U.S.  Department of State
Dispatch Volume 6, Numbers 50, 51, 52
Bureau of Public Affairs

Notice to readers:  The production schedule for Dispatch Magazine was 
disrupted by the federal government furlough that began on December 16, 
1995.  This Dispatch issue, therefore, combines the contents of Volume 
6, issues 50, 51, and 52

1.  Turning From the Horror of War to the Promise of Peace in the 
Balkans - President Clinton
2.  Peace in Bosnia:  A Dividend of American Leadership - President 
3.  NATO:  Reaching Out to New Partners and New Challenges - Secretary 
4.  NATO Foreign and Defense Ministers Hold Meeting on Bosnia - 
Secretary Christopher 
5.  NATO:  Building a New Security Structure for Europe - Secretary 
Christopher, Secretary of Defense Perry 
6.  Working To Engage a Relationship Between Russia and NATO - Secretary 
Christopher, Russian Foreign Minister Kozyrev
7.  NATO Alliance Advances the Goal of European Integration - Secretary 
8.  Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council:  Final Communique   
9.  Recent Achievements in Europe and Their Implications - Secretary 
10.  Renewing the Middle East Peace Process - President Clinton, Israeli 
Prime Minister Peres
11.  American Leadership and the New Europe:  Implementing the Dayton 
Peace Agreement - 
Deputy Secretary Talbott 
12.  The OSCE's Role in Building an Undivided Europe - Deputy Secretary 
13.  The OSCE in Bosnia - Deputy Secretary Talbott 
14.  State Department Support for AIDS-Awareness Programs - Deputy 
Secretary Talbott
15.  International Crime-Fighting Strategies - Robert S.  Gelbard 
16.  Protecting the Earth's Ozone Layer 
17.  Rethinking Proliferation in the Post-Cold War Era:  The Challenge 
Of Technology - Thomas E.  McNamara 
18.  Treaty Actions


Turning from the Horror of War to the Promise of Peace in the Balkans
President Clinton
Remarks at the signing of the General Framework Agreement for Peace in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Paris, France, December 14, 1995

President Chirac, President Izetbegovic, President Tudjman, President 
Milosevic, Secretary General Boutros-Ghali, Secretary General Solana, 
Representative Bildt, Prime Minister Filali, Prime Minister 
Chernomyrdin, Prime Minister Major, Prime Minister Gonzales, Chancellor 
Kohl:  Let me begin, on behalf of the people of the United States, by 
thanking all of those whose labor and wisdom helped keep hope alive 
during the long, dark years of war--the humanitarian relief workers, the 
United Nations forces from Europe and beyond.  Had it not been for their 
dedication and their sacrifice, the toll of the war in Bosnia would have 
been even greater.

And I thank those whose work helped make this moment of peace possible, 
beginning with our host, Prime Minister Chirac, for his vigor and 
determination; Prime Minister Major, who was a full partner in the 
development of the rapid reaction force and our NATO cooperation; and 
our friend, Chancellor Kohl, who has taken in so many of the refugees 
and who now is sending German troops beyond his borders in this 
historic, common endeavor.  I thank the leaders of the strong NATO and 
the determined negotiating team of Russians, Europeans, and Americans.

All of you have brought us to this bright new day, when Bosnia turns 
from the horror of war to the promise of peace.  President Izetbegovic, 
President Tudjman, President Milosevic:  By making peace, you have 
answered the call of your people.  You have heard them say, "Stop the 
war, end the suffering, give our children the blessings of a normal 

In this chorus for peace today we also hear the hallowed voices of the 
victims--the children whose playgrounds were shelled in the killing 
fields, the young girls brutalized by rape, the men shot down in mass 
graves, those who starved in the camps, those who died in battle, the 
millions taken from their homes and torn from their families.  Even from 
beyond the grave, there are victims singing the song of peace today.  
May their voices be in our minds and hearts forever.

In Dayton, these three Balkan leaders made the fateful choice for peace.  
Today, Mr.  Presidents, you have bound yourselves to peace.  But 
tomorrow you must turn the pages of this agreement into a real-life 
future of hope for those who have survived this horrible war.  At your 
request, the United States and more than 25 other nations will send you 
our most precious resource--the men and women of our armed forces.  
Their mission:  to allow the Bosnian people to emerge from a nightmare 
of fear into a new day of security, according to terms you have approved 
in a manner that is evenhanded and fair to all.

The international community will work with you to change the face of 
Bosnia:  to meet human needs; to repair and to rebuild; to reunite 
children with their families and refugees with their homes; to oversee 
democratic elections, advance human rights, and call to account those 
accused of war crimes.

We can do all these things, but we cannot guarantee the future of 
Bosnia.  No one outside can guarantee that Muslims, Croats, and Serbs in 
Bosnia will come together and stay together as free citizens in a united 
country sharing a common destiny.  Only the Bosnian people can do that.

I know that the losses have been staggering, that the scars are deep.  
We feel even today that the wounds have not healed.  But Bosnia must 
find a way, with God's grace, to lay down the hatreds, to give up the 
revenge, to go forward together.  That is the road--indeed, that is the 
only road--to the future.

We see, from Northern Ireland to the Middle East, from South Africa to 
Haiti, people turning from hatred to hope.  Here in Europe, countries 
that for centuries fought now work together for peace.  Soon the Bosnian 
people will see for themselves the awesome potential of people to turn 
from conflict to cooperation.  In just a few days, troops from all over 
Europe and North America and elsewhere--troops from Great Britain, 
France, and Germany; troops from Greece and Turkey; troops from Poland 
and Lithuania; and troops from the United States and Russia--former 
enemies, now friends--will answer the same call and share the same 
responsibilities to achieve the same goal--a lasting peace in Bosnia 
where enemies can become friends.

Why would they do this? Because their hearts are broken by the suffering 
and the slaughter; because their minds recoil at the prospect of a 
needless, spreading war in the heart of Europe.  But they--we--do so in 
the face of skeptics who say the people of the Balkans cannot escape 
their bloody past, that Balkan hearts are too hard for peace.

But let us remember this war did violence not only to Bosnia's people 
but also to Bosnia's history, for Bosnia once found unity in its 
diversity.  Generations of Muslims, Orthodox Catholics, and Jews lived 
side by side and enriched the world by their example.  They built 
schools and libraries and wondrous places of worship.  Part of the 
population laid down their tools on Friday, part on Saturday, and part 
on Sunday.  But their lives were woven together by marriage and culture, 
work, a common language, and a shared pride in a place that then they 
all called home.  Now, if that past is any guide, this peace can take 
hold.  And if the people of Bosnia want a decent future for their 
children, this peace must take hold.

Here in this City of Light, at this moment of hope, let us recall how 
this century--marked by so much progress and too much bloodshed, witness 
to humanity's best and humanity's worst--how this century began in 
Bosnia.  At the dawn of the century, when gunfire in Sarajevo sparked 
the first of our two world wars, the British Foreign Secretary, Sir 
Edward Gray, said these words:  "The lamps are going out all over 
Europe.  We shall not see them lit again in our lifetimes."

But they were lit again, by an extraordinary generation of Europeans and 
Americans.  The torch of freedom they carried now shines more brightly 
than ever before on every continent.  That torch can shine on Bosnia 
again, but first it must warm the hearts of the Bosnian people.

So I say to all the people of the Balkans on behalf of all of us who 
would come to see this peace take hold:  You have seen what war has 
wrought.  You know what peace can bring.  Seize this chance and make it 
work.  You can do nothing to erase the past, but you can do everything 
to build the future.  Do not let your children down.  


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Peace in Bosnia:  A Dividend of American Leadership
President Clinton
Remarks to the Committee for American Leadership in Bosnia, Washington, 
DC, December 6, 1996

I want to welcome this distinguished group of Americans to the White 
House.  Each of you has worked very hard throughout your career to 
preserve and to project America's leadership around the world.  Today 
you have joined across partisan lines to make a strong case for 
America's leadership in Bosnia, and I thank you for that.

I welcome the support that you and others, including Presidents Bush and 
Ford, have shown for our troops and our efforts to secure peace in 
Bosnia.  All of you represent a spirit that has helped keep our country 
strong.  Regardless of party or political differences, you've stood up 
for America's leadership on behalf of our interests and our values.  

Many of you have been working for peace in Bosnia since that terrible 
war began.  Now that the Balkan leaders have made a commitment to peace, 
you know that we must help that peace take hold.  You understand the 
importance of our action and the costs of our failure to act--something, 
I might add, that has been under-discussed in the public arena in the 
last few weeks.  Our conscience demands that we seize this chance to end 
the suffering, but our national security interests are deeply engaged as 

Europe's security is still inextricably tied to America's.  We need a 
strong Europe as a strong partner on problems from terrorism to the 
spread of weapons of mass destruction.  Europe's stability is threatened 
as long as this war burns at its center.  We have to stand with the 
Europeans on Bosnia if we're going to stand with them--and if we expect 
them to stand with us--on the whole range of other issues we clearly are 
going to face together in the years ahead.

Our engagement in Bosnia is also essential for the continued viability 
of NATO.  All the parties there--all the parties--asked for NATO's help 
in securing this peace.  If we're going to be NATO's leader, we have to 
be part of this mission.  If we turn our backs on Bosnia now, our allies 
will do the same; the peace will fail, the conflict could spread, the 
slaughter will certainly resume.  NATO would be shaken to its core.  Its 
ability to shape a stable, undivided Europe would be thrown into doubt, 
and our leadership in Europe and around the world would pay a terrible, 
terrible price.

For 50 years, the bipartisan consensus for our leadership in the world 
has been a source of America's progress and strength.  At the dawn of 
the post-Cold War era, that consensus is being questioned.  But I 
believe that vision and unity are still called for.

During my recent trip to Europe, everywhere I went and every person with 
whom I talked--from people on the street to prime ministers--said the 
very same thing:  American leadership matters.  American leadership is 
welcome.  American leadership is necessary.  But leadership is not a 
spectator sport.  In Bosnia, our leadership can make a difference 
between peace and war.  It demands our participation.

I have to tell you that I knew how the European leaders felt, and I 
thought I knew how the people in the street felt.  But the personal 
expression of support for America's willingness to help broker this 
peace agreement in Dayton and then to participate in the peace mission 
in Bosnia was more intense, more persistent, and more urgent than I had 
imagined--from the Prime Minister of Great Britain to the Prime Minister 
of Germany, to the Prime Minister of Spain, to the Prime Minister of 
Ireland, and everyone else I talked to.  This is a very, very, very 
important thing in terms of our relationships with Europe and what we 
expect in terms of a partnership with Europe in the years ahead.

Let me say to those of you who come here from both parties:  I 
understand that bipartisanship in foreign policy has never meant 
agreement on every detail of every policy.  And while we may differ from 
time to time on the specifics of our policies, we still must agree--and 
we have never fundamentally disagreed on purpose--to defend our 
interests, to preserve peace, to protect human rights, to promote 
prosperity around the world.

That does not mean that we can solve every problem; we cannot be the 
world's policeman.  But when our leadership can make a difference 
between war and peace and when our interests are engaged, we have a duty 
to act.  We have seen the dividends from the Persian Gulf to the Middle 
East, from North Korea to Northern Ireland to Haiti.  American 
leadership can also produce those dividends and more in Bosnia, because 
we can make a difference there.

I'm convinced that this mission is clear and it's achievable.  Our 
troops will have strong rules of engagement.  They will operate under an 
American general, and they will be fully trained and heavily armed.  Our 
commanders have done all they can to minimize the risks and to maximize 
their ability to carry out a clearly defined mission with a clear end 
point.  There will be no "mission creep."

The peace agreement has given these parties a real opportunity to have a 
peaceful future.  But they can't do it alone, and they're looking to us 
to help.  

America is seen by all of them as an honest broker and a fair player.  
Each of you has played a role in creating that image, and I want to 
thank you for that as much as anything else.  The thing that has 
constantly impressed me as I have dealt with people all around the world 
is that people believe we are a nation with no bad motives for them or 
their future.  

That is what has made this moment possible in Bosnia, and that is what 
has also imposed upon us our responsibilities at this moment.  For all 
that you have done to bring that about and for your support today, I 
thank you very, very much.  


NATO:  Reaching Out to New Partners and New Challenges
Secretary Christopher
Intervention at the North Atlantic Council Ministerial Meeting, 
Brussels, Belgium, December 5, 1995

Mr.  Acting Secretary General, distinguished colleagues:  It is an honor 
to speak to you on behalf of the United States.

Let me begin by congratulating Javier Solana on his selection as our new 
Secretary General.  Minister Solana has made a signal contribution to 
Spain's leadership role in Europe and its distinctive role in securing 
the peace in Bosnia.  He and Prime Minister Gonzalez also have 
demonstrated leadership by making a strong transatlantic relationship 
such a high priority of Spain's EU presidency.  I have been honored to 
serve with him as a fellow NATO foreign minister.  I am confident he has 
the vision and the strength to guide NATO at this time of unprecedented 

For NATO this is, without exaggeration, a moment worthy of being called 
"historic." In fact, we have just heard an announcement that adds to the 
history being made this week.  Let me be the first of our ministers to 
welcome what Minister de Charette has just said.  The steps he has 
announced bring France more directly and fully into important aspects of 
the military side of the Alliance.  It is particularly significant that 
now France will again be a full member of the Military Committee.  It is 
also most welcome that Defense Minister Millon's presence in meetings 
such as this will become the rule, not the exception.  Always a strong 
and loyal ally, France has been playing an important role in NATO's 
adaptation to its new post-Cold War tasks.  Today, France has taken a 
further critical step, one that will increase the strength and 
effectiveness of the Alliance.

The Alliance also has just approved its largest and most significant 
operation ever, and it has done so in the cause of peace.  The mission 
in Bosnia will help ensure the stability of Europe by helping to end the 
worst European conflict since NATO's creation.  It will unite more than 
two dozen nations in Europe and North America, including Russia, in a 
coalition of power and principle that only NATO could bring together, in 
a mission that only NATO could undertake.

Today, the Alliance also will take the next step in its gradual but 
steady process of outreach and enlargement to the east.  This process 
will encourage and consolidate the remarkable democratic gains that our 
new partners are making.  It will help us move toward a Europe in which 
brutal conflicts, such as the one we are now resolving in Bosnia, become 
a thing of the past.

Today's decisions reaffirm our conviction that NATO remains fundamental 
to stability and to peace on this continent.  By acting on that 
conviction, we will ensure that, for the United States, for Europe, and 
for the alliance that unites our strength, the next 50 years will be as 
successful as the last.

NATO was formed in the shadow of the Soviet threat.  Meeting that threat 
was its primary goal for almost half a century.  But its founders also 
created NATO to be a permanent alliance that would meet emerging threats 
to our security and deter new ones from arising.  

Likewise, our predecessors did not see NATO as a static institution.  
The Alliance always has been open to new members that share its 
principles and that could contribute to its goals.  It always has been 
dedicated to the integration of as much of Europe as would eventually 
become free.

Our Alliance helped assure the victory of democracy throughout Europe--
but that is not all it has done.  In its first half-century, it helped 
reconcile nations that had long been divided by conflict, thus making 
European integration possible.  It provided a secure environment for 
war-torn economies to rebuild.  And it grew from its original 12 members 
to 16, bringing new nations into our transatlantic community of 
democracies.  What NATO did to strengthen the bonds within our community 
complements what it did to protect our community.  

Today, NATO is fulfilling its enduring mission by meeting new 
challenges.  It is helping us overcome what are now the most immediate 
threats to the stability of Europe:  the fragility of democratic 
institutions in Central Europe and the former Soviet Union, the 
potential resurgence of old territorial disputes, and the exploitation 
of ethnic and religious tensions.  

It is in the former Yugoslavia that these new threats have appeared in 
their most dangerous and deadly form.  And among all Western 
institutions, only NATO has had the strength to bring the brutal war in 
this region to an end.  Without NATO's determined efforts, including its 
air campaign, there would not have been a peace agreement in Dayton.  
Moreover, the parties made it clear that they would reach a settlement 
only if NATO agreed to lead a peace implementation force.

In less than two weeks, the Presidents of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, 
and Serbia will gather in Paris to sign the peace settlement.  Shortly 
thereafter, our soldiers will begin to deploy to Bosnia by land and by 
air, so that the parties will have the confidence they need to carry out 
the agreement.  Advance teams are already on the ground to prepare for 
the arrival of the main force.  

NATO rightly refused to fight a ground war in Bosnia.  But now we have a 
chance to secure the peace, and we are seizing that chance.  This will 
be a noble mission, unique in the history of Europe.  It will be a 
defining challenge for this alliance.  It will have profound 
consequences for our interests today and for our hopes for the future.

Most immediately, it means that the killing in Bosnia can stop for good.  
It means that the children of a European country will be able to walk to 
school and play in the streets without having to fear a sniper's bullet 
or a falling mortar shell.  

NATO's mission is precisely defined and realistic--to implement the 
military aspects of the Dayton Peace Agreement.  It will not be NATO's 
job to guarantee Bosnia's recovery from four years of violence.  But our 
troops can give Bosnia an opportunity to rebuild, an opportunity to find 
justice, an opportunity to flourish as a single, sovereign state.

The deployment of IFOR means that this terrible war will not spread.  
Ever since the violence began, we have faced the real possibility that 
it would destabilize a region where shifting frontiers and ethnic 
tensions have long been a cause of conflict among great powers.  A wider 
war would directly threaten those members of the Alliance that border 
this volatile region.  As a threat to Europe's security, it would also 
be a threat to America's security.  Ending such a war would be far more 
costly and dangerous than the operation we are launching today.

The deployment of IFOR also meets a fundamental challenge to NATO and to 
its mission of protecting Europe from war.  It brings an end to a war 
that for four years has been an affront to the values and a threat to 
the interests of each member of the Alliance.  

Our NATO troops in Bosnia will be joined by soldiers from many of our 
new partners to the east.  In the last two years, we have held numerous 
exercises together under the Partnership for Peace.  We have marveled 
that soldiers who once trained to fight each other in war were training 
together to prepare for missions of peace.  Now, that training is paying 
off in a real mission with enormous stakes.  

We are determined that NATO will continue to reach out to new partners 
and new challenges.  That is the future of our Alliance in a Europe that 
must become more integrated.  Our comprehensive strategy, from the 
Partnership for Peace to the process of enlargement, to our new 
relationship with Russia, is not an abstract vision.  It is meant to 
help us deal with real-world problems such as the war in Bosnia.  Our 
mission in Bosnia will be its first true test.

It is important and gratifying, for example, that Russia is playing a 
role in IFOR.  The U.S.  Secretary of Defense, William Perry, has met 
with Russian Defense Minister Grachev four times in the last seven weeks 
to hammer out the operational details of Russia's participation.  In 
Bosnia, we will demonstrate in the most tangible way possible that NATO 
and Russia can work together constructively on behalf of stability in 
Europe.  And we will reaffirm the inclusiveness of our approach to 
European security.

We must continue to strengthen the NATO-Russia relationship.  The 
Partnership for Peace offers strong prospects to continue building 
cooperation with the Russian military and civilians alike.  We look 
forward to Russian and Allied troops participating in joint exercises--
while IFOR is in Bosnia, and beyond.  And we welcome General Grachev's 
recent expressions of support for an enhanced Russian role in the 
partnership.  NATO has also developed a political framework for its 
future relationship with Russia.  I want to encourage Russia to respond 
positively.  This relationship is vital to building an integrated Europe 
at peace.

Last May, we recognized also that Ukraine is a linchpin of European 
security.  As a result, NATO is also developing a relationship with 
Ukraine that will be similar to the ties we are developing with Russia.  
I am pleased that Ukraine has participated in several major land and sea 
exercises in 1995 and that Ukraine has declared its willingness to serve 
with us in IFOR.

At last December's NAC, we launched the first phase of NATO's 
enlargement.  The NATO enlargement study, which the Alliance recently 
completed, will form the foundation of our enlargement effort.

The study confirms that potential members must meet the same obligations 
as each existing member of the Alliance.  We have made it clear to 
interested partners that they will be admitted to NATO only if they 
continue to consolidate democratic institutions, establish firm civilian 
control over their militaries, and respect international norms at home 
and abroad.  By participating in IFOR under NATO command, many will 
begin to demonstrate that they are willing and able to meet NATO's 
considerable obligations.

Our strategy is producing many other positive results.  From Romania to 
the Baltics, the prospect of NATO membership has been a powerful 
argument for continued democratic reform.  It was an important incentive 
for Hungary and Slovakia to sign a treaty guaranteeing respect for 
borders and minority rights--a treaty we expect to be fully carried out.  
These results demonstrate the wisdom of our course.  Indeed, to lock in 
these kinds of gains, enlargement must move forward.

Today, we begin the second phase of the process of NATO enlargement.  
Beginning in early 1996, those partners who wish to pursue membership 
will hold intensive consultations with the Alliance.  Their countries 
will learn quite specifically what will be expected of them and their 
armed forces if they become members.  And NATO will assess what each 
potential member will be able to contribute.  At the same time, the 
Alliance will consider what internal measures it will take to prepare 
for enlargement.  In particular, we will examine the resource and 
staffing implications.  

We believe that this process should take us through all or most of next 
year.  We should take on the question of the next steps at our North 
Atlantic Council meeting in December 1996.  What is important is that we 
remain on our steady, deliberate course.

We also will take new steps to strengthen the Partnership for Peace.  
The Partnership will be a critical proving ground for partner countries 
wishing to join NATO.  We will adopt a program of practical work that 
will strengthen ties.  For some countries, this program will be a work 
plan toward membership.  For others, it will deepen their long-term 
partnership with the Alliance.  The Partnership for Peace will remain a 
permanent and significant part of Europe's new security architecture.  

Since its launch nearly two years ago, the Partnership has exceeded all 
expectations.  In 1995, 10 major exercises were conducted in locations 
as diverse as the Black Sea waters of Bulgaria and Romania, off 
Denmark's Jutland coastline, the plains and forests of the Czech 
Republic and Hungary, and the bayous of Louisiana.  At least a dozen 
major Partnership exercises of increasing complexity are scheduled for 
1996, drawing on the land, sea, and air capabilities of virtually every 
Alliance  and partner country.

NATO also is taking a set of steps to strengthen the Partnership for 
Peace and the North Atlantic Cooperation Council in all their 
dimensions.  I am pleased that this ministerial will agree to move 
forward in five specific areas, consistent with the proposals I set 
forth in Noordwijk last June:

First, we will complete work with our partners through the North 
Atlantic Cooperation Council--NACC--on principles for civilian and 
democratic control of the military.  Through the Partnership for Peace, 
we will develop concrete guidelines and actions to implement them.  
Progress in this area will help interested partner countries prepare for 
NATO membership, while making an important contribution to democracy 
across the region.

Second, we have agreed to establish a joint defense planning and review 
process committee to foster deliberative consultations between Allies 
and partners.  We will encourage partners to apply the planning and 
review process to all elements of their armed forces, not just those 
performing peacekeeping and humanitarian tasks.  We hope that the 
committee can contribute to the interoperability of partner and NATO 
armed forces and to the adaptation of partner military doctrines to 

Third, we will establish a stronger, more substantive role for partners 
in the planning of partnership exercises.  Such a role will now become a 
standard, permanent feature of the exercise planning process.  It will 
help us conduct more complex and challenging exercises that meet 
partners' needs while improving our capability for joint action.

Fourth, we will involve partners more routinely in the substantive 
activities and consultations of the North Atlantic Council--NAC--and 
NATO senior committees.  This will help us extend the kind of 
consultative and practical cooperation undertaken in the planning and 
review process to non-military areas of the Partnership.  It will also 
advance our goal of deepening the Partnership's political as well as its 
military character.

Finally, we have agreed to increase our bilateral funding and improve 
its coordination in support of the Partnership.  I placed a special 
emphasis on the urgency of additional resources at our last ministerial, 
and I am pleased that we have agreed to move forward.  Although partners 
will remain responsible for making their own contributions to ensure 
their participation, it is essential that NATO members do more to 
sustain the Partnership's success.  I also look forward to the report 
due next spring that will recommend ways to realign NATO budgets and 
staff to meet future Partnership needs.

Let me stress the importance of helping our partners achieve greater 
compatibility with the Alliance.  We should encourage other partner 
countries to build on the examples set by Poland and Hungary by 
developing "national NATO compatibility plans." These plans would focus 
their efforts to reform military and defense structures in ways that are 
consistent with Alliance standards.  Developing and implementing such 
plans will be of clear benefit to countries wishing to prepare for NATO 
membership.  It will also strengthen the ability of other partner 
nations to participate in peacekeeping and other joint missions.

The United States is determined that the Partnership for Peace sustain 
the remarkable momentum it has achieved since its inception.  The 
durability of the Partnership can be complemented by giving greater 
vitality to the NACC as a political framework for relations between the 
Alliance and its partners.  The NACC should move beyond its solely 
consultative role to become a more results-oriented forum.

Besides setting guidelines for civilian control of the military, the 
NACC could also work to encourage good neighborly relations between 
partner countries.  This could lead to joint Partnership exercises 
designed to complement the confidence-building measures underway through 
the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe.  Political 
cooperation of this kind can be another way to help prepare partner 
countries for membership in NATO and for all partner countries to deepen 
their security.

Let me turn briefly to another issue that we must resolve if we are to 
solidify the comprehensive new European security architecture we are 
building.  The Conventional Forces in Europe--CFE--Treaty is a landmark 
model for security cooperation, and it is critical to a stable and 
secure Europe.  Under the treaty, more than 50,000 pieces of military 
equipment already have been destroyed.  Confidence has been boosted by 
this reduction in arms and by the openness with which it has been 
achieved.  Indeed, the CFE Treaty provides dramatic evidence that the 
Cold War is over.

But the continued and complete fulfillment of all CFE obligations is 
essential to strengthening the security of all states party to the 
treaty.  The United States has welcomed the agreement reached last month 
in Vienna by all 30 CFE states specifying the elements of a solution to 
the flank problem.  We must finalize a solution to the flank issue in 
the next several months.  We should intensify our work in Vienna and 
agree to send policy-making officials--with decision-making authority 
from national capitals--no later than mid-February.  These officials 
should press for a cooperative solution that reinforces the integrity of 
the treaty and the security of all the states party to it.

Finally, let me reaffirm the importance the United States attaches to a 
stronger European defense identity that will support greater operational 
flexibility for European operations and greater burden-sharing between 
European and North American allies.  We support improving coordination 
and cooperation between NATO and the Western European Union.  And we 
continue to support the concept of combined joint task forces--and we 
hope to reach final agreement on it soon.  Making progress on these 
fronts will contribute to the process of European integration, which the 
United States has supported for half a century and will continue to 
support as we approach a new century.

I observed at the outset that this is a time of defining challenge for 
this alliance and its future.  More than that, it is a positive turning 
point for the United States and Europe and for the relationship that we 
are destined to share.  Over the past year, some have questioned whether 
we would drift apart--whether the ties that bind us would inevitably 
fray in the post-Cold War world.  The events of the end of this fateful 
year prove them wrong--profoundly wrong.

Two weeks ago, we reached the agreement in Dayton--an agreement that we 
would not have reached without steadfast military and diplomatic 
cooperation between the United States and its European allies.  On 
Sunday, President Clinton completed his fifth trip to Europe as 
president--a trip on which he reaffirmed our ancestral ties to Britain 
and Ireland, reinvigorated the peace process in Northern Ireland, and 
reinforced the determination of our Bosnia-bound soldiers training in 
Germany.  On Sunday in Madrid, he stood with the Prime Minister of Spain 
and the President of the European Commission to launch an ambitious 
agenda of cooperation between the United States and the European Union.  
And next week, the eyes of the world will be on Paris when the 
settlement of the bloodiest war in a half-century of European history is 

We can be proud of these achievements.  We can be proud of the 
commitment and cooperation that made them possible.  We have 
demonstrated once again to ourselves and to the world that our common 
effort makes this a better world.  Today, as we move forward together, 
let us have confidence in this great Alliance and in the common purpose 
that unites our two continents.  



NATO Foreign and Defense Ministers Hold Meeting on Bosnia
Secretary Christopher
Intervention at sixteen-plus-sixteen meeting of NATO foreign and defense 
ministers on Bosnia, in Brussels, Belgium, December 5, 1995

Mr.  Acting Secretary-General, distinguished colleagues:  It is a great 
privilege for Secretary Perry and me to speak with you today on behalf 
of the United States and President Clinton.  For the first time in 
NATO's history, all 16 of our foreign ministers and all 16 of our 
defense ministers are meeting together.  As we prepare to launch this 
historic mission in Bosnia, our alliance has never been more united.

We are united because our mission is deeply rooted in NATO's fundamental 
purpose:  to combine our strength in the defense of peace.  That purpose 
was conceived by NATO's founders a half century ago in the wake of the 
two most destructive wars in human history.  They created this permanent 
alliance to ensure we would never have to fight a third great war.

In its first half century, our Alliance met its greatest test.  As a 
result, we have reached the most hopeful period in the modern history of 
Europe.  Thanks to NATO, Western Europe emerged from the Cold War more 
secure and united than ever before.  Thanks to NATO, Central Europe was 
able to win its freedom, and the barbed wire that once divided this 
continent has been discarded for good.  Thanks to NATO, the partnership 
between the United States and Europe is indissoluble, and we can pursue 
our shared interests and values effectively together.

The Cold War is over, but we still have great challenges to meet.  Such 
a challenge is clearly posed by the war in the former Yugoslavia.  In 
the first shots that rang out in Sarajevo, we heard an ominous echo of 
the origins of World War I.  In the killing fields and concentration 
camps of Bosnia we have seen our most terrible memories of World War II 
come to life again in the heart of Europe.

This summer, the war in Bosnia reached a point of crisis.  NATO faced 
the prospect of withdrawing UN troops from Bosnia under fire.  But in 
these terrible events, we saw a chance to change the course of the war.  
Together, we agreed to take decisive action to protect Bosnia's 
remaining safe areas.

Without NATO's determined use of force, our diplomacy could not have 
brought the parties to the table.  Without the prospect of a NATO 
implementation force, the parties would not have had the confidence to 
reach--and to implement--a comprehensive settlement.  Without NATO, 
there would be no peace and no hope in Bosnia.

The Dayton Peace Agreement has given us our best hope to achieve a 
lasting peace.  We wanted an agreement that addressed all the 
fundamental issues that divided the parties, with no short cuts or 
ambiguities, and that is what we obtained.  We wanted Bosnia to remain a 
single state, and it will.  We did not want Sarajevo to be divided as 
Berlin once was, and it will not be.

As we negotiated, we constantly insisted on an agreement that our troops 
could implement and enforce safely and effectively.  Each part of the 
agreement was carefully constructed to take the needs of our armed 
forces into account.  The three Balkan presidents have provided formal 
assurances for the safety of our troops.  We expect them to take the 
necessary steps to ensure that this and every other commitment made at 
Dayton is fully honored.  

NATO has approved a detailed operational plan to implement the 
agreement.  This plan meets two tests that President Clinton laid out in 
his address last week to the American people.  First, the mission is 
"precisely defined--with clear, realistic goals that can be achieved in 
a finite period of time." NATO can provide a respite from fear and a 
chance to start rebuilding, but only the people of Bosnia can finish the 
job.  Second, our troops will have the strength and authority to protect 
themselves and to fulfill their mission.  I am confident this plan will 
have the support of the American people and our Congress.

For each of our nations, deploying troops is always a difficult and 
solemn choice.  But President Clinton has made clear that the United 
States is determined to carry out the responsibilities of leadership.  
Meeting that responsibility is profoundly in the interest of our nation 
and the world.  

Last weekend in Ireland, President Clinton reminded us that European 
soldiers have stood shoulder to shoulder with America far from European 
shores, most recently in the Persian Gulf and in Haiti.  Nowhere is it 
more important that we stand together than in Europe, where our common 
security interests are so great.  We designed NATO to secure these 
interests effectively and to share the risks of our collective effort.

Our 16 nations will form the critical core of the NATO force in Bosnia.  
But equally important, we will be joined by our new partners from 
Central Europe and the New Independent States, who will serve side by 
side with NATO troops for the very first time.  

The breadth of this coalition is not unique just in NATO's history.  In 
all of modern European history, this is the first time that soldiers 
from every European power will serve together in a common military 
operation.  Think of it:  soldiers from France and Germany, Britain and 
Spain, Greece and Turkey, Poland and Sweden, Russia and the United 
States all sharing the same risks on the same soil, under the same 
banner, at the same time.  Never before could we say with such 
conviction that our only remaining enemy is war itself.

We are closer than ever to fulfilling the dream that Harry Truman 
expressed upon the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty.  "If there is 
anything inevitable in the future," he said, "it is the will of the 
people of the world for freedom and peace."

Because of the mission we launch today and because of our strategy of 
integration, the entire continent can one day share the blessings of 
peace that unite our community of free nations.  As we strive with our 
partners to overcome the division of Bosnia, we can also help overcome 
the remaining division of Europe.  Bosnia, once the symbol of Europe's 
post-Cold War disintegration, can be the proving ground for a broader 
and deeper transatlantic community.  

These are goals that the United States and Europe can and will achieve 
as allies, as partners, and as friends.  Winston Churchill's immortal 
words remain our guidepost:  "Let us move forward together." Thank you.  



NATO:  Building a New Security Structure for Europe
Secretary Christopher, Secretary of Defense Perry
Opening remarks at a press conference, NATO Headquarters, Brussels, 
Belgium, December 5, 1995

Secretary Christopher.  Good afternoon.  Secretary Perry and I have just 
taken part in what can accurately be called a historic day here at NATO.  
For the first time, all 16 NATO foreign ministers and all 16 NATO 
defense ministers met together.  This was a clear demonstration of the 
unity and common purpose that NATO has as we prepare to launch our 
mission in support of peace in Bosnia.

In addition, today, we heard welcome news that France intends to 
participate more fully in the military aspects of NATO.  We also 
confirmed the selection of Foreign Minister Javier Solana of Spain as 
the next Secretary General of NATO.  We launched a new phase in NATO's 
enlargement program.  And we have taken steps to strengthen the 
Partnership for Peace.  Not a bad day's work, as far as NATO goes.

NATO's deployment in Bosnia will help to ensure the stability of Europe 
by helping to end the bloodiest conflict in Europe since NATO's 
creation.  Without NATO's air campaign, we could not have brought the 
parties in Bosnia to the negotiating table.  Without the prospect of a 
NATO Implementation Force, it is clear to me that there would have been 
no peace agreement in Dayton.  As my colleagues made very clear to us, 
also, without United States leadership, without United States 
participation in the Implementation Force, NATO would be not able to 
carry out the important mission which will be launched by today's 

Today, at our meeting of defense and foreign ministers, we heard a 
briefing from the NATO commander--the American George Joulwan--who gave 
us a briefing on the NATO mission plans.  His briefing makes it clear 
that the mission is precisely defined, with clear, realistic goals that 
can be achieved in about a year.  Our troops will have the strength and 
the authority to carry out their mission with maximum safety.

More than two dozen countries are united in a coalition of power and 
principle to help the parties in Bosnia in their courageous decision for 
peace.  In all the modern history of Europe, this is the first time that 
soldiers from virtually every major European power will serve together 
in a common military operation.  Think of it:  soldiers from France and 
Germany, Britain and Spain, Greece and Turkey, Poland and Sweden, Russia 
and the United States, all sharing the same risks on the same soil, 
under the same banner, and at the same time.  

Today, the Alliance also began the next phase in the process of 
enlargement, a process that was launched by President Clinton at the 
NATO summit in January 1994.  Beginning in early 1996, those partners 
who wish to pursue membership in NATO will hold extensive consultation 
with the Alliance on what would be expected of them if they became 
members.  NATO, in turn, will consider what it needs to do to prepare 
for enlargement--what would be the responsibilities and consequences if 
an enlargement decision were taken.  This process will take us through 
all or most of next year.  We will then consider steps to be taken 
thereafter at our meeting next December.

We also agreed today to take new steps to strengthen the Partnership for 
Peace.  This includes a program of practical work, which will be a work 
plan toward membership for some countries, and for other countries, a 
means of strengthening their long-term relationship with NATO.  I am 
pleased that the ministers also adopted measures to strengthen the 
Partnership in five respects, as I had proposed last spring.

In closing, let me simply say that today's actions demonstrated the 
vitality and continuing importance of the Alliance as a force for peace 
and stability in an integrated Europe.

Thank you very much.  Secretary Perry.

Secretary Perry.  For 50 years, NATO prepared for war, and our vigilance 
helped deter the very war that we feared.  Now we are preparing to 
implement a peace in Bosnia.  It is both ironic and wonderful that the 
largest military operation in NATO's history will be to forge a peace, 
not to fight a war.

All the qualities that we developed for war--unity of command, 
discipline, and a shared vision of a secure Europe --all of these 
qualities will make us effective in peace.

Today's meeting made it clear that NATO is approaching the challenge in 
Bosnia with remarkably strong unity and a clear, common vision.

My favorite motto is the Latin phrase carpe diem--"seize the day."  What 
we have seized this day is more than an opportunity to secure peace in 
Bosnia.  We have seized the opportunity to build a new security 
structure for Europe, a structure which will last well into the 21st 
century.  We are also seizing the opportunity to advance the NATO-Russia 
pragmatic partnership, an opportunity to resolve our differences and 
pursue our common causes in a spirit of comity and cooperation.

I met with Minister Grachev four times in the last seven weeks.  We 
dealt with very difficult problems, but we did succeed in hammering out 
an agreement in principle.  This agreement called for Russian 
participation in the peace Implementation Force.  The NATO staff is now 
working with the Russians to make this agreement final.

It is clear that this arrangement-- both in achieving it and in 
implementing it--will have its challenges.  But our ability to establish 
this arrangement will demonstrate that there is a new NATO-Russian 
partnership at work.  In effect, this agreement casts a long shadow on 
how we deal with all other security issues in Europe for decades to 
come.  We are drawing a circle which includes Russia inside the circle 
working with us rather than outside the circle working against us.  

This is a moment of truth for our Alliance, a moment when we can and  
must secure peace in Bosnia and build a better Europe in the process.  

During the Cold War, President Kennedy voiced his hopes for the Atlantic 
Alliance.  We are on the brink of realizing his hopes today.  He said, 
“We must seek a world where peace is not a mere interlude between wars, 
but an incentive to the creative energies of humanity”.

Let it not be said of this Atlantic generation that we left our ideals 
and visions to the past.  Indeed, I believe that by our actions today, 
this Atlantic generation will carry our ideals and visions well into the 



Working To Engage a Relationship Between Russia and NATO
Secretary Christopher, Russian Foreign Minister Kozyrev
Opening remarks at press availability, Brussels, Belgium, December 6, 

Secretary Christopher.  Good morning.  It is always a pleasure to meet 
with my friend, Andrei Kozyrev.  Of course, I am looking forward to 
doing that today.  It is a good opportunity for us to review events 
since we were last together and to discuss this important NATO meeting.   

With respect to Bosnia, one thing I want to emphasize is that Russia has 
been our partner--and a very good partner--from the very beginning as a 
member of the Contact Group and then as one of the co-chairmen at 
Dayton.  Naturally, both the Foreign Minister and I have considerable 
satisfaction with the comprehensive agreement that was reached at 
Dayton, and we are equally committed and determined to see that it is 
effectively implemented.  

Soon, American and Russian troops will be serving together in the 
implementation force--the first time we have served together since World 
War II.  Last month, our soldiers trained together in a mock 
peacekeeping mission in Fort Riley.  In Bosnia, we will demonstrate in 
the most tangible way that the United States and Russia can work 
together in a NATO operation, working constructively on behalf of peace 
and stability--an arrangement that was worked out through very careful 
conversations between American officials and Russian officials.  

I think it is our determination that we continue to work together to 
engage a relationship between Russia and NATO.  NATO has developed a 
political framework for that relationship, and I will be encouraging the 
Foreign Minister to respond positively during his visit here.  

We will also discuss the important steps that the Alliance agreed to 
take yesterday with respect to the Partnership for Peace and the North 
Atlantic Cooperation Council--the NACC.  We very much welcome the recent 
indication from Russia that they want to play an enhanced role in the 
Partnership for Peace which, of course, has turned out to be such a 
positive and strong organization.  

I expect to talk briefly with the Foreign Minister about NATO's process 
of enlargement and to emphasize that we are continuing on the steady, 
deliberate course that we have been on from the first--neither faster 
nor slower than we have indicated in the past.  

Finally, I look forward to discussing with the Foreign Minister the 
period ahead when we have a great deal of work to do in common and some 
problems to work through in common, such as the CFE matter.  But I think 
the relationship here, in connection with Bosnia, is a symbol of the 
value of the United States-Russia relationship and it shows the prospect 
of an overarching relationship between Russia and NATO.  So, Andrei, as 
always, I welcome you.  It is very nice to see you again.

Foreign Minister Kozyrev.  First, thank you for the welcome.  I share 
with you that our two countries are following the path that was 
established by the two presidents in Hyde Park.  Yesterday, I had a 
telephone conversation with the President and he reminded me that he is 
going to strictly follow this path.  

As for the Bosnian issue, we will continue our endeavors in the spirit 
of political settlement and in accordance with our Partnership 
agreements.  The military are continuing their work on the issues of 
military implementation but I think, more importantly, that it is to 
ensure right away a civilian settlement in the Balkans in order to find 
a proper solution for the civilian reconciliation in the Balkans.  

Concerning NATO, we will continue to study the content of yesterday's 
NATO document.  Yesterday, the President had determined briefly but 
quite consistently our attitude toward these problems.  It can go down 
to a formula--as yes to the Partnership and no to the enlargement.  

I welcome the fact that the communique of the NATO Council contains the 
mention of a model formula--of a model of European security, and I hope 
that this forum here in Brussels and next month in Budapest will be 
marked as an event of Russian-American cooperation in working out this 
new model.  For us, this is a priority.  

I am glad that NATO's communique contains a mention of the substantial 
role of the OSCE, the essential role of the OSCE, and, in this spirit, 
we will continue our endeavors in Budapest.  In a few words, our 
partnership is gaining momentum and the most important thing now is to 
fulfill it right to the point, to sustain it, to defend it.  

Finally, I agree with the Secretary of State that we have before us an 
agenda on the arms limitation and reduction concerning Europe and 
nuclear testing, as well as the strengthening of the ABM treaty, which 
will fasten the ratification of the START II treaty.  In other words, I 
think that we will continue our work in a spirit of partnership between 
Russia and the United States.  

Finally, I am grateful to the Secretary of State for his friendly 
attitude and for establishing a good tradition, and I think that this is 
right that we meet with the Secretary of State in the very beginning--
before or on the eve of any official function.  



NATO Alliance Advances the Goal of European Integration
Secretary Christopher
Remarks prior to meeting with foreign ministers from the Baltic and 
Central European countries, Brussels, Belgium, December 6, 1995

Good afternoon.  I am pleased to continue the tradition of meeting with 
the foreign ministers of Europe's newly democratic states.  This is the 
fourth such meeting.  One of the most rewarding features of my job as 
Secretary of State is the chance to work with Europe's new democracies 
to help them become our close partners as we build an undivided Europe.

Our meeting today comes at a defining moment for NATO, for our new 
partners, and for European security.  This week, NATO approved its 
largest and most significant operation ever--and its first operation in 
which Central European and Baltic soldiers will be deployed on an actual 
mission with NATO troops under NATO command.

The participation of these and other countries in our mission in Bosnia 
will make IFOR one of the most remarkable coalitions in European 
history.  It vindicates the choice that NATO made two years ago to reach 
out to new partners, and it has important implications for the future.

The Alliance is determined to advance the goal of European integration 
by bolstering the Partnership for Peace and pursuing a steady, 
deliberate policy of enlargement.  We designed the Partnership for Peace 
to prepare our partners to work with NATO on concrete security problems.  
That is why we have held 10 major joint exercises in 1995 alone.  Far 
sooner than anyone imagined, the Partnership is paying off--in a real 
mission with real stakes.

Yesterday, NATO agreed to strengthen the Partnership further.  This 
includes a program of practical   activities, which will be a work plan 
toward membership for some countries and, for other countries, a means 
of strengthening their long-term relationship with NATO.

Last year, at President Clinton's initiative, we launched the first 
phase of NATO's enlargement process.  The enlargement study that the 
Alliance recently completed confirmed a number of important principles 
which will guide our future discussions.

Yesterday, NATO launched the second phase in the process.  Beginning 
early next year, those partners who wish to pursue membership will hold 
intensive consultations with the Alliance.  They will learn quite 
specifically what will be expected of them and their armed forces if 
they become members.  We expect to consider the question of the next 
phase at our NATO ministerial in December 1996.

In the process of enlargement, potential members will be judged on a 
case-by-case basis.  What matters is a commitment to NATO's goals and 
the ability to meet them.  The process of enlargement will stay on 
course.  Our approach will be steady and deliberate.

For the United States, this process offers the prospect of peaceful 
integration on a continent where our own security is deeply engaged.  
Step by step, it gives us the opportunity to build a partnership with 
Europe as a whole.  Those are the goals we will pursue today and in the 
days ahead.  



Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council:  Final Communique

Text of final communique issued by    the North Atlantic Council, NATO 
Headquarters, Brussels, Belgium, December 5, 1995.

1.  Today, we are pleased to appoint   Mr.  Javier Solana as the new 
Secretary General of the Alliance and Chairman of the North Atlantic 
Council.  We express our deep appreciation for the outstanding 
contribution and service rendered to our Alliance in this challenging 
time by Secretary General Willy Claes.

2.  We meet as the Alliance is preparing itself for the implementation 
of the military aspects of the peace agreement for Bosnia-Herzegovina 
under NATO command and with the participation of other countries.  This 
confirms the key role of the Alliance    in ensuring security and 
stability in Europe, in line with the Alliance's   New Strategic 
Concept.  The ongoing transformation and restructuring of our Alliance, 
which we are determined to carry forward in 1996, has prepared us better 
to meet this new challenge.

The Alliance's cohesion and solidarity, together with a strong 
transatlantic link and partnership, are essential to our ability to 
perform NATO's core functions as well as to undertake an operation of 
this kind.  We reiterate our firm commitment to this partnership, 
strengthened through a developing European pillar reflecting the 
emerging European Security and Defence Identity.  We welcome the 
decisions announced by the French Foreign Minister at our meeting 
expressing France's strong commitment to engage more fully in a changing 
Alliance and its further transformation, as well as in the development 
of its European pillar.  We also welcome the Transatlantic Initiative of 
the EU and the U.S.  to broaden the foundations of the partnership.

In 1996, the Alliance will continue the steady, measured and transparent 
progress leading to eventual enlargement.

3.  Today, there is genuine hope that a lasting peace can be established 
in Bosnia-Herzegovina.  Decisive action by the Alliance in support of 
the United Nations in the Former Yugoslavia, together with a determined 
diplomatic effort, broke the siege of Sarajevo and made a negotiated 
solution possible.  We pay tribute to the men and women involved in 
Operations Sharp Guard, Deny Flight and Deliberate Force.  We welcome 
the agreement initialled in Dayton for peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina.  We 
are looking forward to the conferences in London, Paris and Bonn.  We 
underline the importance of the civil-military interface in the 
implementation of the peace agreement.  Quick and effective 
implementation of the peace agreement will be crucial for creating the 
conditions for the restoration of normal life in this war-torn country.  
We expect the parties to honour their commitments.  The basic agreement 
on Eastern Slavonia and its rapid implementation are vital contributions 
to stability in the region.

Later today, we will be meeting with our Defence Ministers for a 
detailed discussion of arrangements for the implementation of the 
military aspects of a peace plan in Bosnia-Herzegovina and will issue a 
separate statement.

4.  We are pleased that Russia will contribute to the multinational 
force established to implement the military aspects of the peace 
agreement for Bosnia-Herzegovina.  We attach great importance to this 
cooperation between NATO and Russia, which will not only help to ensure 
the successful implementation of the peace settlement but will also 
assist in building lasting cooperative security structures in Europe.  
We remain convinced that the construction of such a cooperative European 
security architecture, with the active participation of Russia, is in 
the interest of both NATO and Russia, as well as of all other states in 
the OSCE area.  We welcome the agreement in principle reached between 
Secretary Perry and Minister Grachev on a political consultative 
mechanism on IFOR operations.  We look forward to its being confirmed in 
a formal agreement between Russia and the Alliance.

We reaffirm our commitment to close, cooperative and far-reaching 
relations between NATO and Russia, including mutual political 
consultations and practical security co-operation building on 
Partnership for Peace and our enhanced dialogue beyond PfP.  We have 
initiated with Russia a dialogue on the future direction our 
relationship should take.  To that end we put forward proposals in 
September on a political framework document elaborating basic principles 
for security cooperation as well as for development   of permanent 
mechanisms for consultation.  We look forward to a Russian response to 
our suggestions in carrying forward our fruitful dialogue on these 
subjects.  Relations should be transparent, reflect common objectives, 
and be rooted in strict compliance with inter-
national commitments and obligations.

We are pleased that important consultations have taken place in a 16+1 
format.  In the course of recent months, we discussed a range of issues 
related to the situation in the Former Yugoslavia, the proliferation of 
weapons of mass destruction and the safe and secure dismantlement of 
nuclear weapons, the CFE Treaty, and the enhancement of our 
relationship.  We are committed to making full use of the potential of 
existing NATO-Russia agreements and invite Russia to do likewise.  In 
this context, we would especially welcome strengthened and increased 
Russian participation in NACC and PfP activities.

We affirm our strong support for the ongoing political and economic 
reforms in Russia.  We will improve our information activities in order 
to promote better understanding of the Alliance, in particular its role 
in strengthening stability and security in Europe.

5.  Democracy, independence, economic development and territorial 
integrity in all newly independent states are of direct concern to us.  
They constitute essential factors for stability and security in Europe.  
We will therefore continue to support actively the endeavours of these 
states and to develop further our cooperative relationships with them 
bilaterally as well as through the Alliance's initiatives.

In this context, we reaffirm our support for an independent, democratic 
and stable Ukraine.  We are pleased with the new impetus which was given 
to NATO-Ukrainian relations during the course of this year.  We note 
with satisfaction Ukraine's active participation in the Partnership for 
Peace programme and in the North Atlantic Cooperation Council.  
Reflecting Ukraine's importance and role in European security and 
stability, we   are developing an enhanced relationship in accordance 
with the objectives agreed during the visit of the Ukrainian Foreign 
Minister to Brussels in September 1995.  We are looking forward to 
Ukraine's participation in the implementation of an agreed peace plan 
for Bosnia-Herzegovina, which will contribute significantly to the 
deepening of our practical cooperation.

6.  We intend to continue to develop the North Atlantic Cooperation 
Council and the Partnership for Peace as permanent features of the 
evolving European security architecture.  They will continue to play an 
important role in forging strong, lasting links between NATO and all its 
Partners.  By deepening interaction and developing common habits of 
behaviour, both NACC and the Partnership contribute increasingly to 
security and stability throughout Europe.

We are pleased that, in less than two years, Partnership for Peace has 
become firmly established and attracted widespread participation.  
Building on this momentum, the Alliance should ensure that the 
Partnership  achieves its full potential.  With the aim of expanding the 
scope of the Partnership, we are committed to:

  --  Working with Partners to strengthen the PfP's political-military 
dimension and current programmes of military cooperation;
  --  Further broadening and deepening the PfP planning and review 
  --  Providing opportunities for Partners to assume greater 
responsibilities for shaping their cooperation programmes;
  --  Encouraging greater Partner participation in exercise planning, 
including the involvement of Partner Liaison Officers from the 
Partnership Coordination Cell;
  --  Increasing information exchange on bilateral programmes which 
support PfP.

We welcome steps already taken to develop, broaden and deepen the PfP 
planning and review process, in particular, proposals to individualise 
and refine the interoperability objectives and opportunities for 
Partners to bring a greater part of their forces into the planning and 
review process.  We encourage all Partners to take advantage of this 

We encourage Partners to develop individual, national plans that cover 
all aspects of Partnership, including civil-military relations, 
interoperability, defence policy and planning, etc.  These plans would 
serve to give direction to the reform and restructuring of Partner 
defence establishments so as to make them more compatible with those of 
NATO.  While these would be national plans, we stand ready to provide 
advice and assistance to our Partners.

To ensure that appropriate resources are available to support the 
evolution of the Partnership, we have tasked the Council in Permanent 
Session to provide before our Spring Ministerial a report on the 
resource and staffing requirements for the Partnership, in the context 
of the overall report on Alliance budgetary management, structures and 
procedures which we have already requested.

We are looking forward to tomorrow's meeting with our Partners in the 
North Atlantic Cooperation Council to discuss the state of our 
cooperation and to consult on current European security issues.  In 
order to enhance the effectiveness and utility of the NACC, we have 
instructed the Council in Permanent Session to generate, together with 
our Partners, a more focused and result-oriented approach to those 
issues which are central to our cooperation programmes including 
developing common political objectives where appropriate.

Within the NACC framework, we attach particular importance to programmes 
designed to give increased emphasis to the development of civil-military 
relations and the democratic control of armed forces and to the 
promotion of good neighbourly relations.  Building on the dialogue 
already underway in PfP, we look forward to working with Partners to 
develop common objectives to assist them in ongoing reform efforts.

We welcome the first steps taken to streamline and harmonise NACC and 
Partnership structures and procedures, in line with our remit of 

7.  We note with satisfaction the progress achieved through NATO's 
enlargement study, the briefings to our Partners, and Partners' positive 
responses to our presentations.  The study will remain a valuable 
foundation for the enlargement process.

We have considered the issues raised by Partners which now need to be 
addressed in greater detail.  Accordingly, we have decided that in 1996 
the enlargement process will consist of three elements:

  --  With those Partners who so wish, we would pursue, on an individual 
basis, intensive bilateral and multilateral consultations, building on 
the foundation of the enlargement study and the presentations made 
during the first phase.  Any interested Partner would be able to pursue 
an intensified, individual dialogue with the Alliance;
  --  Through further enhancement of the Partnership for Peace, the 
Alliance will adopt a programme of practical work that will strengthen 
ties between the Alliance and all of our Partners; For some Partners 
these activities will facilitate their ability to assume the 
responsibilities of membership, while for others they will serve to 
strengthen their long-term partnership with the Alliance;
  --  The Alliance will consider what internal adaptations and other 
measures are necessary to ensure that enlargement preserves the 
effectiveness of the Alliance.  In particular, we must examine the 
resource and staffing implications of enlargement.

These three elements will constitute the next phase of the enlargement 
process which NATO began in January 1994.  Intensified dialogue will 
work in two directions.  Interested Partners   will learn more about the 
specific and practical details of Alliance membership; they can review 
their efforts in terms of the various precepts and principles included 
in the enlargement study.  NATO, in turn, will learn more about what 
individual Partners could or could not contribute to the Alliance and 
could begin to identify areas for additional work.  Participation in 
this next phase would not imply that interested Partners would 
automatically be invited to begin accession talks with NATO.

We have tasked the Council in Permanent Session, with the advice of the 
NATO Military Authorities, to develop and implement each element   of 
this next phase starting early in 1996, taking into account the 
conclusions of the study and an assessment   of the briefing process.  
This phase will continue through 1996; we will assess progress at our 
December 1996 Ministerial and consider the way forward.

8.  We affirm the need to continue the efforts initiated by our Heads of 
State and Government to adapt the political and military structures of 
the Alliance to take account of the full range of Alliance missions, the 
admission of new members into the Alliance and the emerging European 
Security and Defence Identity.

We welcome the progress made, while recognising that much remains to be 
done to complete this important task.  Key to these efforts is the 
finalisation of the CJTF concept, which is a means to provide separable, 
but not separate military capabilities that could be employed by NATO or 
the WEU, including in operations with participating nations outside the 
Alliance.  We are very encouraged by the significant progress that has 
been made recently within the Alliance and consider that we now have a 
good basis on which to proceed to final agreement in the near term.  We 
have tasked the Council in Permanent Session to complete, as a matter of 
urgency, the detailed work necessary to finalise the concept to the full 
satisfaction of all Allies.  We welcome the WEU's continuing readiness 
to intensify cooperation with NATO on these matters and look forward to 
further close consultations between the two organisations.

9.  We note with satisfaction the increasing ties between NATO and the 
WEU and are determined to strengthen further our relations and 
cooperation on the basis of agreed principles of complementarity and 
transparency.  We support the improvement of WEU's operational 
capabilities, which would strengthen the European pillar of our Alliance 
and enable the European Allies to take greater responsibility for 
shouldering their share of the common security and defence.  We 
therefore direct the Council in Permanent Session to expedite 
implementation of the decisions taken in this regard at the Brussels 

We attach importance to the dialogue that has been established between 
the two organisations, including in Joint Council meetings, on subjects 
of common concern and are determined to develop them further.   In this 
connection, we have tasked the Council in Permanent Session to identify, 
in consultation with the WEU, additional areas of our respective 
activities on which exchanges of information, consultations and 
cooperation would be of mutual benefit.  We also expect a deepening of 
mutually beneficial NATO-WEU cooperation in the areas of intelligence, 
strategic mobility and logistics, which would help in developing the 
WEU's operational capability.

We noted the establishment of EUROFOR and EUROMARFOR by Italy, Portugal, 
Spain and France and of the France-British Euro-Air Group.  We welcome 
the prospect of all of these multinational capabilities becoming 
available to NATO as well as to the WEU, in keeping with the existing 
NATO commitments of participating nations, and we look forward to the 
early definition of the relationship of EUROFOR and EUROMARFOR to NATO.  
We note Luxembourg's decision to participate in the EUROCORPS and the 
new operational status, as of 30th November 1995, of the EUROCORPS, 
which will contribute to the greater operational capability of the 
European pillar of the Alliance.

We further welcome the "Common Concept of the 27 WEU Countries on 
European Security," adopted at the WEU Council in Madrid, which 
represents an important contribution by the WEU to the process of 
developing the new European security architecture.  We note with 
particular attention the "WEU Contribution to the 1996 European Union 
Inter-Governmental Conference," which is an important contribution for 
the development of a European Security and Defence Identity and 
therefore of great relevance to the Alliance.  We reiterate our support 
for the development of this identity, which will strengthen the European 
pillar of the Alliance and thus the Alliance itself.  We expect that 
further NATO-WEU discussion of these matters will be helpful in 
attaining this goal.

10.  The OSCE has an essential role in European security and in 
promoting stability on the Continent.  We continue to be committed to 
furthering its comprehensive approach to security and to strengthening 
its effectiveness, particularly in conflict prevention, management and 
resolution.  From an Alliance perspective, widening the process of 
democratic development throughout Europe is essential to maintaining 
security for all of its members.  Arms control and confidence-building 
measures are central elements for further developing cooperative 
security in Europe, as are the development of norms and standards for 
democratic control and use of armed forces.

The OSCE will be a valuable partner of the Alliance in the 
implementation of a peace settlement in Bosnia.  We look forward to 
working together with the OSCE in this endeavour.  Its role in the 
elections process, in monitoring human rights, and in establishing 
confidence- and security-building measures and arms control in the 
Former Yugoslavia is central to the peace process.  The implementation 
of the peace settlement will be one promising test ground for 
cooperation in many areas between our two organisations.  We note the 
proposal to consider the convening of a regional table, in the context 
of the OSCE "Pact on Stability."

We support the continued efforts of the Minsk Group to achieve a 
political settlement of the conflict in and around Nagorno-Karabakh, 
which would, along with other conditions, allow the deployment of an 
OSCE multinational peacekeeping force, as agreed at the Budapest Summit.

We welcome the ongoing efforts    of the OSCE assistance group for 
Chechnya, which is assisting the civilian population, monitoring the 
human rights situation, and supporting a political settlement of the 
conflict under OSCE auspices.  We urge the parties to pursue meaningful 
negotiations seeking an end to hostilities and to the continued 
suffering among the civilian population.

We warmly welcome the recent meeting of the OSCE Chairman-in-Office with 
the North Atlantic Council and will continue our efforts to improve the 
pattern of contacts between NATO and the OSCE, including through senior 
representation at Ministerial meetings and, on a more routine basis, 
through the International Staff.  We will continue to coordinate our 
contributions to the development of an OSCE Security Model for the 21st 
Century, which aims at the coherent development of a European security 
architecture including all participating states.

11.  We attach great importance to the full implementation and continued 
integrity and effectiveness of the CFE Treaty.  The Treaty is a 
cornerstone of European security.  The reduction period, completed on 
17th November, has resulted in the remarkable, unprecedented destruction 
of about 50,000 pieces of military equipment in Europe.  Transparency 
and enhanced cooperation between armed forces have been important 
features of this process, to which NATO has made a major contribution.

However, we note with concern all cases of failure by States Parties to 
fulfil their Treaty obligations, among them the problem of Russia's 
flank obligations.  We stress that compliance with legally binding 
obligations is a necessary foundation for good overall relations.

We welcome the 17th November Decision by the Joint Consultative Group, 
in which the 30 CFE States reconfirm their commitment to the Treaty and 
agree to find a cooperative solution to the flank problem, which does 
not diminish the security of any State.  In this context, we specially 
urge all States Parties who have failed to comply with their 
obligations, to intensify their efforts to reach as quickly as possible 
such a cooperative solution acceptable to all.  These problems should be 
addressed through an open-minded and constructive dialogue.  This will 
provide a firm basis for the successful outcome of the Review Conference 
next year and the continued integrity and viability of the Treaty.

12.  We reiterate our conviction that security in Europe is greatly 
affected by security and stability in the Mediterranean.  We are 
satisfied with the talks held this year with a number of Mediterranean 
non-NATO countries (Egypt, Israel, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia) in 
order to explore the possibilities for a permanent dialogue with 
countries in the region.  In light of the interest shown, we have 
decided to pursue further the dialogue, with the aim of fostering 
transparency and achieving a better mutual understanding with the 
countries to our South, and with a view to contributing to strengthening 
stability in the Mediterranean region.  We welcome the extension of the 
dialogue to Jordan.  Our initiative complements without duplicating 
other international efforts aimed at fostering stability in this region, 
in particular the Euro-Mediterranean Conference held in Barcelona in 
November 1995.

13.  The Alliance's continuing success in addressing the political and 
defence aspects of proliferation, furthered by the work of the Senior 
Politico-Military Group on Proliferation and Senior Defence Group on 
Proliferation, demonstrates NATO's resolve to work together on common 
security concerns and is an important aspect of the Alliance's ongoing 
adaptation.  We welcome and endorse this work as a contribution to 
enhancing NATO's ability to safeguard the security of its members states 
in the face of direct risks posed by NBC proliferation.  We also welcome 
the consultations with Cooperation Partners on proliferation issues.

We reiterate our conviction that the indefinite extension of the Treaty 
on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons constitutes a decisive step 
towards the strengthening of the international non-proliferation regime 
and of international security.  We appeal to all states not yet party to 
the Treaty to accede to it at the earliest date.

We fully support the ongoing efforts in the Conference on Disarmament 
towards achievement as the highest priority in 1996 of a global ban on 
all nuclear testing.  We believe that the conclusion of a Comprehensive 
Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT) are 
important elements in strengthening the international non-proliferation 
regime, of which the cornerstone is the Nuclear Non-Proliferation 
Treaty.  In this respect, we welcome the decision taken by France, the 
United Kingdom and United States in favour of a treaty prohibiting all 
nuclear weapon test explosions and all other nuclear explosions, which 
will facilitate the adoption of a total and complete test ban.

We welcome the ongoing implementation of the START I Treaty.  We note 
the importance of an early entry into force of the START II Treaty, the 
Chemical Weapons Convention, and the Open Skies Treaty.  We support the 
ongoing work to strengthen confidence in compliance with the Biological 
Weapons Convention.  We are pleased that the Review Conference of the UN 
Weaponry Convention in Vienna was able to agree on a new protocol on 
control of blinding laser weapons, and look forward to it reaching 
agreement on a substantially strengthened protocol on landmines as the 
Conference reconvenes in Geneva.

14.  International terrorist crimes cannot be justified under any 
circumstances.  They constitute a serious threat to peace, security and 
stability which can threaten the territorial integrity of states.  We 
reiterate our strong commitment to combat this scourge.  We condemn all 
acts, methods and practices of international terrorism regardless of 
their origins, causes and purposes.

15.  We reaffirm our commitment to the Alliance's common-funded 
programmes.  We consider these programmes vital elements in underpinning 
our military structures, providing essential operating capability and 
strengthening Alliance cohesion.  We need to ensure that resources are 
targetted at those programmes which will have the highest priority.  We 
note that work is continuing on the examination of Alliance budgetary 
management, structures and procedures, and look forward to reports on 
progress by the time we next meet.

16.  The Spring 1996 meeting of the North Atlantic Council in 
Ministerial Session will be held in Berlin, Germany, on 3rd June.  



Recent Achievements in Europe and Their Implications
Secretary Christopher
Opening statement at a news conference, Washington, DC, December 8, 1995 
(introductory remarks deleted)

I wanted to share some thoughts with you this morning on what was a 
genuine watershed week in Europe--a watershed week for American 

Across Europe, from Northern Ireland to the Balkans to the Baltics, last 
week's events have brought us closer to the goals America has sought in 
Europe for half a century--peace, stability, prosperity, and an 
undivided continent.

These events demonstrate once again that American leadership in Europe 
is essential.  Our commitment to provide that leadership is unequivocal.  
Any thought that the United States and Europe should be allowed to let 
their historic ties wither is simply misguided and wrong.

After returning from my recent trip, I'm more convinced than ever that 
our nation has a vital interest in European security.  For 50 years, we 
have stood with Europe, and Europe has stood with us.  Walking away now 
is not an option.  It would be shortsighted and damaging to American 
interests and American values.

Nowhere is it more critical that Members of Congress take the long view 
than in connection with Bosnia. I've been around for a long time, and 
I've heard many debates about America's role in Europe.  For 50 years, 
our bipartisan choice for leadership and engagement has brought us great 
security and immense prosperity.

I hope that the Members of Congress, especially the younger members, 
will recall this history.  I urge them to reflect on the 
responsibilities and benefits of leadership.  The plain fact is that if 
we don't lead this peace mission now, war will return to Bosnia and 
American leadership will erode.

The President had quite an extraordinary trip to Europe.  In London, 
Dublin, Belfast, and in talking with our soldiers in Germany, his words 
resonated all through the continent.  I heard this over and over again 
as I traveled in Europe.  He was the first sitting President to visit 
Northern Ireland where his personal involvement helped bring that 
troubled land much closer to peace.

In Madrid, the President signed the Transatlantic Agenda between the 
United States and the European Union which commits us to joint action 
across the full range of common interests.  Two days later in Brussels, 
responding to the President's initiative for Bosnia, NATO launched the 
largest-single operation in its history, and it did so with a clear 
demonstration of unity and purpose.

In addition, NATO ministers began the second phase of the NATO 
enlargement process, which remains on a steady, deliberate, careful 
course.  We also took steps to strengthen the Partnership for Peace, an 
initiative which has exceeded all of its expectations and has earned for 
itself a permanent place in Europe.  Finally, we welcomed a new 
Secretary General of NATO, Javier Solana, to help us meet the challenges 
of the future and to guide NATO at one of the most critical periods of 
its history.

These were the achievements of the last week or so.  Let me reflect on 
their implications, especially those of the mission in Bosnia.

In the next few months, our most important challenge will be to 
implement the Dayton Peace Agreement while minimizing the risks to our 
troops.  But in Brussels, my counterparts and I were also very much 
aware that this is a defining moment for NATO.

First, there can no longer be any doubt that NATO is here to stay as the 
guarantor of transatlantic security.  Without NATO, it is clear that 
there would be no peace in Bosnia.  Without a unified NATO-led force on 
the ground, the parties would not have the confidence to implement the 
peace agreement.  That is one reason why France has now agreed to 
participate more fully in the military aspects of NATO and why troops 
from the formerly neutral countries of Europe, such as Finland and 
Sweden, will serve in Bosnia under NATO command.

Second, it is widely recognized in Europe, and especially among our NATO 
allies, that American leadership is essential.  In fact, in Brussels my 
colleagues made it clear that without American leadership and 
participation, we would not have this chance for peace, and NATO would 
not be able to carry out its mission in Bosnia.

Asserting our leadership in Bosnia puts us in a stronger position to 
advance our interests all through Europe.  It will have enormously 
positive consequences for our interests in European security and 
integration.  It will make us more effective in asserting our global 
priorities in such diverse areas as arms control, trade, and 
environmental protection.

Third, the very nature of our coalition in Bosnia has historic 
implications.  Russia will contribute 2,000 troops.  Nearly every 
country from Central Europe will participate.  Indeed, since the rise of 
the nation-state in Europe, this is the first time that soldiers from 
virtually every European power will serve together in a common military 
endeavor.  Never before have we been able to say with such confidence 
that our only remaining enemy in Europe is war itself.

NATO is able to work with its new partners so effectively because two 
years ago President Clinton had the foresight to propose the Partnership 
for Peace.  Now all the joint exercises and exchanges and training that 
we've had in the last two years will pay off in a real mission with real 

That mission will enhance our ability to work together.  It will show 
that NATO and Russia can cooperate constructively in this kind of a 
mission.  It will give some of our partners a chance to show that they 
can meet the obligations of NATO membership and will be a step in that 
deliberate path that we're following.

Before leaving Europe, I met with the Foreign Ministers of the Central 
European and Baltic countries, as is my new tradition to do.  I was 
struck by their appreciation of American leadership, their confidence in 
the NATO mission in Bosnia, and their commitment to participate in it.  
As we work with them to overcome the terrible division of Bosnia, we can 
also advance the President's concept of the importance of an integrated, 
unified Europe.

IFOR must succeed, first and foremost, of course, for the sake of peace 
in Bosnia.  But we should understand that another goal is within sight--
an alliance that has evolved to meet the challenges of a new Europe.  
That is, of course, all the more reason to strive for success in the 
mission in Bosnia.  



Renewing the Middle East Peace Process
President Clinton, Israeli Prime Minister Peres
Opening remarks at a press conference, Washington, DC, December 11, 1995

President Clinton.  Good afternoon.  It is a pleasure to welcome Prime 
Minister Peres back to the White House.  For as long as there has been a 
prospect of peace in the Middle East, Shimon Peres has stood at the 
forefront, striving to bring a new day of security and harmony to the 
people of Israel and to all the people of the region.

From his early years as one of the architects of Israel's defense, he 
has devoted himself to ensuring the security of his nation.  From his 
first term as Prime Minister in the mid-1980s, through the negotiations 
that led to the signing here of the Declaration of Principles with the 
Palestinians, to the peace of the Araba with Jordan, to the Interim 
Accord ceremony just 21/2 months ago, Shimon Peres has been a visionary 
for peace.  He has seen the way.  He has been a leader on the path to 
peace.  And time and again he has been proven right.

One of the very last things Yitzhak Rabin said was that Shimon Peres was 
his full partner in forging peace.  With those words and the memory of 
my friend in mind, let me renew now the pledge I first made to Prime 
Minister Rabin at the beginning of my presidency.  

Mr.  Prime Minister, as Israel continues to take risks for a lasting and 
comprehensive peace the United States will stand with you to minimize 
those risks and to ensure your success.  I pledge to you personally, 
Shimon, that I will be your partner in peace.

Until an assassin's bullet cut short his life, Prime Minister Rabin rose 
time and again to the challenges of peace.  The United States knows 
that, just as he has in the past, Prime Minister Peres will do so as 
well.  It is a measure of how much has changed in the Middle East that 
on his journey here the Prime Minister met with King Hussein, President 
Mubarak, and Chairman Arafat, and that on his trip home he will visit 
with King Hussein of Morocco.

I have been especially encouraged to hear the Prime Minister talk about 
the progress in redeploying forces.  He reviewed for me his meeting with 
Chairman Arafat, who reaffirmed his commitment to building upon and 
implementing the Declaration of Principles and the Interim Agreement.  

The key to a lasting settlement in the Middle East is achieving peace 
between Israel and Syria, and Israel and Lebanon.  Today, Prime Minister 
Peres and I agreed to redouble our efforts to achieve these goals.  We 
agree that to close the circle of peace it will take more intensive and 
more practical negotiations.  Each side will need to make a greater 
effort to take account of the others' concerns.  The United States 
stands ready to help bring the parties together and work with them in 
the negotiations.  Peace is our mission.  The Prime Minister and I are 
determined that nothing--nothing--will deter us from this task in the 
weeks and the months ahead.

Today, I have also spoken with President Asad of Syria about our talks 
here in Washington.  President Asad told me he was committed to do his 
best to move the peace process forward and to reach an early agreement 
between Syria and Israel.  He also agreed to my proposal that Secretary 
Christopher travel to the region next week to consult with him on the 
next steps we will take together.

We, of course, recognize that the differences will not disappear 
immediately.  Great hurdles must be overcome, but an Israel-Syria 
settlement is worth our every effort.  It would end the Arab-Israeli 
conflict.  It would establish a comprehensive peace.  It could transform 
the face of the entire Middle East and the lives of all its inhabitants.

That was Yitzhak Rabin's dream.  Here at the White House, that soldier 
of peace said, "enough of blood and tears." The United States is 
heartened that Shimon Peres will carry on.  Together, we will work to 
fulfill Yitzhak Rabin's legacy.

Mr.  Prime Minister, as you go forward, the United States will go with 
you, and proudly.

Prime Minister Peres.  Mr.  President, Mr.  Vice President, Mr.  
Secretary of State, ladies and gentlemen:  Let me say from my heart that 
we are so moved by the American participation in our great sadness when 
Prime Minister Rabin was assassinated.  Mr.  President, you have led a 
most unusual delegation that moved our heart:  the President himself, 
two former presidents, the Secretary of State, two former secretaries, 
the leaders of the Senate and of the House of Representatives, and 
important--of journalists, of leaders.  There was greatness in the 
sadness as Prime Minister Rabin was assassinated because he was right, 
not because he was wrong.  

And may I say, ladies and gentlemen, that President Clinton did 
something most unusual.  He has added an expression to the Israeli 
dictionary--shalom, chaver.  It is a very unusual combination.  And for 
ones who don't understand Hebrew, let me say, the Russians are saying, 
"a comrade," which I know exactly what it is; the Americans are saying 
"a friend," which I understand what it is; but the Israelis are saying 
"chaver," which means togetherness.  And since the President has used 
this word, we feel more together.  We feel that we have an enriched 
dictionary among ourselves, and between the United States of America and 
us.  Believe me, I speak on behalf of all the Israelis for this 
enrichment of expression and feelings.

So I should really start by saying, shalom, chaver.  These, your 
farewell words to Prime Minister Rabin echoed throughout our land.  The 
people of Israel will never forget your moving demonstration of 
solidarity in a moment of grief, of shock, of disbelief, and 
determination.  For us, you're a leader; you're a friend.

I stand beside you, Mr.  President, in the footsteps of my partner, a 
great captain of peace, Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin.  Together with 
you-- and I know how much he trusted you-- we scaled the trail from the 
depths of hostility to the highlands of promising peace.  Indeed, 
together, we shall stay the course and, with firm resolve, reach a 
destiny of lasting and secure peace.  A peace for the whole of the 
Middle East--Arabs and Jews, Jews and Arabs--this was Yitzhak Rabin's 
quest.  It is my commitment.  

Your leadership and devotion to the cause of peace are manifestly clear 
to Israel and to its neighbors as well.  This is a constant direction, 
not a point of passing.  May I say that as Bosnia reeled in agony, you 
offered a compass and a lamp to a confused situation, ending blood, 
offering hope, as in the Middle East.  It is time to put an end to the 
Arab-Israeli conflict.  With you, Mr.  President, in the forefront, by 
our side, it may become possible, as it did in the past, bringing, 
thereby, peace, security, and prosperity to all people.  Prophecy may 
meet reality again and again.

Since your presidency and through our partnership, the Middle East has 
already undergone an unbelievable change.  Here at the White House on 
September 13, 1993, we came to grips with the heart of the problem.  The 
Israeli-Palestinian Declaration of Principles created a road map by 
means of which the Palestinians, alongside Israel, are becoming masters 
of their destinies.  Palestinian elections are a new promise that 
reflects the interaction between peace and democracy.  Nothing is a 
better guarantee for peace than democracy.

Israel and Jordan are displaying its fruits day in and day out.  Peace 
with Egypt remains a cornerstone of the peace process, for, by it, 
regional war is no longer the justification of policies that leaves 
lands deserted rather than flourishing.

Today, we seek an opening of a new, maybe a final, chapter:  the end of 
war in the Middle East in its totality.  Peace between Syria and Israel 
and between Lebanon and Israel will leave no reason whatsoever for the 
continuation of belligerency.  Syria, together with us, stands in a 
unique position to contribute to a peaceful Middle East.  The conflict 
between us has been bitter, complicated.  The land that gave birth to 
prophecy can now give birth to yet a new vision.

President Asad and myself can, with the assistance of your leadership, 
Mr.  President, and the assistance of your administration and Congress, 
build a new equation of genuine peace and security to end terror, to 
begin a market economy.  I speak of boundaries of permanent peace.  I 
speak of lands of new and great opportunity.  Peace between us must 
indeed put an end to the conflict that has mired our region for so long.  
The President, the Secretary of State, and their peace team will 
continue to create with us the architecture for peace in the region.  We 
welcome you.  

Today, I discussed the possible new opportunity with President Clinton.  
I find a warmth and an openness in our discussion, and I am very 
grateful.  Mr. President, we are proud to be partners with you in 
working to make this prospect become a reality.  It is my hope that 
President Asad will join us soon on this historic journey.  

To my fellow Israelis, I can say we have in you, Mr.  President, a true 
friend and a true partner.  There is no time now for political vacation.  
We don't intend to rest.  We intend to continue the momentum, full-speed 
ahead, in the name of all Israelis.  And,  I think all Israelis, they 
will tell you, Mr.  President, toda, chaver--thank you, chaver.   



American Leadership and the New Europe:  Implementing the Dayton Peace 
Deputy Secretary Talbott
Address to the World Affairs Council, Pittsburgh, PA, December 14, 1995

Thanks, Jerry [Dempsey].  Let me begin by adding my own condolences to 
the family and many friends of George Oehmler, who did me the honor of 
introducing me when I appeared before this group in 1991.  Let me also 
thank Peter Stephans, Judy Nees, and everyone associated with the World 
Affairs Council of Pittsburgh for giving me the opportunity to be here 
today.  I'd also like to thank George Savarese, who has been my host, 
traveling companion, and interviewer during my visit here.   

Denny Rusinow, who was my friend and mentor and neighbor in Yugoslavia 
20-some years ago, has told me about the splendid work that this 
organization does in keeping your community informed about the vital 
issues that face our country and the world as a whole.  It is certainly 
a fine tribute to George Oehmler, and I am pleased to be able to play a 
small role in honoring him today.  

Your invitation has given me what those of us who work in Washington so 
often need:  a chance to get out into the real world.  I'm particularly 
glad to be in this part of the real world, which is not far from where I 
grew up, in Cleveland.  Now, that may sound like a segue into some good-
natured observations about the NFL rivalry between your home town and 
mine.  But given what's happening to the Browns this season--and I don't 
mean just losing games to the Steelers--I think I'll just move on to 
other subjects.  And when we get to the question-and-answer period, you 
can ask me about anyone or anything on earth no matter how disagreeable-
-Muammar Qadhafi, Kim Jong Il,  Saddam Hussein--just don't ask me about 
Art Modell, okay?    

Actually, I didn't move to Cleveland until I was six years old.  I was 
born south of there, in Dayton, Ohio.  Now, that's a reason for hometown 
pride--and, I might add, national pride!  Twenty-three days ago, on 
November 21, American diplomats--principally my boss, Warren 
Christopher, and my old friend, Dick Holbrooke--brokered, in Dayton, a 
settlement to end the war in Bosnia.  About seven hours ago, the 
Secretary, Dick Holbrooke, and President Clinton were at the Elysee 
Palace in Paris, where they witnessed the signing of the Dayton accords.  

But, as all of you know, the relief and satisfaction that all Americans 
feel over the prospect of peace in the former Yugoslavia has been mixed 
with apprehension, skepticism--in some cases outright anger--over the 
prospect of the United States' armed forces taking part in the 
implementation of that peace.  My principal purpose in meeting with you 
today is to explain why President Clinton is convinced that the American 
military role in Bosnia is in the vital interest of our country--and why 
it therefore deserved the support it received from the United States 
Congress yesterday.  To drive that point home, I would like to spend a 
few minutes on President Clinton's strategic vision for building an 
undivided Europe--a Europe united by a shared commitment to democracy, 
civil society, and the free market.   

Pittsburgh is a good place to emphasize that point, since this city is a 
microcosm of our nation, which owes much of its strength and identity to 
the many nations of Europe.  I was reminded of this last evening, 
driving in from the airport, emerging from the Fort Pitt Tunnel and 
seeing all those church spires on your skyline.  There are more than 
2,400 houses of worship in and around this city, and many of them serve 
to keep alive your citizens' roots in one Old Country or another--
especially in countries that have suffered, through much of this 
century, under communism.  There's the Immaculate Heart of Mary, a 
center of the Polish Hill community; there's St.  John the Baptist, 
where Ukrainian Americans gather every Sunday on the South Side; there's 
Temple B'nai Emunosh, on Squirrel Hill, a congregation which includes 
many recent immigrants from the former Soviet Union; and then there are 
the two St.  Nicholases--the Croatian Catholic Church in Milvale and the 
Serbian Orthodox Church in Monroeville.  

The last time I was here, I visited the Nationality Rooms and Inter-
cultural Exchange Program at the Cathedral of Learning on the campus of 
the University of Pittsburgh.  I remember that these 23--soon to be 24--
classrooms are decorated with the murals and furniture of the many 
faraway lands to which this city's citizens can trace their origins.  
The point is, we owe Europe a lot.  But it owes us a lot, too.   

Three times in this century, Americans have come to Europe's rescue--
twice in hot wars, once in a cold one.  And each time we did so for 
reasons that reflected not just our national generosity and our sense of 
international obligation but also for a hard-headed, forward-looking 
recognition of our vital self-interest.  We, the United States, have had 
to keep sending our armies "over there," across the Atlantic, because 
we--Americans and Europeans alike--have had so much difficulty defining 
and putting in place a set of rules and institutions that would keep the 
continental peace on which transatlantic security and prosperity, to a 
large extent, depend.  In short, we've had a lot of trouble in the 20th 
century getting it right in Europe.  

Fifty years ago, in the spring of 1945,  most of the peoples of Central 
and Eastern Europe ended up on the wrong side of the dividing line 
marked by the westward advance of the Red Army.  That was the real 
beginning--and the primary cause--of the Cold War.  Now that great 
struggle is over.  With its end, it is not only possible but imperative 
that we extend to all of Europe the benefits and responsibilities of the 
political and economic partnerships that have been such a source of 
strength for the West.  That is why our Administration has focused so 
much of our country's foreign policy resources on political and economic 
assistance programs for the emerging market democracies of Central 
Europe and the New Independent States of the former Soviet Union.  
That's also why President Clinton has renewed the U.S.  commitment to 
NATO, the anchor of American engagement in Europe and the linchpin of 
transatlantic security.  Now that the Cold War has ended, we must work 
with our NATO allies to bring the new democracies of Central Europe and 
the former Soviet Union into a new European security order.  Thanks to 
President Clinton's determined leadership over the past three years, 
NATO expansion will be a key part of that process.   

NATO remains vital to the national security of the United States because 
the end of the Cold War has left us with a formidable array of security 
challenges, in Europe as elsewhere around the globe.  Perhaps the most 
serious of those threats are those posed by aggressive nationalism and 
ethnic conflict--and nowhere have these threats arisen more starkly than 
in the former Yugoslavia.  

For the past four years, we have witnessed in that troubled region the 
greatest carnage and the worst atrocities in Europe since World War II.  
Thanks to the persistent efforts of American and European diplomats, 
there is now a peace agreement.  As we debate how to implement the 
peace--which is really a question of whether to implement it--we should 
consider the alternatives--which is to say, the consequences of refusal 
or failure.  

The alternative to the Dayton Peace Agreement is surely a wider, even 
more terrible conflict.  If warfare were to break out anew in Bosnia, it 
could spread to other nations--to the north, south, and east.  Albania 
could intervene to protect the ethnic Albanians who live in the southern 
Serbian province of Kosovo.  Fighting there could cause a massive flow 
of refugees into Macedonia, destabilizing that fragile, newly 
independent country and, perhaps, drawing in, on opposite sides, Greece 
and Turkey.  

Meanwhile, the entire Islamic world is watching.  Muslims everywhere are 
waiting to see whether their co-religionists in Bosnia will be accorded 
the same rights and protections as other Europeans.  We must not let the 
Balkans give radical elements from the Middle East a foothold in the 
heart of Europe.  

Then there is the fate of NATO itself.  A resumption of the war would 
threaten the viability of an organization that is vital to us and to 
Europe.  If we were to adopt a posture of standing aside with our 
fingers crossed behind our backs, we would discredit the alliance as a 
whole and our leadership of it.  The alliance can no more ignore the 
conflagration in the Balkans than an architect can ignore a fire raging 
in one wing of a building on which he is working.   

The United States is the leader of the Alliance; therefore, the United 
States must lead in Bosnia.  Merely hoping that the fire there will burn 
itself out or that someone else will come along with enough buckets of 
water to put it out is not just wishful thinking.  It would be, if it 
were the basis for policy, extremely irresponsible and deeply harmful to 
our national interests.  

Another point:  If the fighting in Yugoslavia resumes--and if it 
escalates and spreads--it would put increasing strain on relations 
between the United States and Russia, and it would do so at a time of 
ferment and uncertainty in Russian domestic politics.  In short, a new 
eruption of fighting in the Balkans would undermine our twin strategic 
objectives in Europe.  Those are, first, to advance integration between 
East and West and,  second, to restrain post-communist disintegration in 
the East.  So those are the stakes.  High stakes justify--indeed, 
require--bold action.   

We must, of course, be hard-headed in assessing the costs and risks.  
And our troops who will be deployed as part of the Bosnia peace 
implementation force will, indeed, face risks.   

But President Clinton; Secretary of State Bill Perry; and Gen. John 
Shalikashvili, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, are doing 
absolutely everything in their power--which is considerable--to reduce 
those risks.  

They are doing so in four ways:  

First, the Implementation Force is being deployed only now that the 
parties to the conflict have agreed to a real peace.  We are not sending 
them into a shooting war, as we did in World War I and World War II, not 
to mention Vietnam, Lebanon, or Somalia.  

Second, the force will be militarily formidable.  It will be more than 
capable not only of defending itself but also of compelling the parties 
to the peace agreement to live up to the commitments embodied in the 
peace settlement.    

Third , we will be sharing the burden--as well as the risk and the cost.  
Only a third of the implementation force will be American.  Our NATO 
allies--France, Great Britain, and the rest--will provide tens of 
thousands of troops.   

And while this will be a NATO-led operation, other nations that are not 
members of the Alliance will participate as well.  Virtually all of the 
nations of Central Europe--including Poland, Hungary, the Czech and 
Slovak Republics,  Lithuania, and Ukraine--have agreed to contribute 
troops.  Russia will send some 2,000 soldiers, making this a most 
concrete example of U.S.-Russian military cooperation in the post-Cold 
War era.  

Fourth, the role which our soldiers are being asked to play is carefully 
defined and circumscribed.  Its main responsibilities will be monitoring 
the separation of the former combatants and patrolling the new 
boundaries between them during a much-needed cooling-off period.  In 
short, there will be no "mission creep" from purely military tasks into 

We have a clear exit strategy.  We believe that 12 months is an accurate 
estimate of how long it will take for the military implementation force 
to accomplish its mission.  Non-military tasks, such as policing, 
election and human rights monitoring, and economic reconstruction will 
be the responsibility of international civilian and non-governmental 

The larger job of building a stable, democratic, and prosperous multi-
ethnic society in Bosnia will, of course, take much longer than 12 
months; it will take years if not decades.  That task will be on the 
shoulders of the people of the region, but they will have to rely 
heavily on support from the European Union, the United Nations, and 
other international institutions and organizations.  The non-
governmental sector also has a vital role to play--from the  
International Red Cross and Medicins Sans Frontiers to grass-roots 
support from communities around the globe.   

In this regard, Pittsburgh is exemplary.  The Croatian Fraternal Union 
and the Serbian National Federation, both of whose national headquarters 
are located in this city, have played important roles in providing 
humanitarian relief to the region over the past four years.  So, too, 
have the local chapter of the United Jewish Fund and the Islamic Center 
in Oakland.  

For all those reasons, we are confident that we can get the job done in 
Bosnia--and that we can manage and minimize the risks to our troops.  At 
the same time, as we conduct our national debate over this policy, we 
must be just as tough-minded in recognizing the costs and risks that we 
would incur if, instead of taking action, we were to choose inaction--
particularly inaction or inadequate action in the face of atrocities 
such as mass rape, concentration camps, massacres, and forced 
deportations.  The term "ethnic cleansing" has already been inscribed 
into the glossary of this century--right here next to "final solution" 
as an administrative euphemism for genocide.   

The phenomenon of "ethnic cleansing" in the Balkans, by that or any 
other name, is not only an issue of moralpolitik, it is also an issue of 
realpolitik.  Even when the phrase ethnic cleaning means "merely" mass 
deportation rather than mass murder, it captures the essence of what is 
most insidious--and most contagious--about the catastrophe that has 
befallen the former Yugoslavia.  If aggressive nationalism triumphs 
there, it will not only be devastating in that region, it will be 
ominous elsewhere as well,  especially to the north and to the east.   

Throughout the former Soviet empire, dark forces similar to those that 
have convulsed the Balkans are vying with those of freedom and tolerance 
to fill the partial vacuum left by the collapse of communist rule.  Just 
to cite one example:  The lethal syndrome that we often call 
Balkanization could just as well be termed Caucasus-ization.  Over the 
past four years, the peoples of Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Armenia have 
suffered in much the same way as the people of the Balkans.  

If there is to be a post-Cold War peace in Europe--and not a cold peace 
but a real one--it must be based on the principle of multi-ethnic 
democracy.  The United States is one of the first and one of the 
greatest examples of that principle, not least because it is home to 
cities such as Pittsburgh.  Therefore it is right and natural--and in 
our national interest--that the United States should champion that 
principle elsewhere.  And it should do so, among other reasons, because 
multi-ethnic democracies are more likely to be good trading partners, 
good neighbors, good citizens of the international community.  

I realize that there is a lot of skepticism about whether the values and 
institutions associated with multi-ethnic democracy can ever take hold 
in the former Yugoslavia.  Listen carefully to the current debate about 
our policy  and the forthcoming deployment of U.S.  troops, and you will 
often hear the suggestion that the conflict among Serbs, Croats, and 
Muslims is, quite simply, insoluble; that the region is a permanent and 
hopeless quagmire--a word intended to have, in our ears, cautionary 
echoes of Vietnam.   

You will sometimes hear a hint that there's something in the air or the 
water  of the Balkans that dooms those "wretched" people to slaughter 
each other.  That's often the subliminal message, I believe, of the 
cliche about "ancient hatreds." As I mentioned earlier, my wife and I 
lived in Yugoslavia for two years  at the beginning of our careers as 
journalists, around the corner from Denny, Mary, and Allison Rusinow, 
who are here today.  We saw how the South Slavs could live harmoniously 
with each other, notably including in Bosnia.   

There was nothing predestined about the horror that has been raging in 
the Balkans for the past four years.  It was foolish, demagogic local 
politics,  along with short-sighted international diplomacy that helped 
trigger, in the late 1980s and early 1990s, the third Balkan war of this 
century.  By the same token, it will take sound, far-sighted diplomacy, 
including plenty of American leadership and statesmanship, to head off a 
resumption and escalation of that war now.  

As we go forward, we should avoid stereotypes about national character, 
particularly ones that would, if they become the basis of our policy, 
consign whole peoples to tyranny or civil war or unending chaos on the 
perverse theory  that that is the fate they deserve, or that that fate 
is encoded in their genes.  Just as there were wise, brave champions of 
freedom in Gdansk and Prague in the 1970s--men such as Lech Walesa and 
Vaclav Havel, who went from being persecuted dissidents to being the 
presidents of their countries--there are individuals in Belgrade and 
Zagreb and Sarajevo today whose basic humanity may, with our help, 
ultimately prevail over the rapacity of some of their countrymen.  Serbs 
and Croats and Muslims have lived peacefully together in Sarajevo, just 
as they have in Pittsburgh, and they can do so again.  

In 1915,  the great British historian Norman Angell said that every 
England has its Ireland and every Ireland has its Ulster.  Angell was 
diagnosing what has been a very European malignancy, particularly in 
this century:  aggressive, intolerant nationalism.  But, even as we 
experience our own fin de siecle recurrence of the disease, we are 
having some success with the cure.   

Take Ulster itself.  Not too long ago, that place name, like Bosnia 
today,  stood for a murderously insoluble problem.  Yet, today, the 
people of Northern Ireland  are finally within reach of peace--that's 
thanks mostly to themselves.  But it's also thanks to their desire to 
belong to an increasingly integrated Europe, and it's thanks as well to 
American statesmanship.  Similarly, other regions that we not long ago 
thought were doomed to permanent conflict are proving otherwise:  the 
Middle East and Southern Africa.  

Now that same, more favorable, more hopeful wave of history has reached 
the Balkans.  The leaders of the former Yugoslavia have agreed on a 
peace.  With the Dayton accords and the Elysee signing now behind us, 
the tough work of implementation begins.   

The parties to the conflict and our NATO allies have made clear that 
they are counting on significant U.S.  participation in the 
implementation force.  Without our being there, the force as a whole 
won't be there, in which case there will be no peace, and we will face 
the array of consequences that I have outlined here.  

Let me conclude by acknowledging what we all recognize:  The conflict in 
the former Yugoslavia has gone on for far too long; it has been the 
cause of far, far too much carnage and destruction, too much misery, too 
much frustration,  too much tension between us and our partners--old and 

All of us wish that something like the Dayton talks could have taken 
place a year ago, better yet two years ago--better still, three or four.  
But we are where we are, and we must make the best of what we have 
before us today.  And what we have, as President Clinton has been saying 
for three years, is a historic opportunity to build, for the first time 
in history, a Europe that is undivided and increasingly united by a 
shared commitment to the values that have made our own country great and 

This time we must get it right.  Taking advantage of this opportunity 
will require steadfastness in our diplomatic efforts and in our military 
commitment.  But success will also require public support.  And to 
muster and sustain that support, we had better have the best possible 
answers to the toughest possible questions--starting with yours right 



The OSCE's Role in Building an Undivided Europe
Deputy Secretary Talbott
Intervention at the OSCE ministerial meeting, Budapest, Hungary, 
December 7, 1995

Good morning.  Mr.  Chairman, Excellencies, colleagues, ladies and 
gentleman:  We meet at a decisive moment--for peace in the Balkans, for 
the future of Europe, and for this organization.  The end of the Cold 
War has given all of us--every country represented here today--the 
opportunity to participate in building an undivided Europe--a Europe 
increasingly free, increasingly secure, increasingly prosperous, 
increasingly integrated.  That goal has been one of President Clinton's 
highest priorities from the start of his Administration.

But in addition to presenting us with a historic opportunity, the end of 
the Cold War has also confronted us with a formidable array of security 
challenges.  The most dangerous and immediate of those is the threat 
posed by aggressive nationalism and ethnic conflict of the kind that 
have wreaked such havoc in the former Yugoslavia.  I look forward to our 
discussion of that issue tomorrow.

It is a starting point for American policy that we must address this, 
and other challenges, together.  That means pooling our resources, 
strengthening and redefining existing institutions and arrangements, and 
creating new mechanisms where necessary.  

The OSCE has a special role to play in the evolution of a new European 
security architecture.  The capacities and common purposes that made the 
CSCE a bridge between East and West  during the Cold War make the OSCE 
essential today.  The organization's broad membership shares a 
conviction that European security and stability depend on 
institutionalized respect for democracy, human rights, and the rule of 
law, as well as arms control and conflict resolution.

The outgoing Chairman-in-Office, Foreign Minister Kovacs, and his staff, 
especially Deputy State Secretary Erdosz and Ambassadors Gyarmati and 
Krasznai, deserve our gratitude for the initiative and statesmanship 
that they have brought to their work over the past 14 months.  We now 
look forward to working with the incoming Chairman, Foreign Minister 
Cotti, to build on all that this organization has accomplished over the 
past year.  

The OSCE assistance group in Chechnya, formed in April, has provided 
solid, neutral ground for negotiations between the Russian Government 
and Chechen representatives.  Regrettably, those talks are now stalled 
and the fighting continues.  Nonetheless, as today's developments 
announced by the Chairman make clear, the OSCE remains committed to 
helping in any way it can to promote a settlement, monitor human rights, 
renew implementation of the military agreement, and ensure free and fair 
elections.  Moreover, the OSCE's involvement has confirmed an important 
proposition:  that international engagement in a conflict within a 
sovereign state is taken by the world as a sign of health in an emerging 
democracy, not as a sign of weakness.  

We should also recognize the importance of the work that the OSCE is 
doing in Nagorno-Karabakh.  In accordance with what our leaders resolved 
here in Budapest last year, Minsk Group negotiators have stepped up 
their efforts to resolve this tragic conflict.  Now, for the first time, 
Armenian and Azerbaijani leaders are conducting a direct dialogue, and a 
fragile cease-fire continues to hold.  We must do all that we can to 
ensure that this process continues.  

In Moldova, again underscoring what our Chairman has said today, we 
welcome the reaffirmation of the importance of the troop withdrawal 
agreement and of continued offers of OSCE assistance.  The other OSCE 
missions are equally deserving of our strong support.

Meanwhile, arms control remains vital both to European security in 
general and to the work of this organization in particular.  A case in 
point is the treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe,  which came about 
under this organization's auspices and which has made a substantial 
contribution to regional security.  As the chairman stated, the 30 
parties to this agreement have already eliminated some 50,000 heavy 

That said, CFE compliance is unfinished business.  We have yet to 
resolve the difficult flank issue.  As Secretary Christopher indicated 
at the NAC meeting on Tuesday, we should intensify our efforts to 
resolve this problem by sending policy-making officials with decision-
making authority to Vienna, no later than mid-February.  I want to 
stress, as Secretary Christopher did in Brussels, that any solution we 
reach must preserve the integrity of the treaty and not diminish the 
security of any state.

Over the last year,  our discussions  on a Common and Comprehensive 
Security Model for the 21st century have given OSCE member states the 
opportunity to set forth their goals and their concerns for the future 
of European security.  In discussions leading up to next year's Lisbon 
summit, we should look for concrete measures that states can take now to 
improve our common security.  

During the Cold War, the CSCE was the rallying point for courageous men 
and women who, often at great personal risk, confronted tyranny to win 
the fundamental freedoms set out in the Helsinki Final Act.  CSCE gave 
heart to reformers in states that eventually liberated themselves and 
their countries from the burden of totalitarianism and set forth on the 
road toward market democracy and civil society and full participation in 
an increasingly integrated world community.  We owe those men and women, 
as well as this organization, an enduring debt of gratitude.  

It is our generation's responsibility to carry on this great work by 
ensuring that the ideals articulated first by CSCE and now by OSCE 
undergird the future of the continent.  That's the best possible legacy 
we could leave for our children and our children's children.  



The OSCE in Bosnia
Deputy Secretary Talbott
Intervention at the OSCE Ministerial, Budapest, Hungary, December 8, 

Good morning.  We agreed yesterday that this organization faces a moment 
of truth, a moment of testing.  That is especially true in the former 
Yugoslavia where, in the last four years, Europe has witnessed the 
greatest carnage and the worst atrocities since World War II--and where 
the alternative to the peace now at hand is surely a wider, even more 
terrible war.  

There are several organizations that have the opportunity and the 
obligation to implement the peace in Bosnia.  The United Nations, NATO, 
the Partnership for Peace, the European Union, the Council of Europe, 
the Organization of the Islamic Conference, the international financial 
institutions, and non-governmental organizations all have their roles to 
play.  They will apply themselves to the task in Bosnia individually 
and, to an unprecedented extent, in concert with each other.  

But as previous speakers made clear, at the very center of this 
collective enterprise is the OSCE.  That is as it should be.  For two 
decades, this organization has stood for the principles that must be re-
established in the former Yugoslavia if there is to be peace in this 
region and on this continent--respect for international borders, respect 
for national minorities, respect for basic human rights.  Moreover, OSCE 
comes to its newest, most daunting assignment with a number of assets.  
These include a solid track record in conflict resolution and election-
monitoring, and a consensus-based, consultative decision-making process.  
Another asset of this organization is the trust that this body has 
accumulated over the years, which ensures its efficacy as an honest 

It was with all this in mind that the sponsors and the signatories of 
the Dayton Peace Agreement asked the OSCE to take the lead in four 
areas--each vital to the implementation of the peace:  confidence-
building, arms control, elections, and human rights.  Let me say a word 
about all four.  

Part of the cause for the catastrophe in the former Yugoslavia is that 
for too long there were too many weapons, too many inequities, and too 
little trust among the parties to the conflict.  The restoration of 
peace and stability will depend on better communications, including more 
face-to-face contacts, across the cease-fire lines.  Peace will also 
depend on establishing, sooner rather than later, rough military parity 
among the parties--parity at the lowest possible level, consistent with 
the parties' legitimate defense requirements.  

Therefore, the OSCE will be responsible for overseeing a series of 
confidence-building and arms-reduction negotiations.  A first round of 
talks will begin among the Bosnian parties within seven days of the 
Paris signing ceremony.  The parties in Dayton have, with the Contact 
Group's support, also asked the OSCE to support follow-on negotiations 
that will lead to regional  arms control talks, with the goal of 
enhancing the stability and security of all the nations in south central 

Now a word about elections.  Democracy is key to the durability of an 
equitable peace in Bosnia, and free and honest elections are key to 
democracy.  The OSCE will prepare for and supervise voting throughout 
Bosnia-Herzegovina within six to nine months.  To accomplish this task, 
the OSCE will need to establish an election commission and, in 
cooperation with other international organizations, deploy observers in 
several dozen field offices across the country.

Finally, the OSCE must move rapidly to help the Bosnian Government 
protect the human rights and fundamental freedoms of all its citizens.  
The Dayton Peace Agreement calls for the creation of a Bosnian 
commission for human rights issues, including a network of investigators 
and advocates headed by an independent, human-rights ombudsman.  We 
would all hope, I'm sure, that this organization will act quickly to 
appoint and support the ombudsman.  

Preserving and promoting human rights in the aftermath of war will be a 
major challenge.  We will need to draw upon a broad range of resources 
from the international community.  This will be a test both of the 
OSCE's leadership and of its ability to cooperate effectively with the 
United Nations and others to provide a corps of international monitors 
to deter and, where necessary, respond to abuses.  

In order to manage and meet all these responsibilities, the member 
states of the OSCE will have to commit the financial and human resources 
that this operation requires--and do so quickly.  The United States has 
Foreign Service officers and other personnel ready to go to the region 
as part of this OSCE effort.  My government has also pledged an up-front 
payment to enable the OSCE to begin work immediately.  We commend those 
nations that have made similar arrangements, and we call upon others to 
do the same.  With that end in mind, we welcome the establishment of a 
fund for voluntary contributions from any interested parties.

In summary, Mr.  Chairman, the OSCE faces, in Bosnia, what is 
unquestionably the largest, most complex mission in its 20-year history.  
Among the obstacles we must overcome is widespread skepticism, 
pessimism, even cynicism about the chances of success.  

In combating defeatism in all its forms, perhaps our best allies are the 
Bosnian people themselves--Bosnians who, for decades, indeed, centuries, 
lived together in harmony; Bosnians who, through four years of conflict 
and mayhem, have published independent newspapers, kept radio stations 
on the air, produced plays, maintained shops and small businesses, and 
even trained athletes to send to the next Olympic games.  Their physical 
and moral courage has kept alive the dream of civil society and multi-
ethnic democracy in the face of chaos, aggressive nationalism, and 
ethnic cleansing.  These heroes--our allies in the cause of peace--are 
from the same mold as the dissidents and reformers who won hard-fought 
gains throughout Central Europe and the former Soviet Union in the 1970s 
and 1980s.  These Bosnians--our fellow citizens of Europe and of the 
transatlantic community--are asking us to help them as they work to 
rebuild their institutions, their economy, their lives, and their hope 
for Europe.  In helping them, we will be helping our- selves.

We have today, and in the months to come, an opportunity to turn Bosnia 
from a synonym for man's inhumanity to man and an evil portent for the 
future into something positive.  Bosnia could yet turn out to be a 
demonstration of collective resolve to meet the challenges of post-Cold 
War Europe--and to vindicate the high ideals for which the OSCE stands.  
Thank you.  



State Department Support for AIDS-Awareness Programs
Deputy Secretary Talbott
Remarks at World AIDS Day program, Washington, DC, December 1, 1995

Let me start by welcoming all of you to the Dean Acheson Auditorium.  I 
would like to thank the Kaiser Permanente Educational Theatre for being 
here this afternoon.  This fine group of performers has done a 
remarkable job of providing essential public health information to a 
wide cross-section of the Washington metropolitan area community, 
helping to save many lives and improve the quality of countless others 
in the process.   

I understand that John Stevenson, the head of English programming for 
the Voice of America, is the "guest director" this year for the play 
you're about to see--yet another indication of the range of talents and 
of the commitment to public service that we have in our foreign affairs 
family.  I also want to thank Nellie Clemons-Green for all of the work 
she has done in organizing the State Department's participation  in 
today's activities.   

World AIDS Day is, as many of you know, now an annual event, observed in 
190 nations around the globe.  AIDS is a problem that has been with us 
for at least 15 years now, and it is, I am sorry to say, not going to go 
away anytime soon.   

As President Clinton puts it, AIDS is "the health crisis of this 
century."  It takes a terrible, unrelenting toll every year, every day, 
every hour.  Over a million Americans have contracted the HIV virus.  In 
October, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention announced that 
AIDS has become the number one killer of Americans between the ages of 
25 and 44.  The disease has touched virtually every community in the 
United States--every neighborhood and every profession.  By the end of 
this decade, AIDS will have killed more Americans  than all of the wars 
of this century--World War I, World War II, the Korean war and Vietnam 
We at the State Department have three additional reasons to be 
supportive of AIDS-awareness programs.   

First, AIDS has stricken us where we work, here in the Department itself 
and at our 263 posts around the world.  Our own colleagues in the 
Foreign Service and the State Department Civil Service are all-too-often 
among the victims of this disease.  Many of us have lost friends and 
family members.   

Second,  it has stricken us where many of us live--in the District of 
Columbia.  The rate of HIV infection in Washington, DC is three times 
higher than in any other large American city.  Unfortunately, the rest 
of the country is following along much the same path:  Much of the 
recent increase in AIDS cases has been in the South and Midwest, where 
the disease is increasingly affecting small towns and rural areas.  

The third reason for State's involvement is that AIDS is one of the 
global issues that we must address in our foreign policy.  Southeast 
Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa have been the hardest hit so far; in some 
parts of these regions, the infection rate is approaching 25% of the 
total population.  But I'm afraid that the worst numbers are still to 
come:  Some of the world's largest nations--including Brazil, India, and 
China--are likely to face epidemics of unprecedented proportions in the 
coming years.  Moreover, there is an increasing threat posed by the 
transmission of HIV-related secondary infections, such as tuberculosis, 
which are easily transmitted to the population as a whole.  To make 
matters worse, drug-resistant strains of these diseases are becoming 
more and more prevalent.  

As this year's World AIDS Day theme indicates, the crisis demands a 
response; it means that each and every one of us has responsibilities to 
do everything we can to reduce the number of new infections; to protect 
the basic rights of those who have been infected, especially in regard 
to employment, housing, and access to social services; to ensure that 
those who have fallen ill as a result of the disease receive comfort and 
the best possible care; and to support the search for a vaccine and, 
eventually, a cure.   

Many of you are involved in local community efforts in the Washington 
metropolitan area.  You are, therefore, on the front lines of this 
battle.  But as an institution, the State Department has a special 
responsibility to play an international leadership role on this issue.  

Three months ago, Under Secretary Wirth announced an inter-agency 
strategy and action plan to help U.S.  policymakers work more 
effectively with international partners to combat the global threat of 
AIDS.  Deputy Assistant Secretary Anne Solomon is now spearheading the 
working group that is coordinating this action plan's implementation.  

There are a number of important initiatives that other agencies have 
already undertaken that we can now build on.  For instance:  

  --  USAID has been helping to identify successful prevention 
strategies worldwide and to publicize successes to government and 
community health workers so that they can be duplicated elsewhere; 
  --  The Peace Corps has incorporated AIDS education into many of the 
other services that it provides around the globe, such as the teaching 
of English, thus providing a uniquely effective means  of grass-roots 
  --  The Department of Defense is using military-to-military 
educational programs to reduce the rate of infection in foreign 
militaries.  Since in some armies more than half of the soldiers are 
infected, this is a particularly effective way of reaching a population 
that is at high risk; and 
  --  On Wednesday, President Clinton will convene the first White House 
conference on HIV and AIDS.  The purpose of this conference will be to 
raise domestic awareness about the tremendous impact that the epidemic 
is having on individuals and their families, communities, institutions, 
and society as a whole.  It will also address a wide range of practical 
concerns, from vaccine development to substance abuse, to health and 
disability benefits, to job discrimination.

Meanwhile, the State Department has made real progress in its efforts to 
boost the effectiveness of international cooperation on AIDS-related 

  --  Two years ago, in Tokyo, we launched the U.S.-Japan Common Agenda-
-a joint program to pool the resources of our two governments in 
tackling global issues.  The agenda has a strong HIV/AIDS component and, 
thus, is a good model as we pursue similar bilateral agreements with 
other nations.
  --  Meanwhile, U.S.  ambassadors and other embassy representatives are 
meeting with senior host government officials  around the world to 
describe the U.S.  international strategy on HIV/AIDS and to encourage 
those leaders to expand prevention and care programs in their countries.
  --  Last December, we went to the AIDS summit in Paris and worked with 
41 other nations to establish an international consensus for future 
action.  The Paris declaration includes provisions for increased global 
collaboration--in both the public and private sectors--on AIDS education 
and research; and for protecting the rights of those who are living with 

This is, as I said at the outset, not going to be an easy battle.  But 
as Ms. Clemons-Green, Dr.  Rigamer, and the Kaiser Permanente 
Educational Theatre are demonstrating this afternoon, we can make a 
difference for the better.  



International Crime-Fighting Strategies
Robert S.  Gelbard, Assistant Secretary for International Narcotics and 
Law Enforcement Affairs
Statement before the House International Relations Committee, 
Washington, DC, December 7, 1995

Mr.  Chairman and members of the committee:  Our foreign law 
enforcement, democracy, and broad rule of law programs all work together 
on a continuum.  They are integral to the success of every foreign 
policy objective we have set for ourselves.  This is because solid 
judicial and law enforcement systems, which operate effectively and 
enjoy public confidence, are basic to advancing the growth in democracy 
we have seen and are supporting around the world.  The President has 
been emphatic about the Administration's determination to counter 
international criminal elements which undermine our goals.  As he said 
at the United Nations when he announced his international crime 
initiative:  "Nowhere is cooperation more vital than in fighting the 
increasingly  interconnected groups that traffic in terror, organized 
crime, and drug smuggling."

The Administration departments and agencies represented at this table 
each play an important role in our endeavors, as do numerous other 
federal organizations not present.  This is testament to the enormity of 
the task we face and the complexity of the policies and activities we 
have undertaken to achieve our goals.  The importance of what we are 
trying to do is immeasurably heightened for reasons that are perfectly 
clear.  The nations of the world are no longer divided into two basic 
camps.  Each day, our world becomes more interdependent, and we now face 
universal threats to our peace and security.

The growing phenomenon of transnational crime is a trend which, 
unchecked, can destroy the many remarkable advances around the world.  
International criminal elements corrupt emerging democracies, free-
market economies, and our citizens' security.  We urgently need to work 
with the international community to stop the advance of the criminal 
underground.  Nowhere has this been more apparent to me than in Russia--
one of my stops on a two-week trip to that part of the world from which 
I recently returned.

Since we last met with this committee on this important subject, the 
Administration has worked hard to develop policies and programs to 
attack the international criminal networks which directly affect the 
health and well-being of all Americans.  Further, we have worked hard to 
do this in a manner that furthers our fundamental interests in fostering 
the rule of law abroad.  The effort involves many people and 
organizations, and there are growing pains.  Indeed, our systems are not 
perfect; however, the will is there, and the goals of the various 
institutions are the same.  As each day passes, we have a better idea of 
what we are dealing with, and our track record shows the ability for 
fast, flexible responses to lightning-speed political developments.  We 
can point to concrete achievements.

Our umbrella strategy against international crime contains political and 
programmatic tactics involving a wide variety of initiatives.  To foster 
a universal approach in the foreign policy context, the Secretary of 
State, two years ago, broadened the scope of my bureau to include 
coordination of overseas law enforcement activities through the creation 
of the Office of  International Criminal Justice.  Since then, we have 
undertaken a wide range of anti-crime initiatives.  Some of them are 
far-reaching and require considerable time for execution.  Others we 
have been able to effect quickly in response to immediate foreign policy 

As we continue our efforts in this important arena, we have discovered 
that much of the work we have carried out against major drug traffickers 
and their money-laundering operations is entirely applicable to 
combating transnational crime.  This is true whether we consider 
strategies, political pressures, training and technical assistance, or 
provision of equipment.  Ultimately, institution-building is key; we 
have seen this in Colombia.  I dare say progress in Colombia in bringing 
down top traffickers would not have been possible were it not for the 
considerable strengthening we have fostered in Colombia's law 
enforcement and    judicial organizations.  Certain safeguards have 
helped to ensure, in the Colombian model, that police training supports 
our broader human rights, rule of law, and democracy objectives.  The 
flexibility to train police, in keeping with our other foreign policy 
objectives, is central to our ability to attack transnational crime.

Anti-Crime Training Initiative

We learned from our experience with international narcotics control that 
one of the most effective ways to get immediate results is to provide 
law enforcement training in the most threatened countries where we are 
able to conduct programs.  In this way, we achieve two primary tangible 
benefits.  First, trustworthy links are established between U.S.  and 
foreign law enforcement entities that help roll back organized crime's 
move into the United States.  Second, improved foreign law enforcement 
expertise heightens national ability to control organized crime and 
specific major crime problems that negatively affect the growth of free 
markets and democracy.

Under the Administration's rule of law and democracy initiative, we have 
targeted Russia, the New Independent States, and Central Europe for law   
enforcement training.  Indeed, we consider this effort essential to 
these new nations' first line of defense against corrupting influences.  
Further, we have worked closely, not only with federal law enforcement 
agencies in an interagency working group, but also with the Department 
of Justice and  the Agency for International Development--USAID--to 
coordinate these programs.  In 1995, the law enforcement  effort 
involved some $20 million in Freedom Support and SEED Act funds.

I would like to share with this committee some remarkable statistics.  
In the last 12 months, our single-minded efforts in collaboration with 
dedicated colleagues in the various Justice and Treasury agencies have 
resulted in the delivery of over 120 training programs for more than 
4,000 law enforcement  officers.

These courses, conducted by the FBI, DEA, Secret Service, Customs, 
Treasury's FINCEN, IRS, ATF, FLETC, and ICITAP, have ranged from 
combating white-collar crimes and financial institution fraud to drug 
enforcement seminars and basic law enforcement techniques.  All of them 
are conducted in the spirit of democratic and community-based policing.  
Students from all over Central Europe and the NIS have studied, mostly 
in two-week seminars, in Moscow, St.   Petersburg, Omsk, Warsaw, Prague, 
Vilnius, Riga, Tbilisi, and other far-flung places.  In our country, 
their travels for course work have ranged from Quantico, Virginia to 
Glynco, Georgia, to gain the fundamental knowledge they need to confront 
the criminal threat at home.

We are achieving momentum in the law enforcement training program, and 
expansion of the effort has been closely linked to our rule of law 
programs.  Most important, the instruction on combating transnational 
criminal activity calls immediate attention to the need for criminal law 
reform in the region.  There can be, after all, no seizures of criminal 
assets if there are no asset forfeiture laws.  Nor can we prosecute 
smugglers when possession of narcotics and nuclear materials is 
perfectly legal.

The International Law Enforcement Academy--ILEA--now operational in 
Budapest, is a central component of our program.  Mr.  Chairman, I 
encourage members of this committee to see the academy for themselves, 
first-hand.  Since the initial classes got underway--only six months 
ago--ILEA is now a fully functioning institution.  It is a truly 
international school with increasing support from our European  allies.  
With an expected annual graduation of some 250 mid-level law enforcement 
officers, its eventual influence in support of U.S.  and international 
police work should not be underestimated.  The return on our relatively 
small investment--roughly $3 million this year---holds significant 

Rapid Responses to Criminal Threats

More than ever before, we must act quickly to counter the nearly 
instantaneous threats that undermine our foreign policy goals.  The 
perpetrators of organized crime, ever opportunistic, are only too ready 
to work political events to their advantage.  Haiti is perhaps a classic 
example.  While permanent democracy in Haiti is, perhaps, still a 
vision, I believe that the international effort mounted to establish a 
secure environment respectful of fundamental human rights has laid the 
important groundwork for its ultimate achievement.

The rapid installation of some 1,000 police monitors and support staff 
from 20 different countries, followed by speedy training in 
collaboration with our Justice Department to start up the new National 
Haitian Police Force, were essential elements in the overall effort.  
Crime, of course, has not been eradicated in Haiti, but law enforcement 
in the country, based on community policing and the protection of human 
rights, is making important strides.  Certainly, our experience in Haiti 
prepares us, with the international community, to confront similar 
situations in other parts of the world.

The Administration is honing its ability to respond to other 
transnational crime that threatens the security of our own and other 
nations.  With the Immigration and Naturalization Service, for example, 
we are working to develop new programs to counter the destabilizing 
influences of international alien smuggling, which the President calls 
"the traffic in human misery."  This global, criminal activity pays 
handsomely for highly organized groups that earn billions with 
relatively little risk of detection or punishment.  On a bilateral and 
multilateral basis, we are working to secure new laws that criminalize 
alien smuggling which, remarkably, is still not a crime in most 
countries.  We have reports of literally thousands of illegal aliens all 
over the world, most of them apparently "warehoused" by the smugglers 
for eventual delivery to the U.S.  These include as many as 60,000 
Chinese illegally in Moscow and innumerable Asians presently located in 
various spots throughout Latin America.

Similarly, we have responded concretely to criminal activity that 
directly affects American business.  Each year, thousands of cars stolen 
from the U.S.  wind up in Central America.  With the support of the 
National Insurance Crime Bureau--NICB--we have undertaken initiatives 
designed to halt this thievery, which causes astronomical losses for 
ordinary Americans.  Special treaties designed to help recover stolen 
vehicles have been signed with seven Central American countries, and new 
FBI-designed training programs for stolen car investigations are 
underway for local law enforcement officials in Latin America.  The NICB 
considers the training so critical that it is helping to underwrite a 
portion of it.

The Crime Initiative

I would like to turn for a moment to the President's new Crime 
Initiative.  The new Presidential Directive, made public at the UN, is 
important because it reinforces our mandate for combating transnational 
crime.  Moreover, it clearly establishes the principle that fighting 
crime is not just a domestic or internal matter.  Taken as a whole, the 
initiative provides a comprehensive policy framework for combating this 
growing threat to our national security.

Key to this framework is the Executive Order under the International 
Emergency Economic Powers Act--IEEPA--aimed at ending the scourge that 
major narcotics traffickers centered in Colombia have wrought in the 
United States and beyond.  The IEEPA Executive Order is designed to deny 
such traffickers the benefit of assets subject to U.S.  jurisdiction and 
to prevent U.S.  persons from engaging in commercial and financial 
dealings with them.  The money laundering initiative instructs the 
Secretaries of State and Treasury and the Attorney General to identify 
the nations that are most egregious in facilitating criminal money 
laundering and press them to enter into bilateral or multilateral 
arrangements to conform to international standards against money 
laundering or face possible sanctions.

On the legislative side, the President also instructed the 
Administration to prepare a comprehensive legislative package to enable 
law enforcement    authorities to better investigate and prosecute 
international criminals.  The Administration also will seek appropriate 
authority for U.S.  agencies to provide additional training and other 
assistance to friendly governments to help in their own efforts to 
combat international crime.  Finally, the President called for the 
negotiation of a Universal Declaration on Citizens' Security which is 
also intended to focus on the nexus of issues related to crime and 
narcotics, such as terrorism and the illegal trafficking of arms and 
deadly materials.

Working With the International Community

In accord with the crime initiative, we are also working through 
traditional   bilateral relationships as well as the web of 
international organizations to advance our counter-crime policies and 
programs.  Recently, we pushed the UN Commission on Crime Prevention and 
Criminal Justice to adopt a more practical focus, especially in terms of 
helping countries update outdated criminal codes.  Likewise, the 28-
member international Financial Action Task Force--FATF--has succeeded in 
upgrading financial crimes, especially money laundering, as a foreign 
policy concern throughout the world.  The Administration's directions 
within the FATF are specifically designed to intensify the risks for 
money launderers, particularly through anti-money laundering regulations 
and enforcement.

I cannot overstate the importance of our European partners in these 
endeavors, particularly to the emerging institutions of the European 
Union.  Our European friends have the institutional strength and 
technical expertise to play a leadership role in helping those countries 
at greatest risk, and we are working with them to fulfill our 
international obligations.

We are close to reaching consensus on the new U.S.-EU Transatlantic 
Agenda, which includes responding     to the global challenges of 
organized crime, narcotics trafficking, immigration, and asylum.  
Moreover, we are using the Working Group on Transnational Organized 
Crime, announced at the G-7 summit in Halifax, to advance the 
international anti-crime agenda.  The G-7 group is a particularly good 
venue to advance the President's Universal Declaration on Citizens' 
Security, as envisioned in the President's crime initiative.  At the 
meeting of the working group in Ottawa last week, we tabled 20 different 
multilateral initiatives aimed at getting countries to work together 
against international crime.  These innovative proposals cover 
everything from financial crimes and illegal firearms trafficking to 
counterfeiting, extradition, mutual legal assistance, asset forfeiture, 
and smuggling of illegal immigrants.

In this hemisphere, the Summit of the Americas is emerging as an 
important multilateral forum to counter crime.  Just a few days ago in 
Buenos Aires, a ministerial meeting on money laundering--one of 23 major 
Summit of the Americas initiatives--considered new hemispheric measures 
designed to counter financial crime, which has emerged as a tremendous 
threat to   our political, economic, and social well-being.  We expect 
that the involvement of well-established institutions such as the OAS 
will be an important part of this initiative.

The Road Ahead

Transnational crime threatens advances around the world and our own way 
of life.  The American people know it.  Public opinion polls show that 
95% of Americans consider crime a critical national issue.  The 
Russians, Hungarians, and Poles I met during my trip last month also 
understand how crime undermines the gains they have made in freedoms, 
and honest men and women are willing to do whatever it takes to stop it.  
We owe it to ourselves and our children to help them.  We can do it with 
thoughtful and well-coordinated programs that make careful use of our 

We cannot entirely rid ourselves    of transnational crime, but we can 
minimize its effects.  It is true that inter- national criminals have 
great power in the form of money and weapons for  corruption and 
intimidation, but the citizens and governments working against them have 
an even greater advantage.  We have the political will and the moral 
authority to expose and isolate the perpetrators.  We have the power to 
deny criminals--and their profits--a safehaven by pursuing good 
governance strategies and enforcing established international rule of 
law standards.  There are no quick or easy solutions, but I am sure that 
if we fight transnational crime on every front we can reduce it until it 
no longer poses a serious threat to our security or that of the world.  



Protecting the Earth's Ozone Layer

Statement by Department Spokesman Nicholas Burns, Washington, DC, 
December 8, 1995.

In Vienna today, the United States successfully negotiated significant 
new measures to help protect the earth's ozone layer.  Through the 
leadership of the U.S.  delegation, the parties to the Montreal Protocol 
on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer agreed to controls on methyl 
bromide and hydro-chlorofluorocarbons (HCFCs).  These controls will 
greatly reduce the threat of ozone depletion while supporting U.S.  
business and improving the competitive situation for U.S. agriculture.

The Montreal Protocol, a major international treaty agreed to by 
President Reagan and begun in January 1989, has been ratified by more 
than 150 nations and was crafted to halt the degradation of and restore 
ozone levels in the earth's stratosphere.  The ozone layer is vital to 
all life, filtering out harmful ultraviolet radiation which can lead to 
increased skin cancer, cataracts, and damage to plants and aquatic 
organisms.  Since 1989, the parties to the Montreal Protocol have made 
significant progress in reducing the growth rate of several major ozone 
depleting substances (e.g., chlorofluorocarbons and halons).  However, 
further controls on HCFCs and methyl bromide--an agricultural fumigant--
have been deemed by scientists as crucial to restoring the integrity of 
the ozone layer by the middle of the 21st century.

"Today's action will help protect the environment and safeguard public 
health for this and future generations in America and around the world," 
said Carol Browner, Administrator of the Environmental Protection 

Secretary of Agriculture, Dan Glickman said, "Progress in securing 
agreement by developing countries for controls on methyl bromide is a 
strong, positive step in leveling the playing field for U.S.  farmers.  
The Clinton Administration is committed to taking responsible action to 
protect American agrculture from competitive disadvantage." 

"The decisions taken in Vienna represent good environmental policy, good 
economic policy, and clearly demonstrate that U.S.  leadership is 
essential for strong international environmental policy and 
cooperation," said Timothy E.  Wirth, Under Secretary of State for 
Global Affairs.

The Vienna agreements strengthen the developed countries' phaseout 
schedule for HCFCs and, for the first time, specify a phaseout schedule 
for developing countries.  On methyl bromide, developed countries agreed 
to a complete phaseout in 2010 (with reductions of 25% in 2001 and 50% 
in 2005).  Developing countries agreed to freeze use of methyl bromide 
in 2002.  In addition, the parties agreed to consider critical 
agricultural-use exemptions for methyl bromide at their 1996 meeting 
under the Montreal Protocol, and to consider a phaseout schedule for 
developing country use of methyl bromide at the 1997 meeting.  



Rethinking Proliferation in the Post-Cold War Era:  The Challenge of 
Thomas E.  McNamara, Assistant Secretary for Political-Military Affairs
Address to the Wilton Park Special Conference, London, U.K.  December 8, 

I am very pleased to have been invited to address this group on such a 
timely topic.  The theme of this conference is of more than academic 
interest to me and to Washington policy- makers.  Over the past three 
years, adjusting our arms control and non-proliferation policy to the 
post-Cold War environment has been one of the dominant and demanding 
international security tasks the U.S.  Government has undertaken.  I 
would like to focus my remarks on three principal issues.  

First, I will address how the end of the Cold War has changed the 
environment in which non-proliferation policy must operate.  Second, I 
will take note of some unique opportunities that have opened up to us.  
Finally, I would like to discuss briefly the relative position of 
regional factors and technological factors in coping with and rolling 
back proliferation.

The Changed Environment

The collapse of the Soviet Union turned the world on its head in many 
aspects of international security policy.  Nonproliferation policy was 
not immune.  In the case of non-proliferation policy, the collapse of 
the Soviet empire created new proliferation concerns.  Whatever one 
might say about the Soviet Union in the broader context of international 
security, the East Bloc was considered safe territory on the map used by 
non-proliferators.  If we had concerns about Soviet missile or chemical 
exports, these were seen in the overall Cold War context.  In the 
nuclear field, the Soviets, who were very good at control across the 
board, were circumspect and cautious in their nuclear supply policy.

The four years since the fall of the U.S.S.R.  has reversed all that.  
First, the breakup of the U.S.S.R.  left weapons of mass destruction 
with inadequate controls in some of the new        independent states.  
Second, Russia and the other New Independent States--NIS--face new 
economic incentives to export WMD-related technologies, material, and 
equipment at a time of grave economic crisis.  Third, the collapse of 
totalitarian controls opened up the risk that individuals with access to 
dangerous materials or with sensitive knowledge could be persuaded to 
smuggle it to rogue states or terrorists.

So far, we have generally not seen major transfers of nuclear materials 
from the NIS to third parties.  While some materials have been smuggled 
out of the former Soviet Union--FSU--they have been in quantities that 
were not sufficient for weapons use.  But we need to be vigilant to the 
danger that such weapons and material might indeed be smuggled out of 
the NIS--a danger that will remain as long as there is serious 
instability in the NIS.

Thus, we have the first challenge of technology diffusion.  One of the 
dominant non-proliferation objectives the U.S.  has pursued since 1992 
has been to ensure that Russia, the other NIS, and other former members 
of the Warsaw Pact are able to control weapons of mass destruction 
goods, technology, and expertise in a manner that will promote non-
proliferation.  While more needs to be done, this aspect of post-Cold 
War activity, with the enthusiastic support of these states, has 
generated a number of notable successes.  The vast majority of states in 
Central Europe and the FSU have made conformity with non-proliferation 
norms a central building block of their security and foreign policies.  
In so doing, they made a strong case for their integration into other 
security and political institutions to which they aspire.  Ukraine, 
Belarus, and Kazakstan renounced the nuclear option that the collapse of 
the U.S.S.R.  opened up to them.  Russia has joined the Missile 
Technology Control Regime--MTCR--and agreed with us to unprecedented 
steps to ensure that arms control be irreversible.  Science centers have 
opened in Moscow and Kiev to prevent "brain drain" by employing 
thousands of scientists from the Soviet weapons complex in peaceful  
scientific projects.  Russia has begun  cooperation with the Group of 7-
-the G-7--to prevent nuclear smuggling.  The list of actions goes on and 

A second element of the post-Cold War environment has been less 
positive.  The old constraints of the bipolar world have disappeared.  
Regional actors, especially those cut off from the international 
mainstream, have lost Cold War security relationships.  They also have 
been freed from superpower constraints and, in particular, those 
constraints that were imposed by the former Soviet Union.  The breakup 
of the FSU has, in some cases, increased the level of insecurity of the 
FSU's former clients and their motivation to acquire weapons of mass 
destruction.  Iraq and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea--
D.P.R.K.--are cases in point.  The threat this trend poses to us has 
been made painfully clear.  Recent revelations of the UN Special 
Commission paint a grim picture.  Unknown to any of us, coalition forces 
in the Gulf war faced a series of Iraqi biological and chemical weapons 
deploy- able on a variety of delivery systems.  Worse, we now know that 
Saddam Hussein had plans that would have     allowed him to target most 
of the capitals of Europe and the Middle East with missiles tipped with 
nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons by the end of this century.  
North Korea's use of obsolete but indigenous technology to create a 
nuclear weapons program also put us on the edge of a major crisis.

This trend even goes beyond states.  For the first time, non-state 
actors have become risks in this field.  A bizarre Japanese cult not 
only used chemical weapons in a terrorist strike but also was acquiring 
the technology to build nuclear and biological weapons.  Opportunists 
and criminals have managed to get their hands on small quantities of 
nuclear weapons usable material.  Hence there is a real threat that a 
black market could open up in nuclear, biological, and chemical  weapon 
materials to private proliferators.  Proliferation always had been a 
game played by states--and a limited number of them.  The existing non-
proliferation system has not been geared toward coping with the 
challenge of proliferation opened up, literally, to the man in the 
street--another new challenge in technology diffusion.

These new challenges have called for responses unlike those the non-
proliferation and arms control practitioners of the Cold War would 
recognize.  The Agreed Framework for North Korea, the UN Special 
Commission for Iraq, the creation of multilateral science centers, and 
some of the unique arrangements the United States entered into to remove 
nuclear material from the FSU all broke long-established precedents.  
But they were crafted to respond to these new challenges.  Likewise, 
efforts to strengthen the International Atomic Energy Agency's--IAEA's--
system of safeguards--the 93+2 safeguards program--will provide that 
agency with enhanced access to nuclear facilities through, for example, 
environmental monitoring.  This will increase the international 
community's confidence in IAEA inspections.  Missile non-proliferation 
challenges have been met through a strengthened MTCR, including new MTCR 
partners and states that have agreed to adhere to the MTCR guidelines.  
The indefinite extension of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty--NPT--
without a vote reflects the growing consensus that non-proliferation 
regimes serve the interest of the global community.

New Opportunities

In many ways, however, the real headline stemming from the end of the 
Cold War in this field is that non-proliferation norms have become truly 
global.  The adherence to the NPT of all but the very few countries with 
obvious political and security motives to hold open a nuclear option was 
the clearest example of this phenomenon.  Last May's decision to extend 
the NPT indefinitely was strongly supported by the international 
community with the exception of a very few states.  And States did not 
support this extension because the nuclear weapon states had arm-twisted 
them into doing so.  Their support for indefinite extension reflected 
the simple recognition that the treaty is in their national interests 
and that global stability is served by international efforts to stem the 
spread of weapons of mass destruction.  The NPT's extension can, in 
turn, help lay the foundation for further nuclear reductions by the 
nuclear weapon states.

Further in this regard, we should note the rush of countries to 
demonstrate their commitment to inter- national norms through adherence 
to the various non-proliferation regimes.  Former dissenters from the 
consensus on non-proliferation--all of whom were vocal spokesmen for the 
unacceptably discriminatory nature of these regimes--have rushed to join 
up.  Argentina and South Africa joined the NPT and have been accompanied 
by Brazil into the MTCR.  Desire for participation in the Nuclear 
Suppliers Group (NSG), Australia Group (AG), MTCR, and the Coordinating 
Committee on Multilateral Export Controls--the COCOM successor regime--
is high.  In short, I believe the fundamental debate over the non-
proliferation regime is over.  The world, with some exceptions,  has 
accepted the international non-  proliferation regime as a fundamental 
basis for international behavior.

I would like to turn now to a discussion of what I believe is a historic 
opportunity that should not be missed.  A unique confluence of events 
has created a moment in which all states have it in their interest to 
eliminate major portions of their arsenals of weapons of mass 
destruction.  The U.S.  and Russia have agreed to truly massive 
reductions of their nuclear arsenals.  Indeed, only their capabilities 
to destroy nuclear weapons hold them to the current dismantlement 
schedule; they cannot go faster.  Other members of the nuclear weapons 
states are also reducing their nuclear arsenals.  The U.S.  and the 
Russians have agreed to the complete destruction of their chemical 
weapons.  All the nuclear weapons states have agreed to accept 
additional global and non-discriminatory limitations on their nuclear 
programs through negotiation of a comprehensive test ban and a fissile 
material cutoff.  And the U.S. and Russia are committed to further 
reductions in their nuclear stockpiles.

One would have thought that those who have for so long pressed the major 
powers to meet international demands for more and faster arms control 
would seize this moment to lock in progress on arms control and non-
proliferation that could only have been dreamed of even a few years ago.  
Instead, we are seeing a remarkable reverse logic taking hold in 
multilateral arms control circles.  The very countries that would 
benefit most from locking in progress at this unique moment have 
advanced the argument that new non-proliferation agreements are somehow 
a favor to be done for the great powers and that somehow it is primarily 
a favor to the current nuclear weapons states to constrain nuclear 
testing, to extend the NPT, or to cap the production of fissile 
material.  A few governments have managed to persuade some countries and 
some well-meaning groups in the West that such agreements are suitable 
hostages to force the nuclear weapon states to agree to a time-bound 
framework in a multilateral context to complete elimination of nuclear 
weapons.  The nuclear weapons states have agreed to the eventual 
elimination of nuclear weapons.  But this effort to greatly expand and 
multilateralize the process of nuclear arms reduction is  completely 
impractical and will only slow down reductions.  One can only be struck 
by how this linkage--which its proponents know is unacceptable to the 
nuclear weapons states--appeared just as the opportunity for progress on 
a comprehensive test ban treaty--CTBT--and fissile material control 
treaty--FMCT--opened wider.

The assumptions behind this new obstacle are patently false.  It is not 
primarily the current nuclear weapons states who lose if proliferation 
is not constrained by international law and global agreements.  Nor does 
the responsibility for eliminating nuclear weapons fall to the nuclear 
weapons states alone.  Several factors contribute to a climate that 
makes further nuclear disarmament possible.  One such factor is 
stringent non-proliferation arrangements that give states confidence in 
the peaceful nature of their neighbors' nuclear programs and that are 
faithfully adhered to.  A commitment by the nuclear weapons states to 
reduce further their nuclear stocks is another.  The first factor is 
just as critical as the second.  Unless states have a high degree of 
confidence that their neighbors are not developing nuclear weapons, the 
nuclear proliferation problem will continue to haunt us.  

It is unrealistic, at best, to believe that the nuclear weapons states 
will eliminate their nuclear arsenals in advance of or as a precondition 
to enhancing the global non-proliferation regimes.  The decisions of the 
nuclear weapons states in the area of nuclear disarmament are shaped by 
what they perceive to be threats to their security interests, including 
the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.  Moreover, a 
precipitous and premature end to existing security structures, and 
doubts about security commitments, which depend, in part, on the U.S.  
nuclear umbrella, could actually promote instability as states that have 
until now eschewed the nuclear option decide they have no choice but to 
reexamine their options.  The lessons of Iraq and North Korea should not 
be lost.  I cannot cite a single case in which the driving factor for a 
state to develop weapons of mass destruction was nuclear weapons states' 
unwillingness to eliminate their nuclear weapons.  A complex set of 
factors are at play when states opt to devote often scarce resources to 
developing weapons of mass destruction.  Regional political 
instabilities or consideration of national prestige are the key 
motivating factors.  So the suggestion that elimination of the nuclear 
weapons states' nuclear arsenals would translate into a world free from 
the threat of nuclear weapons is absurd and needs to be recognized as 

Moreover, the nuclear weapons states can survive in a proliferated 
world.  They have the more direct means to prevent an opponent from 
threatening them with nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons.  
Failure to conclude new non-proliferation agreements does not speed up 
nuclear disarmament; it strengthens the arguments of those who say the 
great powers need to maintain their arsenals as a defense against newly 
emerging proliferation threats.  It is precisely the states in the Non-
Aligned Movement--NAM--who have given up such an option and who are not 
protected by   alliances with NWS whose security would be most damaged 
by blocking progress now.  It is also precisely the states that have 
declined to join the non-proliferation regime that are the greatest 
advocates of linking new nonproliferation agreements with further 
nuclear disarmament.  The forces that advocate a strengthened non-
proliferation regime need to influence those that do not to ensure that 
full advantage is taken of the confluence of events that are now 
prompting the major powers to adopt limitations on their capabilities.

The Role of Technology Denial

The Marquess of Salisbury wrote that, “If you listen to the doctors, 
nothing is healthy, if you listen to the theologians, nothing is 
innocent, and if you listen to the soldiers, nothing is safe.”

Sometimes, I suspect that he could say today, "and if you listen to a 
non-proliferator, no technology transfer is safe."  Without question, 
technology denial has an important role in controlling the proliferation 
threat.  Yet, because states are motivated by political and security 
factors to develop weapons of mass destruction, many have developed 
these programs indigenously without benefit of technology transfer.  The 
fact that much of the weapons of mass destruction and missile 
technologies are at least 50 years old also decreases the utility of 
technology denial as a non-proliferation tool.  North Korea, which has 
made a nearly religious effort to cut itself off from outside 
technology, is today a proliferation threat in the nuclear, chemical, 
and missile fields--clearly demonstrating the limitations of a 
technology denial strategy.

Having said that, however, we should not hesitate to use every available 
tool to slow the development of weapons of mass destruction.  Technology 
denial is really the only tool avail- able in those cases where the best 
we can do is delay development of weapons of mass destruction to allow 
time for other factors to be brought into play.  The fact that Iran has 
not yet fulfilled its desire to obtain nuclear weapons is directly 
related to the concerted efforts of most nuclear suppliers to deny it 
technology.  Technology denial can be an effective tool in cases where 
inter-national embargoes or the threat of them bolster attempts to 
prevent transfers of sensitive technologies.  Libya and North Korea are 
two examples.  Technology restrictions can block the efforts of states 
to make qualitative and quantitative improvements to their weapons of 
mass destruction and missile programs.

In sum, technology denial will continue to play an important role in 
non-proliferation strategy.  It would, therefore, be a mistake to give 
up on the progress made in tightening international restrictions on key 
commodities of concern for proliferation.  One of the primary diplomatic 
tasks before us will be to persuade a new generation of suppliers of 
these commodities in the FSU, Central Europe, and Asia to join the 
existing arrangements.  In this context, I will mention again that we 
are also trying to close a gap in the non- proliferation regimes through 
the early establishment of a successor regime to the venerable--albeit 

While on the subject of technology denial, I would like to note the 
particular problems presented by biological weapons.  UNSCOM's 
revelations about Iraq's biological weapons--BW--program have reminded a 
number of us that biological weapons have always been the poor cousin in 
the non-proliferation business.  Yet, they present severe dangers--on 
the scale of nuclear weapons in terms of destructiveness of human life--
because detection and verification in the BW field is inherently 
difficult.  Delivery and production options are all-too-available, even 
for non-state actors.

Increased access to technology may be an incentive to states to join the 
international non-proliferation consensus.  We should continue our 
efforts to explore those possibilities.  However, we need to make 
certain that in trying to use technology transfer to induce good 
behavior we do not inadvertently contribute to proliferation.  The North 
Korean case is a good example of technology incentives being used to 
non- proliferation advantage.  In that case, the U.S.  agreed to replace 
graphite-moderated reactors, which are good plutonium producers, with 
light-water reactors.  This arrangement, once fully implemented, will be 
a net non-proliferation gain.  We also made prudent use of incentives to 
help Russia regulate its missile-related exports according to 
international standards.  The U.S.  offered to facilitate Russian access 
to the international commercial space-launch market--which did not 
involve any  transfer of sensitive technology--if Russia committed to 
abide by the MTCR guidelines.  The Russians agreed.  This has led to 
mutually beneficial space cooperation as well as to Russian membership 
in the MTCR.  There are also many forms of peaceful space cooperation 
that do not raise proliferation concerns.  Satellites, data processing, 
and other areas unrelated to rocket systems provide potential "safe" 

Despite the important role of technology, however, we cannot escape the 
fact that proliferation is essentially a regional political problem that 
must   always focus on regional political solutions.  If we are to 
succeed in effectively addressing the problem, we must first address the 
regional insecurities that give rise to weapons of mass destruction 
programs.  Unless we first identify and eliminate the basis for these 
insecurities, we will be confined to treating the symptoms of the 
problem.  In the Middle East, for instance, the U.S.  and Russia as co-
sponsors of the peace process have sought to address arms control and 
regional security issues in the context of efforts to achieve peace in 
the region.  The Arms Control and Regional Security working group was 
established to deal with the thorny proliferation and arms control 
questions that must be addressed in the context of broader efforts in 
the region.  It is only through this kind of attention to the underlying 
factors that cause proliferation that we will manage to arrive at a 
lasting solution to the proliferation problem.  There will be no 
universal cure, however.  The states in question must be genuinely 
prepared to grapple with the fundamental political and  security 
motivations that drive proliferation before we can hope to deal with the 
most difficult non-proliferation cases.

In conclusion, I believe that there is ample opportunity for progress in 
this area as well as a pressing need to address the new proliferation 
problems that have emerged in the post-Cold War period.  I hope that I 
have succeeded in providing this conference with some ideas that will 
prove useful as you continue in your efforts to confront this problem 
and devise solutions to it.



Treaty Actions


Chemical Weapons 
Convention on the prohibition of the development, production, 
stockpiling, and use of chemical weapons and on their destruction, with 
annexes.  Done at Paris Jan. 13, 1993.  [Senate] Treaty Doc. 103-211.
Ratifications:  Argentina, Oct. 2, 1995; Canada, Sept. 26, 1995; 
Slovakia, Oct. 27, 1995.

Convention on the protection of children and cooperation in respect of 
intercountry adoption.  Done at The Hague May 29, 1993.  Entered into 
force May 1, 19952.
Signature:  Philippines, July 17, 1995.
Ratifications:  Ecuador, Sept. 7, 1995; Peru, Sept. 14, 1995; Spain, 
July 11, 1995.

Convention on the rights of the child.  Done at New York Nov. 20, 1989.  
Entered into force Sept. 2, 19902.
Signature:  Andorra, Oct. 2, 1995.
Accession:  Tonga, Nov. 6, 1995.

Memorandum of understanding among the United States, Greece, Italy, 
Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers 
Europe (SHAPE) concerning the manning, funding, and support of NATO 
Southern Region Maritime Sub-Principal Subordinate Command Head-quarters 
of Commander Gilbraltar Mediterranean (HQ GIBMED), Commander Maritime 
Air Forces Mediterranean (HQ MARAIRMED), Commander Central Mediterranean 
(HQ MEDCENT), Commander Eastern Mediterranean (HQ MEDEAST), Commander 
Northeast Mediterranean (HQ MEDNOREAST), Commander Submarines 
Mediterranean (HQ SUBMED), with annexes.  Signed at Casteau Sept. 27 and 
Oct. 2, 1995.  Entered into force Oct. 2, 1995; effective Jan. 1, 1994.

Memorandum of understanding among the United States, the Federal 
Republic of Germany, Greece, Italy, Turkey, and the Supreme Headquarters 
Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) concerning the establishment, mission, 
financing, administration, and status of Headquarters 5 Allied Tactical 
Air Force (HQ 5 ATAF), with annexes.  Signed at Casteau Sept. 25, 26, 29 
and  Oct. 2, 1995.  Entered into force Oct. 2, 1995; effective Jan. 1, 

Human Rights
International covenant on civil and political rights.  Adopted by the UN 
General Assembly Dec. 16, 1966.  Entered into force Mar. 23, 1976; for 
the U.S. Sept. 8, 1992.
Signature:  Sao Tome and Principe, Oct. 31, 1995.
Accessions:  Chad, June 9, 1995; Uganda, June 21, 1995.

Optional protocol to the international covenant on civil and political 
rights.  Adopted by the UN General Assembly Dec. 16, 1966.  
Entered into force Mar. 23, 19762.  
Accessions:  Chad, June 9, 1995; Croatia, Oct. 12, 1995; Uganda, June 
21, 1995; Uzbekistan,    Sept. 28, 1995.

International covenant on economic, social, and cultural rights.  
Adopted by the UN General Assembly Dec. 16, 1966.  Entered into force 
Jan. 3, 19762.
Signature:  Sao Tome and Principe, Oct. 31, 1995.
Accessions:  Chad, June 9, 1995; Uzbekistan, Sept. 28, 1995.

Single convention on narcotic drugs, 1961.  Done at New York Mar. 30, 
1961.  Entered into force Dec. 13, 1964; for the U.S. June 24, 1967.  
TIAS 6298; 18 UST 1407.

Protocol amending the single convention on narcotic drugs, 1961.  Done 
at Geneva Mar. 25, 1972.  Entered into force Aug. 8, 1975.  TIAS 8118; 
26 UST 1439.
Accession:  Guinea-Bissau, Oct. 27, 1995.

Convention on psychotropic substances.  Done at Vienna  Feb. 21, 1971.  
Entered into force Aug. 16, 1976; for the U.S. July 15, 1980.  TIAS 
9725; 32  UST 543.
Accessions:  Belgium, Oct. 25, 1995; Chad, June 9, 1995; Guinea-Bissau, 
Oct. 27, 1995; Uzbekistan, July 12, 1995.

United Nations convention against illicit traffic in narcotic drugs and 
psychotropic substances, with annex and final act.  Done at Vienna Dec. 
20, 1988. Entered into force Nov. 11, 1990. [Senate] Treaty Doc.  101-4.
Ratifications:  Algeria, May 9, 1995; Belgium, Oct. 25, 1995.
Accessions:  Chad, June 9, 1995; Guinea-Bissau, Oct. 27, 1995; Malawi, 
Oct. 12, 1995.

Prisoner Transfers
Convention on the transfer of sentenced persons.  Done at Strasbourg 
Mar. 21, 1983.  Entered into force July 1, 1985.  TIAS 10824.
Accession:  Ukraine, Sept. 28, 1995.

Racial Discrimination
International convention on the elimination of all forms of racial 
discrimination.  Adopted by the UN General Assembly Dec. 21, 1965.  
Entered into force Jan. 4, 1969; for the U.S. Nov. 20, 1994.  [Senate] 
Ex. C, 95th Cong., 2d sess.
Accessions:  Monaco, Sept. 27, 1995; Uzbekistan, Sept. 28, 1995.

Convention on the safety of United Nations and associated personnel.  
Done at New York Dec. 9, 19941.
Signatures:  Fiji, Oct. 25, 1995; Liechtenstein, Oct. 16, 1995; Romania, 
Sept. 27, 1995; Russian Federation, Sept. 26, 1995.

Convention against torture and other cruel, inhuman, or degrading 
treatment or punishment.  Adopted by the UN General Assembly Dec. 10, 
1984.  Entered into force June 26, 1987; for the U.S. Nov. 20, 1994.  
[Senate] Treaty Doc. 100-20.
Accessions:  Chad, June 9, 1995; Uzbekistan, Sept. 28, 1995.


Protocol amending the convention with respect to taxes on income and on 
capital of Sept. 26, 1980, as amended by protocols of    June 14, 1983 
and Mar. 28, 1984.  Signed at Washington Mar. 17, 1995. Entered into 
force Nov. 9, 1995.

Agreement for Cooperation in the Global Learning and Observations to 
Benefit the Environment (GLOBE) Program, with appendices.  Signed at 
Beijing Oct. 18, 1995.  Entered into force Oct. 18, 1995.

Czech Republic 
Security agreement concerning security measures for the protection of 
classified military information.  Signed at Prague Sept. 19, 1995.  
Entered into force Sept. 19, 1995.

Dominican Republic 
Basic exchange and cooperative agreement for topographic mapping, 
nautical and aeronautical charting and information, geodesy and 
geophysics, digital data and related mapping, charting and geodesy 
materials, with glossary.  Signed at Santo Domingo and Fairfax Sept. 18 
and 25, 1995.  Entered into force Sept. 25, 1995.

Agreement on science and technology cooperation, with annexes.  Signed 
at Cairo Mar. 20, 1995.  Entered into force Aug. 31, 1995.

Agreement concerning exchange of research and development information, 
with appendix.  Signed at Washington and Helsinki Sept. 11 and Oct. 5, 
1995.  Entered into force Oct. 5, 1995.

Agreement for the adaptation and testing of a dry/low emissions upgrade 
for the intercooled recuperated (ICR) gas turbine engine, with annexes.  
Signed at Washington and Paris June 13 and Aug. 30, 1995.  Entered into 
force Aug. 30, 1995.

Agreement concerning Japan's financial contribution for U.S. 
administrative and related expenses for Japanese fiscal   year 1995 
pursuant to the mutual defense assistance agreement of Mar. 8, 1954.  
Effected by exchange of notes at Tokyo Oct. 13, 1995.  Entered into 
force Oct. 13, 1995.

Agreement concerning the elimination of nuclear weapons infrastructure.  
Signed at Almaty and Washington Sept. 22 and Oct. 3, 1995.  Entered into 
force Oct. 3, 1995.

Agreement on scientific and technical cooperation, with attachment.  
Effected by exchange of notes at Skopje Oct. 10, 1995.  Enters into 
force upon completion of necessary legal requirements of the parties.

Agreement concerning the establishment of the Malaysian-American 
Commission on Educational Exchange.  Signed at Kuala Lumpur Aug. 3, 
1995.  Entered into force Aug. 3, 1995.

Agreement regarding the consolidation and rescheduling of certain debts 
owed to, guaranteed by, or insured by the United States Government and 
its agencies, with annexes.  Signed   at Managua Aug. 28, 1995.  Entered 
into force Nov. 1, 1995.

Agreement regarding the consolidation, reduction, and rescheduling of 
certain debts owed to, guaranteed by, or insured by the United States 
Government and its agencies, with annexes.  Signed at Dakar Aug. 28, 
1995.  Entered into force Nov. 1, 1995.

United Kingdom 
Agreement concerning the annex on intellectual property rights. with 
attachment.  Effected by exchange of notes at Washington Nov. 29, 1995.  
Entered into force Nov. 29, 1995.


1 Not in force.  
2 Not in force for the U.S.   


[END DISPATCH VOL 6, NOS. 50, 51, 52

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