracy. 
 
The P.R.C. has enjoyed a positive relationship with the United States 
and other Western countries that has allowed it to carry out the program 
of reform and opening to the outside world that has propelled China 
toward becoming an economic power. Taiwan capital--over $20 billion--has 
fueled a significant part of China's economic progress, large numbers of 
Taiwan residents have visited China, and the mainland has become one of 
Taiwan's largest export markets. All of these achievements would be 
immediately put at risk in the event of conflict in the Strait. 
 
Conflict would also be costly to the United States and to our friends 
and allies in the region. Taiwan is an important economic actor 
throughout East Asia. It is located along one of the main sea lanes in 
the western Pacific. Any confrontation between the P.R.C. and Taiwan, 
however limited in scale or scope, would destabilize the military 
balance in East Asia and constrict the commerce and shipping which is 
the economic life-blood of the region. It would force other countries in 
the region to re-evaluate their own defense policies, possibly fueling 
an arms race with unforeseeable consequences. It would seriously affect 
the tens of thousands of Americans who live and work in Taiwan and the 
P.R.C. Relations between the U.S. and the P.R.C. would suffer damage 
regardless of the specific reaction chosen by the President in 
consultation with Congress. For all these reasons, we are firmly 
determined to maintain the balanced policy which is best designed to 
avoid conflict in the area. 
 
What would the U.S. do if commitments to peaceful settlement appeared to 
weaken, if hostilities appeared more likely? In this unfortunate 
circumstance, which neither side seeks, the Administration would 
immediately meet its obligations under the TRA to consult with the 
Congress on an appropriate response. Circumstances leading to this 
situation would be important in determining our response: What caused 
the breakdown? Both sides have a responsibility to act in ways that 
promote stability and avoid needless provocation. But I hardly need 
remind this committee that the people of the United States feel strongly 
about the ability of the people of Taiwan to determine their future 
peacefully. This sentiment must not be underestimated. 
 
The Challenge 
 
Our policy must be consistent and must be carefully designed to 
encourage both sides to find a peaceful and durable solution. As always, 
our own national interest must be the guiding principle to our policy. 
 
In this regard, we will continue to make clear to the P.R.C. through 
diplomatic and other channels that any attempt to resolve the Taiwan 
question through other than peaceful means would seriously affect the 
interests of the United States. This position comprises a fundamental 
premise that underlies our policy: that the P.R.C. will pursue a 
peaceful settlement. Over the past months and, indeed, recent days, we 
have made clear in our diplomatic dialogue with Beijing our deep concern 
over exercises and the dangers of escalation. We also have used and will 
continue to use our military-to-military relationship with the P.R.C. to 
communicate these concerns directly to PLA leaders. 
 
We must, though, avoid unwarranted actions that could further add to 
tensions. We should maintain our present prudent and effective policy of 
arms sales, within the framework of the TRA and in conformity to the 
1982 joint communique. We have an enormous stake in preserving stability 
in Asia and maintaining a productive relationship with the P.R.C. We 
will continue to engage the Chinese Government on issues of mutual 
interest and encourage the P.R.C.'s positive participation in the 
international community. We seek engagement, not confrontation. We 
expect the Taiwan authorities as well to avoid any actions which could 
potentially put at risk the interests of all parties concerned. 
 
Taiwan and the P.R.C. must eventually find some sort of common ground, 
if they are to continue to enjoy the peace and prosperity that exists in 
the Strait area today. Both sides need to avoid provocative political or 
military actions that have the potential to destabilize the situation. 
They must together actively seek ways to address their differences 
peacefully. This is the only long-term guarantee of Taiwan's security. 
It is also the only long-term guarantee of peace and stability in East 
Asia. Only through the resumption of positive dialogue directly between 
Beijing and Taipei can the route to a peaceful and lasting settlement be 
found. We understand that the Taiwan authorities are prepared to resume 
cross-Strait talks. The P.R.C. has also indicated its willingness to 
expand ties with Taiwan in a number of areas as long as the Taiwan 
authorities continue to embrace the principle of "one China." We hope 
the two sides will agree as soon as possible to take up again the 
dialogue that was suspended last June. 
 
Mr. Chairman, several administrations of both political parties have 
followed a consistent policy on the subject of today's timely hearing. 
It is a policy that has served the interests of the United States, the 
P.R.C., Taiwan, and regional security and prosperity. We intend to 
pursue this course as outlined in this statement. We call on Beijing and 
Taipei to exercise restraint and resume dialogue looking toward a 
peaceful resolution of the issues between them. And we urge bipartisan 
support in the Congress and Administration that will send a steady 
signal of American purposes and resolve. We will work closely with you 
toward this goal.  
 
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[END DISPATCH VOLUME 7, NUMBER 6]
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