U.S. Department of State Dispatch 
Volume 6, Number 47, November 20, 1995 
Bureau of Public Affairs 
 


                           U.S. Department of State
                                    Dispatch
                    Volume 6, Number 47, November 20, 1995


ARTICLES IN THIS ISSUE: 
 
1. APEC: Making Progress Toward Free Trade Through the Osaka Action  
Agenda--Secretary Christopher  
2. Restoring Positive Momentum In U.S.--China Relations-Secretary  
Christopher, Chinese Foreign Minister Qian   
3. APEC Economic Leaders' Declaration for Action    
4. Joint Statement: Ensuring Peace And Stability in Northeast Asia-- 
Secretary Christopher, Japanese Foreign Minister Kono, South Korean  
Foreign Minister Gong   
5. Fact Sheet: Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation   
6. Fact Sheet: U.S. Economic Relations With East Asia and the Pacific 
7. Human Rights in Vietnam--Steven J. Coffey 
8. U.S. Leadership and the Balkan Challenge--Deputy Secretary Talbott 
9. New U.S.-EURATOM Agreement For Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation  
10. Treaty Actions 


 
ARTICLE 1 
 
APEC: Making Progress Toward Free Trade Through the Osaka Action Agenda 
Secretary Christopher 
APEC Ministerial Intervention, Osaka, Japan, November 16, 1995 
 
Minister Kono, Minister Hashimoto, Excellencies, colleagues, and  
friends: It is a pleasure to join you at this year's ministerial meeting  
of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum. Let me take this  
opportunity to express my deep appreciation to our Japanese hosts. Prime  
Minister Murayama, Minister Kono, Minister Hashimoto, and their  
colleagues have worked hard to make our meetings in Osaka a success.  
 
After six years of progress and vision, APEC now faces a crucial seventh  
year of decision. As the guiding force for economic growth and  
integration in the world's most dynamic region, APEC must not only  
sustain the momentum it has achieved over the last two years. It must  
begin to take concrete and far-reaching actions to open up trade and  
investment in the Asia-Pacific region. If APEC is truly to make history,  
it must produce results. 
 
The American people in particular have a great stake in APEC's success.  
APEC's members include our three largest bilateral trading partners-- 
Canada, Japan, and Mexico. More than 2-1/2 million jobs depend on our  
exports to APEC members in East Asia alone. Four out of the 10 economies  
that the United States has identified as vital Big Emerging Markets  
belong to APEC. 
 
The breathtaking transformation of the Asia-Pacific region over the past  
half-century testifies to its remarkable economic growth. Previously  
underdeveloped societies have become modern nation-states offering broad  
opportunities to their people. The Pacific Rim has become the free  
market's newest frontier. Within the span of one generation, bicycles  
and sampans have given way to subways and supertankers as Asian  
economies have converted themselves into economic dynamos. Thirty years  
ago, Asia accounted for only 4% of the world's economy; today, it  
accounts for 25%.  
 
This growth is transforming the vast Pacific--turning the seas and skies  
that once divided us into channels for commerce and cooperation. More  
than 40% of U.S. trade is with Asia. Trade within APEC now accounts for  
almost 70% of the trade totals of its member economies, and investment  
among them continues to grow. American firms are helping to construct  
airports in Malaysia. Indonesian companies are putting up hotels in  
Vietnam. Korean companies are manufacturing computer components in the  
United States. Australian engineering firms are paving roads in  
Indonesia. And a Singaporean brewery is bottling beer in Cambodia. 
 
The dramatic growth and integration of the Asia-Pacific region that I  
have seen in cities like Kuala Lumpur and Jakarta is not an accident but  
a reflection of the energy and vision of its diverse peoples. It is that  
energy and vision that must continue to inspire APEC's efforts.  
 
When the ministers of APEC's original 12 members met in Canberra in  
1989, they recognized that the best way to sustain our region's dynamism  
was to ensure that our economies grew together. In a rapidly developing  
region where skyscrapers were going up next to rice paddies, that meant  
cooperating to address shared practical challenges such as breaking  
transportation bottlenecks, harmonizing technical standards, and easing  
strains on the environment. By expanding trade and investment among our  
economies, APEC's members would help create jobs and opportunity on both  
sides of the Pacific. By establishing stronger ties among our nations,  
they would promote regional stability. 
 
When President Clinton took office, he understood that the security and  
prosperity of the United States in the coming century depends, in large  
part, on the prosperity and stability of the Asia-Pacific region. He  
recognized APEC's potential both to spur trade and investment and to lay  
the basis for what he called "a community of shared interests, shared  
goals, and a shared commitment to mutually beneficial cooperation." 
 
That is why President Clinton took the initiative two years ago to  
invite APEC leaders to Seattle. There, at Blake Island, the leaders  
recognized an opportunity to build a new economic foundation for the  
Asia-Pacific that harnesses the energy of our diverse economies,  
strengthens cooperation, and promotes prosperity.  
 
Last year in Bogor, with the leadership of President Soeharto, the  
leaders gave life to the vision of Blake Island by issuing the historic  
Bogor Declaration that calls for free and open trade in the Asia-Pacific  
region by the year 2020. They set that ambitious goal because they  
agreed that a joint commitment to liberalization is the best way to  
accelerate growth and development in each of our economies.  
 
Now, these declarations must be translated into actions. As the Chinese  
saying goes, "words must count and deeds must yield results." At this  
ministerial and leaders' meeting, APEC must undertake the hard work of  
moving from a vision to a practical blueprint for action. We are charged  
with devising an Action Agenda that takes concrete steps to promote  
growth and reduce economic disparities. 
 
The proposed Action Agenda before us sets forth 15 specific, practical  
areas where we can make immediate progress toward creating a common  
business environment in a giant market of 2.1 billion people. This nuts- 
and-bolts work might seem to lack the drama and novelty of our earlier  
meetings. But while it may not make for big headlines, it does make for  
bigger bottom lines. 
 
For example, different product standards, technical specifications,  
inspection requirements, and performance tests are in force across the  
region. The Action Agenda calls on us to begin taking steps to align  
them with international standards. Bottom line: By doing so, we can  
break down trade barriers and cut costs for business. The Action Agenda  
also calls for us to simplify and harmonize customs standards. Bottom  
line: Our businesses will find it faster and cheaper to import and  
export if all our member economies meet our commitment to follow the  
Kyoto Convention by 1998.  
 
In addition to taking these and other concrete steps  provided for in  
the Action Agenda, we expect that our leaders will commit to a series of  
early actions that demonstrate their determination to achieve free trade  
and investment. Such "downpayments" will help build the momentum we need  
to meet the commitment we made in the Bogor Declaration. The first and  
most important downpayment for the United States is to implement the  
Uruguay Round fully, promptly, and, in some areas, at a higher level of  
discipline than required by the agreement. 
 
Implementing the liberalization elements of the Action Agenda  
successfully will require close adherence to three guiding concepts that  
I call the "three Cs"--comprehensiveness, comparability, and  
consultation. 
 
First, comprehensive coverage. We must maintain our leaders' commitment  
to liberalize all sectors of our economies by the 2010/2020 deadline.  
The growing integration of our economies means that when one member  
protects even one sector, many members suffer lost economic  
opportunities as a result. 
 
Given the diversity of our economies, it is appropriate that we have  
some flexibility in the pace and sequencing of our actions. We will  
liberalize gradually because the Bogor Declaration gives us time to  
adjust before open trade is fully realized. But we must include all  
sectors in the Osaka Action Agenda. Failure to do so would risk  
unraveling the core of our Bogor commitment and undermining APEC's  
credibility and influence as a force for global liberalization. 
 
Second, comparability. As we liberalize our economies, we must ensure a  
comparable level of opportunities and benefits for the people of all the  
APEC member economies. We do not have to take identical steps, but the  
steps we take should produce comparable results. Each of us can take  
difficult steps if all of us are taking difficult steps.  
 
Third, consultation. To ensure comparability, we must engage in a  
continuing process of consultation. Consultation will help keep the  
process of liberalization moving forward. We all need to meet face-to- 
face to review where we stand in our liberalizing efforts and to see  
where we are going. 
 
While these "three Cs" should guide the first part of our Action Agenda,  
we must not forget the "fourth C"--cooperation. Since its inception in  
1989, APEC has made a tangible contribution to the development of each  
of our economies. Beyond the liberalization and facilitation of trade,  
APEC must broaden its efforts under the second part of our Action Agenda  
to promote economic and technical cooperation. Whether in human  
resources, science and technology, or infrastructure, we must continue  
to spur development by harnessing the diversity of experience and  
outlook that is one of APEC's greatest strengths. 
 
Last year, I introduced three initiatives consistent with the priori- 
ties for cooperation that President Soeharto had identified in his  
capacity as chairman. Let me briefly review their status.  
 
I am pleased to announce that the APEC Education Foundation that I  
proposed has now been incorporated. The Foundation will support  
research, scholarship, and academic exchange activities among our  
economies. It will also strengthen cooperation among the APEC Study  
Centers that are the key component of the Leaders' Education Initiative  
proposed by the United States at Blake Island. These human links are  
essential not just to economic development but to building a Pacific  
Community of shared values and interests. I look forward to the  
formation of a Board of Governors and Advisory Council that fully  
reflect our region's excellence in education and scholarship, and I hope  
that the Foundation will begin making grants next year.  
 
I also proposed a meeting of transport ministers to address our massive  
infrastructure needs. Without safe and efficient harbors, airports,  
railroads, and highways, the Asia-Pacific is in danger of having its  
vital arteries of commerce blocked off or choked by bottlenecks and dead  
ends. My colleague, Secretary Pena, will review the outcome of the  
ministerial he hosted last June in Washington. I am pleased that we were  
able to encourage competition in the transport sector, examine ways to  
improve our facilities, and bolster our cooperation and training in  
critical areas such as safety and security. 
 
Finally, I proposed at last year's ministerial that APEC members agree  
to transform the ad hoc Pacific Business Forum into a permanent APEC  
Business Advisory Committee. The United States believes that this  
initiative will strengthen private sector participation in the working  
groups and provide APEC with invaluable advice on our efforts to expand  
trade and investment. I am glad that the Action Agenda takes this  
important step, and I look forward to working with the committee to  
ensure that its voice is heard. 
 
After all, the real test of APEC's success will be whether its work has  
practical relevance to the business community. The private sector  
remains the catalyst of this region's dynamism. That is why APEC's job  
is to remove impediments that unnecessarily restrict business activity.  
Just as the Boeing Company's computer network enables engineers in  
America and Japan to work at the same time on the same design, APEC  
should permit our businesses to function effectively across a dozen time  
zones and languages. We can only achieve that goal by considering  
business views closely.  
 
The Action Agenda addresses another area of critical importance to  
business--liberalization and transparency in government procurement  
markets. Most of the monumental volume of infrastructure projects in  
developing APEC economies--already equaling about $200 billion a year-- 
is government-generated. The Action Agenda includes a guideline that  
calls upon each APEC economy to "enhance the transparency of its  
government procurement regimes and its government procurement  
information."  Member economies will "develop, by 2000, a set of non- 
binding principles on government procurement" among other collective  
actions in this area.  
 
Next year, in Manila, we should agree to accelerate the adoption of  
these principles. Their adoption at the earliest possible date will be  
an important step in guiding the efforts of member economies to achieve  
the greatest possible transparency in government procurement. As in so  
many other areas of focus for APEC, improvements in any member economy  
ultimately benefit every member economy. 
 
The adoption of APEC principles on government procurement can make an  
even greater practical impact if we intensify our efforts. I believe  
that a working group should identify the highest standards and best  
practices already in effect across the region and report back to us next  
year in Manila. As we work to strengthen national laws and regulations  
addressing government procurement, APEC members could draw on specific  
practices in areas such as timely public notice of procurement  
opportunities, use and articulation of objective criteria for awarding  
contracts, and a mechanism for unsuccessful bidders to appeal to an  
administrative entity other than the awarding agency.  
 
The entire region shares an overriding stake in ensuring that our  
government procurement practices meet world-class standards. Our  
economies share a stake in the most efficient use of scarce capital--and  
in meeting infrastructure needs through the best technology and service  
the private sector can offer. Our companies share a stake in bidding  
practices that reward low cost and high quality--and in business  
environments that are equitable and predictable. And our people share a  
stake in the wise use of their resources--and in public institutions  
that foster respect for the rule of law. I look forward to working with  
my colleagues to strengthen APEC's commitment to transparency over the  
next year. 
 
Our officials have worked hard over the past 12 months to forge a  
consensus document that reflects our economic diversity and, more  
importantly, reinforces our shared commitment. I believe our senior  
officials have found the right balance between a flexible, yet credible,  
approach for achieving our trade and investment liberalization and  
economic cooperation objectives. I commend warmly the spirit of  
compromise, cooperation, and common purpose that has characterized their  
efforts and that has produced the draft we will finalize today. With  
this spirit, APEC promises to mature as a force for growth and  
prosperity across the region--and for trade liberalization around the  
world. 
 
As ministers, we face a great responsibility to our leaders in setting  
out an Action Agenda that meets the terms of their Bogor Declaration.  
But as we carry out our core commitments to liberalize trade and  
investment, we should keep in sight the broader vision of a Pacific  
Community that first brought our leaders together. The Action Agenda we  
devise in Osaka represents the focus of our efforts, but it should not  
limit our horizons. We must be willing to explore new areas where APEC's  
spirit of cooperation can promote the prosperity and development of our  
diverse peoples.  
 
The Asia-Pacific encompasses the oldest of civilizations and the newest  
of nations. Its people embrace all creeds and colors, and its economies  
span from subsistence agriculture to advanced aerospace. But where some  
have seen a clash of cultures, APEC increasingly embodies a unity of  
interests. The Action Agenda that we devise here in Osaka will guide our  
economies to achieve our common goal of free trade and investment by the  
year 2020. Fulfillment of that common goal will bring us ever closer to  
achieving our shared Asia-Pacific destiny.    
 
(###) 
 
 
 
ARTICLE 2 
 
Restoring Positive Momentum In U.S.-China Relations 
Secretary Christopher, Chinese Foreign Minister Qian  
Opening remarks at news conference prior to their meeting, Osaka, Japan,  
November 16, 1995 
 
Secretary Christopher. Good afternoon. I am pleased to meet today with  
my colleague, Vice Premier and Foreign Minister Qian Qichen of China.  
Today marks my fourth meeting with the Vice Premier in the last 3-1/2  
months, beginning with our important meeting in Brunei. I look forward  
to sustaining the positive momentum we have achieved over this period. 
 
As members of the APEC Forum, the United States and China share an  
interest in promoting the continuing economic growth and integration of  
the Asia-Pacific region. As members of the ASEAN Regional Forum, we  
share an interest in promoting a more secure region through dialogue and  
confidence-building measures. And as great nations who sit together as  
permanent members of the UN Security Council, our two countries have a  
shared interest in promoting stability, security, and prosperity around  
the world. 
 
In our talks today, the Foreign Minister and I want to build on the  
positive meeting between Presidents Clinton and Jiang last month at the  
United Nations 50th anniversary commemoration. There, our two leaders  
agreed on the central importance of strong ties between our two  
countries and the need to restore positive momentum in our relationship.  
While our two nations have differences in important areas such as human  
rights, nevertheless, I believe that we are both prepared to discuss  
those differences in an open and constructive manner. 
 
The recognition of the importance of the U.S.-China relationship has  
enabled us to invigorate our bilateral dialogue. We are very pleased  
that Ambassador-designate Li Daoyu has returned to Washington--and with  
a little cooperation from the United States Senate, we hope Senator  
Sasser will be in Beijing soon. 
 
Contacts between our countries on security issues are resuming. Defense  
Assistant Secretary Nye is in China today meeting for talks with his  
Chinese counterparts. We are also seeking areas of agreement in  
preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, a matter of  
great concern regionally and globally. We can advance our common  
interest in non-proliferation by moving forward on a zero-yield  
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. 
 
By working together, the United States and China can more effectively  
address a number of issues that are basically common international  
challenges. Our two countries have agreed to work together in fighting  
international crime, narcotics trafficking, and money laundering--the  
kind of security challenges that President Clinton referred to in his UN  
speech last month. We are pursuing high-level talks on the environment,  
sustainable development, and energy as well as United Nations issues. 
 
Finally, as two important economies, we share very important economic  
interests that we will be discussing today. The United States has a  
large stake in China's dynamic economy, and we are working to try to  
enlarge our opportunities for trade and investment in China. We  
staunchly support China's accession to the WTO at the earliest possible  
time. We will continue to work with China to ensure that its accession  
takes place on appropriate terms. 
 
In closing, let me say that our relationship with China is one of our  
most important bilateral relationships, and I thank the Minister for his  
help in enabling us to work constructively on this important  
relationship and invigorate it and to build momentum. Thank you very  
much. 

 
Foreign Minister Qian. I am very pleased to have this opportunity to  
meet once again with the Secretary of State, Mr. Christopher. Both of us  
are here for the APEC ministerial meeting. China and the United States  
share a lot of common ground within APEC, although there is no denying  
that we are divided on certain issues. Today, I'm happy to tell you that  
the two countries have reached agreement in their consultation. So we  
are not divided anymore on the Action Agenda, which is going to be  
adopted smoothly. 
 
President Jiang Zemin and President Clinton, not long ago in New York,  
had a very good meeting, during which they emphasized the shared, common  
interests that exist between the two countries--despite the fact that  
there are some differences. Both sides expressed their willingness to  
view the Sino-U.S. relationship from a strategic perspective and with an  
eye on the 21st century. Both sides would work together so that the  
bilateral relationship could enjoy stable and sustained development on  
the basis of the three Sino-U.S. joint communiques. 
 
During today's meeting, we are going to exchange views on issues of  
common interest, as well as how to resume and broaden our cooperation in  
some fields. Of course, there is no denying that there are some  
differences and contradictions that exist between us that need to be  
addressed and tackled. The Secretary of State, Mr. Christopher, has  
enumerated some areas of importance that will be discussed in our  
meeting. I think that he would also not forget the question of Taiwan,  
which is a very sensitive issue in our bilateral relationship. This  
question also deserves very careful discussion in our meeting today. It  
is my hope that this meeting could result in better mutual understanding  
and more common ground between the two countries, thus sustaining the  
good momentum of growth in our bilateral relationship. Thank you.  
 
(###) 
 
 
 
ARTICLE 3 
 
APEC Economic Leaders' Declaration for Action 
Declaration released following the APEC Economic Leaders' Meeting,  
Osaka, Japan, November 19, 1995. 
 
1. We have gathered in Osaka to further advance the Asia-Pacific  
economic dynamism and sense of community. The Asia-Pacific is  
experiencing the most striking economic growth in the world and ever- 
increasing interdependence. It is a major contributor to global  
prosperity and stability. 
 
We believe our economic reforms based on market-oriented mechanisms have  
unleashed our peoples' creativity and energy and enhanced the prosperity  
and living standards of our citizens in the region and the world as a  
whole. In the current climate in our vast and diverse Asia-Pacific  
region, APEC presents us with a golden opportunity for the 21st century.  
Through APEC we can harness, coordinate, and channel dynamic economic  
trends to our collective advantage. 
 
2. At Blake Island we established the vision of a community of Asia-      
Pacific economies, and at Bogor we set a number of specific goals and  
objectives, including: 
 
--  Free and open trade and investment in the Asia-Pacific no later than  
2010 in the case of industrialized economies and 2020 in the case of  
developing economies; 
 
--  Expansion and acceleration of trade and investment facilitation  
programs; and 
 
--  Intensified development cooperation to attain sustainable growth,  
equitable development, and national stability. 
 
We have, with Osaka, entered the action phase in translating this vision  
and these goals into reality. Today we adopt the Osaka Action Agenda,  
the embodiment of our political will, to carry through our commitment at  
Bogor. We will implement the Action Agenda with unwavering resolve. 
 
3. The Osaka Action Agenda is the template for future APEC work toward  
our common goals. It represents the three pillars of trade and  
investment liberalization, their facilitation, and economic and  
technical cooperation. Achieving sustained economic development  
throughout the APEC   region depends on pursuing actions in each of  
these areas vigorously. 
 
Reflecting the diverse character of APEC and the broad scope of our  
activities, we will achieve the long-term goal of free and open trade  
and investment in several ways. We will: 
 
--  Encourage and concert the evolving efforts of voluntary  
liberalization in the region; 
 
--  Take collective actions to advance our liberalization and  
facilitation objectives; and 
 
--  Stimulate and contribute to further momentum for global  
liberalization. 
 
4. We emphasize our resolute opposition to an inward-looking trading  
bloc that would divert from the pursuit of global free trade, and we  
commit ourselves to firmly maintaining open regional cooperation. We  
reaffirm our determination to see APEC take the lead in strengthening  
the open multilateral trading system. We trust that enlarged  
participation by APEC economies in the WTO would facilitate greater  
regional cooperation. We will explore joint initiatives under the WTO,  
including preparations for the Ministerial Meeting in Singapore.  
Ensuring that APEC remains consistent with the WTO Agreement, we will  
achieve trade and investment liberalization steadily and progressively. 
 
Desiring that trade and economic tensions among APEC economies be  
resolved in a non-confrontational manner, we are committed to finding  
ways of ameliorating trade friction. We agree on the desirability of an  
APEC dispute mediation service, without prejudice to rights and  
obligations under the WTO Agreement and other international agreements. 
 
5. In the Action Agenda we have agreed to a set of fundamental  
principles to guide the achievement of our liberalization and  
facilitation: comprehensiveness; WTO consistency; comparability; non- 
discrimination; transparency; standstill; simultaneous start, continuous  
process, and differentiated time tables; flexibility; and cooperation.  
We direct our ministers and officials to immediately begin the  
preparation of concrete and substantive Action Plans to be submitted to  
the 1996 Ministerial Meeting in the Philippines for assessment. Overall  
implementation of the Action Plans will begin in January 1997 and will  
be reviewed annually. 
 
To assist in this process, we instruct our ministers and officials to  
engage in consultation in a collective effort of a confidence-building  
nature to facilitate exchanges of information, to ensure transparency,  
and to contribute toward attaining the comparability of respective  
Action Plans. 
 
The Action Agenda may be revised and improved as necessary in response  
to changing circumstances. While we have chosen the unique approach of  
concerted liberalization grounded in voluntarism and collective  
initiatives by the member economies as the key means for implementing  
the Action Agenda, its success hinges upon our own continuing efforts,  
strong self-discipline, and close consultation. 
 
6. Governed by the Osaka Action Agenda's principles of mutual respect  
and equality, mutual benefit and assistance, constructive and genuine  
partnership, and consensus building, we will promote action-oriented  
economic and technical cooperation in a wide range of areas. With the  
Action Agenda, APEC has gained renewed momentum and broader perspective  
for economic and technical cooperation. 
 
Economic and technical cooperation implemented through various means  
including Partners for Progress serves to promote trade and investment  
liberalization and facilitation, to narrow the disparities within the  
region, and to achieve growth and prosperity for the region as a whole.  
We will thus work through policy dialogue and joint activities to  
broaden and deepen intra-regional cooperation in all areas of our  
interest. 
 
At the ministerial level, valuable consultations have been held on  
macroeconomic, financial, exchange rate, and other policies regarding  
capital flows, capital market development, and infrastructure financing.  
We also commend the valuable contribution at the ministerial level in  
such fields as telecommunications and information industry,  
transportation, small and medium enterprises, and science and  
technology. We hope that they will continue their good efforts. 
 
7. We are pleased to announce that each of us has brought a package of  
initial actions demonstrating our firm commitment to achieving  
liberalization and facilitation. These voluntary actions will spur and  
inspire APEC liberalization. They also represent the first wide-ranging  
initiatives to accelerate the implementation of our Uruguay Round  
commitments and to deepen and broaden the outcome of the Uruguay Round  
through, for example, acceleration of tariff reductions, early  
implementation of WTO agreements, and pursuance of deregulation.  
Together with these measures, our collective    actions including  
harmonizing and enhancing the efficiency of customs procedures and  
promoting mutual recognition and improving conformity assessment  
capabilities will yield immediate and tangible benefits for business. We  
urge non-APEC economies to follow suit and help advance global trade and  
investment liberalization. 
 
8. The Eminent Persons Group and the Pacific Business Forum have made  
important contributions to the formulation of the Osaka Action Agenda.  
Highly appreciative of the dedication and wisdom of the people who took  
part in the process, we congratulate them on the successful completion  
of their task. 
 
Recognizing that business is the source of vitality for the Asia-Pacific  
and the driving force for regional economic development, we will appoint  
the members of the APEC Business Advisory Council to provide insights  
and counsel for our APEC activities. 
 
9. Our ambitious attempt to promote wide-ranging regional cooperation  
and foster the spirit of community in the Asia-Pacific will doubtless  
encounter numerous new challenges and incur new responsibilities  
despite, or perhaps because of, our economic growth. The Asia-Pacific  
region's fast-expanding population and rapid economic growth are  
forecast to sharply increase the demand for food and energy and the  
pressures on the environment. We are agreed on the need to put these  
inter-related, wide-ranging issues on our long-term agenda and consult  
further on ways to initiate joint action so as to ensure the region's  
economic prosperity is sustainable. 
 
Through our actions we affirm the vital importance of expanding and  
strengthening the shared interests which are the foundation of APEC    
and of forging relationships of trust among our peoples. We pledge to go  
forward together to meet the challenges ahead.  
 
(###) 
 
 
 
ARTICLE 4 
 
Joint Statement: Ensuring Peace And Stability in Northeast Asia 
Secretary Christopher, Japanese Foreign Minister Kono, South Korean  
Foreign Minister Gong 
Released following trilateral talks, Osaka, Japan, November 17, 1995 
 
1.  The Foreign Ministers Gong Ro-Myung of the Republic of Korea  
(R.O.K.), Yohei Kono of Japan, and Secretary of State Warren Christopher  
of the United States (U.S.), participating in the 7th APEC Ministerial  
Meeting, held talks on the overall situation in Northeast Asia on  
November 17, 1995, in Osaka, Japan. 
 
2.  The three Ministers shared the view that close consultation,  
cooperation, and coordination among the R.O.K., Japan, and the U.S. have  
become ever more important to ensure peace and stability in Northeast  
Asia including the Korean Peninsula. 
 
3.  The Ministers also agreed that the three countries would continue to  
closely coordinate their policies toward North Korea in order to  
encourage North Korea's increased opening to and dialogue with the  
outside world and the improvement in inter-Korean relations.  In this  
regard, the three Ministers decided to maintain close consultation on  
the ministerial as well as senior official-level to further strengthen  
the trilateral cooperation. In this context, they decided to hold the  
first senior-level meeting next January. 
 
4.  The three Ministers welcomed the progress that has been made in  
implementing the Agreed Framework during its first year, particularly  
the maintenance of the nuclear freeze. At the same time, they expressed  
concern over the delay in North-South dialogue.  They exchanged views  
concerning the negotiations between the Korean Peninsula Energy  
Development Organization (KEDO) and North Korea concerning the light  
water reactor supply agreement. They affirmed that continued concerted  
efforts by the three countries, in cooperation with other countries, are  
essential to successfully implement the Agreed Framework. 
 
5.  The three Ministers reaffirmed that the continued presence and  
engagement of the United States is essential to ensure peace, stability,  
and prosperity in the region. 
 
6.  Ministers also expressed satisfaction with the fact that they were  
able to reconfirm, through these trilateral policy talks, their  
commitment to make joint efforts for the reduction of tension in the  
Korean Peninsula and the strengthening of the groundwork for  
peaceful reunification of the two Koreas through improvement in the  
inter-Korean relationship.   
 
(###) 
 
 
 
ARTICLE 5 
Fact Sheet: Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation 
Background 
 
The Asia-Pacific region, comprising some of the most dynamic economies  
in the world, has experienced unprecedented growth in the last two  
decades. Economic relations among economies of the region also have  
increased dramatically, fueled by growing trade and financial flows.  
 
Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) was established in 1989 to  
better manage the effects of growing interdependence in the Pacific  
region and sustain economic growth. Originally, APEC was an informal  
group of 12 Asia-Pacific economies. In November 1991, APEC admitted  
China, Hong Kong, and Chinese Taipei. In November 1993, Mexico and Papua  
New Guinea joined. Chile joined in November 1994, bringing membership to  
18. 
 
APEC provides a forum for discussing a broad range of important regional  
economic issues. The APEC chair rotates annually among members and is  
responsible for hosting the annual ministerial meeting. Foreign and  
economic ministers from the members first met in Canberra, Australia, in  
November 1989. Since then, annual ministerial meetings have been held in  
Singapore, Seoul, Bangkok, Seattle, Jakarta, and Japan. Upcoming  
ministerial meetings will be held in the Philippines (1996), Canada  
(1997), and Malaysia (1998). Japan hosted periodic lower-level meetings  
throughout 1995 to lay the groundwork for the ministerial meeting.  
 
U.S.-APEC Relations
 
The United States works closely with members of APEC, which is an  
important part of U.S. engagement in the Asia-Pacific region. President  
Clinton has underscored that the United States is "committed to making  
[APEC] a vehicle for liberalization in the region." 
 
In 1994, U.S. trade with Asia and the Pacific was more than $424  
billion, 70% more than trade with Western Europe. U.S. foreign direct  
investment in APEC member economies was more than $200 billion in 1994,  
about 33% of total U.S. foreign direct investment. 
 
APEC Progress 
 
APEC has grown from an informal dialogue group to a more formalized  
institution that involves all major economies of the region: China, Hong  
Kong, and Chinese Taipei joined APEC in 1991; APEC established a  
permanent secretariat in Singapore in September 1992;  and, at the  
November 17-19, 1993, ministerial meeting in Seattle, Mexico and Papua  
New Guinea joined APEC. In Seattle, ministers also agreed to the  
Declaration on an APEC Trade and Investment Framework and action plan,  
set up the Committee on Trade and Investment, and extended the non- 
governmental Eminent Persons Group's mandate to develop proposals to  
effect its long-term recommendations and vision for Asia-Pacific  
regional economic cooperation. 
 
APEC economic leaders, meeting on Blake Island near Seattle on November  
20, 1993, set forth a vision which recognizes that in the post-Cold War  
era: 
 
We have an opportunity to build a new economic foundation for the Asia- 
Pacific that harnesses the energy of our diverse economies, strengthens  
cooperation, and promotes prosperity.  
 
The leaders also: 
 
--  Called for a successful conclusion to the Uruguay Round of the  
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade; 
--  Called on APEC to expand its economic dialogue and advance its work  
program; 
--  Agreed to convene a meeting of APEC finance ministers; 
--  Asked business leaders to establish a Pacific Business Forum; 
--  Asked APEC to strengthen its policy dialogue on small and medium- 
sized business enterprises; and 
--  Agreed to establish an APEC Education Program and a Business  
Volunteer Program.  
 
In Bogor, Jakarta, in November 1994, APEC economic leaders reached  
agreement on strengthening economic cooperation within the region for  
the purpose of strengthening the open multilateral trading system,  
enhancing trade and investment liberalization in the Asia-Pacific  
region, and intensifying Asia-Pacific development cooperation. Leaders  
also announced their commitment to achieve "free and open trade and  
investment in the Asia-Pacific." All barriers to trade and investment  
are to be dismantled before 2010 or 2020 by developed and developing  
participants, respectively. 
 
APEC's priority is to encourage market-oriented solutions to the  
adjustment problems associated with quickly growing economies. APEC made  
significant contributions to negotiations during the Uruguay Round and  
is considering moves toward regional trade liberalization. 
 
APEC Groups
 
APEC senior officials oversee 10 working groups, covering broad areas of  
economic, educational, and environmental cooperation. In addition, APEC  
has a Committee on Trade and Investment with customs and standards and  
conformance subcommittees, and an Economic Committee. Following are the  
working groups. 
 
Trade and Investment Data. Develops consistent and reliable data in  
merchandise trade, trade in services, and investment. 
 
Trade Promotion. Develops proposals to exchange trade and industrial  
information and to promote economic and trade missions among economies  
of the region. Organizes international seminars and meetings to promote  
trade, an Asia-Pacific trade fair, and a training course on trade  
promotion. 
 
Industrial Science and Technology. Promotes economic growth by expanding  
technology flows and focusing on science and technology issues that  
network potential partners together in the Asia-Pacific region. 
 
Human Resource Development.  
Seeks ways to exchange information among Asia-Pacific economies in such  
areas as business administration, industrial training and innovation,  
project management, and development planning. In this working group, the  
United States hosted an APEC education ministerial in Washington, DC, in  
August 1992 and sponsors the APEC Partnership for Education Program,  
which promotes university partnerships among U.S. and Asian/South  
Pacific universities, outreach and cooperative education activities, and  
private sector training. 
 
Energy Cooperation. Develops cooperative projects, such as a regional  
database on energy supply and demand, and exchanges views on, among  
other things, coal utilization, technology transfer, and resource  
exploration and development. 
 
Marine Resource Conservation. Exchanges information on policy and  
technical aspects of marine pollution and advancement of integrated  
coastal zone planning. Exchanges information on and develops  
recommendations for dealing with red tide/toxic algae pollution  
problems.  
 
Telecommunications. Compiles annual survey on APEC telecommunications  
development activities, including a description of each member country's  
telecommunications environment. Explores ways to establish and develop  
regional networks, initially by encouraging electronic data interchange.  
Exchanges information on policy and regulatory developments in each  
member's telecommunications sector. Disseminates a manual on how to  
approach training in a telecommunications organization, followed by a  
pilot project reviewing needs and recommending solutions in a selected  
organization.  
 
Transportation. Studies and recommends ways to improve infrastructure,  
facilitate movement of passengers and freight, collect and exchange  
data, and enhance transportation safety and security. This U.S.-led  
working group is one of three added in March 1991. The United States  
proposed it because of the importance of improved transportation links  
to continued economic growth in the region. In June 1995, the United  
States hosted an APEC transportation ministerial. 
 
Tourism. Studies one of the region's most important industries, focusing  
on tourism data exchange, barriers to expansion, training programs, and  
current projects in APEC member economies. 
 
Fisheries. Surveys the pattern of APEC fisheries cooperation to develop  
fisheries resources. Reports on the role of APEC in coordinating and  
complementing the work of existing organizations and promoting  
cooperative relations among APEC participants.  
 
Participating Economies 
Australia 
Brunei 
Canada 
Chile 
China 
Hong Kong 
Indonesia 
Japan 
South Korea 
Malaysia 
Mexico 
New Zealand 
Papua New Guinea 
Philippines 
Singapore 
Chinese Taipei 
Thailand 
United States 
 
(###) 
 
 
 
ARTICLE 6 
 
Fact Sheet: U.S. Economic Relations With East Asia and the Pacific 
 
Background
 
The East Asian and Pacific region is the world's most economically  
dynamic area. Japan has become the second-largest economy and, with the  
United States, one of  the world's leading aid donors. The region's  
newly industrialized economies (NIEs)--Hong Kong, Singapore, South  
Korea, and Taiwan--have maintained high economic growth rates over the  
last two decades. In the process, they have achieved "middle-income"  
levels of per capita GNP and have become major participants in  
international trade and investment. Thailand and Malaysia are fast  
approaching development levels close to those of the NIEs. 
 
Over the last decade, the East Asian and Pacific region has surpassed  
Western Europe to become the largest regional trading partner of the  
United States, both as a supplier of U.S. imports and as a customer for  
its exports. In 1994, U.S. trade with the Pacific Rim countries was more  
than $424 billion, 70% more than trade with Western Europe. American  
direct investment in the region reached $108.4 billion in 1994, 18% of  
total U.S. overseas investment. 
 
The members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)-- 
Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and  
Vietnam (Vietnam joined in July 1995)--combined are America's third- 
largest source of imports and its fourth-largest export market. In 1994,  
U.S. trade with ASEAN was $83.8 billion. In the preceding decade, total  
U.S. trade with the ASEAN countries grew at an average annual rate of  
13%. The United States is the leading export market for the Philippines,  
Singapore, and Thailand and is the second-largest export market for  
Malaysia. U.S. direct investment in ASEAN grew to $24.5 billion in 1994,  
up 20% since 1993. 
 
Transportation also links the United States more closely to East Asia  
and the Pacific. In 1993, air traffic on Pacific routes overtook  
Atlantic traffic on a passenger-mile basis. By the year 2000, the  
Pacific market is projected to account for almost half of total  
international traffic.  
 
U.S. Support for Economic Reforms
 
The achievements of the successful Asian economies can be attributed  
largely to market-oriented, outward-looking strategies of growth,  
together with the high value that these societies traditionally have  
placed on education, discipline, and hard work. The United States  
contributes to this success and supports economic reforms by providing: 
 
--  The principal market for the region's exports; 
--  Leadership in promoting an open international trade and financial  
system; 
--  Economic assistance to the region's developing nations; and 
--  A military security umbrella. 
 
The Philippines and Indonesia have economic reforms underway that, if  
sustained, will enable them to capitalize on their impressive potential.  
Australia and New Zealand also are engaged in difficult economic  
restructuring and trade liberalization efforts. Some Pacific island  
nations are not yet fully participating in the region's economic  
success. Implementation of market-oriented reforms has boosted the  
economies of Laos and, to a lesser extent, Vietnam, but both countries  
remain poor. 
 
China experienced rapid economic growth during most of the 1980s and  
1990s as it moved toward a more market-oriented system.  
 
Trade Success and Imbalances
 
More than 36% of U.S. total trade is now conducted with the East Asian  
and Pacific region. However, this dramatic expansion has been  
accompanied by the development of large, recurring trade deficits with  
some U.S. trade partners. In 1994, the United States had trade deficits  
with Japan ($65.7 billion), China ($29.5 billion), Taiwan ($9.6  
billion), and South Korea ($1.6 billion). The overall U.S. trade deficit  
with the East Asian and Pacific region increased from about $103 billion  
in 1993 to $119 billion in 1994. On the other hand, the United States  
had a $6.6-billion trade surplus with Australia in 1994.  
 
There is particular concern about the size of Japan's trade surplus. The  
"Framework for a New Economic Partnership," concluded in 1993, has   as  
its goal a significant reduction in both countries' external balances.  
In addition, the NIEs, particularly South Korea and Taiwan, also have  
reduced import barriers to a limited extent. East Asian and Pacific  
countries recognize that their growth and export successes require them  
to bear a much larger burden for the health of the world economy.  
Consequently, they are undertaking appropriate adjustments to help  
correct international imbalances by: 
 
--  Ensuring realistic exchange rates; 
--  Lowering barriers to imported goods, services, and investment; and 
--  Adopting macroeconomic and structural policies that encourage growth  
through increased domestic demand as well as exports. 
 
The United States, in turn, must maintain its efforts to reduce domestic  
fiscal imbalances and to keep its import markets open. 
 
On the positive side of the ledger, Japan is the largest market for U.S.  
agricultural products, with $11.9  billion in 1993 in farm and forestry  
products imports. Japan and South Korea are now taking steps to open  
their rice markets. But these are only partial indications of the  
realignment of traditional trading relationships that is taking place.  
Services markets in Asia are expanding as regional economies reach new  
levels of development, providing opportunities for U.S. firms. U.S.  
sales to ASEAN grew 18% from 1992 to 1993 alone. In 1994, the United  
States exported more to Singapore than it did to Saudi Arabia. More  
American goods and services went to Malaysia than to Brazil that year.  
Also, in 1994, U.S. exports to South Korea outstripped U.S. exports to  
France. Finally, the Japanese economy has started a process of recovery  
that should provide new momentum for the entire region. 
 
Increasing Regional Cooperation
 
The United States has been working with East Asian and Pacific economies  
for several years to strengthen regional economic cooperation. U.S.  
officials have had extensive consultations with ASEAN, the Asian  
Development Bank, the UN Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the  
Pacific, the South Pacific Council, the South Pacific Forum, and the  
Pacific Economic Cooperation Council. Many of the region's leaders  
recently have called for more intensive consultation among the market- 
oriented economies of the East Asian and Pacific region on macro- 
economic issues, structural reform, and the health of the world trading  
system. The U.S. played a key role in the formation of Asia-Pacific  
Economic Cooperation (APEC), a regional forum based on those principles. 
 
The United States works actively with its East Asian and Pacific  
partners to promote APEC as a vehicle for regional economic cooperation.  
At the invitation of then-Australian Prime Minister Hawke, the first  
APEC ministerial conference convened in Canberra in November 1989. A  
second ministerial meeting took place in Singapore in July 1990, leading  
to the creation of work projects in various areas of interest to the  
original APEC members. Since then, annual ministerial meetings have been  
held in Seoul, South Korea;  Bangkok, Thailand; Seattle, Washington;  
Jakarta, Indonesia; and Osaka, Japan. Subsequent ministerials will be in  
the Philippines (1996), Canada (1997), and Malaysia (1998). 
 
(###) 
 
 
 
ARTICLE 7 
Human Rights in Vietnam 
Steven J. Coffey, Acting Assistant Secretary of the Bureau of Democracy,  
Human Rights, and Labor 
Statement before the Subcommittees on International Operations and Human  
Rights and on Asia and the Pacific of the House International Relations  
Committee, Washington, DC, November 8, 1995 
 
Mr. Chairman, I would like to thank you for the opportunity to be here  
with you today to discuss how we are handling the issue of human rights  
with Vietnam.  
 
It goes without saying that few countries have elicited as much  
passionate debate and soul-searching among the American people as has  
Vietnam. Thus, it is appropriate that we approach this newest, and  
promising, chapter in U.S.-Vietnam relations with our commitment to  
human rights and freedom very much in mind.   
 
The President's decision last July to normalize relations with Vietnam  
came after long reflection and, above all, tireless effort by those who  
have sought an accounting of the fate of American prisoners of war and  
missing-in-action. Indeed, achieving the fullest possible accounting of  
our American prisoners of war and missing-in-action will remain our  
highest priority in our relations with Vietnam. 
 
This, in turn, points to a deeper truth about our ties with Vietnam-- 
that we enter the future with enduring memories and feelings. We do not  
forget for a moment that thousands of Americans gave their lives for the  
cause of freedom in Southeast Asia. So the human rights concerns that  
attend our foreign policy today have special resonance when dealing with  
Vietnam. This is why our human rights dialogue with Vietnam preceded  
normalization and why the President is committed to pursuing an  
improvement in Vietnam's human rights practices.  
 
I can assure you that human rights is very much on our minds as we  
broaden bilateral ties with Vietnam. One indication of this fact is that  
since assuming the position of Acting Principal Deputy Assistant  
Secretary for human rights a month ago, I have devoted more time to  
Vietnam than to any other subject. 
 
Our dialogue with Vietnam on human rights issues dates to February 1994,  
when the President first initiated a dialogue with the Vietnamese in  
order to formally and systematically address our human rights concerns.  
Our bureau was assigned primary responsibility for the dialogue--working  
with the East Asia and Pacific Affairs Bureau--and held second and third  
rounds in August 1994 in Washington and in May 1995 in Hanoi. Just two  
weeks ago, on October 30, we held the latest round--the first since  
normalization. 
 
My experience in this latest round reinforced my belief that the  
establishment of formal diplomatic ties will enhance our ability to  
pursue our goals of improving Vietnam's human rights practices. Our  
principal message to the Vietnamese has been that we seek progress in  
all areas of our relationship, including human rights, and that human  
rights will affect the warmth and depth of bilateral relations.  
 
We are encouraged by the emphasis placed by the Vietnamese themselves on  
establishing a civil society based on the rule of law. Our human rights  
dialogue and other forms of engagement that support these efforts will  
ultimately benefit the Vietnamese people. In fact, as economic  
liberalization has progressed in Vietnam, we have seen the beginnings of  
potentially hopeful trends.
 
-- Government intrusiveness into the daily lives of the populace has  
decreased.     
-- The government has made some progress in developing a legal  
structure, although much remains to be done. 
-- Within narrow boundaries, the government has allowed and even  
encouraged serious press debate and criticism, particularly on  
corruption issues and government  mismanagement.  
-- Citizens also have greater freedom to travel and change their  
residences and to engage in economic activities than in the recent past. 
 
Human Rights in Vietnam Today  
Notwithstanding these promising beginnings, Mr. Chairman, there is no  
getting around the fact that the Vietnamese Government still severely  
limits civil liberties, particularly freedom of expression, association,  
and religion. Nor does the one-party state currently permit open  
political debate.     
 
The government continues to monitor the activities of Vietnamese  
citizens, particularly those suspected of engaging in political or  
religious activities outside those approved by the government. In order  
to control dissenting voices, the government also continues arbitrarily  
to arrest and detain persons for the peaceful expression of opposing  
views. Our estimates indicate that 200 and perhaps as many as 1,000  
Vietnamese citizens have been imprisoned for such peaceful activities,  
including well-known political dissidents such as Professor Doan Viet  
Hoat, Dr. Nguyen Dan Que, and Doan Thanh Liem. 
 
Some recent events confirm this overall assessment. On August 12, the  
Vietnamese Government tried and convicted nine pro-democracy activists,  
including  American citizens Nguyen Tan Tri and Tran Quang Liem, for  
planning a pro-democracy conference in Ho Chi Minh City in November 1993   
Several days later, six Buddhist clerics were tried and convicted for  
participating in flood-relief efforts and other activities sponsored by  
the Unified Buddhist Church of Vietnam--UBCV.     
 
These developments are particularly disappointing in light of Vietnam's  
recent efforts to broaden its ties internationally.  
    
U.S. Human Rights Efforts
 
As you know, Mr. Chairman, we normalized relations with Vietnam four  
months ago. We cannot expect comprehensive change overnight. As else-  
where in the world, the realization of the Vietnamese people's human  
rights is a work in progress which will require steady and long-term  
effort on our part and, of course, on theirs. We are committed to seeing  
this process through.  
 
While our dialogue is the principal mechanism for us to raise human  
rights issues, human rights also figures prominently in all contacts  
between U.S. and Vietnamese officials. As Secretary Wiedemann made  
clear, human rights was highlighted in Secretary Christopher's meetings  
with Vietnamese officials in Hanoi and in his major speech to Vietnamese  
students there. I personally--and numerous other U.S. Government  
officials, including Secretary Christopher--have conveyed the message  
that the American people will be paying close attention to the  
government's human rights practices. We believe the Vietnamese  
leadership understands that progress on human rights is necessary in  
order to achieve the kind of warm bilateral ties both our governments  
seek. As part of the process of expanding economic relations, we will  
initiate a dialogue on worker rights in order to collect more  
information and identify areas where further progress can be made. We  
intend to move forward in this area of our relationship in a carefully  
phased approach, consistent with U.S. statutory requirements.  
 
While we would like to see fundamental changes in Vietnam in the short  
term, such progress is highly unlikely. However, through candid  
dialogue, we have begun the process of establishing benchmarks by which  
we can measure progress toward positive change. By agreeing to conduct  
the human rights dialogue, the Vietnamese have acknowledged the fact  
that human rights will remain an important part of our bilateral  
relationship. We will continue to press our concerns on all issues,  
including those where near-term progress is difficult. I would, at this  
point, Mr. Chairman, like to turn to some specific issues that are  
particularly salient in our human rights engagement with Vietnam. 
 
U.S. Citizens Tri and Liem
 
The release last Sunday of American citizens Nguyen Tan Tri and Tran  
Quang Liem was a welcome step. Their release came after several months  
of serious efforts by U.S. Government officials to resolve these cases  
favorably. Following Secretary Christopher's October 3 meeting with  
Vietnamese Foreign Minister Cam, we were assured that the two Americans  
would be released as a humanitarian gesture in the interests of  
improving relations. In follow-up conversations, we pressed the  
Vietnamese to act promptly. 
 
Although the Vietnamese Government contends the activities of Mr. Tri  
and Mr. Liem were unlawful and their arrest and subsequent conviction  
justified, we wholeheartedly disagree. From the information available to  
us, these two Americans did nothing other than enter Vietnam. No  
meetings were ever held, papers produced, or demonstrations planned.  
Despite these differences of opinion, Vietnam's decision to release Mr.  
Tri and Mr. Liem is an indication that both sides can come together to  
resolve difficult issues. 
 
I would add the observation that our diplomatic presence in Hanoi, as a  
result of normalization, helped this process immensely, enabling us to  
conduct regular prison visits, meet with government officials, and  
monitor legal proceedings. These activities are essential in order to  
protect the rights of American citizens, and we must have the resources  
to carry out these tasks. 
 
Mr. Chairman, I also want to assure you that we have not forgotten the  
seven Vietnamese citizens who remain imprisoned for involvement with Mr.  
Tri and Mr. Liem. We intend to continue to press the Vietnamese to  
release all prisoners of conscience. 
 
Legal Reform
 
Mr. Chairman, the Vietnamese Government's stated desire to move toward  
the rule of law affords a good opportunity to address the arbitrariness  
and lack of transparency in the legal system. It is in Vietnam's  
interest to bring its laws into conformity with international standards- 
-both for the maintenance of a stable and just society and because the  
lack of a consistent, clear legal system deters the prospective  
investors and entrepreneurial spirit the country's economy so urgently  
needs. Thus far, Vietnam has expressed interest in cooperating on legal  
reform efforts and is currently receiving assistance from the  
Governments of Canada, Australia, France, and others. One American legal  
expert is currently posted to Vietnam under the auspices of the UN  
Development Program, working with the Ministry of Justice. IRI is active  
on these issues as well.  
 
Of particular concern to us are the ambiguities within the legal code  
that can be used to arrest individuals involved in the peaceful  
expression of dissenting views. The Vietnamese Government has not yet  
taken action to address these provisions in the criminal code.  
 
Arbitrary Detention and Prison Access 
 
In our human rights dialogue, we have raised the issue of arbitrary  
detention and prison access and explained that the arbitrariness of the  
legal system is fundamentally incompatible with Vietnam's stated goal of  
establishing the rule of law. There have been some helpful steps. In  
December 1994, the SRV allowed the UN Working Group on Arbitrary  
Detentions to visit Vietnam. Earlier in the year, it also allowed an  
Australian delegation to visit prisons.  
 
We have urged the SRV to adopt the recommendations of the UN Working  
Group, including allowing the Working Group to return to Vietnam. The  
Vietnamese have assured us that the recommendations are currently under  
consideration. 
 
Religious Persecution
 
Mr. Chairman, the Vietnamese Government has, in recent years, taken a  
number of steps to relax restrictions on freedom of worship. However,  
the government continues to restrict the activities of religious  
organizations. 
 
Indeed, tensions between the government and the Unified Buddhist Church  
of Vietnam have heightened since 1992. We have, on numerous occasions,  
expressed to Vietnamese authorities our serious concerns about the  
treatment of the leaders of the UBCV. Six Buddhist monks, including the  
Venerable Thich Quang Do, were convicted of "sabotaging the solidarity  
policy." According to the information available to us, these monks were  
engaged in peaceful activities, including flood relief efforts in  
November 1994. We have also urged the government to allow an independent  
observer to meet with the Venerable Thich Huyen Quang in order to  
confirm his status. The government denies he is being held under house  
arrest.  
 
Similarly, the dispute between the government and the Vatican over  
Vatican appointments is unresolved, and the government continues to  
maintain restrictions on other activities of the Protestant and Catholic  
churches including the right to assemble, speak, and teach. To date, we  
have made little headway on this issue but intend to keep trying through  
more coordinated efforts with interested parties. 
 
Conclusion
 
As I think I have demonstrated, Mr. Chairman, we are engaged on human  
rights in Vietnam and are pursuing these concerns with the government.  
Through the cultivation of civil society and the rule of law, and what  
we hope will be expanded bilateral ties, we will continue to work to  
resolve these outstanding issues, both in the near term and in the  
longer term. The release of Mr. Tri and Mr. Liem is one clear example of  
what can be achieved through dialogue, mutual understanding, and a  
commitment to strengthen bilateral ties. 
 
Our human rights issues in Vietnam do not differ substantially from  
those issues over which we contend with a number of countries. We do  
believe that normalization has afforded us new channels in and through  
which to advance human rights in Vietnam, the world's eighth most- 
populous country. And in so doing, we may help pursue our shared goals  
of enabling the people of Vietnam to live in freedom and dignity.  
 
(###) 
 
 
 
ARTICLE 8 
U.S. Leadership and the Balkan Challenge 
Deputy Secretary Talbott 
Remarks at the National Press Club,  Washington, DC, November 9, 1995 
 
Thank you, Bud [Karmin]. And thanks to all of you for the chance to be  
here today. I have been to many of these events over the years, and I am  
glad to return for the first time in an official capacity. I do so to  
discuss with you the American effort to bring peace to the former  
Yugoslavia. Let me begin with an update on the Dayton talks.   
 
I was out there on Monday to meet with Dick Holbrooke's team, with Carl  
Bildt and the Contact Group, and with the leaders of the parties to the  
conflict. Most of the draft documents that comprise the overall peace  
agreement are now in the hands of the parties. Those include detailed  
constitutional and territorial proposals for a future Bosnian state, a  
separation-of-forces agreement, a plan for national elections, and an  
agreement on the return of refugees. There are, every day, numerous,  
intensive meetings on virtually every aspect of the prospective  
settlement. President Tudjman returned to Dayton last night. We hope to  
use his presence to make some progress on the problem of Eastern  
Slavonia. Secretary Christopher will be going to Dayton tomorrow to  
provide further high-level support for the process.  
 
That's it. The lid is back on until about this time tomorrow, when you  
can tune in with Nick Burns for your next glimpse into what we are  
trying, for solid diplomatic reasons, to keep as tightly under wraps as  
possible.  
 
What I would like to do now is step back and look at the larger question  
of what's at stake in Dayton. That means having a clear sense of the  
consequences for our country and for the world if the talks were to fail  
and the Balkans were to be plunged back into war. Then I would like to  
look ahead to the challenge we will face if the Dayton talks succeed.  
 
Many of you have pointed out that the Administration has a tough job of  
persuasion here on the home front--up on the Hill but beyond the Beltway  
as well. We know it. It is not self-evident to the American people why a  
conflict nearly 5,000 miles from here matters enough to justify a heavy  
investment of our treasure, prestige, and military resources.  
 
So let me start right there. Bosnia matters to Americans because Europe  
matters to America. War in Bosnia threatens the peace of Europe-- 
particularly, though not exclusively, those parts of Europe that are  
emerging from Soviet-era dictatorships. And that means it threatens the  
transatlantic community of which we are a part--and of which we are a  
leader.   
 
The conflict in the Balkans is a direct consequence of the end of the  
Cold War. During that nearly half-century-long struggle, we were  
concerned about the spread of communist order. Now that the Cold War is  
over, we face a very different threat: the spread of post-communist  
disorder.   
 
That danger exists in part because of where the former Yugoslavia is. It  
is on a fault line between East and West, between Europe and Asia. If  
warfare breaks out anew and continues unabated, it could suck in other  
nations to the north, south, and east. Albania could intervene to  
protect the ethnic Albanians who live in the southern Serbian province  
of Kosovo. Fighting there could cause a massive flow of refugees into  
Macedonia, destabilizing that fragile, newly independent country and,  
perhaps, drawing in, on opposite sides, Greece and Turkey. A widening of  
the war might also tempt Hungary to come to the rescue of ethnic  
Hungarians in the Vojvodina region of northern Serbia.  
 
Meanwhile, the entire Islamic world is watching. Muslims everywhere are  
waiting to see whether their co-religionists in Bosnia will be accorded  
the same rights and protections as other Europeans. The answer to that  
question could have an impact on the future of moderate, pro-Western  
leaders such as Prime Minister Ciller of Turkey and Prime Minister  
Bhutto of Pakistan. Other forces in the Middle East and Persian Gulf see  
the Balkans as a target of opportunity. Iran's repeated offer to send  
"peacekeepers" to Bosnia is hardly motivated by altruism.   
 
Then there is the fate of NATO. A continuation of the war would threaten  
the viability of an organization that is vital to us and to Europe. If  
we were to adopt a posture of standing aside with our fingers crossed  
behind our backs, we would harm our bilateral relations with Britain,  
France, and other allies that have troops on the ground in Bosnia. We  
would also discredit the alliance as a whole and our role in it.   
 
Another point: If the fighting in Yugoslavia resumes--and if it  
escalates and spreads--it would put increasing strain on relations  
between the United States and Russia, and it would do so at a time of  
ferment and uncertainty in Russian domestic politics. In short, a new  
eruption of fighting in the Balkans would undermine our twin strategic  
objectives in Europe. Those are, first, to advance integration between  
East and West and, second, to restrain post-communist disintegration in  
the East.   
 
So those are the stakes. High stakes justify--indeed, require--bold  
action. We must, of course, be hard-headed in assessing the costs and  
risks that come with such action. But we must be just as tough-minded in  
recognizing the costs and risks that we will incur if we choose  
inaction--particularly inaction, or inadequate action, in the face of  
atrocities like mass rape, concentration camps, massacres, and forced  
deportations. As recently as August, the Bosnian Serb authorities in  
Banja Luka made local Muslims wear special white arm bands and marked  
their homes with white cloth, all as a prelude to "ethnic cleansing."  
That administrative euphemism, coupled with the deja vu of the arm  
bands, makes clear what we have been up against in Bosnia: In a word-- 
and it is the right word--it is genocide in our time, genocide on the  
continent of Europe.   
 
At issue here is not just an outrage against humanity but a challenge to  
American interests and American leadership. Far-away peoples look to us  
and count on us not just because of our economic strength and the power  
of our armed forces, but also because of what we stand for--and what we  
are prepared to act against.   
 
Taking decisive action in the Balkans has been especially difficult.  
There were, for a long time, severe limits on what the international  
community could do to make peace until the parties themselves were  
prepared to do so. But there is no question what is required today. It  
is a combination of diplomatic skill and the credible threat of force to  
keep the parties at the negotiating table, and that means keeping them  
from returning to the battlefield--not to mention the killing fields. It  
also means putting an end to genocide and bringing to justice the  
perpetrators of crimes against humanity.  
 
That is why we fully support the work of Judge Richard Goldstone and the  
United Nations War Crimes Tribunal. We have dispatched 23 officials of  
our government to work as prosecutors and researchers for the Tribunal,  
and we are fighting on Capitol Hill to preserve its funding. We are also  
making an energetic, systematic effort to provide the war crimes  
investigators and prosecutors with the facts they need to do their work.  
Even when relevant information comes from intelligence or other  
classified sources, we will find a way to get it to Judge Goldstone in a  
timely and useful manner. John Shattuck, our Assistant Secretary for  
human rights, is now traveling across Bosnia. This is his fourth trip  
there in two months. His mission is to mobilize the full resources of  
the U.S. Government in the investigation of atrocities and to gather  
additional material that we will provide to the Tribunal.   
 
Let me add that all of us recognize the crucial, sometimes heroic role  
that the press has played in informing the world about the horror in the  
Balkans. You, like we, have lost colleagues. Even with a cease-fire in  
place, covering the situation remains dangerous, as we were all reminded  
by the ordeal of David Rohde. In talking to Mr. Rohde yesterday,  
President Clinton and Secretary Christopher made it clear that we intend  
to hold Serb officials to their commitments that Western journalists as  
well as Western diplomats will have access to the suspected sites of  
human rights violations.  
 
The War Crimes Tribunal has already issued 46 indictments, including  
three more this morning, and Judge Goldstone, who will be in Washington  
next week, has told us to expect dozens more to come soon. We have made  
it clear that no indicted war criminals will be involved in  
negotiations, in the signing of agreements, or in subsequent elections.  
The peace process will not impede the investigation of atrocities or the  
prosecution of those responsible. Indicted war criminals like Dr.  
Karadzic and General Mladic should recognize that amnesties and  
immunities are not on the table in Dayton or anywhere else. If we or any  
other responsible members of the international community apprehend them,  
they will get a quick, one-way trip to the courtroom at Churchill Plein  
#1 in The Hague.  
 
Let me say a few more words about "ethnic cleansing" in the Balkans and  
why that phenomenon, by that or any other name, is  not  only an issue  
of moralpolitik, it is also an issue of realpolitik. Even when the  
phrase ethnic cleansing means "merely" mass deportation rather than mass  
murder, it captures the essence of what is most insidious--and most  
contagious--about the catastrophe that has befallen the former  
Yugoslavia.   
 
Too many leaders of those republics-turned-independent-states have tried  
to define statehood, citizenship, and international boundaries in terms  
of ethnic homogeneity and ethnic purity. Hence the dream of Greater  
Serbia, which is a nightmare for all non-Serbs, whether they live in  
Serbia proper or amid ethnic Serbs in neighboring states.   
 
Equally unacceptable is the idea of an ethnically "pure" Croatia that  
would deny the legitimate rights of Croatian Muslims and Serbs. We have  
given President Tudjman a clear, unambiguous message, and we have given  
it to him in Dayton as well as in Zagreb: If Croatia wants the benefits  
of membership in the community of market democracies--if it wants to  
enjoy international respectability--then it will have to ensure the non- 
Croats in its population have the full rights and protections of  
citizenship. Our support for Croatia is contingent on Croatia's  
continuing support for the Bosnian Federation. Moreover, we will, along  
with our allies, do everything we can to discourage the irredentist  
fantasies of any leader in the Balkans. I stress this point because if  
aggressive nationalism triumphs in the former Yugoslavia, it will not  
only be devastating in that region--it will be ominous elsewhere as  
well, especially to the north and to the east.   
 
Throughout the former Soviet empire, dark forces similar to those that  
have convulsed the Balkans are vying with those of freedom and tolerance  
to fill the partial vacuum left by the collapse of communist rule.  
 
Just to cite one example: The lethal syndrome we often call  
Balkanization could just as well be termed Caucasusization. The peoples  
of Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Armenia have suffered in much the same way  
as the people of the Balkans. If there is to be a post-Cold War peace in  
Europe--and not a cold peace, but a real one--it must be based on the  
principle of multi-ethnic democracy.   
 
The United States is one of the first and one of the greatest examples  
of that principle. What' s more, the civic behavior and constitutional  
structures associated with pluralism are conducive to regional peace and  
international trade. Hence, it is in our interest that multi-ethnic  
democracy ultimately prevails in Europe and elsewhere.  
 
Can those values and institutions ever take hold in the former  
Yugoslavia? I realize there is a lot of skepticism if not cynicism on  
that point. Many assert, or at least imply, that the conflict among  
Serbs, Croats, and Muslims is, quite simply, insoluble; that the region  
is a permanent and hopeless quagmire--a word intended to have, in our  
ears, cautionary echoes of Vietnam. Listen carefully and you will  
sometimes hear in the current debate a hint that there is something in  
the air or the water of the Balkans that dooms those wretched people to  
slaughter each other. That is often the subliminal message, I believe,  
of the cliche about "ancient hatreds."  
 
Having lived in Yugoslavia for two years--and having seen how the South  
Slavs could live harmoniously with each other--I find this view wrong- 
headed in the extreme. There was nothing predestined about the horror  
that has been raging in the Balkans for the past four years. It was  
foolish, demagogic local politics, along with short-sighted  
international diplomacy, that helped trigger, in the late 1980s and  
early 1990s, the third Balkan war of this century.   
 
By the same token, it will take sound, far-sighted diplomacy, including  
plenty of American leadership and statesmanship, to head off a  
resumption and escalation of that war now. That task will be hard enough  
without encumbering ourselves with the excess baggage of historical, not  
to mention ethnic, determinism.   
 
Let us remember, as we put our shoulder to the wheel in the Balkans,  
that patience and persistence have paid off in other areas that were  
long believed to be in the "too hard" category--the Middle East,  
Northern Ireland, and South Africa. There is hope for the former  
Yugoslavia, too.   
 
Why is that hope realistic today when it seemed so forlorn only a few  
months ago? President Clinton has pressed for the vigorous use of NATO  
air power as a necessary component of peacemaking since the early days  
of his presidency. But it took 2 1/2 years for the pieces of the puzzle  
to come together in a way that would permit that strategy to work.   
 
The murderous Serb capture of Srebrenica in early July was a turning  
point. It moved the international community to take a quantum leap in  
what it was willing to do to protect the United Nations-designated safe  
areas and to punish continuing Serb aggression. At Secretary  
Christopher's urging, the London conference in late July streamlined the  
mechanism for backing diplomacy with real force: no more cumbersome  
"dual key" arrangements; no more pin-prick air strikes.   
 
Seizing the moment, President Clinton undertook a new diplomatic  
initiative. Secretary Christopher, Tony Lake, and Dick Holbrooke worked  
the diplomatic front. Meanwhile, U.S. and NATO warplanes, no longer  
grounded by the dual key, reinforced much more convincingly than before  
the message that the time had come to stop the killing and start talking  
about the terms for a lasting political settlement.  
 
Since then, our negotiating team has made real progress. The parties  
have accepted the continuation of Bosnia-Herzegovina as a single, multi- 
ethnic state within its current, internationally recognized borders.  
Within that state, the parties have agreed that there will be two  
constituent entities. That arrangement will, we believe, make it  
possible for fratricidal passions to cool. The people of Bosnia need  
time to recover from the disintegration that they have been through--  
and to rediscover first the possibility, then the advantages, of  
integration.  
 
If--and it is still a big "if"--the Dayton talks succeed and the three  
heads of state agree on a peace settlement, then the tough work of  
implementation will begin. There, too, the United States must lead. That  
means we must be willing to send troops. Let me walk you through the  
logic of why that is true.   
 
After four years of brutal war, there is, to put it mildly, little trust  
left among the different communities in Bosnia. Peace will require an  
armed international presence to give the parties the confidence that  
they need to carry out the settlement and to begin the long, hard work  
of rebuilding and living together again.  
 
Only one organization can enforce a peace, and that is NATO. Both the  
parties to the conflict and our NATO allies have made clear that they  
are counting on significant U.S. participation in the implementation  
force. Without our being there, the force as a whole won't be there, in  
which case there will be no peace, and we will face the array of  
consequences I have outlined here.  
 
Let me stress, as President Clinton did again yesterday in meeting with  
congressional leaders, two points: first, the implementation force will  
be deployed only if the parties agree to a real peace; and second, the  
force will be militarily formidable. It will be capable not only of  
defending itself but also of compelling the parties to the peace  
agreement to live up to the commitments embodied in the peace  
settlement.  
 
We believe that 12 months is a reasonable period of time for the  
implementation force to accomplish its mission. While this will be a  
NATO-led operation, other nations, not members of the alliance, will  
also participate. So far, more than a dozen states, including Poland,  
Hungary, the Czech and Slovak Republics, Ukraine, and Pakistan, have  
expressed an interest in contributing.   
 
So has Russia. Yesterday, Bill Perry and Pavel Grachev, his Russian  
counterpart, met in Brussels to hammer out the details of a joint  
operation.  It will represent the most concrete example of U.S.-Russian  
military cooperation in the post-Cold War era. It is welcome in its own  
right and also as a precedent for the future--a future in which we hope  
that Russia and the U.S., and for that matter Russia and NATO, will find  
numerous ways to work together in building an undivided Europe.  
 
Let me conclude by expanding on that last point: The conflict in the  
former Yugoslavia has gone on for far too long; it has been the cause of  
far, far too much carnage, too much misery, too much frustration, too  
much tension between us and our partners--old and new. All of us wish  
that something like the Dayton talks could have taken place a year ago,  
better yet two years ago--better still three or four. But we are where  
we are, and we must make the best of what we have before us today.   
 
What we have today is an opportunity, far from certain and still fraught  
with danger but, nonetheless, real, to turn Bosnia from a synonym for  
past failures and an evil portent for the future into something  
positive. Bosnia could yet turn out to be a demonstration, however  
belated, of international resolve to meet the first major challenge to  
the collective security of post-Cold War Europe.  
 
Taking advantage of this opportunity and passing this test will require  
steadfastness in our diplomatic efforts and in our military commitment.  
But success will also require public and congressional support. And to  
muster and sustain that support, we had better have the best possible  
answers to the toughest possible questions--starting with yours right  
now.  
 
Thank you very much. 
 
(###) 
 
 
 
ARTICLE  9 
 
New U.S.-EURATOM Agreement For Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation 
Statement by Department Spokesman Nicholas Burns, Washington, DC,  
November 7, 1995. 
 
A new Agreement for Cooperation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy  
between the United States and the European Atomic Energy Community  
(EURATOM) was signed November 7 in Brussels, Belgium. 
 
The United States Representative to the European Union, Ambassador  
Stuart E. Eizenstat, signed the agreement on behalf of the United  
States. Mr. Christos Papoutsis, EU Commissioner for Energy, and Sir Leon  
Brittan, Vice President of the European Commission, signed the agreement  
on behalf of the commission. 
 
The new agreement provides an updated, comprehensive framework for  
peaceful nuclear cooperation between the United States and EURATOM,  
seeks to facilitate such cooperation, and provides for strengthened  
controls reflecting our shared strong commitment to nuclear non- 
proliferation. 
 
The U.S. Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 (NNPA) establishes  
specific requirements for agreements of this type. The new U.S.-EURATOM  
agreement satisfies all NNPA requirements. 
 
Upon its entry into force, the agreement will replace a U.S. agreement  
with EURATOM dating from 1958 and an additional U.S. agreement with  
EURATOM that entered into force in 1960 and will expire on December 31,  
1995. It also will replace existing bilateral U.S. agreements with EU  
member states Austria, Finland, Portugal, Spain, and Sweden. 
 
The new agreement has an initial term of 30 years and will continue in  
force indefinitely thereafter in increments of five years until  
terminated in accordance with its provisions. In the event of  
termination, key non-proliferation conditions and controls will remain  
effective. 
 
The new agreement provides to EURATOM (and reciprocally to the United  
States) advance, long-term approval for specified enrichment,  
retransfers, reprocessing, alteration in form or content, and storage of  
specified nuclear material in a manner that is compatible with U.S. non- 
proliferation policies and statutory requirements. The approval for  
reprocessing and alteration in form or content may be suspended if  
either activity ceases to satisfy criteria set out in the agreement,  
including criteria relating to safeguards and physical protection. 
 
The advance, long-term approvals reflect the Administration policies,  
set forth in President Clinton's Non-Proliferation Policy Statement of  
September 27, 1993, aimed at improving the climate of cooperation with  
and providing greater certainty for the civil nuclear programs of  
countries and groups of countries with unquestioned nuclear non- 
proliferation credentials. Associated with the agreement is a joint  
declaration on non-proliferation policy, which elaborates in detail the  
strong commitment to nuclear non-proliferation shared by the two  
parties. 
 
Importance of the Agreement
 
The United States believes that the new agreement will promote important  
U.S. non-proliferation and other foreign policy interests. Among the  
benefits expected to accrue to the United States from the agreement are  
the following. 
 
-- Renewal and strengthening of political and economic bonds with U.S.  
friends and allies in Europe at a time when new challenges threaten  
global security in the post-Cold War era. 

-- More effective cooperation with European partners in preserving and  
strengthening the international nuclear non-proliferation regime,  
support of which is a fundamental objective of U.S. national security  
and foreign policy. 

-- Substantial upgrading of U.S. controls over nuclear items subject  
to previous U.S. agreements with EURATOM as well as over future  
cooperation. 
 
-- Reaffirmation of the U.S. intention to be a reliable nuclear trading  
partner, thus helping to ensure the continuation and possible growth of  
U.S. civil nuclear exports to the countries of EURATOM. 
 
Negotiation and Approval 
The new agreement was negotiated by the Department of State with the  
technical cooperation and assistance of the Department of Energy and in  
consultation with the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. Also, it was  
reviewed by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, which recommended that  
the President approve it. 
 
President Clinton approved the new agreement and authorized its  
execution by Presidential Determination No. 96-4, dated November 1,  
1995. 
 
Now that the agreement has been signed, the President, as required by  
Section 123 of the U.S. Atomic Energy Act, will submit it to Congress  
for a review period of 90 continuous session days. The new agreement may  
be brought into force at the conclusion of this statutory congressional  
review period unless a joint resolution of disapproval is enacted. 
 
During the interval between expiration of the present U.S.-EURATOM  
agreement December 31 and entry into force of the new agreement, it will  
not be legally possible to issue U.S. licenses for the export of nuclear  
material and equipment to EURATOM countries except those covered by the  
bilateral agreements remaining in force. Nevertheless, accumulated days  
of continuous session may be carried over into 1996, and the gap in  
agreement coverage is expected to be brief and manageable.  
 
(###) 
 
 
 
ARTICLE 10
 
Treaty Actions 
 
Multilateral 
 
Arbitration 
Convention on the recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral  
awards. Done at New York June 10, 1958. Entered into force June 7, 1959;  
for the U.S. Dec. 29, 1970. TIAS 6997; 21 UST 2517.Accession: Bolivia,  
Apr. 28, 1995. 
 
Chemical Weapons  
Convention on the prohibition of the development, production, 
stockpiling, and use of chemical weapons and on their  
destruction, with annexes. Done at Paris Jan. 13, 1993. [Senate] Treaty  
Doc. 103-21(1). 
Ratifications: Algeria, Aug. 14, 1995; Austria, Aug. 17, 1995; Ecuador,  
Sept. 6, 1995; Japan, Sept. 15, 1995; Poland, Aug. 23, 1995; South  
Africa, Sept. 13, 1995. 
 
Children 
Convention on the rights of the child. Done at New York Nov. 20, 1989.  
Entered into force Sept. 2, 1990(2). 
Ratification: Swaziland, Sept. 7, 1995. 
 
Narcotics 
Single convention on narcotic drugs, 1961. Done at New York Mar. 30,  
1961. Entered into force Dec. 13, 1964; for the U.S.June 24, 1967. TIAS  
6298; 18 UST 1407. 
 
Protocol amending the single convention on narcotic drugs, 1961. Done at  
Geneva Mar. 25, 1972. Entered into force Aug. 8, 1975. TIAS 8118; 26 UST  
1439. 
Accession: Uzbekistan, Aug. 24, 1995. 
 
United Nations convention against illicit traffic in narcotic drugs and  
psychotropic substances, with annex and final act. Done at Vienna Dec.  
20, 1988. Entered into force Nov. 11, 1990. [Senate] Treaty Doc. 101-4. 
Accessions: Saint Lucia, Aug. 21, 1995; Uzbekistan, Aug. 24, 1995. 
 
Prisoner Transfers 
Convention on the transfer of sentenced persons. Done at 
Strasbourg Mar. 21, 1983. Entered into force July 1, 1985. TIAS 10824. 
Ratification: Ireland, July 31, 1995. 
 
Property 
Convention establishing the World Intellectual Property Organization.  
Done at Stockholm July 14, 1967. Entered into force Apr. 26, 1970; for  
the U.S. Aug. 25, 1970.     TIAS 6932; 21 UST 1749. 
Accession: St. Kitts and Nevis, Aug. 16, 1995. 
 
Red Cross 
Protocol additional to the Geneva conventions of Aug. 12, 1949, and  
relating to the protection of victims of international armed conflicts  
(Protocol I), with annexes. Done at Geneva June 8, 1977. Entered into  
force Dec. 7, 19782. 
 
Protocol additional to the Geneva conventions of Aug. 12, 1949, and  
relating to the protection of victims of non-international armed  
conflicts (Protocol II). Done at Geneva June 8, 1977. Entered into force  
Dec. 7, 19782.  
Accession: Cape Verde, Mar. 16, 1995; Zambia, May 4, 1995. 
Ratification: Honduras, Feb. 16, 1995. 
 
Refugees  
Convention relating to the status of refugees, with schedule and annex.  
Signed at Geneva July 28, 1951. Entered into force Apr. 22, 1954 (2).  
TIAS 6577. 
 
Protocol relating to the status of refugees. Done at New York Jan. 31,  
1967. Entered into force Oct. 4, 1967; for the U.S. Nov. 1, 1968. TIAS  
6577; 19 UST 6223. 
Accession: Antigua and Barbuda, Sept. 7, 1995. 
 
Terrorism  
Convention on the safety of United Nations and associated personnel.  
Done at New York Dec. 9, 1994(1). 
Signature: Bolivia, Aug. 17, 1995. 
Ratification: Ukraine, Aug. 17, 1995. 
 
Weapons, Conventional Convention on prohibitions or restrictions on the  
use of certain conventional weapons which may be deemed to be  
excessively injurious or to have indiscriminate effects, with annexed  
protocols. Adopted at Geneva Oct. 10, 1980. Entered into force Dec. 2,  
1983; for the U.S. Sept. 24, 1995. [Senate] Treaty Doc. 103-25. 
 
Protocol on non-detectable fragments (Protocol I) to the  
convention on prohibitions or restrictions on the use of certain  
conventional weapons which may be deemed to be excessively injurious or  
to have indiscriminate effects. Adopted at Geneva Oct. 10, 1980. Entered  
into force Dec. 2, 1983; for the U.S. Sept. 24, 1995. [Senate] Treaty  
Doc. 103-25. 
 
Protocol on prohibitions or restrictions on the use of mines, 
booby-traps, and other devices (Protocol II) to the convention on  
prohibitions or restrictions on the use of certain conventional weapons  
which may be deemed to be excessively injurious or to have  
indiscriminate effects. Adopted at Geneva Oct. 10, 1980. Entered into  
force Dec. 2, 1983; for the U.S. Sept. 24, 1995. [Senate] Treaty Doc.  
103-25. 
 
Protocol on prohibitions or restrictions on the use of incendiary  
weapons (Protocol III) to the convention on prohibitions or restrictions  
on the use of certain conventional weapons which may be deemed to be  
excessively injurious or to have indiscriminate effects. Adopted at  
Geneva Oct. 10, 1980. Entered into force Dec. 2, 1983 (2) 
Ratifications: Ireland, Mar. 13, 1995; South Africa, Sept. 13, 1995. 
 
Women  
Convention on the elimination of all forms of discrimination against  
women. Adopted by the UN General Assembly Dec. 18, 1979. Entered into  
force Sept. 3, 19812. [Senate] Ex. R, 96th Cong., Sec. Sess. Accessions:  
Eritrea, Sept. 5, 1995; Fiji, Aug. 28, 1995; Malaysia, July 5, 1995;  
Uzbekistan, July 19, 1995; Vanuatu, Sept. 8, 1995. 
Ratification: Lesotho, Aug. 22, 1995. 
 
Convention on the political rights of women. Done at New York Mar. 31,  
1953. Entered into force July 7, 1954; for the U.S. July 7, 1976. TIAS  
8289; 27 UST 1909. 
Accession: Uganda, June 21, 1995. 

 
Bilateral 
 
Armenia  
Postal money order agreement. Signed at Yerevan and Washington June 28  
and Aug. 3, 1995. Entered into force Sept. 1, 1995. 
 
Cambodia  
Investment incentive agreement. Signed at Phnom Penh Aug. 4,1995. Enters  
into force on date on which Cambodia notifies the U.S. that all legal  
requirements have been fulfilled. 
 
Dominican Republic  
Postal money order agreement. Signed at Washington and Santo Domingo  
Aug. 6 and 14, 1995. Entered into force Sept. 1, 1995. 
 
Ecuador  
Agreement amending the agreement of Oct. 15, 1993, concerning the  
protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights. Signed at  
Quito July 28, 1995. Entered into force July 28, 1995. 
 
Estonia  
Agreement to treat the agreement of June 19, 1995, among the States  
Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty and other States participating in  
the Partnership for Peace regarding the status of their forces as  
binding. Effected by exchange of notes at Tallinn July 14 and 18, 1995.  
Entered into force July 18, 1995. 
 
Agreement extending the agreement of June 1, 1992, concerning fisheries  
off the coasts of the United States. Effected by exchange of notes at  
Tallinn    Mar. 11 and May 12, 1994. Entered into force Sept. 1, 1995. 
 
Finland  
Agreement relating to scientific and technological cooperation, with  
annexes. Signed at Washington May 16, 1995. Entered into force Aug. 27,  
1995. 
 
France 
Technical exchange and cooperation agreement in the field of light water  
reactor safety research, with appendices and annex. Signed at Rockville  
and Fontenay-aux-Roses Apr. 25 and May 22, 1995. Entered into force May  
22, 1995. 
 
Haiti  
Agreement regarding the consolidation, reduction, and rescheduling of  
certain debts owed to, guaranteed, by or insured by the United States  
Government and its agencies, with annexes. Signed at Port-au-Prince,  
Aug. 7, 1995. Entered into force Sept. 7, 1995. 
 
Hong Kong 
Agreement extending the agreement of Nov. 23, 1990, as extended,  
concerning the confiscation and forfeiture of the proceeds and  
instrumentalities of drug trafficking. Effected by exchange of letters  
at Hong Kong July 3 and 10, 1995. Entered into force July 10, 1995;  
effective Jan. 18, 1996. 
 
Korea 
Arrangement for the exchange of technical information and cooperation in  
regulatory and safety research matters, with addenda. Signed at  
Rockville June 5, 1995. Entered into force June 5, 1995. 
 
Lithuania 
Agreement concerning temporary application of agreement of 
June 19, 1995, among the States Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty and  
the other States participating in the Partnership for Peace regarding  
the status of their forces. Effected by exchange of notes at Vilnius  
July 20 and 25, 1995. Entered into force July 25, 1995. 
 
Mexico 
Temporary exchange stabilization agreement, with annexes. Signed at  
Mexico and Washington Jan. 2 and 4, 1995. Entered into force Jan. 4,  
1995. 
 
Namibia 
Memorandum of understanding concerning scientific and technical 
cooperation in the earth sciences, with annexes. Signed at Reston and  
Windhoek July 27 and Aug. 23, 1995. Entered into force Aug. 23, 1995. 
 
Nicaragua 
Agreement among the United States and the Government of  
Nicaragua/Central American Business Administration Institute regarding  
the assumption, payment, and discharge of certain debts. Effected by  
exchange of notes at Managua Aug. 28, 1995. Entered into force Aug. 28,  
1995. 
 
Agreement regarding the consolidation and rescheduling of certain debts  
owed to, guaranteed by, or insured by the United States Government and  
its agencies, with annexes. Signed at Managua Aug. 28, 1995. Enters into  
force following signature and receipt by Nicaragua of written notice  
from the U.S. that all necessary domestic legal requirements have been  
fulfilled. 
 
Senegal  
Agreement regarding the consolidation, reduction, and rescheduling of  
certain debts owed to, guaranteed by, or insured by the United States  
Government and its agencies, with annexes. Signed at Dakar Aug. 28,  
1995. Enters into force following signature and receipt by Senegal of  
written notice from the U.S. that all necessary domestic legal  
requirements have been fulfilled. 
 
Sweden 
Agreement relating to participation in the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory  
Commission program of severe accident research. Signed at Rockville and  
Stockholm Jan. 10 and Apr. 24, 1995. Entered into force Apr. 24, 1995;  
effective Jan. 1, 1994. 
 
United Nations  
Agreement regarding the furnishing of defense articles and defense  
services by the United States to the United Nations for purposes of  
supporting the Rapid Reaction Force established pursuant to United  
Nations Security Council Resolution 998. Effected by exchange of notes  
at New York July 28, 1995. Entered into force July 28, 1995. 
_____ 
 
1 Not in force.  
2 Not in force for the U.S.  
 
(###) 
 
 
[END OF DISPATCH VOLUME 6, NUMBER 47]
(###)

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