U.S. Department of State
Dispatch Volume 7, Number 5, January 29, 1996
Bureau of Public Affairs

ARTICLES IN THIS ISSUE:  
1. Reducing the Threat of Weapons of Mass Destruction - President 
Clinton, Fact Sheet
2. The State of the Union:  America's World Leadership Role - President 
Clinton 
3. The Wassenaar Arrangement - Lynn E. Davis
4. Treaty Actions  



ARTICLE 1:  

Reducing the Threat of Weapons of Mass Destruction
President Clinton, Fact Sheet
President Clinton

Statement released by the White House, Office of the Press Secretary, 
following Senate ratification of the START II Nuclear Arms Reduction 
Treaty with Russia, Washington, DC, January 26, 1996.

Today, Senate Democrats and Republicans, working together, have 
increased the security of the American people by ratifying the START II 
Nuclear Arms Reduction Treaty with Russia. I applaud this historic step. 
As I stated in my State of the Union address this week, it will make 
every American, every Russian, and people all over the world more 
secure.

START II requires dramatic cuts in the nuclear arsenals of our two 
countries. Together with the START I Treaty, which we put into force in 
December 1994, it will eliminate submarine-, bomber-, and land-based 
missile launchers that carried more than 14,000 warheads--two-thirds of 
the nuclear arsenal the United States and the former Soviet Union 
maintained at the height of the Cold War. START II also will eliminate 
the most destabilizing type of nuclear weapon--the multiple-warhead 
ICBM. 

Starting with President Nixon, six American presidents from both parties 
have worked to control and reduce the number of nuclear weapons. 
President Bush negotiated START II and submitted it to the Senate in 
January 1993. I am proud that we have seized the opportunity presented 
by the end of the Cold War to take this big step back from the nuclear 
precipice.

As President, my most basic duty is to protect the security of the 
American people. That is why I have made reducing the nuclear threat one 
of my highest priorities.

As a result, for the first time since the dawn of the nuclear age, there 
are no Russian missiles pointed at our people. We convinced Ukraine, 
Belarus, and Kazakstan to give up the nuclear weapons left on their land 
when the Soviet Union broke up. We persuaded North Korea to freeze its 
dangerous nuclear weapons program under international monitoring. We are 
working with countries around the world to safeguard and destroy nuclear 
weapons and materials--so that they don't fall into the hands of 
terrorists or criminals. We led global efforts to win the indefinite 
extension of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty which bans the spread 
of nuclear weapons to states that do not have them.

Now, as I urged in the State of the Union address, we must do even more 
to give the American people real, lasting security. We can end the race 
to create new nuclear weapons by signing a truly comprehensive nuclear 
test ban treaty this year. We can outlaw poison gas forever if the 
Senate ratifies the Chemical Weapons Convention this year. We can take 
the fight to terrorists--who would acquire terrible weapons of mass 
destruction--if Congress finally passes legislation I proposed after the 
Oklahoma City bombing to give American law enforcement an even stronger 
arsenal.

Working together, I believe we can and we will take all these important 
steps to increase the security of the American people.


Fact Sheet:  Treaty on the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic 
Offensive Arms (START II)

What is START II?

The START II Treaty is a bilateral treaty negotiated by the United 
States and Russia during 1991 and 1992. It was signed by Presidents Bush 
and Yeltsin on January 3, 1993.

START II builds on the foundation of START I to create an equitable and 
effectively verifiable agreement that reduces the number of strategic 
delivery vehicles (ballistic missiles and heavy bombers) and the number 
of warheads deployed on them. Overall strategic forces will be reduced 
by 5,000 warheads in addition to the 9,000 warheads being reduced under 
START I.

Key Provisions of START II

Because START II builds upon the START I Treaty, START I remains in 
effect. START II will remain in force throughout the duration of START 
I, which has a 15-year duration and can be extended for successive 5-
year periods by agreement among the parties to the treaty.

START II sets equal ceilings on the number of strategic nuclear weapons 
that each party may deploy. The final ceilings will be reached in two 
phases. Phase One is to be completed seven years after entry into force 
of the START I Treaty, which was on December 5, 1994. Phase Two is to be 
completed by 2003. However, Phase Two may be completed by the end of 
2000 if the United States is able to provide financial assistance for 
the elimination of strategic offensive arms in Russia.

By the end of the first phase, each party must have reduced the total 
number of its deployed strategic warheads to 3,800-4,250. This includes 
warheads on deployed intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), 
warheads on submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and the 
warheads carried on heavy bombers with nuclear missions. No more than 
1,200 warheads may be on deployed ICBMs with multiple reentry vehicles 
(MIRVs); no more than 2,160 on deployed SLBMs; and no more than 650 may 
be on deployed heavy ICBMs.

By the end of the second and final phase, each party must have reduced 
the total number of its deployed strategic warheads to 3,000-3,500. Of 
those, none may be on MIRVed ICBMs, including heavy ICBMs. No MIRVed 
ICBMs will be deployed by the end of the second phase. No more than 
1,700-1,750 warheads may be on deployed SLBMs. There will be no 
prohibition on MIRVed SLBMs.

Downloading

START II allows for a reduction in the number of warheads on certain 
existing MIRVed ballistic missiles. This is called "downloading." Such 
downloading will be permitted in a carefully structured fashion, which 
is a slight variation from the rules agreed in START I.

 -- Each side will be able to download two existing types of ballistic 
missiles by up to four warheads each.
 -- No more than 105 ICBMs of one of those types may be downloaded by up 
to five warheads each. Such an ICBM may be deployed only in silos in 
which it was deployed at the time the two START treaties were signed.

Thus, the three-warhead U.S. Minuteman III ICBM, the four-warhead 
Russian SS-17 ICBM, and 105 of the six-warhead Russian SS-19 ICBMs may 
be downloaded to a single warhead, to comply with the requirement to 
eliminate all MIRVed ICBMs.

The Russian SS-18 heavy ICBM and launchers for the SS-24 ICBM would be 
destroyed. SS-24 ICBMs would be eliminated in accordance with START 
procedures.

Missile-System Elimination

In START I, deployed SLBMs and most deployed ICBMs may be removed from 
accountability either by destroying their launchers or, with the 
exception tion of SS-18 silos, by converting the launcher so that it is 
only capable of launching another type of missile. Moreover, 154 SS-18 
silos must be eliminated through destruction under START I.

Under START II, those rules will continue to apply but with the major 
exception of the SS-18. Ninety SS-18 silos may be converted to launch a 
single-warhead ICBM, which Russia has said will be a variant of the SS-
25. The START II Treaty provisions specify conversion procedures which 
are subject to inspection and which are virtually irreversible without 
destroying the silo.

In addition to the elimination or conversion of SS-18 silo launchers, 
all SS-18 ICBMs, whether deployed or non-deployed, must be eliminated no 
later than January 1, 2003. This is a major improvement on START I, 
which did not require the destruction of silo-based missiles. Moreover, 
this provision achieves the long-standing U.S. goal of totally 
eliminating heavy ICBMs.

Heavy Bombers

Under START II, heavy bombers will be attributed as carrying the actual 
number of weapons--whether long-range air-launched cruise missiles 
(ALCMs), short-range missiles, or gravity bombs--for which they are 
equipped. This number is specified in the treaty's Memorandum of 
Attribution and is subject to confirmation by a one-time exhibition of 
the bombers and by on-site inspections.

This attribution formula is another improvement over START I. Under 
START I, the first 150 U.S. heavy bombers equipped to carry long-range 
ALCMs are attributed with 10 warheads; each bomber in excess of the 150 
would be attributed with the actual number of long-range ALCMs it is 
equipped to carry. For the former Soviet Union, the first 150 heavy 
bombers are attributed with eight warheads; each heavy bomber in excess 
of 150 would be attributed with the number of long-range ALCMs it is 
equipped to carry. For both parties, all heavy bombers equipped to carry 
nuclear weapons other than long-range ALCMs are attributed with one 
warhead each.

Up to 100 heavy bombers that were equipped for nuclear arms other than 
long-range ALCMs may be reoriented to a conventional role and exempted 
from accountability under START II. Such bombers will be based 
separately from heavy bombers equipped to carry nuclear weapons, they 
will be used only for non-nuclear missions, and they must have 
observable features that differentiate them from nuclear-equipped heavy 
bombers of the same type. If these heavy bombers are returned to a 
nuclear role, which is permitted, they will become accountable under 
START II and may not be returned to their exempted status.

Verification

The comprehensive, intrusive START I verification regime also will apply 
to START II. Additionally, START II has new verification measures. These 
include the following:  

 -- Observation of the conversion of SS-18 silos; 
 -- Observation of SS-18 eliminations; 
 -- Exhibitions of heavy bombers to allow confirmation of capacity; and 
 -- Exhibition of reoriented bombers to confirm their observable 
differences.

Moreover, re-entry vehicle inspections (RVOSI) will allow inspectors 
visual access to the front ends of ICBMs and SLBMs to verify that the 
number of warheads attributed to those systems match the number deployed 
on them. 

(###)



ARTICLE 2:  

The State of the Union:  America's World Leadership Role
Excerpt from the State of the Union Address by President Clinton, 
Washington, DC, January 23, 1996.

. . . Our sixth challenge is to maintain America's leadership in the 
fight for freedom and peace throughout the world. Because of American 
leadership, more people than ever before live free and at peace, and 
Americans have known 50 years of prosperity and security. 

We owe thanks especially to our veterans of World War II. I would like 
to say to Senator Bob Dole and to all others in this Chamber who fought 
in World War II, and to all others on both sides of the aisle who have 
fought bravely in all our conflicts since:  I salute your service and so 
do the American people. 

All over the world, even after the Cold War, people still look to us and 
trust us to help them seek the blessings of peace and freedom. But as 
the Cold War fades into memory, voices of isolation say America should 
retreat from its responsibilities. I say they are wrong.

The threats we face today as Americans respect no nation's borders. 
Think of them:  terrorism, the spread of weapons of mass destruction, 
organized crime, drug trafficking, ethnic and religious hatred, 
aggression by rogue states, environmental degradation. If we fail to 
address these threats today, we will suffer the consequences for all our 
tomorrows. 

Of course, we can't be everywhere. Of course, we can't do everything. 
But where our interests and our values are at stake and where we can 
make a difference, America must lead. We must not be isolationist. We 
must not be the world's policeman, but we can and should be the world's 
very best peacemaker. 

By keeping our military strong, by using diplomacy where we can and 
force where we must, by working with others to share the risk and the 
cost of our efforts, America is making a difference for people here and 
around the world. For the first time since the dawn of the nuclear age, 
there is not a single Russian missile pointed at America's children. 
North Korea has now frozen its dangerous nuclear weapons program. In 
Haiti, the dictators are gone, democracy has a new day,  and the flow of 
desperate refugees to our shores has subsided. Through tougher trade 
deals for America--more than 80 of them--we have opened markets abroad, 
and now exports are at an all-time high, growing faster than imports and 
creating good American jobs. 

We stood with those taking risks for peace--in Northern Ireland, where 
Catholic and Protestant children now tell their parents that violence 
must never return; in the Middle East, where Arabs and Jews who once 
seemed destined to fight forever now share knowledge and resources and 
even dreams. 

And we stood up for peace in Bosnia. Remember the skeletal prisoners, 
the mass graves, the campaign to rape and torture, the endless lines of 
refugees, the threat of a spreading war. All these threats, all these 
horrors have now begun to give way to the promise of peace. Now, our 
troops and a strong NATO, together with our new partners from Central 
Europe and elsewhere, are helping that peace take hold. 

As all of you know, I was just there with a bipartisan congressional 
group, and I was so proud not only of what our troops were doing but of 
the pride they evidenced in what they were doing. They know what 
America's mission in this world is, and they are proud to be carrying it 
out. 

Through these efforts, we have enhanced the security of the American 
people. But make no mistake about it:  Important challenges remain. 

The START II Treaty with Russia will cut our nuclear stockpiles by 
another 25%. I urge the Senate to ratify it now. We must end the race to 
create new nuclear weapons by signing a truly comprehensive nuclear test 
ban treaty this year. As we remember what happened in the Japanese 
subway, we can outlaw poison gas forever if the Senate ratifies the 
Chemical Weapons Convention this year. We can intensify the fight 
against terrorists and organized criminals at home and abroad if 
Congress now passes the anti-terrorism legislation I proposed after the 
Oklahoma City bombing. We can help more people move from hatred to hope 
all across the world in our own interest if Congress gives us the means 
to remain the world's leader for peace. . . 

(###)



ARTICLE 3:  

The Wassenaar Arrangement 
Lynn E. Davis, Under Secretary for Arms Control and International 
Security Affairs
Address at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, 
DC, January 23, 1996

In December 1995, 28 governments agreed to establish a new international 
regime to increase transparency and responsibility for the global market 
in conventional arms and dual-use goods and technologies. The official 
name of the regime is "The Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for 
Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies"--Wassenaar being 
the town outside The Hague where five rounds of negotiations took place 
over the past two years.   

The Wassenaar Arrangement is just an initial international framework 
that will need to be elaborated and defined more fully. But it already 
represents some notable achievements for U.S. foreign policy. For the 
first time, there is a global mechanism for controlling transfers of 
conventional armaments and a venue in which governments can consider 
collectively the implications of various transfers on their 
international and regional security interests. In view of the close 
association between advanced technologies--including production 
technologies--and modern battlefield weapons, sensitive dual-use 
commodities will receive the same measure of scrutiny as do arms. 

Moreover, the preliminary scope of international support for this 
enterprise is already quite broad. Our friends and allies in Europe and 
in the Pacific comprise the core membership, but Russia and the four 
Visegrad states of Central Europe have also joined as full members.  

The composition and the goals of the Wassenaar Arrangement are tailored 
to respond to the new security threats of the post-Cold War world and 
will close a critical gap in the international control mechanisms, which 
have concentrated on preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction and their delivery systems. While the Wassenaar Arrangement 
will not duplicate the other non-proliferation mechanisms, it will, 
through a variety of means, complement and, where necessary, reinforce 
them. 

Restraint in Trade to Pariahs 

Even before its establishment, the regime has served to attract 
countries worldwide wishing to join the first post-Cold War security 
framework. To meet the membership criteria, they have taken steps to 
adhere to the policies of the other non-proliferation regimes and to 
establish effective export controls. Most importantly, all of the 
participating countries currently maintain national policies to prevent 
transfers of arms and sensitive technologies for military purposes to 
the four pariah countries--Iran, Iraq, Libya, and North Korea. This is a 
critical requirement that the United States insisted on and will 
continue to insist on in examining the credentials of new members. 

The United States has sought and obtained commitments through sensitive, 
high-level negotiations that produced bilateral agreements with Russia 
and other prospective members to close down their arms sales to Iran and 
forego any new contracts involving arms and arms-related technologies.   
By requiring responsible arms transfer policies as a condition for 
membership, the new regime furthers our international security interests 
and the security of long-standing allies, such   as Israel and South 
Korea, who live in dangerous neighborhoods. 

Further, the Wassenaar Arrangement calls for enhancing cooperation among 
the participants to prevent the acquisition of armaments and sensitive 
dual-use items for military end-uses, if the situation in a region or 
the behavior of a state is or becomes a cause for serious concern to the 
participating states. The transparency provisions in the new arrangement 
and our own national technical means will give us confidence that 
current policies of restraint toward the pariah countries are 
continuing, and that future transfer policies remain consistent with 
this goal. 

Does this mean that we have bridged our differences with Europe over 
high-technology sales to Iran? Unfortunately, we continue to have 
serious concerns with European policy in this area. What we have 
obtained to date is a growing recognition that certain levels of high-
technology trade, even when intended for civilian use, should not be 
carried on in secrecy.  

When it comes to dangerous regimes like Iran, international 
transparency--and accountability--are necessary. The Wassenaar 
Arrangement will help advance that proposition through the initial 
information-sharing measures. But those measures need to go much further 
before we can say there are effective international guide
lines in place that will prevent future tyrants from embarking upon the 
kind of military build-up that Saddam Hussein undertook before invading 
Kuwait. 

Preventing Destabilizing Accumulations of Arms 

Indeed, the Gulf War has been a critical factor shaping U.S. negotiating 
positions because it serves as a stark reminder of the dangers to 
international peace and security that can result from the destabilizing 
accumulation of conventional weapons and the indiscriminate export of 
arms and sensitive dual-use technologies. The case of Iraq showed us 
that often the only constraint on a state's ability to obtain dangerous 
arms is its ability to pay for them. Suppliers from both East and West, 
including our allies and American firms, contributed in different ways 
to Saddam Hussein's multi-billion-dollar military build-up. 

How will this arrangement begin to help us prevent future Iraqs? During 
plenary discussions and working-group meetings, governments will share 
intelligence on potential threats to international and regional peace 
and stability. They will look particularly at clandestine projects and 
dubious acquisition trends. They will also exchange specific information 
on a regular basis about global transfers to non-participating countries 
of certain sensitive dual-use goods and technologies. More than 100 of 
these have been selected for this information sharing, including machine 
tools, computers, and telecommunications. The details   of this special 
sensitive list will be published shortly.   

Governments have agreed to notify denials of items on this list to non-
participating states promptly on an individual, case-by-case basis and 
of transfers on an aggregate and periodic basis. They will also require 
notification of any transfers of any sensitive list item previously 
denied by another member state for an essentially identical transaction. 

This transparency in the transfer of sensitive dual-use goods and 
technologies will help the new regime identify acquisition patterns that 
suggest emerging threats to regional and international peace. 
Transparency also allows countries to alert one another to export 
requests that warranted denials. This will help foster common and 
consistent export policies, while eliminating inadvertent undercuts by 
participants. Although all export decisions will remain fundamentally at 
the discretion of each country, transparency will enhance responsibility 
in arms transfers because countries will only go forward with those 
transfers that they are prepared to defend to the others in the 
arrangement. 

We will obtain similar benefits from the transparency regime on the arms 
side. We will provide information on arms transfers on a weapons list 
that initially will be composed of the categories of major weapons 
systems used for the CFE Treaty and the UN Arms Register. The 
information will come twice a year and include more details than 
previously available, such as descriptions of the model and type of all 
weapons except for missiles. We have agreed as a priority to expand and 
redefine that list to cover more comprehensively the weapons of modern 
warfare. In the cases of both armaments and dual-use items, governments 
will have the ability to request additional information on individual 
transfers through diplomatic channels. 

In addition, the Wassenaar Arrangement is expected to provide for more 
intensive consultations and more intrusive information sharing among six 
major weapons suppliers--the U.S., the United Kingdom, Russia, France, 
Germany, and Italy. 

From the U.S. perspective, we hope that this group will provide the 
means of defining common approaches to trade with regions of potential 
instability, such as the Middle East and South Asia. It could also 
include steps to enhance stability by preventing the introduction of 
sophisticated weaponry in certain parts of the world, where it currently 
does not exist. We have made some specific proposals to the other five 
suppliers concerning timely notification of shipments of major weapons 
and the development of measures to address situations of particular 
concern. 

National Controls 

As is the case for the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the Australia Group, and 
the Missile Technology Control Regime, the Wassenaar Arrangement is 
based on national controls. It is not directed against any state or 
group of states and will not impede bona fide transactions. Nor will it 
interfere with the rights of states to acquire legitimate means with 
which to defend themselves. Rather, it is focused on the behavior of 
states and especially on dangerous behavior.  

Participants have agreed to control globally all items set forth on a 
basic list of dual-use goods and technologies and on a munitions list, 
with the objective of preventing unauthorized transfers or retransfers 
of these items. The new arrangement thus will not involve license-free 
trade among the participants. Governments have also agreed to exercise 
extreme vigilance in trade on a very sensitive list of dual-use goods 
and technologies. 

Controls of items on the various lists will be implemented through each 
of the participating country's laws and regulations. In the U.S., most 
of the items covered under this arrangement are already subject to U.S. 
licensing requirements. Any modifications to U.S. regulations necessary 
to carry out the requirements of the arrangement will be published in 
the coming months.  

Next Steps  

The first plenary meeting of the Wassenaar Arrangement is slated for 
early April in Vienna. Vienna will be the home base for the regime and 
the site of a small secretariat to conduct day-to-day work. Member 
governments will use the intervening months to make preparations at the 
national level necessary to carry out the understandings they have 
reached and to work out the modalities for sharing information on 
specific transfers. 

The Wassenaar Arrangement will be open on a global and non-
discriminatory basis to all countries meeting the agreed membership 
criteria. There is a line forming of countries seeking membership, for 
example, Argentina, South Korea, Romania, Bulgaria, and Ukraine. We hope 
that some of these countries will have met the criteria by the time of 
the April plenary. 

Perspective on the Arrangement 

Although the COCOM parties were responsible for initiating development 
of the Wassenaar Arrangement, the successor regime differs significantly 
in its goals and procedures, given the changed strategic environment. 
COCOM was designed as an institution of the Cold War to respond to the 
threat posed by the Soviet Union and its allies. The West sought to 
maintain its qualitative edge on the battlefield by a virtual 
prohibition on sales of arms to communist countries and by controlling 
the export of strategic products and technical data.  

As the original threats of the Cold War diminished, new threats to 
global security began to emerge, including the spread of weapons of mass 
destruction and their delivery systems. This led the U.S. and other 
countries to develop worldwide non-proliferation regimes, such as the 
Nuclear Suppliers Group, the Missile Technology Control Regime, and the 
Australia Group. The Wassenaar Arrangement extends and complements this 
development. It begins, as did these other regimes, with the initial 
elements essential to getting underway the practical work--frameworks, 
basic guidelines, and lists. 

Although we are pleased that the regime will be up and running at the 
April plenary, I want to note, quite frankly, that the arrangement falls 
short of U.S. goals in some important areas. We need to go further. 

Americans hold as a fundamental principle the importance of promoting 
international responsibility in arms transfers and in public 
accountability for these transfers. Not all participants in this 
arrangement share this view, and some have consistently resisted 
comprehensive information sharing--even in diplomatic channels. 
Specifically , the United States found itself alone in supporting prior 
notification of transfers. 

The United States also did not win support for focusing the information 
sharing on regions of instability and where the security risks are 
greatest, because participants raised political objections to 
"targeting" specific regions or countries. Instead, we will begin with a 
global exchange. As a result, we will share and obtain not only all of 
the information that we would have available through a regional focus, 
but additional information as well.  

That said, the Wassenaar Arrangement provides an initial international 
framework to respond to the critical security threats of the post-Cold 
War world and to promote the overall non-proliferation and conventional 
arms transfer policies of the Clinton Administration. The realization of 
a broadly based multilateral arrangement covering conventional arms and 
dual-use commodities has been possible only through strong American 
leadership--leadership which must continue to ensure the further 
development of more specific measures in the new regime to meet the 
risks to international peace and stability around the world. 

(###)



ARTICLE 4:

Treaty Actions

Multilateral

Arbitration 
Convention on the recognition  and enforcement of foreign arbitral 
awards. Done at New York June 10, 1958. Entered into force June 7, 1959; 
for the U.S. Dec. 29, 1970. TIAS 6997; 21 UST 2517. 
Accession:  Vietnam, Sept. 12, 1995 (footnote1). 

Chemical Weapons 
Convention on the prohibition of the development, production, 
stockpiling, and use of chemical weapons and on their destruction, with 
annexes. Done at Paris Jan. 13, 1993. [Senate] Treaty Doc. 103-21 
(footnote 2). 
Signature:  Uzbekistan, Nov. 24, 1995. 
Ratifications:  Georgia, Nov. 27, 1995; Italy, Dec. 8, 1995; Namibia, 
Nov. 27, 1995.

Children
Convention on the protection of children and cooperation in respect of 
intercountry adoption. Done at The Hague May 29, 1993. Entered into 
force May 1, 1995 (footnote 2). 
Ratification:  Costa Rica, Oct. 30, 1995. 

Genocide
Convention on the prevention   and punishment of the crime of genocide. 
Adopted by the UN General Assembly at Paris Dec. 9, 1948. Entered into 
force Jan. 12, 1951; for the U.S. Feb. 23, 1989. Accession:  Uganda, 
Nov. 14, 1995. 

Human Rights 
International covenant on civil and political rights. Adopted by the UN 
General Assembly Dec. 16, 1966. Entered into force Mar. 23, 1976; for 
the U.S Sept. 8, 1992. Accession:  Uzbekistan, Sept. 28, 1995. 

Judicial Procedure
Convention on laundering, search, seizure, and confiscation of the 
proceeds from crime. Done at Strasbourg Nov. 8, 1990. Entered into force 
Sept. 1, 1993 (footnote 2). Signature:  San Marino, Nov. 16, 1995.

Narcotics
United Nations convention against illicit traffic in narcotic drugs and 
psychotropic substances, with annex and final act. Done at Vienna Dec. 
20, 1988. Entered into force Nov. 11, 1990. [Senate] Treaty Doc. 101-4. 
Accession:  Haiti, Sept. 18, 1995.

North Atlantic Treaty
Protocol on the status of International Military Headquarters. Signed at 
Paris Aug. 28, 1952. Entered into force Apr. 10, 1954. TIAS 2978; 5 UST 
870.
Accession:  Spain, Aug. 10, 1995. 

NATO Partnership for Peace. Issued by the heads of state and government 
participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council held at NATO 
Headquarters, Brussels, Jan. 10-11, 1994 footnote 3). Signatures:  
Belgium, Aug. 11, 1995; Georgia, July 18, 1995; Germany, July 20, 1995; 
Hungary, June 21, 1995; Norway, June 19, 1995; Slovakia, Aug. 11, 1995; 
Slovenia, July 31, 1995; United States, June 19, 1995. 
Ratification:  Slovakia, Dec. 13, 1995. 

Agreement to amend the Protocol of Signature to the agreement of Aug. 3, 
1959, as amended by agreements of Oct. 21, 1971 and May 18, 1981, to 
supplement the agreement between the parties to the North Atlantic 
Treaty regarding the status of their forces with respect to foreign 
forces stationed in the Federal Republic of Germany. Signed at Bonn May 
16, 1994 (footnote 3). 
Approval:  Netherlands, Apr. 17, 1995.

Agreement on the status of missions and representatives of third states 
to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Done at Brussels Sept. 14, 
1994 (footnote 3). Approval:  United States, Aug. 9, 1995. 

Agreement among the states parties to the North Atlantic Treaty and 
other states participating in the Partnership for Peace regarding the 
status of their forces. Done at Brussels June 19, 1995 (footnote 3). 
Signature:  Estonia, Aug. 31, 1995. 
Approval:  United States, Aug. 9, 1995. 

Additional protocol to the agreement among the states parties to the 
North Atlantic Treaty and the other states participating in the 
Partnership for Peace regarding the status of their forces. Done at 
Brussels June 19, 1995 (footnote 3). 
Signatures:  Belgium, Aug. 11, 1995; Estonia,  Aug. 31, 1995; Georgia, 
July 18, 1995; Germany, July 20, 1995; Hungary, June 21, 1995; Norway, 
June 19, 1995; Slovakia, Aug. 11, 1995; Slovenia, July 31, 1995. 

Patents
Strasbourg agreement concerning the international patent classification. 
Done at Strasbourg Mar. 24, 1971. Entered into force Oct. 7, 1975. TIAS 
8140; 26 UST 1793. 
Accession:  Cuba, Nov. 9, 1995 (footnote 1).

International convention for the protection of new varieties of plants 
of Dec. 2, 1961, as revised. Done at Geneva Oct. 23, 1978. Entered into 
force Nov. 8, 1981. TIAS 10199; 33 UST 2703. Accession:  Chile, Dec. 5, 
1995. 

Racial Discrimination
International convention on the elimination of all forms of racial 
discrimination. Adopted by the UN General Assembly Dec. 21, 1965. 
Entered into force Jan. 4, 1969; for the U.S. Nov. 20, 1994. [Senate] 
Ex. C, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 
Accession:  Japan, Dec. 15, 1995.

Red Cross 
Protocol additional to the Geneva conventions of Aug. 12, 1949, and 
relating to the protection of victims of international armed conflicts 
(Protocol I), with annexes. Done at Geneva June 8, 1977. Entered into 
force Dec. 7, 1978 (footnote 2). 
Accession:  Micronesia, Sept. 19, 1995. 
Ratification:  Panama, Sept. 18, 1995. 

Protocol additional to the Geneva conventions of Aug. 12, 1949, and 
relating to the protection of victims of non-international armed 
conflicts (Protocol II). Done at Geneva June 8, 1977. Entered into force 
Dec. 7, 1978 (footnote 2). 
Accessions:  Colombia, Aug. 14, 1995; Micronesia, Sept. 19, 1995.
Ratification:  Panama, Sept. 18, 1995.

Slave Trade 
Convention to suppress the slave trade and slavery. Concluded at Geneva 
Sept. 25, 1926. Entered into force Mar. 9, 1927; for the U.S. Mar. 21, 
1929. TS 778; 46 Stat. 2183. 

Protocol amending the slavery convention signed at Geneva on Sept. 25, 
1926, and annex. Done at New York Dec. 7, 1953. Entered into force Dec. 
7, 1953 for the protocol; July 7, 1955 for annex to protocol; for the 
U.S. Mar. 7, 1956. TIAS 3532; 7 UST 479. 

Supplementary convention on   the abolition of slavery, the slave trade, 
and institutions and practices similar to slavery. Done at Geneva Sept. 
7, 1956. Entered into force Apr. 30, 1957; for the U.S. Dec. 6, 1967. 
TIAS 6418;   18 UST 3201. 
Accession:  Chile, June 20, 1995.

Terrorism
Convention on the prevention and punishment of crimes against 
internationally protected persons, including diplomatic agents. Adopted 
by the UN General Assembly Dec. 14, 1973. Entered into force Feb. 20, 
1977. TIAS 8532; 28 UST 1975.
Accession:  Portugal, Sept. 11, 1995 (footnote 4).

Convention on the safety of United Nations and associated personnel. 
Done at New York Dec. 9, 19942. 
Signatures:  Czech Republic, Dec. 27, 1995; Slovakia, Dec. 28, 1995; 
United Kingdom, Dec. 19, 1995; Uruguay, Nov. 17, 1995.

Torture
Convention against torture and other cruel, inhuman, or degrading 
treatment or punishment. Adopted by the UN General Assembly   Dec. 10, 
1984. Entered into force June 26, 1987; for the U.S. Nov. 20, 1994. 
[Senate] Treaty Doc. 100-20.
Accession:  Moldova, Nov. 28, 1995.

Treaties
Vienna convention on the law of treaties, with annex. Done at Vienna May 
23, 1969. Entered into force Jan. 27, 1980 (footnote 2).
Accessions:  Turkmenistan, Jan. 4, 1996; Uzbekistan, July 12, 1995.

Weapons, Conventional Convention on prohibitions or restrictions on the 
use of certain conventional weapons which may be deemed to be 
excessively injurious or to have indiscriminate effects, with annexed 
protocols. Adopted at Geneva Oct. 10, 1980. Entered into force Dec. 2, 
1983; for the U.S. Sept. 24, 1995. [Senate] Treaty Doc. 103-25. 

Protocol on non-detectable fragments (Protocol I) to the convention on 
prohibitions or restrictions on the use of certain conventional weapons 
which may be deemed to be excessively injurious or to have 
indiscriminate effects. Adopted at Geneva Oct. 10, 1980. Entered into 
force Dec. 2, 1983; for the U.S. Sept. 24, 1995. [Senate] Treaty Doc. 
103-25.

Protocol on prohibitions or restrictions on the use of mines, booby-
traps, and other devices (Protocol II) to the convention on prohibitions 
or restrictions on the use of certain conventional weapons which may be 
deemed to be excessively injurious or to have indiscriminate effects. 
Adopted at Geneva Oct. 10, 1980. Entered into force Dec. 2, 1983; for 
the U.S. Sept. 24, 1995. [Senate] Treaty Doc. 103-25. 

Protocol on prohibitions or restrictions on the use of incendiary 
weapons (Protocol III) to the convention on prohibitions or restrictions 
on the use of certain conventional weapons which may be deemed to be 
excessively injurious or to have indiscriminate   effects. Adopted at 
Geneva Oct. 10, 1980. Entered into force Dec. 2, 1983 (footnote 2). 
Ratifications:  Argentina, Oct. 2, 1995; Romania, July 26, 1995. 
Accessions:  Brazil, Oct. 3, 1995; Malta, June 26, 1995.

Women
Convention on the elimination of all forms of discrimination against 
women. Adopted by the UN General Assembly Dec. 18, 1979. Entered into 
force Sept. 3, 1981(footnote 2). 
Signature:  Sao Tome and Principe, Oct. 31, 1995. 
Accessions:  Chad, June 9, 1995; Singapore, Oct. 5, 1995. 

Bilateral

Albania
Security agreement. Signed at Washington Oct. 16, 1995. Entered into 
force Oct. 16, 1995.

Australia
Agreement concerning the establishment of certain mutual defense 
commitments. Effected by exchange of notes at Sydney and Canberra Dec. 
1, 1995. Entered into force Dec. 1, 1995.

Cote d'Ivoire 
Agreement extending the agreement of Mar. 13, 1990, concerning a 
cooperative project to study AIDS in Cote d'Ivoire. Signed at Atlanta 
and Abidjan Aug. 23 and Dec. 2, 1995. Entered into force Dec. 2, 1995; 
effective Mar. 13, 1995. 

Czech Republic 
Agreement extending the schedule and annex to the air transport 
agreement of June 29, 1987, as amended and extended (TIAS 11162, 11838, 
11915). Effected by exchange of notes at Prague Oct. 25 and 27, 1995. 
Entered into force Oct. 27, 1995, effective Nov. 1, 1995. 

Germany
Arrangement for the exchange of information and cooperation in nuclear 
safety matters, with annexes. Signed at Berlin Oct. 19, 1995. Entered 
into force Oct. 19, 1995. 

Israel 
Agreement amending the contingency implementing arrangements of Oct. 17, 
1980 (TIAS 9908; 32 UST 3667), for the memorandum of agreement of June 
22, 1979, concerning an oil supply arrangement (TIAS 9533; 30 UST 5994). 
Effected by exchange of notes at Tel Aviv and Jerusalem June 21 and 27, 
1995. Entered into force June 27, 1995.

Korea 
Agreement concerning special measures relating to Article IV of the 
mutual defense treaty regarding facilities and areas and the status of 
United States Armed Forces in the Republic of Korea. Signed at Seoul 
Nov. 24, 1995. Entered into force Jan. 1, 1996.

Latvia
Agreement concerning economic, technical, and related assistance. Signed 
at Riga Dec. 20, 1995. Enters into force when each party notifies the 
other in writing that its legal requirements for entry into force have 
been fulfilled. 

Agreement extending the agreement of Apr. 8, 1993, concerning fisheries 
off the coasts of the United States. Effected by exchange of notes at 
Riga Mar. 28 and Apr. 4, 1995. Entered into force Nov. 24, 1995.

Nicaragua 
Agreement regarding the consolidation and rescheduling of certain debts 
owed to, guaranteed by, or insured by the United States Government and 
its agencies, with annexes. Signed  at Managua Aug. 28, 1995. Entered 
into force Nov. 1, 1995.

Peru
Agreement for the transmission and payment of postal money orders. 
Signed at Washington and Lima Aug. 21 and Sept. 8, 1995. Entered into 
force Dec. 1, 1995.

Agreement concerning the status of certain United States military 
personnel who may serve for a period of less than ninety days at the 
ground-based radar site at Yurimaguas, and at other locations as agreed 
by the Peruvian Air Force. Effected by exchange of notes at Lima Nov. 7, 
1995. Entered into force Nov. 7, 1995. 

Philippines
Protocol amending and supplementing the agreement of Sept. 16, 1982, as 
amended, concerning air transport services. Signed at Manila Nov. 20, 
1995. Entered into force Nov. 25, 1995.

Portugal
Convention for the avoidance of double taxation and the prevention of 
fiscal evasion with respect to taxes on income, with protocol. Signed at 
Washington Sept. 6, 1994. Entered into force Dec. 18, 1995. 

Romania
Agreement concerning economic, technical, and related assistance. Signed 
at Bucharest Oct. 24, 1995. Enters into force the first day of the first 
month after the exchange of diplomatic notes confirming that the parties 
have completed their respective internal requirements necessary for the 
entry into force of the agreement.

Russia
Agreement regarding the rescheduling of certain debts owed to or 
guaranteed by the United States Government, with annexes. Signed at 
Washington Oct. 9, 1995. Entered into force Nov. 29, 1995. 

Agreement amending the agreement of Oct. 9, 1995, regarding the 
rescheduling of certain debts owed to or guaranteed by the United States 
Government. Effected by exchange of notes at Moscow Nov. 28 and Dec. 1, 
1995. Entered into force Jan. 2, 1996.

Senegal
Agreement regarding the consolidation, reduction, and rescheduling of 
certain debts owed to, guaranteed by, or insured by the United States 
Government and its agencies, with annexes. Signed at Dakar Aug. 28, 
1995. Entered into force Nov. 1, 1995.

Slovak Republic 
Agreement to treat the agreement of June 19, 1995, among the states 
parties to the North Atlantic Treaty and other states participating in 
the Partnership for Peace regarding the status of their forces as 
binding between the United States and Slovakia. Effected by exchange of 
notes at Bratislava Aug. 2 and 4, 1995. Entered into force Aug. 4. 1995.

Slovenia
Postal money order agreement. Signed at Washington and Ljubljana Sept. 1 
and 21, 1995. Entered into force Feb. 1, 1996. 

South Africa 
Economic, technical, and related assistance agreement. Signed at 
Pretoria Dec. 5, 1995. Entered into force Dec. 5, 1995. 

Framework agreement concerning cooperation in the scientific, 
technological, and environmental fields, with annex. Signed at Pretoria 
Dec. 5, 1995. Enters into force on the date on which each party notifies 
the other in writing through the diplomatic channel of completion of 
domestic, including constitutional, requirements necessary for 
implementation.

Agreement regarding grants under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as 
amended, and the furnishing of defense articles, related training, and 
other defense services from the United States to South Africa. Effected 
by exchange of notes at Pretoria Nov. 8, 1994 and Oct. 24, 1995. Entered 
into force Oct. 24, 1995.

Sri Lanka 
Agreement relating to the employment of dependents of official 
government employees. Effected by exchange of notes at Colombo Dec. 12, 
1995. Entered into force Dec. 12, 1995.

United Kingdom 
Agreement amending the agreement of Nov. 29, 1973, as amended, to 
establish, operate, and maintain lines of communications and ancillary 
facilities in the United Kingdom for use under emergency conditions for 
logistic support of United States Armed Forces stationed in the European 
Command area in furtherance of the objectives of the North Atlantic 
Treaty. Effected by exchange of notes at London Nov. 20 and   Dec. 7, 
1995. Entered into force Dec. 7, 1995. 

Vietnam 
Postal money order agreement. Signed at Hanoi and Washington Nov. 1 and 
Dec. 4, 1995. Entered into force Feb. 1, 1996.

_______

1 With declaration(s). 
2 Not in force for the U.S. 
3 Not in force. 
4 With reservation.  

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[END DISPATCH VOL. 7, NO. 5]
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