U.S. Department of State Dispatch 
Volume 6, Number 48, November 27, 1995 
Bureau of Public Affairs 
 
 
Articles in This Issue: 
 
1. U.S. Support for Implementing The Bosnian Peace Agreement --  
   President Clinton 
2. Bosnia: An Acid Test of U.S. Leadership -- Secretary Christopher 
3. Combating Nuclear Smuggling -- Lynn E. Davis  
4. Reward Offered for Information Leading to Arrest In Terrorist Bombing 
   in Riyadh  
5. Treaty Actions  
 
 
ARTICLE 1:  
 
U.S. Support for Implementing The Bosnian Peace Agreement 
President Clinton 
Address to the nation, Washington, DC, November 27, 1995 
 
Good evening. Last week, the warring factions in Bosnia reached a peace 
agreement as a result of our efforts in Dayton, Ohio, and the support of 
our European and Russian partners. Tonight, I want to speak with you 
about implementing   the Bosnian peace agreement and why our values and 
interests as Americans require that we participate. 
 
Let me say at the outset that America's role will not be about fighting 
a war. It will be about helping the people of Bosnia to secure their own 
peace agreement. Our mission   will be limited, focused, and under the 
command of an American general. 
 
In fulfilling this mission, we will have the chance to help stop the 
killing of innocent civilians--especially children--and, at the same 
time, to bring stability to Central Europe, a region of the world that 
is vital to our national interests. It is the right thing to do. 
 
From our birth, America has always been more than just a place. America 
has embodied an idea that has become the ideal for billions of people 
throughout the world. Our founders said it best: America is about life, 
liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.  
 
In this century especially, America has done more than simply stand for 
these ideals. We have acted on them and sacrificed for them. Our people 
fought two world wars so that freedom could triumph over tyranny. After 
World War I, we pulled back from the world, leaving a vacuum that was 
filled by the forces of hatred. After World War II, we continued to lead 
the world. We made the commitments that kept the peace, that helped to 
spread democracy, that created unparalleled prosperity, and that brought 
victory in the Cold War. 
 
Today, because of our dedication, America's ideals--liberty, democracy, 
and peace--are more and more the aspirations of people everywhere in the 
world. It is the power of our ideas--even more than our size, our 
wealth, and our military might--that makes America a uniquely trusted 
nation. 
 
With the Cold War over, some people now question the need for our 
continued active leadership in the world. They believe that, much like 
after World War I, America can now step back from the responsibilities 
of leadership. They argue that to be secure we need only to keep our own 
borders safe and that the time has come now to leave to others the hard 
work of leadership beyond our borders; I strongly disagree. 
 
As the Cold War gives way to the global village, our leadership is 
needed more than ever because problems that start beyond our borders can 
quickly become problems within them. We are all vulnerable to the 
organized forces   of intolerance and destruction; terrorism; ethnic, 
religious, and regional rivalries; the spread of organized crime; 
weapons of mass destruction; and drug trafficking. Just as surely as 
fascism and communism, these forces also threaten freedom and democracy, 
peace, and prosperity. And they, too, demand American leadership.  
 
Nowhere has the argument for our leadership been more clearly justified 
than in the struggle to stop or prevent war and civil violence. From 
Iraq to Haiti, from South Africa to Korea, from the Middle East to 
Northern Ireland,   we have stood up for peace and freedom because it is 
in our interest to do so and because it is the right thing to do. 
 
Now, that doesn't mean we can solve every problem. My duty as President 
is to match the demands for American leadership to our strategic 
interest and to our ability to make a difference. America cannot and 
must not be the world's policeman. We cannot stop all war for all time, 
but we can stop some wars. We cannot save all women and all children, 
but we can save many of them. We can't do everything, but we must do 
what we can. 
 
There are times and places where our leadership can mean the difference 
between peace and war and where we can defend our fundamental values as   
a people and serve our most basic, strategic interests. My fellow 
Americans, in this new era there are still times when America and 
America alone can and should make the difference for peace. The terrible 
war in Bosnia is such a case. Nowhere today is the need for American 
leadership more stark or more immediate than in Bosnia. For nearly four 
years, a terrible war has torn Bosnia apart. Horrors we prayed had been 
banished from Europe forever have been seared into our minds again. 
Skeletal prisoners caged behind barbed-wire fences; women and girls 
raped as a tool of war; defenseless men and boys shot down into mass 
graves, evoking visions of World War II concentration camps; and endless 
lines of refugees marching toward a future of despair. 
 
When I took office, some were urging immediate intervention in the 
conflict. I decided that American ground troops should not fight a war 
in Bosnia because the United States could not force peace on Bosnia's 
warring ethnic groups--the Serbs, Croats, and Muslims. Instead, America 
has worked with our European allies in searching for peace, stopping the 
war from spreading, and easing the suffering of the Bosnian people. 
 
We imposed tough economic sanctions on Serbia. We used our air power to 
conduct the longest humanitarian airlift in history and to enforce a no-
fly zone that took the war out of   the skies. We helped to make peace 
between two of the three warring parties--the Muslims and the Croats. 
But as the months of war turned into years, it became clear that Europe 
alone could not end the conflict. 
 
This summer, Bosnian Serb shelling once again turned Bosnia's 
playgrounds and marketplaces into killing fields. In response, the 
United States led NATO's heavy and continuous air strikes, many of them 
flown by skilled and brave American pilots. Those air strikes--together 
with the renewed determination of our European partners and the Bosnian 
and Croat gains on the battlefield--convinced the Serbs, finally, to 
start thinking about making peace. 
 
At the same time, the United States initiated an intensive diplomatic 
effort that forged a Bosnia-wide cease-fire and got the parties to agree 
to the basic principles of peace. Three dedicated American diplomats--
Bob Frasure, Joe Kruzel, and Nelson Drew--lost their lives in that 
effort. Tonight, we remember their sacrifice and that of their families. 
And we will never forget their exceptional service to our nation. 
 
Finally, just three weeks ago, the Muslims, Croats, and Serbs came to 
Dayton, Ohio, in America's heartland, to negotiate a settlement. There, 
exhausted by war, they made a commitment to peace. They agreed to put 
down their guns; to preserve Bosnia as a single state; to investigate 
and prosecute war criminals; to protect the human rights of all 
citizens; to try to build a peaceful, democratic future. And they asked 
for America's help as they implement this peace agreement.  
 
America has a responsibility to answer that request; to help to turn 
this moment of hope into an enduring reality. To do that, troops from 
our country and around the world would go into Bosnia to give them the 
confidence and support they need to implement their peace plan. I refuse 
to send American troops to fight a war in Bosnia, but I believe we must 
help to secure the Bosnian peace. 
 
I want you to know tonight what is at stake, exactly what our troops 
will be asked to accomplish, and why we must carry out our 
responsibility to help implement the peace agreement. Implementing the 
agreement in Bosnia can end the terrible suffering of the people--the 
warfare, the mass executions, the ethnic cleansing, the campaigns of 
rape and terror. Let us never forget that a quarter of a million men, 
women, and children have been shelled, shot, and tortured to death. Two 
million people--half of the population--were forced from their homes and 
into a miserable life as refugees. And these faceless numbers hide 
millions of real personal tragedies; for each of the war's victims was a 
mother or daughter, a father or son, a brother or sister.  
 
Now the war is over. American leadership created the chance to build a 
peace and stop the suffering. Securing peace in Bosnia will also help to 
build a free and stable Europe. Bosnia lies at the very heart of Europe, 
next door to many of its fragile new democracies and some of our closest 
allies. Generations of Americans have understood that Europe's freedom 
and Europe's stability is vital to our own national security. That's why 
we fought two wars in Europe, that's why we launched the Marshall Plan 
to restore Europe, that's why we created NATO and waged the Cold War, 
and that's why we must help the nations of Europe to end their worst 
nightmare since World War II-now. 
 
The only force capable of getting this job done is NATO--the powerful, 
military alliance of democracies that has guaranteed our security for 
half a  century now. And as NATO's leader and the primary broker of the 
peace agreement, the United States must be an essential part of the 
mission. If we're not there, NATO will not be there. The peace will 
collapse, the war will reignite, and the slaughter of innocents will 
begin again. A conflict that already has claimed so many victims could 
spread like poison throughout the region, eat away at Europe's 
stability, and erode our partnership with our European allies.  
 
America's commitment to leadership will be questioned if we refuse to 
participate in implementing a peace agreement that we brokered right 
here in the United States, especially since the Presidents of Bosnia, 
Croatia, and Serbia all asked us to participate and all pledged their 
best efforts to the security of our troops. 
 
When America's partnerships are weak and our leadership is in doubt, it 
undermines our ability to secure our interests and to convince others to 
work with us. If we do maintain our partnerships and our leadership, we 
need not act alone. As we saw in the Gulf war and in Haiti, many other 
nations that share our goals will also share our burdens. But when 
America does not lead, the consequences can be very grave--not only for 
others, but eventually for us as well. 
 
As I speak to you, NATO is completing its planning for IFOR, an 
international force for peace in Bosnia of about 60,000 troops. Already, 
more than 25 other nations, including our major NATO allies, have 
pledged to take part. They will contribute about two-thirds of the total 
implementation force--some 40,000 troops. The United States would 
contribute the rest--about 20,000 soldiers. 
 
Later this week, the final NATO plan will be submitted to me for review 
and approval. Let me make clear what I expect it to include--and what it 
must include--for me to give final approval to the participation of our 
armed forces. 
 
First, the mission will be precisely defined with clear, realistic goals 
that can be achieved in a definite period of time. Our troops will make 
sure that each side withdraws its forces behind the front lines and 
keeps them there. They will maintain the cease-fire to prevent the war 
from accidentally starting again. These efforts, in turn, will help to 
create a secure environment so that the people of Bosnia can return to 
their homes, vote in free elections, and begin to rebuild their lives. 
Our Joint Chiefs of Staff have concluded that this mission should and 
will take about one year. 
 
Second, the risks to our troops will be minimized. American troops will 
take their orders from the American general who commands NATO. They will 
be heavily armed and thoroughly trained. By making an overwhelming show 
of force, they will lessen the need to use force. But unlike the UN 
forces, they will have the authority to respond immediately and the 
training and equipment to respond with overwhelming force to any threat 
to their own safety or any violations of the military provisions of the 
peace agreement.  
 
If the NATO plan meets with my approval, I will immediately send it to 
Congress and request its support. I will also authorize the 
participation of a small number of American troops in a NATO advance 
mission that will lay the groundwork for IFOR, starting sometime next 
week. They will establish headquarters and set up the sophisticated 
communication systems that must be in place before NATO can send in its 
troops, tanks, and trucks to Bosnia. 
 
The implementation force itself would begin deploying in Bosnia in the 
days following the formal signature of the peace agreement in mid-
December. The international community will help to implement arms 
control provisions of the agreement so that future hostilities are less 
likely and armaments are limited, while the world community--the United 
States and others--will also make sure that the Bosnian Federation has 
the means to defend itself once IFOR withdraws. IFOR will not be a part 
of this effort. 
 
Civilian agencies from around the world will begin a separate program of 
humanitarian relief and reconstruction, principally paid for by our 
European allies and other interested countries. This effort is also 
absolutely essential to making the peace endure. It will bring the 
people of Bosnia the food, shelter, clothing, and medicine so many have 
been denied for so long. It will help them to rebuild their roads and 
schools, their power plants and hospitals, their factories and shops. It 
will reunite children with their parents and families with their homes. 
It will allow the Bosnians to freely choose their own leaders. It will 
give all the people of Bosnia a much greater stake in peace than war, so 
that peace takes on a life and a logic of its own.  
 
In Bosnia, we can and will succeed because our mission is clear and 
limited and our troops are strong and very well-prepared. But, my fellow 
Americans, no deployment of American troops is risk-free, and this one 
may well involve casualties. There may be accidents in the field or 
incidents with people who have not given up their hatred. I will take 
every measure possible to minimize these risks, but we must be prepared 
for that possibility. 
 
As President, my most difficult duty is to put the men and women who 
volunteer to serve our nation in harm's way when our interests and 
values demand it. I assume full responsibility for any harm that may 
come to them. But anyone contemplating any action that would endanger 
our troops should know this: America protects its own. Anyone--anyone--
who takes on our troops will suffer the consequences. We will fight fire 
with fire--and then some. 
 
After so much bloodshed and loss, after so many outrageous acts of 
inhuman brutality, it will take an extraordinary effort of will for the 
people of Bosnia to pull themselves from their past and start building a 
future of peace. But with our leadership and the commitment of our 
allies, the people of Bosnia can have the chance to decide their future 
in peace. They have a chance to remind the world that just a few short 
years ago, the mosques and churches of Sarajevo were a shining symbol of 
multi-ethnic tolerance; that Bosnia once found unity in its diversity. 
Indeed, the cemetery in the center of the city was just a few short 
years ago a magnificent stadium which hosted the Olympics--our universal 
symbol of peace and harmony. Bosnia can be that kind of place again. We 
must not turn our backs on Bosnia now. 
 
And so I ask all Americans, and I ask every Member of Congress--Democrat 
and Republican alike--to make the choice for peace. In the choice 
between peace and war, America must choose peace. 
 
My fellow Americans, I ask you to think just for a moment about this 
century that is drawing to a close and the new one that will soon begin. 
Because previous generations of Americans stood up for freedom and 
because we continue to do so, the American people are more secure and 
more prosperous. All around the world, more people than ever before live 
in freedom; more people than ever before are treated with dignity; more 
people than ever before can hope to build a better life. That is what 
America's leadership is all about. 
 
We know that these are the blessings of freedom, and America has always 
been freedom's greatest champion. If we continue to do everything we can 
to share these blessings with people around the world, if we continue to 
be leaders for peace, then the next century can be the greatest time our 
nation has ever known. 
 
A few weeks ago, I was privileged to spend some time with His Holiness, 
Pope John Paul, II, when he came to America. At the very end of our 
meeting, the Pope looked at me and said,  
 
     I have lived through most of this century. I remember that it began 
with a war in Sarajevo. Mr. President, you must not let it end with a 
war in Sarajevo. 
 
In Bosnia, this terrible war has challenged our interests and troubled 
our souls. Thankfully, we can do something about it. I say again, our 
mission will be clear, limited, and achievable. The people of Bosnia, 
our NATO allies, and people all around the world are now looking to 
America for leadership. So let us lead. That is our responsibility as 
Americans. Good-night, and God bless America.  (###) 
 
 
Article 2:  
 
Bosnia: An Acid Test of U.S. Leadership  
Secretary Christopher 
Statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Washington, DC, 
December 1, 1995 
 
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. On Monday night, President Clinton addressed 
the nation to explain why American troops should join our NATO allies to 
help peace   take hold in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Secretary Perry, 
General Shalikashvili, and I are here to further explain our purpose and 
our plans, to answer your questions, and to seek your support. 
 
We have a fundamental choice. As the President made clear, if the United 
States does not participate, there will be no NATO force. If there is no 
NATO force, there will be no peace in Bosnia, and the war will reignite.  
 
We do not have to imagine the consequences. We know what would happen. 
There would be more massacres, more concentration camps, more hunger, a 
real threat of a wider war, and immense damage to our leadership in 
NATO, in Europe, and the world. That is the alternative we can and must 
avoid. We must continue to secure the peace. 
 
The war in the former Yugoslavia has been a threat to our nation's 
interests and an affront to our nation's values. We have been witness to 
horrors and cruelties that my generation--the generation that fought 
World War II--once thought were consigned to a dark and distant past. We 
have faced the constant threat of a wider, even more terrible war in an 
unstable part of Europe. We have had to contemplate the possibility that 
our troops would be called upon to rescue our allies from Bosnia under 
fire. 
 
This summer, the conflict in Bosnia reached a crisis point. The 
President launched a carefully conceived initiative that took us step by 
step from the most horrifying events of the war--the fall of Srebrenica 
and Zepa--to this hopeful point.  
 
At the July London conference, we persuaded our allies to take decisive 
measures to protect Bosnia's remaining safe areas. We led a NATO bombing 
campaign to convince the Bosnian Serbs that nothing more could be gained 
by continuing the war. Our diplomacy produced a cease-fire and a set of 
constitutional principles for a single Bosnian state. And last week, we 
led the parties to a comprehensive settlement in Dayton. That settlement 
will be formally signed in Paris on December 14. 
 
As a result of the President's initiative, the fighting has stopped. We 
now have an opportunity to secure an enduring peace because of American 
strength and American diplomacy. We will achieve our goal only if 
America continues to lead. The parties have taken risks for peace, and 
we must continue to support them. Our national interest in implementing 
the Dayton settlement is clear. 
 
We have a strong interest in ending the worst atrocities in Europe since 
World War II--atrocities that are all the more pernicious because they 
have been directed at specific groups of people because of their faith. 
By helping peace take hold, we can make sure that the people of Bosnia 
see no more days of dodging bullets, no more winters of freshly dug 
graves, no more years of isolation from the outside world.  
 
We have a strong interest in making sure that this conflict does not 
spread. Bosnia lies on a faultline in a volatile region of Europe. To 
the south are Kosovo, Albania, and The Former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia, the likeliest flashpoints of a wider war, as well as Greece 
and Turkey, two NATO allies. To the north and east lie Hungary, Romania, 
and Bulgaria, fragile new democracies deeply threatened by the prospect 
of ethnic conflict in the Balkans. To the north also lies the Eastern 
Slavonia region   of Croatia, which could yet spark a regional war if 
the Dayton accords are not implemented. 
 
Peace in this part of Europe matters to the United States because Europe 
matters to the United States. Twice this century, we have sent millions 
of American soldiers to war across the Atlantic. The first of this 
century's great wars began with violence in Sarajevo. The second began 
with aggression in Central Europe and with horrors that the world 
ignored until it was too late. Ever since, our leaders, Republican and 
Democrat alike, have acted to protect our vital interest in European 
stability. If we do not take this opportunity for peace, we could be 
faced with the prospect of action far costlier and more dangerous than 
anything being contemplated now. 
 
The United States also has a vital interest in maintaining our 
leadership in the world. Taking action in Bosnia now is an acid test of 
American leadership. After creating this opportunity for peace, we 
cannot afford to walk away. I can tell you from my personal experience 
as Secretary of State that if we are seen as a country that does not 
follow through on its initiatives, no nation will follow us--not in 
Europe, not in the Middle East, not in Asia, not anywhere. 
 
Mr. Chairman, the agreement we initialed in Dayton advances our national 
interests and gives us every reason to believe that peace can take hold 
in Bosnia. The settlement was negotiated in 21 long days against the 
backdrop of four bloody years of war. It includes many hard-fought 
compromises. But on every important issue, it meets the principled and 
practical standards on which my negotiating team and I insisted. It is 
an agreement not just of goals, but of means.  
 
-- It preserves Bosnia as a single state with federal institutions that 
represent its Croat, Muslim, and Serb communities alike. 
 
-- It reunifies Sarajevo within the Federation of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, and connects Gorazde to the Federation by a secure land 
corridor. 
 
-- It gives the people of Bosnia the right to move freely throughout the 
country. It gives refugees the right to return to their homes. And it 
creates a mechanism for settling claims to property. 
 
-- It makes it possible for democratic, internationally run elections to 
be held next year. I spent hours in Dayton convincing the parties that 
refugees should have a choice between voting where they currently live 
or in their original homes. 
 
-- The agreement excludes war criminals from office, and it explicitly 
obligates all the parties to cooperate with the investigation and 
prosecution of war crimes. 
 
-- It protects human rights and creates new institutions to investigate 
and punish violations. 
 
-- Most fundamentally, it ends the war and requires the parties to move 
their armed forces behind agreed lines. 
 
Sometimes in a negotiation like this there is a temptation to take short 
cuts, to deal with the hardest issues in an ambiguous way. But in 
Dayton, we insisted on concrete and detailed commitments on the most 
critical issues that divided the parties. Because the agreement is 
comprehensive, it is far more likely to endure. 
 
In the long run, restoring the fabric of Bosnia's society will still 
require an immense effort. But at least that effort can now begin. After 
all, only with peace does Bosnia have a chance to exist as a single 
state. Only with peace does it have a chance to build a multi-ethnic 
democracy. Only with peace will we have a chance to bring war criminals 
to justice and to ensure that no more war crimes are committed. 
 
The Dayton accord does require the parties to take extremely difficult 
steps on the road to peace. I believe that each is prepared to carry out 
its commitments but only if each is confident that the other parties 
will carry out theirs. Each party made it clear that they would reach 
settlement only if NATO agreed to lead a peace implementation force.  
 
Secretary Perry and General Shalikashvili will speak in greater detail 
about our participation in IFOR. But let me address some of the 
questions I know are on your mind. 
 
I know many Americans have wondered why Europe cannot provide all of the 
ground troops in this NATO force. NATO is built on the sharing of effort 
and risk. We are NATO's largest member, the core of its strength and 
resolve. The alliance cannot undertake what will be the largest mission 
in its history if we decline to do our share. At the same time, we 
should remember that other nations, including nearly all our NATO 
allies, Russia, and many of our new partners in Central Europe, will 
contribute two-thirds of the troops in IFOR. 
 
Others have asked whether, after four years of bloodshed, the parties 
are willing to carry through with this agreement. We must remember that 
we secured the agreement because peace is the key to what all the 
parties want--from reconstruction, to justice, to rejoining the 
international community. We constructed the agreement to ensure that it 
will be carried out. We have made certain that sanctions against Serbia-
-our main source of leverage with that country--will be reimposed if the 
agreement is not implemented. Sanctions against the Bosnian Serbs will 
remain in place  until their forces withdraw behind the agreed boundary 
of the Serb Republic. Moreover, our troops will have the strength and 
authority to enforce key military provisions of the agreement. 
 
In addition, let me emphasize that   it was not enough for me that 
President Milosevic was specifically authorized   to negotiate the 
accord on behalf of the Bosnian Serbs. I insisted that the Bosnian Serbs 
initial it as well. In Dayton, President Milosevic promised to obtain 
their agreement within 10 days; as it turned out, he did so in just two 
days. This kind of response increases my confidence that this accord 
will be carried out. 
 
Mr. Chairman, as we negotiated in Dayton, we constantly insisted on an 
agreement that our military could implement and enforce. Each part of 
the agreement was carefully constructed to take into account the needs 
of our armed forces and the advice of the military members of our team. 
As   a result, the military annex to the agreement contains the kind of 
detailed provisions our military considered essential to their task. 
 
Let me assure you that IFOR's mission is well-defined and limited. Our 
troops will enforce the military aspects of the agreement--enforcing the 
cease-fire, supervising the withdrawal of forces, and establishing a 
zone of separation between them. But it will not be asked to guarantee 
the success of democracy or reconstruction, or to act as a police force. 
One of the lessons we have learned in the last few years is that our 
military should not be a permanent guarantor of peace. It should create 
opportunities that others must then seize.  
 
Because IFOR's mission is well defined, we have a clear end point, which 
Secretary Perry will describe in detail. In this respect, I want to 
stress that we are committed to achieve a stable military balance within 
Bosnia and among the states of the former Yugoslavia, so that peace will 
endure. This should be achieved, to the extent possible, through arms 
limitations and reductions.  
 
As significant as these arms control and confidence-building measures 
may be, however, they will not be sufficient to achieve military 
stabilization. The armed forces of the Federation, which have been most 
severely constrained by the arms embargo, will need to obtain some 
equipment and training in order to establish an effective self-defense 
capability. For our part, the United States will ensure that Federation 
armed forces receive the necessary assistance. Neither IFOR nor the U.S. 
military will directly participate in this effort. The best approach--
and the one we will pursue--is for the United States to coordinate an 
international effort to provide the necessary assistance. 
 
Civilian agencies from around the world will carry out a separate 
program to help the people of Bosnia rebuild. Our European allies will 
pay for most of this vital civilian effort. International organizations 
will also play an important role. The OSCE will supervise elections. The 
UNHCR will coordinate the return of refugees. The World Bank and IMF 
will help Bosnia's economy recover, with the EU also playing a leading 
role. The UN will help monitor and train local police. 
 
But none of these important tasks will be carried out unless the peace 
agreement endures. There is no middle ground between peace and war in 
Bosnia. And in the choice between peace and war, as the President so 
plainly put it Monday night, "America must choose peace."   
 
Many years from now, I have no doubt that people will look back on this 
month in history as a critical turning point for the United States and 
Europe. Let it be remembered as the moment when our country grasped the 
chance we created for peace, not as the moment when we hesitated to act. 
 
The President has made his choice. The United States must act as the 
great nation that we are. We must protect our interests. We must uphold 
our ideals. We must keep our commitments. And we must lead. 
 
In the coming days, Mr. Chairman, the Administration will continue to 
consult fully with you and with the Congress. We will continue to work 
hard to gain the bipartisan support of the Congress, just as we work to 
gain the support and understanding of the American people. We are 
confident that the case for moving forward is clear and strong. We are 
prepared to answer your questions and to hear your concerns today. Thank 
you.  (###) 
 
 
Article 3: 
 
Combating Nuclear Smuggling 
Lynn E. Davis, Under Secretary for Arms Control And International 
Security Affairs 
Remarks before the Foreign Correspondents Association, Washington, DC, 
November 29, 1995 
 
I appreciate that your attention today and that of Americans is focused 
on the security challenge in Bosnia and implementing the peace 
agreements. But another critically important security challenge is 
combating nuclear smuggling. I would like to describe the various steps 
that the Clinton Administration has taken and will be taking to ensure 
that the security of Americans is protected from this new danger.  
 
The risk of a nuclear war has been reduced dramatically in the post-Cold 
War world through unprecedented steps on the part of Americans and 
Russians to reduce their nuclear stockpiles and stabilize the nuclear 
balance. Today, the U.S. and Russia are dismantling nuclear weapons, 
literally, as fast as is technically possible. Both nations are 
implementing START I and are committed to ratifying START II--the most 
ambitious nuclear arms control agreement in history. START II will cut 
the nuclear stockpiles of the two countries by two-thirds. 
 
Ironically, we must now attend to the results of our own success. 
Nuclear weapons and their materials do not disappear when they have 
fulfilled their political and military purposes.  
 
One danger that looms is the prospect that these dangerous nuclear 
materials will find their way into the hands of terrorist groups, other 
disaffected groups, or rogue states. The Clinton Administration has 
given a very high priority to preventing nuclear smuggling and has 
worked hard with the Russians to address this critical international 
security problem of the post-Cold War. 
 
We have rendered excess thousands of nuclear weapons and hundreds of 
tons of weapons--usable uranium and plutonium. The plutonium and uranium 
we have freed from nuclear weapons will last for thousands of years. In 
addition to material from weapons programs, smaller but significant 
amounts of nuclear material are located at civil research and processing 
facilities. Only a few kilograms of plutonium--roughly an amount the 
size of a softball--is sufficient to destroy a city. 
 
The nations of the former Soviet Union are confronting the complex task 
of protecting nuclear materials within free societies, in contrast to 
the controls inherent in a totalitarian police state. Extreme economic 
dislocation and the emergence of organized crime in these states have 
increased both the temptation and the potential means to divert nuclear 
material.  
 
The international regime designed to halt nuclear proliferation operates 
on the assumption that states can and will control sensitive materials. 
This Administration, however, recognized early that nuclear smuggling 
constitutes a direct threat to traditional efforts to halt the spread of 
nuclear weapons. Nuclear smuggling is largely the act of disaffected 
individuals outside national controls who have found some gap in the 
nuclear material security systems of states.  
 
National and international mechanisms to control proliferation assume 
that the single-most important technical step in developing nuclear 
weapons is to acquire nuclear weapons-usable material. Manufacture of 
this material requires the investment of hundreds of millions of dollars 
and years of sophisticated engineering. Nuclear smuggling short circuits 
the principal barrier to nuclear proliferation: It bypasses the time and 
the cost. 
 
While we are increasingly confident that a breakdown in the security of 
nuclear weapons is unlikely, we cannot afford to be complacent. We know 
that some nuclear weapons-grade material is not as secure as it can and 
should be. We are aware that there are covert state-supported networks 
to acquire sensitive technology for weapons of mass destruction and that 
criminals have obtained nuclear material in the past few years, though 
in very small quantities. 
 
The international community clearly sees this developing threat  
and is taking the steps necessary to forestall it. Unlike other kinds of 
illegal trafficking, we cannot afford to have even a single case of 
failure, nor can we realistically expect any strategy based only on law 
enforcement and interdiction to be completely effective. 
 
This Administration has been in the forefront of these efforts, and our 
approach has been multilateral and multifaceted. We have taken a number 
of steps which seek to:  
 
-- Control the sources of supply for a nuclear black market; 
-- Reduce the demand for such supply; and 
-- Strengthen the law enforcement and intelligence capabilities directed 
at nuclear smugglers. 
 
Let me outline for you some of the measures we have taken. 
 
-- We succeeded in bringing Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakstan into the 
Non-Proliferation Treaty as non-nuclear weapons states. We are on track 
for the removal of all nuclear weapons from their territory to Russia 
over the next year. The U.S. is assisting these republics in 
transporting their Soviet-era weapons to Russia and is aiding Russia in 
the dismantlement and secure storage of the resulting fissile material. 
In addition, we continue our assistance to Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and 
Kazakstan for the control, protection, and accounting of nuclear 
materials. 
 
-- We are working with Russia, Ukraine, the European Community, Japan, 
and other nations to help prevent economic dislocation from causing the 
flight of Soviet nuclear weapon scientists to cash-rich rogue states by 
creating science and technology centers in Moscow and Kiev. These 
centers provide useful employment in peaceful scientific projects to 
weapons scientists from the former Soviet Union.  
 
-- We are currently implementing an agreement to purchase, over  
20 years, more than 500 tons of highly enriched uranium derived from 
dismantled Russian nuclear weapons. We have begun a bilateral program 
with Russia to develop low-enriched fuels to replace highly enriched 
uranium in Soviet-style research reactors as part of our worldwide 
effort to reduce and eventually to eliminate the use of weapons-usable 
highly enriched uranium in civil nuclear programs. 
 
-- We reached agreement with Russia to halt production of plutonium for 
weapons purposes, and we are conducting a joint study of options to 
dispose of excess weapons plutonium. We are committed to finding ways 
that will allow the conversion of excess plutonium to the spent fuel 
standard--a form that would make it as difficult for a would-be 
proliferator to use the plutonium in nuclear weapons as is the case for 
plutonium embedded in spent fuel for civil reactors.  
 
Neither we nor Russia have stopped at these activities and agreements. 
Our discussions and cooperative efforts continue. 
 
At their May summit in Moscow, President Clinton and President Yeltsin 
called for a joint report on steps to ensure the security of nuclear 
materials. At Hyde Park, the Presidents demonstrated further U.S.-
Russian cooperation through completion of the joint report. This joint 
report records progress in several areas of U.S.-Russian cooperation, 
all of which will bolster our anti-smuggling efforts. 
 
First, government-to-government efforts will expand to cover five of the 
largest civilian sites in Russia handling weapons-usable material. 
 
Second, U.S. and Russian laboratories plan to expand lab-to-lab 
cooperation to other key facilities. 
 
Third, the facility established in part with U.S. funds at Obninsk for 
training in nuclear materials, protection, controls, and accounting will 
be developed further. 
 
Fourth, the U.S. and Russia will continue work to improve their national 
systems of nuclear materials control and accounting through training, 
technical assistance, and the provision of equipment. 
 
These new projects will result in broad improvements in security, 
including several important sites with weapons-usable nuclear material. 
 
These efforts--combating nuclear smuggling, reducing nuclear weaponry, 
and securing nuclear materials--are not cost-free exercises. To date, 
the United States has obligated more than $800 million of the $1.2 
billion appropriated by Congress under the Nunn-Lugar program. These 
specific tasks to combat nuclear smuggling will draw on $30 million in 
Nunn-Lugar funds and $17 million in lab-to-lab cooperation. 
 
These initiatives will take time to mature and to be fully effective. As 
long as any nuclear material remains at risk and the temptation to sell 
it remains real, we must continue to focus on responding to illicit 
transfers through anti-smuggling initiatives. So far, most smuggling 
cases have been scams involving non-nuclear substances or radioactive 
materials without weapons applications. None involved a specific buyer, 
and none involved the amount needed to make a weapon. Nevertheless, as 
long as sellers believe there are rich buyers for illegal nuclear goods, 
there will be a risk of nuclear smuggling. 
 
To guard against the smuggling threat, we organized the executive branch 
so that the U.S. can respond quickly and in a coordinated fashion to any 
nuclear trafficking incident. We oriented our intelligence capabilities 
to track the covert procurement efforts of rogue states. We have worked 
to remove weapons-grade material from possible diversion, as in the case 
of Project Sapphire which transferred multiple bombs' worth of highly 
enriched uranium from Kazakstan to the United States. This material will 
be blended down for use in civilian power reactors. 
 
We have also opened additional law enforcement cooperation with key 
states in Europe to combat smuggling; this was spearheaded by FBI 
Director Freeh's efforts in Moscow. Our law enforcement agencies now 
have designated points of contact for nuclear smuggling incidents. These 
law enforcement and intelligence experts met in Ottawa in May with their 
counterparts from the G-7 and Russia and have held two bilateral 
exchanges on nuclear smuggling with German representatives. 
 
On a continuing basis, we provide export control and customs enforcement 
assistance to states in Central Europe, the Balkans, and Central Asia. 
We assist states and the International Atomic Energy Agency--IAEA--in 
analyzing seized material and in developing accurate sources of 
information on smuggling cases.  
 
The U.S. supplies equipment, technology, and training to states in 
Central Europe and Central Asia to permit them to detect nuclear 
trafficking on their territories, including a large-scale training 
effort in Budapest and other expert conferences in Germany, the U.S., 
and Turkey. An upgraded ability of key countries to exchange law 
enforcement, intelligence and technical information, and share 
information with the states where procurement networks exist will 
frustrate procurement efforts. 
 
We are assisting the UN Special Commission and the International Atomic 
Energy Agency in their efforts to destroy Iraq's covert weapons of mass 
destruction programs. We support financially and technically the new 
IAEA effort to develop safeguards methods to detect clandestine nuclear 
activities, and we recently hosted a conference for technical experts to 
discuss analytical techniques for identifying seized materials. 
 
The next milestone in our fight against nuclear smuggling will be the 
April 1996 nuclear summit in Moscow. Our leaders will want to take stock 
of our collective efforts and decide on further steps to attack nuclear 
smuggling, particularly by working to improve the security of nuclear 
material where it is stored. At the summit, we will present a plan known 
as "The Programme for Combatting Illicit Trafficking in Nuclear 
Material" for adoption by the leaders. 
 
The "Programme for Combatting Illicit Trafficking in Nuclear Material" 
is a cooperative effort of the G-7 and Russia-P-8-non-proliferation 
experts to develop a common approach in the fight against nuclear 
smuggling. Work on this text is an important step toward fulfilling the 
pledge the P-8 leaders made in their 1994 Naples summit statement to 
work more closely to combat the nuclear smuggling threat.  
 
The Programme recognizes that the international community's response to 
nuclear smuggling should draw upon and reinforce existing means, such as 
the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the IAEA. It calls for increased 
cooperation among governments, including in the critically important 
area of storage and control of nuclear material. It seeks the P-8 
governments' commitment to regular sharing and prompt dissemination of 
information on smuggling incidents; enhanced cooperation and 
coordination among intelligence, customs, and law enforcement agencies; 
support for efforts to ensure effective nuclear materials protection, 
control, and accounting; and safe, effective disposition of excess 
stocks of weapons-grade fissile material. 
 
We will seek to broaden the scope of the Programme to include non-P-8 
countries, including those that are potential sources or transit points 
for nuclear material trafficking. We will emphasize that the Programme 
is a model to be used collectively and individually to structure 
bilateral relationships with other countries to assure the security of 
nuclear materials. 
 
Let me say again, we have no information that a nuclear black market has 
successfully developed. Every case involving trafficking of nuclear 
weapons-usable material has--to our knowledge--resulted in the arrest of 
the traffickers. However, the threat remains and will be with us for 
many years to come. To ensure the security of the American people and, 
indeed, that of the entire world, we must remain vigilant. We must 
attack nuclear smuggling at its source and  
at its roots. We cannot permit its success.  (###) 
 
 
Article 4: 
 
Reward Offered for Information Leading 
To Arrest in Terrorist Bombing in Riyadh 
Statement by Acting Department Spokesman Glyn Davies, Washington, DC, 
November 24, 1995. 
 
The Department of State is offering an up to $2 million reward for 
information that leads to the arrest and/or conviction of those 
individuals responsible for the brutal and cowardly terrorist bombing of 
the U.S. Training Mission offices in Riyadh on November 13. This attack 
killed seven innocent people and seriously injured 40 others. 
 
Under the Counter-Terrorism Rewards Program, the U.S. Government offers 
rewards of up to $2 million for information that prevents or resolves 
acts of international terrorism against U.S. citizens or property, or 
leads to the arrest or conviction of terrorist criminals involved in 
such acts. 
 
Overseas, people with information are urged to contact the nearest U.S. 
embassy or consulate, or write to the following address: 
 
Heroes 
P.O. Box 96781 
Washington, DC 20090-6781 USA 
 
Domestically, people should contact the FBI, write to the post office 
box address, or call the Bureau of Diplomatic Security on: 
 
1-800-HEROES-1 
 
In addition, people can provide information to the Counter-Terrorism 
Rewards Program staff through the following Internet address: 
 
heroes@clark.net 
 
The Counter-Terrorism Rewards Program has been an effective tool in 
combating international terrorism. In the past few years, the U.S. 
Government has paid out more than $3 million in over 20 cases worldwide 
for credible information received under the Rewards Program. 
 
The U.S. Government will ensure complete confidentiality to people who 
provide information on past or future acts of terrorism. If appropriate, 
the U.S. Government will relocate people and their families to the 
United States. 
 
The U.S. Government is strongly committed to the fight against 
international terrorism, and will work closely with the Saudi Arabian 
Government to bring the perpetrators of this attack to justice.  (###) 
 
 
Article 5: 
 
Treaty Actions 
 
Children 
Convention on the rights of the child. Done at New York Nov. 20, 1989. 
Entered into force Sept. 2, 19901. 
Accession: Singapore, Oct. 5, 1995; Tuvalu, Sept. 22, 1995. 
 
Copyrights 
Berne convention for the protection of literary and artistic works of 
Sept. 9, 1886, revised at Paris July 24, 1971 and amended in 1979. 
Entered into force for the U.S. Mar. 1, 1989. [Senate] Treaty Doc. 99-
27. 
Accessions: Haiti, Oct. 11, 1995; Turkey, Oct. 1, 1995. 
 
Defense 
Amendment No. 4 to the memorandum of understanding of Dec. 9, 1980, 
concerning the EURO-NATO Joint Jet Pilot Training (ENJJPT) Program. 
Signed at Brussels, Ottawa, Copenhagen, Bonn, Ankara, The Hague, Oslo, 
London, Athens, Rome, Lisbon, Madrid, and Washington Mar. 17, 29, and 
30, Apr. 27, June 16, and 30, July 27, and Sept. 19, 1995. Entered into 
force Sept. 19, 1995. 
Signatures: U.S., Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Italy, the 
Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Turkey, and the United Kingdom. 
 
Finance 
Articles of agreement of the International Finance Corporation. Done at 
Washington May 25, 1955. Entered into force July 20, 1956. TIAS 3620; 7 
UST 2197. 
Acceptance: Bahrain, Sept. 22, 1995. 
 
Judicial Procedure 
Convention abolishing the requirement of legalization for foreign public 
documents, with annex. Done at The Hague, Oct. 5, 1961. Entered into 
force Jan. 24, 1965; for the U.S. Oct. 15, 1981. TIAS 10072; 33 UST 883. 
Accession: El Salvador, Sept. 14, 1995. 
 
Narcotics 
Convention on psychotropic substances. Done at Vienna   Feb. 21, 1971. 
Entered into force Aug. 16, 1976; for the U.S., July 15, 1980. TIAS 
9725; 32 UST 543. 
Accession: Swaziland, Oct. 3, 1995. 
 
United Nations convention against illicit traffic in narcotic drugs and 
psychotropic substances, with annex and final act. Done at Vienna Dec. 
20, 1988. Entered into force Nov. 11, 1990. [Senate] Treaty Doc. 101-4. 
Accessions: Haiti, Sept. 18, 1995; Swaziland, Oct. 3, 1995. 
 
North Atlantic Treaty-Multinational Reaction Forces 
Memorandum of understanding among the United States, Belgium, Canada, 
Denmark, Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, 
Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers 
Europe (SHAPE)  on the establishment and operation of the International 
Planning and Coordinating Staff for the multi-national Reaction Forces 
(Air) of NATO-Reaction Forces Air Staff. Signed at Casteau July 20, 24, 
25, and 28, and Aug. 1, 10, and 15, 1995. Entered into force Aug. 15, 
1995. 
 
Patents 
International convention for the protection of new varieties of plants 
of Dec. 2, 1961, as revised. Done at Geneva Oct. 23, 1978. Entered into 
force Nov. 8, 1981. TIAS 10199; 33 UST 2703. 
Accessions: Portugal, Sept. 14, 1995; Ukraine, Oct. 3, 19952. 
 
Strasbourg agreement concerning the international patent classification. 
Done at Strasbourg Mar. 24, 1971. Entered into force Oct. 7, 1975. TIAS 
8140; 26 UST 1793. 
Accession: Turkey, Oct. 1, 1995. 
 
Patent cooperation treaty, with regulations. Done at Washington June 19, 
1970. Entered into force Jan. 24, 1978. TIAS 8733; 38  UST 7645. 
Accessions: Azerbaijan, Sept. 25, 1995; Turkey, Oct. 1, 1995. 
 
Property 
Convention establishing the World Intellectual Property Organization. 
Done at Stockholm July 14, 1967. Entered into force Apr. 26, 1970; for 
the U.S. Aug. 25, 1970. TIAS 6932; 21 UST 1749. 
Accession: Azerbaijan, Sept. 25, 1995. 
 
Nice agreement concerning the international classification of goods and 
services for purposes of the registration of marks of   June 15, 1957, 
as revised. Done at Geneva May 13, 1977, as amended Sept. 28, 1979. 
Entered into force Feb. 6, 1979; for the U.S. Feb. 29, 1984. 
Accessions: Cuba, Sept. 26, 19952; Turkey, Oct. 1, 1995. 
 
Convention of Paris for the protection of industrial property of Mar. 
20, 1883, as revised. Done at Stockholm July 14, 1967. Entered into 
force Apr. 26, 1970; for the U.S. Sept. 5, 1970; except for Arts. 1-12 
which entered into force May 19, 1970; for the U.S., Aug. 25, 1973. TIAS 
6923, 7727; 21 UST 1583, 24 UST 2140. 
Accession: Azerbaijan, Sept. 25, 1995. 
 
UNIDO  
Constitution of the United Nations Industrial Development Organization, 
with annexes. Done at Vienna Apr. 8. 1979. Entered into force June 21, 
1985. 
Accession: Cambodia, Sept. 18, 1995. 
 
 
 
Bilateral 
 
Canada 
Agreement regarding the application of their competition and deceptive 
marketing practices laws. Signed at Washington and Ottawa Aug. 1, and 3, 
1995. Entered into force Aug. 3, 1995. 
 
Agreement on the establishment of a mediation procedure regarding the 
Pacific Salmon Treaty (TIAS 11091). Signed at Montreal Sept. 11, 1995. 
Entered into force Sept. 11, 1995. 
 
Germany 
Agreement concerning final benefits to certain United States nationals 
who were victims of National Socialist measures of persecution, with 
exchange of notes. Signed at Bonn Sept. 19, 1995. Entered into force 
Sept. 19, 1995. 
 
Haiti 
Agreement regarding the consolidation, reduction, and re-scheduling of 
certain debts owed to, guaranteed by, or insured by the United States 
Government and its agencies, with annexes. Signed at Port-au-Prince Aug. 
7, 1995. Entered into force Sept. 7, 1995. 
 
Honduras 
Basic exchange and cooperative agreement for topographic mapping, 
nautical and aeronautical charting and information, geodesy and 
geophysics, digital data and related mapping, charting and geodesy 
materials, with glossary. Signed at Comayaguela and Fairfax, Aug. 24, 
and Sept. 5, 1995. Entered into force Sept. 5, 1995. 
 
Iceland 
Air transport agreement, with annexes. Signed at Washington June 14, 
1995. Entered into force Oct. 12, 1995. 
 
Japan 
Agreement concerning cooperation in the Global Learning and Observations 
to Benefit the Environment (GLOBE) Program. Effected by exchange of 
notes at Washington Aug. 29, 1995. Entered into force Aug. 29, 1995. 
 
Jordan 
Agreement regarding the reduction of certain debts owed to, guaranteed 
by, or insured by the Government of the United States and its agencies, 
with annexes. Signed at Amman Sept. 25, 1995. Entered into force Sept. 
30, 1995. 
 
Mexico 
Protocol that modifies the agreement of Nov. 9, 1989, for the exchange 
of information with respect to taxes. Signed at Mexico Sept. 8, 1994. 
 
Additional protocol that modifies the convention of Sept. 18, 1992, for 
the avoidance of double taxation and the prevention of fiscal evasion 
with respect to taxes on income. Signed at Mexico Sept. 8, 1994. Entered 
into force Oct. 26, 1995. 
 
Mozambique 
Agreement amending the agreement of Aug. 13, 1993, regarding the  
consolidation and rescheduling of certain debts owed to, guaranteed by, 
or insured by the United States Government and its agency. Effected by 
exchange of notes at Maputo July 13, and   Aug. 31, 1995. Entered into 
force Aug. 31, 1995. 
 
Namibia 
Memorandum of understanding concerning scientific and technical 
cooperation in the earth sciences, with annexes. Signed at Reston and 
Windhoek July 27, and Aug. 23, 1995. Entered into force Aug. 23, 1995. 
 
NATO AEW&C Programme Management Organization Agreement concerning the 
cooperative production of radar system improvements for the E-3 
aircraft. Signed at Hanscom AFB and Washington Aug. 3, and 11, 1995. 
Entered into force Aug. 11, 1995. 
 
Netherlands 
Protocol amending Article VIII of the convention of Apr. 29, 1948, with 
respect to taxes on income and certain other taxes as applicable to the 
Netherlands Antilles. Signed at Washington Oct. 10, 1995. Enters into 
force upon the later of June 30, 1996 or the exchange of instruments of 
ratification. If Protocol has not entered into force prior to Jan. 1, 
1997, it shall not enter into force. 
 
Panama 
Memorandum of understanding concerning the provision of helicopters for 
the purpose of more effectively combating the illicit production and 
trafficking of drugs and other international criminal activities, with 
general provisions. Signed at Washington Sept. 6, 1995. Entered into 
force Sept. 6, 1995. 
 
Peru 
Agreement for the transmission and payment of postal money orders. 
Signed at Washington and Lima Aug. 21, and Sept. 8, 1995. Entered into 
force Dec. 1, 1995. 
 
Russia 
Agreement regarding the rescheduling of certain debts owed to or 
guaranteed by the United States Government, with annexes. Signed at 
Washington Oct. 9, 1995. Enters into force following signature and 
receipt by the Russian Federation of written notice from the U.S. that 
all necessary U.S. domestic legal requirements have been fulfilled. 
 
Sweden 
Agreement for cooperation in    the Global Learning and Observations to 
Benefit the Environment (GLOBE) Program, with appendices. Signed at 
Stockholm Aug. 23, 1995. Entered into force Aug. 23, 1995. 
 
Convention for the avoidance of double taxation and the prevention of 
fiscal evasion with respect to taxes on income, with exchange of 
letters. Signed at Stockholm Sept. 1, 1994. Entered into force Oct. 26, 
1995. 
 
Switzerland 
Agreement on the exchange of military personnel between the U.S. Navy 
and the Swiss Air Force and Anti-Aircraft Command. Signed at Bern and 
Washington July 5, and Aug. 17, 1995. Entered into force Aug. 17, 1995. 
 
United Nations  
Cooperative service agreement for the contribution of personnel to the 
International Tribunal for Rwanda, with annexes. Signed at New York 
Sept. 6, 1995. Entered into force Sept. 6, 1995. 
_______ 
 
1 Not in force for the U.S. 
 
2 With declaration.  
 
[END OF DISPATCH VOLUME 6 NUMBER 48] 
(###)

To the top of this page