U.S. Department of State Dispatch 
Volume 6, Number 39, September 25, 1995 
Bureau of Public Affairs 
 
 
ARTICLES IN THIS ISSUE: 
 
1.  Resources for Leadership--Secretary Christopher 
2.  South Asia After the Cold War: India and Pakistan--Robin L. Raphel 
3.  Assessing the Progress of Haitian Democracy--James F. Dobbins 
4.  Fact Sheet: U.S. Proposals To Improve the Landmines Protocol of the 
Convention on Conventional Weapons 
 
 
 
ARTICLE 1: 
 
Resources for Leadership 
Secretary Christopher 
Statement at the Council on Foreign Relations, Washington, DC, September 
20, 1995 
 
Thank you, Pete, for that kind introduction. I want to say that I have 
great admiration for you and the many contributions you have made in 
your public and private sector careers. In the last decade, no one has 
done more to alert the country to the urgency of tackling the federal 
budget deficit. I had the honor of serving under you as Vice Chairman of 
the Council--but our real affinity, of course, comes from our shared 
prairie roots--Pete's from Nebraska and mine from North Dakota. Even 
though we both ended up in tall buildings in big cities, there were 
certain advantages to growing up in the wide open spaces on the spine of 
America. 
 
As you know, I originally planned to talk tonight about the links 
between economics and our foreign policy. But this evening I have 
something much more immediate on my mind: the importance of American 
leadership and the need to have adequate resources to maintain it. Two 
areas that have been filling my hours this week--the former Yugoslavia 
and the Middle East--illustrate this need. Let me begin with a brief 
comment on each, before moving on to my central theme. 

As we all painfully know, a peaceful resolution to the conflict in the 
former Yugoslavia has eluded the international community for more than 
three years. But now--thanks to President Clinton's leadership and a 
renewed determination by the international community--we are moving 
forward on a diplomatic and military track that seems to be genuinely 
promising. 

Two months ago in London, we persuaded our allies that Serb attacks on 
safe areas would be met by substantial and decisive air strikes. Since 
then, you have seen our highly effective NATO action implementing that 
decision. Two weeks ago our negotiating team, headed by Dick Holbrooke, 
helped to convince the parties to accept the continuation of Bosnia as a 
single state within its current internationally recognized borders. 

Just 2 1/2 hours ago, the deadline for the Bosnian Serbs to move their 
heavy weapons from Sarajevo passed. Based upon conversations that I had 
earlier today with our military authorities and very recent information, 
I confidently expect that commanders in the field will say within just a 
few minutes that they have concluded that the Serbs have met that 
commitment. This means that the NATO bombing campaign can be suspended 
but only suspended so long as there is no threat to Sarajevo or other 
safe areas. 
 
Our negotiating team returned to Washington early this morning for 
consultations and instructions. In the next few days, they will resume 
their intensive shuttle diplomacy, seeking sufficient agreement on key 
issues to allow direct negotiations on a final settlement to begin very 
soon. 
 
Without our military capacity and the will to use it, we would still be 
facing a stalemate in Bosnia. At the same time, without diplomacy, 
military strength alone does not create the conditions that make lasting 
peace possible. Diplomacy and force, we are reminded again, are 
indivisible instruments of American power, whether in Europe or 
elsewhere around the globe. 
 
In the Middle East, American diplomacy has been indispensable to the 
success of Arab-Israeli negotiations. In recent days and weeks, we have 
been intensively involved behind the scenes in an effort to help Israel 
and the Palestinians reach agreement on the implementation of the second 
phase of the Declaration of Principles signed in Washington just over 
two years ago. 
 
The negotiations on the implementation of the second phase of the 
Declaration of Principles are an enormously complex undertaking 
involving redeployment of Israeli troops, security arrangements, 
elections, and the transfer of authority to the Palestinians on the West 
Bank. Little wonder that it has taken a little extra time to negotiate 
this agreement. The wonder is that the parties are overcoming such 
difficult issues and are close to an agreement. This agreement will 
reflect Israel's understandable security requirements and, for the first 
time, enable Palestinians throughout the West Bank to achieve control 
over the most fundamental aspects of their daily lives. Once again, the 
parties will look to us to play a central role in providing the support 
that can make real the promise of peace. 

Bosnia and the Middle East are just two examples of the complex 
conflicts we continue to face in the post-Cold War world. The progress 
made over the last few weeks carries a clear lesson: When the world 
faces tough challenges, very little can be accomplished without American 
leadership, and American leadership cannot be sustained on the cheap. 
 
As all of you know, the Council was founded seven decades ago to make 
the case for American leadership. In the wake of World War I and our 
retreat into isolationism, the first generation of Council members began 
to address one of the great challenges in our democracy: It began to 
construct a durable consensus for the proposition that commitments must 
be made and resources must be spent on behalf of a strong America and a 
better world. 
 
Now, with the end of the Cold War, we have unparalleled opportunities to 
advance our interests and our values. Everywhere I go around the world, 
America is called upon to provide direction and leadership. Open markets 
and open societies are ascendant on every continent, giving us great 
opportunities to enhance prosperity and stability. But this promising 
state of affairs will endure only as long as we work to sustain it and 
to build on it. We cannot wish into being the world we seek. 
 
Indeed, I believe that the importance of American leadership is a 
central lesson of this century. As a global power with global interests, 
retreat is not a responsible option for the United States. 
 
This remains a dangerous world. In the last few years, we have seen half 
a dozen armed conflicts in the former Soviet Union, territory that is 
still home to thousands of nuclear weapons. We have to be constantly 
vigilant to make sure that countries like Iraq and North Korea are 
denied weapons of mass destruction and prevented from menacing their 
neighbors. This imperative is underscored by the recent and clear 
confirmation that Saddam has sought to hide a massive biological weapons 
program. Terrorism and organized crime also threaten our safety, as well 
as the survival of new democracies. 
 
As we look at today's world, the President and I have great hopes but no 
illusions. Our budget reflects our understanding of the opportunities 
and threats we face, and it seeks the resources America needs to meet 
them. In a world without dangers, the recent congressional attempts to 
deny these resources might be more comprehensible. But in the real 
world, these actions would weaken America at a time when we must remain 
strong. 
 
As Pete Petersen has so often reminded us, our nation faces no greater 
challenge than to get our own economic house in order.  Since the early 
eighties, the deficit has constrained our ability to act and weakened 
our credibility with our allies and trading partners. In that vein, I 
view the President's deficit-cutting package of 1993 as one of our most 
important foreign policy achievements--one that has made us stronger 
around the world. 
 
The State Department has not been and should not be exempt from budget 
cuts. In fact, our international affairs spending has been reduced by 
45% in real terms in the last decade. Under my direction, we have cut 
1,300 jobs and reduced administrative expenses by 5% in two years. 
 
The American people rightly demand that we apply the most rigorous 
standards when we decide how to spend their tax dollars. At the same 
time, they have a fundamental expectation that their government will do 
what it must to protect America's security and prosperity. The President 
and I have therefore drawn a line: We will fight budgetary strictures so 
radical that they would damage our nation's interests and cripple our 
ability to lead. 
 
Regrettably, too many Members of the current Congress appear set on 
crossing that line. At every opportunity, the leaders of the new 
Congress call for American leadership. Yet, many would deny us the 
minimum resources that any administration would need to get the job 
done. If the Senate follows the levels approved by the Commerce, 
Justice, and State Appropriations Subcommittee, the State Department 
budget would be cut in one year by 20%--the largest single reduction in 
foreign affairs spending in American history. If these cuts remain, I 
will have no alternative but to recommend to the President that he veto 
the bill. 
 
Last November, on the day after the Congressional mid-term elections, I 
was in Seoul, Korea, on tthe first leg of a long trip through Asia. I 
believed then, as I do now, that the election was not a license to lose 
sight of our global interests, or of the need for bipartisanship in 
foreign policy. I therefore pledged that the United States would remain 
strong and steadfast in our commitments around the world. 
 
The bipartisan consensus on behalf of American engagement in the world 
has been a vital source of America's strength. Five decades ago, that 
consensus enabled Democrats like  Truman and Republicans like Vandenberg 
to come together to launch NATO and the Marshall Plan. A few years 
later, Dwight Eisenhower ran for President in part to put the Republican 
Party firmly--and he hoped permanently--on the side of global 
engagement. In the last two years, that bipartisan consensus withstood 
the forces of isolationism and protectionism to pass NAFTA and GATT, and 
it has sustained our support for reform in the former Soviet Union and 
for the Middle East peace process. 
 
I was heartened to see former President Bush's statement yesterday 
warning against "the voices of isolation," and New York Mayor Giuliani's 
criticism of "the potent strain of isolationism that once again is 
infecting our political discourse." I still hope that their view will 
ultimately prevail in the Congress. 
 
Bipartisanship has never precluded disagreement on matters of policy. 
But it does require agreement that we cannot protect our interests if we 
do not marshal the resources to stand by our commitments. We cannot have 
it both ways. Those who say they want a strong America have a duty to 
help keep America strong. And diplomatic readiness is our first line of 
defense--in large part so that we are not compelled to put our men and 
women in uniform in harm's way. Morale, equipment, and communications 
are no less important to our diplomats than to our soldiers. 
 
Regrettably, in the last few months, both Houses of Congress have put 
forward drastic proposals to slash the foreign affairs budget. The 
recent actions of the Senate Appropriations Committee pose perhaps the 
most immediate threat to our nation's interests. 
 
For example, the Senate appropriators would cut the State Department's 
basic operating budget by almost $300 million. This could force us to 
close some 50 embassies and consulates--the equivalent of every post in 
Asia or Africa. It could force us to consider widespread furloughs and 
layoffs, closing passport offices, and halting the modernization of our 
communications system that is so long overdue. 
 
One casualty would be the principle of universality in our 
representation abroad--the principle that there should be a U.S. mission 
in virtually every country. Universal representation was invaluable 
earlier this year, when more than 170 countries in the world from 
Albania to Zambia had an equal say in the extension of the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty and an equal need to be persuaded by American 
diplomacy. It is also essential when a crisis erupts in an unexpected 
place--whether in Burundi or Belarus--and when American citizens get 
into trouble abroad--and they do get into trouble in the darnedest 
places. 
 
Day in and day out, our ability to meet these challenges depends on our 
people in the field. They are the ones responsible for the arms control 
agreements in Ukraine and Russia. They are the ones who worked out the 
details of our intellectual property rights agreement with China, and 
who must ensure that it is enforced. They are the ones who have to 
convince the parties in Bosnia to choose peace--at grave risk, as we 
have seen, to their own lives. That's why I get so angry when I hear 
disparaging comments about diplomats in long coats, high hats, and 
limousines. 
 
Last year, the people at our posts abroad responded to almost 2 million 
requests for service from Americans overseas. We issued over 6 million 
passports--a record number. In the last few years, our people have 
helped American companies win billions of dollars in contracts. Our 
posts are also the operating platform for more than 38 other agencies, 
including the Defense, Commerce, and Agriculture Departments, the FBI, 
and the DEA. 
 
When Congress mandates deep and devastating cuts, I often wonder if they 
have given any thought to where in the world we should start retreating. 
Should we pull people from our embassies in the Middle East, at a 
critical time for the peace process? Should we close posts in Asia, the 
most dynamic market for our exports in the world? Should we prepare less 
for the next Western Hemispheric summit, ignoring the most dramatic 
march to democracy in the world? Had reductions of this magnitude been 
approved a few years ago, I wonder where the people on Capitol Hill 
would have chosen to cut back--from Haiti, from the Balkans, from 
Northeast Asia? 
 
One of the primary tasks of our diplomats is to prevent crises that 
would otherwise cost us dearly. Our Agreed Framework with North Korea, 
for example, which has frozen its nuclear program, is also saving us 
hundreds of millions of dollars right now. Without it, we would have 
been compelled to increase dramatically our forces in Northeast Asia. 
Yet, we are having a hard time getting Congress to approve $20 million 
to help implement the agreement, as our modest contribution alongside 
the billions, not millions, that South Korea and Japan are prepared to 
contribute. 
 
I am also determined to resist the drastic cuts that have been proposed 
in our obligations to international institutions. The Senate 
appropriators would slash our assessed contributions to international 
organizations by almost $400 million. These measures could affect our 
obligations to NATO. They would force us to cut support for the 
International Atomic Energy Agency, which is critical to our effort to 
ensure that countries like Iraq and North Korea do not become nuclear 
weapons states. They would hurt the World Health Organization, which is 
leading the fight against diseases like AIDS and Ebola. 
 
Our peacekeeping contributions would be limited to only $250 million. 
This would force the withdrawal of peacekeepers and monitors from vital 
trouble spots, including the Middle East. We recognize that peacekeeping 
has not always achieved its intended purpose. But just as surely, it has 
allowed us to advance our interests without forcing our troops to take 
all the risks or our taxpayers to foot all the bills. Without 
peacekeeping as a tool, we would be left with an unacceptable choice 
each time a crisis arose: a choice between acting alone and doing 
nothing. 
 
When we fail to pay our peacekeeping dues, we also compromise our 
ability to push for reform at the United Nations and other institutions. 
Far-reaching change is clearly needed. But we will not convince our 
allies to support our proposals if they think we are using reform as an 
excuse to avoid our obligations. We cannot reform and retreat at the 
same time. 
 
The Senate appropriators have also voted to cut the Arms Control and 
Disarmament Agency by more than 50%. As you know, we are at the verge of 
major breakthroughs in this area, including a Comprehensive Test Ban. 
Why would we choose this moment to decimate the resources we need to 
negotiate and verify such vital and complex arms control agreements? The 
Senate would also slash funding for the USIA and for international 
broadcasting, the voice of our values and one of the most cost-effective 
ways we have to project our influence. 
 
Let me add that these agencies--ACDA, USIA, as well as the Agency for 
International Development--have distinct missions that should be 
maintained. The issue here is resources, not reorganization. 
 
The cuts I have already described are compounded by other Congressional 
proposals, which, if enacted, would slash foreign assistance by almost 
$3 billion. This would devastate funding for multilateral development 
banks and for bilateral aid. 
 
I do not believe that President Eisenhower was wrong in calling foreign 
assistance America's "best investment." I do not think that every 
Congress elected since World War II was wrong in providing steady 
support to American diplomats in the field. I do not believe that every 
administration since the days of F.D.R. was wrong about the vital 
importance of international organizations. 
 
The budgetary proposals we have seen reveal, in my view, how short our 
historical memory is. They reflect a troubling lack of appreciation for 
what the United States has accomplished in the world in the last 50 
years--and how we have accomplished it. Very simply, cuts of the 
magnitude we face would represent a fundamental break with America's 
tradition of leadership. They are not responsible. The ability of this 
and every future President to protect American interests is at risk. 
 
In addition to the budget cuts, I should add that the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee is at this moment holding up 30 ambassadorial 
nominations. It is also refusing to permit a vote on two treaties--START 
II and the Chemical Weapons Convention--on which there is virtually 
unanimous agreement in the Congress. Taken together, the actions I have 
described this evening represent an unprecedented assault on the 
country's ability to carry out an effective foreign policy. 
 
I value the Council as a place for lively discussion and for healthy 
debate. But whatever disagreements we may have on specific policy 
issues, I ask you to consider this: If these cuts are made, in a few 
years we may not have the resources to conduct a foreign policy that is 
worth arguing about. And that would be a tragedy for the United States 
and for the world as well. 
 
Today, time is short. Each of us has to do a better job in defending the 
continuing need for American leadership. If we succeed, I hope we can 
get back to the debate we ought to be having--the debate about how to 
use America's strength, instead of whether we should be strong. Thank 
you.  

(###) 
 
 
 
ARTICLE 2: 
 
South Asia After the Cold War: India and Pakistan 
Robin L. Raphel, Assistant Secretary for South Asian Affairs 
Statement before the Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South Asian 
Affairs of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Washington, DC, 
September 14, 1995 
 
Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee: I am pleased to testify 
before you today on how the Administration looks at South Asia in the 
evolving post-Cold War era. 
 
In earlier testimony before this committee, I reviewed recent positive 
developments in South Asia--in foreign relations, in economic reform and 
growth, and in the strengthening of democratic institutions and respect 
for human rights. At the same time, we recognize there are bound to be 
bumps in the road ahead. Events in Karachi, Afghanistan, Sri Lanka, 
Kashmir, and elsewhere give cause for concern. The threats posed by 
nuclear and missile proliferation remain. Yet, while obstacles will 
inevitably emerge on the road ahead, momentum continues to build for 
progress. We must continue   to encourage our South Asian friends as 
they make the sometimes difficult transition to full democracy and open 
markets. Remaining engaged with South Asian countries is essential if we 
are to advance our key interests in regional stability and non-
proliferation. 
 
While each country in South Asia is important in its own right--I just 
returned from Sri Lanka and Bangladesh where both the achievements and 
the problems are impressive--I want to concentrate today on the region's 
two largest countries and long-time rivals, India and Pakistan. 
 
In building stronger relations with South Asia, we seek to break the 
zero-sum mind-set that has plagued Indo-Pakistani relations since 
partition and was reinforced by the global rivalries of the past 
decades. We are now working to build bilateral ties that stand on their 
own, freed from the complicated triangular equations that dominated the 
earlier foreign policy calculus. For decades, we viewed our relations 
with South Asian countries largely through the prism of our rivalry with 
the Soviet Union. Today, the United States emphasizes good relations 
with each, based on their intrinsic importance to the U.S. and the 
region. 
 
We continue to place a high priority on preventing the proliferation of 
weapons of mass destruction and missile delivery systems and preserving 
regional stability in South Asia. The U.S. can play a role in ensuring 
such stability--a role that has the potential to expand as India and 
Pakistan join us in realizing that relations among our three countries 
are not a zero-sum game. Strong and productive U.S. relations with both 
India and Pakistan serve not only important U.S. interests but also the 
cause of easing regional tensions. We will continue to use our influence 
in both countries to encourage economic development and better regional 
relations. 
 
India, the dominant regional power, will continue to grow in importance 
on the world stage. With its large population, growing economy, and 
technological prowess, India has the potential to be among the great 
world powers of the 21st century. Greatness implies a responsible 
approach toward international affairs. We applaud India's support of 
multilateral peace and development efforts and its continuing role as a 
leader among developing countries. It is also important for India, as 
the most powerful country in its region, to pursue good relations with 
its neighbors. 
 
Our relationship with India is increasingly broad and deep and holds 
great promise for future cooperation. In the economic area, in 
particular, both of our countries are benefiting from strong progress in 
trade and investment. We have initiated a regular dialogue with the 
Indian Government on security issues. Indeed, the U.S.-India Defense 
Policy Group is meeting in Washington this week to discuss expanded 
contacts between the U.S. and Indian militaries. We have been 
cooperating with India in developing the Indian Light Combat Aircraft 
and have an increasing share of the Indian market for military 
technology. 
 
Pakistan has been a valuable friend and ally of the United States for 
nearly five decades. It has been an important source for moderation in a 
troubled part of the world where religious extremism can threaten 
stability in the region and beyond. As Prime Minister Bhutto's speech in 
Beijing eloquently demonstrated, Pakistan is striving to uphold 
simultaneously principles of Islam and of secular democracy. Pakistan is 
a major contributor to peacekeeping operations around the world and has 
worked with us to combat terrorism and narcotics trafficking. 
 
Our efforts to work more closely with Pakistan toward our common goals, 
however, are hampered by the sweeping sanctions imposed under the 
Pressler Amendment five years ago. The Pressler sanctions ended all 
military and economic assistance to Pakistan, terminating many long-
standing and some highly successful programs. While the Administration 
strongly supports the amendment's goal of curbing Pakistan's nuclear 
weapons program, the legislation needs to be revised to fit current 
global realities and to better achieve our non-proliferation objectives. 
Of most immediate concern are the Pressler roadblocks to cooperation 
with Pakistan's Government in areas such as combating terrorism and 
furthering U.S. commercial interests in a lucrative market, where U.S. 
firms need OPIC insurance to level the playing field with their European 
competitors. Our ability to press key non-proliferation goals over the 
longer term has also been eroded by the Pressler Amendment. 
 
Pressler sanctions have also changed Pakistani perceptions of their role 
in the world. For most of the past 40 years, Pakistan's strong, Western 
orientation has been continually reinforced by a broad range of contacts 
with the United States. Five years of sanctions have cut off contacts, 
training, and cooperative projects that reinforced this orientation. No 
one should be surprised if Pakistani military officers and civilians 
look else- where for training and contacts, and for inspiration and 
friendship. Given its troubled neighborhood, Pakistan stands in danger, 
over time, of drifting in directions contrary to our fundamental 
interest and its own. 
 
Over the past year, we have had discussions with many in Congress about 
how to focus sanctions to pursue more effectively our key national 
security objectives, including our non-proliferation aims. This 
dialogue, and work by members of this committee, have resulted in a 
proposed initiative to lift sanctions that blocked progress in areas of 
our relationship unrelated to proliferation--economic and commercial 
growth, counter-terrorism, and professional development in the military. 
 
The problem remained, however, of final disposition of military 
equipment ordered by Pakistan prior to imposition of sanctions in 1990. 
This included 28 F-16 aircraft and about 370 million worth of other 
equipment. Three points of consensus emerged from our dialogue with 
Congress. 
 
1. The United States needs a productive, cooperative relationship with 
Pakistan. It is a large, moderate Islamic democracy in a troubled 
region. It has been an important partner in peacekeeping operations and 
a supporter of counter-terrorism efforts. Like other countries in the 
region, it faces threats from narcotics trafficking and ethnic strife. 
 
2. To preserve a central feature of the Pressler Amendment and avoid 
contributing to further tensions in the region, the U.S. should not 
deliver the controversial F-16 aircraft or resume an official military 
supply relationship with Pakistan. 
 
3. The United States should, however, resolve the fundamental unfairness 
of a situation where we have ended up with both Pakistan's money and the 
embargoed equipment. 
 
The status quo is clearly unacceptable. It is seen as unfair both in 
Pakistan and by many in the United States, and is an unhealthy irritant 
to bilateral relations. This irritation continues to erode our ability 
to work with Pakistan to achieve non-proliferation and other important 
goals. The status quo, unfortunately, offers few incentives for future 
cooperation or restraint by Pakistan--or by India, whose nuclear and 
missile programs are also of concern. Putting this issue behind us will 
permit a more normal and productive relationship between Washington and 
Islamabad, allowing for real progress on non-proliferation and other 
issues of concern to the United States. 
 
The President, therefore, decided to sell the F-16 aircraft to other 
countries and return the proceeds to Pakistan. Proceeds from sale of 
aircraft for which Pakistan paid national funds will be returned 
directly, while proceeds from sale of those aircraft financed by FMF 
loans will be credited to Pakistan's FMF account. 
 
In addition, the President is seeking authority from Congress to turn 
over to Pakistan the other $370 million in other, less controversial, 
equipment in the pipeline. Mr. Reidel will expound at greater length on 
the equipment involved in the context of the military balance in the 
region. 
 
The key impact of sanctions relief  is not military or financial. The 
effect would be primarily in the political realm, creating a sense of 
faith restored and an unfairness rectified with a country and a people 
who have been loyal friends of the United States over the decades. This 
is fully recognized by the Government of Pakistan, which knows we are 
not re-establishing a defense supply relationship. Indians who worry 
about the meaning of this step should also be reassured. 
 
Relations With Russia 
 
The Indo/Pakistan rivalry often spills over in their relations with 
countries outside of South Asia. India and Pakistan's relations with 
Russia are an obvious example, although there are others. Still a major 
buyer of military equipment, India has imported $3.5 billion in military 
equipment--primarily from Russia--since 1990, during which period 
Pakistan imported, from all sources, about $1.7 billion in arms. Russian 
sales to India are not necessarily a cause for concern, but provide a 
useful frame of reference in assessing the significance of the $370 
million in equipment that we seek to release to Pakistan. 
 
However, any Russian resumption of exports of nuclear power reactors or 
missile-related equipment and technology to India would be of concern. 
In 1992, we applied economic sanctions to the Russian space agency--
Glavkosmos--for the export of rocket engine technology to India. We have 
since reached agreement with Russia on an arrangement under which Russia 
terminated the transfer of technology in the rocket engine deal, and we 
lifted the sanctions on Russia. We have continued regular discussions of 
non-proliferation in South Asia with Russia, which shares many of our 
concerns. Russia's imminent membership in the Missile Technology Control 
Regime is another disincentive for it to provide missile-related 
assistance to India. 
 
With the end of the Cold War, Pakistan also has attempted to build a 
military supply relationship with Russia. However, in view of its close 
ties with India, Russia has so far refused to sell any military systems 
to Pakistan. 
 
Relations With Iran 
 
Iran is another country where India and Pakistan compete for influence. 
Both seek to maintain correct relations with Iran. They see Iran as a 
major regional player which is active in Afghanistan and Central Asia--
areas of great concern to both Islamabad and New Delhi. Both are also 
concerned about possible Iranian attempts to radicalize their Muslim 
populations. We would not accept this rationale as justifying efforts by 
either India or Pakistan to improve relations with Iran, but the 
rationale is similar in both cases. 
 
Pakistan and Iran share a common border and are wary neighbors, not 
strategic allies. There is no compelling evidence that they share any 
defense equipment. Their differing regional strategies can be seen in 
Afghanistan, where Iran and Pakistan support competing factions in the 
ongoing civil war. 
 
Questions have been raised about Pakistan-Iran nuclear cooperation  
as well as Iranian security cooperation with India. We are not aware of 
any Pakistani assistance to Iran's nuclear weapons program or 
significant Indian contacts with Iran's military, even following the 
recent visit of the Iranian President to India. It is clear that no 
South Asian state is interested in having another nuclear-capable 
neighbor. 
 
Relations With Central Asia And Afghanistan 
 
Pakistan has strategic and cultural reasons for wanting to play a 
constructive role in Central Asia, an area with which it has ties dating 
back centuries. As a moderate Islamic state, Pakistan is often seen as 
an alternative model to Iran in Central Asia. Pakistan has contributed 
to Central Asian stability in Tajikistan--using its ties to the Tajik 
opposition to promote an end to the conflict--recently by hosting talks 
between the rebels and the government in Islamabad. The Government of 
Pakistan has also played an important, if sometimes controversial, role 
in  Afghan affairs. 
 
The Bhutto Government has also sought to build closer ties with the 
Central Asian republics through the recently revived Economic 
Cooperation Organization, a trade organization originally formed in 1977 
by Pakistan, Turkey, and Iran, but which now includes the Central Asian 
states. It also has sought to build a gas pipeline from Turkmenistan 
across Afghanistan to Pakistan to supply its growing energy needs. 
Neither of these efforts has yet borne fruit, however. Ultimately, a 
stable, peaceful Afghanistan is a prerequisite for a prosperous and 
stable Central Asia. 
 
India has also sought to build its influence in Afghanistan and Central 
Asia, both as a counterweight to Pakistan and China and for long-term 
commercial reasons. India would like to keep Afghanistan from being a 
source of weapons and militants for the separatist violence in Kashmir. 
On the economic front, India is particularly interested in developing a 
land transport corridor through Iran to the Central Asian states and 
Russia. Indian traders and diplomats are increasingly active in the 
Central Asian states. 
 
Relations With China 
 
Pakistan's traditionally close relationship with China remains strong 
despite the gradual rapprochement between China and India. Pakistan 
particularly values its Chinese ties as a source of both moral and 
material support for its interests in the region. Prime Minister Bhutto 
has just returned from bilateral talks with senior Chinese leaders on 
the margins of the world women's conference in Beijing. 
 
Our concerns with aspects of the  bilateral security relationship are 
well-known; they involve Chinese support for Pakistan's nuclear weapons 
program, as well as the provision of missile-related items which would 
violate the missile export provisions of the Arms Export Control Act. 
The latter action prompted our imposition of Category II sanctions on 
both countries in 1993. 
 
We view India's improving relationship with China as a positive trend. 
Though a boundary dispute remains unresolved, confidence-building 
measures along the Indo-Chinese border and peaceful negotiations on 
disengagement suggest that this dispute will not block the world's two 
most populous states from becoming better neighbors. As Indo-Chinese 
ties improve, the reduced threat may make regional nuclear disarmament a 
more viable option and China's military relations with Pakistan less of 
an issue. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Mr. Chairman, I last testified before you six months ago. Since then, we 
have consulted closely with you and other members of the committee along 
with many other members of the Senate and House on how best to pursue 
U.S. interests in South Asia. I appreciate the interest you and they 
have shown and your commitment to providing the President with the 
legislative authority he needs to effectively achieve these objectives. 
I hope the next time I testify, it will be to report on the success of 
our efforts to advance our vital goals in South Asia, foremost among 
them halting nuclear and ballistic missile proliferation.   
(###) 
 
 
 
ARTICLE 3: 
 
Assessing the Progress of Haitian Democracy 
James F. Dobbins, Special Haiti Coordinator 
Remarks at daily press briefing, Washington, DC, September 19, 1995 
 
It has been a year today since U.S. forces entered Haiti at the head of 
a multinational coalition, with the objective of restoring Haiti's 
democratically elected government and assisting a transition to 
sustainable democracy. At the height of the U.S. military presence--
shortly after that initial deployment--there were over 23,000 American 
military personnel in Haiti. Today, there are 2,500 out of a total of 
6,000 UN peacekeeping troops and 800 UN civilian police drawn from 31 
countries 
 
In five months--that is to say, in February 1996--the mission of this 
peacekeeping force will be concluded. Our troops will return home, 
having successfully completed a complex and challenging operation. 
 
Completion of this operation has been keyed to two processes. The first 
of these is the disbanding of Haiti's old institutions of repression and 
the creation of a new professional civilian police force, along with the 
reform of its judiciary. The second process is that of democratic 
renewal and the constitutional transfer of power. This process involves 
the holding of local, municipal, parliamentary, and, finally, 
presidential elections, so that by the time the U.S. and other military 
forces leave Haiti next year, the entire Haitian Government structure--
from the lowest to the highest levels--will be renewed, based on a new 
exercise of democratic choice within the framework of the Haitian 
constitution. Both of these processes are proceeding at a pace that will 
permit us to meet the timetable which the United States and the United 
Nations have set for this peacekeeping operation.  

Last June, Haitians voted to elect 2,000 mayors and municipal and county 
counselors, thereby providing Haiti, for the first time in its history, 
with a comprehensive system of freely elected local government. Last 
Sunday, Haiti completed the second round in the election of members of 
its lower and upper houses of parliament. Like the June 25 vote, 
Sunday's balloting was peaceful. Unlike the June 25 vote, Sunday's 
balloting was more orderly and better administered. 
 
Later this year, Haitians will go to the polls again to elect the 
successor to President Aristide who will take office next February. 
Yesterday, President Aristide reconfirmed "beyond a shadow of a doubt" 
his personal commitment to this transfer of power. 
 
The second ongoing process to which the timing of the international 
peacekeeping effort has been tied is, as I have said, the disbanding of 
Haiti's old, corrupt, and repressive security institutions and the 
creation of a new professional civilian police force and the reform of 
the judiciary. This process is also very much on schedule. The Haitian 
army has been disbanded. Over half--that is to say over 3,000--of its 
members have been demobilized. Most of these individuals are currently 
completing a six-month program of vocational training. Something less 
than 3,000 former members of the Haitian army remain as members of the 
interim police force. Several hundred of these interim police are being 
demobilized each month, as new classes of the Haitian National Police 
are fielded. This demobilization will be completed by February. 
 
By that date, the Haitian National Police will have fielded at least 
5,000 new police officers. These young men and women have been selected 
in an open, rigorous, and competitive national process. They are 
receiving four months of intensive professional training in a program 
organized by the U.S. Department of Justice and taught by professional 
law enforcement officers from France, Canada, and the United States. 
 
The process of selection for the Haitian National Police has drawn on 
the best Haiti has to offer. Tens of thousands of young men and women 
have competed for entry. In a society where less than 25% of the people 
can read and write, the average educational level of the initial group 
of police cadets is two years of college. 
 
Alongside the Police Academy, we have also assisted the Haitian 
Government in creating a new Judicial Academy. American, French, and 
Haitian lawyers are providing instruction to Haitian judges and court 
administrators at this new institution. 
 
The duration of the peacekeeping operation in Haiti has not been tied to 
any particular level of economic performance. However, in connection 
with last year's restoration of democracy, Haiti has received a truly 
massive level of international assistance--to which the United States, 
incidentally, has committed less than one-fourth the total of $1.2 
billion which has been promised for 1995 and 1996.  As a result of this 
assistance and the reforms put in place by the Haitian Government, 
inflation has been halved--down from over 40% last September, when the 
U.S. troops arrived, to something under 20% today. Haitian currency has 
remained stable against the dollar. Economic activity, which fell by 25% 
in that country from 1992 to 1994, is now increasing at a rate of growth 
of 4.5% per annum. 
 
Needless to say, Haiti's economic renewal is at best tentative. Its 
democracy remains fragile, and its new security structures are 
inexperienced and untested. 
 
Business interest in Haiti as a site for investment is relatively high, 
but many investors are awaiting the results of the current electoral 
cycle. Those elections, particularly the June 25 balloting, were far 
from ideal. Brian Atwood, the leader of our Presidential Observer 
Delegation, cited in his statement of June 26 many of the problems his 
group encountered. I did the same in my testimony before the Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee on July 12. At the time, I also indicated 
that there were remedial steps which we believed needed to be taken. The 
Haitian electoral authorities have taken such steps, and the make-up 
balloting on August 13 and the second-round balloting last Sunday 
corrected most of the problems observed on June 25. We are continuing to 
urge further improvements in this regard, with a view to encouraging the 
broadest possible participation in Haiti's forthcoming presidential 
elections. 
 
The human rights situation in Haiti has improved dramatically over the 
past year. After three years of brutal repression, during which rape, 
torture, and murder were the routine instruments of governance, many 
expected the restoration of Haiti's legitimate government to be followed 
by a wave of retribution. Thanks to the professionalism of American and 
international forces--and thanks, particularly, to President Aristide's 
unrelenting campaign of reconciliation--nothing of the sort has 
occurred.  
 
In the three years preceding last September's deployment of U.S. forces 
to Haiti, international observers estimated that more than 3,000 men, 
women, and children were murdered by or with the complicity of Haiti's 
then-coup regime. In the year following the deployment of American 
forces, international observers assess that retribution and other 
political motivations may have been responsible, at the most, for one or 
two dozen of such deaths. Needless to say, even one such incident is too 
many. With our assistance, the Haitian Government is developing the 
professional police, the investigative capabilities, and the judicial 
structure necessary to enforce and maintain the rule of law. 
 
In short, the economic, political, and security situation in Haiti has 
dramatically improved since the deployment of U.S. and international 
forces a year ago today. These improvements are continuing at a pace 
which will permit the peacekeeping operation, begun a year ago today, to 
conclude on schedule in February of next year. 
 
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ARTICLE 4: 
 
Fact Sheet: U.S. Proposals To Improve the Landmines Protocol of the 
Convention on Conventional Weapons 
 
The United States is gravely concerned with the humanitarian tragedy of 
suffering and casualties to the civilian population resulting from the 
indiscriminate use of landmines. A key part of the U.S. strategy on 
landmines is to encourage substantial improvements in the substance and 
scope of the landmines Protocol of the Convention on Conventional 
Weapons (CCW), the only international legal regime that specifically 
regulates and restricts the use of landmines. A formal Review Conference 
will be held from September 25 to October 13, 1995 in Vienna to consider 
possible amendments. 
 
In particular, the U.S. is pressing for the following changes: 
 
-- The expansion of the scope of the Protocol, which is currently 
limited to international armed conflicts, to apply in internal armed 
conflicts, as well as during peacetime. It is in internal conflicts that 
the greatest civilian casualties occur. 
 
-- A requirement that all remotely delivered mines (those delivered by 
aircraft, rocket, or artillery) be equipped with self-destruct devices 
to ensure that they do not remain a danger to civilians long after the 
conflict is over. These mines would also have a backup self-deactivating 
feature (e.g., a battery that exhausts itself) to ensure that they do 
not detonate should the self-destruct device fail. 
 
-- A requirement that any anti-personnel landmines (APL) without self-
destruct devices and backup self-deactivation features be used only 
within controlled, marked, and monitored minefields. These minefields 
would be protected by fencing or other safeguards to ensure the 
exclusion of civilians. Such minefields could not be abandoned (other 
than through forcible loss of control to enemy military action) unless 
they were cleared or turned over to another state that had committed to 
maintain the same protections. APL self-destruct and self-deactivation 
features would have a specified maximum lifetime of 30 days from 
emplacement for self-destruct and 120 days for the self-deactivation 
feature, as well as a minimum required reliability. 
 
-- A requirement that all mines be detectable using commonly available 
technology to simplify the burden and risks of demining. 
 
-- A requirement that the party laying mines assume responsibility for 
them, including a duty at the "cessation of active hostilities" to clear 
them or maintain them in controlled fields to protect civilians. Where 
the party laying the mines no longer controls the territory in which 
they were laid, it would have a duty to provide assistance to ensure 
their clearance, to the extent this is permitted by the state in control 
of the territory in question. 
 
-- The addition of an effective verification mechanism, including the 
possibility of fact-finding inspections by a Verification Commission 
where credible reports of violations have been made. If violations are 
found to have occurred, there would be a possibility of reference to the 
UN Security Council for action, as well as individual criminal liability 
for persons who willfully or wantonly put the civilian population in 
danger. There must also be provision for protection against abuse of 
such a regime. 
 
-- The addition of a mechanism for more frequent consideration of the 
landmines protocol and for exchange of views on all aspects of the 
landmine issue. 
 
The U.S. looks to the Review Conference as an important opportunity to 
begin to solve the landmine crisis and welcomes inquiries and further 
opportunities to discuss these and other landmine-related initiatives 
and issues.   
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[END OF DISPATCH VOL 6, NO 39]
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