U.S. Department of State Dispatch
Volume 6, Number 47, November 20, 1995
Bureau of Public Affairs
U.S. Department of State
Dispatch
Volume 6, Number 47, November 20, 1995
ARTICLES IN THIS ISSUE:
1. APEC: Making Progress Toward Free Trade Through the Osaka Action
Agenda--Secretary Christopher
2. Restoring Positive Momentum In U.S.--China Relations-Secretary
Christopher, Chinese Foreign Minister Qian
3. APEC Economic Leaders' Declaration for Action
4. Joint Statement: Ensuring Peace And Stability in Northeast Asia--
Secretary Christopher, Japanese Foreign Minister Kono, South Korean
Foreign Minister Gong
5. Fact Sheet: Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation
6. Fact Sheet: U.S. Economic Relations With East Asia and the Pacific
7. Human Rights in Vietnam--Steven J. Coffey
8. U.S. Leadership and the Balkan Challenge--Deputy Secretary Talbott
9. New U.S.-EURATOM Agreement For Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation
10. Treaty Actions
ARTICLE 1
APEC: Making Progress Toward Free Trade Through the Osaka Action Agenda
Secretary Christopher
APEC Ministerial Intervention, Osaka, Japan, November 16, 1995
Minister Kono, Minister Hashimoto, Excellencies, colleagues, and
friends: It is a pleasure to join you at this year's ministerial meeting
of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum. Let me take this
opportunity to express my deep appreciation to our Japanese hosts. Prime
Minister Murayama, Minister Kono, Minister Hashimoto, and their
colleagues have worked hard to make our meetings in Osaka a success.
After six years of progress and vision, APEC now faces a crucial seventh
year of decision. As the guiding force for economic growth and
integration in the world's most dynamic region, APEC must not only
sustain the momentum it has achieved over the last two years. It must
begin to take concrete and far-reaching actions to open up trade and
investment in the Asia-Pacific region. If APEC is truly to make history,
it must produce results.
The American people in particular have a great stake in APEC's success.
APEC's members include our three largest bilateral trading partners--
Canada, Japan, and Mexico. More than 2-1/2 million jobs depend on our
exports to APEC members in East Asia alone. Four out of the 10 economies
that the United States has identified as vital Big Emerging Markets
belong to APEC.
The breathtaking transformation of the Asia-Pacific region over the past
half-century testifies to its remarkable economic growth. Previously
underdeveloped societies have become modern nation-states offering broad
opportunities to their people. The Pacific Rim has become the free
market's newest frontier. Within the span of one generation, bicycles
and sampans have given way to subways and supertankers as Asian
economies have converted themselves into economic dynamos. Thirty years
ago, Asia accounted for only 4% of the world's economy; today, it
accounts for 25%.
This growth is transforming the vast Pacific--turning the seas and skies
that once divided us into channels for commerce and cooperation. More
than 40% of U.S. trade is with Asia. Trade within APEC now accounts for
almost 70% of the trade totals of its member economies, and investment
among them continues to grow. American firms are helping to construct
airports in Malaysia. Indonesian companies are putting up hotels in
Vietnam. Korean companies are manufacturing computer components in the
United States. Australian engineering firms are paving roads in
Indonesia. And a Singaporean brewery is bottling beer in Cambodia.
The dramatic growth and integration of the Asia-Pacific region that I
have seen in cities like Kuala Lumpur and Jakarta is not an accident but
a reflection of the energy and vision of its diverse peoples. It is that
energy and vision that must continue to inspire APEC's efforts.
When the ministers of APEC's original 12 members met in Canberra in
1989, they recognized that the best way to sustain our region's dynamism
was to ensure that our economies grew together. In a rapidly developing
region where skyscrapers were going up next to rice paddies, that meant
cooperating to address shared practical challenges such as breaking
transportation bottlenecks, harmonizing technical standards, and easing
strains on the environment. By expanding trade and investment among our
economies, APEC's members would help create jobs and opportunity on both
sides of the Pacific. By establishing stronger ties among our nations,
they would promote regional stability.
When President Clinton took office, he understood that the security and
prosperity of the United States in the coming century depends, in large
part, on the prosperity and stability of the Asia-Pacific region. He
recognized APEC's potential both to spur trade and investment and to lay
the basis for what he called "a community of shared interests, shared
goals, and a shared commitment to mutually beneficial cooperation."
That is why President Clinton took the initiative two years ago to
invite APEC leaders to Seattle. There, at Blake Island, the leaders
recognized an opportunity to build a new economic foundation for the
Asia-Pacific that harnesses the energy of our diverse economies,
strengthens cooperation, and promotes prosperity.
Last year in Bogor, with the leadership of President Soeharto, the
leaders gave life to the vision of Blake Island by issuing the historic
Bogor Declaration that calls for free and open trade in the Asia-Pacific
region by the year 2020. They set that ambitious goal because they
agreed that a joint commitment to liberalization is the best way to
accelerate growth and development in each of our economies.
Now, these declarations must be translated into actions. As the Chinese
saying goes, "words must count and deeds must yield results." At this
ministerial and leaders' meeting, APEC must undertake the hard work of
moving from a vision to a practical blueprint for action. We are charged
with devising an Action Agenda that takes concrete steps to promote
growth and reduce economic disparities.
The proposed Action Agenda before us sets forth 15 specific, practical
areas where we can make immediate progress toward creating a common
business environment in a giant market of 2.1 billion people. This nuts-
and-bolts work might seem to lack the drama and novelty of our earlier
meetings. But while it may not make for big headlines, it does make for
bigger bottom lines.
For example, different product standards, technical specifications,
inspection requirements, and performance tests are in force across the
region. The Action Agenda calls on us to begin taking steps to align
them with international standards. Bottom line: By doing so, we can
break down trade barriers and cut costs for business. The Action Agenda
also calls for us to simplify and harmonize customs standards. Bottom
line: Our businesses will find it faster and cheaper to import and
export if all our member economies meet our commitment to follow the
Kyoto Convention by 1998.
In addition to taking these and other concrete steps provided for in
the Action Agenda, we expect that our leaders will commit to a series of
early actions that demonstrate their determination to achieve free trade
and investment. Such "downpayments" will help build the momentum we need
to meet the commitment we made in the Bogor Declaration. The first and
most important downpayment for the United States is to implement the
Uruguay Round fully, promptly, and, in some areas, at a higher level of
discipline than required by the agreement.
Implementing the liberalization elements of the Action Agenda
successfully will require close adherence to three guiding concepts that
I call the "three Cs"--comprehensiveness, comparability, and
consultation.
First, comprehensive coverage. We must maintain our leaders' commitment
to liberalize all sectors of our economies by the 2010/2020 deadline.
The growing integration of our economies means that when one member
protects even one sector, many members suffer lost economic
opportunities as a result.
Given the diversity of our economies, it is appropriate that we have
some flexibility in the pace and sequencing of our actions. We will
liberalize gradually because the Bogor Declaration gives us time to
adjust before open trade is fully realized. But we must include all
sectors in the Osaka Action Agenda. Failure to do so would risk
unraveling the core of our Bogor commitment and undermining APEC's
credibility and influence as a force for global liberalization.
Second, comparability. As we liberalize our economies, we must ensure a
comparable level of opportunities and benefits for the people of all the
APEC member economies. We do not have to take identical steps, but the
steps we take should produce comparable results. Each of us can take
difficult steps if all of us are taking difficult steps.
Third, consultation. To ensure comparability, we must engage in a
continuing process of consultation. Consultation will help keep the
process of liberalization moving forward. We all need to meet face-to-
face to review where we stand in our liberalizing efforts and to see
where we are going.
While these "three Cs" should guide the first part of our Action Agenda,
we must not forget the "fourth C"--cooperation. Since its inception in
1989, APEC has made a tangible contribution to the development of each
of our economies. Beyond the liberalization and facilitation of trade,
APEC must broaden its efforts under the second part of our Action Agenda
to promote economic and technical cooperation. Whether in human
resources, science and technology, or infrastructure, we must continue
to spur development by harnessing the diversity of experience and
outlook that is one of APEC's greatest strengths.
Last year, I introduced three initiatives consistent with the priori-
ties for cooperation that President Soeharto had identified in his
capacity as chairman. Let me briefly review their status.
I am pleased to announce that the APEC Education Foundation that I
proposed has now been incorporated. The Foundation will support
research, scholarship, and academic exchange activities among our
economies. It will also strengthen cooperation among the APEC Study
Centers that are the key component of the Leaders' Education Initiative
proposed by the United States at Blake Island. These human links are
essential not just to economic development but to building a Pacific
Community of shared values and interests. I look forward to the
formation of a Board of Governors and Advisory Council that fully
reflect our region's excellence in education and scholarship, and I hope
that the Foundation will begin making grants next year.
I also proposed a meeting of transport ministers to address our massive
infrastructure needs. Without safe and efficient harbors, airports,
railroads, and highways, the Asia-Pacific is in danger of having its
vital arteries of commerce blocked off or choked by bottlenecks and dead
ends. My colleague, Secretary Pena, will review the outcome of the
ministerial he hosted last June in Washington. I am pleased that we were
able to encourage competition in the transport sector, examine ways to
improve our facilities, and bolster our cooperation and training in
critical areas such as safety and security.
Finally, I proposed at last year's ministerial that APEC members agree
to transform the ad hoc Pacific Business Forum into a permanent APEC
Business Advisory Committee. The United States believes that this
initiative will strengthen private sector participation in the working
groups and provide APEC with invaluable advice on our efforts to expand
trade and investment. I am glad that the Action Agenda takes this
important step, and I look forward to working with the committee to
ensure that its voice is heard.
After all, the real test of APEC's success will be whether its work has
practical relevance to the business community. The private sector
remains the catalyst of this region's dynamism. That is why APEC's job
is to remove impediments that unnecessarily restrict business activity.
Just as the Boeing Company's computer network enables engineers in
America and Japan to work at the same time on the same design, APEC
should permit our businesses to function effectively across a dozen time
zones and languages. We can only achieve that goal by considering
business views closely.
The Action Agenda addresses another area of critical importance to
business--liberalization and transparency in government procurement
markets. Most of the monumental volume of infrastructure projects in
developing APEC economies--already equaling about $200 billion a year--
is government-generated. The Action Agenda includes a guideline that
calls upon each APEC economy to "enhance the transparency of its
government procurement regimes and its government procurement
information." Member economies will "develop, by 2000, a set of non-
binding principles on government procurement" among other collective
actions in this area.
Next year, in Manila, we should agree to accelerate the adoption of
these principles. Their adoption at the earliest possible date will be
an important step in guiding the efforts of member economies to achieve
the greatest possible transparency in government procurement. As in so
many other areas of focus for APEC, improvements in any member economy
ultimately benefit every member economy.
The adoption of APEC principles on government procurement can make an
even greater practical impact if we intensify our efforts. I believe
that a working group should identify the highest standards and best
practices already in effect across the region and report back to us next
year in Manila. As we work to strengthen national laws and regulations
addressing government procurement, APEC members could draw on specific
practices in areas such as timely public notice of procurement
opportunities, use and articulation of objective criteria for awarding
contracts, and a mechanism for unsuccessful bidders to appeal to an
administrative entity other than the awarding agency.
The entire region shares an overriding stake in ensuring that our
government procurement practices meet world-class standards. Our
economies share a stake in the most efficient use of scarce capital--and
in meeting infrastructure needs through the best technology and service
the private sector can offer. Our companies share a stake in bidding
practices that reward low cost and high quality--and in business
environments that are equitable and predictable. And our people share a
stake in the wise use of their resources--and in public institutions
that foster respect for the rule of law. I look forward to working with
my colleagues to strengthen APEC's commitment to transparency over the
next year.
Our officials have worked hard over the past 12 months to forge a
consensus document that reflects our economic diversity and, more
importantly, reinforces our shared commitment. I believe our senior
officials have found the right balance between a flexible, yet credible,
approach for achieving our trade and investment liberalization and
economic cooperation objectives. I commend warmly the spirit of
compromise, cooperation, and common purpose that has characterized their
efforts and that has produced the draft we will finalize today. With
this spirit, APEC promises to mature as a force for growth and
prosperity across the region--and for trade liberalization around the
world.
As ministers, we face a great responsibility to our leaders in setting
out an Action Agenda that meets the terms of their Bogor Declaration.
But as we carry out our core commitments to liberalize trade and
investment, we should keep in sight the broader vision of a Pacific
Community that first brought our leaders together. The Action Agenda we
devise in Osaka represents the focus of our efforts, but it should not
limit our horizons. We must be willing to explore new areas where APEC's
spirit of cooperation can promote the prosperity and development of our
diverse peoples.
The Asia-Pacific encompasses the oldest of civilizations and the newest
of nations. Its people embrace all creeds and colors, and its economies
span from subsistence agriculture to advanced aerospace. But where some
have seen a clash of cultures, APEC increasingly embodies a unity of
interests. The Action Agenda that we devise here in Osaka will guide our
economies to achieve our common goal of free trade and investment by the
year 2020. Fulfillment of that common goal will bring us ever closer to
achieving our shared Asia-Pacific destiny.
(###)
ARTICLE 2
Restoring Positive Momentum In U.S.-China Relations
Secretary Christopher, Chinese Foreign Minister Qian
Opening remarks at news conference prior to their meeting, Osaka, Japan,
November 16, 1995
Secretary Christopher. Good afternoon. I am pleased to meet today with
my colleague, Vice Premier and Foreign Minister Qian Qichen of China.
Today marks my fourth meeting with the Vice Premier in the last 3-1/2
months, beginning with our important meeting in Brunei. I look forward
to sustaining the positive momentum we have achieved over this period.
As members of the APEC Forum, the United States and China share an
interest in promoting the continuing economic growth and integration of
the Asia-Pacific region. As members of the ASEAN Regional Forum, we
share an interest in promoting a more secure region through dialogue and
confidence-building measures. And as great nations who sit together as
permanent members of the UN Security Council, our two countries have a
shared interest in promoting stability, security, and prosperity around
the world.
In our talks today, the Foreign Minister and I want to build on the
positive meeting between Presidents Clinton and Jiang last month at the
United Nations 50th anniversary commemoration. There, our two leaders
agreed on the central importance of strong ties between our two
countries and the need to restore positive momentum in our relationship.
While our two nations have differences in important areas such as human
rights, nevertheless, I believe that we are both prepared to discuss
those differences in an open and constructive manner.
The recognition of the importance of the U.S.-China relationship has
enabled us to invigorate our bilateral dialogue. We are very pleased
that Ambassador-designate Li Daoyu has returned to Washington--and with
a little cooperation from the United States Senate, we hope Senator
Sasser will be in Beijing soon.
Contacts between our countries on security issues are resuming. Defense
Assistant Secretary Nye is in China today meeting for talks with his
Chinese counterparts. We are also seeking areas of agreement in
preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, a matter of
great concern regionally and globally. We can advance our common
interest in non-proliferation by moving forward on a zero-yield
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.
By working together, the United States and China can more effectively
address a number of issues that are basically common international
challenges. Our two countries have agreed to work together in fighting
international crime, narcotics trafficking, and money laundering--the
kind of security challenges that President Clinton referred to in his UN
speech last month. We are pursuing high-level talks on the environment,
sustainable development, and energy as well as United Nations issues.
Finally, as two important economies, we share very important economic
interests that we will be discussing today. The United States has a
large stake in China's dynamic economy, and we are working to try to
enlarge our opportunities for trade and investment in China. We
staunchly support China's accession to the WTO at the earliest possible
time. We will continue to work with China to ensure that its accession
takes place on appropriate terms.
In closing, let me say that our relationship with China is one of our
most important bilateral relationships, and I thank the Minister for his
help in enabling us to work constructively on this important
relationship and invigorate it and to build momentum. Thank you very
much.
Foreign Minister Qian. I am very pleased to have this opportunity to
meet once again with the Secretary of State, Mr. Christopher. Both of us
are here for the APEC ministerial meeting. China and the United States
share a lot of common ground within APEC, although there is no denying
that we are divided on certain issues. Today, I'm happy to tell you that
the two countries have reached agreement in their consultation. So we
are not divided anymore on the Action Agenda, which is going to be
adopted smoothly.
President Jiang Zemin and President Clinton, not long ago in New York,
had a very good meeting, during which they emphasized the shared, common
interests that exist between the two countries--despite the fact that
there are some differences. Both sides expressed their willingness to
view the Sino-U.S. relationship from a strategic perspective and with an
eye on the 21st century. Both sides would work together so that the
bilateral relationship could enjoy stable and sustained development on
the basis of the three Sino-U.S. joint communiques.
During today's meeting, we are going to exchange views on issues of
common interest, as well as how to resume and broaden our cooperation in
some fields. Of course, there is no denying that there are some
differences and contradictions that exist between us that need to be
addressed and tackled. The Secretary of State, Mr. Christopher, has
enumerated some areas of importance that will be discussed in our
meeting. I think that he would also not forget the question of Taiwan,
which is a very sensitive issue in our bilateral relationship. This
question also deserves very careful discussion in our meeting today. It
is my hope that this meeting could result in better mutual understanding
and more common ground between the two countries, thus sustaining the
good momentum of growth in our bilateral relationship. Thank you.
(###)
ARTICLE 3
APEC Economic Leaders' Declaration for Action
Declaration released following the APEC Economic Leaders' Meeting,
Osaka, Japan, November 19, 1995.
1. We have gathered in Osaka to further advance the Asia-Pacific
economic dynamism and sense of community. The Asia-Pacific is
experiencing the most striking economic growth in the world and ever-
increasing interdependence. It is a major contributor to global
prosperity and stability.
We believe our economic reforms based on market-oriented mechanisms have
unleashed our peoples' creativity and energy and enhanced the prosperity
and living standards of our citizens in the region and the world as a
whole. In the current climate in our vast and diverse Asia-Pacific
region, APEC presents us with a golden opportunity for the 21st century.
Through APEC we can harness, coordinate, and channel dynamic economic
trends to our collective advantage.
2. At Blake Island we established the vision of a community of Asia-
Pacific economies, and at Bogor we set a number of specific goals and
objectives, including:
-- Free and open trade and investment in the Asia-Pacific no later than
2010 in the case of industrialized economies and 2020 in the case of
developing economies;
-- Expansion and acceleration of trade and investment facilitation
programs; and
-- Intensified development cooperation to attain sustainable growth,
equitable development, and national stability.
We have, with Osaka, entered the action phase in translating this vision
and these goals into reality. Today we adopt the Osaka Action Agenda,
the embodiment of our political will, to carry through our commitment at
Bogor. We will implement the Action Agenda with unwavering resolve.
3. The Osaka Action Agenda is the template for future APEC work toward
our common goals. It represents the three pillars of trade and
investment liberalization, their facilitation, and economic and
technical cooperation. Achieving sustained economic development
throughout the APEC region depends on pursuing actions in each of
these areas vigorously.
Reflecting the diverse character of APEC and the broad scope of our
activities, we will achieve the long-term goal of free and open trade
and investment in several ways. We will:
-- Encourage and concert the evolving efforts of voluntary
liberalization in the region;
-- Take collective actions to advance our liberalization and
facilitation objectives; and
-- Stimulate and contribute to further momentum for global
liberalization.
4. We emphasize our resolute opposition to an inward-looking trading
bloc that would divert from the pursuit of global free trade, and we
commit ourselves to firmly maintaining open regional cooperation. We
reaffirm our determination to see APEC take the lead in strengthening
the open multilateral trading system. We trust that enlarged
participation by APEC economies in the WTO would facilitate greater
regional cooperation. We will explore joint initiatives under the WTO,
including preparations for the Ministerial Meeting in Singapore.
Ensuring that APEC remains consistent with the WTO Agreement, we will
achieve trade and investment liberalization steadily and progressively.
Desiring that trade and economic tensions among APEC economies be
resolved in a non-confrontational manner, we are committed to finding
ways of ameliorating trade friction. We agree on the desirability of an
APEC dispute mediation service, without prejudice to rights and
obligations under the WTO Agreement and other international agreements.
5. In the Action Agenda we have agreed to a set of fundamental
principles to guide the achievement of our liberalization and
facilitation: comprehensiveness; WTO consistency; comparability; non-
discrimination; transparency; standstill; simultaneous start, continuous
process, and differentiated time tables; flexibility; and cooperation.
We direct our ministers and officials to immediately begin the
preparation of concrete and substantive Action Plans to be submitted to
the 1996 Ministerial Meeting in the Philippines for assessment. Overall
implementation of the Action Plans will begin in January 1997 and will
be reviewed annually.
To assist in this process, we instruct our ministers and officials to
engage in consultation in a collective effort of a confidence-building
nature to facilitate exchanges of information, to ensure transparency,
and to contribute toward attaining the comparability of respective
Action Plans.
The Action Agenda may be revised and improved as necessary in response
to changing circumstances. While we have chosen the unique approach of
concerted liberalization grounded in voluntarism and collective
initiatives by the member economies as the key means for implementing
the Action Agenda, its success hinges upon our own continuing efforts,
strong self-discipline, and close consultation.
6. Governed by the Osaka Action Agenda's principles of mutual respect
and equality, mutual benefit and assistance, constructive and genuine
partnership, and consensus building, we will promote action-oriented
economic and technical cooperation in a wide range of areas. With the
Action Agenda, APEC has gained renewed momentum and broader perspective
for economic and technical cooperation.
Economic and technical cooperation implemented through various means
including Partners for Progress serves to promote trade and investment
liberalization and facilitation, to narrow the disparities within the
region, and to achieve growth and prosperity for the region as a whole.
We will thus work through policy dialogue and joint activities to
broaden and deepen intra-regional cooperation in all areas of our
interest.
At the ministerial level, valuable consultations have been held on
macroeconomic, financial, exchange rate, and other policies regarding
capital flows, capital market development, and infrastructure financing.
We also commend the valuable contribution at the ministerial level in
such fields as telecommunications and information industry,
transportation, small and medium enterprises, and science and
technology. We hope that they will continue their good efforts.
7. We are pleased to announce that each of us has brought a package of
initial actions demonstrating our firm commitment to achieving
liberalization and facilitation. These voluntary actions will spur and
inspire APEC liberalization. They also represent the first wide-ranging
initiatives to accelerate the implementation of our Uruguay Round
commitments and to deepen and broaden the outcome of the Uruguay Round
through, for example, acceleration of tariff reductions, early
implementation of WTO agreements, and pursuance of deregulation.
Together with these measures, our collective actions including
harmonizing and enhancing the efficiency of customs procedures and
promoting mutual recognition and improving conformity assessment
capabilities will yield immediate and tangible benefits for business. We
urge non-APEC economies to follow suit and help advance global trade and
investment liberalization.
8. The Eminent Persons Group and the Pacific Business Forum have made
important contributions to the formulation of the Osaka Action Agenda.
Highly appreciative of the dedication and wisdom of the people who took
part in the process, we congratulate them on the successful completion
of their task.
Recognizing that business is the source of vitality for the Asia-Pacific
and the driving force for regional economic development, we will appoint
the members of the APEC Business Advisory Council to provide insights
and counsel for our APEC activities.
9. Our ambitious attempt to promote wide-ranging regional cooperation
and foster the spirit of community in the Asia-Pacific will doubtless
encounter numerous new challenges and incur new responsibilities
despite, or perhaps because of, our economic growth. The Asia-Pacific
region's fast-expanding population and rapid economic growth are
forecast to sharply increase the demand for food and energy and the
pressures on the environment. We are agreed on the need to put these
inter-related, wide-ranging issues on our long-term agenda and consult
further on ways to initiate joint action so as to ensure the region's
economic prosperity is sustainable.
Through our actions we affirm the vital importance of expanding and
strengthening the shared interests which are the foundation of APEC
and of forging relationships of trust among our peoples. We pledge to go
forward together to meet the challenges ahead.
(###)
ARTICLE 4
Joint Statement: Ensuring Peace And Stability in Northeast Asia
Secretary Christopher, Japanese Foreign Minister Kono, South Korean
Foreign Minister Gong
Released following trilateral talks, Osaka, Japan, November 17, 1995
1. The Foreign Ministers Gong Ro-Myung of the Republic of Korea
(R.O.K.), Yohei Kono of Japan, and Secretary of State Warren Christopher
of the United States (U.S.), participating in the 7th APEC Ministerial
Meeting, held talks on the overall situation in Northeast Asia on
November 17, 1995, in Osaka, Japan.
2. The three Ministers shared the view that close consultation,
cooperation, and coordination among the R.O.K., Japan, and the U.S. have
become ever more important to ensure peace and stability in Northeast
Asia including the Korean Peninsula.
3. The Ministers also agreed that the three countries would continue to
closely coordinate their policies toward North Korea in order to
encourage North Korea's increased opening to and dialogue with the
outside world and the improvement in inter-Korean relations. In this
regard, the three Ministers decided to maintain close consultation on
the ministerial as well as senior official-level to further strengthen
the trilateral cooperation. In this context, they decided to hold the
first senior-level meeting next January.
4. The three Ministers welcomed the progress that has been made in
implementing the Agreed Framework during its first year, particularly
the maintenance of the nuclear freeze. At the same time, they expressed
concern over the delay in North-South dialogue. They exchanged views
concerning the negotiations between the Korean Peninsula Energy
Development Organization (KEDO) and North Korea concerning the light
water reactor supply agreement. They affirmed that continued concerted
efforts by the three countries, in cooperation with other countries, are
essential to successfully implement the Agreed Framework.
5. The three Ministers reaffirmed that the continued presence and
engagement of the United States is essential to ensure peace, stability,
and prosperity in the region.
6. Ministers also expressed satisfaction with the fact that they were
able to reconfirm, through these trilateral policy talks, their
commitment to make joint efforts for the reduction of tension in the
Korean Peninsula and the strengthening of the groundwork for
peaceful reunification of the two Koreas through improvement in the
inter-Korean relationship.
(###)
ARTICLE 5
Fact Sheet: Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation
Background
The Asia-Pacific region, comprising some of the most dynamic economies
in the world, has experienced unprecedented growth in the last two
decades. Economic relations among economies of the region also have
increased dramatically, fueled by growing trade and financial flows.
Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) was established in 1989 to
better manage the effects of growing interdependence in the Pacific
region and sustain economic growth. Originally, APEC was an informal
group of 12 Asia-Pacific economies. In November 1991, APEC admitted
China, Hong Kong, and Chinese Taipei. In November 1993, Mexico and Papua
New Guinea joined. Chile joined in November 1994, bringing membership to
18.
APEC provides a forum for discussing a broad range of important regional
economic issues. The APEC chair rotates annually among members and is
responsible for hosting the annual ministerial meeting. Foreign and
economic ministers from the members first met in Canberra, Australia, in
November 1989. Since then, annual ministerial meetings have been held in
Singapore, Seoul, Bangkok, Seattle, Jakarta, and Japan. Upcoming
ministerial meetings will be held in the Philippines (1996), Canada
(1997), and Malaysia (1998). Japan hosted periodic lower-level meetings
throughout 1995 to lay the groundwork for the ministerial meeting.
U.S.-APEC Relations
The United States works closely with members of APEC, which is an
important part of U.S. engagement in the Asia-Pacific region. President
Clinton has underscored that the United States is "committed to making
[APEC] a vehicle for liberalization in the region."
In 1994, U.S. trade with Asia and the Pacific was more than $424
billion, 70% more than trade with Western Europe. U.S. foreign direct
investment in APEC member economies was more than $200 billion in 1994,
about 33% of total U.S. foreign direct investment.
APEC Progress
APEC has grown from an informal dialogue group to a more formalized
institution that involves all major economies of the region: China, Hong
Kong, and Chinese Taipei joined APEC in 1991; APEC established a
permanent secretariat in Singapore in September 1992; and, at the
November 17-19, 1993, ministerial meeting in Seattle, Mexico and Papua
New Guinea joined APEC. In Seattle, ministers also agreed to the
Declaration on an APEC Trade and Investment Framework and action plan,
set up the Committee on Trade and Investment, and extended the non-
governmental Eminent Persons Group's mandate to develop proposals to
effect its long-term recommendations and vision for Asia-Pacific
regional economic cooperation.
APEC economic leaders, meeting on Blake Island near Seattle on November
20, 1993, set forth a vision which recognizes that in the post-Cold War
era:
We have an opportunity to build a new economic foundation for the Asia-
Pacific that harnesses the energy of our diverse economies, strengthens
cooperation, and promotes prosperity.
The leaders also:
-- Called for a successful conclusion to the Uruguay Round of the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade;
-- Called on APEC to expand its economic dialogue and advance its work
program;
-- Agreed to convene a meeting of APEC finance ministers;
-- Asked business leaders to establish a Pacific Business Forum;
-- Asked APEC to strengthen its policy dialogue on small and medium-
sized business enterprises; and
-- Agreed to establish an APEC Education Program and a Business
Volunteer Program.
In Bogor, Jakarta, in November 1994, APEC economic leaders reached
agreement on strengthening economic cooperation within the region for
the purpose of strengthening the open multilateral trading system,
enhancing trade and investment liberalization in the Asia-Pacific
region, and intensifying Asia-Pacific development cooperation. Leaders
also announced their commitment to achieve "free and open trade and
investment in the Asia-Pacific." All barriers to trade and investment
are to be dismantled before 2010 or 2020 by developed and developing
participants, respectively.
APEC's priority is to encourage market-oriented solutions to the
adjustment problems associated with quickly growing economies. APEC made
significant contributions to negotiations during the Uruguay Round and
is considering moves toward regional trade liberalization.
APEC Groups
APEC senior officials oversee 10 working groups, covering broad areas of
economic, educational, and environmental cooperation. In addition, APEC
has a Committee on Trade and Investment with customs and standards and
conformance subcommittees, and an Economic Committee. Following are the
working groups.
Trade and Investment Data. Develops consistent and reliable data in
merchandise trade, trade in services, and investment.
Trade Promotion. Develops proposals to exchange trade and industrial
information and to promote economic and trade missions among economies
of the region. Organizes international seminars and meetings to promote
trade, an Asia-Pacific trade fair, and a training course on trade
promotion.
Industrial Science and Technology. Promotes economic growth by expanding
technology flows and focusing on science and technology issues that
network potential partners together in the Asia-Pacific region.
Human Resource Development.
Seeks ways to exchange information among Asia-Pacific economies in such
areas as business administration, industrial training and innovation,
project management, and development planning. In this working group, the
United States hosted an APEC education ministerial in Washington, DC, in
August 1992 and sponsors the APEC Partnership for Education Program,
which promotes university partnerships among U.S. and Asian/South
Pacific universities, outreach and cooperative education activities, and
private sector training.
Energy Cooperation. Develops cooperative projects, such as a regional
database on energy supply and demand, and exchanges views on, among
other things, coal utilization, technology transfer, and resource
exploration and development.
Marine Resource Conservation. Exchanges information on policy and
technical aspects of marine pollution and advancement of integrated
coastal zone planning. Exchanges information on and develops
recommendations for dealing with red tide/toxic algae pollution
problems.
Telecommunications. Compiles annual survey on APEC telecommunications
development activities, including a description of each member country's
telecommunications environment. Explores ways to establish and develop
regional networks, initially by encouraging electronic data interchange.
Exchanges information on policy and regulatory developments in each
member's telecommunications sector. Disseminates a manual on how to
approach training in a telecommunications organization, followed by a
pilot project reviewing needs and recommending solutions in a selected
organization.
Transportation. Studies and recommends ways to improve infrastructure,
facilitate movement of passengers and freight, collect and exchange
data, and enhance transportation safety and security. This U.S.-led
working group is one of three added in March 1991. The United States
proposed it because of the importance of improved transportation links
to continued economic growth in the region. In June 1995, the United
States hosted an APEC transportation ministerial.
Tourism. Studies one of the region's most important industries, focusing
on tourism data exchange, barriers to expansion, training programs, and
current projects in APEC member economies.
Fisheries. Surveys the pattern of APEC fisheries cooperation to develop
fisheries resources. Reports on the role of APEC in coordinating and
complementing the work of existing organizations and promoting
cooperative relations among APEC participants.
Participating Economies
Australia
Brunei
Canada
Chile
China
Hong Kong
Indonesia
Japan
South Korea
Malaysia
Mexico
New Zealand
Papua New Guinea
Philippines
Singapore
Chinese Taipei
Thailand
United States
(###)
ARTICLE 6
Fact Sheet: U.S. Economic Relations With East Asia and the Pacific
Background
The East Asian and Pacific region is the world's most economically
dynamic area. Japan has become the second-largest economy and, with the
United States, one of the world's leading aid donors. The region's
newly industrialized economies (NIEs)--Hong Kong, Singapore, South
Korea, and Taiwan--have maintained high economic growth rates over the
last two decades. In the process, they have achieved "middle-income"
levels of per capita GNP and have become major participants in
international trade and investment. Thailand and Malaysia are fast
approaching development levels close to those of the NIEs.
Over the last decade, the East Asian and Pacific region has surpassed
Western Europe to become the largest regional trading partner of the
United States, both as a supplier of U.S. imports and as a customer for
its exports. In 1994, U.S. trade with the Pacific Rim countries was more
than $424 billion, 70% more than trade with Western Europe. American
direct investment in the region reached $108.4 billion in 1994, 18% of
total U.S. overseas investment.
The members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)--
Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and
Vietnam (Vietnam joined in July 1995)--combined are America's third-
largest source of imports and its fourth-largest export market. In 1994,
U.S. trade with ASEAN was $83.8 billion. In the preceding decade, total
U.S. trade with the ASEAN countries grew at an average annual rate of
13%. The United States is the leading export market for the Philippines,
Singapore, and Thailand and is the second-largest export market for
Malaysia. U.S. direct investment in ASEAN grew to $24.5 billion in 1994,
up 20% since 1993.
Transportation also links the United States more closely to East Asia
and the Pacific. In 1993, air traffic on Pacific routes overtook
Atlantic traffic on a passenger-mile basis. By the year 2000, the
Pacific market is projected to account for almost half of total
international traffic.
U.S. Support for Economic Reforms
The achievements of the successful Asian economies can be attributed
largely to market-oriented, outward-looking strategies of growth,
together with the high value that these societies traditionally have
placed on education, discipline, and hard work. The United States
contributes to this success and supports economic reforms by providing:
-- The principal market for the region's exports;
-- Leadership in promoting an open international trade and financial
system;
-- Economic assistance to the region's developing nations; and
-- A military security umbrella.
The Philippines and Indonesia have economic reforms underway that, if
sustained, will enable them to capitalize on their impressive potential.
Australia and New Zealand also are engaged in difficult economic
restructuring and trade liberalization efforts. Some Pacific island
nations are not yet fully participating in the region's economic
success. Implementation of market-oriented reforms has boosted the
economies of Laos and, to a lesser extent, Vietnam, but both countries
remain poor.
China experienced rapid economic growth during most of the 1980s and
1990s as it moved toward a more market-oriented system.
Trade Success and Imbalances
More than 36% of U.S. total trade is now conducted with the East Asian
and Pacific region. However, this dramatic expansion has been
accompanied by the development of large, recurring trade deficits with
some U.S. trade partners. In 1994, the United States had trade deficits
with Japan ($65.7 billion), China ($29.5 billion), Taiwan ($9.6
billion), and South Korea ($1.6 billion). The overall U.S. trade deficit
with the East Asian and Pacific region increased from about $103 billion
in 1993 to $119 billion in 1994. On the other hand, the United States
had a $6.6-billion trade surplus with Australia in 1994.
There is particular concern about the size of Japan's trade surplus. The
"Framework for a New Economic Partnership," concluded in 1993, has as
its goal a significant reduction in both countries' external balances.
In addition, the NIEs, particularly South Korea and Taiwan, also have
reduced import barriers to a limited extent. East Asian and Pacific
countries recognize that their growth and export successes require them
to bear a much larger burden for the health of the world economy.
Consequently, they are undertaking appropriate adjustments to help
correct international imbalances by:
-- Ensuring realistic exchange rates;
-- Lowering barriers to imported goods, services, and investment; and
-- Adopting macroeconomic and structural policies that encourage growth
through increased domestic demand as well as exports.
The United States, in turn, must maintain its efforts to reduce domestic
fiscal imbalances and to keep its import markets open.
On the positive side of the ledger, Japan is the largest market for U.S.
agricultural products, with $11.9 billion in 1993 in farm and forestry
products imports. Japan and South Korea are now taking steps to open
their rice markets. But these are only partial indications of the
realignment of traditional trading relationships that is taking place.
Services markets in Asia are expanding as regional economies reach new
levels of development, providing opportunities for U.S. firms. U.S.
sales to ASEAN grew 18% from 1992 to 1993 alone. In 1994, the United
States exported more to Singapore than it did to Saudi Arabia. More
American goods and services went to Malaysia than to Brazil that year.
Also, in 1994, U.S. exports to South Korea outstripped U.S. exports to
France. Finally, the Japanese economy has started a process of recovery
that should provide new momentum for the entire region.
Increasing Regional Cooperation
The United States has been working with East Asian and Pacific economies
for several years to strengthen regional economic cooperation. U.S.
officials have had extensive consultations with ASEAN, the Asian
Development Bank, the UN Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the
Pacific, the South Pacific Council, the South Pacific Forum, and the
Pacific Economic Cooperation Council. Many of the region's leaders
recently have called for more intensive consultation among the market-
oriented economies of the East Asian and Pacific region on macro-
economic issues, structural reform, and the health of the world trading
system. The U.S. played a key role in the formation of Asia-Pacific
Economic Cooperation (APEC), a regional forum based on those principles.
The United States works actively with its East Asian and Pacific
partners to promote APEC as a vehicle for regional economic cooperation.
At the invitation of then-Australian Prime Minister Hawke, the first
APEC ministerial conference convened in Canberra in November 1989. A
second ministerial meeting took place in Singapore in July 1990, leading
to the creation of work projects in various areas of interest to the
original APEC members. Since then, annual ministerial meetings have been
held in Seoul, South Korea; Bangkok, Thailand; Seattle, Washington;
Jakarta, Indonesia; and Osaka, Japan. Subsequent ministerials will be in
the Philippines (1996), Canada (1997), and Malaysia (1998).
(###)
ARTICLE 7
Human Rights in Vietnam
Steven J. Coffey, Acting Assistant Secretary of the Bureau of Democracy,
Human Rights, and Labor
Statement before the Subcommittees on International Operations and Human
Rights and on Asia and the Pacific of the House International Relations
Committee, Washington, DC, November 8, 1995
Mr. Chairman, I would like to thank you for the opportunity to be here
with you today to discuss how we are handling the issue of human rights
with Vietnam.
It goes without saying that few countries have elicited as much
passionate debate and soul-searching among the American people as has
Vietnam. Thus, it is appropriate that we approach this newest, and
promising, chapter in U.S.-Vietnam relations with our commitment to
human rights and freedom very much in mind.
The President's decision last July to normalize relations with Vietnam
came after long reflection and, above all, tireless effort by those who
have sought an accounting of the fate of American prisoners of war and
missing-in-action. Indeed, achieving the fullest possible accounting of
our American prisoners of war and missing-in-action will remain our
highest priority in our relations with Vietnam.
This, in turn, points to a deeper truth about our ties with Vietnam--
that we enter the future with enduring memories and feelings. We do not
forget for a moment that thousands of Americans gave their lives for the
cause of freedom in Southeast Asia. So the human rights concerns that
attend our foreign policy today have special resonance when dealing with
Vietnam. This is why our human rights dialogue with Vietnam preceded
normalization and why the President is committed to pursuing an
improvement in Vietnam's human rights practices.
I can assure you that human rights is very much on our minds as we
broaden bilateral ties with Vietnam. One indication of this fact is that
since assuming the position of Acting Principal Deputy Assistant
Secretary for human rights a month ago, I have devoted more time to
Vietnam than to any other subject.
Our dialogue with Vietnam on human rights issues dates to February 1994,
when the President first initiated a dialogue with the Vietnamese in
order to formally and systematically address our human rights concerns.
Our bureau was assigned primary responsibility for the dialogue--working
with the East Asia and Pacific Affairs Bureau--and held second and third
rounds in August 1994 in Washington and in May 1995 in Hanoi. Just two
weeks ago, on October 30, we held the latest round--the first since
normalization.
My experience in this latest round reinforced my belief that the
establishment of formal diplomatic ties will enhance our ability to
pursue our goals of improving Vietnam's human rights practices. Our
principal message to the Vietnamese has been that we seek progress in
all areas of our relationship, including human rights, and that human
rights will affect the warmth and depth of bilateral relations.
We are encouraged by the emphasis placed by the Vietnamese themselves on
establishing a civil society based on the rule of law. Our human rights
dialogue and other forms of engagement that support these efforts will
ultimately benefit the Vietnamese people. In fact, as economic
liberalization has progressed in Vietnam, we have seen the beginnings of
potentially hopeful trends.
-- Government intrusiveness into the daily lives of the populace has
decreased.
-- The government has made some progress in developing a legal
structure, although much remains to be done.
-- Within narrow boundaries, the government has allowed and even
encouraged serious press debate and criticism, particularly on
corruption issues and government mismanagement.
-- Citizens also have greater freedom to travel and change their
residences and to engage in economic activities than in the recent past.
Human Rights in Vietnam Today
Notwithstanding these promising beginnings, Mr. Chairman, there is no
getting around the fact that the Vietnamese Government still severely
limits civil liberties, particularly freedom of expression, association,
and religion. Nor does the one-party state currently permit open
political debate.
The government continues to monitor the activities of Vietnamese
citizens, particularly those suspected of engaging in political or
religious activities outside those approved by the government. In order
to control dissenting voices, the government also continues arbitrarily
to arrest and detain persons for the peaceful expression of opposing
views. Our estimates indicate that 200 and perhaps as many as 1,000
Vietnamese citizens have been imprisoned for such peaceful activities,
including well-known political dissidents such as Professor Doan Viet
Hoat, Dr. Nguyen Dan Que, and Doan Thanh Liem.
Some recent events confirm this overall assessment. On August 12, the
Vietnamese Government tried and convicted nine pro-democracy activists,
including American citizens Nguyen Tan Tri and Tran Quang Liem, for
planning a pro-democracy conference in Ho Chi Minh City in November 1993
Several days later, six Buddhist clerics were tried and convicted for
participating in flood-relief efforts and other activities sponsored by
the Unified Buddhist Church of Vietnam--UBCV.
These developments are particularly disappointing in light of Vietnam's
recent efforts to broaden its ties internationally.
U.S. Human Rights Efforts
As you know, Mr. Chairman, we normalized relations with Vietnam four
months ago. We cannot expect comprehensive change overnight. As else-
where in the world, the realization of the Vietnamese people's human
rights is a work in progress which will require steady and long-term
effort on our part and, of course, on theirs. We are committed to seeing
this process through.
While our dialogue is the principal mechanism for us to raise human
rights issues, human rights also figures prominently in all contacts
between U.S. and Vietnamese officials. As Secretary Wiedemann made
clear, human rights was highlighted in Secretary Christopher's meetings
with Vietnamese officials in Hanoi and in his major speech to Vietnamese
students there. I personally--and numerous other U.S. Government
officials, including Secretary Christopher--have conveyed the message
that the American people will be paying close attention to the
government's human rights practices. We believe the Vietnamese
leadership understands that progress on human rights is necessary in
order to achieve the kind of warm bilateral ties both our governments
seek. As part of the process of expanding economic relations, we will
initiate a dialogue on worker rights in order to collect more
information and identify areas where further progress can be made. We
intend to move forward in this area of our relationship in a carefully
phased approach, consistent with U.S. statutory requirements.
While we would like to see fundamental changes in Vietnam in the short
term, such progress is highly unlikely. However, through candid
dialogue, we have begun the process of establishing benchmarks by which
we can measure progress toward positive change. By agreeing to conduct
the human rights dialogue, the Vietnamese have acknowledged the fact
that human rights will remain an important part of our bilateral
relationship. We will continue to press our concerns on all issues,
including those where near-term progress is difficult. I would, at this
point, Mr. Chairman, like to turn to some specific issues that are
particularly salient in our human rights engagement with Vietnam.
U.S. Citizens Tri and Liem
The release last Sunday of American citizens Nguyen Tan Tri and Tran
Quang Liem was a welcome step. Their release came after several months
of serious efforts by U.S. Government officials to resolve these cases
favorably. Following Secretary Christopher's October 3 meeting with
Vietnamese Foreign Minister Cam, we were assured that the two Americans
would be released as a humanitarian gesture in the interests of
improving relations. In follow-up conversations, we pressed the
Vietnamese to act promptly.
Although the Vietnamese Government contends the activities of Mr. Tri
and Mr. Liem were unlawful and their arrest and subsequent conviction
justified, we wholeheartedly disagree. From the information available to
us, these two Americans did nothing other than enter Vietnam. No
meetings were ever held, papers produced, or demonstrations planned.
Despite these differences of opinion, Vietnam's decision to release Mr.
Tri and Mr. Liem is an indication that both sides can come together to
resolve difficult issues.
I would add the observation that our diplomatic presence in Hanoi, as a
result of normalization, helped this process immensely, enabling us to
conduct regular prison visits, meet with government officials, and
monitor legal proceedings. These activities are essential in order to
protect the rights of American citizens, and we must have the resources
to carry out these tasks.
Mr. Chairman, I also want to assure you that we have not forgotten the
seven Vietnamese citizens who remain imprisoned for involvement with Mr.
Tri and Mr. Liem. We intend to continue to press the Vietnamese to
release all prisoners of conscience.
Legal Reform
Mr. Chairman, the Vietnamese Government's stated desire to move toward
the rule of law affords a good opportunity to address the arbitrariness
and lack of transparency in the legal system. It is in Vietnam's
interest to bring its laws into conformity with international standards-
-both for the maintenance of a stable and just society and because the
lack of a consistent, clear legal system deters the prospective
investors and entrepreneurial spirit the country's economy so urgently
needs. Thus far, Vietnam has expressed interest in cooperating on legal
reform efforts and is currently receiving assistance from the
Governments of Canada, Australia, France, and others. One American legal
expert is currently posted to Vietnam under the auspices of the UN
Development Program, working with the Ministry of Justice. IRI is active
on these issues as well.
Of particular concern to us are the ambiguities within the legal code
that can be used to arrest individuals involved in the peaceful
expression of dissenting views. The Vietnamese Government has not yet
taken action to address these provisions in the criminal code.
Arbitrary Detention and Prison Access
In our human rights dialogue, we have raised the issue of arbitrary
detention and prison access and explained that the arbitrariness of the
legal system is fundamentally incompatible with Vietnam's stated goal of
establishing the rule of law. There have been some helpful steps. In
December 1994, the SRV allowed the UN Working Group on Arbitrary
Detentions to visit Vietnam. Earlier in the year, it also allowed an
Australian delegation to visit prisons.
We have urged the SRV to adopt the recommendations of the UN Working
Group, including allowing the Working Group to return to Vietnam. The
Vietnamese have assured us that the recommendations are currently under
consideration.
Religious Persecution
Mr. Chairman, the Vietnamese Government has, in recent years, taken a
number of steps to relax restrictions on freedom of worship. However,
the government continues to restrict the activities of religious
organizations.
Indeed, tensions between the government and the Unified Buddhist Church
of Vietnam have heightened since 1992. We have, on numerous occasions,
expressed to Vietnamese authorities our serious concerns about the
treatment of the leaders of the UBCV. Six Buddhist monks, including the
Venerable Thich Quang Do, were convicted of "sabotaging the solidarity
policy." According to the information available to us, these monks were
engaged in peaceful activities, including flood relief efforts in
November 1994. We have also urged the government to allow an independent
observer to meet with the Venerable Thich Huyen Quang in order to
confirm his status. The government denies he is being held under house
arrest.
Similarly, the dispute between the government and the Vatican over
Vatican appointments is unresolved, and the government continues to
maintain restrictions on other activities of the Protestant and Catholic
churches including the right to assemble, speak, and teach. To date, we
have made little headway on this issue but intend to keep trying through
more coordinated efforts with interested parties.
Conclusion
As I think I have demonstrated, Mr. Chairman, we are engaged on human
rights in Vietnam and are pursuing these concerns with the government.
Through the cultivation of civil society and the rule of law, and what
we hope will be expanded bilateral ties, we will continue to work to
resolve these outstanding issues, both in the near term and in the
longer term. The release of Mr. Tri and Mr. Liem is one clear example of
what can be achieved through dialogue, mutual understanding, and a
commitment to strengthen bilateral ties.
Our human rights issues in Vietnam do not differ substantially from
those issues over which we contend with a number of countries. We do
believe that normalization has afforded us new channels in and through
which to advance human rights in Vietnam, the world's eighth most-
populous country. And in so doing, we may help pursue our shared goals
of enabling the people of Vietnam to live in freedom and dignity.
(###)
ARTICLE 8
U.S. Leadership and the Balkan Challenge
Deputy Secretary Talbott
Remarks at the National Press Club, Washington, DC, November 9, 1995
Thank you, Bud [Karmin]. And thanks to all of you for the chance to be
here today. I have been to many of these events over the years, and I am
glad to return for the first time in an official capacity. I do so to
discuss with you the American effort to bring peace to the former
Yugoslavia. Let me begin with an update on the Dayton talks.
I was out there on Monday to meet with Dick Holbrooke's team, with Carl
Bildt and the Contact Group, and with the leaders of the parties to the
conflict. Most of the draft documents that comprise the overall peace
agreement are now in the hands of the parties. Those include detailed
constitutional and territorial proposals for a future Bosnian state, a
separation-of-forces agreement, a plan for national elections, and an
agreement on the return of refugees. There are, every day, numerous,
intensive meetings on virtually every aspect of the prospective
settlement. President Tudjman returned to Dayton last night. We hope to
use his presence to make some progress on the problem of Eastern
Slavonia. Secretary Christopher will be going to Dayton tomorrow to
provide further high-level support for the process.
That's it. The lid is back on until about this time tomorrow, when you
can tune in with Nick Burns for your next glimpse into what we are
trying, for solid diplomatic reasons, to keep as tightly under wraps as
possible.
What I would like to do now is step back and look at the larger question
of what's at stake in Dayton. That means having a clear sense of the
consequences for our country and for the world if the talks were to fail
and the Balkans were to be plunged back into war. Then I would like to
look ahead to the challenge we will face if the Dayton talks succeed.
Many of you have pointed out that the Administration has a tough job of
persuasion here on the home front--up on the Hill but beyond the Beltway
as well. We know it. It is not self-evident to the American people why a
conflict nearly 5,000 miles from here matters enough to justify a heavy
investment of our treasure, prestige, and military resources.
So let me start right there. Bosnia matters to Americans because Europe
matters to America. War in Bosnia threatens the peace of Europe--
particularly, though not exclusively, those parts of Europe that are
emerging from Soviet-era dictatorships. And that means it threatens the
transatlantic community of which we are a part--and of which we are a
leader.
The conflict in the Balkans is a direct consequence of the end of the
Cold War. During that nearly half-century-long struggle, we were
concerned about the spread of communist order. Now that the Cold War is
over, we face a very different threat: the spread of post-communist
disorder.
That danger exists in part because of where the former Yugoslavia is. It
is on a fault line between East and West, between Europe and Asia. If
warfare breaks out anew and continues unabated, it could suck in other
nations to the north, south, and east. Albania could intervene to
protect the ethnic Albanians who live in the southern Serbian province
of Kosovo. Fighting there could cause a massive flow of refugees into
Macedonia, destabilizing that fragile, newly independent country and,
perhaps, drawing in, on opposite sides, Greece and Turkey. A widening of
the war might also tempt Hungary to come to the rescue of ethnic
Hungarians in the Vojvodina region of northern Serbia.
Meanwhile, the entire Islamic world is watching. Muslims everywhere are
waiting to see whether their co-religionists in Bosnia will be accorded
the same rights and protections as other Europeans. The answer to that
question could have an impact on the future of moderate, pro-Western
leaders such as Prime Minister Ciller of Turkey and Prime Minister
Bhutto of Pakistan. Other forces in the Middle East and Persian Gulf see
the Balkans as a target of opportunity. Iran's repeated offer to send
"peacekeepers" to Bosnia is hardly motivated by altruism.
Then there is the fate of NATO. A continuation of the war would threaten
the viability of an organization that is vital to us and to Europe. If
we were to adopt a posture of standing aside with our fingers crossed
behind our backs, we would harm our bilateral relations with Britain,
France, and other allies that have troops on the ground in Bosnia. We
would also discredit the alliance as a whole and our role in it.
Another point: If the fighting in Yugoslavia resumes--and if it
escalates and spreads--it would put increasing strain on relations
between the United States and Russia, and it would do so at a time of
ferment and uncertainty in Russian domestic politics. In short, a new
eruption of fighting in the Balkans would undermine our twin strategic
objectives in Europe. Those are, first, to advance integration between
East and West and, second, to restrain post-communist disintegration in
the East.
So those are the stakes. High stakes justify--indeed, require--bold
action. We must, of course, be hard-headed in assessing the costs and
risks that come with such action. But we must be just as tough-minded in
recognizing the costs and risks that we will incur if we choose
inaction--particularly inaction, or inadequate action, in the face of
atrocities like mass rape, concentration camps, massacres, and forced
deportations. As recently as August, the Bosnian Serb authorities in
Banja Luka made local Muslims wear special white arm bands and marked
their homes with white cloth, all as a prelude to "ethnic cleansing."
That administrative euphemism, coupled with the deja vu of the arm
bands, makes clear what we have been up against in Bosnia: In a word--
and it is the right word--it is genocide in our time, genocide on the
continent of Europe.
At issue here is not just an outrage against humanity but a challenge to
American interests and American leadership. Far-away peoples look to us
and count on us not just because of our economic strength and the power
of our armed forces, but also because of what we stand for--and what we
are prepared to act against.
Taking decisive action in the Balkans has been especially difficult.
There were, for a long time, severe limits on what the international
community could do to make peace until the parties themselves were
prepared to do so. But there is no question what is required today. It
is a combination of diplomatic skill and the credible threat of force to
keep the parties at the negotiating table, and that means keeping them
from returning to the battlefield--not to mention the killing fields. It
also means putting an end to genocide and bringing to justice the
perpetrators of crimes against humanity.
That is why we fully support the work of Judge Richard Goldstone and the
United Nations War Crimes Tribunal. We have dispatched 23 officials of
our government to work as prosecutors and researchers for the Tribunal,
and we are fighting on Capitol Hill to preserve its funding. We are also
making an energetic, systematic effort to provide the war crimes
investigators and prosecutors with the facts they need to do their work.
Even when relevant information comes from intelligence or other
classified sources, we will find a way to get it to Judge Goldstone in a
timely and useful manner. John Shattuck, our Assistant Secretary for
human rights, is now traveling across Bosnia. This is his fourth trip
there in two months. His mission is to mobilize the full resources of
the U.S. Government in the investigation of atrocities and to gather
additional material that we will provide to the Tribunal.
Let me add that all of us recognize the crucial, sometimes heroic role
that the press has played in informing the world about the horror in the
Balkans. You, like we, have lost colleagues. Even with a cease-fire in
place, covering the situation remains dangerous, as we were all reminded
by the ordeal of David Rohde. In talking to Mr. Rohde yesterday,
President Clinton and Secretary Christopher made it clear that we intend
to hold Serb officials to their commitments that Western journalists as
well as Western diplomats will have access to the suspected sites of
human rights violations.
The War Crimes Tribunal has already issued 46 indictments, including
three more this morning, and Judge Goldstone, who will be in Washington
next week, has told us to expect dozens more to come soon. We have made
it clear that no indicted war criminals will be involved in
negotiations, in the signing of agreements, or in subsequent elections.
The peace process will not impede the investigation of atrocities or the
prosecution of those responsible. Indicted war criminals like Dr.
Karadzic and General Mladic should recognize that amnesties and
immunities are not on the table in Dayton or anywhere else. If we or any
other responsible members of the international community apprehend them,
they will get a quick, one-way trip to the courtroom at Churchill Plein
#1 in The Hague.
Let me say a few more words about "ethnic cleansing" in the Balkans and
why that phenomenon, by that or any other name, is not only an issue
of moralpolitik, it is also an issue of realpolitik. Even when the
phrase ethnic cleansing means "merely" mass deportation rather than mass
murder, it captures the essence of what is most insidious--and most
contagious--about the catastrophe that has befallen the former
Yugoslavia.
Too many leaders of those republics-turned-independent-states have tried
to define statehood, citizenship, and international boundaries in terms
of ethnic homogeneity and ethnic purity. Hence the dream of Greater
Serbia, which is a nightmare for all non-Serbs, whether they live in
Serbia proper or amid ethnic Serbs in neighboring states.
Equally unacceptable is the idea of an ethnically "pure" Croatia that
would deny the legitimate rights of Croatian Muslims and Serbs. We have
given President Tudjman a clear, unambiguous message, and we have given
it to him in Dayton as well as in Zagreb: If Croatia wants the benefits
of membership in the community of market democracies--if it wants to
enjoy international respectability--then it will have to ensure the non-
Croats in its population have the full rights and protections of
citizenship. Our support for Croatia is contingent on Croatia's
continuing support for the Bosnian Federation. Moreover, we will, along
with our allies, do everything we can to discourage the irredentist
fantasies of any leader in the Balkans. I stress this point because if
aggressive nationalism triumphs in the former Yugoslavia, it will not
only be devastating in that region--it will be ominous elsewhere as
well, especially to the north and to the east.
Throughout the former Soviet empire, dark forces similar to those that
have convulsed the Balkans are vying with those of freedom and tolerance
to fill the partial vacuum left by the collapse of communist rule.
Just to cite one example: The lethal syndrome we often call
Balkanization could just as well be termed Caucasusization. The peoples
of Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Armenia have suffered in much the same way
as the people of the Balkans. If there is to be a post-Cold War peace in
Europe--and not a cold peace, but a real one--it must be based on the
principle of multi-ethnic democracy.
The United States is one of the first and one of the greatest examples
of that principle. What' s more, the civic behavior and constitutional
structures associated with pluralism are conducive to regional peace and
international trade. Hence, it is in our interest that multi-ethnic
democracy ultimately prevails in Europe and elsewhere.
Can those values and institutions ever take hold in the former
Yugoslavia? I realize there is a lot of skepticism if not cynicism on
that point. Many assert, or at least imply, that the conflict among
Serbs, Croats, and Muslims is, quite simply, insoluble; that the region
is a permanent and hopeless quagmire--a word intended to have, in our
ears, cautionary echoes of Vietnam. Listen carefully and you will
sometimes hear in the current debate a hint that there is something in
the air or the water of the Balkans that dooms those wretched people to
slaughter each other. That is often the subliminal message, I believe,
of the cliche about "ancient hatreds."
Having lived in Yugoslavia for two years--and having seen how the South
Slavs could live harmoniously with each other--I find this view wrong-
headed in the extreme. There was nothing predestined about the horror
that has been raging in the Balkans for the past four years. It was
foolish, demagogic local politics, along with short-sighted
international diplomacy, that helped trigger, in the late 1980s and
early 1990s, the third Balkan war of this century.
By the same token, it will take sound, far-sighted diplomacy, including
plenty of American leadership and statesmanship, to head off a
resumption and escalation of that war now. That task will be hard enough
without encumbering ourselves with the excess baggage of historical, not
to mention ethnic, determinism.
Let us remember, as we put our shoulder to the wheel in the Balkans,
that patience and persistence have paid off in other areas that were
long believed to be in the "too hard" category--the Middle East,
Northern Ireland, and South Africa. There is hope for the former
Yugoslavia, too.
Why is that hope realistic today when it seemed so forlorn only a few
months ago? President Clinton has pressed for the vigorous use of NATO
air power as a necessary component of peacemaking since the early days
of his presidency. But it took 2 1/2 years for the pieces of the puzzle
to come together in a way that would permit that strategy to work.
The murderous Serb capture of Srebrenica in early July was a turning
point. It moved the international community to take a quantum leap in
what it was willing to do to protect the United Nations-designated safe
areas and to punish continuing Serb aggression. At Secretary
Christopher's urging, the London conference in late July streamlined the
mechanism for backing diplomacy with real force: no more cumbersome
"dual key" arrangements; no more pin-prick air strikes.
Seizing the moment, President Clinton undertook a new diplomatic
initiative. Secretary Christopher, Tony Lake, and Dick Holbrooke worked
the diplomatic front. Meanwhile, U.S. and NATO warplanes, no longer
grounded by the dual key, reinforced much more convincingly than before
the message that the time had come to stop the killing and start talking
about the terms for a lasting political settlement.
Since then, our negotiating team has made real progress. The parties
have accepted the continuation of Bosnia-Herzegovina as a single, multi-
ethnic state within its current, internationally recognized borders.
Within that state, the parties have agreed that there will be two
constituent entities. That arrangement will, we believe, make it
possible for fratricidal passions to cool. The people of Bosnia need
time to recover from the disintegration that they have been through--
and to rediscover first the possibility, then the advantages, of
integration.
If--and it is still a big "if"--the Dayton talks succeed and the three
heads of state agree on a peace settlement, then the tough work of
implementation will begin. There, too, the United States must lead. That
means we must be willing to send troops. Let me walk you through the
logic of why that is true.
After four years of brutal war, there is, to put it mildly, little trust
left among the different communities in Bosnia. Peace will require an
armed international presence to give the parties the confidence that
they need to carry out the settlement and to begin the long, hard work
of rebuilding and living together again.
Only one organization can enforce a peace, and that is NATO. Both the
parties to the conflict and our NATO allies have made clear that they
are counting on significant U.S. participation in the implementation
force. Without our being there, the force as a whole won't be there, in
which case there will be no peace, and we will face the array of
consequences I have outlined here.
Let me stress, as President Clinton did again yesterday in meeting with
congressional leaders, two points: first, the implementation force will
be deployed only if the parties agree to a real peace; and second, the
force will be militarily formidable. It will be capable not only of
defending itself but also of compelling the parties to the peace
agreement to live up to the commitments embodied in the peace
settlement.
We believe that 12 months is a reasonable period of time for the
implementation force to accomplish its mission. While this will be a
NATO-led operation, other nations, not members of the alliance, will
also participate. So far, more than a dozen states, including Poland,
Hungary, the Czech and Slovak Republics, Ukraine, and Pakistan, have
expressed an interest in contributing.
So has Russia. Yesterday, Bill Perry and Pavel Grachev, his Russian
counterpart, met in Brussels to hammer out the details of a joint
operation. It will represent the most concrete example of U.S.-Russian
military cooperation in the post-Cold War era. It is welcome in its own
right and also as a precedent for the future--a future in which we hope
that Russia and the U.S., and for that matter Russia and NATO, will find
numerous ways to work together in building an undivided Europe.
Let me conclude by expanding on that last point: The conflict in the
former Yugoslavia has gone on for far too long; it has been the cause of
far, far too much carnage, too much misery, too much frustration, too
much tension between us and our partners--old and new. All of us wish
that something like the Dayton talks could have taken place a year ago,
better yet two years ago--better still three or four. But we are where
we are, and we must make the best of what we have before us today.
What we have today is an opportunity, far from certain and still fraught
with danger but, nonetheless, real, to turn Bosnia from a synonym for
past failures and an evil portent for the future into something
positive. Bosnia could yet turn out to be a demonstration, however
belated, of international resolve to meet the first major challenge to
the collective security of post-Cold War Europe.
Taking advantage of this opportunity and passing this test will require
steadfastness in our diplomatic efforts and in our military commitment.
But success will also require public and congressional support. And to
muster and sustain that support, we had better have the best possible
answers to the toughest possible questions--starting with yours right
now.
Thank you very much.
(###)
ARTICLE 9
New U.S.-EURATOM Agreement For Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation
Statement by Department Spokesman Nicholas Burns, Washington, DC,
November 7, 1995.
A new Agreement for Cooperation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy
between the United States and the European Atomic Energy Community
(EURATOM) was signed November 7 in Brussels, Belgium.
The United States Representative to the European Union, Ambassador
Stuart E. Eizenstat, signed the agreement on behalf of the United
States. Mr. Christos Papoutsis, EU Commissioner for Energy, and Sir Leon
Brittan, Vice President of the European Commission, signed the agreement
on behalf of the commission.
The new agreement provides an updated, comprehensive framework for
peaceful nuclear cooperation between the United States and EURATOM,
seeks to facilitate such cooperation, and provides for strengthened
controls reflecting our shared strong commitment to nuclear non-
proliferation.
The U.S. Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 (NNPA) establishes
specific requirements for agreements of this type. The new U.S.-EURATOM
agreement satisfies all NNPA requirements.
Upon its entry into force, the agreement will replace a U.S. agreement
with EURATOM dating from 1958 and an additional U.S. agreement with
EURATOM that entered into force in 1960 and will expire on December 31,
1995. It also will replace existing bilateral U.S. agreements with EU
member states Austria, Finland, Portugal, Spain, and Sweden.
The new agreement has an initial term of 30 years and will continue in
force indefinitely thereafter in increments of five years until
terminated in accordance with its provisions. In the event of
termination, key non-proliferation conditions and controls will remain
effective.
The new agreement provides to EURATOM (and reciprocally to the United
States) advance, long-term approval for specified enrichment,
retransfers, reprocessing, alteration in form or content, and storage of
specified nuclear material in a manner that is compatible with U.S. non-
proliferation policies and statutory requirements. The approval for
reprocessing and alteration in form or content may be suspended if
either activity ceases to satisfy criteria set out in the agreement,
including criteria relating to safeguards and physical protection.
The advance, long-term approvals reflect the Administration policies,
set forth in President Clinton's Non-Proliferation Policy Statement of
September 27, 1993, aimed at improving the climate of cooperation with
and providing greater certainty for the civil nuclear programs of
countries and groups of countries with unquestioned nuclear non-
proliferation credentials. Associated with the agreement is a joint
declaration on non-proliferation policy, which elaborates in detail the
strong commitment to nuclear non-proliferation shared by the two
parties.
Importance of the Agreement
The United States believes that the new agreement will promote important
U.S. non-proliferation and other foreign policy interests. Among the
benefits expected to accrue to the United States from the agreement are
the following.
-- Renewal and strengthening of political and economic bonds with U.S.
friends and allies in Europe at a time when new challenges threaten
global security in the post-Cold War era.
-- More effective cooperation with European partners in preserving and
strengthening the international nuclear non-proliferation regime,
support of which is a fundamental objective of U.S. national security
and foreign policy.
-- Substantial upgrading of U.S. controls over nuclear items subject
to previous U.S. agreements with EURATOM as well as over future
cooperation.
-- Reaffirmation of the U.S. intention to be a reliable nuclear trading
partner, thus helping to ensure the continuation and possible growth of
U.S. civil nuclear exports to the countries of EURATOM.
Negotiation and Approval
The new agreement was negotiated by the Department of State with the
technical cooperation and assistance of the Department of Energy and in
consultation with the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. Also, it was
reviewed by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, which recommended that
the President approve it.
President Clinton approved the new agreement and authorized its
execution by Presidential Determination No. 96-4, dated November 1,
1995.
Now that the agreement has been signed, the President, as required by
Section 123 of the U.S. Atomic Energy Act, will submit it to Congress
for a review period of 90 continuous session days. The new agreement may
be brought into force at the conclusion of this statutory congressional
review period unless a joint resolution of disapproval is enacted.
During the interval between expiration of the present U.S.-EURATOM
agreement December 31 and entry into force of the new agreement, it will
not be legally possible to issue U.S. licenses for the export of nuclear
material and equipment to EURATOM countries except those covered by the
bilateral agreements remaining in force. Nevertheless, accumulated days
of continuous session may be carried over into 1996, and the gap in
agreement coverage is expected to be brief and manageable.
(###)
ARTICLE 10
Treaty Actions
Multilateral
Arbitration
Convention on the recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral
awards. Done at New York June 10, 1958. Entered into force June 7, 1959;
for the U.S. Dec. 29, 1970. TIAS 6997; 21 UST 2517.Accession: Bolivia,
Apr. 28, 1995.
Chemical Weapons
Convention on the prohibition of the development, production,
stockpiling, and use of chemical weapons and on their
destruction, with annexes. Done at Paris Jan. 13, 1993. [Senate] Treaty
Doc. 103-21(1).
Ratifications: Algeria, Aug. 14, 1995; Austria, Aug. 17, 1995; Ecuador,
Sept. 6, 1995; Japan, Sept. 15, 1995; Poland, Aug. 23, 1995; South
Africa, Sept. 13, 1995.
Children
Convention on the rights of the child. Done at New York Nov. 20, 1989.
Entered into force Sept. 2, 1990(2).
Ratification: Swaziland, Sept. 7, 1995.
Narcotics
Single convention on narcotic drugs, 1961. Done at New York Mar. 30,
1961. Entered into force Dec. 13, 1964; for the U.S.June 24, 1967. TIAS
6298; 18 UST 1407.
Protocol amending the single convention on narcotic drugs, 1961. Done at
Geneva Mar. 25, 1972. Entered into force Aug. 8, 1975. TIAS 8118; 26 UST
1439.
Accession: Uzbekistan, Aug. 24, 1995.
United Nations convention against illicit traffic in narcotic drugs and
psychotropic substances, with annex and final act. Done at Vienna Dec.
20, 1988. Entered into force Nov. 11, 1990. [Senate] Treaty Doc. 101-4.
Accessions: Saint Lucia, Aug. 21, 1995; Uzbekistan, Aug. 24, 1995.
Prisoner Transfers
Convention on the transfer of sentenced persons. Done at
Strasbourg Mar. 21, 1983. Entered into force July 1, 1985. TIAS 10824.
Ratification: Ireland, July 31, 1995.
Property
Convention establishing the World Intellectual Property Organization.
Done at Stockholm July 14, 1967. Entered into force Apr. 26, 1970; for
the U.S. Aug. 25, 1970. TIAS 6932; 21 UST 1749.
Accession: St. Kitts and Nevis, Aug. 16, 1995.
Red Cross
Protocol additional to the Geneva conventions of Aug. 12, 1949, and
relating to the protection of victims of international armed conflicts
(Protocol I), with annexes. Done at Geneva June 8, 1977. Entered into
force Dec. 7, 19782.
Protocol additional to the Geneva conventions of Aug. 12, 1949, and
relating to the protection of victims of non-international armed
conflicts (Protocol II). Done at Geneva June 8, 1977. Entered into force
Dec. 7, 19782.
Accession: Cape Verde, Mar. 16, 1995; Zambia, May 4, 1995.
Ratification: Honduras, Feb. 16, 1995.
Refugees
Convention relating to the status of refugees, with schedule and annex.
Signed at Geneva July 28, 1951. Entered into force Apr. 22, 1954 (2).
TIAS 6577.
Protocol relating to the status of refugees. Done at New York Jan. 31,
1967. Entered into force Oct. 4, 1967; for the U.S. Nov. 1, 1968. TIAS
6577; 19 UST 6223.
Accession: Antigua and Barbuda, Sept. 7, 1995.
Terrorism
Convention on the safety of United Nations and associated personnel.
Done at New York Dec. 9, 1994(1).
Signature: Bolivia, Aug. 17, 1995.
Ratification: Ukraine, Aug. 17, 1995.
Weapons, Conventional Convention on prohibitions or restrictions on the
use of certain conventional weapons which may be deemed to be
excessively injurious or to have indiscriminate effects, with annexed
protocols. Adopted at Geneva Oct. 10, 1980. Entered into force Dec. 2,
1983; for the U.S. Sept. 24, 1995. [Senate] Treaty Doc. 103-25.
Protocol on non-detectable fragments (Protocol I) to the
convention on prohibitions or restrictions on the use of certain
conventional weapons which may be deemed to be excessively injurious or
to have indiscriminate effects. Adopted at Geneva Oct. 10, 1980. Entered
into force Dec. 2, 1983; for the U.S. Sept. 24, 1995. [Senate] Treaty
Doc. 103-25.
Protocol on prohibitions or restrictions on the use of mines,
booby-traps, and other devices (Protocol II) to the convention on
prohibitions or restrictions on the use of certain conventional weapons
which may be deemed to be excessively injurious or to have
indiscriminate effects. Adopted at Geneva Oct. 10, 1980. Entered into
force Dec. 2, 1983; for the U.S. Sept. 24, 1995. [Senate] Treaty Doc.
103-25.
Protocol on prohibitions or restrictions on the use of incendiary
weapons (Protocol III) to the convention on prohibitions or restrictions
on the use of certain conventional weapons which may be deemed to be
excessively injurious or to have indiscriminate effects. Adopted at
Geneva Oct. 10, 1980. Entered into force Dec. 2, 1983 (2)
Ratifications: Ireland, Mar. 13, 1995; South Africa, Sept. 13, 1995.
Women
Convention on the elimination of all forms of discrimination against
women. Adopted by the UN General Assembly Dec. 18, 1979. Entered into
force Sept. 3, 19812. [Senate] Ex. R, 96th Cong., Sec. Sess. Accessions:
Eritrea, Sept. 5, 1995; Fiji, Aug. 28, 1995; Malaysia, July 5, 1995;
Uzbekistan, July 19, 1995; Vanuatu, Sept. 8, 1995.
Ratification: Lesotho, Aug. 22, 1995.
Convention on the political rights of women. Done at New York Mar. 31,
1953. Entered into force July 7, 1954; for the U.S. July 7, 1976. TIAS
8289; 27 UST 1909.
Accession: Uganda, June 21, 1995.
Bilateral
Armenia
Postal money order agreement. Signed at Yerevan and Washington June 28
and Aug. 3, 1995. Entered into force Sept. 1, 1995.
Cambodia
Investment incentive agreement. Signed at Phnom Penh Aug. 4,1995. Enters
into force on date on which Cambodia notifies the U.S. that all legal
requirements have been fulfilled.
Dominican Republic
Postal money order agreement. Signed at Washington and Santo Domingo
Aug. 6 and 14, 1995. Entered into force Sept. 1, 1995.
Ecuador
Agreement amending the agreement of Oct. 15, 1993, concerning the
protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights. Signed at
Quito July 28, 1995. Entered into force July 28, 1995.
Estonia
Agreement to treat the agreement of June 19, 1995, among the States
Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty and other States participating in
the Partnership for Peace regarding the status of their forces as
binding. Effected by exchange of notes at Tallinn July 14 and 18, 1995.
Entered into force July 18, 1995.
Agreement extending the agreement of June 1, 1992, concerning fisheries
off the coasts of the United States. Effected by exchange of notes at
Tallinn Mar. 11 and May 12, 1994. Entered into force Sept. 1, 1995.
Finland
Agreement relating to scientific and technological cooperation, with
annexes. Signed at Washington May 16, 1995. Entered into force Aug. 27,
1995.
France
Technical exchange and cooperation agreement in the field of light water
reactor safety research, with appendices and annex. Signed at Rockville
and Fontenay-aux-Roses Apr. 25 and May 22, 1995. Entered into force May
22, 1995.
Haiti
Agreement regarding the consolidation, reduction, and rescheduling of
certain debts owed to, guaranteed, by or insured by the United States
Government and its agencies, with annexes. Signed at Port-au-Prince,
Aug. 7, 1995. Entered into force Sept. 7, 1995.
Hong Kong
Agreement extending the agreement of Nov. 23, 1990, as extended,
concerning the confiscation and forfeiture of the proceeds and
instrumentalities of drug trafficking. Effected by exchange of letters
at Hong Kong July 3 and 10, 1995. Entered into force July 10, 1995;
effective Jan. 18, 1996.
Korea
Arrangement for the exchange of technical information and cooperation in
regulatory and safety research matters, with addenda. Signed at
Rockville June 5, 1995. Entered into force June 5, 1995.
Lithuania
Agreement concerning temporary application of agreement of
June 19, 1995, among the States Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty and
the other States participating in the Partnership for Peace regarding
the status of their forces. Effected by exchange of notes at Vilnius
July 20 and 25, 1995. Entered into force July 25, 1995.
Mexico
Temporary exchange stabilization agreement, with annexes. Signed at
Mexico and Washington Jan. 2 and 4, 1995. Entered into force Jan. 4,
1995.
Namibia
Memorandum of understanding concerning scientific and technical
cooperation in the earth sciences, with annexes. Signed at Reston and
Windhoek July 27 and Aug. 23, 1995. Entered into force Aug. 23, 1995.
Nicaragua
Agreement among the United States and the Government of
Nicaragua/Central American Business Administration Institute regarding
the assumption, payment, and discharge of certain debts. Effected by
exchange of notes at Managua Aug. 28, 1995. Entered into force Aug. 28,
1995.
Agreement regarding the consolidation and rescheduling of certain debts
owed to, guaranteed by, or insured by the United States Government and
its agencies, with annexes. Signed at Managua Aug. 28, 1995. Enters into
force following signature and receipt by Nicaragua of written notice
from the U.S. that all necessary domestic legal requirements have been
fulfilled.
Senegal
Agreement regarding the consolidation, reduction, and rescheduling of
certain debts owed to, guaranteed by, or insured by the United States
Government and its agencies, with annexes. Signed at Dakar Aug. 28,
1995. Enters into force following signature and receipt by Senegal of
written notice from the U.S. that all necessary domestic legal
requirements have been fulfilled.
Sweden
Agreement relating to participation in the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission program of severe accident research. Signed at Rockville and
Stockholm Jan. 10 and Apr. 24, 1995. Entered into force Apr. 24, 1995;
effective Jan. 1, 1994.
United Nations
Agreement regarding the furnishing of defense articles and defense
services by the United States to the United Nations for purposes of
supporting the Rapid Reaction Force established pursuant to United
Nations Security Council Resolution 998. Effected by exchange of notes
at New York July 28, 1995. Entered into force July 28, 1995.
_____
1 Not in force.
2 Not in force for the U.S.
(###)
[END OF DISPATCH VOLUME 6, NUMBER 47]
(###)
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